동아시아안보와 국제 관계에 대한 꾸준한 연구 활동을 펼쳐온 오공단 박사가 새로운 저작을 발표했다. 북한의 정책 엘리트들을 다룬 이번 저작물에서는 그들의 힘을 지탱하는 방식, 정당과 정치체제, 정보 경로 및 인터넷이나 휴대전화까지 최신의 방대한 자료를 일목요연하게 정리하고 있다.
부루킹스연구소에서 수석연구위원으로 재직하고 있는 오공단 박사는
"North Korea"s Nuclear Politics", Current History, with Ralph C. Hassig (September 2004)
"North Korea: The Hardest Nut," Foreign Policy, with Ralph C. Hassig (November 2003)
"Prospects for Korean Unification," Education About Asia (Fall 2003)
"Northeast Asia: Changes and the Potential for a Cooperative Future," NIRA Policy Research (Vol. 16, No.1, 2003)
"Terrorism Eclipses the Sunshine Policy: Inter-Korean Relations and the United States," Asian Update (The Asia Society, 2002)
등을 비롯한 한반도와 동아시아 지역에 대한 왕성한 연구활동을 펼치고 있다.
Executive Summary
As with any nation, access to information within the DPRK proceeds along two very broad paths - official and unofficial. And, as with any other nation, the paths are affected by a host of social and political factors. Within the DPRK, these factors are expressed in extremes not typically witnessed in other nations.
The most significant of these is the importance and closeness of an individual or organization to Kim Chong-il and the power-holding elite. The average infantry soldier or citizen has no access whatsoever; however, as one progresses up the military chain of command or within the Korean Workers" Party (KWP), access increases so that at the very top three-tenths of one percent of the population - the military and power-holding elite and their immediate subordinates - access to information is the best it can be.
The military elite within the DPRK should be understood to comprise not only those individuals within the National Defense Commission holding military rank, but also those military personnel situated within the broader power-holding elite. From an organizational standpoint, this includes the Ministry of People"s Armed Forces (MPAF) leadership and extends down to the commanders of the Guard Command, Security Command, General Rear Services Bureau, General Staff Department, Korean People’s Navy Command, Korean People"s Air and Air Defense Command, Corps, and a small number of the General Staff Department’s major bureaus (e.g., Reconnaissance Bureau). It also includes those individuals within the KWP, the State Security Department (SSD), and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) who are serving military officers.
When looking at access to information among the military elite, it is essential that the reader set aside many preconceived ideas concerning the nation and the subject. The most common of these - and thus the most important to set aside - is that the DPRK is a "closed" nation. While true for the vast majority of its population, it is patently false when considering the military elite. Their potential to access information,1 should they desire to do so, is quite good, but certainly less than that of their counterparts in the Republic of Korea (ROK, more commonly known as South Korea).
The flow of information within the DPRK can best be described as "Kimcentric" - vertical and convoluted. That is, it is towards Kim Chong-il that all important 1 The term "potential" is used here because it is unclear whether the majority of the military and power-holding elite actually desire to access information on their own from outside the nation.
information streams, and from him that all significant orders and directions issue forth. For the nation in general, and the military specifically, this flow is vertical. In most militaries in the world, information flows both up and down the chain of command and horizontally at each level, while orders flow down. Within the Korean People’s Army (KPA), information flows up the chain of command and only orders flow down. There is extremely little horizontal flow of information or communications except at the highest levels. Major KPA units (e.g., corps, divisions, and brigades) can communicate with headquarters above them and units subordinate to them, but very little communication is permitted with units adjacent to them. This vertical flow of information is a means of maintaining strict control over the KPA. The belief is that if major units were allowed to communicate horizontally, they could unite and possibly stage a coup.
As information flows upwards into the military and power-holding elites, it is processed by overlapping and competing organizations - many of which are in competition with each other through what might best be described as a lens of self deception composed of four layers: historical world view, political indoctrination, hatred for the U.S., and authoritarian cultural rules.
This lens is so darkly colored that instead of focusing and illuminating, it distorts and misrepresents the reality of the information. Ominously, it is upon this information and analysis that Kim Chong-il and the military and power-holding elite base their decision making.
The Internet (and to a lesser degree the national intranet) is playing an increasingly important role within the DPRK. The basic reason for this is simple: "information is power." Kim Chong-il and the military and power-holding elite unmistakably erstand this, which is why they have so vigorously endeavored to restrict access to it. Yet, at the same time they understand the decisive importance of the information concerning world affairs available on the Internet in bolstering their national survival.
Because of the extremes inherent in the access and flow of information among the military and power-holding elite, the entire process is vulnerable to self-deception, overload, manipulation (domestic or foreign), and collapse.
주요 목차
A. The Military and the Power-holding Elite
B. Organization National Defense Commission
Korean Workers" Party
Ministry of People"s Armed Forces
Intelligence and Internal Security Services
Cabinet
C. Information Access and Flow
Internet, Intranet, and Cell Phones
Access to Information
Flow of Information
Lens of Self Deception
D. Summary
Appendix A: DPRK Print and Electronic Media
