EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 29   Author 통일연구원 연구위원인 김수암 박사는 서울대학교에서 정치학 박사학위를 받고 민주평통 상임위원, 외교통상부 정책자문위원으로 활동하고 있다. 연구관심은 북한인권, 대북지원, 남북간 인도주의 사안 등이다. 수많은 논문과 연구보고서를 출판했으며, 최근 논문으로는 “대북지원과 국민적 합의,” “유엔인권레짐과 북한인권: ‘전략’과 ‘관계’를 중심으로,” “헬싱키 최종의정서의 의의와 특징: 인권의제를 중심으로” 등이 있다.         I. 문제제기   1990년대 국가의 배급에 의지하고 있던 북한주민들은 경제난에 따른 심각한 식량난으로 인해 아사라는 극단적 상황에 직면하게 되었다. 당시 당국의 허가 없이 다른 국가로 넘어가는 것은 조국반역 행위로서 심각한 처벌이 뒤따르게 되었다. 그럼에도 불구하고 아사라는 절망적 상황에 몰린 북한주민들은 처벌의 위협을 무릅쓰고 식량을 구하기 위해 국경을 넘어 중국으로 넘어가게 되었다. 그런데 북한의 경제난이 장기화되면서 단순히 식량을 구하러 넘어갔다 되돌아오던 탈북행위의 성격도 변화하기 시작하였다. 점점 중국 내에서 체류하면서 돈을 벌려는 탈북 행렬이 증가하게 되었다.   이와 같이 중국에 체류하는 탈북자들이 증가하면서 핵심 당사국인 중국은 탈북자 문제를 주요 현안으로 다루지 않을 수 없었다. 중국은 탈북자에 대해 인권적•인도적 관점에서 접근하기보다 북중간의 정치ᆞ안보적 이해라는 전략적 관점에서 접근하였다. 특히 중국은 탈북자에 대해 ‘난민’이 아니라 경제적 목적으로 중국과 북한의 국경을 불법적으로 넘어온 ‘불법월경자’라는 입장을 확고하게 견지하였다. 이러한 입장에 따라 중국은 탈북자들을 체포하여 북한으로 강제로 송환하여 왔다. 다만, 국제사회의 비난이 거세지면서 중국 내 공관에 진입한 탈북자들의 제3국 정착을 허용하는 등 일부 인도적 관점을 수용하기도 하였다. 이러한 일부 전향적 조치에도 불구하고 탈북자들의 강제 송환이 지속되면서 주로 탈북자의 국제법적 신분과 강제송환문제에 국내외의 관심이 집중되어 왔다.   1990년대 중반 탈북 행렬이 본격화된 이후 탈북 현상의 장기화 과정에서 탈북양상이 변화하고 있다. 먼저 북한 내 배출요인, 중국ᆞ한국 등 외부의 유인요인도 변화하고 있다. 특히 탈북자들의 탈북동기에서 커다란 변화가 나타나고 있다. 또한 남성 중심에서 여성 중심으로 탈북자의 성별 비율이 급격하게 변화하였다. 이들 탈북 여성들은 비자발적 형태로 중국 남성과 결혼관계를 유지하여 왔고 이 과정에서 탈북 여성과 중국 남성 사이에 태어난 아동들의 인권문제가 주요 현안으로 대두되고 있다. 또한 남한에서 정착하는 탈북자들의 규모가 증가하는 가운데 기입국한 탈북자와 북한 내 가족과의 연계가 탈북 행위의 성격에 변화를 초래하는 요인으로 작용하고 있다.   이러한 변화 현상에서 보듯이 1990년대, 2000년대를 거치면서 탈북자 문제는 복합적 성격을 띠게 되었다. 따라서 우리는 탈북 현상의 장기화에 따른 탈북자 문제의 복합적 성격을 정확하게 규명하고 그 대응방안을 마련할 필요가 있다. 무엇보다도 탈북자 문제는 핵심 당사자인 강대국 중국의 태도를 변화시켜야 하는 전략적 성격을 내포하고 있다는 점도 고려하여 접근해야 한다. 이 글에서는 탈북행위 성격의 변화 양상을 규명하고 중국의 태도 변화를 유도할 수 있는 대안을 제시하고자 한다.   II. 중국 체류 탈북자 양상의 변화   고난의 행군 이후 거의 20년 동안 탈북 행렬이 지속되는 과정에서 중국 내 탈북자 성격도 변화를 겪고 있다. 따라서 효율적인 탈북자 정책을 수립하기 위해서는 이러한 탈북자 성격의 변화에 대한 면밀한 고찰이 전제되어야 한다.   1. 중국 체류 탈북자 규모의 감소   중국은 탈북자를 불법월경자로 규정하고 있기 때문에 유엔난민최고대표사무소(UNHCR)와 NGO의 접근을 허용하지 않고 있다. 이로 인해 탈북자 규모를 체계적으로 조사할 수 없는 상황이다. 따라서 중국에 체류하고 있는 탈북자 규모를 정확하게 파악하기는 어렵다. 다만 1990년대 중반 이후 탈북자 지원 단체와 전문가들은 표본 조사를 통해 탈북자 규모를 추산하여 왔다. 이와 같이 추산의 방식으로 규모에 접근함으로써 발표 주체별로 상당한 편차를 보여 왔다. 그럼에도 불구하고 북한 내 고난의 행군 시기에 맞물려 1999년 후반 중국 내 탈북자 규모가 가장 정점에 달했다는 사실에 대해서는 공감대가 형성되었다.   1990년대 후반 정점을 기록한 중국 내 체류 탈북자의 규모는 2000년대 들어 지속적으로 감소되는 것으로 파악되고 있다. 발표 주체별로 여전히 규모의 편차가 있지만 2000년대 초반이 되면 탈북자의 규모에 대해 10만명 선이라고 추산하는 견해가 다수를 점하고 있다. 그런데 2000년대 중반으로 접어들면서 탈북자 규모는 더욱 축소되는 것으로 평가되고 있다. 미 국무부는 2005년 2월 조사결과를 토대로 미국의 탈북자 정책의 근간이 될 해외체류 탈북자 규모에 대해 3만~5만 명으로 추정한 바 있다. 좋은벗들도 2005년 6~7월 국경에서 500km 반경에 있는 동북3성 농촌지역에 대한 중국 현장조사 결과를 토대로 탈북자 규모가 5만명 선인 것으로 발표하였다.   2000년대 후반이 되면 탈북자 규모는 2만~5만명 선으로 보다 감소한 것으로 추정되고 있다. 피터슨 연구소의 놀랜드와 해거드는 2008년 중국 내 탈북자가 크게 감소되어 2~4만 명 정도로 추산하였다. 현재 민간단체 일부는 1만 2천~2만명 선으로 추정하고 있다. 그러면 전반적으로 중국에 체류하는 탈북자 규모가 감소하는 요인은 무엇인가? 첫째, 후술하듯이 신규탈북의 경우 남한행을 희망하는 비중이 압도적으로 높다는 점에서 중국 내 체류 규모의 증가로 이어지지 않고 있다. 둘째, 중국에 장기 체류하는 탈북자들도 지속적으로 남한으로 입국하고 있다. 신규 탈북에 따른 중국 체류 탈북자 증가가 없는 가운데 탈북자에 대한 중국공안의 단속으로 인한 신분불안정, 강제 송환 이후 북한당국에 의한 처벌에 직면한 탈북자들은 제3국에서 재정착을 모색하도록 만드는 요인으로 작용하고 있다. 이와 같이 중국 내 체류하는 탈북자가 제3국 정착을 위해 중국을 떠나면서 중국 내 탈북자 규모가 감소하는 요인으로 작용하고 있다. 미국, 영국, 캐나다 등 탈북자들의 국제이동 경로가 다양해지고 있지만 특히 남한에서 정착하기 위해 중국을 떠나는 탈북자가 증가하면서 남한 내 유인요인이 중국 내 탈북자 규모 감소의 핵심 요인이 되고 있다. 2002년부터 1,000명을 넘어선 이후 2006년부터 2,000명 이상의 탈북자가 남한에 입국하고 있다. 신규 탈북이 급격하게 감소하는 가운데 기존에 중국에 체류하고 있던 탈북자들의 남한 입국이 꾸준하게 증가하면서 중국 체류 탈북자 규모는 지속적으로 감소하고 있는 것으로 판단된다. 셋째, 중국 당국이 탈북자를 체포하여 지속적으로 북한으로 강제송환하고 있다.   이와 같이 탈북자의 전체 규모는 감소하고 있지만 이들의 중국 내 체류는 장기화되고 있다. 따라서 규모의 축소와 체류의 장기화를 고려한 실질적 보호방안을 마련할 필요가 있다.   2. 탈북동기의 변화   규모의 축소 및 체류의 장기화와 더불어 배출요인(push factor)의 관점에서 탈북 동기의 변화양상을 고려할 필요가 있다. 핵심 배출요인의 하나인 탈북동기에 변화가 나타나고 있다. 첫째, 초창기 생존을 위한 탈북보다는 북한 내 삶과 비교하여 ‘보다 나은 삶’을 찾아 탈북하는 현상이 늘어나고 있다. 이에 따라 경제적 동기 자체에도 질적 변화가 나타나고 있다. 둘째, 기입국 북한이탈주민들의 권유에 따른 탈북이 크게 증가하고 있다.   [표 1]에서 보듯이 통일연구원이 2010년부터 금년 10월말까지 입국한 606명의 탈북자를 대상으로 실시한 실태 조사에서 606명 조사대상자 중 402명이 탈북동기에 대해 응답하였다. 이들 420명의 탈북동기를 살펴보면 여전히 경제적 이유가 39.1%로 가장 높은 비중을 차지하고 있지만 기입국 가족의 권유도 25.7%로 상당히 높게 나타나고 있다. 그리고 북한체제에 대한 불만도 12.6%로 나타나고 있다. 이와 같이 북한체제에 대한 불만, 처벌에 대한 두려움, 한국행이라는 탈북동기는 북한당국의 입장에서 조국반역죄 등 반국가 및 반민족 범죄 차원에서 처벌할 가능성이 높다는 점에서 탈북자의 국제법적 지위규정에 영향을 미치는 주요 요소가 될 수 있다...(계속)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 27   Author Sukhee Han is currently an associate professor of Chinese studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He completed both undergraduate and MA program at the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Yonsei University. He continued his M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. degree programs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. With the completion of his Ph.D. in 1998, he moved to Beijing and accumulated his career as a lecturer at Peking University’s School of Government and as a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing. Professor Han’s area of interest is in Chinese security and foreign policy as well as business practices in China. His recent English publications include “South Korea between the United States and China since the Global Financial Crisis” (2010), “The Evaluation of Beijing Consensus: A Case of China-Angola Relations”(2009), “China’s Pursuit of Peaceful Power Transition: A Case of ICT” (2009), “Public Diplomacy between China and the World: The 2008 Beijing Olympic Torch Relay, A Test Case”(2009), “The Rise of China, Power Transition and South Korea's Soft Hedging”(2009), “Support and Apprehension: Chinese Views on the US Presidential Election”(2009), and “From Engagement to Hedging: South Korea’s New China Policy” (2008).         I. Introduction   Traditionally China has emphasized peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as an important strategic interest in its security. As East Asian history demonstrates, China has long perceived the Korean Peninsula as a strategic catalyst for its security and safety, and therefore it has never allowed any other power, other than itself, to exercise control of the peninsula. China has decided to intervene in Korea militarily four times—in 1592, 1627, 1894, and 1950—combating the potential challengers for securing its own suzerainty over the peninsula. Although China’s sphere of influence shrank to the northern half of the peninsula in the wake of the end of the Korean War in 1953, its interest in North Korea as a strategic buffer has remained consistent until the present. Given Pyongyang’s strategic value as a buffer state, Beijing’s primary objective with the North has been the survival of its backward and fragile regime, and peace and stability remain as the necessary prerequisite for its regional security.   However, the recent security environment on the peninsula has never achieved the expectations of China as it has grown. A series of Pyongyang’s arbitrary military provocations, including its sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010, its bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in November of 2010, and its unauthorized launch of a long-range missile in April 2012 have profoundly undermined the security environment around the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the sudden death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 has further aggravated the regional sense of security uncertainty. This unstable security situation per se may be indicative of the term “status quo minus.” Status quo minus implies a situation in which a weak and isolated North Korea raises an imminent security threat by “demonstrating an enhanced capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction and adopting more bellicose rhetoric and behavior.” (Goldstein 2006, 131-136) In this context, economically desperate North Korea tends to implement aggressive provocations on the basis of its belief that Pyongyang’s assertive behavior helps its regime survival. Subsequent U.S. military counteraction against North Korea’s violence will inevitably force China to intervene in the North Korean quagmire.   As a political ally, economic supporter, and diplomatic patron to Pyongyang’s regime, China has exerted whatever diplomatic influence and intervention it can on the North as far as these help maintain peace and stability in the region. Once it intervenes, China’s strategic objective is to shift the security situation on the Korean Peninsula from a status quo minus to a status quo plus. “Status quo plus,” in contrast to status quo minus, indicates a situation in which North Korea stops imposing a serious threat or provocation to neighboring states. In this context, the risk of intense crisis or military confrontation remains “at a modest level,” by the major presence of U.S. military stationed in South Korea. Also, the U.S. security alliance works as a hedge against a deterioration of strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula. To the extent that North Korea’s belligerence can be successfully constrained, security and stability on the peninsula and broadly in the Northeast Asian region may be sustained.   For China, status quo plus seems to be the most preferred security context for the region. China believes that status quo plus shapes North Korea to be kinder, gentler, and more reform-oriented. It also understands status quo plus as “the best way to ensure Pyongyang’s survival,” without any sudden major changes. (Scobell 2004, 16-17) Therefore, China, in pursuit of reaching a status quo plus has to deal with three different North Korean issues: North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, Pyongyang’s economic predicament, and the North’s violent provocations in the region. Despite no immediately satisfactory outcome expected in a short time period, China has consistently implemented its political, economic, and diplomatic influence to shift the regional security situation from status quo minus to status quo plus.   II. The North Korean Threat and Status Quo Minus   The major reason to define the post-2010 security situation on the Korean Peninsula as status quo minus is that North Korea, despite its economic backwardness, diplomatic isolation, and political volatility, poses a variety of security threats to the Northeast Asian region. North Korean threats can be classified into three dimensions. First, Pyongyang’s nuclear threat for about twenty years has continued to undermine Northeast Asian regional stability. Despite the Agreement Framework of 1994 and the eight-year-long Six-Party Talks, North Korea has continued to develope its nuclear devices, and it ultimately tested them twice in 2006 and 2009. Even after the nuclear tests, no specific diplomatic measures have been found to dismantle Pyongyang’s unauthorized nuclear development except the Six-Party Talks. (Nanto and Manyin 2010) Despite the death of his father, however, Kim Jong-un seems to have no intention of giving up his nuclear program and therefore the Six-Party Talks have little chance of meeting their founding goal: North Korea’s nuclear dismantlement. Although China has consistently argued for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, China falls short of convincing the regional powers and in the meantime the North’s nuclear threats are getting more serious for South Korea’s security. (Chanlett-Avery 2012)   Second, North Korea’s military provocations toward the South have caused profound security threats to the entire region. Two cases, including the tragedy of the Cheonan in March 2010 and the North’s bombardment of the South’s Yeonpyong Island in November 2010, have shown that North Korea can provoke security threats to the South at any time without declaration of war. (Thompson 2010; Swaine 2010; 2011) Furthermore, these provocations have also showed that the bilateral confrontation on the Korean Peninsula risk being escalated to a face-off between the regional powers: the United States and China. The cases of the Cheonan and Yeonpyong divided regional security structure into two alliance systems, the U.S.