.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note The extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US aims to protect South Korea from a third-party aggressor such as North Korea. However, there are issues related to the provider’s credibility and reliability. In this commentary, Professor Mason Richey, associate professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, examines whether South Korea should continue to rely on US extended nuclear deterrence by considering the status of the current US-ROK alliance. Professor Richey suggests three “mutually reinforcing paths” including strengthening South Korea’s conventional deterrence capabilities, initiating a Korean Peninsula Nuclear Planning mechanism, and having South Korea take post-US presidential election measures to improve relations with the US. As much as Seoul’s national security depends on Washington, US domestic political factors affect South Korea’s security. In this regard, the upcoming US election may provide a crossroad for the US-ROK alliance. Professor Richey argues that alliance recovery will be easier if Biden gets elected since his administration’s priority is to repair US alliances.     The highest expression of the US-ROK alliance is extended nuclear deterrence. This tool for international order building/maintenance and nonproliferation refers to the intentional strategic US declaration to protect an ally from a certain level of aggression (mainly nuclear, but presumably also sub-nuclear) by a third-party state. Although the US is not itself threatened or attacked directly, the US protects the ally through the dissuasive threat of a retaliatory strike against the third-party state via the use of nuclear weapons. In the specific case of the US-ROK alliance, for which North Korea is the most likely third-party aggressor, extended nuclear deterrence is anchored in the following: technological means to deliver warheads on target, leader-level political agreement, reputational incentives for the US to meet its commitment, the stationing of US military forces on South Korean territory, and deep, path-dependent institutional cooperation both diplomatically and militarily. The logic of and motivation for extended nuclear deterrence are clear. The extension of the US nuclear umbrella to South Korea is intended to deter North Korea (and possibly other states such as China and Russia) from launching a nuclear attack on South Korea. This aims to promote stability in the East Asia region. It reduces South Korea’s incentive to develop an independent nuclear deterrent, helping prevent a proliferation arms race among neighboring states seeking their own paths of nuclear breakout. Moreover—and arguably more importantly—US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea is intended to increase conventional deterrence as well, as Washington’s nuclear backstop for Seoul in theory disincentivizes[1] Pyongyang from launching a major[2] conventional attack for fear that it could escalate to an unwinnable nuclear conflict. The logic of extended nuclear deterrence may be clear, but there always lingers the question of the credibility and reliability of the provider of extended nuclear deterrence. This is true both in general and in the particular case of the Korean peninsula. US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea is central to the security of both the Korean peninsula and East Asia writ large, yet is politically fragile. Hence the question: should South Korea count on US extended nuclear deterrence? This article examines the question from several perspectives, notably in light of strategic considerations and the current state of the US-ROK alliance.   Casting Doubt If the conceptual logic of extended nuclear deterrence is clear, the willpower to execute its fundamental underpinning—launching a US nuclear strike against a third-party state on behalf of an ally—is highly uncertain. The clarity of the logic obscures the gravity of the act: the use of a uniquely[3] destructive weapon that potentially entails the death of millions and uncontrolled escalation presenting existential risk to humanity (if additional nuclear powers were to be drawn in). Ordering a nuclear attack on any state—even one directly at war with the US—is an enormous psychological burden for any US president; to do so primarily for the benefit of an ally, rather than primarily for the US and its population, requires an almost unimaginable level of fortitude. The credibility of extended nuclear deterrence rests, however, precisely on the assumption that this presidential fortitude is reliable, that the US president would trade San Francisco for Busan.[4] This unimaginable, yet reliable fortitude is necessary, and a heavy lift, even in the most favorable of circumstances, which, one hastens to add, do not obtain with the current situation of US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. Credible, reliable extended nuclear deterrence requires—in order to buttress the requisite presidential fortitude—a rock-solid relationship between allies (including between ally leaders), as well as the patron state’s principled purpose and clarity about the strategic value of meeting its extended nuclear deterrence obligations. There is reason to doubt this in the current situation under US president Donald Trump. To begin with, Trump is notorious for his unreliability as a partner, an ingrained aspect of his psychological profile that extends back to his period as a businessman and has remained prominent during his White House mandate. Beyond his general propensity for personal betrayal, Trump has repeatedly denigrated US allies, including South Korea. Why should South Korea—and, perhaps more importantly from an extended deterrence perspective, North Korea or another nuclear-weapon-possessing adversary of South Korea—believe a generally mendacious and unreliable Trump would honor the US obligation of a retaliatory nuclear strike on behalf of South Korea when doing so potentially would put the US in danger, clearly violating Trump’s “America First” foreign policy orientation? Beyond the sheer problem of the unreliability and alliance hostility of Trump—who might, after all, soon be out of office and succeeded by Joe Biden, a seasoned supporter of US alliances—what he represents about the US body politic is also discouraging for US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea. Trump’s administration—which, despite being riven with corruption, grift and graft, lawless opportunism, incompetence, and negligence, enjoys the support of 35%-45% of the population, who ipso facto finds this behavior benign—is an expression of how little the US government and broader population are dedicated to upholding the rule of law. This problem is unlikely to vanish even with Trump out of office—it is, rather, a flaw in the national character of the US at the moment. This raises the question—critical for South Korea—of how seriously a state that does not sufficiently respect domestic rule of law can be expected to respect its defense commitment to a treaty ally. Additionally, one must recall that Trump’s foreign policy—including alliance hostility that casts doubt on extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea—is also an expression of the aggregate preference of the US population to be less militarily engaged abroad. The historical default foreign policy preference of the broad US population is moderate isolationism, with the more interventionist, proactive, alliance-focused post-WWII period an exception. It is worth asking if the US can be trusted to support a policy as laden as extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea—with the major risks that entails—given that the US population clearly supports removal of trivial numbers of US troops even from places such as Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, which have extremely limited capacity to inflict damage on the US territory.  Turning from domestic political factors in the US to the international strategic context for US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea, the situation is also unfavorable. Any realistic adversary scenario involves a third-party state (North Korea, China, Russia) that could strike US territory with a residual (third) strike, if the US were itself to retaliate (second strike) on behalf of South Korea in reprisal for the third-party state’s initial (first) strike against South Korea. The US and South Korea may game out the scenarios to locate a point of US dominance on the escalation ladder (indeed this is one of the reasons for the US introduction of low-yield warheads for SLBMs in the western Pacific), but the bottom line is that the third-party states most likely to be involved in conflict with South Korea are sufficiently nuclear-armed that, under conflict conditions, a strike on US territory cannot be excluded. Consequently, there is a chance that the US president would avoid that risk by not launching a nuclear attack against said third-party state in accordance with US extended nuclear deterrence commitment. South Korea must know this. North Korea certainly does. Indeed Pyongyang just provided a vivid picture of its own deterrence capabilities in its latest October 10 military parade, which displayed a new, larger ICBM and a new variant of the Pukguksong series SLBM. The ICBM (provisionally known as the Hwasong-16), which can strike anywhere in the continental US, is presumably capable of carrying multiple warheads and decoys or a larger thermonuclear warhead with better and more robust penetration aids and other countermeasures. These technologies seem designed to defeat US ballistic missile defense, which is a problem for extended nuclear deterrence because a sufficiently reliable and comprehensive missile defense sys-tem would buttress the US perception that it could strike North Korea without fear of reprisal. That is, to the extent that North Korean capabilities cast doubt on the effectiveness of US ballistic missile defense, they erode the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea.[5] Less is known about the new Pukguksong SLBM, but its deployment would also complicate US calculations of its deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis North Korea. Neither of these new sys-tems has been tested, and are ostensibly not ready for operational deployment. And in the case of North Korean SLBMs, there are enormous unanswered questions about command-and-control, the survivability of North Korea’s noisy and outdated submarines, and other aspects of reliability. Nonetheless, the ongoing quantitative and qualitative development and improvement of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal represent a technological wedge for decoupling Washington from Seoul. From a strategic perspective, the incentive structure to provide extended nuclear deterrence for the purpose of order building/maintenance and nonproliferation changes when the third-party state has nuclear weapons that can strike the extended nuclear deterrence provider.[6]   Effects and Responses The bottom line is that in the current environment, South Korea cannot truly trust US extended nuclear deterrence. Yet it is also, seemingly, consigned to do so, absent a fraught attempt at developing an independent nuclear deterrent that would likely break the US-ROK military alliance and have grave effects on both the South Korean economy (which might face economic sanctions for proliferation activities) and regional stability in Northeast Asia. So, how might South Korea mitigate the downsides of this unenviable situation? Three potentially mutually reinforcing paths come to mind. The first task is strengthening South Korea’s conventional deterrence capabilities. North Korea’s nuclear weapons do, of course, represent a risk to South Korean security, whether through inadvertent or intentional use, but both of these scenarios are exceedingly unlikely, and it is in fact North Korean conventional capabilities (with, to be sure, Pyongyang’s nuclear sword of Damocles hanging in the background) that are the greater and more direct threat to South Korea. If Seoul successfully invests in conventional deterrence capabilities,[7] it can likely raise the cost of North Korean conventional aggression sufficiently that North Korean leadership will not have a competitive strategy for enacting it. South Korea is already taking some of these steps, both through its rising defense budget—including for R&D and procurement—and the conceptual triad of Kill Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense, and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation. One notes also that Seoul should expect Pyongyang to continue to engage in “grey zone” actions that undermine South Korean security and resolve slowly over time, while no single action rises to a level sufficient to warrant a major South Korean kinetic response. It would behoove Seoul to develop better strategies, and the requisite capabilities for applying them, to deter, and if necessary, counter, these “grey zone” actions. A second step is considering initiating a Korean Peninsula Nuclear Planning mechanism in which South Korea would have a role. With some adjustment for different contexts, this would be analogous to the Nuclear Planning Group at NATO. This would build confidence regarding nuclear policy issues—strategy, nuclear use options/targeting, etc.—on both sides of the US-ROK alliance. Crucially, it would formally bring Seoul into the process of reviewing and adapting extended nuclear deterrence policy as a function of evolving threats. This approach—which has been proposed before, and which has some downsides, including Seoul’s ostensible steep learning curve in this area due to lack of experience—is a middle step between doing nothing and re-deploying[8] US nuclear weapons on South Korean territory, which would be clearly highly provocative vis-à-vis North Korea and Beijing, and for which there is insufficient popular support in South Korea. The US is, as a rule, only willing to consider this type of high-level defense cooperation with the closest of allies, a group to which South Korea still belongs. Despite some recent alliance turbulence—much of which stems from the idiosyncrasies of president Trump—there is a history of institutional cooperation between US and South Korean foreign affairs and defense ministries, as well as high levels of popular support for the alliance among both countries’ broader population. These pillars of cooperation could be used to support the establishment of a Korean Peninsula Nuclear Planning mechanism. Lastly, Seoul should take steps—post-US presidential election—to ameliorate the fraying of its relationship with Washington. This will likely be easier with a Biden administration, given his statements that a major foreign policy priority would be repairing US alliances. However, this is critical regardless of who wins the election. At the end of the day, extended nuclear deterrence is only as credible as the solidity of the alliance in which it is embedded. To that end, Seoul should consider the extent to which that solidity could be bolstered by taking more of an active interest in US security concerns in the broader East Asia region. This is difficult for South Korean governments that are understandably preoccupied with the Korean peninsula and concerned about offending Beijing, yet it would be salutary for the US-ROK alliance, and thus for extended nuclear deterrence, for Seoul to indicate that it also has some skin the game for Washington’s regional policies. One good turn deserves another. ■   [1] The “stability/instability” paradox notwithstanding. See: Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961), p. 226. [2] Lower-level and asymmetric aggression are addressed below. [3] Indeed there is an entire literature discussing how nuclear weapons’ sui generis character has produced a strong normative prohibition—the “nuclear taboo”—on the first use of nuclear weapons. [4] During the Cold War, France pursued an independent nuclear deterrent outside the context of NATO precisely because Charles de Gaulle did not believe the US would “trade New York for Paris.” [5] This is also true for Japan. [6] Again, this is also true for Japan. [7] Including but not limited to fighter aircraft, missiles and missile/air defense, anti-submarine warfare technology, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, improved land fighting sys-tems, autonomous sys-tems and robotics to mitigate future demographics-induced manpower shortages, cyber capabilities, etc. [8] There has been some debate recently about the possibility of re-introducing US tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean territory.     