편집자 주 한미정상회담 개최 이후 북핵 문제 해결, 한반도의 항구적 평화정착에 대한 한미 간의 논의와 정책 조율이 가시화되고 있다. 한미 정상은 공동성명을 통해 판문점 선언과 싱가포르 합의의 기본 틀에 기초하여 외교적 방법을 통해 북핵 문제를 해결하겠다는 의사를 표명했다. 이에 전재성 EAI 국가안보연구센터 소장(서울대 정치외교학부 교수)은 북미간 신뢰구축, 미국의 대북 정책 위상 제고와 구체화, 중국의 적극적 협력 등 북핵문제 해결을 위한 북미 협상의 조건과 회담 재개 가능성을 검토한다.     2021년 4월 말 바이든 정부 대북 정책 리뷰의 골자가 발표되고 5월 21일 한미정상회담이 개최되면서 북핵 문제 해결, 한반도의 항구적 평화정착에 대한 한미 간의 논의와 정책 조율이 가시화되고 있다. 미국은 오바마 정부와 트럼프 정부의 과거 접근법의 문제점들을 극복하면서 실용적이고 단계적인 접근을 통해 차근차근 북핵 문제 해결의 실마리를 실무차원에서부터 찾아가겠다고 이야기하고 있다. 한국 정부는 2018년 북핵 문제 해결 과정에서 거둔 성과를 유지하려는 의지를 보였다. 그 결과 한미 정상의 공동성명에서 판문점 선언과 싱가포르 합의의 기본 틀에 기초하여 외교적 방법을 통해 북핵 문제를 해결하겠다는 의사를 표명했다.   현재로서는 바이든 정부의 대북 정책 리뷰의 전모를 알 수 없고 향후 발표계획이 있는지도 불명확하다. 그러나 이번 한미 정상회담에서 미국이 한국에 대해 기울인 외교적 노력을 보면서 미국과 상대국의 이익을 냉철히 계산하고 공통의 이익을 관철해나가려는 치밀한 접근법을 추구한다는 점을 알 수 있다. 미국은 동맹국과 국제사회의 의견을 수용하면서 북미 양측의 이익을 조율해 나가는 단계적이고 실무적인 노력을 기울일 것으로 기대할 수 있다. 북한은 현재까지 바이든 정부의 대북 전략의 전모를 파악하기 위해 관망의 태도를 유지하고 있다. 향후 북미 협상이 재개되는 조건은 무엇이며 회담의 재개 가능성은 얼마나 되는가.   북미 협상의 조건과 회담 재개 가능성   북한은 작년 7월 10일 김여정 담화를 통해 북미 간 대화재개의 조건을 명확히 밝힌 바 있다. 물론 트럼프 시대의 조건이지만 현재까지 다른 명확한 입장표명이 없기 때문에 향후 대화 재개 조건으로 참고할 수 있다. 김여정은 북한이 트럼프 대통령만을 상대하는 것이 아니라 미국 전체를 상대해야 하므로 미국 전체와의 신뢰구축이 중요하다고 말하면서 신뢰 구축의 조건으로 미국의 대북 적대시 정책 철회 움직임을 들고 있다. 대북 적대시 정책 철회에서 경제 제재 해제는 별다른 의미가 없다는 점도 명확히 하고 있다. 제재 해제가 대북 적대시 정책 철회의 내용을 담고 있는 신호가 아니면 경제적 실익 자체는 중요하지 않다는 것이다. 북한은 안보 대 안보의 교환조건으로 북한에 대한 체제보장을 위해 미국이 어떠한 고민을 하고 무엇을 제시할 수 있는지 지켜보고 있는 것이다.   이러한 입장은 2019년 2월 28일 하노이 회담의 결렬 사태와 연결되어 있다. 스티븐 비건 당시 대북 특별대표는 2019년 1월 31일 스탠포드 대학교 연설에서 하노이 협상에 대한 준비 상황을 논의하고 있다. 싱가포르 정상회담 이후 북미 간에는 비교적 일관된 대화의 채널이 마련되어 있었고, 북핵 문제에 대한 국제사회 전체의 관심과 지원이 있었기 때문에 북핵 문제 해결에 조심스러운 낙관론을 펴고 있었다. 미국은 북한의 핵무기와 운반수단, 더 나아가 모든 대량살상무기의 완전하고 검증가능한 폐기를 추구하지만, 시작은 영변시설이며 점차 모든 플루토늄과 우라늄 시설로 확장될 것을 북측으로부터 약속받았다는 것이다. 북한은 북핵의 완전한 폐기 이전에 일정한 시점에서 핵프로그램에 대한 완전한 신고를 하기로 했고 미국은 이에 상응하는 대가를 고민하고 있다고 지적하고 있다.   문제는 볼튼의 회고록에서 나타났듯이 비건의 협상안은 하노이 회담 직전 백악관 내에서 철저히 무시되었다는 점이다. 결국 하노이 회담은 결렬되었는데 향후 북미 협상이 재개되기 위해서는 이러한 전철을 다시 밟아서는 안된다는 것이 명확하다. 북한은 미국 대통령의 의사를 대변하지 못하는 대북 특사를 믿지 못하게 되었고, 북미 간에 중재역할을 자처한 한국 정부에 대한 신뢰도 거둔 상태이다. 북미 회담의 재개 조건을 북한 입장에서 생각해보면 소위 대북 적대시 정책 철회에 더해, 대북 특사의 권한, 한미 간의 긴밀한 조율에 기초한 한국의 대미 협상력 강화 등이 중요한 요인이 될 것이다. 또한 북미 협상이 재개되기 위해서는 바이든 대통령 뿐 아니라 미국 전체의 대북 적대시 정책 철회의 시그널이 있어야 하고, 협상 실무자가 대통령의 전적인 위임을 받아야 할 뿐 아니라 북핵 폐기에 상응하는 적절한 보상을 해야 한다는 점을 예상해 볼 수 있다.   바이든 대통령은 한미정상회담의 기자회견장에서 성 김 대사를 대북 특사로 임명하고 한국의 대표단 앞에서 전적인 권한을 위임하는 모습을 보였다. 또한 트럼프 정부와는 달리 바이든 대통령과 미국의 행정부는 완전한 체계를 가지고 대북 협상에 임할 것이기 때문에 대통령과 행정부, 의회 등의 정책 분열 등은 생각하기 어렵다. 결국 북미 간에 안보 대 안보의 조건을 충당할 수 있는 미국의 정책이 중요하게 된다. 한미 정상회담을 준비하면서 북핵 문제와 한반도 평화를 둘러싼 한미 간의 조율 상태도 고양되었다고 본다. 바이든 정부는 북핵 문제 해결책에 대한 동맹국들, 특히 한국의 입장을 존중하는 모습을 여러 차례 보였고 한국 정부 역시 미국의 정책 리뷰를 지지하는 언급을 한 바 있다. 북핵 문제 이외에도 동아시아 지역안보, 경제, 기술, 보건 등 한미 파트너십이 강화된 상황에서 한미 관계가 좀 더 긴밀해지고 이 과정에서 대북 정책 조율도 지속될 것으로 기대할 수 있다.   한편 미국의 입장에서 북한이 완전한 핵 폐기를 위해 노력하는 진정성이 보이지 않을 때 본격적인 대북 협상을 하기는 어렵다. 북한은 바이든 정부와 북핵 문제 해결의 최종 상태에 대한 합의를 한 적이 없으며 미국으로서는 트럼프 시대에 북한이 한 핵폐기 약속을 확인하지 않을 수 없다. 미국은 한미정상회담 공동성명에서 판문점선언과 싱가포르합의에 근거한 협상을 추구하겠다고 했지만 북한의 핵 폐기 의지가 확인되기 전까지 정상회담을 할 수 없다는 점도 명확히 했다. 당장은 완전한 핵폐기를 향한 북한의 의지를 확인하려는 미국과, 대북 적대시 철회의 증거를 보려는 북한 사이에서 줄다리기가 팽팽할 것이다.   북미 양자 간의 신뢰구축이 당장 이루어지기는 쉽지 않다. 상당 시간 동안 다양한 신뢰구축을 통해 북미 간 의미 있는 대화의 토대를 마련해야 한다. 한미 양국이 할 수 있는 노력으로는 우선 양국 간의 긴밀하고 일관된 정책 협의가 필요하다. 북한은 하노이 결렬 이후 한국 정부의 미국 설득 능력에 대해 심각한 회의를 표명해왔다. 미국은 한국 정부가 대북 제재를 약화시키면서 북한 설득에 나설 것을 우려하고 있다. 한국이 미국과 완벽한 정책 조율을 이룰 때 북한은 한국의 중재 노력을 보다 신뢰하게 된다. 또한 한국의 대북 관계 개선 노력, 남북 협력 사업에 대한 미국의 신뢰도 확보할 수 있다. 향후 한국 정부가 추구할 수 있는 대북 인도 사업이나 남북관계 개선 사업이 국제사회의 대북 제재 원칙을 지키면서도 북한과의 신뢰구축에 도움이 된다는 점을 미국이 확신할 수 있어야 한다.   둘째, 미국의 대북 정책이 높은 우선 순위와 구체성을 가져야 한다. 현재 바이든 정부의 우선 순위는 코로나 사태 극복과 국내 경제 회복, 특히 중산층의 회복이라는 것은 잘 알려진 사실이다. 외교정책에서도 중국, 러시아, 환경, 보건, 이란, 중동 사태 등 산적한 문제들이 많다. 북핵 문제는 이러한 문제들에 비해 우선 순위가 떨어지는 것이 사실이다. 미국이 북핵 문제를 심각하게 여기고 해결하려는 의지를 강화할 때 북한도 협상에 적극적으로 임할 것이다. 트럼프 정부는 북한이 핵을 포기할 경우 밝은 미래가 있다고 논하고는 했는데, 계획의 구체성이 없으면 북한을 설득하기는 쉽지 않다. 비건 대북 특별대표는 북한에 대한 미국의 지원책을 가능하면 상세하게 제시하려 했지만 역시 역부족이었다. 경제 제재 해제의 로드맵은 물론, 이후 북한의 자구책에 대한 미국의 계획이 구체적일 때 북한 체제 보장에 대한 신뢰도가 높아질 것이다.   미중 전략 경쟁과 북핵 문제의 분리 중요   북핵 문제 해결을 위해서 중국의 적극적 협력도 중요한 요소이다. 중국은 바이든 정부의 대북 정책 리뷰에 대해 특별한 입장을 표명하지 않고 있다. 바이든 정부는 환경, 보건문제와 함께 핵비확산을 중국과의 협력 이슈로 제시한 바 있다. 중국 역시 국제규범을 준수하는 강대국의 관점에서 북한의 비핵화라는 목적을 지지하고 있다. 문제는 미중 간 전략 경쟁이 점차 심해지는 가운데 북핵을 둘러싼 미중 간 협력이 확보될 수 있는가 하는 점이다. 비핵화 과정에서 북미 관계가 개선되고 비핵화 이후 북한의 대외정책 방향을 예상할 수 없게 되면 중국은 미중 전략 경쟁 속에서 더욱 경계심을 가지고 북핵 문제에 임할 가능성이 높다. 더욱이 이번 한미 정상회담에서 한미 양 정상은 남중국해와 대만에서 사실상 중국을 견제하는 내용을 공동성명에 포함시켰다. 한국이 중국을 견제하는 방향으로 한미동맹을 움직인다는 인상을 중국이 갖게 되면 북핵 문제에서 어떠한 입장을 취할지 알 수 없다. 대북 경제제재가 한미 양국의 대북 정책에 핵심적인 요소이기 때문에 중국의 제재 유지 여부가 매우 중요한 상황이다. 한미 양국은 외교적 노력을 통해 미중 전략 경쟁과 북핵 문제를 분리시킬 가능성을 유지하는 것이 중요하다.      ■ 전재성 - EAI 국가안보연구센터 소장, 서울대학교 교수. 미국 노스 웨스턴 대학교에서 정치학 박사학위를 취득하였으며, 국제정치학회장, 외교부 및 통일부 정책자문위원으로 활동하고 있다. 주요 연구 분야는 국제정치이론, 국제관계사, 한미동맹 및 한반도 연구 등이다. 주요 저서 및 편저로는 《남북간 전쟁 위협과 평화》(공저), 《정치는 도덕적인가》, 《동아시아 국제정치: 역사에서 이론으로》 등이 있다.     담당 및 편집: 표광민 EAI 선임연구원 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I ppiokm@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note 30 years have passed since North Korea’s then “nascent” nuclear program was identified as a “gravely serious threat.” Since 1991, its once budding nuclear program has amassed into a large-scale program, posing a grave challenge for the nuclear proliferation regime and regional security in Northeast Asia. In the following Global NK Commentary, Ben Forney, PhD candidate at the Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies, explains that international coordination efforts to deter North Korea from developing its nuclear weapons have been inconsistent and ineffective. Manifest in cable exchanges between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo and President George H.W. Bush’ solo enactment of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, unaccompanied by any consultation of his international counterparts, the US stance towards North Korea since 1991 has been contradictory and erratic. With the Biden administration facing a long list of domestic and international concerns not pertaining to the North Korean nuclear regime and the Moon administration’s difficulties into its final year, Forney asserts that prospects for meaningful progress on the North Korean nuclear issue seem bleak.     On August 13, 1991, the US State Department sent a classified diplomatic cable to Tokyo, summarizing the key points of a meeting held between US and South Korean officials the previous week. The topic of the meeting was North Korea’s nascent nuclear program. In the cable, the Japanese were informed of the threat this posed to the region and were encouraged to present unified opposition against Pyongyang’s increasingly defiant behavior. Thirty years later, it is a testament to the failure of the international community’s approach to North Korea that the language used in the cable remains relevant and repeated in current policy discussions.   “Both sides agreed that the development by North Korea of nuclear weapons usable materials posed a gravely serious threat to security in North East Asia[...] We agreed that we should exert maximum efforts diplomatically to find a solution to this problem[...] The importance of pressure from the broad international community was stressed[...] inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities by the IAEA should be devised to maximize pressure at each stage.” (emphasis added)[1]   As even the most casual North Korea watcher will recognize, variations of these phrases have been repeated by American administrations ever since. Policymakers have called the North Korean nuclear weapons program a “grave concern”[2], while “maximum pressure” remains a catchphrase for security establishment hawks.[3] At the same time, Washington continues to pursue unified collaboration with Seoul and Tokyo. Secretary of State Blinken recently emphasized the Biden administration’s intention to engage in “close cooperation and consultation with the Republic of Korea, with Japan and with other key partners, including resuming pressure options and the potential for future diplomacy”. [4]   However, this cable is most revealing not for its continued relevance to policymakers, but for the context in which it was written and the actions taken by the George H.W. Bush administration in the months following its release. The year 1991 saw the final collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the zenith of America’s “unipolar moment” of global dominance. It was during this brief period of optimism and relaxed tensions that President Bush enacted one of the largest unilateral disarmament initiatives in history. Known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), this policy saw the US withdraw most land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, remove strategic bombers from alert, and stand down portions of the ICBM program. Crucially, the PNIs were launched without guarantees of reciprocation from Russia or any other nuclear power. [5]   The president announced the PNIs on a primetime television address on September 27, 1991. The announcement was remarkable because, unlike most nuclear weapons policies requiring years of planning and multiple agencies, the PNIs went from idea to implementation in less than a month and involved few people outside a core group of administration security officials. [6]   US allies also had little warning that the announcement was forthcoming and had only a few opportunities to provide input. Nowhere was this more apparent than in South Korea, where the US stored approximately 100 nuclear warheads, down from around 540 in 1976. [7]   Just four days prior to his address, President Bush met with his South Korean counterpart Roh Tae Woo at a General Assembly meeting of the United Nations in New York. According to officials, the PNIs were not discussed in the meeting. The upcoming nuclear weapons withdrawals were only made known to the Roh administration via a secret exchange between US Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Korean National Security Advisor Kim Jong Hwi. In these talks, it was left ambiguous as to whether air-delivered nuclear weapons, which were housed at a US base in South Korea, would be included in the PNIs. [8]   When The Washington Post reporter Don Oberdorfer exposed this lack of consultation in an article on October 19th, the South Korean administration reacted with disappointment and frustration. It had just been announced that the air-delivered nuclear weapons would, in fact, be removed from the peninsula, and the Roh administration looked as if it had been forced into accepting a unilateral move from the US that the North would interpret as a weakening of US commitment to South Korean security. The timing was particularly sensitive, as a planned North-South meeting was just days away. Kim Jong Hwi, who was to be a member of the South Korean delegation, made his displeasure known to the American ambassador, Donald Gregg. Gregg immediately cabled Washington:   “Kim said that people in Seoul were ‘really concerned’ about the absence of specific pre-consultation [...] Kim caustically noted that non-consultation was ‘nothing new’ and cited earlier unilateral announcements on the closure of U.S. air bases in Korea. He also pointedly referred to the contrasting pattern of prior consultation with our European allies.”[9]   Uncoordinated Efforts Deemed Less Useful Than No Efforts – An Insight into Why the North Korean Nuclear Regime Remains a “Grave Concern".   Anxious to assuage Seoul’s concerns, Wolfowitz replied that “[...] we do take seriously any signal that could be erroneously interpreted by both the North and the South regarding the strength of our commitment” and promised to meet with Kim in the coming weeks. [10]Subsequent exchanges continued, culminating in President Roh’s November 8, 1991 Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This, in turn, led to the North-South Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on January 20, 1992.   The eventual collapse of the Joint Declaration and buildup of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities are too large a topic to discuss here, but the question remains: Between August and September 1991, why did the US advocate for maximum pressure on North Korea and close consultation with allies while secretly planning to deliver the greatest military concession to North Korea since the Korean War without informing Seoul?   In the optimism of the moment, the Bush administration hoped that a major concession like the unilateral removal of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula would encourage North Korea to abide by its IAEA obligations. The administration, however, had misread Pyongyang’s intentions at the time; this undercut the policy of united diplomatic action and maximum pressure described in the cable. It cleared the way for the North to be the sole possessor of nuclear weapons on the peninsula and weakened US leverage in future negotiations. Of course, one could argue that it was reasonable back in 1991 to assume that North Korea wanted to dismantle their nuclear program and integrate into the international community. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was about to lose its biggest benefactor and increasing engagement efforts from a democratic South offered the Kim Il Sung regime new avenues to relax tensions. If Pyongyang had reciprocated, the PNIs might be heralded today as the breakthrough arrangement that convinced North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.   