-Korean alliance and the Chinese-North Korean alliance, and the potential confrontation between the two alliance systems creates regional instability. (Michishita 2009, 139-152) To maintain regional security and stability, the vicious cycle that begins from North Korea’s provocations to the South, as a first step, should be controlled. Pyongyang’s provocations, alarming Seoul and prompting it to improve its defense capabilities, forced the implementation of a U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise. And China, suspicious of U.S. military intentions, tends to be at odds with the United States and South Korea, while improving its diplomatic and economic ties with the North. At this stage, the key point is how to stop North Korea’s further provocations toward the South. For regional crisis prevention, China’s diplomatic influence on the North is essential. (Byun 2010)...(Continued)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 22   Author Shin-wha Lee is a professor in the department of political science and international relations at Korea University. Professor Lee received her B.A. in English language and literature from Ewha Women’s University and received her Ph.D. in government and politics (international relations) from University of Maryland at College and served as Post-Doctoral fellowship at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. She served as a researcher of Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University, special advisor to the United Nations, ‘Rwandan Independent Inquiry’ appointed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, chair’s advisor of East Asian Vision Group, Korean Coordinator of Trilateral Commission, visiting professor of Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at Singapore Nanyang University, Korean representative of the Korea-China-Japan Future Leaders’ Forum, visiting scholar of East Asian Studies Program at Princeton University, full-time visiting professor of School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, and scholar-in-residence for political affairs of the Republic of Korea Permanent Mission to the United Nations. Now she is a member of editorial board of Journal of East Asian Studies, research director of Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University, member of Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, member of Trilateral Commission, member and executive committee of board of directors of Academic Council for the United Nations System, and division chief of Asiatic Research Center at Korea University Humanity Korea (HK) Project. Her recent English publications include South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia (2008), Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks for the Promotion of Human Security in East-Asia (2004), and Environment Matters: Conflicts, Refugees & International Relations (2001).       I. Introduction   The end of the twentieth century witnessed a change in the nature of armed conflict. Large interstate wars were replaced by violent intrastate conflicts, or “new wars” (Kaldor 1999; 2007), where the vast majority of casualties have been civilians. Overwhelmed by the proliferation of internal conflicts and the resulting humanitarian crises over the past two decades, the international community has increasingly recognized the importance of international mediation or intervention for crisis prevention and response. UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions have been the primary tool for dealing with these problems, with human rights and international responsibility towards civilians trumping potential violations of state sovereignty.   However, international intervention, particularly ones that involve military action, has increased concerns among some states worried about potential infringements on state sovereignty. Since the issue of human rights is commonly regarded as part of the domestic legal affairs of state, external intervention on the grounds of human rights violations is viewed as unjustifiable violation of sovereignty (Lee 2004).   Consequently, the international community remains undecided whether human rights and humanitarian issues should be seen as problems of security. In contrast, issues such as environmental and economic deterioration, and the spread of epidemiological diseases have been defined as security relatively easily. Regardless, it seems to be an irreversible trend within the United Nations (UN) and among other international actors to seek and justify new norms and rules of protection after witnessing obvious failures to prevent mass atrocities and the genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur. In order to address the issues of state sovereignty and individual human rights simultaneously, a change in the normative framework is much needed. The notion of the responsibility to protect (R2P) was developed with this imperative to seek a new international norm and policy guideline on when and how the international community should intervene for the sake of human protection. After the NATO-led military action in Kosovo in 1999 for humanitarian ends brought about serious concerns about the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, the report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) on the R2P attracted global attention and fueled an international debate.   The R2P is a norm or set of principles that redefines sovereignty as a responsibility rather than as a privilege or a means of control. It prescribes that a state has the responsibility to protect its population and if a national government is neither able nor willing to fulfill the responsibility to protect its people, the international community has a secondary responsibility to protect them by force, if necessary, from the “four R2P crimes,” genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (ICISS 2001). The principles of R2P were unanimously adopted by the heads of state and government at the World Summit High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2005, and the UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/63/308) on the implementation of R2P was adopted in September 2009.   However, it is very difficult to turn the concept into policy, even if it is unanimously accepted. Originally, the ICISS report recommended that the range of R2P should include situations of state collapse and overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes (ICISS 2001), but this was later narrowed down to the four R2P crimes. This was to prohibit arbitrary use of the R2P concept to justify unbounded international intervention. Yet, it still generated much controversy during the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctioned North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military intervention in Libya in 2011, an intervention based on R2P. Moreover, this limited definition of R2P has led to debates on how it can effectively respond to cases such as North Korea, which face complex emergencies where a combination of natural and man-made disasters adds to the suffering of the people.   Just as in humanitarian intervention, the R2P faces several dilemmas: How serious should humanitarian emergencies be to warrant international intervention? How can the narrowly defined R2P crimes accommodate those suffering in complex humanitarian crises? When should the UNSC approve external military engagement as a justifiable act and when should it not? What generates more danger, forcibly intervening or remaining an onlooker to the humanitarian crisis within a state? What kinds of normative and legal grounds can the R2P provide for outside involvement? Why is the R2P doctrine more than mere humanitarian intervention, and can the R2P overcome the shortcomings of humanitarian intervention? Why did we need intervention in Libya while not in Syria where the situation has been more or less the same as in Libya in terms of the necessity of civilian protection? Is it feasible for the international community to opt for military intervention in North Korea based on the principles of the R2P if a crisis occurs as it did in Libya?   Along the line of these inquiries, this working paper first reviews international responses to complex emergencies, with particular emphasis on multidimensional UN peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Second, the development of the concept and debates of the R2P will be discussed, which will be followed by the limitations and controversies related to the notions and practices of the R2P. Third, the possibility of the R2P applied to both internationally endorsed R2P crimes and “non-R2P” crimes will be examined with a number of case studies: Cambodia, Darfur, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Libya, and Syria as R2P-delineated crimes; and Myanmar, Somalia, and Zimbabwe as non-R2P cases. Through these case studies, we can evaluate the possibility and validity of expanding the scope of the R2P and find the practical implications for the case of North Korea. It seems unfortunately improbable that the UN member states will apply the R2P to North Korea, not only in its current situation, but even if the people of the country were to face a situation like that of Libya and Syria, because China and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, will veto any military intervention against North Korea.   In brief, the initial assumption of this paper is that considering the difficulty in turning the R2P from words to deeds, it is practical to limit the R2P’s scope to four crimes. However, the narrowly described R2P also limits its potential to prevent, protect, or react to complex humanitarian emergencies, even for cases such as North Korea, where human rights violations and humanitarian challenges are among the most dreadful in the world. Therefore, it is ultimately beneficial to explore ways to expand the scope of the R2P in a way that does not undermine its applicability in the real world.     