Mason Richey is Associate Professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Seoul, South Korea), and Senior Contributor at the Asia Society (Korea). Dr. Richey has also held positions as a POSCO Visiting Research Fellow at the East-West Center (Honolulu, HI) and a DAAD Scholar at the University of Potsdam. His research focuses on U.S. and European foreign and security policy as applied to the Asia-Pacific. Recent scholarly articles have appeared (inter alia) in Pacific Review, Asian Security, Global Governance, and Foreign Policy Analysis. Shorter analyses and opinion pieces have been published in 38North, War on the Rocks, Le Monde, the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, and Forbes, among other venues. He is co-editor of the volume The Future of the Korean Peninsula: Korea 2032 (Routledge, forthcoming 2021).   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note As US-China competition intensifies, South Korea is facing new difficulties in creating effective North Korean policies as well as diplomatic strategies. Professor Chaesung Chun, Chair of the National Security Research Center at EAI and a professor at Seoul National University, outlines the changes in US policy toward China that have occurred in the past year and discusses the implications that this shift towards a “New Cold War” has for South Korea in particular and Asia as a whole. He asserts that without diplomatic cooperation with its neighboring countries, South Korea will struggle to implement effective and successful North Korean policy in the midst of the shifting nature of US-China competition. He argues that South Korea needs to design policies that can affect the politics of both US and China. In this commentary, he proposes three possible ways forward. First, South Korea can deliver policy ideas to key policy advisors through Track II talks. Second, the Moon administration must clearly communicate the norms and fundamentals that Korea aims to pursue though its policies. Finally, South Korea has the option of presenting Korea’s policy alternatives through strategic dialogues in Track I talks between Korea and the US. Professor Chun states that “the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the successful North Korea policy are vital, but these will become more possible when South Korea reinforces its position within the rapidly changing global dynamics, especially with regard to the US-China relations."     As the US-China strategic competition gradually shifts toward a hegemonic challenge, South Korea’s North Korea strategies are faced with increasing difficulties. North Korean nuclear issue currently shows no signs of resolution, and it is clear that the geopolitical environment will continue to worsen if US-China competition intensifies. A variety of proposals for South Korea’s strategy in the middle of US-China rivalry have been presented, but recent changes in US strategy towards China pose challenges to South Korea’s position. China, in US strategic thinking, is perceived as pursuing hegemonic power not only in Asia, but also globally. Anti-Chinese sentiment following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has fueled this opinion. China’s relatively quick economic recovery adds to the concern over the rise of China. Chinese intrusions into major disputed territories including the South China Sea are increasing, and China continues to expand its global presence by supplying global public goods in many areas especially for global health. Challenges posed by China today make the US more nervous than during the 2008 Financial Crisis. With the US presidential election a month away, the US China policy has been heavily politicized and is emerging as an important electoral agenda with other overwhelming domestic political issues. The year 2020 marks a milestone in the US strategy toward China. Before 2020, the Trump administration was focused on various economic assistance including infrastructure assistance to Asian countries, and the promotion of free within the Indo-Pacific strategic framework, which was related to security strategies toward Asia as a whole. At the same time, the administration also pushed for trade negotiations to reorganize bilateral economic relations with China. However, the Trump administration’s China policy has become much tougher in 2020. Since the global onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the US has intended to reduce its reliance on China for core medical supplies by creating an alliance called the “Economic Prosperity Network,” and tried decoupling from China in advanced technologies sectors crucial to China’s future development. Such US moves are accompanied by a policy to further decouple Asian countries from China. Furthermore, the security architecture seems to depart from the US-centered bilateral alliance network, namely the hub-and-spoke sys-tem, to form a multilateral security sys-tem similar to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). This attempt can be confirmed by the recent remarks of the Defense Secretary Esper and Deputy Secretary of State Biegun. The US takes issue with the ideological characteristics of the Chinese regime and President Xi Jinping’s leadership. This is well-illustrated in Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library. Pompeo mentioned in his speech that Chinese regime is fundamentally totalitarian Marxist-Leninist one, and that it is forcing coercive governance on its neighboring countries and throughout the globe, thereby weakening freedom. This new Cold War rhetoric implies that the liberal countries cannot coexist with communist China. The US has shifted to an offensive stance towards China, claiming that its engagement policy toward China for the last five decades has failed. However, it is difficult to conclude that US engagement policy towards China over the past 50 years has totally failed. China has developed under the existing US-led liberal economic order, has not explicitly posed military challenges, and still values the existing global norms. If the US and the international community had not pursued a policy of engagement with China, China’s external behavior might have been more aggressive. Second, the new Cold War type of strategy could give the impression that the US is seeking regime change. China, which is well aware of the fact that the end of the Cold War resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union, will have no choice but to respond in a very aggressive fashion. This may eventually lead to a military confrontation between the US and China, having an adverse impact on the neighboring countries. The new Cold War atmosphere also increases the potential for a confrontation between the US and China to turn into a hot war. After World War II, George Kennan insisted on the geopolitical containment of the Soviet Union. However, he did not necessarily agree with the use of military means. The NCS-68 advocating for the military containment only came into force after the Korean War when fear of a military attack by a communist regime spread widely. If short-term and high-intensity disputes occur in the South China Sea between the US and China, the current status quo could unexpectedly turn into a hot war. To prevent such changes from occurring in the near future is extremely important. Fourth, the allies and strategic partners of the US do not necessarily agree with the US perception of China and the strategic calculation in line with a new Cold War. This is not only due to differing perceptions of China, but also due to differences in ultimate policy goals. The US believes that from a global strategic perspective, China’s military modernization and stronger national power can be a threat. However, many Asian countries do not feel that China poses a direct security threat with differing degrees. The, the so-called new Cold War strategy towards China has a number of problems, and is bound to backfire if it is forced on America’s allies. First, the existing US-centric international order arose from a set of policies that encompassed a number of different arrangements. Alliances were formed to promote the active forward deployment of the United States, provide defense support to allies, pursue an international order based on embedded liberalism which benefitted America’s allies economically and promoted compromise between governments. Also the US government served as a model for the pursuit of human-rights oriented policies and democracy. Second, the new Cold War offensive has already provoked a fierce reaction from China. This is because China feels that the new US strategy undermines the ideological legitimacy of the Chinese regime, This move is believed to frustrate China’s growth and strengthen the collective security of Asian countries in competition with China. If Asian countries join the US offensive against China, Chinese retaliation will be stronger. If the US fails to provide a viable alternative that can both prevent and respond to Chinese retaliation against these Asian countries, the new Cold War structure will eventually weaken. Third, if the allies nevertheless decide to join the US-led anti-China camp, we can expect retaliation from China which will hurt the industry sector of Asian countries. This will likely intensify anti-Chinese sentiment, but also it may also lead to anti-American sentiment, as the US has established a new Cold War structure. The US could end up with economically weakened allies who lay some blame on US policies. Amid the US-China rivalry, it is not easy for South Korea to find a path toward effective North Korea policy. It is difficult for South Korea to pursue successful policy towards North Korea without diplomatic engagement with its neighboring countries, especially China. South Korea, as a middle power, must work to design policies that will impact the politics of both the US and China. Under the current circumstances, South Korea should devise various ways to influence US policy towards China. One potential way to achieve this goal is to deliver policy ideas to key policy advisors through Track II talks. The US is facing major upcoming changes in its policy towards China and its national security strategy. Input from US allies on policy alternatives would enable the US to devise better polices. Second, Korea must clearly communicate the fundamentals and norms that it wishes to pursue though its policies. It is necessary to devise policies that are differentiated from those of the US and are based on more universal norms, with concrete logic and theories that support such policy endeavors. Successful policies may eventually influence US policies by setting a good example. The third option is to present Korea’s policy alternatives through strategic dialogues in Track I talks between Seoul and Washington. It is crucial to engage in a strategic dialogue that preemptively presents policies that benefit not only Korea but also the US and the wider international community. US strategy towards China that South Korea may recommend is as follows. Currently the discourse on China policy in the United States varies. The advocates of the new Cold War confrontation, offensive realists, and liberals all have different opinions on the ultimate purpose of China policy. The supporters of the new Cold War and the offensive realists both emphasize ways to reinforce the role of Asian allies. The former focuses on possible result of the collapse of the Chinese regime, while the latter stresses changes in the balance of power between the US and China, recommending the strategy of off-shore balancing and the increased role of alliances. Liberals argue for consistent and reinforced open engagement with China. The new Cold War is unacceptable to Asian allies and also active US intervention remains necessary. Therefore, South Korea should pursue active diplomatic efforts to maintain the military status quo and enable China’s external behaviors to be consistent with existing norms, and foster close cooperation within the international community to positively influence China’s future development path. Second, it is difficult to create a collective security sys-tem without invoking aggressive response from China. As a hegemonic power, the US is proposing the idea of broad collective security, taking into account China’s breach of norms and disputes over maritime territorial and transportation routes. When the US still maintains a military advantage over China with the current bilateral alliance sys-tem being able to keep China in check, the imposition of artificial collective security could result in a backlash. There must be an alternative to the bygone collective security of the 20th century—an alternative that seeks to create a more flexible and creative network within the current bilateral alliance sys-tem. Third, complete economic decoupling would entail substantial costs. It is also unclear whether pursuing such a strategy would in fact harm China, as China has the capacity to minimize economic damage through the establishment of the so-called “red supply chain.” Excessive politicization and securitization of markets would inevitably affect the global economic order. Even under the US-led economic order, politicized and secured economic practices could have negative impacts. Therefore, we must find ways to maintain the existing liberal order and international organizations while convincing China to cease its breaching of norms. We must pursue a recoupling, not decoupling, of cooperation. Fourth, we should actively develop areas that facilitate cooperation with China. In this regard, South Korea’s role in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue is essential. It is true that the visibility of the North Korea nuclear issue has decreased significantly in the US presidential elections. However, the North Korea nuclear issue is a matter of cooperation between the US and China, as Deputy Secretary Beigun commented during a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on July 22nd.  Since South Korea is an important party to the North Korean nuclear issue, Seoul must work to exercise its influence on US-China relations by establishing a track record of policy success. The resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the successful North Korea policy are vital, but these will become more possible when South Korea reinforces its position within the rapidly changing global dynamics, especially with regard to the US-China relations.     