Instead, US actions in 1991 are symbolic of the contradictory policies towards North Korea that it has pursued in the subsequent decades. Despite statements proclaiming US-ROK solidarity, administrations in Washington and Seoul are frequently out of step and even when they align, policymakers continue to confine themselves to ineffective “maximum pressure” campaigns or one-sided concessions that fail to change the calculus of the North Korean regime. Such was the case with President Trump’s 2017 threats of “fire and fury”, made just months after President Moon was inaugurated with the promise to improve inter-Korean relations. The following year, the summits between Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore and Hanoi and the 2019 trilateral meeting at Panmunjom, while rich in symbolism, bolstered Kim’s claims of legitimacy without requiring any reciprocity or change.   Perhaps President Bush could have been forgiven in 1991 for trying a tentative carrot and stick approach towards North Korea and for rushing through a symbolic piece of disarmament legislation that captured the spirit of the time. But after thirty years, many policymakers still do not accept that North Korea is too sophisticated at evading sanctions to succumb to loophole-ridden pressures and too ideologically entrenched to be enticed into fundamental reforms through concessions. This causes Washington and Seoul to engage reactively when Pyongyang raises and lowers tensions, hoping that the right balance of sanctions and summits will tempt the regime to denuclearize. The result is that policies continue to be inconsistent, both in application and duration. If Washington and Seoul want to present unified opposition to Pyongyang’s provocations, they must commit to coordinated, sustained, high-level engagement with the issue. But considering the Biden administration’s long list of domestic and international concerns, the myriad difficulties facing the Moon administration in its final year, and the underlying tensions in ROK-Japan relations, meaningful progress on the North Korean nuclear issue seems unlikely in the months ahead. ■      [1]“Telegram, State Department to Tokyo, etc., August 13, 1991, Subject: U.S.-ROK Hawaii Meeting on North Korea (Secret)” https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176666-Document-01-Telegram-State-Department-to-Tokyo. (See also “Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: The Next Steps in the North Korea Nuclear Issue, ca. September 1991 Secret/Eyes Only”https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176667-Document-02-Memorandum-for-Under-Secretary-of and “Paper, US-ROK Basic Positions, ca. August/September 1991, Secret (two versions: a and b)” https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176669-Document-03b-Paper-US-ROK-Basic-Positions-ca) [2]Alexander, David. “Obama says North Korea nuclear test a ‘grave concern.’” Reuters, May 25, 2009.https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-usa/obama-says-north-korea-nuclear-test-a-grave-concern-idUSTRE54O14220090525. [3] Byun, Duk-hyun. “U.S. must use maximum pressure to convince N. Korea it is safer without nukes: McMaster.”.. Yonhap News Agency, March 03, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210303000300325. [4] Pamuk, Humeyra and Shin, Hyonhee. “Blinken says U.S. weighs pressure, diplomacy on North Korea over denuclearisation and rights abuses.” Reuters, March 18, 2021.https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-asia-southkorea-idUSKBN2BA08D. [5] Fuhrmann, Matthew and Early, Bryan R. “Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.” Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 4, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 21–43. [6]Koch, Susan. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. National Defense University. 2012. Accessed at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA577537.pdf. [7] Woolf, Amy F. and Chanlett-Avery, Emma. “Redeploying U.S. Nuclear Weapons to South Korea: Background and Implications in Brief.” Congressional Research Service. Accessed at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44950.pdf. [8] Oberdorfer, Don. “U.S. Decides to Withdraw A-Weapons from S. Korea” The Washington Post, October 19, 1991.https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/10/19/us-decides-to-withdraw-a-weapons-from-s-korea/3759ee3f-e9bf-4944-bfdf-2f9ea727b546/. [9] “Cable, Amembassy Seoul 11234 to SecState, Subject: Further Korean Reaction to the [redacted] Initiative, October 21, 1991 (Secret)” https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176670-Document-04-Cable-Amembassy-Seoul-11234-to. [10] “Cable, Amembassy Seoul to Secretary of Defense, November 1, 1991, Subject: Consultations in Seoul, Secret” https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176672-Document-06-Cable-Amembassy-Seoul-to-Secretary. [11] Bush, George H. W., et al. A World Transformed, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1998. [12] Koch, 2012. [13] Bush, 1998. p. 545.     Ben Forney is a PhD candidate at the Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies. He previously worked as a Research Associate at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, focusing on North Korea`s overseas networks and sanctions evasion measures. He has a MA in International Area Studies from Seoul National University and was a Fulbright Grantee to South Korea in 2009.   Typeset by Kwang-min Pyo Senior Researcher For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I ppiokm@eai.or.kr      

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note Humanitarian aid carries connotations of emergency, urgent response, and acute threats to human morbidity, mortality, and dignity. Despite the end of the famine emergency since the mid-1990s, however, the DPRK has continued to receive international humanitarian aid. This article argues that while concepts of development and humanitarianism highlight the challenges to bringing structural change in the DPRK, the long-term nature of need in the DPRK does not signal an inappropriate match with humanitarian aid. In a sanctioned and highly politicised environment with questions of denuclearisation and human rights abuses, seeking to improve daily lives is an inherently structural act. Without structural changes, acute needs have and likely will continue even in times of non-emergency.     2020 quietly marked a quarter century of international humanitarian aid in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea), an effort that began with the DPRK’s landmark appeal in 1995 during a period of famine known as the Arduous March. Humanitarian aid, sometimes referred to as ‘humanitarian relief’, carries connotations of emergency, urgent response, and acute threats to human morbidity, mortality, and dignity. The Relief Web Glossary of Humanitarian Terms, for example, defines humanitarian assistance as ‘aid that seeks, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population.’[1] However, the role of humanitarian aid in long-term contexts of need, including but certainly not limited to the DPRK, questions the contemporary utility of this understanding. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Red Cross and United Nations (UN) bodies began working in the country on both a resident and non-resident basis in the mid-1990s. They were met with a context in some ways different from many others in which they had worked – there was no violent armed conflict, power vacuums, local civil society, or traditional threats to aid worker security.[2] As the famine subsided, it became clear that even without an acute crisis, humanitarian need persisted. Humanitarian staff and agencies have come and gone, geopolitics have created and narrowed opportunities for engagement, and programmes have shifted from famine relief to include efforts geared more at sustainability and capacity building – but despite the end of the famine emergency, the DPRK has continued to receive international humanitarian aid. Humanitarian efforts contend with the discomfort between two realms: access and the structural nature of need. Agencies work in the country to their attempts to positively impact the lives of North Koreans, and work within the constraints of both externally-imposed challenges (e.g. funding amounts and sanctions) and internally determined structural impediments to better humanitarian conditions (e.g. human rights abuses and state choices regarding resource use). The DPRK is not unique in its position as a long-term humanitarian aid recipient. In 2019, the DPRK was one of 40 countries with more than 700,000 people determined to be experiencing humanitarian need. 27 countries were part of UN-coordinated humanitarian or refugee response plans for five or more consecutive years, but the DPRK is one of only three of the 27 whose humanitarian need is not rooted in conflict and/or displacement.[3] Instead, Development Initiatives characterises the DPRK, along with Haiti and Tanzania, as having ‘natural hazards’ as the cause of humanitarian crisis. This summary characterisation overlooks the deep political and economic roots of humanitarian need. In the mid 1990s major failings of the humanitarian sector, such as genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, raised discussions of the value of the so-called humanitarian principles and the relationship between humanitarianism and politics.[4] These conversations have circled back in recent years, with renewed focus on tackling the root causes of need and questioning the relationship and constructed dichotomy between life-saving humanitarian and structural development work.   Deep roots in a protracted context – the blurring of the humanitarian/development divide While there is no singular definition of humanitarianism, the mainstream international sector generally focuses around four areas: protecting life, health, subsistence, and physical security, with primary and secondary aims being protection of ‘human life where this is threatened on a wide scale’ and reduction of ‘excessive human suffering,’ respectively.[5] Though the boundaries of these ideas are not neatly drawn – what is the threshold for ‘excessive’? – they do highlight the importance of not just preserving or saving life but considering the quality of those lives. The mainstream sector cites a group of four principles, known as the humanitarian principles, as guiding concepts in their work. They are humanity (addressing human suffering wherever it is found), neutrality (not taking sides in conflicts or disputes), impartiality (allocating aid based on needs, without discrimination), and independence (autonomy from political or other aims). Development is also rooted in ideas of quality of life. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee definition of official development assistance (ODA) focuses on the ‘the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries.’[6] OECD concepts of development have been criticised for being too simple, relying on the premise that ODA flows will bring economic growth which will in turn bring development.[7] Other ideas of development are broader, such as Sen’s seminal argument of freedom as both the ends and the means of development.[8] In both cases, development strikes closer to the political, economic, and societal core of not only times of uniquely acute need, but also day-to-day life. Dr. Stephen Linton, founder and president of the DPRK-focused NGO Eugene Bell Foundation, discussed the humanitarian/development divide in a 2018 interview:   I think one of the problems is that, particularly recently, this term ‘humanitarian assistance’ has been expanded. And many international organisations and large NGOs, and even small NGOs, are providing what they call capacity building, or development assistance. And they call this humanitarian aid. But the intent of these programmes is to make life better for people, and there’s certainly nothing wrong with that. But genuine, emergency aid is not necessarily to make life better, it’s to save life that is in danger of ending … So I think pulling this term back apart where a distinction is made between life-saving aid, which no one, including the US government, objects to, and developmental aid, that can look in a certain sense like economic aid, has been a challenge.[9]   Linton’s remarks drill to the issue of the humanitarian-development nexus in the DPRK: in a sanctioned and highly politicised environment with questions of denuclearisation and human rights abuses, seeking to improve daily lives is an inherently structural act. Without structural changes, acute needs have and likely will continue even in times of non-emergency. Notably in 2005, the DPRK attempted to halt humanitarian aid and requested the departure of all NGOs, for the UN to shift to longer-term development work, and decried other countries such as the US for making humanitarian aid political.[10] It is unclear exactly what the DPRK envisioned for its UN-supported development work. Additionally, the nuclear issue had already halted donor appetite for involvement in more overtly structural and therefore political assistance, and humanitarian actors had also already been involved in work aimed at sustainability, not just emergency relief. The announcement did cease or interrupt work, such as by the World Food Programme, but the DPRK continued to receive humanitarian aid though at much lower funding levels.   Role of humanitarian aid in contexts of chronic need In May 2016, over 9,000 participants from government, civil society, humanitarian agencies, and the private sector gathered in Istanbul for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), following then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s call to improve the humanitarian sector. Notably missing was Médecins sans Frontières (MSF, also known as Doctors without Borders), who pulled out weeks before in dissatisfaction with the WHS’s direction, which the NGO described as ‘an incorporation of humanitarian assistance into a broader development and resilience agenda.’ MSF also highlighted its concern that having NGOs and UN agencies make commitments on the same platforms as states unfairly raised the profile and responsibilities of the former, when it is the latter that actually hold both power and responsibility.[11] The title of Ban Ki-moon’s WHS report, ‘One humanity: shared responsibility’ pinpoints exactly the dissent MSF raised – are these truly shared responsibilities? Discussion of ‘ending conflict’ and ‘addressing root causes’ on a global level can flatten the depth and texture of what these platitudes mean in specific contexts. What does it mean to end need, and who has responsibility to act, in a conflict primed but not actively hostile context like the DPRK? As sceptics of aid often point out, humanitarian issues in the DPRK and blockages to aid such as sanctions are borne from the regime’s decision making. Until the regime, as well as international stakeholders such as the United States, Republic of Korea, and China, commit to changes that will adequately address the economic and political root causes, what are humanitarians to do? DuBois presents the idea of ‘humanitarianisation’ as a central flaw in contemporary humanitarian approaches - where contexts and issues that are not humanitarian receive humanitarian responses ‘often resulting in the biased, inappropriate and expansive management of crisis effects rather than causes.’[12] He asserts that humanitarian crises contain two core characteristics: a change from ‘normalcy’ that requires more than available response abilities. Dubois argues that protracted contexts are not humanitarian crises, and humanitarians should stand back in favour of more appropriate actors (e.g. peacebuilding, development, etc.).[13]   The case for supporting humanitarian efforts in the DPRK The danger in interpreting the DPRK as not appropriate for humanitarian response is fourfold. First, while the ‘hermit kingdom’ moniker has largely fallen out of fashion (rightfully so!) and North Korean linkages have many facets, the country still has limited entry points for engagement. Curtailing humanitarian aid would eliminate one pathway for engagement, for learning about the challenges facing North Koreans, and for exposing North Koreans to outside ideas. Studies using humanitarian data[14] show that even with their limitations, there is a rich body of knowledge about the country facilitated by humanitarian interaction. Second, without a clear understanding of what other actors would intervene, their status as state or non-state actors, how they would be funded, and the DPRK’s willingness to work with them, understanding the DPRK as not an emergency and therefore not humanitarian risks leaving an unfilled gap. Alternatively, this approach risks a gap filled by actors whose past behaviour demonstrates minimal interest in North Koreans’ human security such as China. Third, the interwoven nature of acute need and normality do not signal a need to pull humanitarian aid away from the DPRK – instead, it highlights one understanding as to why humanitarian aid would continue to be appropriate. As Hilhorst explains, classical humanitarian paradigms are built on the exceptionality of crisis, while resilience approaches tear down divides between what is normal and what is a departure from normality.[15] The DPRK’s continued humanitarian engagement demonstrates that humanitarian constructs have gone beyond ideas of ‘emergency’ or crisis. Fourth, the resilience paradigm also provides a framing for prepositioning humanitarian relationships – if the DPRK does fall back into large-scale emergency, established humanitarian linkages will likely be beneficial in constructing a larger scale or more urgent response.[16]   Conclusion The responsibility for the well-being and human security of the North Korean people lies primarily with their own government. Humanitarian discussion around responsibility and power to end root causes serves as a reminder of this. This article argues that while concepts of development and humanitarianism highlight the challenges to bringing structural change in the DPRK, the long-term nature of need in the DPRK does not signal an inappropriate match with humanitarian aid. The DPRK’s COVID-19 response has severely impacted humanitarian aid as imports face hurdles and both domestic and international travel are restricted. Some groups have had to wholly pause their work, while others have found new ways of working with their North Korean counterparts to continue projects in some capacity. How the 2021 humanitarian landscape in the DPRK develops remains to be seen, with the potential for monumental challenges. For example, the World Food Programme has noted a ‘significant residual risk’ that lack of food importation will halt their work in 2021.[17] Much of this is dependent on the DPRK’s response to COVID-19. However, humanitarian support — which requires commitments within the control of the international community, such as funding as well as legislation to reduce barriers and unintended effects of sanctions — should continue despite the protracted and structural nature of need. ■     [1] ReliefWeb. 2008. Glossary of Humanitarian Terms. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/reliefweb-glossary-humanitarian-terms-enko. [2] The Aid Worker Security Database (available at https://aidworkersecurity.org/) contains no record of security incidents against humanitarian aid workers in the DPRK. [3] Development Initiatives. 2020. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2020. pp. 22-23. Available at: https://devinit.org/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2020/#downloads. [4] Barnett, Michael. 2011. The Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. [5] Darcy, James and Charles-Antoine Hofmann. 2003. “According to need? Needs assessment and decision-making in the humanitarian sector.” (Humanitarian Policy Group Report 15). London: Overseas Development Institute. P. 13 [6] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2018. “Official development assistance – definition and coverage.” Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm [7] Tandon, Yash. 2008. Ending Aid Dependence. Cape Town: Fahamu. [8] Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [9] Arirang News. 2018. “[ISSUE TALK] TB crisis in North Korea ‘emergency situation’: One-on-one with Stephen Linton.” Video, 16:40. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmfR97EsNcQ [10] BBC. 2005. “North Korea rejects UN food aid.” BBC. 23 September 2005. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4273844.stm. [11] Médecins sans Frontières. 2016. “MSF to pull out of World Humanitarian Summit.” Retrieved from https://www.msf.org/msf-pull-out-world-humanitarian-summit. [12] DuBois, Marc. 2018. “The new humanitarian basics.” (Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper). London: Overseas Development Institute. P. 1. [13] Ibid, p. 8. [14] See, for example: Smith, Hazel. 2015. North Korea: Markets and Military Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Smith, Hazel. 2016. “Nutrition and Health in North Korea: What’s New, What’s Changed and Why It Matters.” North Korean Review 12(1): 7-34. [15] Hilhorst, Dorothea. 2018. “Classical humanitarianism and resilience humanitarianism: making sense of two brands of humanitarian action.” Journal of International Humanitarian Action 3(15). [16] This also emerged as a finding from a study on humanitarian impacts of sanctions. See Zadeh-Cummings, N., and Harris, L. 2020. ‘The Impact of Sanctions Against North Korea on Humanitarian Aid,’ Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, 2(1). [17] World Food Programme. 2020. “Country Strategic Plan Revision.” Available at: https://www.wfp.org/operations/kp02-dprk-interim-country-strategic-plan-2019-2022. P. 3.     Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings is the associate director of research and lecturer in humanitarian studies at the Centre for Humanitarian Leadership at Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). Her research interests include humanitarianism, the DPRK, humanitarian pedagogy, and civil society.   Acknowledgement Dr Zadeh-Cummings would like to thank Marc Dubois for insightful conversation and exchanges that informed some of the ideas in this article.   담당 및 편집: 표광민 선임연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I ppiokm@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note From the construction of open-air theaters to the use of new celebratory mediums in national events and the resumption of the 2020 Youth Day Celebration amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea has experienced a significant transformation in its social and cultural underpinnings over the past year. Seunghee Ha, a research fellow at the Dongguk University DMZ Peace Center, argues that these changes provide important insights into how the North Korean authorities are gradually accommodating new tastes and desires that have emerged among its citizenry. Where such behaviors were once deemed threatening “non-socialist” behaviors, Ha believes that the state’s reactive adaptation highlights the increasing agency of ordinary North Koreans upon the direction of the country’s social preferences. For Ha, this “bottom-up” approach ultimately has the potential to produce a North Korea more socially aligned with the rest of the international community.     This article provides an overview of North Korea’s social and cultural changes in 2020 based on the “people-first principle” that the regime advocates. This article views “the people” as the leading agents of social change in North Korea, and looks at “bottom-up” changes through several key examples. Policies have changed from a “top-down” approach in which the State leads the change. State-led efforts like construction and modernization of infrastructure, mobilization and control of the people, and civilizing efforts are still ongoing. However, the direction and the main agent of policy change are gradually shifting from the State to the people. The North Korean regime has recognized this change among the people and started to reflect such change in its policies. In this article, the process of such change is explained as a “bottom-up” approach. First, a new change is emerging in the new generation of young people. During the 2019 Lunar New Year celebration, a new format of performance began to appear in the form of large-scale outdoor concerts. After this, performances at major events in North Korea gradually moved from indoors to outdoors. The regime has been building a series of youth open-air theaters in accordance with the shift to outdoor performances which began in 2019. Last year alone, active construction took place on Pyongyang Youth Park Open-air Theater in January, Pyongannam-do Youth Open-air Theater in October, Hwangbuk Sariwon Youth Open-air Theater in November, and Sinuiju Youth Open-air Theater in Pyongbuk. That is, the outdoor performance format was adopted In North Korea due to changes in the tastes and cultural consumption patterns of young people, who favor performances like large-scale concerts. It is also noteworthy that while the North Korean regime canceled or downsized most of its planned celebrations as part of a strict response to COVID-19, celebrations of major anniversaries resumed beginning with the August 28 Youth Day celebration. The Youth Day performance, which has been held indoors in the past, was performed on an outdoor stage for the first time. While it is possible that the Youth Day event was held because the spread of COVID-19 had slowed at the time, it is worth noting that on August 28, the day of the Youth Day celebration, the Rodong Sinmun published an article that emphasized the emergency anti-epidemic drive by stressing the importance of “more intensive anti-epidemic measures” and stating that “the emergency anti-epidemic sys-tem must be strictly followed.” The Youth Day performance took place while strict anti-virus measures were in place, and all outdoor audience members were required to wear masks. The fact that the event was held despite the virus situation shows how important the Youth Day event is to the North Korean authorities. To celebrate Youth Day on August 28, 2020, the Rodong Sinmun published writings from the participants of the 2nd National Meeting of Young Frontrunners in Noble Traits held in May 2015. The articles emphasized the beautiful stories and achievements of these participants and expressed their gratitude to the Party. The articles depicted a desirable image of the exemplary youths and described the “young frontrunners in noble traits” as “the wonderful young people of our time who have noble moral character and do many good things for society and the group.”