II. International Intervention in Complex Emergencies   1. Rise of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies   The UN is dedicated to respecting the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of its member states, as well as safeguarding peace through international cooperation and collective security. The founders of the organization envisioned its vital role in preventing conflicts between states. It was believed that defending against external aggression would in turn guarantee the personal security of citizens within the respective states.   The majority of armed conflict today, however, stems from civil wars and communal conflicts within a single recognized state, rather than wars between states. Out of a total of 29 major armed conflicts over the past decade 2001-2010, only 2 were fought between states and the remaining 27 cases have been internal (SIPRI Yearbook 2011). These intrastate conflicts, which have become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War, have been based on ethnic, communal, and religious differences within a state, and often have become intractable when factors, like struggle over political power, territorial issues, and core economic resources have come into play.   The most serious crises that have emerged in the midst of intrastate conflict or state failure have often been defined along humanitarian lines. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), today’s armed conflicts are coupled with the “active and deliberate targeting of civilians, including humanitarian aid workers, widespread human rights violations, the use of rape and other crimes of sexual violence as brutal weapons of war, particularly against women and children, and forced displacement.” The denial of civilian access to basic necessities, such as food, water and shelter, and limited international humanitarian access to crisis zones are also the main causes of widespread human afflictions, not to mention cases of ethnic cleansing or genocide which represent the worst forms of humanitarian crises in conflict areas (Lee 2004)...(Continued)

김성배 국가안보전략연구소 책임연구위원. 북한과 한반도 관련 정책 개발에 대한 자문을 맡고 있다. 김성배 박사는 국가안보전략연구소에 부임하기 전까지 통일부 정책보좌관(2006), 국가안전보장회의(National Security Council: NSC) 행정관(2003-2006년)을 역임하였으며, 서울대학교 대학원에서 정치학 박사 학위를 취득하였다.   조동호 이화여자대학교 사회과학대학 북한학과 교수. 미국 펜실베니아 대학교에서 경제학 박사학위를 취득하였고, 한국개발연구원(KDI)에서 선임연구위원, 북한경제연구팀장, 기회조정실장을 역임하였다. 현재 민주평화통일자문회의 경제과학환경위원회 상임위원, 대통령자문 한중전문가공동연구위원회 위원, 대통령실 외교안보수석실 정책자문위원, 통일부 정책자문위원, 국회 예산정책처 예산분석실 자문위원 등을 맡고 있으며, 동아시아연구원 북한연구센터 소장, 조선일보 <아침논단> 고정칼럼리스트, SBS 외교통일안보 자문위원 등으로도 활동하고 있다. 주요 연구분야는 북한경제와 남북경협이며, 최근 연구로는 “북중관계의 변화와 남북경협,” “An Evaluation of the Situation Facing the North Korean Economy Today and Prospects,” “계획경제의 한계,”《북한 2032: 선진화로 가는 공진전략》(공편) 등이 있다.         I. 미중 복합외교 시대와 새로운 대북정책의 모색   지난 60여 년 동안 한국의 대북정책은 세계 및 지역 질서와 밀접한 연관을 맺으며 전개되어 왔다. 냉전시대 한국의 대북정책이 비록 데탕트와 신 냉전의 교차에 따른 미시적 변화를 보였지만 적대적 공생의 범주를 넘지 못한 것은 기본적으로 세계 및 지역 수준의 냉전질서에 기인한 것이었다. <7.7 선언>(1988)으로 대표되는 노태우 정부의 북방정책은 세계적 탈냉전 흐름에 반응한 정책이었으며 한국의 대북정책이 처음으로 봉쇄(containment)로부터 관여(engagement)로 전환하는 계기가 되었다. 김영삼 정부의 대북정책도 북핵 문제라는 돌출변수로 인해 온건과 강경을 오갔으나 탈냉전이라는 흐름을 거스를 수는 없었다. 김대중•노무현 정부의 대북정책도 그 명칭이 무엇이든지 간에 교류와 협력을 통한 북한의 변화를 모색했다는 점에서 관여정책의 연장선에 있는 것이었다. 이명박 정부의 대북정책은 원칙적으로 상생과 공영이라는 모토 하에 기존의 관여정책을 유지하면서도 기왕의 햇볕뿐만 아니라 제재(sanctions)라는 정책수단을 동원하여 북한체제의 변화(regime change)를 추구하는 다소 복잡한 모습을 보여주었는데 이는 주로 국내 정체성의 정치와 더불어 북한의 권력승계라는 변수가 작용한 결과로 보인다. 이명박 정부는 전임 정부와의 차별화에 주력하면서도 남북정상회담 가능성을 타진하는 등 관여정책을 모색하기도 하였다. 그러나, 2008년 7월 금강산관광객 피격사건이 발생하고 같은 해 김정일 위원장의 건강이 악화되면서 북한에서 후계체제 구축작업이 가속화되는 가운데 2009년 5월 2차 핵실험이 실시되고 2010년 들어 천안함•연평도 사태가 발생하면서 관여정책을 본격적으로 추진할 수 있는 기회를 얻지 못하였던 것이다. 오늘날 한국의 대북정책을 둘러싼 논쟁을 보면 정책목표는 대개 수렴하면서도 정책수단의 차이가 부각되는 양상이다. 문제는 대북정책을 둘러싼 문제의식이 안으로는 정체성의 정치에 밖으로는 탈냉전이라는 한계에 머물러 있으며 보수와 진보, 그리고 탈냉전을 넘어서는 세계 및 지역 수준의 격변을 포착해 내지는 못하고 있다는 점이다 .   21세기 들어 세계질서는 단순히 탈냉전이라고 하는 수준을 넘어서 국제정치 행위자와 무대 등 모든 측면에서 근원적 변화를 겪고 있다. 탈냉전 초기인 1990년대에는 미국 중심의 단극체제가 일시 작동하는 듯 보였지만 21세기 들어 중국의 국력이 예상보다 급격히 신장되고 2008년 미국의 금융위기와 2011년 유럽의 재정위기 등이 불거지면서 미중 두 강대국을 축으로 세계 및 지역 질서가 재편되고 있다. 미중관계가 이른바 G2체제, 또는 미중시대라는 말에 어울리게 안정적이고 협력적 관계로 나아갈 것인지 아니면 불가피한 경쟁 속에서 불안정하고 갈등적 관계로 귀착될 것인지에 따라서 글로벌 거버넌스의 운명이 좌우될 것이다. 특히, 동아시아 지역질서는 글로벌 파워이자 지역국가라는 중국의 이중적 속성으로 인해 미중관계가 직접적으로 투영될 수밖에 없다. 국제정치 무대도 기존의 안보•경제 중심에서 환경•에너지, 정보•지식 등 다양한 무대가 동시에 펼쳐지는 한편 다양한 이슈들이 클러스터화되어 안팎으로 연쇄반응을 일으키는 양상을 보이고 있다. 특히, 세계경제의 위기와 미중 간 경제력 격차의 축소로 인해 경제가 핵심적 동인으로 작용하고 있다.   우리의 최대 안보현안인 북핵•북한 문제 역시 이러한 세계 및 지역 수준의 움직임으로부터 자유로울 수 없다. 최근 수년간 한반도를 둘러싼 국제정치적 흐름은 북핵•북한 문제가 사실상 미중을 위시한 강대국 정치의 대상이 되고 있다는 것을 보여주었다. 천안함•연평도 사태 이후 미중이 보여준 상이한 반응과 미묘한 갈등은 미중 양국이 북한문제를 미중관계의 맥락에서 다루고 있다는 것을 시사한다. 2011년 1월 미중 정상회담에서 한반도 문제가 예상보다 비중 있게 다루어지고 6자회담 재개 등 북한문제 관련 합의가 비교적 수월하게 창출된 것은 미중관계의 안정적 관리 차원에서였다. 김정일의 사망 이후 중국이 김정은 체제를 강력히 엄호하고 미국 역시 북한의 안정적 권력승계를 희망한 것도 북한체제의 급변으로 인한 동아시아의 급격한 현상변경을 바라지 않는다는 의미로 해석된다. 한편, 북핵•북한 문제는 한반도의 안보현안이지만 중국 자체의 안정성이나 동아시아의 영토•영해 분쟁 등 여타 안보현안이나 세계경제 위기나 환경•에너지 문제와도 연쇄작용을 일으킬 수 있다. 무엇보다 중국 자체의 불안정성이 증대할 경우 북한은 직접적 영향을 받을 것이며 중국이 자신의 핵심이익으로 간주하고 있는 주권과 영토문제에서 수세에 몰릴 경우 중국은 북한문제까지도 포함시켜 핵심이익을 확장적으로 정의할 가능성을 배제할 수 없다 . 한편, 북핵•북한 문제는 세계 및 지역 수준의 경제 리스크로 작용하고 있으며 에너지 이슈의 부각은 북핵•북한 문제에 대한 러시아의 관여를 증대시킬 것이다.   우리는 향후 대북정책을 수립하고 추진하는데 있어서 이러한 세계 및 지역 수준의 역동성이 북한문제에 어떻게 투영될 것인지를 반드시 고려해야 할 것이다. 이와 동시에 한국의 전반적 외교정책을 수립하고 대외전략을 구사하는데 있어 북한문제와 대북정책을 적극적으로 활용할 필요가 있다. 동아시아 질서 건축 과정에 직접 설계자로 참여하든, 중견국 외교전략을 구사하든 북한문제와 대북정책이 우리에게 상당히 효과적인 외교자원이 될 수 있기 때문이다. 향후 10년을 내다보는 2010년대 대북정책을 제시하기 위해서는 먼저 북한의 선택과 북한체제의 장래에 대한 정밀한 분석과 전망이 요구된다. 당연히 향후 북한의 운명을 좌우할 김정은 체제에 대한 평가로부터 시작할 수밖에 없다.   II. 김정은 체제의 안정성과 리더십 유형   김정은은 2009년 1월 김정일에 의해 후계자로 지명된 이후 집중적으로 후계자 수업을 받았으며 2010년 9월 28일 44년 만에 개최된 제3차 당대표자회에서 당중앙군사위원회 부위원장 직위를 차지함으로써 2인자의 자리에 올랐다. 그리고 김정일 위원장이 사망한지 불과 며칠 지나지 않은 작년 12월 30일 김정일이 남겼다는 소위 <10.8 유훈>에 따라 조선인민군 최고사령관직에 추대되었다. 또한, 김정은이 후계자의 지위에 올랐던 2010년 9월 당대표자회에 이어 또다시 금년 4월 11일 개최되는 당대표자회에서 당총비서직 자리에도 등극할 전망이며, 4월 13일 개최되는 최고인민회의 제12기 5차회의에서 국방위원장직을 승계할 가능성도 배제할 수 없다.   김정일이 치열한 권력투쟁과 장기간에 걸친 후계자 수업과 업적 쌓기를 통해 공식으로 후계자 지위를 획득한 ‘쟁취형 후계자’라면 김정은은 아버지의 후광에 힘입어 순식간에 후계자 반열에 오른 ‘간택형 후계자’이다. 김정은의 리더십은 아직 충분히 검증되지 않았으며 그의 권력기반이 확고히 공고화되었다고 속단하기도 힘들다. 그럼에도 불구하고 김정은 체제가 비교적 안정적으로 착근할 것으로 보는 근거는 수령제•후계제 라고 하는 북한의 독특한 정치제도와 대안적 정치세력이 형성되기 어려운 북한의 정치구조에 있다. 북한은 구소련과 중국의 권력 이양기에 나타난 혼란을 반면교사 삼아 “후계자가 수령의 사상과 영도를 받들어” 모든 문제들을 처리해 나가는 후계제도를 창출하였다 . 절대권력으로서 수령의 정치적 후원을 받는 후계자에게 도전할 수 있는 정치세력은 존재하기 어렵다. 김정일 사후 권력구조로 집단지도체제나 후계자와 지배엘리트가 연합하는 혼합형체제가 등장할 것으로 예측한 이들도 있으나 현재로서는 가능성이 낮아 보인다. 집단지도체제는 본질적으로 북한의 수령제와 배치된다. 북한이 수령제의 당위성을 설명하면서 제시했던 핵심적 논리가 집단지도체제의 폐해였다(김일성 1996, 109-110). 설사 후계자의 정치적 리더십과 권력기반이 상대적으로 취약하더라도 권력엘리트들은 독자적 연합을 통해 후계자를 견제하는 정치적 리스크를 감수하기 보다는 후계자와의 지배연합을 통해 기득권을 유지하는 합리적 선택을 할 가능성이 높으며 이것이 혼합형체제를 주장하는 주된 논거이다. 현재 북한은 장성택, 김경희, 리영호 등 당과 군의 실세들이 김정은을 후견하는 모습을 보이고 있어 일견 혼합형체제처럼 보이기도 하지만 혼합형체제는 어디까지나 일시적, 과도적일 뿐이며 결국은 일인지배체제나 집단지도체제로 귀착될 수밖에 없다(정영태•이교덕•정규섭•이기동 2010, 51-52). 그런데, 집단지도체제가 경험적으로나 이데올로기적으로 북한에 착근하기 어렵다고 할 때 결국엔 김정은 중심의 일인지배체제로 귀결될 가능성이 높다 .   김정은 체제가 출범한지 두 달 정도 지난 시점에서 평가해 보면 김정은의 권력기반은 비교적 견고한 것으로 보인다. 김정은은 공식적으로 북한의 최고지도자 지위를 차지하는데 머무르지 않고 최고지도자로서의 역할 수행을 강화해 나가는 모습을 보이고 있다. 그는 새해를 맞아 1월 1일 당•정•군 고위간부들과 공연을 관람하고 설날에는 국가연회를 베푸는 등 북한의 권력엘리트들을 장악해 나가는 모습이다. 2월 16일 김정일 70회 기념행사의 주인공도 사실상 김정은이었다. 김정일 생일에 처음 거행된 열병식에서 리영호 총참모장, 김영춘 인민무력부장, 박재경 대장 등 군수뇌부는 김정은 부위원장 앞에 도열하여 충성을 맹세하는 장면을 연출했다. 또한, 김정은은 금년 1월부터 2월까지 10번 이상 군부대를 시찰하고 경제현장을 방문하는 등 과거 김정일 위원장이 수행하던 최고지도자 역할을 무리 없이 수행하고 있다.   이런 점에서 볼 때 적어도 단기적으로는 김정은 체제의 권력기반에 이상징후가 발생할 가능성은 높지 않을 것이다. 그러나, 중장기적으로 보면 김정은 체제에 대한 도전은 곳곳에 도사리고 있다. 북한의 고질적 경제난과 국제사회의 비핵화 압력 등에 대응하여 김정은이 효과적인 정치적 리더십을 보여주지 못한다면 구조적으로 불안정한 권력을 유지하게 될 것이다. 북한이 단기적으로 수년 내에 정치적 불안정에 빠질 가능성은 높지 않지만 그 이후에도 중장기적으로 정치적 안정을 유지할 수 있을지는 장담할 수 없다.   선군의 ‘계승’을 내세울 수밖에 없는 3대 세습의 태생적 한계와 북한의 장기 생존을 위한 ‘변화’의 필요성이라는 구조적 압력이 공존하는 모순적 딜레마 속에서 김정은 체제가 선택할 수 있는 길은 많지 않다. 선군의 계승과 정책전환 사이에서 이러지도 저러지도 못하는 어정쩡한 입장에 놓일 가능성이 높으나 이는 체제 불안정성만 가중시킬 것이다. 따라서 결국 북한이 선택할 수 있는 길은 두 가지이다. 하나는 변화의 압력을 무시하고 제2의 유훈 통치를 통해 선군에 얽매여 제2의 고난의 행군을 감수하는 길이다. 김정은은 앞으로도 선군 정치를 내세워 경제개혁과 비핵화를 외면하고 공포정치를 통해 권력의 공고화에 치중할 가능성이 있다. 이러한 선택은 당장의 권력유지에는 도움이 될지 모르나 중장기적으로는 북한 사회의 구조적 모순을 더욱 심화시켜 정치적 불안정을 증대시키게 될 것이다. 또 다른 하나는 자주적 변환을 통해 선경제와 비핵화의 길로 나아가는 것이다. 당분간 김정은 체제는 ‘김정일 유훈 통치’를 전면에 내걸 수밖에 없는 입장이라서 김정일 시대와의 차별화를 꾀하기는 어려울 것이다. 또한 권력 이양기의 특성상 당장 파격적 변화를 추구하기는 쉽지 않을 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 조심스럽게 이러한 미래를 모색해 나가는 것이 또 하나의 대안일 것이다.   한편, 김정은 체제는 이미 부분적으로 아버지 시대와는 미묘하게 다른 리더십 유형을 보여주고 있다. 외견상 가장 인상적인 부분은 김정은 부위원장이 군부대 시찰 과정에서 군인들과 팔짱을 끼거나 손을 꽉 잡는 등 스킨십을 강화하고 있다는 것이다. 1월 14일 자강도 만포시 주민들에게 이례적으로 긴 문장의 친필편지를 보낸 것(<조선중앙통신> 2012/1/16)도 북한 주민들과의 스킨십을 강화하려는 의도로 해석된다. 공개된 현지지도 수행자 명단이 4~5명에 불과해 수행자가 10~20명에 달했던 김정일 위원장 시절에 비해 간소화되었다는 것도 눈에 띈다. 군인 및 주민과의 접촉을 강화하기 위해 실무형 수행단을 꾸린 것으로 보이기 때문이다. 이러한 점들은 김정일 위원장 시절에는 거의 볼 수 없었던 장면으로서 “군중로선”을 강조했던 김일성 주석 시대를 떠올리게 한다는 점에서 주목된다. 아직 최종적으로 판단하기는 이르지만 이미 김일성을 빼어 닮은 외모로 세간의 주목을 받고 있는 김정은 부위원장이 아버지보다는 할아버지의 리더십 유형을 추구하고 있다는 해석이 가능하기 때문이다. 김정일 위원장의 경우 3년이라는 비교적 긴 기간에 걸쳐 김일성의 유훈 통치에 의존했고 1998년 헌법개정으로 권한이 강화된 국방위원장직에 재추대되면서부터 강성대국과 선군정치를 내거는 등 유훈 통치의 그늘에서 벗어났다. 그런데, 김정은 체제는 2월 16일 김정일 탄생 70주년을 정점으로 점차 애도정국을 마무리하고 4월 15일 김일성 탄생 1백주년을 맞는 경축정국으로 전환하는 모습이다. 여기서도 김정일의 유훈 못지않게 김일성 혈통을 부각시키려는 김정은 체제의 의도를 읽을 수 있다.   III. 김정은 시대의 북핵 외교 : 김정은식 등거리 외교?   김정은 체제는 핵과 미사일 문제 등 대외정책에서 이중적 신호를 동시에 보이고 있다. 한편으로는 미국과 <2•29 합의>를 통해 우라늄 농축을 포함한 모든 핵활동의 중단을 약속하는 유화적 모습을 보이는가 하면 다른 한편으로는 지난 3월 16일 소위 ‘광명성 3호’라는 장거리 로켓발사를 선언하여 미국과 국제사회의 강경 대응을 자초하고 있다. 북한은 인공위성 발사가 우주의 평화적 이용에 관한 문제로서 북미간 <2•29 합의>에 위반되지 않는다는 주장이지만 미국은 인공위성 발사체는 장거리미사일과 기술적으로 동일한 만큼 <2•29 합의>의 위반이라는 입장이다. 미국은 북한이 실제로 ‘광명성 3호’ 발사를 강행하면 대북 영양제공을 중단하고 추가적 대응조치를 모색할 계획이며 북한은 이에 반발하여 제3차 핵실험 등을 감행할 가능성을 배제할 수 없는 상황이다. 북한은 ‘광명성 3호’ 발사를 김일성 탄생 100주년 경축행사 차원에서 추진하고 있고 북한주민들에게 선전하고 있는 만큼 이를 취소할 가능성은 희박하다. 그러면서도 북한은 국제사회에 위성발사 참관을 요청하고 핵활동의 중단을 감시할 국제원자력기구(International Atomic Energy Agency: IAEA) 사찰단의 입국을 제안하는 등 협상의 여지를 남겨두려는 모습도 보이고 있다...(계속)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 20   Author Jin-Ha Kim is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). He was formerly a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS). Dr. Kim received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. His research interests lie in comparative authoritarianism, bureaucratic dictatorship, post-socialist transition, and the North Korean political economy. His recent works on North Korea include “On the Threshold of Power, 2011/12: Pyongyang’s Politics of Transition” (Forthcoming), International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (December 2011); “North Korea’s Leadership Structure and Post-Socialist Transition: Comparing with the Cases of Vietnam and Romania” (in Korean and co-authored with Moon-Hee Song), Unification Policy Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (June 2011); and “Reopening the Six-Party Talks: Prospects and North Korea’s Likely Negotiating Strategies Following the US-China Summit” (in Korean), KDI Review of the North Korean Economy (May 2011).       