Chaesung Chun is the chair of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and a professor of the department of political science and International relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his PhD in international relations at Northwestern University in the United States, and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. His main research interests include international political theory, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsular affairs. He is the co-author of The Korean War: Threat and Peace, and the author of a number of publications including Are Politics Moral and International Politics in East Asia: History and Theory.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note With the upcoming 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, the world is focused on how the outcome of the election would change Washington's foreign policy trajectory, including its North Korea Policy. Yonho Kim, Associate Director at the George Washington Institute for Korean Studies, asserts that if Biden is elected as president, his North Korean policy would return the U.S. to multilaterally imposed sanctions and heightened attention on the North Korean human rights situation. He makes reference to Biden’s statements during the 2020 Democratic National Convention, in which he emphasized that he would "build a sustained, coordinated diplomatic campaign to advance the longer-term goal of denuclearization" while supporting "humanitarian aid and pressure the regime to cease its gross human rights abuses." With the assumption that Biden's North Korean policy is likely to be centered on working-level diplomacy and cooperation with U.S. allies and partners, Professor Kim envisions that Biden's North Korean policy would resemble the "strategic patience" campaign from the Obama administration. While the results of the 2020 presidential election remain uncertain, Professor Kim argues that Biden's win would open a window for removing the Trump administration's footprints from Washington.     The First Virtual Democratic National Convention and the Defeat Trump Coalition This year’s Democratic National Convention in the United States marked a historic transition in many ways due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Democratic Party convened major party stakeholders and leading participants to a virtual platform guided mainly by public health concerns, while giving up the traditional plan designed for a crowded political festival. Joseph Biden delivered a speech to accept the Democratic nomination for president, which is the culmination of the convention, on a lonely stage without crowds roaring with enthusiasm, but surrounded by flags in an empty convention hall. The first virtual national party convention of its kind offered a unique experience for viewers with a mix of prerecorded speeches and well-produced visual elements. Many viewers had already become used to virtual political campaigns since the COVID-19 outbreak earlier this year. However, the virtual convention highlighted the fact that the pandemic has reshaped not only everyday life in America but also the whole domestic political process with potential long-term impacts. Not surprisingly, the headline convention speakers, including Biden’s running mate Senator Kamala Harris and former presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton, consistently tried to draw attention to Biden’s superb candidacy, but it was also obvious that the main theme dominating the four-day convention was “Defeat Trump.” The Democratic Party demonstrated a broad coalition of constituents, including the left that initially rallied to Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren at the primary, seeking to end the tumult of the Trump era. The “Defeat Trump” coalition made the case for Biden’s candidacy by arguing that he has the best chance to end the chaos Donald Trump’s presidency created. Republicans were also invited to join the coalition. Along with some Republicans who voted for Trump in 2016, former Ohio governor John Kasich and former secretary of state Colin Powell lent another Republican voice supporting Biden’s candidacy at the convention. On the same day of Biden’s acceptance speech, more than 70 former Republican national security officials released a statement endorsing the former vice president. The group, including former intelligence chiefs, contested Trump’s dangerous incompetence with “Biden’s character, experience, and temperament to lead the nation.” In the following week of the convention, more than 20 former Republican lawmakers endorsed Biden for president on the first day of the Republican National Convention. The increasing number of notable “Republicans for Biden” revealed growing frustrations with the direction of their party and offered a symbolic boost to Biden although Trump’s overwhelming popularity among Republican voters remains intact.   Restoring America’s Reputation and Biden’s North Korea Policy The 2020 Democratic Party Platform endorsed at the party’s national convention made it clear that repairing the soul and character of the United States will be the party’s guiding principle for the upcoming presidential campaign and beyond. In order to unite and heal the nation, the Democratic party called for a new national leadership to address “the worst public health crisis in a century, the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, the worst period of global upheaval in a generation, the urgent global crisis posed by climate change, the intolerable racial injustice that still stains the fabric of our nation.” Likewise, on foreign policy, the platform aimed to renew American leadership and restore America’s reputation and influence in the world. In this context, Trump was blamed for “sowing doubts about our commitments to diplomatic agreements, mutual defense, democratic values, and strategic purpose.” In particular, the platform opposed to Trump’s demand for a dramatic increase in South Korea’s share of alliance costs amid a nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. Without articulating the Korean Peninsula in his acceptance speech, Biden reiterated the party platform’s rebuke of Trump’s bold top-down approach to North Korea. He said, “I will make it clear to our adversaries the days of cozying up to dictators are over.” This statement echoed the party platform’s argument that rather than defend democracy and human rights, Trump has fawned over autocrats and sent love letters to despots. Although Biden did not elaborate on his administration’s North Korea policy at the party’s convention, the party platform succinctly described a Democratic alternative: “Together with our allies—and through diplomacy with North Korea — we will constrain and contain the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program and its regional belligerence. We will build a sustained, coordinated diplomatic campaign to advance the longer-term goal of denuclearization. And we will not forget the people of North Korea—Democrats will support humanitarian aid and pressure the regime to cease its gross human rights abuses.” According to a New York Times survey of Democratic presidential candidates during the early primaries, Biden has already favored a mixture of multilateral diplomacy and sanctions in containing North Korea’s nuclear threats unless there is an imminent long-range missile attack from Pyongyang. He aimed to “set the right formula of sanctions enforcement and sanctions relief” and “make it harder for Kim [Jung-un] to continue on his belligerent path, while making credible efforts to offer an alternative vision for a nonnuclear future to Kim and the people of North Korea.” Biden was not responsive to the idea of gradually lifting sanctions in return for Pyongyang’s nuclear freeze. Rather, he revealed his intention to be assertive with Pyongyang by agreeing to insist on substantial disarmament before relieving any sanctions.   Strategic Patience 2.0? After the failed Hanoi summit with North Korea in 2019, the Trump administration’s approach to North Korea relied on its own version of strategic patience although Trump himself derided the Obama administration for arriving at the same kind of stalemate with Pyongyang: one with no real negotiations and no intentional escalation. Some North Korea watchers are skeptical that a Biden administration would turn out differently. Both Biden and Kim would refuse to return to diplomacy unless the other side would abandon its own strategic patience. After all, North Korea blasted Biden calling him an “imbecile” and a “rabid dog” in response to his strong objection to Trump’s bromance with Kim who is, in his words, “a murderous dictator.” Trump promised to make deals with North Korea “very quickly” if re-elected. Some experts in Washington speculate that Trump’s legacy project with Pyongyang would immediately start with his second term. However, if Biden wins the November presidential election, the U.S. policy toward North Korea is likely to be centered on working-level diplomacy and coordination with its allies and partners. Indeed, Biden’s top North Korea policy advisers are familiar with the ‘strategic patience’ camp that will not offer any diplomatic rewards for bad behaviors. Biden has also been accusing Trump of ignoring North Korea’s human rights abuses while coddling the country’s dictator Kim Jung-un. It is noteworthy that a long-time pro-engager like Biden drew attention to the human rights situation in North Korea which has become a serious bipartisan concern with Pyongyang in Washington. In addition to the human rights front, a Biden administration would have to engage with a North Korea determined to return to its byungjin line and pursue its new offensive for making a breakthrough head-on in face of the tight international sanctions. Furthermore, Pyongyang’s self-isolation amid the COVID-19 pandemic would allow little chance of resuming engagement with the North at least in the near term.   Will the Defeat Trump Coalition Succeed? Biden kicked off the general election campaign with a clear lead over Trump in most national polls. The “Defeat Trump” coalition is likely to continue expanding its base among the independent and moderate Republican voters. Biden has also been adept in not allowing any room for his opponents to link him to the left, especially on immigration, health care, and defunding the police, although Trump kept attacking him as a tool of the left. Uncertainties surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, the Biden campaign admits, will define the election results. Voters have a hard time paying attention to Biden’s vision for a new America when the COVID-19 pandemic (not to mention social injustice protests and police brutality) dictates their daily lives. The political needle amongst swing voters and moderate Republicans would ultimately be moved by the way the pandemic subsides leading up to the November election. It is still uncertain how the pandemic would impact voter turnout and the controversies over mail-in voting would disrupt the vote-counting process. In addition, the fall debates could be a turning point for the Biden campaign depending on the candidates’ performances on the stage. Should the former vice president win in November, though, it will open the window for removing Trump’s various footprints in Washington.     Yonho Kim is Associate Research Professor of Practice and Associate Director of GW Institute for Korean Studies. He specializes in North Korea’s mobile telecommunications and U.S. policy towards North Korea. Kim is the author of North Korea’s Mobile Telecommunications and Private Transportation Services in the Kim Jong-un Era (2019) and Cell Phones in North Korea: Has North Korea Entered the Telecommunications Revolution? (2014). His research findings were covered by various media outlets, including Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic, Yonhap News, and Libération. Prior to joining GWIKS, he extensively interacted with the Washington policy circle on the Korean peninsula as Senior Researcher of the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Senior Reporter for Voice of America’s Korean Service, and Assistant Director of the Atlantic Council’s Program on Korea in Transition. He holds a B.A. and M.A. in International Relations from Seoul National University, and an M.A. in International Relations and International Economics from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note North Korea and China have historically shared amicable relations, and their relationship has been referred to “as close as lips and teeth.” Professor Jaewoo Choo from Kyung Hee University challenges the idea that North Korea-China relations are evolving into “normal relations” by highlighting the distinctiveness of their ties as communist states. He states that the two countries share three security objectives: 1) to rid the U.S. presence and influence in the region, 2) to resolve the nuclear issue, and 3) to replace the armistice agreement with a peace treaty. He emphasizes the misconceptions regarding the seemingly normal relations between North Korea and China, which in reality are subject to party-to-party relations as opposed to state-to-state relations. These two countries are unable to have normal relations since it prerequisites the collapse of North Korea’s party state sys-tem or the separation of powers between parties and the state within China. Normal relations also require changes in the way North Korea currently values China as an asset for its geographic security. Professor Choo concludes that as long as the Communist Party of China and the North Korean Workers’ Party exist, the special relationship will be maintained for these two states achieve their security goals on the Korean Peninsula.     In understanding North Korea-China relations, one must be cautious not to overinterpret the underlying diplomatic rhetoric. Approaches calling for literary interpretations of such rhetoric must be avoided. For example, the change in how North Korean and Chinese head of states have referenced their bilateral relations—from “blood alliance” or “relationship forged in blood” to “traditional comradeship” or “traditional friendship”—does not signify that the special meaning and essence of their relationship has expired. The essence and distinctiveness of the North Korean-Chinese bilateral relations are grounded upon the diplomatic and policy goals that they share as communist states. Their relationship is dominated by communist dogma, principles, and rules. As such, their approach on matters of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula—including the North Korean nuclear problem—is fundamentally different compared to that of South Korea. Therefore, it is important to analyze the ‘special relationship’ between North Korea and China in a political context and understand their working relations based on the dynamics of international politics. An accurate understanding about the foundation and buildup of North Korea-China relations is critical.    