[1] Kim Jong Un emphasized the youth-first principle[2] in an appreciation letter delivered to the Youth League organization during the 2nd National Meeting of Young Frontrunners in Noble Traits in 2015. In the letter, he used varying phrases to praise youths including “a young man who moved on from the past and started anew,” “no men are born bad,” “there is no young man who cannot improve,” and “educate young people who are behind.” Through these statements, we can infer that there were signs of ideological disturbance and North Korean youths distancing themselves from the socialist style at that time. Accordingly, the National Meeting of Young Frontrunners in Noble Traits aimed to reinforce ideology and strengthen unity among the youth in the recognition of their role and importance as the next generation. In addition, it had the purpose of suppressing the current atmosphere of ideological disturbance that was prevalent among the youth by extolling the virtues of the young frontrunners in noble traits and presenting these youths as role models. The youth-first policy advocated by the North Korean authorities indicates that they are well aware of the role and the importance of the country’s youth as their successors. At the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), it was suggested that the name “Youth League” be revised during the upcoming Youth League Congress in accordance with the adoption of the decision to amend the Party rules. It is expected that by recognizing today’s youth and reflecting their changes, North Korea will focus more on the consciousness and problems of the youth who will lead the Party in the future through renovation under a new name. Changes led by the people may also appear alongside the COVID-19 induced quarantine measures. Last year, the aftermath of continued international economic sanctions was aggravated by the outbreak of COVID-19 in North Korea. Despite the Party’s anti-epidemic drive, the public’s adherence to quarantine measures and discipline have weakened. Some people have displayed a “chronic attitude” toward the Party’s anti-epidemic drive and “the false behavior of not wearing mask in public.”[3] The Rodong Sinmun explained that not wearing a mask is "a serious social and political problem of not being able to following one’s basic obligation as a member of society and can be seen as a sin against the state.”[4] The Rodong Sinmun also criticized “a phenomenon [that] arose where some citizens, seeing wearing masks as burdensome, held fast to their opinion against those who require them to abide by the quarantine regulations…Officials of certain units organized worker meetings without wearing masks or some did not appropriately respond to the demands made by members of relevant institutions that are acquainted with the state of the quarantine work”[5] as the product of selfish thinking. The North Korean regime regarded these problems as a failure to recognize the severity of COVID-19, and pointed out “chronological, mechanical, and practical treatment”[6] of the emergency anti-epidemic drive as the biggest problem. They further cautioned that “the greatest enemy in overcoming the existing crisis is laxity,” stating “arbitrary interpretation and undisciplined behaviors in implementing the code of conduct and norms established in relation to pandemic prevention can jeopardize not only individuals but the country as well.”[7] These statements imply that the control of the leadership has decreased since violations of pandemic measures continue despite the State’s emphasis on strict quarantine.[8] Such lack of discipline has been viewed as a “non-socialist” phenomenon. North Korea’s Unabridged Dictionary defines “non-socialism” as “all kinds of unsound things that violate the socialist principle. If non-socialism is promoted, socialism cannot be advocated for, and the superiority of North Korean socialism prioritizing the people cannot be developed.”[9] “Non-socialist” behaviors, which existed in North Korea prior to the pandemic, have increased as COVID-19 persists and have become the target of regime criticism. The non-socialist phenomenon has become an internal problem in North Korea. Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address on January 1, 2018 mentioned the non-socialist phenomenon in the passage “A vigorous struggle should be waged to tighten moral discipline throughout society, establish a socialist way of life, and eliminate all kinds of non-socialist practices so as to ensure that all the people, possessed of ennobling mental and moral traits, lead a revolutionary and cultured life.”[10] On July 20, 2020, the Korean Central News Agency reported that when Kim Jong Un inspected the construction site of Pyongyang General Hospital, he instructed the officers in charge to replace all of the construction directors because they had burdened the people when securing equipment and materials.[11] In the 20th expanded Meeting of the Political Bureau of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK held on November 15, 2020, Kim also criticized the relevant departments of the Party Central Committee, judicial prosecutors, and security agencies as irresponsible, citing their extreme negligence of duties as the reason for the appearance of non-socialist behaviors in educational institutions such as Pyongyang Medical University and society as a whole.[12] Likewise, the prolonged quarantine measures have led people to neglect their duties and fostered a lack of discipline within society. The North Korean regime continues to criticize this behavior and highlight the boundaries of ideological disturbance. COVID-19 has placed the North Korean people under strict quarantine measures and control of the authorities in the context of economic sanctions. The North Korean people experienced increasing disaster fatigue following their mobilization in flood restoration along with the 80-day battle to prepare for the 8th Party Congress. The North Korean authorities responded accordingly. During the commemorative speech at the military parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the WPK, Kim Jong Un said in tears that “our service personnel performed devotedly on the anti-epidemic front and the front of removing the aftereffects of natural disasters which we unexpectedly had to face this year. No one would approach their patriotic and heroic devotion without shedding tears of gratitude…I feel deep regret for them, and I feel pain in my heart as they are not all here on this glorious night with us…I thought over what I would say first at this moment, when we will be looking back upon every page of our Party’s 75-year history filled with glory, I have only one sincere, heartfelt word: thanks.” Kim’s tears and direct expression of gratitude can be interpreted as intending to give the public credit for overcoming difficulties and raise their loyalty by conveying emotional messages. The 75th anniversary of the founding of the WPK was celebrated with new types of events. These events included a “lighting festival” using light, a “military parade music concert” held by the State Council’s performance group, and a comedy performance show, “Our House Full of Laughter.” “Our House Full of Laughter” was performed at the Youth Park Open-air Theater from October 7th to 16th. The performance consisted of narration props, gags, animal performances, sand paintings, and fantasy magic. Previously, North Korea established the National Comedy Company in 1994 under the direction of Kim Jong Il in order to overcome the Arduous March. The Company was disbanded at the end of the famine as its role was finished. The exceptional comedy performance included in the celebration of the 75th founding anniversary of the Party had a similar purpose to the National Comedy Company established by Kim Jong Il to overcome the Arduous March in 1994 of defeating difficulties through laughter. North Korea used laughter to overcome the Arduous March in 1994, and similarly, “Our House Full of Laughter” is intended to console the exhausted public that has suffered the continuing hardships of sanctions, COVID-19, and natural disasters with laughter. In other words, we can infer from the way that a comedy performance group was established to appease public sentiment using laughter that North Korea’s current situation is comparable to the suffering of the Arduous March. In sum, North Korea is reacting passively in order to satisfy people’s tastes and desires as “bottom-up” changes transform the new generation’s consciousness. People are now directly expressing their opinions on the external environment and domestic issues. In the Kim Jong Un period, new national symbols have been redefined overall, and the old factors that were in line with the previous globalization standards are undergoing a process of reorganization with the current globalization standards. This can be seen as a process of making a “universal state” comparable to the international community. The “people-first principle” stipulated as a basic political means at the 8th Party Congress suggests that the power that has been concentrated in the state has begun to shift to the people as a result of the sys-tem changes made in response to the environment of the times. The “people-first principle” exists as a slogan of strategic governance for loyalty to the State and patriotism for the people. Nevertheless, it can be interpreted that the reason behind the emergence of such strategic slogans is that it is impossible for the State to exist solely with authority without appealing to the people. We can learn more about North Korea and its current transition by focusing on the people-led social and cultural changes. ■     [1] “Shall be a pioneer of the technological breakthrough,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, August 29, 2020. [2] North Korea’s Joseonmal Daesajeon(Unabridged Dictionary) defines Youth-first as “Valuing the status and roles of the youth who are the leading players in national defense and socialist construction”, and Youth-first politics as “Politics of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) that has firm belief in the youth in revolution and construction from the most accurate understanding of the status and role of young people and implement things based on their strength.” [3] “Let’s prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus, by tightening-up quarantine measures,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, February 16, 2020. [4] “Everyone must wear masks completely”, “Never slow down the tightening-up,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, February 22, 2020. [5] Sung-min Kim, “Great national project for the People's security,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, March 9, 2020. [6] “Infinite responsibility, loyalty, and dedication must be accompanied in making the decision in the Party Central Committee's emergency enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau,”「Rodong Sinmun」, July 30, 2020. [7] “Top-class alert and strict compliance required under the maximum emergency sys-tem,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, August 4, 2020. [8] Seungjun Oh and Seunghee Ha, “North Korea’s Response to COVID-19: Focusing on the Rodong Sinmun,” 『NORTH KOREAN STUDIES REVIEW』, 24.2(2020): p. 33. [9] North Korea’s Joseonmal Daesajeon(Unabridged Dictionary) [10] “New Year’s Address,” 『Rodong Sinmun』, January 1, 2018. [11] Korean Central News Agency, July 20, 2020. [12] “The 7th Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) held the 20th enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau,” 『Rodong Sinmun』, November 16, 2020.     Seunghee Ha is a researcher of North Korean society and culture who has previously served as a Fellow at the Institute of North Korean Studies at Dongguk University. Dr. Ha received her PhD in North Korean Studies from the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, Korea. Her main research interests include North Korean society and culture, North Korean music, and North Korean media. Her recent publications include “North Korea’s Response to COVID-19: Focus on the Rodong Sinmun” (2020), “North Korea’s Use of YouTube Propaganda Media” (2020), and “The Utilization of Electronic Music Bands in North Korea-Japan Relations” (2020).   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장             문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I j.baek@eai.or.kr    