I. Introduction   At the third Delegates’ Conference of the North Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), held on September 28, 2010, the third-generation hereditary succession of Kim Jong-Un, Kim Jong-Il’s third son, was officially declared. This news reignited the perennial debate between the collapsists (Noland 2004, 12-19; Litwak 2007) and the resilientists regarding whether the Kimist (Buzo 1999) autocracy will survive the presumably conflict-ridden process of leadership transition. Collapsists call attention to the structural vulnerabilities of the personalist regime. One scholar argues that as power succession struggles intensify, the “regime tends to crack along the lines of personal loyalties and ‘estate inheritance’” (Mansourov 2007, 51). On the other hand, refuting the predictions of serious disruption, resilientists emphasize the regime’s durability, buttressed by persistent ruling and coercive institutions (Kihl 2007, 3-33). As Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind (2010) note, the autocratic iron cage has been vigilantly guarded, with many effective “tools of authoritarian control.” It is thus expected that “despite all of the obstacles Kim Jong-Un must overcome as he ascends the throne,” the regime will nevertheless manage to maintain stability (Lind 2010). Another resilientist even believes that “the succession seems to be going smoothly” (Chinoy 2011).   The resilientists’ arguments are apparently supported by the earlier experience of the Kimist regime’s survival in the initial hereditary succession process after Kim Il-Sung’s death in 1994. However, before assessing the potential effects of the impending third-generation succession on North Korea, we first need to solve the puzzle of why no modern republic-style autocracy has ever completed a leadership transfer to a third-generation hereditary autocrat (Brownlee 2007b). As Jason Brownlee shows, of the hundreds of potential candidates, only a few autocracies have cleared the thorny hurdle of the first succession to second-generation offspring. Even those few that have proved their persistence by passing the initial test failed to survive long enough to complete the next succession to a third-generation dictatorship.   What makes hereditary succession so rare? What prevents second-generation autocrats from handing down their thrones to their offspring as their fathers did? The first suffocates the next. The succession from father to son makes infeasible the next hereditary succession of the grandson. The reason seems to be that the initial succession over-consolidates personalist regimes to such an extent that the continuation of hereditary succession is no longer feasible.   Hereditary succession is a counterstrategy employed preemptively to cope with a fatal crisis of leadership transition in newly founded autocracies. This succession is feasible only when two conditions are met concurrently. The first condition is that coherently organized ruling institutions should be present. Effective institutions enforce hereditary succession. Mobilizing mass support, a competent ruling party consolidates the elites and constituencies to promote the attainment of the collective action needed for the smooth transfer of power. This process also organizationally produces reassuring effects for the security of elites after the succession. On the other hand, cohesive military and state coercive agencies repress the opposition within and without (Foran 1993, 3-27; Slater 2003, 81-101; Bellin 2005, 21-41). The second condition is that power must be concentrated in the predecessor to such a degree that he monopolizes decision-making authority and mobilizes ruling organizations. Only a few extraordinarily powerful autocrats have been able to satisfy both conditions at the same time, wielding “the power to make decisions” and “to enforce” them simultaneously (Slater 2010, 138). Therefore hereditary autocracy is rare.   In implementing hereditary succession, a regime’s tendency toward personalization is exacerbated. The successor’s survival strategy accelerates the predecessor’s patrimonial drive to minimize institutional autonomy so that, while the retinues’ vulnerability to his discretion is maximized, the rise of rivals entrenched in ruling institutions is prevented. This process inevitably deinstitutionalizes the regime to such an extent that the latter can survive only with the presence of a dictator who personally acts out the functions of institutions. Absentee dictatorship becomes impossible. When a personalist program succeeds, institutions decay. When it fails, rivals prevail. Whether it succeeds or not, it is thus least likely that the given autocracy concurrently meets the aforementioned two feasibility conditions of hereditary succession, especially when the incumbent dictator is debilitated. In that case, no hereditary succession is feasible.   In order to test the explaining power of the proposed “Second-Time-Unlucky” hypothesis based upon an auto-destructive logic of autocratic hereditary succession, this paper mainly surveys nine cross-national cases of hereditary autocracies: the Trujillos of the Dominican Republic (r. 1930-61), the Duvaliers of Haiti (r. 1957-86), the Somozas of Nicaragua (r. 1936-79), the Chiangs of Taiwan (r. 1949-88, the Kims of North Korea (r. 1948-present), the Assads of Syria (r. 1971- ), the Lees of Singapore (r. 1965- ), the Aliyevs of Azerbaijan (r. 1993- ), and the Gnassingbés of Togo (r. 1967- ). In the last four cases, the incumbent second-generation hereditary rulers are currently in power. Of them, Kim Jong-Il alone has formally set in motion a third-generation succession plan. A review of the past trajectories of these regimes can also explore the explanatory validity of the hypothesis.   The cross-national selection and examination of the cases allow us to examine potential alternative explanations for the rise and demise of hereditary succession. The cases are selected naturally. Of “258 post-World War II autocrats who ruled for at least three years” (Brownlee 2007b, 597), only nine of them managed to hand down the throne to a hereditary successor. The selected nine hereditary autocracies had diverse cultural, religious, and historical (and colonial) legacies. They can be conspicuously differentiated by economic fragility, ideological orientation, and human development. Even if the lack of a strong civil society characterizes the nine cases, most nonhereditary postwar autocracies have weak civil societies, signifying that all the enumerated factors are not decisive in explaining the rise and fall of hereditary autocracies. Contrastingly, as proposed in the second-time-unlucky hypothesis, the nine hereditary autocracies started with a powerful dictator and an effective party with robust coercive institutions, concurrently meeting the aforementioned two feasible conditions of hereditary succession. Before their final dissolution, four of them had degenerated into “sultanistic regimes” (Chehabi and Linz 1998a, 3-25), with decayed institutions. The remnant five regimes currently ruled by the founders’ sons also display identifiable tendencies of institutional de-routinization or debilitated dictatorship, providing grounds for future testing. All suggest the relatively stronger explanatory, predictive, and falsifiable potentialities of the second-time-unlucky hypothesis.   The synoptic survey of the cases is then supported by a focused investigation of the case of the North Korean regime. Reinforced by an application of a structured contingency approach, which highlights reciprocal interactions between the institutional precedents and agential actors, we can map North Korea’s trajectories into and out of personal dictatorship, tracking the past transition from a Stalinist single-party system to “sultanistic dictatorship” (Huntington 1991, 112), which was triggered by the hereditary succession to Kim Jong-Il. Beyond the debate about regime collapse, it allows us to anticipate that, in the current context of “post-totalitarian” (McEachern 2010) decay, the impending third-generation succession could precipitate another transition. Analyzing the Kim Jong-Un ascension plan with balanced titrations of such factors as the patrimonial legacies and the distribution of power among major actors and agencies, more plausible transition routes can be discerned. Whether by negotiation or by violence, the next transition is likely to invite either a single-party-based oligarchy or a military regime, neither of which is likely to produce stability due to the country’s institutional lack of binding precedents and commitments...(Continued)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 19   Author Chun, Chaesung is a Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations in Seoul National University. He is now a visiting professor at Keio University in Tokyo. He is also a director of Asian Security Initiative of East Asian Institute. He is a member of Advisory Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Reunification. He received his MA degree from the Seoul National University, and Ph.D degree from Northwestern University in the field of International Relations Theory. Major fields include international relations theory, security studies, South Korean Foreign policy, East Asian security relations. Major articles include “A Study on the Forma-tion of European Modern States System,” “Critique of constructivism from the perspective of postmodernism and realism,” “The Rise of New Powers and the Responding Strategies of Other Countries.”       I. Introduction   After the Cold War ended and the former Soviet bloc broke down, North Korea’s rival, South Korea, established diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union and China, which put North Korea on a difficult journey for survival. Witnessing long-standing communist regimes that had worked alongside Pyongyang to construct socialism helplessly collapse or change over from communism under external pressure or pressure by the people, North Korea found itself in a desperately dangerous situation in which it had to sustain its socialist system and regime, and worry about not just a transition but an absorbed unification by the South.   With the fall of the socialist bloc, the U.S.-led liberal democratic bloc’s development accelerated even further. In the post–Cold War environment, not only the new structure of power but also the development of the massive trends of globalization, information proliferation, and democratization confirmed socialism to be a system lacking the open, democratic, and creative qualities it needed to cope with these changes. In addition, liberal democracy developed in tandem with a market economy. At the same time, as the United States, who was the longtime adversary of North Korea, built an unrivaled hegemony with unprecedented qualities of leadership, North Korea felt ever more threatened.   