North Korea and China’s Shared Security Objectives North Korea and China share three security objectives. First is to get rid of U.S. presence in the region, which they consider their biggest security threat. Such policy—which is rooted in anti-imperialism—is still effective today as their greatest policy end goal in terms of security. In 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai proclaimed that ‘the problems of Asia should be solved by Asians.’ President Xi Jinping reminded this statement again in 2014 as in the ‘New Asian Security Concept.’ The realization of such concept is based on the premise that United States’ influence, interference, intervention, and participation within the region be precluded. Second of all, North Korea and China have shared objectives with regard to resolving the nuclear issue. Both countries share the perspective that denuclearization should be achieved in exchange for a peace regime that prescribes to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula and the end of the ROK-U.S. alliance. This is evident in how China has repackaged its adamant position since the first North Korea nuclear crisis by adopting phrases such as “double suspension (simultaneous cease to both ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and North Korean nuclear tests)” and “two-track (denuclearization in tandem with the creation of a peace regime).” Lastly, both countries wish to replace the armistice agreement into a peace treaty, which will lay the groundwork for dismissing U.S. military presence from East Asia. This aligns with North Korea and China’s strategic calculation of initially foregoing the problem of U.S. troops in Japan, and resolving the Taiwan issue as well as U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense.   Misunderstandings about ‘Normal Relations’ between North Korea and China ‘Normal Relations’ refer to state-to-state relations that function accorded to respected national interests. However, the peculiar political sys-tem and structure of North Korea and China prevent both countries from enjoying ‘normal relations.’ In so far as the two countries maintain a ‘party-state’ sys-tem and a communist form of government, their special relations will prevail. In this case, however, the special relations do not refer to ‘a blood-alliance forged in blood.’ Rather, it signifies a relationship shared by communist states and hence, one that is governed by the rules and principles of the two communist parties.  North Korea and China are not normal countries. They are ‘party-state’ governments in which the party reigns over the state. Therefore, unlike the case of “nation-states,” it is the party that governs and leads the state and its social institutions. Led by the party, the diplomatic relations forged between two communist countries are subject to party-to-party relations. Hence the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Workers’ Party of Korea respectively directs the relationship between China and North Korea at the state and government level. Thus, in the diplomacy of communist countries, party-to-party relations are considered a higher concept than that of inter-government relations or inter-state relations. However, we have a misconception that North Korea-China relations are evolving into ‘normal relations.’ In 2005, Chinese Premier Wu Yi emphasized that economic cooperation between North Korea and China ‘should be a market economy led by private sector corporations, based on market principles.’ This statement was upheld by Hu Jintao on August 2010 as the principles for North Korean-Chinese economic cooperation, under the slogan that bilateral economic cooperation would be ‘government-led, corporation-centered, market-operated, and mutually beneficial.’ Such principles were laid out with the belief that North Korea-China economic cooperation could not be managed solely by the party, and should be missioned by the government. China’s independent sanctions against North Korea since 2013 in response to North Korea’s nuclear test also add to the popular misconception that bilateral relations are becoming ‘normal.’ In order to justify its decision, the Chinese Communist Party established in a Global Times editorial that sanctions is an inevitable measure in cases where: 1) Damages have been made to the environmental security of China’s northeastern region, 2) Threats have been placed on its ‘spacial advantage,’ 3) China’s ability to lead has been impaired or it has been averted from being led, and 4) China can no longer carry out the sanction within its own boundaries. China’s actions show how the state attempts to utilize diplomacy to independently control its level of sanctions, in addition to the UN sanctions it already supports.   Why North Korea-China relations cannot be normal relations North Korea-China relations cannot be normal due to the following three reasons. First of all, normal bilateral relations prerequisite the collapse of North Korea’s ‘party-state’ sys-tem or the separation of powers between the party and the state within China. Neither will happen as long as the communist regimes remain in power. Second of all, a transition to normal relations will mean the opening and reform of North Korea. In other words, it engendersan opportunity for the North’s ‘party-state’ sys-tem to transform if opening and reform means political reformation. This change towards a normal state may entail either a transition from a one-party sys-tem to a multi-party sys-tem, or the displacement of the communist ideology. A fundamental adjustment in North Korea’s diplomatic relations with China will be inevitable. Lastly, normal relations must follow a fundamental change in how North Korea values China as an asset to its geographic security strategy. It will signify North Korea’s rearrangement of its security values, with much implications to the foundation of a ‘peace regime’ on the Korean Peninsula as the transition from an ‘armistice’ to a ‘peace treaty’ will concur. Such a collective security sys-tem is bound to downplay China’s geographic value to North Korea as it would alter the existing dynamics of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the alliance between North Korea and China. However, these changes seem very unlikely given the current status quo.   Characteristics of North Korea and China’s Special Relations First of all, ‘party-to-party’ relations take precedence over ‘state-to-state’ and ‘inter-government relations.’ Thus the party’s foreign relations, foreign policy and strategy are not under the jurisdiction of the Chinese government nor the state but are instead, dictated by the party’s International Liaison Department, especially considering China’s relations with North Korea. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is often found at a loss with regards to communist party-to-party relations. For instance, never has there been a case where the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware beforehand of the North Korean leader’s state visit. Secondly, summit meetings between the two communist countries are seldom defined as official. This is because such visits are considered as visits by party leaders, and not by the head of state. It is confirmed by the listing of their official titles in North Korean and Chinese state documents. These titles are arranged in the order of the party, government, and then the military. The fact that their party title precedes the others signifies that the summit is a party affair and not a state event. Thirdly, ‘party-to-party’ diplomacy is free from state protocols. Protocols such as the inspection of the guards or the 21-gun salute do not exist at the party summit. One underlying privilege of the party summit is that it can happen anywhere other than the state capital and at any time by their mutual consent. Another distinctive privilege is they can shy away from informing the world of the content of their discussion as in the form of a joint statement. However, that does not mean there are no protocols at all. Communist leaders have their own special protocols. For example, two thirds of the members of the party standing committee welcome the visitor upon his or her arrival, and partake in the viewing of performances as a tradition. Fourth, North Korea is the first country for the designated successor of the Communist Party of China. The same goes for North Korea. North Korea and China are sent to accrue a first-hand-experience of and appreciate the values and importance of the alliance. The endeavor is perhaps driven by a growing concern amongst North Korean and Chinese leaders of the possibility that the postwar generation leaders may underappreciate the values of the alliance. These practices began with Hua Guofeng in May 1978, for example, when the party elected North Korea as his first overseas visit country following his success to Mao Zedong. The same applies for Hu Yaobang, Hua's successor in 1983. Jiang Zemin, the party's secretary of state, who took power in a rapid fashion due to the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, may not have visited North Korea prior to taking office, but his first overseas as party leader was also North Korea. Hu Jintao, who officially succeeded Zhang in 2002, made his first overseas trip to North Korea in 1993 after being named successor. Xi Jinping also visited North Korea first in 2003 after being appointed to the central government, and then in 2008. Likewise, the first overseas visit by North Korea’s Kim Jong-il after being officially confirmed as the successor was China in June 1983. It is said that Kim Jong-un also visited China in 2010 after being nominated as the new leader. Finally, diplomatic relations between the two states can only be nullified by the end to party relations. While communist states can announce of suspension of their inter-state and inter-government relations, it does not mean the end of official diplomatic ties. Such ties can only be terminated when the party relationship ends. One salient example was the deterioration of China and Soviet Union relations in the 1960s. Although both China and the Soviet Union suspended diplomatic exchanges at both the national and government levels, they averted the official breakoff of ties. The official termination came at the announcement of the end of communist party ties.   An Unusual Alliance and China's Lack of Influence on North Korea The North Korea-China alliance is inherently different from a typical alliance. The difference lies in the fact that neither of the two countries had stationed troops, had practiced a joint military exercise and had engaged in arms trade since the early 1990s. However, a special relationship was instead founded by the common national security goals and experiences as comrades who had fought against imperialism and for socialist internationalism. Their goal is to maintain a protective relationship against the threat of US imperialism till it is completely eradicated. Since North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006, China's approval of sanctions and reduction of aid, long-term suspension of bilateral visits, and the rising criticism of the Chinese public against North Korea have been considered as reasons behind the rift in North Korea-China relations. As a result, there was a widespread perception that the relationship between the two countries was shifting to a "normal state" relationship. This was also fueled by China’s successive failure to show an effective control the North’s provocations since the nuclear test. Nevertheless, the neighboring countries still look for China’s help should the North’s denuclearization talks fall into a stalemate. Fortunately, North Korea has more or less been positive to China’s arbitration. But this does not validate China's influence on North Korea. Beijing is only called upon to mediate the talks between Washington and Pyongyang under two circumstances. One is when Washington is at a loss of a direct communication channel with Pyongyang. The other is when Washington is preoccupied with more important foreign policy agendas such as the Iraq war in 2003. The reality is that Pyongyang prefers direct negotiations with Washington without Beijing’s arbitration. Historically, North Korea has never had a success in talking to the U.S. via China. Hence since its nuclear test, North Korea has focused on direct communications with the U.S. without China as its middle man. It is therefore noteworthy that China has maintained a passive demeanor of acting as a mediator only at the request of the U.S.   When Does China and North Korea’s Special Relationship Come into Effect? Since the founding of the two countries, prolonged suspension of visits between the leaders of North Korea and China has been frequent. On the other hand, external players have played a role in returning them to dialogue. The Soviet Union was one factor during the Cold War. At the time, China needed North Korea to neutralize Soviet threats and to prevent Soviet influence from spreading throughout the Korean Peninsula. North Korea also needed China to maximize the efficacy of its “tightrope diplomacy" between China and the Soviet Union. However, the trend has changed since the North Korean nuclear crisis during the post-Cold War period. The special relationship between North Korea and China was especially helpful at the start of high-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea. Although the relationship between North Korea and China had seemed suspended for a while, it was able to be quickly restored. For example, the June 1999 declaration of normalization was facilitated by the rapid progress made in the relationship between North Korea and the U.S. that was epitomized by William Perry’s visit to the North in May. The relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang was stalled for 7 years then due to the South Korea-China normalization in 1992 and the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. As high-level talks between the U.S. and North Korea resumed following North Korea’s first two nuclear tests, Kim Jong-il has visited China three times between 2010 and 2011. Although bilateral talks had been discontinued since 2008, former U.S. President Carter’s visit to North Korea in May 2011 reopened North Korea-U.S. high-level talks in July. Additionally, while Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping did not hold talks for six years since coming into power in 2012, they have held a series of meetings since 2018. For instance, Kim Jong-un visited China three times in 2018 (March, May and June), and visited again in May 2019. Xi Jinping reciprocated it to Pyongyang in June 2019. The special relationship between North Korea and China also came into effect when the U.S. pressured China with a preemptive strike on North Korea. It succeeded in eliciting China to accept the host role of the six-party talks in 2003. Moreover, the U.S. utilized the same tactic when it sent Joseph Dunford, the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to China in August, and then Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, in September to achieve two goals. One was for China to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. The other was to find out China's potential response in the case that dialogues fail to produce a substantive result but a preemptive strike as the only viable option to the U.S. The U.S. strategy of pressuring China with a preemptive strike on North Korea has mostly been successful. Although China prefers a peaceful resolution to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through dialogue, and welcomes talks between North Korea and the U.S., it still has its own concerns. This is why China often takes on a passive attitude until there is pressure from the U.S. China is concerned about North Korea’s arbitrary departure, the unexpected loss of North Korea and unintentionally losing North Korea. North Korea's arbitrary departure refers to North Korea severing its ties with China and joining hands with the U.S. The unexpected loss of North Korea means that the U.S. and North Korea would join forces as North Korea makes progress in its negotiations with the U.S. This would result in North Korea relying less on China without China’s awareness due to its improved relations with the U.S. In other words, North Korea in such a case would become pro-U.S. An unintentional loss of North Korea by China means that North Korea ends up realizing itself having already been siding with the U.S. as a result of progress made in the relationship with the U.S. even without resolving the nuclear issue. In this case, North Korea's nuclear status would be implicitly recognized and security issues between North Korea and the U.S. can be compromised bilaterally regardless of China's intention, allowing the North to fully achieve its “Juche (Self-Reliance)” ideology in terms of national defense and security. North Korea is attempting to make up for its weaknesses by taking advantage of China's anxiety, and by making it difficult for China to grasp its intentions through the engagement of “tightrope diplomacy" between the U.S. and China. Due to North Korea’s “tightrope diplomacy,” it is sometimes placed under strong sanctions by both the U.S. and China, while at other times, frequently visited by the U.S. and China. At other times, North Korea has actively sought to grasp the positions of both the U.S. and China through "interference diplomacy," and maximized its interests through "tightrope diplomacy". Thus, as long as the Communist Party of China and the North Korean Workers' Party exist, a special relationship will be maintained until the two communist states achieve their national security goals on the Korean Peninsula.     