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note The 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), which was held over a period of 8 days, ended on January 12, 2021. In this commentary, Young-Sun Ha, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University, analyzes Kim Jong Un’s report given during the 8th WPK and uses it to predict what comes next for North Korea. Professor Ha criticizes North Korea’s limitations in reviewing its own achievements during the past five years, arguing that the regime is viewing the future through the eyes of the past. Professor Ha argues that North Korea’s five-year economic development plan will suffer from continued economic sanctions and limited capacity for self-reliance. The constant strengthening of national defense, including nuclear weapons, will end up driving an arms race, paradoxically weakening the regime’s power. Professor Ha also anticipates difficulties for the regime with the new Biden administration, highlighting North Korea’s demands for sanctions relief and a security guarantee and the US expectation of a nuclear freeze including comprehensive reporting and verification. In order for North Korea to successfully deal with the triple crises of continued sanctions, the pandemic, and natural disasters over the next five years, Professor Ha asserts that North Korea must leave behind its Cold War mindset and seek a new strategy of denuclearization and coevolution suited for the 21st century.     This week, North Korea held the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), which provides vital insight into what to expect from the regime over the next five years until the 9th Congress. Over the course of nine hours, Kim Jong Un reviewed the main domestic and international challenges that have prevented North Korea from progressing in the past five years since the 7th Congress, and laid out the North’s projects and strategies for overall innovation of the current Party and national tasks to ensure the next step of the victory of North Korean socialism. However, the limitations of Kim Jong Un’s report were clear as he looked into the future through the eyes of the past, following the basic framework and language of the revolutionary line that has maintained its influence in the regime since it emerged in the mid-1960s and replaced the war line. Kim Jong Un’s report mainly dealt with four things: First, a review of the Party’s work since the 7th Congress, second, the advancement toward building domestic socialist power, third, the progress of independent reunification and external relations, and fourth, the strengthening of the Party programs. The 8th WPK Congress report began by summarizing the difficulties and achievements of North Korea’s political, economic, military, and diplomatic positions over the past five years. The “People-First” Principle was emphasized as the core of Yeongdo ideology. Kim Jong Un then stated that “although the strategic goals in economic construction were not reached,” a valuable foundation for sustainable economic development had been laid. The report gave a detailed review of the military’s achievements in strengthening North Korea’s nuclear war deterrence and self-defense capabilities, and particularly emphasized the effort to modernize nuclear weapons. This section of the report concluded by saying, “North Korea has emerged as a strong nuclear and military power in the world, and the era of trying to bargain for our own interests with superpowers has ended.” This clearly shows how difficult it will be for North Korea to accept complete denuclearization, contrary to our hopeful expectations. Kim Jong Un assessed the country’s recent diplomacy efforts as “a series of the worst of the worst unprecedented crises in the external environment due to the desperate attacks of the United States and the pressures of the economic sanctions implemented by its followers.” The Central Committee of the Party added to this by stating, “With a bold path change and aggressive strategy, North Korea has contributed to the creation of an atmosphere for peace and dialogue in which international society can sympathize with us, as well as the organization of active external activities to raise our international status.” That is, the report assesses DPRK-China, DPRK-Russia, and DPRK-US relations from the perspective of strengthening international revolutionary capabilities within the Three Fronts strategy. The next section of the report reviewed the tasks ahead to achieve the next leap in the construction of North Korean socialism, covering the fields of the economy, defense, science technology, and culture in that order. It began with an examination of the economic difficulties of the past five years before discussing the new five-year economic plan starting in 2021. Specifically, Kim Jong Un highlighted “the worst-ever sanction policies of the United States and other hostile forces,” “severe natural disasters,” and “the prolonged global health crisis” as external challenges, while recognizing the weakness of the previous five-year economic development plan, the old sys-tem, and old methods of business as internal problems. The report highlighted the aim of the new five-year economic development plan to achieve sustainable economic growth free from external influences, and to significantly improve the quality of life for the people by reorganizing the economic business sys-tem and restoring the foundations of self-reliance. However, the report failed to suggest any appropriate solutions, as international economic sanctions, global health crises, and natural disasters cannot be overcome by self-reliance and will persist throughout the next five-year economic development plan period as well. The next part of the report emphasized the strengthening of national defense. Kim Jong Un referenced the miniaturization of nuclear weapons, the development of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, the possession of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and nuclear submarines as a delivery sys-tem, and the research and development of advanced weapons and military satellites, stating “As long as imperialism remains on Earth and the threat of war by hostile forces against our country continues, the historical mission of our revolutionary armed forces will never change, and our national defense must be constantly strengthened along the path of new development.” He indicated that the strengthening of national defense will continue until the military build-up of the US and other hostile forces ceases and the threats and blackmail against North Korea come to an end. However, the continued strengthening of the regime’s national defense will end up increasing the defenses of its counterparts, paradoxically leading to the weakening of regime security over time. Similarly, excessive efforts to strengthen military power, including nuclear capabilities, will only prolong international economic sanctions and increase inefficient investment, resulting in a weakening of North Korea’s overall domestic capabilities. Kim Jong Un stressed that it will be possible for North Korea to demonstrate the superiority and the power of North Korean socialism despite the current difficult circumstances. He predicated this on the condition that the country succeeds in reinforcing the core economy and military power, promoting science and technology to construct socialism, and creating a Joseon-style civilization as a new enlightenment of socialist culture while developing corresponding national and social sys-tems. The report next moves on to discuss independent reunification and the development of North Korea’s external relations. Although Kim stated that “The two Koreas are now standing at a critical juncture. They must choose whether to take the path of peace and reunification by resolving the serious deadlock in North-South relations, or whether continue to suffer division amid the vicious circle of confrontation and the danger of war,” he also took a principled stand in saying, “In North-South relations, it is critical to be willing to solve the essential problems first. We must stop hostile actions toward each other, and be sincere in how we handle the North-South Declaration.” Kim declared that a new path for inter-Korean relations based on trust and reconciliation will open up if South Korea stops focusing on cooperation on peripheral problems such as COVID-19 prevention, humanitarian issues, and tourism, and instead starts to work on the essential problems of peace on the Korean Peninsula, such as suspending the import of advanced military equipment and the joint ROK-US military exercises. These arguments clearly show how North Korea remains limited owing to self-contradiction. The regime claims that it has no choice but to strengthen its defense capabilities as long as hostile forces continue to pose a threat. However, South Korea and the United States feel that there is no alternative but to strengthen their defense capabilities as long as North Korea poses a nuclear threat. Several basic principles taken from the historical lessons of international politics should be followed in order to resolve this dilemma. First, the issues that North Korea considered peripheral or non-essential are in fact a very important first step toward solving the essential problem of the current stage wherein the two Koreas even distrust “building trust to build trust.” The essential issues of peace on Korean Peninsula must be achieved by true consensus on the complete denuclearization of North Korea and a guarantee for North Korea’s regime security. A minimum level of mutual deterrence sys-tem should be maintained in order to break this vicious cycle in the process of seeking new inter-Korean relations, and there must be mutual efforts to engage in economic cooperation and preparation for future-oriented survival strategies. In the regime’s discussion of the development of external relations, Kim Jong Un delineated his strategy of “consistently confronting hostile forces and superpowers as a powerful Party,” and then explained some key principles. First, North Korea will firmly adhere to the principle of self-reliance in order to protect its national interest. Second, it will offensively pursue diplomatic war in order to keep its right to sovereignty and development. Third, the regime will focus its external political activities to suppress the United States, which is the biggest obstacle to revolution and North Korea’s biggest enemy. Fourth, no matter who is in office in the United States, US policy towards North Korea will not change. Therefore, North Korea will establish a shrewd strategy toward the United States and continue to expand its self-reliant capabilities and anti-imperialist alliance. Policy toward the United States, which lies at the core of North Korea's diplomacy, will have a decisive impact on North Korea in the next five years. President-elect Joe Biden has signaled that he will take a more cautious approach, criticizing President Trump's policy toward North Korea. It is expected that Biden will place somewhat of an emphasis on bottom-up diplomacy unlike Trump’s unilateral top-down diplomacy that resembled a TV show, with splashy events like the US-DPRK Summit. Biden, who emphasizes American leadership in sharp contrast to Trump’s America First policy, will place value on multilateral negotiation tactics with the relevant states, like the Six-Party Talks, to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The United States will first begin with a nuclear freeze negotiation, even though the ultimate goal is complete denuclearization. Although a nuclear freeze can be regarded as an intermediate stepping stone, the US will not negotiate a nuclear freeze if it lacks trust in the ability to eventually achieve the final goal of complete denuclearization. That is, the United States will proceed to nuclear freeze negotiations only after receiving a comprehensive report of all nuclear facilities and nuclear capabilities to guarantee that North Korea has truly made a strategic decision to pursue complete denuclearization. As seen at the US-DPRK Hanoi Summit, Kim Jong Un’s regime is open to negotiations for partial denuclearization. However, North Korea has never made the strategic decision to give up its ability to hold the minimum nuclear weapons required to secure the regime, and will not give up its nuclear weapons easily in the future either. The United States seems willing to accept comprehensive reporting and verification as a first step towards complete denuclearization. Negotiations over the North Korean demand to lift economic sanctions and guarantee regime security and the US request for a nuclear freeze and complete reporting and verification will inevitably be fierce. The Biden administration, which emphasizes democracy, holds the view that North Korea needs to choose denuclearization as a measure of self-preservation. Since information on the rapidly changing world is key to North Korea coming around to the viewpoint that denuclearization is a means of self-preservation, free communication of information in North Korea will no doubt be raised as a crucial issue. If North Korea responds to the Biden administration’s North Korea policy in line with the basic principles it has laid out for its external policies going forward, it will realistically be impossible to resume negotiations on lifting economic sanctions and guaranteeing regime security, both of which North Korea desperately needs. North Korea is expected to face the triple disaster of economic sanctions, a health crisis, and natural disasters in the next five years. It must devise a forward-looking survival and developmental strategy that is appropriate for the 21st century, going beyond its past view of strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities. The Asia-Pacific, where the Korean Peninsula is located, is entering a period of change in the political order under the dual influence of the global COVID-19 pandemic and strategic competition between the US and China. In order to go beyond 19th century self-reliance and achieve 21st century coexistence, North Korea should also emerge as a rising power in the new Asia-Pacific order by developing a new blueprint that includes a commitment to denuclearization in the name of self-preservation and coevolution with nearby states.■     Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} 편집자 주 신년기획 특별논평 "EAI 한국외교 2021 전망과 전략" 시리즈 네 번째 보고서로 북한 8차 당대회를 토대로 북한의 향후 5년을 예측한 하영선 EAI 이사장(서울대 명예교수)의 논평이 발간되었습니다. 저자는 북한 당대회 보고를 분석하며 북한 스스로의 지난 5년 과업 평가를 소개하고, 과거의 눈으로 미래를 내다보는 북한의 한계를 지적합니다. 논평을 통해 저자는 북한의 5개년 경제 계획은 계속되는 경제 제재와 자력갱생의 한계로 어려움을 겪을 것이라고 전망합니다. 핵무기를 포함한 방위력의 지속적 강화는 상대국의 방위력 역시 증강시키는 결과를 불러일으켜 오히려 안보의 약화를 초래하는 자기모순에 직면하게 될 것이라고 경고하는 한편, 남북한 관계 개선을 위한 방안으로는 장기적인 신중론을 제시합니다. 또한, 북미관계에 대해서는 북한의 제재 해제, 체제보장 요구와 상반되는 미국 신정부의 포괄적 신고와 검증을 포함한 핵동결을 거친 완전 비핵화 요구라는 난관을 예상하고 있습니다. 북한이 향후 5년 동안 지속적으로 겪어야 할 경제 제재, 보건 위기, 자연재해의 3중고를 성공적으로 해결하려면 3대 혁명역량 강화와 같은 19세기적 생존 전략을 넘어서 21세기에 걸맞은 공생의 비핵 생존번영 전략을 새롭게 마련해야 한다고 저자는 주장합니다.     제 9차 대회가 열릴 때까지 향후 5년의 북한을 가늠할 수 있는 북한노동당 제 8차 대회가 열렸다. 김정은 위원장은 9시간에 걸쳐 제 7차 당대회 이후 지난 5년 동안의 국내외 형세 속에서 북한의 전진을 막았던 주 객관적 요인들을 되돌아보고, 당면한 당과 국가사업 전반을 혁신하며 북한 사회주의를 승리의 다음 단계로 이행시키기 위한 투쟁 사업과 방도들을 밝히는 보고를 했다. 그러나 보고는 1960년대 중반에 전쟁 노선 대신 새롭게 등장해서 여전히 생명력을 유지하고 있는 혁명 노선의 기본 틀과 언어로 구성되어 있어서 과거의 눈으로 미래를 내다보는 한계를 크게 벗어나지 못했다. 보고는 첫째, 제7차 당대회 이후 지난 5년 동안의 성과, 둘째, 국내 사회주의 건설의 전진, 자주적 통일과 대외관계 발전, 당 사업의 강화·발전을 다루고 있다.  보고는 우선 지난 5년 동안의 정치, 경제, 군사, 외교 진지의 어려움과 성과를 정리하고 있다. 먼저 정치사상 분야에서는 인민대중 제일주의를 영도(領導) 사상의 핵심으로 강조하고 있다. 다음으로, 경제건설 분야에서 “비록 예견했던 전략목표에 도달하지는 못하였지만” 앞으로 자력으로 경제 발전을 지속시켜 나갈 수 있는 소중한 밑천이 마련되었다고 평가하고 있다. 