The Kim Il-sung regime, which was searching for a survival strategy throughout 1991 and 1992, stirred up the first nuclear crisis in 1993, and the Kim Jong-il regime that followed in 1994 tried to escape its post–Cold War crisis by freezing its nuclear program but firmly promoting military-first politics. In the process, North Korea focused on aligning its internal system and strove to provide an opportunity for economic development, on the one hand, while concentrating on creating a diplomatic environment in which North Korea could survive on a long-term basis, on the other. On the basis of its bilateral diplomatic relationship with the United States that was arranged after the first North Korean nuclear crisis, North Korea tried to put an end to the so-called “United States’ hostile policy toward North Korea” while it sought to strengthen its self-defense capacity based on military power that revolved around military-first politics. In regards to South Korea, Pyongyang, while keeping itself from an absorbed unification, utilized Seoul’s engagement policy to secure practical interests for the sake of future regime development.   Also, by improving relations with neighboring states such as China, Russia, and Japan, North Korea attempted to maximize economic and diplomatic support from them. At the same time, it established diplomatic relations with non-Asian states, including those in Europe, and pursued a practical diplomatic doctrine that could have economic and diplomatic benefits, even if only partially.   However, facing a more conservative U.S. foreign policy and the anti-terrorism campaign after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, North Korea found itself in a much more unfavorable diplomatic situation. Eventually, in October 2002, the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis signaled that North Korea was reverting back to the rigid nuclear military-first diplomacy centered on its nuclear program and nuclear weapons. Within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, sporadic attempts to discuss North Korean abandonment of its nuclear program with accompanying economic aid continued, but North Korea did not have the strategic option of abandoning its nuclear program. Its neighbor states’ security guarantees failed to satisfy its insecurities, and thus the North Korean problem based on the nuclear weapons issue is still going in circles without much progress.   The North Korean nuclear program is not a nuclear weapons issue but a question of the survival of North Korea as a political entity. North Korean nuclear weapons diplomacy is also not about nuclear weapons but about its survival and the overall political system based on military-first priorities. As long as North Korea’s nuclear military-first diplomacy and military-first political system interact reciprocally, the individual evolution of North Korean diplomacy is impossible. And if North Korea’s politics, economy, military, society, and other areas do not evolve in tandem, neither will its diplomacy.   Furthermore, North Korea’s evolution without outside support cannot fulfill the goals that are desired. Neighboring states’ foreign policy toward Pyongyang must also evolve at the same time to support and strengthen North Korea’s domestic forces that advocate for such advancement. North Korea and its neighboring countries’ coevolution will alleviate North Korea’s political concerns and, in the long run, create diplomatic agreements on and action plans for North Korea’s role in Northeast Asia.   This working paper predicts that if North Korea pursues nuclear military-first diplomacy in order to support its “strong and prosperous state” policy, it cannot survive as a normal and developed state in the international community. North Korea must make a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear program and revive as a truly developed state, meeting twenty-first-century global standards. In order to achieve this status, the evolution of both North Korea’s political system and its diplomacy must work simultaneously. Moreover, North Korea’s evolution should be supported by the evolution of neighboring states’ North Korea policy. I first examine the development of North Korean diplomacy, and analyze why North Korea’s military-first diplomacy will inevitably fail. Then, I introduce the three steps of diplomatic evolution for North Korea, and through a discussion of the coevolution process of it and its neighboring states, explore the possibility of whether its overall system can lead to a normal and developed future.   II. Components and Evaluation of Diplomatic Strategy in the Military-First Era   1. Components of Diplomatic Strategy   Diplomacy in the military-first era has the strategic goal of serving the strategic purpose of military-first politics. Military-first politics, which has made the military the most important pillar of the regime while it promoted the militarization of the overall society, is a method to maintain and further strengthen the survival capacity of the North Korean socialist regime after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, diplomacy in the military-first era, or, in other words, military-first diplomacy, aims to guarantee the survival of North Korea’s “Great Leader”–centered socialist regime and focuses on creating a diplomatic environment in which North Korea can eventually become a “strong and prosperous state.” As the authority and power of the military have been reinforced, the status and influence of the military in the decision-making process of foreign policy have only increased. Pyongyang, in deciding on its method of enforcing foreign policy, has frequently resorted to military action. Its decision to develop nuclear weapons to use them as an important diplomatic tool can also be understood as one product of the military-first political system.   This argument about North Korea’s military-first politics is closely related to its evaluation of the situation of the international community and the direction of future foreign policy. In other words, this discussion analyzes the environment of military-first politics while finding the “fundamental questions arising in today’s world” from the international political environment. North Korea proclaims the goal of its foreign policy as “protecting and adhering to Juche [Self-reliant] socialism, the bastion of global socialism, from the allied forces of imperialism, and completing Juche achievements.” (Kang 2002, 7-8) Additional explanations of this statement read “as long as imperialism exists on the face of the Earth and the schemes of aggression by imperialists continue, we cannot submit to such forces. The ultimate triumph of Juche achievements can only be accomplished by unrelenting fights. Also, the fundamental spirit of military-first ideology is to fully invoke military, political and economic power to fight to the end against the imperialists who try to crush Juche ideology. Through this process, we shall independently build a new peaceful society based on the dynamic spirit of military-first ideology.” (Kang 2002, 15) Such statements show the direction of North Korea’s diplomatic strategy.   Military-first diplomacy more specifically comprises (1) securing a survival environment through strengthening military deterrence and negotiations with the United States, (2) practical diplomacy for acquiring economic resources, and (3) diplomacy with South Korea in which North Korea, in the name of unification strategy, acquires the necessary diplomatic resources to secure economic aid and an environment in which it can survive. On this survival environment, North Korea asserts that “only a strong military response to the hostile imperialist forces, that only pursue wars of aggression, can lead to peace.” It also states that “it is military-first politics that will provide the peaceful environment necessary for our nation’s unification.” (Kang 2002, 268) Moreover, on acquiring economic aid, it explains that “when our republic suffered an unprecedented food crisis and energy shortage that damaged our overall economy because of U.S. economic sanctions and their schemes using military pressure, military-first politics was the force that drove the military to be the primary actor that vitalized the overall economy.” It also explains that there is a need to “make the military the main force and mightily construct overarching socialism.” (Chun 2004, 32) On its strategy toward South Korea, it argues that “military-first politics is the strongest measure of unification our generation can use to realize our nation’s long-cherished wish for unification.” It further states that “military-first politics finds its meaning in that it hinders the United States’ attempts at wars of aggression and thus provides the fundamental setting for a peaceful environment for our nation’s unification.” It asserts that “this is all because military-first politics is a political method that provides deterrence [in] preventing war on the Korean Peninsula.”   Such military-first politics is also implied in the revised constitution of North Korea. In the Eighth Constitution revised on September 5, 1998, the expression “Marxism-Leninism” in Article 4 of the Seventh Revised Constitution was deleted. The phrase “repel foreign powers on a national scale” of Article 5 was deleted as well. Moreover, in the Eighth Revised Constitution, Article 17, “autonomy, peace, amity” were set as the goals of foreign policy and at the same time, the diplomatic stance was based on “our own version of socialism and strengthening of international solidarity based on autonomy.” The fundamental direction of North Korean diplomacy has thus shifted from (1) revolutionary diplomacy to practical diplomacy, (2) from diplomacy focused on “liberating the South” to a protectionist diplomacy to maintain the North Korean socialist regime, (3) from encampment diplomacy to nonalignment diplomacy in the short run and to open diplomacy in the long run, and (4) from a self-reliant diplomacy between China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War to inducement diplomacy due to Sino-Soviet détente.   Such fundamental diplomatic orientations of Pyongyang clearly differ from its diplomatic strategies during the Cold War period. The Korean Workers’ Party code and the former socialist constitution stipulate that “the immediate purpose of [the] Korean Workers’ Party is to achieve complete socialist victory in the Northern part of the Republic and [finish] national liberation and the historic task of the people’s democracy revolution on a national scale. The ultimate goal is to penetrate Juche ideology across the entire society and [construct] a communist society” (Preamble of the code). For this goal, North Korea adopted a platform to strengthen the three main revolution capabilities and increase diplomatic relations within the socialist bloc and the Third World through strong ties to the Soviet Union. The one continuity is that amid the lack of evidence that North Korea has given up on communist unification, it has not given up the political intention to put the entire Korean Peninsula under its influence by measures other than war. As Hak Soon Paik has pointed out, “In the historical, psychological, and substantial space of the ‘Korean Peninsula,’ the essence of North Korea’s strategy, to win the competition between the two Koreas and secure a monopolized authority over the entire peninsula to build a unified nation, has not changed.” (Paik 2003, 150)   The core goal of military-first diplomacy was diplomatic relations with the United States. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, North Korea focused on negotiating with the United States, and between December 1988 and December 1992, it pushed forward advisor-level diplomatic contacts in Beijing twenty-eight times (Kim 2002, 149-151). However, as North Korea realized that the required factors for its survival were increasingly lacking, it decided on walking the path of military-first diplomacy and then launched the first nuclear crisis in March 1993. Afterward, by agreeing to freeze its nuclear program in the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korea tried to make diplomatic room for its survival for the time being. After going through the first nuclear crisis and signing the Agreed Framework, the bilateral relationship between the United States and North Korea began, and until the DPRK-U.S. Joint Communiqué under the Clinton administration in 2000, desperate efforts to improve U.S.-DPRK relations, known as the “Geneva Agreed Framework system,” continued for eight years. This relationship then experienced a year-long lull after the Bush administration came into office. In 2002, with the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis, this bilateral relationship entered the era of the Six-Party Talks, but without an effective breakthrough, it stagnated.   North Korea, based on its nuclear program, proceeded with its military-first diplomacy while trying to sign a peace treaty with the United States and to create the military and diplomatic environment necessary for its survival. After the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, U.S.-DPRK relations showed partial progress. On January 12, 1995, the U.S. State Department announced that it would ease the sanctions on North Korea, allow business and travel between the United States and the DPRK, grant permission to North Koreans to use U.S. finance institutions, and engage in the importation of magnesite from North Korea. During this process, North Korea continually emphasized the signing of a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty. While demanding the conclusion of a peace treaty, North Korea took measures such as expelling the delegation of the Czech Republic in 1993, establishing Panmunjom representatives of the Korean People's Army in 1994, and pulling out North Korean representatives from the Panmunjom Military Armistice Commission, to jeopardize the armistice system. The Four-Party Talks were held in March 1997, but after six talks ending in June 1998, the Four-Party Talks ceased due to North Korea’s refusal to participate. This was the result of North Korea’s repeated argument that the U.S.-DPRK peace treaty must be signed first...(Continued)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 18   Author Kim, Sungbae is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). In that position, he provides advice to government and contributes to development of policy on North Korea and Korean Peninsula issues. Prior to this position, he served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Minister of National Unification (2006). Before taking up that position, Dr. Kim served as Senior Director and Director (2003-2006) of the Strategic Planning Bureau, National Security Council (NSC) of Korea. Dr. Kim earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at Seoul National University.       I. What Made North Korea's Nuclear Threat “Underbalanced”?   The balance of power principle has prevailed on the Korean Peninsula since the Cold War began. The Korean War can be understood from this point of view. The military buildup has increased continuously between the two Koreas even since the signing of the armistice, and both big and small military conflicts keep occurring. These circumstances have resulted in a kind of strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula. However, a decisive factor that might change the inter-Korean strategic balance arose in the early 1990s: North Korea’s nuclear development.   North Korea's nuclear development was first detected in its initial stages in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was never effectively stopped, and the North is now considered to be at a nuclear arsenal stage with an accumulation of nuclear materials and two nuclear tests. Notably, in November 2010, North Korea's uranium enrichment program was revealed in addition to its existing plutonium-based nuclear program, which made the North Korean nuclear issue of greater concern. North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 marked a critical stage, making North Korea a de facto nuclear state. But South Korea’s response was unexpectedly restrained. There were no strong sanctions against North Korea nor a corresponding attempt at nuclear armament. What made this happen?   Why was North Korea's nuclear armament not stopped? According to realist theory, the logic of the security dilemma should have called for a balancing behavior, but the actual responses were limited and even resembled a de facto appeasement policy. The U.S. option might have been restricted by the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula and the U.S.-ROK alliance. Any sanctions against North Korea, military or economic, could not be imposed if opposed by South Korea, the United States’ ally. What were South Korea's responses? North Korea's nuclear armament decisively changed the military strategic balance in inter-Korean relations. Although South Korea ought to have responded more proactively to the North Korean threat, it did not, from the standpoint of realism. Even without a preemptive military strike, strong sanctions against North Korea ought to have been imposed, given that security concerns were the highest priority in the South Korean decision-making process. Yet the Roh Moo-Hyun administration largely continued to draw on existing inter-Korean relations and only joined the sanctions against North Korea imposed by the UN Security Council following the first nuclear test, the most critical phase in the North Korean nuclear program. Was this action a policy failure or an exceptional case? If we just want to evaluate South Korean policy then we could stop here, but if we want to carefully analyze it then a much more complex analysis will be required.   Neoclassical realists call a threatened country’s behavior “underbalancing” when it has failed to recognize a clear and present danger, has simply not reacted to it or has responded in a paltry and imprudent way (Schweller 2004, pp. 159–160). It is debatable whether we can call the Roh administration’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear threat “underbalancing.” Liberalists as well as realists might not consent to this argument. From a liberalist perspective, the Roh administration's response was a rational choice that reflected the progress of inter-Korean relations, because excessive military measures or strong sanctions against North Korea might have caused unnecessary military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and compromised the entire inter-Korean relationship. Strict realists may not regard the Roh administration’s behavior as “underbalancing,” either. In their view, any balancing act was not needed at that time, because an aggregate strategic balance was already working on the Korean Peninsula since the U.S.-ROK alliance was in place. Rather, they might have viewed the Roh administration’s response as over-engaging behavior, which was too sensitive to North Korea’s reaction. However, defining balancing behavior as a militarily meaningful measure is a too narrow and military-centric approach. Even the concept of “soft balancing” was developed to describe limited and indirect balancing strategies through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining, contrasted with “hard balancing” such as military buildup and alliance formation (Paul 2005, p.58). The Roh administration’s response to North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 was even below its own threatened level, let alone the level that the conservatives and the United States demanded. There are enough grounds for taking the Roh administration’s behavior as “underbalancing,” for it neglected even “soft balancing” It was, however, “underbalancing” on a specific issue rather than in an aggregate power structure.   Nevertheless, this paper is not based on the neoclassical realist approach. The Roh administration’s response is difficult to explain using neoclassical realist theory even if there was some kind of “underbalancing” phenomenon. Neoclassical realism notes the role of domestic politics. The distortion in foreign policy by domestic politics is fully considered in foreign policy studies. The problem is that as shown by the complete differences in the policy toward North Korea of the Roh and Lee administrations, South Korean domestic politics can be an “overbalancing” factor as well as an “underbalancing” one. How can we explain such differences in policy preferences? We need a more complex approach than comparative foreign policy theory. In the case of South Korea, it is impossible to generalize about how domestic politics is reflected in foreign policy with several domestic variables. In South Korea, inter-Korean relations are deeply linked to domestic politics, because policy toward North Korea includes cultural elements such as identity and norms.   This discussion will analyze how the domestic politics of South Korea are reflected in the North Korean nuclear issue, the highest national security concern when North Korea conducted its nuclear test in 2006. Especially, it will show how cultural elements such as norms and identity shaped the South Korean government’s response to North Korea's nuclear threat in term of constructivism. Yet the global cultural environment on which constructivism focuses will not be dealt with in depth here. Constructivism tends to note the effect of the domestic cultural environment in addition to the international one. But the global cultural environment such as the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and non-proliferation norms have had a relatively insignificant impact on the South Korean government's policy decisions. I will therefore review the relevance of various alternative approaches that can be used to explain South Korea's underbalancing behavior in response to North Korea's nuclear threat.   II. How to Explain South Korea’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: A Brief Theoretical Review   1. Neoclassical Realist Approach   The nuclear issue is the most typical military security issue in the international political arena and can be expected to be strongly explained by realist international political theory that stresses high politics. According to traditional realism, all nations pursue their national interests, defined as power. Yet there is an inevitable limitation to national power; the balance of power is a major factor that determines the behavior of nations (Morgenthau 1985). And the most explicit form of power is the military and nuclear weapons that are the most destructive means.   