Jaewoo Choo is a Professor of Chinese foreign policy in the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyung Hee University. He is a graduate of Wesleyan University (BA in Government) and Peking University (MA & Ph.D. in International Relations). He was a visiting professor to Georgia Tech, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, and the Brookings Institution. His research interests are Chinese foreign policy, multilateral security cooperation, US-China relations, and China-North Korea relations. Recent publications include first-ever book in Korea on the history of US-China relations titled US-China relations for Koreans: From Korean War to THAAD Conflicts (Seoul: Kyung-In Publishing House, 2017), and US and China’s Strategy on the Korean Peninsula: Reading from the Facts (Seoul: Paper & Tree, 2018). He’s currently working on book manuscripts on US-North Korea relations and China-North Korea relations.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note Unlike South Korea, North Korea’s involvement on the global stage remains limited due to the nation’s ideals of self-reliance. Dr. Seunghee Ha, a research fellow of the Institute of North Korean studies at Dongguk University discusses North Korea’s efforts to meet international standards by “revamping its cultural infrastructure, reframing its music to befit that of a civilized nation, and by developing its informational infrastructure to reflect current trends in media.” As an example, she highlights North Korea’s efforts to provide its people with a more civilized lifestyle through the construction of the Yangdok Hot Spring Resort which Kim Jong Un considers as his symbolic administrative achievement. In addition, Dr. Ha also adds that North Korea’s attempt at globalization can also be seen through the introduction of the Samjiyon Orchestra, the “Pyongyang International Vocal Competition” as well as its New Year Eve’s concert by which the nation showcased its international and musical capabilities and use of art for state propaganda. In terms of media and technology, Dr. Ha brings attention to North Korea’s ambition to reach a wider international audience. North Korea has not only selected YouTube as its new medium for propaganda through the channel New DPRK but has also developed various support programs and applications including a virtual meeting sys-tem called Rakwon.  Although North Korea argues that its globalization efforts aim to improve its people’s living standards, Dr. Ha cautions against the state’s mindset of viewing its people as “objects of enlightenment” and questions whether the nation’s acts are truly for the people.     North Korea is undergoing rapid changes to join the international community following its declaration of building a “socialist civilization” in the 2012 New Year’s Address. At the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) on May 7, 2016, Kim Jong Un defined a cultural power as one that “accelerate[s] the building of a highly civilized socialist country and thus bring[s] up all the people to be able men for the socialist construction with profound knowledge and cultural attainments.”  As such, North Korea has been placing efforts to meet the international standards in various aspects. Most representatively, the country is seeking to improve the livelihoods of its people by revamping its cultural infrastructure, reframing its music to befit that of a civilized nation, and by developing its informational infrastructure to reflect current trends in media.   Tourism Industry Amid these developments, there are key examples that signal changes within North Korea. Within the tourism sector, each region in North Korea has adopted tourism urbanization in order to provide the people with civilized lifestyles. For example, the Yangdok Hot Spring Resort, which began its construction on August 17, 2019 according to a local map, was completed on December 7, 2019 and opened in January 2020. This center is a “combined hot spring therapy facility and multi-functional sports and cultural complex conducive to the promotion of the people's health and their leisure activities." It is composed of both indoor and outdoor baths, a skiing ground, a horse-riding park, a resort, a section for therapy and convalescence, volunteer facilities, and multi-floored dwelling houses. The Yangdok Hot Spring Resort, since its beginning, was constructed as a state-approved model for future constructions and designed to reflect and emulate ‘international trends’ and ‘improved realities.’ The facility aims to be on a par with international standards as a main hot spring tourism attraction with the incorporation of herbal hot springs, Korean style hot spring baked eggs, and doctor fish, which are widely-used tourist goods in Asia. At the ‘Sixth National Conference of War Veterans’ held in July 2020, Kim Jong Un invited attending veterans to the Yangdok Hot Spring Resort to promote the facility as one of his symbolic administrative achievements, considering how he had restored such an impoverished area into a place of cultural attraction within such a short period of time. This can be portrayed as an attempt by the Kim regime to elevate the people’s cultural standards to a global level by expanding their “realm of cultural lifestyles,” by introducing them to diverse experiences and by supporting their sentiment of cultural acceptance. At the same time, the addition of a golf course within the complex, among others, also implied that the facility would be catered for foreign tourists. Hence there seems to be a domestic motivation to develop a tourist attraction of a global standard—one which would be able to host foreigners and signal renewal of its tourist industry, especially amid continued sanctions. In addition to the Yangdok Hot Spring Resort, North Korea is also developing other special tourist zones such as the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area as well as regions including Nampo and Chongjin. North Korea plans to continue utilizing its natural resources in the future to develop its domestic tourism.   Music Industry With regard to the music industry, the introduction of the Samjiyon Orchestra and its special performance in honor of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics suggested a symbol of a new musical beginning for North Korea. The orchestra is considered as an expansion of the Samjiyon Band—a semi-orchestra that emerged in 2009—as it consists of central members from the band and other members from different major bands. On October 10, 2018, the Samjiyon Orchestra opened its exclusive theater, the Samjiyon Orchestra Theater. The theater emphasized its status as a “world-hub for cultural activities” and “a hall of modern arts and culture, where [the North Korean people] and artists could freely create and enjoy music and arts, as well as a sophisticated and civilized cultural lifestyle,” especially considering how it is a “Saegulim Theather” that consists of pure music and without processed amplification. However, it is ironic in that the Samjiyon Orchestra returned to classic light music instead of adhering to electronic music. Since Kim Jong Un came into power in 2012, the Moranbong Band had been established to place electronic music at the forefront to signal the emergence of a young leader who selected such genre to emphasize his connection with the ‘new generation’ and their sentiment and musical taste. But the Samjiyon Orchestra, by selecting the classic genre and by adopting the form of an orchestra, is utilizing the symbolic significance provided by a ‘classic orchestra.’ In the past, North Korea had established a national symphony orchestra to fortify its foundation and identity as an emerging cultural nation during its nation-building stages after declaring its independence. In this context, North Korea has portrayed the Samjiyon Orchestra as a symbol of its civilized socialist state by building upon the symphonic form based on cultural authority and an independent institution for music. Furthermore, as theaters of different countries provide a cultural indicator of the international standing, North Korea aimed to reify its international image through the arts by constructing a new national theater fit to be its national symbol. Globalization of the musical realm could also be seen through music festivals. In 2018, North Korea held an international music festival entitled the “Pyongyang International Vocal Competition.” The competition was hosted by the Ministry of Culture “to find and promote talented new singers, and foster the exchange and culture and arts and assistance from countries all over the world.” As host of an international music competition, North Korea desires to showcase its international and musical capabilities and utilize the arts for state propaganda.   Stage Art North Korea is experiencing a period of transition in stage art as seen through the 2019 New Year Celebration Concert. The state conducts various celebrations as it generally upholds both solar and lunar New Year. In particular, New Year celebrations held on the last day of each year have generally been conducted indoors at a designated theater. From 2018, however, this celebration has been renamed as the “New Year’s Eve Concert” and converted into a large outdoor celebration held at the Kim Il-sung Square. The Kim Il-sung Square is located at the heart of Pyongyang and serves as a central place of gathering, embodying the country’s national spirit and holding diverse significance. The concert was conducted in an elaborate manner with various stage settings and props, including a large-scale stage and screen, laser spotlights, drones and fireworks. Furthermore, the event resembled a typical large concert with a countdown until the New Year, an artillery salute, and people taking photos with their smartphones and cheering with character balloons in glow-in-the-dark sticks. Yet as an outdoor event held at temperatures below zero, choreographed dances and orchestral performances were not included in the program. The performers also did not wear Hanbok (traditional Korean attire) or other dresses but instead had on padded coats and fur hats, indicative of the cold sensible temperature. North Korea’s push to hold the event of such great scale with an innovative program and diverse elements despite unfavorable conditions suggests the nation’s desire to showcase its strength even amid sanctions. By utilizing theatrical elements that could only be enacted on a grand outdoor stage and having the people enjoy and cheer at the event, North Korea also wished to demonstrate its elevated cultural living standards.   Media & Technology In the fields of media and IT, North Korea has aimed to promote itself overseas and establish a remote communication sys-tem through YouTube, as well as develop various software and other relevant technologies. North Korea has selected YouTube as its new medium for propaganda considering its wide reaching international audience. Its YouTube channel, “DPRK Today,” which opened on December 19, 2014, was discontinued and replaced by a new channel under the name “NEW DPRK” on October 10, 2019. This channel regularly uploads Vlog-type videos—those that capture one's daily lives in a video format—with three hosts appearing individually in a television show format. Popular among these videos include “Rhee SooJin's One-man TV show,” which features the daily life of Rhee SooJin, a 7-year-old girl. In the video, SooJin introduces the viewers to an average life in Pyongyang under various concepts including "Soojin at Home," "Going to School," and "Soojin Goes to the Hospital." Other hosts perform hamburger “mukbang” at Moranbong's Seokwang restaurant, visit the opening of the Pyeongyang International Film Festival, trim hair in Changkwangwon hair salon, and buy a cellphone(smartphone), all of which are to showcase an "average life" in North Korea. The videos’ English title and Chinese subtitles indicate that they are made for overseas promotion. In the IT realm, North Korea is developing various education support programs and applications in order to establish an information infrastructure. In 2017, the state’s Education Committee developed and utilized a remote testing sys-tem for college entrance exams. On May 23, 2019, the information technology lab at Kim Il-sung University’s Institute of Advanced Science Institute created a virtual meeting sys-tem called "Rakwon” and introduced it nationwide. This virtual meeting sys-tem houses functions for sending videos and voice files, accessing electronic documents simultaneously, and for performing real-time multi-media tasks and virtual meetings. North Korea’s official news source, the Rodong Sinmun, reported that the preliminary meeting for the Fifth Meeting of the Seventh Central Military Commission of the WPK on June 23, 2020 was run virtually.   