한편, 군사 분야에서는 핵전쟁 억제력과 자위적 국방력의 강화에서 이룬 성과를 자세히 소개하면서, 특히 핵 무력의 현대화 노력을 상세하게 밝히고 있다. 이러한 노력으로 “우리나라를 명실공히 세계적인 핵 강국, 군사강국으로 부상시켰으며 대국들이 우리 국가와 민족의 이익을 제멋대로 흥정하려 들던 시대를 영원히 끝장냈다.”라고 평가하고 있다. 우리의 희망적 기대와는 달리, 북한이 얼마나 완전 비핵화를 받아들이기 어려운가를 잘 보여 주고 있다. 그리고 외교분야에서는 “미국의 발악적인 공세와 그에 추종하는 세력들의 필사적인 압박 봉쇄 책동(策動)으로 인하여 총결 기간 우리 공화국을 둘러싼 대외 환경은 건국이래 유례를 찾아볼 수 없이 엄혹(嚴酷)하였다”라고 말하면서, 당 중앙위원회는 “대담한 노선 전환과 공격적인 전략으로 국제사회가 공감하는 평화의 기류를 조성하고 대화 분위기를 마련하였으며 공화국의 국제적 지위를 높이기 위한 영활(靈活)한 대외활동을 조직 영도하였다.”라고 말하고 있다. 이에 따라, 북중, 북러, 및 북미 관계를 국제 혁명역량의 강화라는 시각에서 평가하고 있다.   이어서 북한 사회주의 건설의 획기적 전진을 위해 경제, 국방, 과학기술, 문화 분야의 과업들을 검토하고 있다. 먼저 2021년에 시작하는 국가 경제발전 5개년 전략을 수립하기 위해서 지난 5년의 경제 부실을 검토하면서 객관적으로는 “미국과 적대세력들이 강행한 최악의 야만적인 제재봉쇄 책동”과 “혹심한 자연재해, “세계적인 보건 위기의 장기화” 와 주관적으로는 경제발전 5개년 전략의 부실, 낡은 사업 체계와 사업방식을 지적하고 있다. 따라서 새로운 5개년 경제계획은 경제사업체계와 부분들의 유기적 관계를 복구 정비하고 자립적 토대를 다져서 외부적 영향에 흔들림 없이 지속적인 경제성장과 인민 생활의 뚜렷한 개선을 목표로 하고 있다고 밝히고 있다. 그러나 5개년 계획 기간 동안에 여전히 지속될 국제 경제 제재, 보건 위기, 자연재해는 단순히 자력갱생적 노력만으로 극복하는 데에는 명백한 한계가 있음에도 불구하고, 바람직한 해결 방안을 제시하지 못하고 있다. 보고는 다음으로 국가 방위력의 강화를 강조하고 있다. “지구 상에 제국주의가 남아있고 우리 국가에 대한 적대세력들의 침략전쟁위험이 계속되는 한 우리 혁명무력의 역사적 사명은 절대로 변할 수 없으며 우리의 국가 방위력은 새로운 발전의 궤도를 따라 부단히 강화되어야 한다”라고 말하면서 핵무기의 소형 경량화, 전술 및 전략핵무기의 개발, 핵 운반수단으로써 대륙간탄도미사일과 핵잠수함의 보유 및 첨단 무기와 군사위성의 연구 개발을 언급하고 있다. 이러한 국가 방위력의 강화는 북한에 대해서 미국과 적대세력들의 군비 증강이 사라지고, 위협과 공갈이 종식될 때까지 지속될 것이라고 밝히고 있다. 그러나 국가 방위력의 지속적 강화는 상대 세력의 방위력도 증강시켜서 시간이 갈수록 오히려 안보의 약화를 불러오는 자기모순에 직면하게 될 것이다. 동시에 핵 능력을 포함한 군사력의 무리한 강화는 국제 경제제재를 장기화시키고 비효율적 투자를 급증시켜 결과적으로 총체적인 국내 역량의 약화를 가져오게 될 것이다. 김정은 위원장의 보고는 핵심적인 경제, 군사력의 강화와 함께, 사회주의 건설의 핵심인 과학기술의 촉진, 사회주의 문화의 새로운 개화로서 조선식(朝鮮式) 문명의 창조를 해 나가면서 이에 상응한 국가사회 제도를 발전시켜 나가면 어려운 형세 하에서도 북한형(北韓型) 사회주의의 우월성과 위력을 발휘할 수 있다고 강조하고 있다. 보고는 다음 주제로서 자주적 통일과 대외관계 발전을 다루고 있다. 김정은 위원장은 “지금 우리 민족은 북남관계의 심각한 교착상태를 수습하고 평화와 통일의 길로 나아가는가 아니면 대결의 악순환과 전쟁의 위험 속에 계속 분열의 고통을 당하는가 하는 중대한 기로에 서있다”라고 말하면서 “북남관계에서 근본적인 문제부터 풀어나가려는 입장과 자세를 가져야 하며 상대방에 대한 적대 행위를 일체 중지하며 북남선언들을 무겁게 대하고 성실히 이행해 나가야 한다”는 원칙적 입장을 밝혔다. 따라서 북한은 한국은 방역 협력, 인도주의적 협력, 개별 관광과 같은 비본질적인 문제를 제안하지 말고, 첨단 군사장비 반입과 한미 합동 군사훈련 중지와 같은 한반도 평화의 근본적 문제부터 풀어야 신뢰와 화해에 기초한 남북관계의 새로운 길이 열릴 것이라고 강조했다. 북한의 시야에서, 북한의 방위력은 적대세력들의 위협이 계속되는 한 강화될 수밖에 없다고 강조하고 있다. 그러나 한미의 시야에서 보면, 한국과 미국도 북한의 핵무기를 포함한 위협이 있는 한 방위력을 강화할 수밖에 없다. 따라서 북한의 요구는 자기 모순적 한계를 보여주고 있다. 이러한 어려움을 풀어 나가기 위해서 국제정치의 역사적 체험을 되돌아보면 몇 가지의 기본 원칙을 찾아 볼 수 있다. 우선, 남북한처럼 ‘신뢰 구축을 위한 신뢰 구축’조차 상호 불신하는 단계에서는 북한이 비중을 두지 않는 비본질적 문제는 본질적 문제를 풀기 시작하는 첫 단계로서 대단히 중요하다는 것이다. 다음으로는 한반도 평화의 본질적 문제는 북한의 완전 비핵화와 북한의 체제보장이라는 것에 명실상부한 합의가 이루어져야 한다. 셋째, 새로운 남북관계를 찾아가는 과정에서 악순환을 막기 위해서는 상호 최소한의 억지 체제를 유지해야 하며, 경제적 상호 협력을 늘리고, 미래지향적 생존 번영 전략 마련에 상호 기여하도록 노력해야 한다. 한편, 대외관계 발전을 위해서는 “불법무도하게 날뛰는 적대세력들과 강권을 휘두르는 대국들에 대하여는 강대강(强對强)으로 맞서는 전략을 일관하게 견지”하겠다는 전체 방향을 먼저 밝힌 다음에 지켜 나갈 중요 원칙들을 들고 있다. 첫째, 국익 수호를 위해 자주의 원칙을 확고히 견지한다. 둘째, 자주권과 발전권을 위해 외교전을 공세적(攻勢的)으로 전개한다. 셋째, 대외 정치활동을 혁명 발전의 기본 장애물이며 최대의 주적(主敵)인 미국을 제압하고 굴복시키는데 초점을 맞춘다. 넷째, 미국 대통령이 누가 집권하든, 미국의 실체와 대조선 정책의 본심은 변하지 않으므로 대미 전략을 책략적으로 수립하고 반제자주역량과의 연대를 계속 확대한다. 북한 외교의 핵심인 대미 정책은 향후 5년의 북한에 결정적 영향을 미치게 될 것이다. 새로 당선된 조 바이든(Joe Biden) 대통령은 트럼프 대통령의 대북정책을 강하게 비판하면서 보다 신중한 접근을 시작하고 있다. 첫째, 트럼프의 북미 정상회담처럼 TV쇼 같은 일방적인 하향식 외교 대신에 상향식 외교에 상대적 비중을 둘 것이다. 둘째, 트럼프의 미국 제일주의 대신 미국의 리더십을 강조하는 바이든은 관련 당사국들과 함께 북핵문제를 풀기 위해서 6자 회담 같은 다자 협상을 중시할 것이다. 셋째, 비핵화를 최종 목표로 하되 핵동결 논의를 우선 시작할 것이다. 그러나 핵동결을 중간 징검다리로 삼을 수는 있으나, 완전 비핵화의 최종 목표에 대한 신뢰가 없는 핵동결 협상을 하지는 않을 것이다. 따라서 북한이 완전 비핵화의 전략적 결단을 했다는 신뢰를 줄 수 있게 모든 핵 시설과 핵 능력의 포괄적 신고를 해야 미국은 핵동결 협상을 진행할 것이다. 김정은 체제는 하노이 북미 정상회담에서 본 것처럼, 부분적 비핵화를 협상할 수는 있으나, 체제 보장을 위한 최소 억지의 핵보유 능력까지 포기하는 전략적 결단을 한 적이 없으며, 앞으로도 쉽사리 포기하지 않을 것이다. 한편, 미국은 당장 완전 비핵화가 어렵다면, 우선 최소한 포괄적 신고와 검증을 요구하고 있다. 따라서 북한이 원하는 제재 해제, 체제보장과 미국이 원하는 동결, 포괄적 신고와 검증의 협상이 치열하게 진행될 수밖에 없다. 넷째, 민주주의를 강조하는 바이든 행정부는 북한이 비핵화로 가는 최종 결단을 내리기 위해서는 자생(自生)적 노력이 필요하다고 보고 있다. 이를 위해서는 급변하고 있는 세계질서에 대한 정보가 핵심적으로 중요하므로, 북한 내의 보다 자유로운 정보 소통 문제가 중요하게 제기될 것이다. 북한이 대외 정책의 향후 기본 입장에 따라서 바이든 신정부의 대북정책에 대응하면 북한에게 절실하게 필요한 경제제재 해제와 체제보장에 대한 본격적 논의는 현실적으로 불가능하다. 향후 5년 동안 경제제재, 보건 위기, 자연재해의 삼중고를 지속적으로 겪어야 하는 북한은 3대 혁명역량 강화라는 과거의 시야를 넘어서서 21세기에 걸맞은 미래의 시야에서 생존 번영 전략을 새롭게 짜야한다. 한반도가 자리 잡고 있는 아시아 태평양은 코로나의 전 세계적 감염과 미중의 전략적 경쟁이라는 이중적 영향 속에서 본격적인 질서 재건축의 시기를 맞이하고 있다. 북한도 19세기적 자력갱생을 넘어선 21세기적 공생을 위해서 비핵 북한의 자생적 노력과 관련 당사국들의 공동 진화적 협력이 함께 어우러지는 청사진을 새롭게 마련하고 아시아 태평양 신(新)질서의 새로운 주인공으로 부상해야 한다.■     ■ 저자: 하영선_ EAI 이사장, 서울대학교 명예교수. 남북정상회담 준비위원회 원로자문회의 위원과 대통령국가안보자문단을 역임했다. 서울대학교 외교학과에서 학사와 석사학위를, 미국 워싱턴대학교에서 국제정치학 박사학위를 받았다. 서울대학교 외교학과 교수 (1980-2012)로 재직했으며 미국 프린스턴대학 국제문제연구소와 스웨덴 스톡홀름 국제평화연구소의 초청연구원이었다. 최근 저서 및 편저로는 『사랑의 세계정치: 전쟁과 평화』(2019), 『한국외교사 바로 보기: 전통과 근대』(2019), 『미중의 아태질서 건축경쟁』(2017), 『1972 한반도와 주변4강 2014』 (2015), 『하영선 국제정치 칼럼 1991-2011』(2012), 『복합세계정치론』(2012), 『역사속의 젊은 그들』(2011) 등이 있다.   ■담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / jhsuh@eai.or.kr     [EAI논평]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 전문가들이 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있도록 마련된 담론의 장입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note The US and North Korea seemed to be making progress before the Hanoi Summit took place. However, after the Hanoi talks fell apart, negotiations sputtered and then stalled. The situation now is arguably worse than it was three years ago. Professor Kyungyon Moon from Jeonbuk National University states that the US, rather than seeing North Korea as an equal negotiating partner, has instead sought to implement punishing tactics as though the regime is a “rogue boy” in need of discipline. This attitude on the part of the US has resulted in an unwillingness in Washington to consider further negotiations or compensatory measures. Professor Moon argues that while South Korea should be playing the role of active mediator between the two countries, it has not been able to keep North Korea and the US at the negotiation table. South Korea must do its part and actively mediate between North Korea and the US by convincing the US to provide a compensation mechanism to North Korea, which will open the path to resumed negotiations.     North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and its fifth in September of the same year proved that its nuclear weapons capability has reached the final stages. It also demonstrated the regime’s ability to strike the mainland United States through a series of ballistic missile launches. This prompted the international community, especially the United States, to take practical action on the North Korean nuclear issue and throw strategic patience aside. The United States and the international community have imposed strong and practical economic sanctions against North Korea beyond formal sanctions. It has banned all overseas worker projects and exports of coal and other mineral resources to China, which were the main sources of income for the North Korean economy and the military. It also banned all exports of strategic materials, oil, and chemicals to North Korea. Above all, China and Russia judged that North Korea was ignoring their warnings against upgrading its nuclear capabilities. Thus, China and Russia joined the US and the international community's economic blockade against North Korea, and economic sanctions against the North began to take effect. The situation on the Korean Peninsula has escalated into a state of war as North Korea protested against these strong sanctions. In particular, President Trump's unilateral foreign policy and unpredictable leadership have raised concerns that military operations against North Korea may be possible. This has forced the Korean government and civil society into a state of tension exceeding any that have come before it. In May 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration, which aims to build trust with North Korea, was inaugurated. Moon’s administration began its charm offensive by initiating sports diplomacy, inviting North Korea to attend the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics held in February. Moon quickly followed this with an invitation to the dialogue table to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Following North Korea's decision to participate in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, the Korean Peninsula was more peaceful than ever. The first inter-Korean summit was held in May 2018, and progress seemed tenable until the second round of US-North Korea talks broke down in February 2019. Hopes abounded that the half-century-long dispute and confrontation between the two Koreas might be resolved. At the same time, the Trump administration was soaked in "selfish expectations" that it would be able to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue where former US presidents had failed. During the same period, North Korea conveyed the results of the series of inter-Korean summits and the first-ever US-North Korea summit to its people through propaganda media. The North Korean government called on its people to remain patient for just a bit longer, sending the message that it would be able to end its confrontation with the international community and focus on economic development. North Koreans endured the pain of economic hardship caused by tighter internal controls and the US economic blockade in the hopes that US-North Korea negotiations meant that the young leader Kim Jong Un would catch the two rabbits of regime security and economic development that Kim Jong Il had failed to achieve. Indeed, the US sanctions imposed on North Korea after the fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016 were enough to inflict pain not only on the Kim Jong Un regime but also on the North Korean people. The ban on exports of oil, chemical, and fertilizer products to energy-poor North Korea has dealt a direct blow to its economy, especially agricultural production. Oil and fertilizer aid, which had been provided by China, an ally regardless of sanctions, was suspended. The US has taken a so-called “smart sanction” approach by sanctioning agencies and people involved in nuclear development, saying it minimizes the humanitarian damage that could be caused by economic sanctions, but it has not in fact been “smart” at all. In the midst of this, the South Korean government and NGOs were unable to provide virtually any aid, even with sanctions exceptions granted by the US and UN. This seems to be due to the US calculation that any aid will weaken US leverage in the process of denuclearization negotiations. North Korea's current economic hardship is believed to be the worst since the early 2000s, when 300,000 died of starvation. In July 2020, North Korea finally began to criticize the US and South Korea. The regime’s criticism centered on how the US, South Korea, and the international community rewarded North Korea, which participated in the denuclearization negotiations in a serious and unprecedented manner to pursue peace on the Korean Peninsula starting with its attendance at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. The failure to come up with a proper compensation mechanism for North Korea, which actually participated in the negotiations, has impacted the situation in a number of ways. As discussed above, the unprecedented strong US sanctions against North Korea during the negotiations have left North Koreans more impoverished, greatly dampening Kim Jong Un's grip. Kim Jong Un's foreign policy of pursuing a conciliatory policy of dialogue and negotiations ended in failure, and Kim Jong Un will have no choice but to support the hardliners in denuclearization negotiations and foreign policy going forward. What created this situation? Did North Korea make too many demands at the US-North Korea talks in Hanoi in February 2019? Were the demands of the US reasonable? What did South Korea do? It may be difficult to find a clear answer, but if we look back on the past three years since the first inter-Korean summit in 2018, it is not difficult to understand the North's choices or the background of Kim Yo-jong’s criticism of the United States and South Korea issued in July of this year. First, the US has treated North Korea as though the regime is a teenager who should be disciplined, not as an equal with which the US must negotiate. The US began negotiations with the North determined not to offer any indications of potential compensation or signs of a conciliatory attitude until the teenager named North Korea reflected on its actions and promised to shape up. The outcome of this approach was foregone. The US would not make any concessions or offer kindness until North Korea first reflected on its attitude and asked for forgiveness, promising that it would never do wrong again. However, a successful negotiation is a process in which the participants in the negotiations recognize each other as partners on equal footing. Both sides can then reach an agreement while upholding mutual respect by making equivalent concessions to find a consensus. This further requires a clear mutual understanding of the needs of the other side. However, the US instead saw North Korea as a rogue boy, not a negotiating partner, and no conciliatory gestures such as compensation were ever considered as the US sought to change the North’s attitude. Second, let's assume that throughout the last three years of US-North Korea denuclearization negotiations, the US has maintained its perception that it is in a superior position rather than a partner in an equal dialogue. Viewed through this lens, the US approach to these negotiations has been one of a father seeking to discipline and correct the attitude of a rogue teenager. Even if this were the case, it takes a harmonious use of both carrots and sticks for a father with the upper hand in terms of power or authority to discipline a child. Children should not be given too