Thus the balance of power is the most effective tool for analysis to explain a nuclear issue. Structural realism, pioneered by Waltz, emphasizes the concept of the balance of power in a different context. Under an anarchical international system without global government, nations have the same functional property as units in that they have to put the top priority on their survival and safety rather than on cooperation with other nations. Therefore, the most significant element in international politics is the distribution of power; in this context the balance of power is the core factor that can explain and predict the behavior of all nations (Waltz 1979). Nuclear armament, in particular, is a critical factor that can change the strategic balance among nations in a fundamental way. North Korea's nuclear development can be interpreted from a realist point of view. There are various interpretations of the nuclear negotiating strategy of North Korea. Yet it cannot be disputed that North Korea developed its nuclear weapons program in order to secure its survival and safety. It is generally understood that the strategic factors for North Korea's nuclear weapons are the increased security vulnerability with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc; the fear of U.S. attack, which intensified following the Iraq War; the diverging gap in South-North Korea national capabilities; and the burden from the conventional arms race with South Korea due to the North’s own economic difficulties. Whatever the factors might be, nuclear armaments can be perceived as the most effective tool to guarantee the survival of the North Korean regime in a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment.   The problem is whether realism can explain South Korea’s response to North Korea's nuclear threat. Traditional realism regards a state as a unit pursuing power as a human being does. And structural realism sees the international anarchic structure as defining the behavior of an individual state. Either way, realism takes a state as a rational unitary actor. A state naturally shows balancing behavior toward external threats, but this has not been the case on many occasions, such as the response to North Korea's nuclear threat in 2006. South Korea did not take any meaningful military measures at that time. In this regard, we might take note of the geopolitical risk that the South Korean government faces. The possibility of full-scale war, as experienced in the Korean War, limits options in North Korean policies. But overemphasizing the geopolitical risk might lead to ignorance of the fact that there are various levels of sanctions and diverse types of military sanctions, such as military exercises and deterrence measures. In any sense, the Roh administration’s response is difficult to explain from a realist point of view.   Even within realism, international politics theory based on a positivist hypothesis of rationality has been questioned. Neoclassical realists note the process and interaction of agents and acknowledge that the response of a state to an external threat can be influenced by domestic circumstances. The closer the policymaking process and actual state's society relations to a unitary actor, the more accurate realism's prediction is. Conversely, when states are divided at the society level, they are less likely to behave in accordance with balance-of-power predictions. According to Schweller, a neoclassical realist, we can explain an actor's choices by two reasons, the first being an actor's preferences, that is, willingness, and the second being the ability of the actor to balance, given the political and material hurdles that must be overcome to do so. Schweller posits four variables that are comprehensive enough to explain state responses to threats: elite consensus, government or regime vulnerability, social cohesion, and elite cohesion. He insists that incoherent and fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats, because elites view the domestic risks as too high and are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society (Schweller 2004, pp. 168–170).   A neoclassical realist approach indeed has some implications concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. It is true that the North Korean nuclear issue has deteriorated over the past twenty years since the early 1990s despite some progress. North Korea was suspected of developing its nuclear program in the early 1990s and is supposed to be a de facto nuclear state today. From a neoclassical realist viewpoint, this situation is the result of a lack of proper responses to explicit external threats and a typical “underbalancing” phenomenon. In Schweller's framework, it is the result of South Korea's specific domestic politics. It is true that the South Korean state-society was fragmented during the same period. Particularly after the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, the entire society as well as the political elites was rendered almost dichotomous over inter-Korean relations and the policy toward North Korea. But it is not enough to explain South Korea's response to North Korea’s nuclear threat only by reference to the cohesion of society. Schweller's framework, based on the British and French experiences during the interwar period, cannot be applied to South Korea, which has a different historical background. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to explain the Lee administration's response to the North Korean nuclear issue, which is the very opposite to the Roh administration’s, while societal fragmentation and cohesion have not changed. It does not make sense to explain that South Korea's response has changed completely after only two years, with a change of actor's preferences due to adjustments in domestic political circumstances. Rather, it would be more plausible to say that the policy preferences of the two administrations were different socio-psychologically. It is true that domestic politics are relevant in balancing external threats. But in the South Korean case, cultural elements such as norms and identity are much more influential than political and economic interests.   2. Liberalist Explanation   Liberalists have much to say about South Korea's response to North Korea’s nuclear threat. They would resent the concept of “underbalancing.” “Underbalancing,” which is very value-oriented, is a concept based on the assumption that a proactive balancing action has to be taken. But liberalists would not consider the Roh administration's response to be “underbalancing.” To them, it was the appropriate response to prevent tensions from accelerating on the Korean Peninsula. In their view, a kind of under-engaging has happened under the Lee administration, to the extent that the North Korean nuclear issue has deteriorated to a much greater extent. The motivation behind North Korea’s nuclear threat has been to prompt the United States to negotiate the lifting of financial sanctions against North Korea rather than to create a substantial and immediate threat to cause a strategic imbalance between the two Koreas. Taking excessive military measures is overbalancing that might cause military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In the liberalist view, the Roh administration's choice reflected the progress of inter-Korean relations. Based on a cost-benefit analysis, it was a rational choice to maintain inter-Korean relations through a measured response rather than through sacrificing the entire relationship by strong sanctions against North Korea. This means that the so-called spill-over effect” worked, as liberalism and functionalism would say. Liberalist approaches are based on the hypothesis that the state is basically a rational actor. But if we understand that the Roh administration's choice was not the best but was inevitable and rational, it, at least, comes from the fact that the actor (the Roh administration) had a liberalist's view. The Lee administration showed another choice in sacrificing its inter-Korean relationship in order to protect its security interests. Still, the liberalist approach also cannot effectively explain why the two South Korean administrations under almost the same state-society structure made opposite political choices.   3. Constructivist Alternative   The constructivist approach is relevant in analyzing the Roh administration’s response to the North Korean nuclear issue in that it emphasizes cultural elements such as norms and identity. South Korean domestic politics became more diversified as the country went through rapid industrialization and democratization over the past half century, and the influence of domestic variables in the decision-making process has greatly increased. Thus, we can explain South Korean behavior by analyzing public opinion on specific foreign policy issues or bureaucratic interests. We can also simply use ways of analysis such as cognitive consistency, group thinking, and psychological stress.   However, the Roh administration's response to North Korea's first nuclear test that I analyze here seems to have been more affected by discourse politics and cultural elements than by political interests, being much more relevant than the personal level cognitive and psychological elements of political elites.   Constructivism focuses more on the cultural-institutional elements of a state's environment and identity than on the physical environment surrounding it, shaping the national security interests or the security policies of a state. Katzenstein defines norms as collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. The former is called "constitutive effects" that specify what actions will make the relevant others recognize a particular identity, and the latter is called "regulative effects" that specify the standards for proper behavior (Katzenstein 1996, p. 5). Taken together, norms establish expectations about who the actor will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave (Katzenstein 1996, p. 54). Norms influence policy decision-makers to prefer or avoid particular polices on the grounds of norms, and the public or experts present or support specific norms to affect policymaking...(Continued)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 17   저자 Hwang, Jihwan is an assistant professor of the University of Seoul, Korea. Professor Hwang was an assistant professor of North Korean Studies at Myongji University, and a research fellow at the Institute for Unification Studies of Seoul National University. His research interests include East Asian international relations and security studies, focusing on the North Korean nuclear crisis. His main concern is how to explain North Korea’s foreign policy in terms of international relations theories. He published numerous articles, and his recent publications include “International Relations Theory and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” “Offensive Realism, Weaker States, and Windows of Opportunity: The Soviet Union and North Korea in Comparative Perspective,” “The Second Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy,” and “Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power.” Professor Hwang received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Colorado at Boulder.       I. Introduction   Ever since Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, the military-first policy has been maintained as Kim Jong-il’s principal strategy for governance and survival in North Korea. The policy’s effectiveness as a force in domestic politics and political propaganda is debatable, but its critical flaw is that it creates doubts as to whether it will be effective enough to ensure North Korea’s security and powerful state building in a rapidly changing world order.   The military-first policy is designed to enable North Korea to become a strong and prosperous state by 2012, but in fact it is restricting the development of nonmilitary sectors. Running the state through the army and focusing almost all of state capacity on the military disrupts the effective distribution of resources and aggravates the problem of an overweening military and an excessive emphasis on security. Thus despite its designers’ intentions, the military-first policy will inevitably fail as a national strategy.   Kim Jong-il initially adopted this strategy in order to facilitate the maintenance of his regime. There is a possibility that despite Kim Jong-il’s being aware of the policy’s its imminent failure, a lack of alternatives is forcing him to hold on to it. Insistence on this strategy will foster not the construction of a strong and prosperous state, but both external and internal ineffectiveness, weakening both the regime and the state, and eventually bring them down. On the other hand, if the current strategy is abandoned and North Korea makes new strategic decisions, its chances of survival will be greater and it will certainly be able to become a normal state in the international community.   This paper points out the structural problems that North Korea’s military-first policy entails, and proposes a new direction for development in a so-called coevolution strategy. Pyongyang could adopt it by modifying the military sector, aiming to transform North Korea from both the inside and the outside. The North Korean issue is not one which can be solved simply by changing the international community or the South Korean government’s North Korea policy. The problem with President Lee Myung-bak’s Grand Bargain or the Obama administration’s “Comprehensive Package” is that they lack programs that would transform the North Korean state itself. Meanwhile, due to the current domestic situation and the political environment on the Korean Peninsula, the possibility of the problem’s being successfully resolved by North Korea’s leadership by promoting a different autonomous reform program in the Chinese or Vietnamese style is rather low. In the beginning stages of reform there would be heightened socioeconomic instability due to the loosened grip on internal politics, and the leaders would feel increasingly threatened by their relative weakness compared to their strong South Korean neighbor. Therefore for the successful survival of North Korea, there must be a coevolution strategy consisting of giving up its nuclear weapons and promoting an autonomous reform program, while its neighboring states simultaneously ensure and support its safety.   The strategy proposed in this paper is not a completely new concept. Despite certain defects, former President Kim Dae-jung’s ”Sunshine Policy” and President Lee Myung-bak’s ”Denuclearization-Openness-3,000 Initiative” both aim for internal change in North Korea and simultaneous support from the international community. The discussions on the Korean Peninsula’s peace system during the Six-Party Talks follow the same context, aiming to shape North Korea’s strategy by changing the security environment of the Peninsula. However with the absence of mutual trust, such an approach is bound to take on a limited form, and a more fundamental strategy that satisfies both sides is required.   Advocating both guaranteeing the system and the giving up nuclear weapons may seem reckless and unrealistic, but the current environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula is actually quite favorable for resolving the North Korean issue. This situation becomes clearer if we understand that North Korea is facing a three-fold problem of nuclear weapons, economic crisis, and the succession of its leader. It also requires a fundamental reform in all other sectors, including politics, international relations, the economy, and the socio-cultural realm (Chun 2009). In order to achieve fundamental reform, the military-first policy must be abandoned and a new strategy needs to be devised. But given North Korea’s political situation, unless change in the political structure comes first, there is a very low chance that nuclear weapons will be given up and economic reforms will be carried out. In this context, a coevolution strategy aims to make North Korea decide its strategy regarding nuclear weapons and economic reforms during its process of achieving a stable succession. Such a strategy aims for an eventual shift from a “military-first policy” to an “economy-first policy.”   Coevolution strategy in the military sector aims to resolve the problem of “‘excess security” and excess caused by the military-first policy, the essence of which is giving up nuclear weapons. Just as in other sectors, it is composed of three stages. The first stage consists of North Korea declaring the shutdown of its nuclear weapons program in the process of the succession while the international community ensures external and internal security. The second stage is North Korea actually carrying out what it has promised and shaking off the security dilemma by moving from a “military-first policy” to an “economy-first policy.” The final stage results in the reduction of armaments of both South and North Korea, the latter participating in East Asian multilateral security cooperation after having adopted an entirely new approach to becoming a strong and prosperous state.   II. Understanding and Evaluating Military Strategy in the Military-First Era   1. Military Strategy in the Military-First Era   Kim Jong-il’s military-first policy can be interpreted as having succeeded and developed Kim Il-sung’s idea of prioritizing the military and applying this to national strategy during the era of armed struggle (Kang 2002, 17). Kim Jong-il said that “safeguarding and persisting in our socialism and completing the great achievement of revolution by using force is our Party’s unwavering will and conviction.” He added that he was not willing to pursue any changes, emphasizing that he had “reached a firm decision to overcome any hardship by relying on the strength of the gun.” (Jeon 2004, 15-16) However, it is said that Kim Jong-il’s policy is different from Kim Il-sung’s strategy to a certain extent, because there was formerly no party, state, or formal military during the process of nation-building and Kim Il-sung was mostly dependent on the proletariat class when conducting warfare against the Japanese. On the other hand, in a situation in which both a party and a state exist, Kim Jong-il’s military-first strategy insists on relying on strong military power represented by the North Korean People’s Army to protect socialism and face the international community’s hostile policies (Jeon 2004, 16-17).   This aspect is made evident in the “military before labor (先軍後勞)” terminology emphasized by the“military-first policy.” It is based on the notion that in the fulfillment of socialism the proletariat force can carry out its role only with the support of strong military power because even the proletariat force, which is the spearhead of the struggle for socialism, cannot escape the fate of getting enslaved if there is no strong military (Kang 2002, 22-30). Thus this perspective places more importance on the revolutionary spirit of the military rather than on that of the proletariat class, and regards the military not as a means but as the leading force of politics. This reflects how, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of socialism, North Korea’s internal and external security dilemma has intensified and the proportion that the military sector takes in national strategy has increased accordingly.   In the end, there are two types of military-first policies: the “political strategy placing the military as the top priority of national affairs” and the “political strategy having the military as the core and main force.” (Jeon 2004, 19; Kang 2002, 19-22; Eom and Yun 2006, 150-151) In the perspective of military strategy, the former is for foreign security and the latter for internal stability of the regime.   (1) Military Strategy of the Military-First Era Aiming for External Security   North Korea claims that military-first policy is the “political strategy placing the military as the top priority in national affairs.” (Jeon 2004, 20-26) Because, it says, the international community, including the United, States, is menacing its right to exist, it is inevitable that the North Korean military sector be treated as of the utmost importance in order to be able to defend the state’s other duties in areas such as politics, economics, and culture. The existing traditional socialist theory was perceived to be based on a materialist view of history aiming to construct socialism with improvements in the economic sector such as in production, followed by the strengthening of the military sector. In other words, the military was thought to be reliant on the economic sector. North Korea asserts that a military-first policy works based on creative principles that differ from traditional socialist theory because it proposes first and foremost the strengthening of the military based on juche ideology (Jeon 2004, 21-23).   Because the military is perceived as the most important factor, the military-first policy devotes itself primarily to strengthening national defense. For this purpose, it is especially important to focus on developing the industrial sector of national defense because it is essential for establishing a defense system entirely for the people and the state, which would thus increase national defense capabilities. In addition North Korea emphasizes that unlike imperialism and an arms race, this type of politics aims to contain war and attain peace, and not to threaten the other states. Its goal is to become an invincible military power that is able to secure the state’s and nation’s rights to life and sovereignty, and guarantee the construction of a strong and prosperous state (Eom and Yun 2006, 156-167)...(Continued)