Conclusion North Korea’s developments in music, arts, and technology indicate its continued efforts to build the nation into a civilized socialist country that meets international standards. In order to address its need to globalize, North Korea has been more accepting of the so-called symbols of capitalism and Western culture based on different reasons. These recent trends can be seen as North Korea’s strategy to break free from previous stigmas and overcome sanctions by evolving into a normalized country and joining the international community. However, with the fallout of denuclearization talks, globalization can also be characterized as part of North Korea’s efforts to improve “self-reliance” and its overall international standing. This process also has its shortcomings in that as North Korea opens its doors to external culture in an accelerated fashion, its people will also accept these changes more rapidly, consequently expanding the scope of subcultures. As an example, North Korea deemed that young men who “keep their hairstyle excessively long and tie a topknot, or have their bangs covering half of their faces” do not fit the nation’s vision for aesthetics and encouraged them to comply with the social atmosphere by adopting the standard norms set by the state. The state also argued that the clothes and hairstyles of its people reflect “the level of civilization of the socialist state,” and pressured the people to adopt looks that befit a “civilized country.” In this manner, North Korea views its people as objects of enlightenment by requiring them to become “civilized” as defined by the state’s developmental views. North Korea has indicated that its ultimate goal of building a “civilized socialist country” is to expand upon the people’s privileges and “appreciate and love [its] people.” However, we can only remain uncertain of whether these acts are truly for the sake of the people. Questions of whether North Korea is truly fighting to build itself into a civilized socialist country for the “love of its people,” and how long such “Truman Show” will last depend on the will of the people who are the actors of this scenario.     Seunghee Ha is the Research Fellow of the Institute of North Korean Studies at Dongguk University. Dr. Ha received her PhD in North Korean Studies from the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, Korea. Her main research interests include North Korean music, North Korean society and culture, and North Korean media. Her recent publications include “The Utilization of Electronic Music Bands in North Korea-Japan Relations(2020), A Study on Perception Types Regarding North Korean Samjiyon Orchestra Performances in South Korea(2019),Changes in Perception and Utilization of Talented Youths in North Korea(2019).   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note From as early as 1985, long and continued efforts have been made towards the goal of denuclearizing North Korea, though various setbacks and deterrence have resulted in such efforts being met with varying degrees of derailment. Dr. Sangsoo Lee from the Institute for Security and Development Policy points out the need to address the significant issue presented by the general lack of trust in Pyongyang and United States’ willingness to negotiate corresponding measures towards denuclearization and peacebuilding in North Korea. Dr. Lee states that to garner trust between the two nations, they must both define and adhere to a red line to enable a conducive environment for negotiations. Additionally, due to the vagueness of what North Korea perceives as US hostile policy, which North Korea demands the removal of in order to secure an ultimate security guarantee, Dr. Lee argues that any efforts toward a long-term security guarantee should “look beyond the details of future negotiations between the United States and North Korea.”     Nuclear talks have stalled since the failed Stockholm meeting last October, and the deadlock is likely to continue this year. It seems that neither side is interested in resuming negotiations any time soon. Washington argues that North Korea should be the first to take substantive steps toward denuclearization. However, Pyongyang also lacks trust in the willingness of the United States to take corresponding measures in response to its actions for denuclearization. The impasse in denuclearization negotiations has seen both sides adopt a kind of strategic patience, bolstering their leverage and deterrence over the other. Pyongyang has set a year-end deadline for Washington to make concessions, announcing its intention of pursuing a “new path” by warning of the resumption of nuclear and long-range missile tests if the US fails to meet its demands. Since this year, North Korea has focused its missile and strategic weapon tests on the Korean Peninsula, further deteriorating the security environment. North Korea is using South Korea as a scapegoat for the stalemate in US-DPRK negotiations. Following Pyongyang’s denouncement of the anti-regime leaflets sent by civilian groups in South Korea, North Korea has once again taken a hostile stance towards the South and indicated its determination to completely shut down all contacts and communication channels between the two countries. In line with its hardline policy toward the South, North Korea destroyed the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office several weeks ago. Although North Korea decided to suspend further provocations against South Korea during a Central Military Commission meeting on June 24, with the recent termination of North-South military hotlines, the likelihood of a military conflict in the DMZ and the Yellow Sea has increased significantly. The US and South Korean governments have already cautioned Pyongyang not to escalate tensions any further. It can therefore be expected that any further provocations from North Korea may lead to military countermeasures from the US and South Korea, which would in turn further increase tensions on the Korean Peninsula. For example, B-52 long-range bombers, America’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and other strategic weapons could be deployed towards the Korean Peninsula, as the US did before to deal with North Korea’s nuclear and ICMB tests in 2017. Given the current situation, potential future developments appear worrisome as there is a risk of a return to a vicious cycle of confrontation, despite not being in the interest of any party. This article attempts to suggest some ways to find a middle ground between the US and DPRK, who remain divided with perception gaps and differences in their approaches and demands. It puts forth a three-step roadmap to ameliorate tensions on the Korean Peninsula, specifying reciprocity and a sequencing of measures to achieve the end goal of denuclearization.   1. Initial Step: Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula With the recent gridlock, both sides have frequently emphasized that it is up to the other party to show willingness and make the first move. Both sides have imposed a number of preconditions as the basis for the resumption of negotiations—preconditions which have turned out to be unacceptable to the other party involved. However, it has become obvious that a lack of trust hinders moving beyond the security dilemmas, creating a vicious cycle of tensions and escalation. As a conflict prevention measure, both parties must define the red lines for each side and refrain from crossing these red lines, which can be a starting point for creating an environment conducive to resuming negotiations. The urgent issue for the Trump administration is to maintain North Korea’s moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests, which the administration has sought to brand as a success of its diplomacy. However, North Korea has already warned the US that it may resume nuclear development, including new ICBM tests. Furthermore, while downplaying North Korea’s series of short-range projectile launches that did not pose a direct threat to the US mainland, Trump is now under growing pressure as its allies South Korea and Japan, as well as the US military bases in these two countries, have increasingly been threatened by North Korea’s short-range missiles and strategic weapons. Although the regime has not engaged in further ICBM missile tests, North Korea has continued its missile technology development. Most of the weapons North Korea has tested recently were ballistic missiles or artillery shells with solid fuel The regime is likely working to expand its solid fuel missile capabilities, which can be used for a long-range delivery sys-tem. The continuation, and especially the ramping up of testing including multiple launch rocket sys-tems (MLRS) and SLBMs will likely elicit a strong US response, particularly if Trump perceives it to be damaging to his re-election chances in the lead up to the US presidential elections in November. North Korea has long bristled at the joint military exercises held by the US and South Korea and the use of strategic military assets in the drills. Despite the scaling down and delay of recent joint military drills, North Korea has continued to state that all military exercises should be permanently terminated. It seems as though calling for a suspension of such joint military exercises is the first step for the regime in demanding its long list of security assurances. In this regard, it is almost certain that additional missile tests and military exercises would be red lines for each side for the resumption of negotiations. Thus, a possible option for resuming future negotiations is a moratorium on all missile tests (including short-range missiles) in response to a moratorium on all joint military exercises, which would address top interests for both sides. Such a compromise may serve as a useful starting point to break the current deadlock. The idea is that a cessation of the next joint military exercise can be seen by the DPRK as a partial lifting of hostile policy, while a moratorium on all missile tests can be seen by the US as a serious indication of its willingness to pursue long-term denuclearization.   2.  Mid-term Step: Action for Action Although the two sides agreed on the long-term goals of denuclearization and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula during the first-ever US-DPRK summit meeting in Singapore, there are still differences in the approaches and demands of each side due to distrust between the US and DPRK. Indeed, much speculation and debate surround the sincerity of North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization, and from North Korea’s perspective the US commitment to normalizing relations. Pyongyang has its own conception of denuclearization which consists of a parallel process of removing US hostile behaviors such as lifting sanctions, suspending US-ROK military drills, and withdrawing US strategic weapons. This is mainly due to Pyongyang’s lack of trust in the willingness of the US to commit to corresponding measures. North Korea claims it has taken some steps toward denuclearization, such as the destruction of nuclear test sites and moratoriums on nuclear and ICBM tests, but the US has not made any concessions in return. Washington, on the other hand, argues that North Korea should take more serious steps towards denuclearization than simply halting tests, stating that this is not sufficient to merit corresponding measures from the US. For the US, a successful deal is more contingent on the DPRK demonstrating “real” progress on denuclearization. This concept is grounded in lingering skepticism in Washington regarding North Korea’s actual willingness to abolish all of its nuclear materials and weapons. Nevertheless, as we learned from the failure of the Hanoi Summit, both the US and North Korea need to show greater flexibility in their approaches. Thus, the issues of corresponding measures and the precise parameters of diplomatic give and take are crucial. Still, the US has consistently stated that the sanctions won’t be lifted until North Korea completes the process of denuclearization. However, there are also growing debates within the US that it could be more effective to take incremental steps and a parallel approach by providing corresponding measures in exchange for denuclearization actions as opposed to making immediate and unilateral demands for denuclearization. In this regard, to avoid collapsing future negotiations, it is necessary to discuss a roadmap to specify mutually agreed-on levels of reciprocity and a sequencing of measures in the next working level meeting. More specifically, greater consideration must be given to what kind of sanctions relief to provide to find reciprocity and sequencing which can be agreed upon. Thought also needs to be given to what kind of process denuclearization will be and how to verify the process. Such a parallel and concrete approach may push the negotiation process to continue, and in doing so both sides can reach the final stage of implementation, which will involve removing all nuclear facilities (beyond Yongbyon) and all sanctions. A snapback option can be adopted during the process to prevent either side from violating agreements and to reassure skeptics in Washington. For example, the US can reinstate sanctions through a snapback if North Korea doesn’t follow an agreed sequence of denuclearization measures. In sum, future working level negotiations should create an agenda for practical commitments on the complete and verifiable dismantling of all of North Korea’s nuclear productions in exchange for lifting all sanctions between the US and DPRK, based on incremental and parallel approaches.   3. Long-term Step: Peacebuilding and Denuclearization A perception gap remains between the parties on key issues, such as denuclearization and a peace regime. North Korea claims that a peace regime can only be established through long-term trust building and requires the withdrawal of US hostile policies toward the country. In what Pyongyang perceives to be a hostile security environment, nuclear weapons offer the ultimate security guarantee for the regime. Therefore, in the long term there is a need to place greater focus on security guarantees from the US which can replace its nuclear weapons in return for the completion of denuclearization measures. However, North Korea’s perception of US hostile policy is very vague and has been used by the regime to justify the legitimacy of its nuclear development. Indeed, any diplomatic effort to denuclearize the DPRK prior to reaching a comprehensive agreement on security guarantees for North Korea has thus far been doomed to failure. This issue was brought up again after the Hanoi Summit when Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho said that a security guarantee was Pyongyang’s main goal rather than sanctions relief. As a result, for future negotiations, it is unlikely that any amount of humanitarian or economic aid alone can persuade the DPRK to take serious action toward complete denuclearization. Many experts think Pyongyang will demand not only normalized relations with the US but ultimately the withdrawal of all US forces from South Korea as an ultimate condition for denuclearization. However, such a move would have an impact on the whole security structure and balance of power in Northeast Asia as China could fill the vacuum left by US military power in the region. So, the question remains whether the US could offer such guarantees to the regime. In this regard, long-term measures to offer a security guarantee to the regime must look beyond the details of future negotiations between the US and DPRK and integrate multilateral security instruments to deal with the broader security issues in Northeast Asia. In this complementary multilateral setting, all regional actors can discuss the issues of a peace treaty, arms control, inter-Korean cooperation, normalization of relations with Japan, and economic compensation to North Korea which might provide more solid and comprehensive security guarantees to North Korea. Such a multilateral approach would be able to address issues of cooperation between the US and China to facilitate a long-term solution to the situation on the Korean Peninsula. It would also provide a way for all sides to reaffirm that the end goals remain full denuclearization of the Peninsula and the building of a long-term peace regime in Northeast Asia.   Conclusion The current situation on the Korean Peninsula urgently calls for crisis management measures focusing on the prevention of military conflict. To begin with, both official and unofficial diplomatic channels between the US/ROK and the DPRK are needed to clarify intentions and defuse tensions in order to try to stabilize the situation. Reducing tensions will eventually build confidence and allow negotiations in other areas—including denuclearization—to proceed more smoothly. A nuclear negotiation must resume between Washington and Pyongyang to move toward the common goal of denuclearization and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. If such negotiations are not complemented by efforts to reduce tensions by engaging each other in dialogue, all parties involved risk the further increase of military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. There may be a long way to go, but to build a sustainable peace, all nuclear weapons must be removed from the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, denuclearization cannot be completed without the process of peacebuilding. Thus, achieving denuclearization and building a peace regime cannot be viewed as separate objectives. They must go hand-in-hand. In fact, there is no option other than both sides narrowing the gap through more negotiations, rather than pressing the other side to accept its preconditions. Recognizing that there is no silver bullet solution, the continuation of diplomatic negotiations will eventually build confidence and allow the process to reach its final goal—including denuclearization and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. With a narrowing window of opportunity, a large concern is that time may be running out to regain momentum for future talks unless both sides change their calculation methods soon.     Sangsoo Lee is the deputy director of the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) and the head of the Stockholm Korea Center. His areas of interest are security and conflict issues in Northeast Asia with a focus on the North Korean nuclear crisis and inter-Korean relations. He is originally from South Korea, but studied in China and has lived in Europe for a long time. Dr. Lee holds a Ph.D. in Northeast Asian Studies from Peking University and has been a Visiting Researcher at the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) (2007) and at the London School of Economics (LSE) (2011).   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) exist as a crucial platform to monitor and advocate the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, highlighting the goal of inclusiveness in economic and social growth under the slogan of “no one should be left behind.” In light of North Korea’s promise to report its Voluntary National Review (VNR) on the implementation of the SDGs, Professor Taekyoon Kim from Seoul National University raises the question of North Korea’s possible motives behind its compliance with the United Nations’ global assignment. Professor Kim addresses the irony behind North Korea’s proactive engagement with the SDGs and their presentation of high quality content and institutional support which will be carried out by the Workers’ Party of Korea, given the reality of the WPK’s general non-compliance with global norms and rules. He argues that the nation engages itself in carrying out global norms such as the SDGs due to the lack of binding enforcement, and that North Korea’s willingness to do so is merely an opportunistic attempt to present itself as a good global citizen and receive more aid and economic support from the international community. Furthermore, Professor Kim adds that the engagement with the SDGs is useful for the North’s own agenda towards its domestic development.     Becoming a Member of International Society in the SDG Era? The advent of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) era, endorsed by the 70th UN General Assembly in September 2015, requires all UN member states to abide by the global norm of the SDGs until 2030 by placing a stronger emphasis on cultivating inclusive state-society relations oriented towards promoting economic growth and social development within planetary boundaries and human rights protection. Replacing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000, the SDGs, composed of 17 goals and 169 targets, have become the highest end of shared norms and universal goals of international society under the slogan of “no one should be left behind.” While all UN members are asked to report their own “voluntary national review (VNR)” explaining how they are implementing the SDGs at the national level to the UN High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) every four years, a few countries such as the United States and North Korea have not yet submitted their VNRs. However, it is interesting to see that North Korea has officially promised to report its VNR to the HLPF by July 2020, a deadline which has now been delayed due to COVID-19. Why did North Korea decide to comply with the global assignment of VNR reporting? Can it be said that North Korea wants to become a real member of international society in the SDG era by declaring its willingness to participate?   North Korea’s Proactive Engagement in the SDGs Indeed, North Korea has been proactive in its effort to join the ranks of UN member countries which satisfy the basic requirement of SDG preparation and implementation since it participated in the regional SDG conference initiated by UNESCAP in 2017. The North Korean delegation strongly emphasized its readiness to fulfill the mission of the SDGs at the national level in line with its 5-Year National Strategy for Economic Development (NSED), particularly in the areas of zero hunger (Goal 2), clean water and sanitation (Goal 6), affordable and clean energy (Goal 7), sustainable cities and communities (Goal 11), responsible consumption and production (Goal 12), life on land (Goal 15), and partnership for the goals (Goal 17). In October 2019 when UNESCAP hosted another regional SDG conference in Vladivostok, North Korea presented a very detailed and well-organized plan to achieve the SDGs and manage the implementation mechanism via a “whole-of-society” approach for all 17 Goals. Its proactive engagement with the SDGs is flabbergasting in terms of the high quality of the content and of its institutional support, both of which the Workers’ Party of Korea, which has not been a good follower of global norms and rules, will orchestrate. Its preparation schemes, seemingly, are absolutely better than those of South Korea and other advanced economies and even seem to be desperate to achieve the SDGs to ensure the survival and elevated standard of living for the North Korean people.   Why is North Korea Engaging in the Implementation of the SDGs? The reasons why North Korea is involving itself in implementing a global norm like the SDGs can be understood largely through the following four interpretations. First, the SDGs are a soft norm without binding enforcement. A verbal pledge to achieve the SDGs is not necessarily followed by real implementation, simply because there is no centralized authority to punish violators at the global level. North Korea, therefore, will not lag behind if it simply makes an official promise to international society. Second, North Korea can become a good citizen of international society by sending a strong signal of its intention to conform to the global rules shared by all UN member states. This relates to the third observation that North Korea has made a strategic calculation to get more aid and economic support from the international community in signaling its strong willingness to follow the SDGs. North Korea is rather fraught with despair under the current economic sanctions and needs an exit strategy from the protracted deadlock. The logical upshot is that the SDGs would provide a great opportunity space for North Korea. Finally and most importantly, the SDGs per se would be a very tempting and handy instrument for North Korea to maximize the universal and global values for its domestic agenda of national development strategies. By aligning the global norm of the SDGs with the 5-Year NSED, Pyongyang can not only justify the national development plan as being linked with the global trend, but also persuade the people to tighten their belts further for economic development despite the severe economic sanctions imposed by the US-led alliance. In fact, we can confirm this via the Party newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, which has often used the term “sustainable development” since 2015.   Utilizing the Global Norms for the Sake of the National Strategy for Development In many cases, the universality of global norms can be strategically utilized for the specific purpose of individual states. The global norms are reborn and reformulated by domestic political regimes for their survival and other strategic interests. China has been equalizing its national implementation of the SDGs with the grand strategy of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The UK has determined that British foreign aid is the best package to align the implementation of the SDGs with the realization of its national interests by tackling global poverty and inequality. Likewise, North Korea has also made a smart move to utilize global norms for the sake of its national strategy for economic development, together with the strategic purposes of its external relations with the international community. In a nutshell, North Korea’s preparation for the SDGs should be decoded at the nexus of its national strategies and its exposure to global norms and rules as a member of international society.     Taekyoon Kim is a professor of International Development and an associate dean for academic affairs at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. He currently serves as an executive director of the Korea International Cooperation Agency and a member of the Sustainable Development Committee for the city of Seoul. He also served as a visiting professor at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, USA, Lingnan University, Hong Kong and Tübingen University, Germany. His recent publications include "Tax Reform, Tax Compliance and State-Building in Tanzania and Uganda," Africa Development 43(2), 2018 (co-authored), and "Social Politics of Welfare Reform in Korea and Japan: A New Way of Mobilizing Power Resources," Voluntas 30(2), 2019 (co-authored). He received his Ph.D. in international relations from Johns Hopkins University-SAIS and D.Phil. in social policy and intervention from the University of Oxford.    담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 Global NK 논평의 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 Global North Korea 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    Editor's Note In addition to criticizing South Korea for distributing anti-North Korea leaflets, North Korea detonated the Inter-Korean Liaison Office following Kim Yo Jong’s official statement. Dr. Choong-Koo Lee, an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, analyzes North Korea’s strategies based on the 7th Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Congress and Plenary Sessions of the Seventh Central Committee. Dr. Lee argues that North Korea needs to develop a new national strategy rather than rely on its past tactics which seems to have failed in helping North Korea recover from its current economic instabilities. He adds that “it is time for the international community to make joint intellectual efforts to enable North Korea to announce a new national strategy preparing for denuclearization at the next Party Congress.”     1. Introduction Recently, North Korea has been warning of its intention to sever relations with the South. Using the leaflets distributed by North Korean refugee organizations across the border as a pretext, on June 16, North Korea blew up the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong, apparently as a partial measure to abandon North-South military cooperation. The statement released on June 4, 2020 by Kim Yo Jong, first deputy director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), seemed to indicate that the North is doing this no matter what efforts or words the South puts forth. Since the denuclearization discussions began between the North and the US and the North and South following the PyeongChang Olympics in 2018, the situation has taken a number of unpredictable turns. The North’s current criticism of the South seems to be due to the stalemate between North Korea and the US which emerged following the US-DPRK summit in Hanoi, as well as the economic difficulties that the North has continued to suffer due to ongoing sanctions. The North’s strategic actions indicate a need to re-evaluate the regime’s post-nuclear strategy.   2. North Korea’s Post-Nuclear Strategy Proposed at the 7th WPK Congress During the 7th WPK Congress which was held for four days from May 6 to 9, 2016, a post-nuclear strategy for North Korea was proposed. North Korea has demonstrated rapid progress in its efforts to develop nuclear weapons following the promulgation of the Byungjin line policy to simultaneously pursue economic and nuclear weapons development. On January 6, 2016, they tested a hydrogen bomb, and on February 7 of the same year they launched the Gwangmyeong 4 while also claiming to have succeeded in launching a satellite into orbit. After starting off 2016 in this way, the national strategy proposed by North Korea during the 7th WPK Congress was revealed as being based on the regime having already obtained nuclear weapons. Chairman Kim Jong Un emphasized that North Korea had now become one of the world’s nuclear states in his Work Report speech given during the Congress. As the domestic goal of the national strategy, Chairman Kim focused on developing technological productivity and normalizing the economy in order to legitimize the regime. This focus can be confirmed by the fact that the table of contents of the report on domestic policy began with a political legitimation strategy leading to the science and technology development strategy and economic development strategy. In the logical structure, the goal of building a strong socialist country linked the political necessity of legitimizing the regime to economic development policy. After defining the goal of building a strong socialist country as the basic task to legitimize his rule, Kim Jong Un emphasized the science and technology development policy as the policy area that must be prioritized in order to build a strong socialist country. He further stated that economic development was “the area where our party and government must concentrate their energy now.” The science and technology development strategy included a plan to develop cutting-edge technology, apply science and technology to the economy, and strengthen science education. It also had the goal of making North Korea a country that “develops its economy, military, and culture with  science and technology.” The economic strategy announced during the Party Congress consisted of “the directives of Jucheization, modernization, scientification, and informatization of the people’s economy” and a five-year strategy to improve the people’s living standards. This strategy focuses on making North Korea an independent and technology-driven economy, and has the additional aim of improving the everyday lives of North Koreans. At the same time, Chairman Kim put forth policies to achieve the domestic task of civilizing the country. The goals set to accomplish this task consist of stimulating the development of the country’s education, social welfare, physical education, and culture. Moreover, he emphasized in his speech that efforts to build a strong military and political nation must be consolidated in order to create a strong backbone for North Korea’s domestic and diplomatic policies. While consolidating the socialist political sys-tem, he stated that the country would pursue policies to tighten the military’s control of the country, strengthen their combat readiness, and develop the national defense industry. In addition to these domestic strategies, at the 7th WPK Congress Chairman Kim also discussed the regime’s international strategy as well as its strategy towards South Korea, comprising the three revolutionary capabilities. First, the strategy towards the South aims for reunification through self-determination and consists of the four principles of national autonomy, national solidarity, securing peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the creation of a federal sys-tem. In order to achieve unification as an independent country, the first necessary step is to improve the fundamentals of inter-Korean relations. Kim Jong Un called for an end to psychological warfare and the spread of propaganda in order to achieve this goal. He also mentioned the necessity of the South recognizing North Korea’s regime, for dialogue and the lessening of tensions between the two countries, and for basic respect for inter-Korean cooperation. Moreover, Kim Jong Un demanded that the US remove itself from the Korean Peninsula, put a stop to its sanctions against the regime, and stop provoking confrontation between the two Koreas in order to facilitate reunification. The noteworthy aspect of North Korea’s strategy towards the South is its strong use of self-assertive language with regard to the principles of securing peace on the Korean Peninsula and creating a federal sys-tem against the backdrop of its nuclear weapons development. North Korea has demanded that the US recognize it as a nuclear state, draw up a peace treaty between the two countries, and remove its troops from South Korea. The regime has also referenced the possibility that it may pursue non-peaceful reunification if South Korea remains stubborn in its demand for unification through absorption. Next, Chairman Kim presented the policy directions that must be pursued in order to achieve the strategic international diplomacy target of promoting global independence in the three diplomacy realms of self-determination (anti-imperialism), peace, and friendship. In the realm of self-determination diplomacy, the regime stated that they would seek an alliance of anti-imperialist powers, maintain their status as a nuclear state, and defend the WPK policy line. In the realm of peace, the North Korean military will emphasize nuclear deterrence on the basis of maintaining peace in the region and in the world as a responsible nuclear state, and positively aim towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. In the realm of friendship, North Korea will expand its friendly relations with the “progressive” countries of the world. It will also pursue the normalization of relations with countries it has considered hostile in the past as long as they respect North Korea’s sovereignty and treat it amicably. The regime has said that its policy direction includes the diversification of diplomatic relations through exchanges and cooperation with capitalist countries. Through these particularities in its diplomatic policy, North Korea has demonstrated that it will also strengthen its self-assertiveness on the basis of its identity as a nuclear state.   3. Pushing North Korea’s National Strategy Forward after Declaring the Completion of Nuclear Weapons Development After the end of 2017, by which time North Korea had demonstrated its success in developing nuclear weapons through nuclear and missile tests, the regime indirectly announced that the necessary conditions for pushing forward with the new national strategy regarding inter-Korean relations and foreign relations had been met, and that the national strategy of the 7th WPK Congress would be fully implemented. First, the regime declared an internal focus on the domestic economy. At the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, Chairman Kim Jong Un proscribed that North Korea would now solidify the step of becoming a “nation with strong political ideology, and a nation with a strong military,” clarifying that the policy for all-out concentration on economic development meant that the entire WPK and the entire North Korean government should focus their efforts on building a socialist economy. During the 7th WPK Congress in 2016, he also stated that as North Korea had already become a nuclear state, “now is the time for our Party and our nation to focus our entire effort” on the economic line. In 2016, North Korea had already provided the logic behind choosing to concentrate on economic development after two years. However, while North Korea declared during the 7th WPK Congress that it had now become a nuclear state, in fact the regime needed to conduct a series of nuclear tests in order to prove its nuclear deterrence to both the domestic and international audiences. Accordingly, it was only after the regime declared in November 2017 that it had become a nuclear state that it could pursue the national strategy which was declared during the 7th WPK Congress. Of course, it is likely that with the opportunity presented by the inter-Korean dialogues and the US-DPRK contacts at the beginning of 2018, the regime had a chance to push ahead with a new national strategy. At that time, North Korea pushed for policies in line with the national strategy it had put forth in 2016 regarding the South, including improving basic inter-Korean relations, concluding a peace treaty on the Peninsula, and dissolving sanctions. In order to realize the goal of fundamentally improving inter-Korean relations announced during the Party Congress, the Panmunjom Declaration was concluded on April 27, in which the two Koreas agreed to stop engaging in hostile actions. As another measure towards this goal, the Pyongyang Joint Declaration was signed on September 19, 2018 as a measure to reduce the risk of a military collision near the MDL or the NLL. Following the US-DPRK summit in Singapore, the eighth round of military talks was held between North and South Korean generals on June 14, 2018, and another three rounds were held including the talks on October 26, 2018. Moreover, an agreement was drawn up between North and South Korea and the US and North Korea through the Singapore Summit and the Panmunjom Declaration to build permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. Although President Trump said no, Chairman Kim Jong Un requested during the Hanoi summit between the US and North Korea that the UN sanctions be lifted for the sake of civilian economic activities. Of particular note in the realm of international diplomacy is North Korea’s nuclear test moratorium declaration as part of its national strategy of possessing nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes. This moratorium enabled the regime to conduct active friendship diplomacy in order to seek stronger amicable relations with the international community and a normalization of US-DPRK relations. On April 20, 2018, during the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, when it was declared that all effort would be concentrated on economic development, the regime announced that it was committing to a moratorium on nuclear and ICBM testing, that it would dismantle its nuclear testing grounds, that it would support an international nuclear test ban, and that it would commit to no first use of nuclear weapons and to non-proliferation. This announcement was in line with the policy direction of peace diplomacy put forth at the 7th WPK Congress. In other words, North Korea referred to its no first-use policy, its willingness to fulfill its non-proliferation obligations, and its eventual goal of denuclearization of the world during the 2016 WPK Congress. Moreover, the Singapore summit can be considered an effort to improve relations between North Korea and the US, which is in line with the “friendship diplomacy” policy direction of working to improve and normalize relations with countries that the DPRK has considered hostile.   4. North Korea’s Tactical Retreat from its National Strategy and inter-Korean Relations However, despite North Korea’s active diplomacy in 2018, Chairman Kim was unable to succeed in creating a favorable environment for domestic policy due to the sanctions issue. When we say that North Korea set strategic goals in the domestic realm for regime survival, we can consider the North’s peace diplomacy, improvements to inter-Korean relations, and friendly diplomacy toward the US to be aimed toward creating a favorable environment for domestic economic development. In contrast to this strategic intention, Chairman Kim’s demand for a lifting of sanctions which he made during the Hanoi summit was rejected, and international sanctions on North Korea have shown no signs of weakening since then. Of course, following the no-deal Hanoi summit, North Korean held the Fourth and Fifth Plenary Sessions of the Seventh Central Committee, where the regime’s policy of economic development via self-reliance under the ongoing sanctions began to take shape. At the Fourth Plenary Session, a demand to exhibit all of the nation’s domestic economic potential under a unified command of the Cabinet as a countermeasure to the continued sanctions was made. During the Fifth Plenary Session, the order was given to create measures for reorganizing the order and sys-tem of economic projects, including the unified command of the Cabinet, and a scientific manufacturing plan as well as to apply science and technology to the agricultural sector. However, substantive economic content appears to be absent from North Korea’s countermeasures to the sanctions apart from the Cabinet command and the emphasis on economic management. This also means that of the various options in the five-year plan put forth during the 7th WPK Congress, these are the only available options left. Furthermore, as the sanctions drag on, the complaints of the people and the North Korean elite alike are increasing and Chairman Kim is becoming increasingly dependent on the political sys-tem of the Party and social control to maintain his regime. Currently, North Korea appears to be working to escape the sanctions by withdrawing from all of the agreements and promises that were achieved in the international and inter-Korean spheres after 2018. The North appears to be withdrawing more rapidly from the commitments made to the South as compared to the agreements made with the international community. Previously, North Korea has played the “development of strategic weapons” card when denuclearization negotiations have reached a stalemate. During the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee held in December 2019, Chairman Kim announced that he would continue to mobilize nuclear deterrence and develop new strategic weapons in the face of the nuclear threat and hostile actions of the US. This came up again during the fourth meeting of the Seventh Central Military Commission held on May 24, 2020. Next, the regime is tearing down the achievements that it pushed for initially in inter-Korean relations. On June 9, 2020, the North cut off communications between the leaders of North and South Korea as well as their governments and militaries, and on June 16 they blew up the inter-Korean liaison office. On June 17, North Korea’s military general staff department announced that it was considering moving troops again to Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong, which were formerly sites of North-South economic cooperation. North Korea’s declaration that the propaganda fliers sent from South Korea into the North were the reason it blew up the inter-Korean joint liaison office could be the application of the logic of the 7th WPK Congress. Kim Jong Un demanded that the fliers be stopped as a condition of improving inter-Korean relations at the Party Congress. It seems likely that North Korea is using this as part of its effort to achieve sanctions relief as a condition for South Korea to maintain any improvements in inter-Korean relations. North Korea cannot withstand continued sanctions by attempting to pursue only self-reliance measures, and so it is making unrelated demands of South Korea regarding inter-Korean relations. Today, North Korea is taking tactical measures to retreat from its own national strategy in order to escape the unfavorable situation it is in, but it must seek new national strategies beyond these short-term tactics. North Korea has pursued a national strategy of focusing on economic development and improving inter-Korean relations and US-North Korea relations through peaceful nuclear policy since 2018, but has been threatening to reverse the compromise policy since the failed Hanoi summit. North Korea's recent criticism of South Korea seems to be more dramatic in its intention to curb internal dissatisfaction due to worsening economic conditions. North Korea will demand that South Korea represent the North’s perspective rather than the US perspective when it comes to the sanctions issue. At the least, by doing so, North Korea can sow discord within the ROK-US alliance. However, this may be only a short-term solution. The further deterioration of inter-Korean relations will be a factor that prevents North Korea from focusing on economic development. This kind of negative impact is thought to be the reason Kim Jong Un decided to withhold military action against South Korea at the June 23 meeting. To fundamentally solve the Korean Peninsula problem, North Korea must find a new national strategy to solve the denuclearization problem. Previously, North Korea decided to pursue economic development in order to obtain the legitimacy of the regime, but today it is in a situation where it is necessary to worry about regime instability. Considering that North Korea intends to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the WPK in October of this year, it seems to want to hold the 8th Party Congress next year. If so, it is time for the international community to make joint intellectual efforts to enable North Korea to announce a new national strategy preparing for denuclearization at the next Party Congress.     Choong-Koo Lee is an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) in Seoul, South Korea. Dr. Lee received his PhD degree in international relations at Seoul National University. He served as a chief of staff to a congressman in the foreign affairs committee at the National Assembly of South Korea. His research interests include the nuclear strategy of North Korea, Sino-North Korea relations, US-North Korea relations, and inter-Korean relations.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  j.baek@eai.or.kr