much love or overly harsh discipline. For teenagers who have already demonstrated a bad attitude, hardline measures such as sticks will only worsen the situation. You have to expand your mind, and soft, warm gestures are the only way to open the heart of a wounded child. North Korea has been the loner of the international community for the past 30 years since the end of the Cold War, a rogue teenager who does not hesitate to act out to attract attention. Hunger and the past three years of denuclearization negotiations have been tougher than ever due to the US whip of economic sanctions. North Korea came to the negotiation table willing to discuss making changes. But when North Korea said they would turn over a new leaf, how could the US take their word for it? The US instead countered by asking the regime to show their willingness to change by taking action first, insisting on a total surrender and behavior change. Wasn't this demand too harsh for a child who just emerged from a dark tunnel? The father should have shown warm behavior first. In other words, the US should have provided North Korea, which was seriously involved in denuclearization negotiations, with a compensation mechanism. Third, suppose North Korea is a misbehaving child and the United States is the father who wants to correct their behavior. In this analogy, let us assume that South Korea is the mother. What role did the mother play in the father's discipline of his son? What should South Korea's role be? From South Korea’s perspective, the father is blunt and strict because he has a mission to protect his family from the harsh world. Such a father is more likely to use a whip than to engage in warm actions or speak gently to discipline his child. The mother should be an active partner who advises such a father that warm words and actions are a more effective means of discipline than a whip. It is easy to guess what role South Korea should have played as the mother when the US as the father favored taking up the whip over warm words and actions in disciplining his son, North Korea. However, South Korea did not do its part properly. Such a mother is bound to be resentful of North Korea's distorted position as a child. The last three years of denuclearization negotiations are about to collapse. COVID-19 has prompted North Korea to refrain from making the extreme choice of leaving the negotiating table entirely. However, even if the denuclearization negotiations between the US and North Korea resume, absent fundamental changes in Washington's attitude toward Pyongyang, the chances of success appear low. South Korea should also take a more active role. South Korea should hold on to North Korea, which wants to leave the negotiating table, and persuade the US to provide a corresponding compensation mechanism by sitting at the negotiating table. ■     Dr. Kyungyon Moon has been an associate professor at the School of International Studies at Jeonbuk National University, Republic of Korea since 2016. He served as a research fellow at the Research Institute for North Korea Development at the Export-Import Bank of Korea from May 2014 to February 2016, a research professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University from March 2013 to April 2014, and worked as a professional researcher at the Institute for Poverty Alleviation and International Development (IPAID) at Yonsei University in South Korea. He is a civilian member of the South and North Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council of the South Korean government. He has also served as the Chair of the Research Committee at the Korea Association of International Development and Cooperation and as a member of the Policy Advisory Committee of the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea. Moon received his master’s degree from the University of Oslo, Norway and his doctoral degree from Cranfield University in Britain. His research interests include poverty reduction, aid architecture, famine in North Korea, and civil movement in humanitarian and development assistance, as well as international cooperation with a special focus on food aid.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원 · 연구실장             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note The European Union and South Korea are important partners for each other in many aspects. The EU's eighth largest trading partner is South Korea, and the EU is the fourth largest export market for South Korea. In addition to trade, the two countries directly affect one another in information technology, health sector, as well as in security. Dr. Michael Reiterer, former ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Korea, explains the needs for international security cooperation in Asia. He argues that Seoul needs to contribute more in dealing with North Korea in order to maintain peace within the region. He also argues that “When necessary, South Korea must be prepared to use instruments, including commercial sanctions to support international efforts to promote global values and rights.” Dr. Reiterer also adds that South Korea has shown potential to contribute to a multilateral sys-tem through its experience in dealing with the pandemic. In particular, he argues that Seoul can play a role in engaging with the four major powers to bring peace to the Korean Peninsula.     The geopolitics and economics of Northeast Asia are very much part of a dangerous world. Geographical distance does not protect or shield the European Union because the global economy is heavily dependent on this region. The juxtaposition of national interests on the Korean Peninsula among the United States, China, Japan and Russia leave no doubt that peace and security is an essential element of the EU’s relations with these powers. The prosperity South Korea enjoys compared to many parts of the world often camouflages the fact that it is situated in a rough neighborhood. The potential for an explosion or implosion of North Korea cannot be completely ruled out. While Pyongyang insists that its nuclear and missile capabilities are for deterrence, increased confidence that it cannot be attacked by the US could tempt it into aggressive actions towards South Korea or the proliferation of WMD in attempts to procure foreign currency. Moreover, the Korean Peninsula lies at a juncture of major powers with different values and approaches to the international sys-tem. Competition between China and the US may be escalating to the level of a “new cold war”[1]. On top of this, South Korea’s historical disagreements with Japan strain what should be a natural sys-tem of alliances bringing together the US, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand to deal with an increasingly assertive China concerning Hong Kong, Taiwan and the East and South China Seas.   The North Korea challenge While many have gotten used to seven decades of brinkmanship, the country has now reached a stage where it may have the capacity to launch a nuclear armed Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile capable of hitting anywhere in Europe, North America or Australia. The 10 October 2020 parade commemorating the foundation of the Workers Party of Korea also sought to demonstrate a significant improvement in conventional warfare assets. This is not to mention the country’s equally menacing cyber-attack capability and stocks of chemical and biological weapons that are not only for deterrence—recall the assassination of Kim Jong-un’s half-brother at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in 2017. We know in hindsight that we may well have got closer to a military confrontation during the “fire and fury” days of 2017 than many realized when unknown new factors – including President Trump – entered the equation. Despite three meetings between Trump and Kim, negotiations remain stuck over the perennial problem of how to sequence actions towards denuclearization and a (gradual) lifting of sanctions. Of course, it is wishful thinking that North Korea, as it exists in its current form, would ever engage in complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. Kim Jong-un has made clear that nuclear weapons are not only a matter of national pride, but essential to regime survival, and in his argument, the prevention of war. “Irreversible” would mean a sudden disappearance of the scientists working for decades on the project and their accumulated know-how. Just as in the children’s story of the Emperor’s New Clothes when nobody dare say the obvious, the international community’s objective, whether it likes it or not, should be to limit the growth of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capacity. This equates to a de facto focus on arms control and ensuring that Pyongyang never sees a reason to use or aid the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Maintaining a constructive ambiguity may be useful: non-recognition as a nuclear state (unlike Pakistan and India, whose example weighs in negatively) may help to avoid a nuclear arms race. The North could go down the path of gradual denuclearization once the incentives are attractive enough, but achieving denuclearization up front, followed by normalization of relations with the US and the world is an unattainable goal. Alternatively, the international community could set the goal of addressing the situation through an overall package that would include an end-of-war declaration, peace treaty, diplomatic relations, negotiating processes, the lifting of sanctions according to benchmarks reached and eventually the securing of nuclear arms under the auspices and control of an international body. While difficult to imagine, this appears a preferable and attainable aspiration compared to the decades of stalemate which have worked exclusively in the interest of North Korea. The major problem remains that over the last decades North Korea successfully concealed its grand strategy of what it wants to achieve, in case that there is one, or has masterfully induced permanent guessing of what it could be – an element of insecurity and ambiguity which underpins the North Korean negotiating position.   The EU must be a player The security of Asia and Europe are intertwined as confirmed by the 2016 Global Strategy[2] and reiterated in the 2018 policy paper Enhanced Security Cooperation in and with Asia.[3] The EU had settled for a policy of “critical engagement”[4] with North Korea which needs to be revisited in light of the following developments: While all are talking or try to talk to the North (US, Chinese, Russian presidents to name just a few) the EU let the mid-senior level Political Dialogue between officials fade away after 2015.[5] Given the flurry of summits and engagement in 2018, the EU de facto side-lined itself. This is neither in line with the professed interest to be a global player and to contribute to peace and prosperity through conflict prevention and resolution, nor with trying to wield power and influence in using the language of power (J. Borrell[6]) which needs follow- up by actions demonstrating this power.  Redressing the situation will require a high-level political process at the ministerial level as the working level has not been able to move during the last five years. Having a clear EU position is also necessary to avoid seeing the EU get caught between the US and China. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not the prerogative of any two Member States. It is a common EU policy goal in the context of the threat that North Korea poses as well as the way its undermines principles of peaceful international relations and the rule of law. The non-accreditation of an EU ambassador to Pyongyang is an obstacle to engagement and should be solved quickly to allow normal diplomatic engagement. This would allow the EU to talk not only about but with North Korea. Opening and widening channels of communication are not a reward for anybody but a necessary condition for diplomacy to work effectively.   Need for international cooperation Based on the consensus reflected in the 2016 EU Global Strategy that the security and prosperity of Asia and Europe depend on each other and on the recognition that the Korean Peninsula is one of the hot spots of international politics, the EU as an aspiring global player needs a strategic approach that includes the necessary level of political attention and human and material resources. The interest of the EU’s citizens and economy are clear: the EU would be directly affected by a major crisis on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea is the EU’s eighth largest trading partner[7], with particular importance in information technology and more recently the health sector; the EU is the fourth largest export market and one of the largest foreign investors in South Korea. On the meta-level, the effectiveness of the multilateral sys-tem with the UN at its center is at stake when it comes to sanctions, human rights and dispute management.   The EU’s comprehensive approach to foreign and security policy In order to address the situation in North Korea the EU needs to draw on its comprehensive approach to security and make good use of its toolbox as there is need to: manage a crisis;[8] prevent a crisis from escalating; provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities; mitigate a public health situation made worse by COVID-19 despite denials; work towards arms reduction and denuclearization; deal with flagrant violations of human rights; and facilitate an environment conducive to negotiations through trust and confidence building measures.   If there ever are significant changes in the situation and the major parties begin to move towards a settlement of some kind such as an end of war declaration or peace treaty, there will be a demand to look at lessons from the EU in stabilizing post-conflict situations and guiding countries into participation in the international community and global economy. The example of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) project in the 1990s testifies to the importance of the EU being part of any such process and not simply a financial contributor[9]. Therefore, timely preparations are needed to develop a road map including contingency planning for positive and negative scenarios that will allow the EU to be part of the (pre-) negotiating process.   The EU’s policy toolbox The EU is rather scrupulous in supporting the effective implementation of international sanctions, which are in addition to autonomous ones through demarches and technical support, and in issuing statements to make clear what is expected of the DPRK – all necessary and useful policy instruments. The latest round of such demarches was completed in October 2020. However, I agree with many analysts[10] that if the EU is to pursue its interests in East Asia, like the other major players, it must be in a position to utilize the following specific instruments of engagement in relation to North Korea: increasing contacts with the DPRK Embassy in Berlin that is responsible for EU affairs; making better use of the six embassies of Member States in Pyongyang, once the full diplomatic presence in the North Korean capital is restored post-COVID; re-starting the EU-DPRK Political Dialogue and using it for functional approaches based on common interest, like engaging in a human rights dialogue based on human security; nominating a non-resident EU Ambassador to the DPRK; eventually nominating a Special Representative; and promoting and participating in relevant Track 1.5 events.   With international partners, the EU should consider: offering the experience gained in difficult negotiations in Europe, following up on the offer to share more closely experiences from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) negotiating process and sharing the advantages of multilateralism.   Promoting the multilateral rules-based sys-tem and the rule of law[11] is an essential ingredient for providing security on the Korean Peninsula. Frankly, this has thus far been in short supply. There has to be confidence that an agreement reached by diplomatic means will be effectively implemented and guaranteed, otherwise no party and especially North Korea will have any incentive to sign a treaty. Providing such an environment through active crisis management could be an essential contribution by the EU which has higher credibility in this area than any other player, not least because of its unwavering support despite fierce US resistance for the Iran agreement which it helped to negotiate in the first place. Monitoring of any agreement reached, especially regarding denuclearization could be an appreciated contribution by the EU, including providing verification inspectors in support of IAEA. In a negative scenario, the tightening of the EU’s own autonomous sanctions must be part of the planning. At the same time, consideration should be given to a loosening of sanctions in a positive scenario, in line with critical engagement and a balanced and effective carrot and stick approach. Furthermore, at this stage, the Korean Peninsula would blend well into the Connectivity of the Eurasian continent, as advocated by the EU-Connectivity Strategy[12] and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM).[13] On all these instruments, the EU could deliver if it is united. Without unity in foreign policy, attention will be needed not to raise false expectations or to try and punch beyond its weight, which would lead to a loss of credibility. A policy paper under the guidance of the EEAS outlining a fresh start for the EU to assist the deblocking of the current situation presented at a convenient venue for interested parties would facilitate engagement and provide transparency. Last but not least, in order to walk the talk, sufficient means (personnel, funds) would be required to implement a work program.   Seoul needs to contribute The Moon Jae-in Administration has a very strong focus on North Korea. This reminds me of my first meeting with a Korean President, Kim Dae-jung, at the 2000 ASEM Summit when it was known that he was about to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for having solved the North Korean issue… While the Moon Administration’s focus on inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation brought success in 2018, the problems since testify to the need for a wider South Korean focus on strengthening the international rule of law-based sys-tem on which any ultimate settlement will depend. Seoul needs to stand up and be heard in defending universal values. This often leads to uncomfortable situations and reactions that go against commercial and even short-term security interests: one can never always please Washington, Beijing and Moscow at the same time, however important their positions on the DPRK might be. When necessary, South Korea must be prepared to use instruments, including commercial sanctions to support international efforts to promote global values and rights. The EU and its Member States and other middle powers[14] such as Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Canada often find themselves falling into the bad books of important and powerful partners while defending the global commons. But that does not stop them from speaking up. They realize that the defense of the rules-based sys-tem as a whole is the basis for promoting their interests. South Korea currently has many areas in which it could step up its contribution to the multilateral sys-tem. The example it has set in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, the potential it has to (yet to be proved) to be a leader in promoting a green economic recovery, its strengths in the digital economy and the soft power it gains from the popularity of its cultural products around the world are key building blocks for expanding this role. Ultimately, a stronger international sys-tem of multilateralism and rule of law will serve to support Seoul in its engagement with the four major powers in pursuing peace on the Korean Peninsula. It will also be the necessary framework for accommodating China’s security interests.   Conclusion In many of these areas, the European Union is a natural and congenial partner for South Korea. This is evident when looking back on 57 years of diplomatic relations and a decade of EU-Korea Strategic Partnership[15] being commemorated in 2020. Walking the talk of the policy of Enhanced Security Cooperation in and with Asia and translating the “language of power” into action means that there must be a focus[16] on Northeast Asia if the EU is serious about becoming a Global Player. This is an ample groundwork to build upon.■   [1] Gideon Rachman (2020). A new cold war: Trump, Xi and the escalating US-China confrontation, Financial Times, 5 October 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/7b809c6a-f733-46f5-a312-9152aed28172 [2] European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf [3] Council of the European Union, Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia - Council conclusions, 28 May 2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35456/st09265-re01-en18.pdf [4] European Union External Action, DPRK and the EU, 26 June 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4186/DPRK%20and%20the%20EU [5] European Union External Actions, EU-DPRK Political Dialogue – 14th Session, 25 June 2015, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/6336/node/6336_ko [6] European Parliament, Hearing with High Representative/Vice President-designate Josep Borrell, 7 October 2019. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190926IPR62260/hearing-with-high-representative-vice-president-designate-josep-borrell [7] European Commission, Countries and regions: South Korea, April 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/ [8] European Union External Action, Crisis management and Response, 15 June 2019,  https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/412/crisis-management-and-response_en [9] Michael Reiterer. “The EU’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific region”. Marchi, Ludovica (ed.) The European Union and Myanmar: Interactions via ASEAN. Routledge, 2019; p. 10. [10] Ramon Pacheco Pardo, et al, It’s Time for the European Union to Talk to North Korea, 38 North, 2 March 2020, https://www.38north.org/2020/03/eu030220/; Mason Richey, et al, “Strategic Implications of a Nuclear North Korea: Europe’s Dual Role in Diplomacy and Deterrence,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 32, No. 2, June 2020, pp 231－252; Tereza Novotna, What Can a New “Geopolitical” EU Do about North Korea?, 38 North, 6 February 2020, https://www.38north.org/2020/02/tnovotna020620/; Ramon Pacheco Pardo, The EU is irrelevant in the Korean Peninsula, right? Wrong, EUROACTIV, 1 February 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/european-external-action-service/opinion/thurs-the-eu-is-irrelevant-in-the-korean-peninsula-right-wrong/; Mario Esteban, The EU´s role in stabilising the Korean Peninsula, Real Instituto Elanco Working Paper, January 2019, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/49ffc71b-569c-4c88-bcab-b9bffc485716/WP1-2018-Esteban-EU-role-stabilising-Korean-Peninsula.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=49ffc71b-569c-4c88-bcab-b9bffc485716%20 [11] Council of the European Union , Council conclusions-EU action to strengthen rules-based multilateralism, 17 June 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39791/st10341-en19.pdf [12] European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank: Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategyl, 19 September 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_-_connecting_europe_and_asia_-_building_blocks_for_an_eu_strategy_2018-09-19.pdf  This Communication builds on the EU´s experience of enhancing connections among Member States and with and in other regions. The sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity distinguishes it from the BRI and aims at connecting the Eurasian continent in offering Connectivity partnerships (first concluded with Japan in 2019). [13] European Commission, European Commission: ASEM Sustainable Connectivity Portal, https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/asem-sustainable-connectivity/ [14] Leif-Eric Easley, Shaping South Korea’s middle-power future, East Asia Forum, 27 May 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/05/27/shaping-south-koreas-middle-power-future/ [15] For the EU, a Strategic Partnership is not just an honorary title but a recognition that a partner has the means and the will to work with the EU in addressing issues of global significance. In Asia, the EU has only four strategic partners; namely with Korea, India, China and Japan. Strategic partners cooperate in the interest of defending the global commons, based on shared interests not only bilaterally; Michael Reiterer, The 10th Anniversary of the EU-Korea Strategic Partnership, Institute for European Studies Policy Brief, July 2020, https://www.korea-chair.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/KFVUB_Policy-Brief-2020-09.pdf [16] Mason Richey, et al, A pivotal shift: Europe’s strategic partnerships and rebalance to East Asia. Political Science, 2019, DOI 10.1080/00323187.2019.1640070     Michael Reiterer studied law at the University of Innsbruck (Dr. juris) and holds diplomas in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University/Bologna Centre and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.  In 2005 he was appointed adjunct professor for international politics at the University of Innsbruck; in 2018 Distinguished Associate Professor, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), changed to Distinguished Professor in International Security and Diplomacy. Furthermore, since 2020 he was invited to join the Global Fellowship Initiative of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) as Associate Fellow and the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS), Washington D.C., as Senior Advisor. He is also Adjunct Professor at LUISS, Rome, Webster University, Vienna and Danube University, Krems. He is a frequent speaker at international conferences, teaches at various universities specializing in EU foreign policy, EU-Asia relations, Northeast Asia, Korea, Japan, inter-regionalism, human rights and cultural diplomacy - all areas he has published extensively in.  He retired as an official of the European Union in September 2020 after having served as Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the European Union (EU) to the Republic of Korea (2017-20), Principal Advisor at the Asia-Pacific Department of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels (2012-16), EU-Ambassador to Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein (2007-2011), Minister/Deputy Head of the EU-Delegation to Japan (2002-2006) and as Counsellor for the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). In the Austrian service (1981-1998) he held the positions of Minister Counsellor at the Permanent Mission to the EU, Counsellor at the Permanent Mission to GATT and Deputy Trade Commissioner for West African (out of Abidjan, Cote d´Ivoire) and for Japan.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원 · 연구실장             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr