중국의 미래 성장과 아태 신문명 건축

중국은 1978년 개혁개방 이후 지속적으로 연평균 경제성장률 9%를 상회하는 고도의 성장을 이루었다. 이러한 중국의 고속 성장은 국내 및 지역적 차원을 넘어 지구적 변화를 견인하고 있으며, 이는 안보와 경제 등 전통적 이슈뿐만 아니라 에너지와 환경 등 신흥 이슈에도 상당한 파장을 일으킬 것으로 예상된다. 따라서 중국의 변화가 인류의 공생과 지속가능한 발전으로 이어질 수 있도록 바람직한 아태 질서 설계도를 마련하고, 한국의 역할을 제시하고자 EAI는 2018년 “중국의 미래 성장과 아태 신문명 건축”이라는 중장기 연구사업을 기획하여 운영하고 있다.

 

아-태 에너지·자원 협력 구상

현재 진행되고 있는 미·중 간의 무역 분쟁은 무역과 기술 영역에 대해 영향을 미치고 있지만 금융과 에너지, 군사·안보 부분에는 아직 대립이 본격화되고 있지 않다. 동아시아 연구원은 아-태 지역에서 에너지·자원 분야의 협력이 미·중 간의 갈등을 극복하고 오히려 협력을 강화할 수 있는 미완의 영역이자 가능성을 지닌 영역으로 바라보고, 중견국인 한국이 주축이 되어 미·중 간 협력의 전기를 마련할 수 있는 방안을 모색하는 연구를 진행한다. <아-태 에너지·자원 협력 구상>은 한샘DBEW연구재단의 지원을 받아 진행 중인 <중국의 미래 성장과 아태 신문명 건축> 프로젝트(2018-2021)의 제2차년도 사업이다.

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[워킹페이퍼] China’s Digital Transformation and Its Implication for the Asia-Pacific

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} li {margin:8px 0;} Editor's Note In this paper, Mingshen Zhang analyzes China’s digitalization as spurred by advances in smart digital technologies and discusses the opportunities that this will bring to the regional economy and integration in the Asia-Pacific. China’s digital transformation is taking place across sectors, but not evenly; while China is highly digitized in e-commerce, it falls far behind in the digitalization of the manufacturing and R&D industries. Zhang, however, asserts that China’s digitalization will be further accelerated by domestic factors, such as demographic changes and structural industrial shifts, and predicts that it will generate opportunities for regional economies to cooperate with China on the development of digital infrastructure and government policy frameworks for the Internet and the digital economy.     Quotes from the paper  Introduction At present, digital transformation centered on the use of smart information technology to change the economic and social activities is expected to generate substantial digital economy and digital dividend. As a general purpose technology, smart digital technology has strong properties of platforms, openness, integration, and ecosys-tem, which will impose broad impacts on the innovation, entrepreneurial activities, investment, trade, and industrial development. Currently, the Asia-Pacific region arrives at a critical point to overcome the structural problems, shape the economic momentum and pursue the quality oriented economic growth. Therefore, all the Asia-Pacific economies have reached a broad consensus in the exploitation of the digital economy and dividend. They seek to give full play to the leading role of digital transformation in improving labor productivity, creating business opportunities and promoting free trade in order to better achieve sustainable development and inclusive and secure growth in the Asia-Pacific. China, one of the most important economies in the Asia-Pacific, is also undergoing an unprecedented digital transformation. Due to the scale and sys-tematic integration effects of digitalization, it can be expected that China’s huge market potential, rich application scenarios, and urgent upgrading needs may bring not only historical opportunities for digital economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region but also essential incentives for this region to form a more intimate innovation community. This paper consists of three parts. The first section attempts to summarize the characteristics of the new round of digitalization induced by smart digital technologies. Moreover, it further develops a digitalization matrix as a framework to capture the feature of digital transformation. In the second section, the paper moves towards the analysis of status-quo and trends of China’s digitalization by using the digitalization matrix. Finally, it identifies possible opportunities for boosting the digital economy to pursue quality-oriented economic growth and regional integration in the Asia-Pacific region by China’s digitalization.   A New Round of Digitalization: Characteristics and Elements Information and Communication Technology (ICT) plays a crucial role in digitalization as the ICT is often used and developed as a part of the process of ongoing adoption of digital technologies to change the economy and society. Since the 1950s, four generations of computers have evolved. Each generation reflected  hardware changes in size and capability enhancements in computer operating sys-tems. Primarily due to the dramatic improvements in computer components and manufacturing, computers today can do more than the largest computers of the mid-1960s at about a thousandth of the cost. Furthermore, the technological progress of ICT in the last several decades is much faster than we expected. The breakthrough in the ICT in the last decade results in the emergence of smart digital technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things (IoC), Cloud Computing, Cyber-Physical Sys-tems and Big Data, which has launched a new round of digitalization. For example, computer scientists began tinkering with AI in the 1950s, but it is only in the last decade that AI has been realized when new applications were able to be unlocked thanks to hardware developments, including faster processors and more abundant storage, larger data sets, and more capable algorithms. The smarter digital technology blurs the boundary among the physical, digital and biological world, which is one of the most prominent features in the current digitalization as Schwab (2017) called it as the Fourth Industrial Revolution. In this way, digital technology diffuses into every corner of our social and economic life, enhancing the potential of individuals, enterprises, industries, and government within the whole economy.   Understanding the Status Quo and Trend of China’s Digitalization Overall, although China’s digital transformation has been steadily unfolding, the main progress happens on the consumption/application side rather than the production/physical side. For example, due to the emergence of digital giants like BAT (namely Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) and the prosperity in e-commerce, it is widely recognized that China represents one of the leading and critical forces in digitalization globally. The vast market demand has stimulated the booming development of China’s digital economy, but it also causes the digital transformation to concentrate on the consumer end and the application end. Zhang (2018) compared the digitalization between China and South Korea, finding that China only gained a prominent advantage over South Korea in terms of digitalization of trade and consumption but lagged far behind South Korea in digitalization in the process of manufacturing. More specifically, China accounts for a more significant portion of export in ICT goods than that of South Korea. Also, almost 23% of total Chinese retail sales are relative to e-commerce in 2017, just seven percentage points higher than that of South Korea. However, the robot density in China is 68, just around one-tenth of it is in South Korea. Concerning the ICT manufacturing and services expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP, the level of South Korea is four times higher than that of China.             Figure 4  Colored digitalization matrix using data from China and South Korea                  Source: Zhang (2018). Note: The element in red represents China has more advantage in that area, and the blue ones indicate the opposite situation. The darker the color implies the more sizeable relative gap of digitalization exists between China and South Korea.   The Implication of China’s Digital Transformation for the Asia-Pacific [D]igital economy may provide incentives and opportunities to strengthen economic cooperation. It is no doubt that profiting from innovation is the ultimate incentive for any entities regardless of what the type of innovation is and what the tool we utilize. In the era of the digital economy, the value-capture problem for innovators in the digital economy involves some different challenges from those in the industrial economy, with the dynamics of platforms and ecosys-tems being important (Teece 2018). Thus, we should create an open, inclusive, diverse, and fully interactive ecosys-tem based on the platform in order to take advantage of the network effect, scale effect, and the economy of scope. Furthermore, smart digital technology enables us to realize the instant interaction and self-adaption to eliminate the uncertainty, which lowers the threshold of regional cooperation for SMEs and underdeveloped economies. The incentive and opportunities brought by the digitalization will have prominent influences on regional integration through digital trade and logistic facilitation. Considering the limited scale of market and lack of access to the international market for some economies in the Asia-Pacific, it is somewhat difficult for them to exploit the opportunities of economic cooperation. The unique advantage that China possesses may suggest that China’s digitalization can be an opportunity for the Asia-Pacific to cope with the impact of the digital economy mentioned above. As the second largest economy and the growing mid-class, China owns one of the most huge and promising markets with increasing potential all over the world. Also, China regards the digitalization as one of the top priorities to achieve the quality-oriented economic development. Especially in recent years, the new round of digitalization stepped into a new stage, aiming to speed up digitalization towards production/physical side. The significant improvement in digitalization in the dimensions including factor, industry and governance demonstrate China can help the other economies to overcome the sustained challenges in digital transformation and leverage the opportunities regarding economic cooperation. For example, China has established various funding mechanisms like AIIB, Silk Road Funds, and other long-term cheap loans, all of which can support the construction and interconnection of digital infrastructure. The Chinese digital giants like BATJ (namely Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and JD) can also play a more significant role in facilitating cross-border e-commerce in many ASEAN countries. Even in the clouding service, Alibaba is competent to build an ecosys-tem including more than 8,000 companies and meet their demands in time with its leading technologies. Among over a thousand smart city pilots have been launched across the world, China is home to half of these cities, amounting to a staggering 500 pilots. It provides significant opportunities for the Asia-Pacific economies with leading capabilities in this aspect to profit from their leading technologies and abundant experiences through a mechanism such as PPP contract. Considering China’s digitalization can be regarded as an opportunity for the Asia-Pacific, I strongly recommend the economies in the Asia-Pacific should enhance cooperation on digital economy by leveraging China’s digitalization. I refer to the APEC Internet and Digital Economy Roadmap which is released in 2017 and select the promising areas including (1) Development of digital infrastructure; (2) Development of holistic government policy frameworks for the Internet and Digital Economy; (3) Promoting coherence and cooperation of regulatory approaches affecting the Internet and digital economy; (4) Promoting innovation and adoption of enabling technologies and services; (5) Enhancing inclusiveness of Internet and digital economy; and (6) Facilitation of e-commerce and advancing cooperation on digital trade.     Author’s Biography Mingshen Zhang received his doctoral degree from Renmin University of China in 2014 and has served as the assistant research fellow in Institute of Economic Research, National Development and Reform Commission since 2015. His research interests concentrate on innovation and entrepreneurship such as technology transfer and commercialization. His work has been published in multiple journals, including Research Policy and Macroeconomic Research. He is also the author of the book, entitled Open Innovation of China’s Firms and Performance Implication within the Context of Structural Reform (2017).  

Mingshen Zhang 2019-05-03조회 : 8813
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[워킹페이퍼] Searching for China’s Technological Champions: What Past Structural Flaws and Policy Failures Tell Us about the Likelihood of Success for Current Policies

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} li {margin:8px 0;} Editor's Note 개혁개방 정책을 추진한 지 40년이 지난 현재, 중국은 세계 2위 경제대국으로 성장했습니다. 그러나 앞서 고속 성장을 경험한 한국이나 대만에 비해 첨단기술 측면에서는 중국이 여전히 뒤쳐져 있는 상황입니다. 한국이 삼성, LG, 현대 등 굴지의 대기업을 배출하고, 대만 역시 TSMC를 필두로 한 반도체 기업들을 육성한 데 반해, 중국 기업으로는 화웨이 정도만이 세계 무대에서 두각을 나타내고 있을 뿐이라고 Douglas Fuller 홍콩시티대 교수는 진단합니다. Fuller 교수는 본 워킹페이퍼를 통해 이 같이 중국의 첨단기술산업 발전이 주변국에 비해 더딘 이유로 중국의 비효율적 산업정책 결정 과정 및 재원 배분, 과도한 시장 규제 등을 들고 있습니다.     Quotes from the paper  Introduction This report attempts to explain the limited emergence of Chinese technology titans. The first section examines the structural reasons there has not been great success in pro-active (as opposed to passive, tariff-driven infant industry protection) industrial policy in building technology-intensive firms in China. The second section turns to look at how sectoral characteristics shape the opportunities for technological upgrading among Chinese firms given the state’s policies outlined in the first section. The third section addresses the important issue of market regulation and how that has impacted upgrading in various industries. The fourth section examines the critical role that foreign venture capital has played in China’s technology sector, and the implications of the current surge of domestic venture capital. The final section will address continuities and departures with China’s past industrial development in Xi’s industrial policies.   The Sorrows of Industrial Policy In the case of China, there are four serious constraints to the effective pursuit of industrial policy: (1) the structure of the state apparatus, (2) the bias of credit allocation toward SOEs/state-favored firms and the resulting managerial deficiencies of these firms (3) the information asymmetries due to sheer geographic size and population of China and (4) the balance of exports vis-à-vis procurement. These obstacles are in addition to the incentives for local officials that prioritize investment and land grabs over implementing upgrading of local firms and multinationals within their jurisdictions discussed by Fuller (2016, Chapter 2).   Sectoral Characteristics and Success There has been variation in technological catch-up across sectors in China’s economy. For more medium-tech technology, machinery-based sectors, China has experienced a fair amount of upgrading among domestic firms (Brandt and Thun 2010, 2016). For many high-technology sectors, China’s record of catch-up among domestic firms has been weak, and hybrid firms located in China but financed from outside of China have driven technologically upgrading. And in most be noted that for even the mature, medium-technology industries, Brandt and Thun (2010, 2016) find little evidence for effective industrial policy beyond the tariff barriers that encourage multinational corporations (MNCs) in these industries to set up factories in China. There would be no problem with such a hybrid model of high technology development except for two issues.  First, industrial policy has wasted a tremendous amount of resources on the domestic firms in high-technology areas. Second, the hybrid model itself is under threat as will be discussed later in this report.     Regulation of Competition Brandt and Thun (2016) in revisiting the machine sectors they analyzed over time have concluded that some sectors were much less successful than others even though they shared the benefit of MNC suppliers investing in China. They concluded that the state regulation of market competition to keep out rather than encourage competition was holding back those sectors that achieved less upgrading. The auto industry is a case in point.  The state kept primarily private firms from entering into this market for decades, and consequently, the local state champions, despite benefitting from being the partners of the joint-ventures (JVs) required for MNCs entry, failed to upgrade effectively. In contrast, construction equipment, where there was a veritable free-for-all of foreign, state-owned, private, and other firms in the gray corporate area between state-owned and truly private, witnessed impressive upgrading. To underline Brandt and Thun’s point, the most promising domestic carmaker today is a late arriving (due to state barriers to entry), private firm, Geely.   Domesticating Venture Capital Virtually every big name in technological or business model innovation in China that emerged out of the start-up scene over the last two decades received the majority of its funding from overseas venture capital (VC). From the triumvirate of Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) to more recent success stories, such as Xiaomi, foreign venture capital has played a critical role in China’s start-up scene. In short, VC was the main conduit for creating the hybrid firms driving China’s technology development. Why has foreign venture capital played such an outsized role? Prior to 2007, one could point to the fact that China did not have the legal framework for general-limited partnership structures commonly used for venture capital in the U.S., U.K. and elsewhere. However, even after this problem was resolved through revisions in China’s Partnership Law, foreign venture capital has still played an outsized role in China’s financing of technological entrepreneurship. One way to understand why this has been the case is the bridging function foreign venture capital plays in linking Chinese entrepreneurs to institutions abroad better able to support technological entrepreneurship.  Whereas the domestic stock markets remain unattractive due to its speculative nature (due largely to the dearth of large institutional investors) and the state’s slow and biased process of deciding which firms can list, foreign venture capital has deep experience in listing start-ups on stock markets abroad   Continuities and Departures in Industrial Policy under Xi The MiC 2025 builds upon previous announced policies of the past ten years, and not surprisingly exhibits some of the flaws of past industrial policymaking. First and foremost, too many state-owned firms are the vehicles of choice for pursuing these industrial policies. Second, and worse still, the funds provided for these industrial policies are often used to spur the state takeover of private (often nominally foreign) companies and assets. Third, state procurement appears once again to be one of the preferred means of supporting these industries. Given that such procurement is not typically distributed to the most capable firms, much of the spending on these various industries may prove to be both ineffective and wasteful. Understandably, the scale of the proposed plans has alarmed foreign companies and countries alike. Even if China’s flawed industrial policymaking process does not lead to success, it may still lead to adding large amounts of capacity in various sectors. In other words, there is the possibility that relatively ineffective industrial policy could create a lose-lose situation in which inefficient Chinese capacity crashes the global market in a certain good (e.g. DRAM) without actually spurring sustainable development in China. However, I expect going forward that these industrial policies will face both financial and human capital constraints that limit the effective added capacity in some of these sectors. Of course, these industrial policy limitations are unlikely to alleviate the American government’s concerns about loss of intellectual property via forced transfer or theft as outlined in USTR’s 2018 Section 301 report.     Author’s Biography Douglas B. Fuller is a professor at City University of Hong Kong. The focus of his research is innovation, technology policy and international business. He has previously taught at Zhejiang University, King’s College London, Chinese University of Hong Kong and American University in Washington D.C. He has led research projects sponsored by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Savantas Policy Institute of Hong Kong. Fuller is the author of Paper Tigers, Hidden Dragons: Firms and the Political Economy of China’s Technological Development, and a co-organizer of Network B (Globalization and Socio-economic Development) of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics.   

Douglas B. Fuller 2019-05-03조회 : 8689
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[워킹페이퍼] China’s Trade: Development, Challenges and Transformations

Editor's Note Unlike other papers analyzing China’s economic policy in line with its broader national strategy, Junwei Liang narrows his focus down to China’s trade policy and trends. He offers a comprehensive overview of China’s trade balances, product varieties, trade partners, regional characteristics, and trade in commodities and services, arguing that China should make more of an effort to use its domestic market and the rising social challenges of a decreasing labor force. Despite global concerns about China’s return to a more statist and developmentalist approach, the author offers assurance that China will continue to pursue opening up and deepen its reforms.      .a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} li {margin:8px 0;} Quotes from the paper  Introduction Since the reform and opening-up in 1978, China has witnessed an explosive growth in trade, especially in export of commodity. After the accession to the WTO, the linkage of “Made in China” to the international market has boosted competitiveness of China’s products, while more and more conflicts and contradictions between China and trade partners have been emerging vastly and vigorously. The trade policy of the Trump administration against China is quite non-political-friendly, more importantly, a very awful and frightful signal to the global free trade regime. This will pose great challenges on Chinese authorities and companies, even individuals. China will, in the foreseeable future, be continuing implementing reform and opening-up and some critical transformations will be made in a larger and deeper sense, although it might be a long way to go.   China’s Trade Development    Figure 1  Trade Value and Share of China: 1950-2017 Source: UNCTAD, Billion USD, %.      Figure 2  Trade Balance of China: 1978-2017 Source: UNCTAD, Billion USD.      Figure 3  Product Varieties of China’s Export: 1995-2017 Source: UNCTAD, Billion USD.   Figure 4    Product Varieties of China’s Import: 1995-2017 Source: UNCTAD, Billion USD.   Figure 17   Partners of China’s Export: Number and Average Value Source: UNCTAD, Billion USD.      Figure 18   Partners of China’s Import: Number and Average Value Source: UNCTAD, Billion USD.       Conflicts, Contradictions and Challenges of China’s trade   Figure 26  Frequencies and Percentages of Global Antidumping Initiations and Measures Source: UNCTAD, Billion USD.      Figure 27  The Share of AD Initiations and Measures against China Filed by the World and the U.S. Source: WTO (%)   Figure 28  337 investigation the U.S. has initiated on China and the rest of the World Source: WTO (%)   China’s Coming Transformations in Trade Reform and opening-up is a great process that has helped China and the rest of the world achieve development and progress together. Opening-up is the path China must take to achieve prosperity and development. President Xi Jinping pointed out that “What has happened proves that opening-up was key to China’s economic growth over the past 40 years and in the same vein, high-quality development of China’s economy in the future can only be achieved with greater openness.” At present, the world is undergoing great development, transformation and adjustment. The road to world economic recovery is hard and tortuous; economic globalization experiences twists and turns; and unilateralism and protectionism are on the rise. These are the challenges that all of the countries are facing. Under the new conditions, China will adhere to its fundamental national policy of opening-up, actively promoting international cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, and striving to create a future that is open, innovative, inclusive and mutually beneficial. China will unswervingly promote opening-up on a higher level, significantly relax access to markets, create a more attractive environment to investment, implement high-standard policies of trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, build free trade ports with Chinese characteristics, and make a new ground to pursue opening-up on all fronts.       Author’s Biography Junwei Liang was granted a PhD degree from Nanjing University in 2009 and is now an associate Professor at Shandong University. His research is focusing on International Political Economics, including welfare analysis of trade policies and NTMs on China’s innovation on firm level. His findings have been published on both Chinese and English journals, such as World Economy, Journal of Quantitative and Technical Economics, etc. He is now the peer reviewer of several leading journals in China.  

Junwei Liang 2019-04-17조회 : 8730
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[워킹페이퍼] Rising China, Developmental Security and the Emerging Order in the Asia-Pacific

Editor's Note Feiteng Zhong attempts to understand the rise of China by applying key concepts from international relations theory, such as the “balance of power” and “hegemony.” Zhong, however, points out that some concepts can be interpreted differently according to local contexts and thus it is necessary to look at a phenomenon from various perspectives to reach comprehensive understanding. As part of this effort, the author introduces a new concept, called “developmental security” as an alternative way to view China’s rise in the Chinese context. This concept is originated from China’s development-oriented grand strategy in which growth in GDP per capita forms the basis for national strategic goals, the interests of security and development are unified, and a peaceful environment around the region is fostered to promote domestic development.     Quotes from the paper  In the field of international relations, there are two main issues attracted great concerns related to the rising of China. First, will China return to traditional China, that is, to build a regional order in the surrounding areas similar to the Tributary Sys-tem (Friedberg 2011; Pan and Lo 2017) Second, will China replace the U.S. and become a hegemonic power equivalent to the U.S. (Mearsheimer 2010; Kurth 2012)? For most Chinese scholars, both of them are not the best options (Zhong 2015; Qi 2015). According to the White Paper of China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation issued by the China’s State Council Information Office on January 11th, 2017, the security framework in the Asia-Pacific region which was promoted by China “does not mean starting all over again, but improving and upgrading the existing mechanisms,” and “should be adopted as a common caused by all the countries in the region” (China’s State Council Information Office 2017). However, the challenge is what reasonable and feasible scenarios would be if those two options are not the case. This article concludes that China will neither become another U.S. nor return to the past, considering the fact that China is still the largest economy with far lower income levels than the U.S. by 2050. GDP per capita is closely related to a country's technical capability, the global vision of its domestic audiences, and its interdependence of the global economy. With the improvement of China’s GDP per capita, especially the gap between the eastern coastal areas of China and high income countries was greatly reduced, China is going to embrace globalization, but in a Chinese way. It is clear that China will face increasingly complex international security challenges to safeguard its growing interests abroad, but its main challenges remain at the domestic level, particularly in addressing the gap between the rich and the poor, regional imbalances and the sustainability of development.     China’s Development Path towards 2050 According to data released by the USDA in December 2017, China's per capita GDP was close to $7,400 in 2017, compared to that U.S. GDP per capita was $53,000, that of Japan was $48,000 and that of South Korea was $26,000. Even by 2030, China's GDP per capita is expected to be less than $15,000, which is equivalent to only 22.4 percent of that of the U.S. (USDA 2017). In October 2017, during the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Japan’s Institute of Energy Economics, released a forecast report on the future of energy development in 2050, which provides the economic development prospects of major economies in the world, especially the East Asia economies (The Institute of Energy Economics 2017). According to this forecast, as shown in Table 1, China's GDP per capita is expected to reach 14,000 US dollars by 2030, 22,000 US dollars by 2040 and 30,000 US dollars by 2050. However, in terms of economic size, China will account for 17.7 percent of the world's economy by 2030, according to the USDA. By then, the U.S. will account for 19.8 percent, while Japan and South Korea will account for only 6 percent and 1.6 percent respectively. According to projections from the Institute of Energy Economics in Japan, a size of China's economy will reach 89.8 percent of the U.S. economy in 2030 and 111.1 percent of the U.S. economy in 2040, making it the largest economy in the world. By then, the third-largest economy will be India, not Japan. Therefore, the world is entering a major stage of economic restructuring.   Table 1 Growth Prospects of China and Other Global Major Economies until 2050   GDP per capita GDP   2030 2040 2050 2030 2040 2050 China 14.4 22.1 30.1 20311 30759 40328 India 4.0 6.4 9.5 6133 10236 15857 Japan 57.6 67.4 77.2 6948 7705 8329 Korea 35.6 43.6 52.2 1877 2284 2633 United States 63.5 74.6 84.1 22629 27677 32902 China/U.S. 22.7% 30.0% 35.8% 89.8% 111.1% 122.6%                      Source: The Institute of Energy Economics (2017).       Understanding the Traditional Paradigm of Power Transition between China and the U.S. [T]he relationship between hegemony and international order has long been a subject of discussion in the field of international relations. Robert Gilpin, the late professor at Princeton University who wrote about this in the early 1980s, argues that war is the main driver of sys-temic change. Robert Keohane, on the other hand, believes that the decline of hegemony does not necessarily lead to the collapse of the international order, because other countries benefit from it, and several countries can join together to maintain the international sys-tem. At present, the debate is still continuing. John Ikenberry, a liberal scholar at Princeton University, argues that China also benefits from the American order and will not overturn it (Ikenberry 2018). Other realists, such as John Mearsheimer, argue that China's rise is likely to lead to a war between China and the U.S. (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016). […] China and the West have different views on Great Power. The core lies in that the western concept of great power is based on military power, while the popular concept of great power in China mainly refers to the size of population and land, without economic and military implications. With the rise of China's economy, new meanings with economic power were added to the concept of China’s great power. However, the Chinese government still considers itself as the biggest developing country in the world, a concept broadly used since the mid-1980s (Zhong 2019).   Developmental Security: A New Perspective Understanding China’s Rise If we recognize the importance of per capita GDP in understanding international security issues, we will have a new perspective to examine the state of peace between China and its neighbors since the reform and opening up. At present, many scholars in Asia are talking about getting rid of the "middle-income trap." From a global perspective, it is more important to summarize how Asian countries get rid of the "low income trap." According to Robert Barro, a macroeconomist at Harvard University, the average annual growth rate in the west over the 200 years since the industrial revolution has been two percent. If developing countries are to catch up, especially if they are to get rid of two income traps, it will take a 25-year average of 2.9 percent growth in each income stage (Barro 2016, 14). Barro also believes that getting out of the "low income trap" is far more difficult than getting out of the "middle income trap." In 1998, China graduated from low-income countries and became a lower middle-income country. In 2010, China became a high middle-income country. From 1990 to 2011, China reduced the number of poor people by 439 million, making a huge contribution to global poverty reduction. Some scholars have pointed out that China's poverty reduction policy experience is of great significance to many low-income developing countries (Pan and Chen 2016, 135-143). At the same time, China's national security policy and its ideas of foreign relations should be given equal attention. China's national security philosophy is quite different from that of the U.S. The basic international political concept of the American elite is based on the history of European international politics. The most prominent one is the concept of balance of power. The Chinese government has highlighted the correlation between domestic security and international security and its ability to highlight the state of sustainable security in the definition of national security. In this regard, it is similar to the concept of "comprehensive security" proposed by Japan in the early 1980s. China's grand strategy is a strategy of internal and external balance (Zhong 2018). More fundamentally, since the reform and opening up, China has implemented a grand strategy based on development, which can also be called "developmental security." It has three basic characteristics: first, it takes the development of per capita GDP as the basis for constructing national strategic goals; second, security interests and development interests are unified, and there is a coordinated relationship between military expenditure and domestic socio-economic development. Third, we should foster a peaceful environment around the region that is conducive to development (Zhong 2017). It is hard to imagine how peace in East Asia could have lasted so long since the late 1970s, if a rising China had not adopted such a strategy.   A Complex and Networked Asia Pacific Order Conceptually, Robert Keohane and Josephy Nye demonstrated in the late 1970s that the overall power distribution does not correspond to the issue-area power distribution. A country with a small economy can also become one of the world's top countries in individual issue areas. When Keohane and Nye proposed the concept of complex interdependence, the empirical facts on which it was based came mainly from the relations between the U.S. and Canada, Australia and the European countries, when the average per capita GDP of Western developed countries was close to $10,000. By this measure, as China's per capita GDP increases further, many countries in China's neighbors can reach this level. According to the current calculation, if the initial results of the BRI are achieved, the GDP per capita of countries involved in the BRI can also be doubled in the next 15 years, which will deepen the complexity of China's neighbor relations. If complex interdependence can be applied to developed countries in the 1970s, the concept can also generalize China's future relations with regional countries. […] [I]n the conception of the Asia-Pacific regional order in 2030 and 2050, one should not look for clues only from the Western theories of international relations. In various Western theories of international relations, scholars generally believe that the core mark of a great power is military capability (Zhong 2017b). Although China attaches equal importance to military capabilities, the development of military capabilities should match the needs of the domestic economy and society under the development security strategy. Moreover, since the founding of a new China, China's military expenditure has never reached the corresponding level of the U.S. in terms of the proportion of its economy size. While neighboring countries often accuse China of the increase in military spending at an average annual rate of 10 percent, they have never simultaneously considered that China's economy has grown at a similar rate over the past four decades. Some scholars have pointed out that, if measured by military spending as percentage of total governmental expenditure, China's military growth rate is even lower than domestic expenditure. In this regard, international observers need to have a better understanding of China's domestic affairs and the affairs of the Asian region, which means frequent visits to China and its neighbors, frequent comparisons of regional differences, and efforts to seize the interests and development trends of all parties from various complex regional and trans-regional phenomena.     Author’s Biography   Feiteng Zhong is Professor and Head of Department of Great Power Relations Studies, National Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He received his Ph.D. (2009) in international relations from the Waseda University as well as the Peking University. He is also the author of "Developmental Security: China Rise and Regional Order Reconstruction" (China Social Sciences Press 2017). His main research interests include International Political Economy, The Political Economy of the Belt and Road Initiative, China's Foreign Policy, East Asia and the United States.   .a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} li {margin:8px 0;}

Feiteng Zhong 2019-04-17조회 : 8583
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] From Big to Powerful: China´s Quest for Security and Power in the Age of Innovation

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} li {margin:8px 0;} Editor's Note In this paper, Tai Ming Cheung examines the vision and paths put forward by China under Xi Jinping to build a militarily powerful and technologically advanced country, which is also called a "techno-security state." Xi’s military reinforcement strategy is composed of the three following components―reform, modernization, and innovation; Xi has put particular emphasis on innovation and expanded its application to military arena far more compared to his predecessors. Cheung expects the Chinese techno-security state to make smooth progress under Xi’s leadership based on sufficient financial capacity and good access to foreign technology, despite hurdles such as bureaucratic fragmentation, corruption, and political interference.     Quotes from the paper  Introduction At the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2017 that solidified Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and Commander-in Chief Xi Jinping’s hold on power for the foreseeable future, he offered a confident, even strident, vision of China’s growing long-term influence and might in the international sys-tem. Xi talked about “socialism with Chinese characteristics entering a new era” in which he described China as “moving closer to the global center stage,” that China’s brand of socialism offered a new option for countries who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence, and a China that was becoming a great power (Xi 2017). To realize these grand ambitions, Xi stressed that China needs to become a militarily powerful and technologically advanced country, and he offered a timeline. First, the country should reach the first tier of the world’s most innovative countries by 2035, and at the same time, the military would realize its objectives of becoming a fully modern force. By 2050, China would challenge for global leadership with a world-class military a centerpiece of the country’s “comprehensive national strength.” This paper examines whether these goals are realistic and achievable within the timeline put forward by Xi? How will China undertake this grand transformation? What is Xi’s vision for marrying military power with innovation? What are the geostrategic and geo-economic implications for the United States and Asia if China is successful?   The Emergence of the Chinese Techno-Security State under Xi Jinping China under Xi Jinping is a security-maximizing state that is building its power and prestige on an increasingly capable and expansive economic and technological foundation. The country fits the profile of what can be defined as a techno-security state in which the development efforts of the state are prioritized to meeting expansive national security requirements, of which the cultivation of strategic technological and industrial capabilities are prime goals. […] Xi’s vision of the Chinese techno-security state is heavily influenced by the ideological and organizational principles laid down during the Maoist era in the 1950s to 1970s and updated by his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao in the 1990s and 2000s. These principles are emphatically statist in nature: Technological development is strategic and fundamental for determining China’s place in the global strategic and economic balance –it is a vital ingredient in grand strategic thinking. The state must invest in critical technological sectors because of high risks and long and costly research and development cycles. The state must nurture indigenous innovation capacity, although this should allow for absorption of foreign technologies to help catch up. Technology diffusion through spin-off or spin-on should be a central long-term goal Military and security considerations should be paramount. Emphasis should be on ‘big science’ mega-projects. The grand strategy of Xi’s techno-security state has several core components: Building a strong national security state, especially prioritizing the development of military, internal security, and information control capabilities across a wide array of domains, of which cyber is of central importance. Building an advanced defense science, technological and industrial base. Forging a dual-use civil-military economy.   The Rise of the Chinese National Security State under Xi  In the making of the national security state, Xi has put forward a concept that he describes as a ‘national security path with Chinese characteristics’ that is a mixture of assertive principles coupled with deep concerns of vulnerabilities (Xinhua News Agency April 16, 2014). A number of key notions are behind the shaping of this concept: National security is comprehensive: Xi sees the domestic and external components of national security as overlapping and tightly connected, which is very different from the compartmentalized approach that his predecessors pursued. This is an important reason why Xi decided to establish a new organization, the National Security Commission, to manage this integrated approach (Lampton 2016; Wuthnow 2017). National security is expansive: Closely connected with the perspective that national security is comprehensive is the notion that it is expansive and covers many different domains. In a new national security law that is being finalized, national security is identified as covering 11 categories: political, territorial, military, economic, cultural, social, ecological, science and technology, information, nuclear, and natural resources. Ensuring national security has to be done pro-actively, pre-emptively, and strategically: It is important to identify and address national security challenges and opportunities early, strategically, and decisively rather than being reactive and tactical. This requires extensive and high-level leadership engagement, close coordination across the national security apparatus, and the development of a capable and substantial intelligence sys-tem to keep abreast of internal and international developments. Strongly asserting China’s interests: Xi is stressing the need to engage in struggle (斗争) in the pursuit of national interests, especially in the military and diplomatic arenas. In describing China’s approach in dealing with the United States, Admiral Sun pointed out that “facts have shown that without struggle it will be impossible for the United States to respect our core interests, without struggle it will be impossible to realize cooperation and win-win on the basis of equality, and without struggle it will be impossible to have an excellent situation today.” In other words, China needs to take a resilient stance and push hard against the United States in order to win its respect, although the Chinese leadership is also careful not to go too far and spark armed conflict, as it remains much weaker.   The Cult of Innovation and the Transformation of Chinese Military Power Xi Jinping’s grand goal of transforming the Chinese defense establishment from being big to being strong rests on a three-pronged strategy of reform, innovation, and modernization. Reform refers to undertaking a concerted roots and branch restructuring of the existing defense establishment to improve its readiness and ability to fight and win future wars as well as to ensure its political reliability to the Communist Party. Innovation concerns the development of new, especially novel, ways and means of strengthening China’s military power and influence through hard (such as material, technological, and industrial) and soft (such as normative, strategy and tactics, processes) factors. Modernization is the result of the implementation of the reforms and innovation on the development of defense capabilities. While these three components of Xi’s military strengthening strategy are being pursued on parallel but separate tracks, there is considerable overlapping and coordination of their activities. Moreover, although these endeavors are occurring concurrently, there are different timeframes set for them. Accomplishing the bulk of structural reforms is targeted for the beginning of the 2020s, while Xi declared at the 19th Party Congress that defense modernization would basically be completed by 2035 and China would become a world class defense innovation power on a par with the United States by 2050. Reform and modernization have been at the top of the defense establishment’s policy agenda going back to the 1970s, but innovation has only come to the fore since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao emphasized the importance of innovation, especially related to research and development, during their tenures. Xi though has elevated innovation to a core priority and broadened its application to far more military areas than his predecessors did.   Global Implications: Intensifying U.S.-China Technological Competition The Chinese techno-security state is flourishing and looks set to grow faster, bigger, and better under Xi Jinping’s long-term leadership. While weaknesses such as bureaucratic fragmentation, corruption, political interference, and entrenched corporate interests will complicate progress, there are numerous strengths that will allow the techno-security state to mitigate or overcome these obstacles. They include ample funding and good access to foreign technology and know-how. The rise of the Chinese techno-security state has triggered deepening concern in the United States that its military technological superiority with China is under mounting threat. This has led to intensifying Sino-US defense technological competition that is likely to become more acute. The U.S. Defense Department has been pursuing a number of initiatives since the early 2010s in an effort to maintain its technological advantages, such as the Third Offset Strategy and the Defense Innovation Initiative that was pursued by the Obama Administration (see Cheung and Mahnken 2018). While the Trump Administration no longer uses the Third Offset label, it has made clear that it embraces the view that the United States and China are now great power rivals. This is spelled out in the US national defense strategy issued in January 2018 that points out, “as China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global pre-eminence in the future” (U.S. Defense Department 2018). This competition in the defense domain has also spilled over into the broader U.S.-China technology relationship, especially in areas such as high and strategic technology, communications technology, U.S. and allied curbs on Chinese investment in sensitive technological areas, and restrictions on research and development exchanges. The two countries appear to be spiraling into a technological cold war that has far-reaching negative consequences for not only their techno-security establishments but also for the development of their national innovation capabilities and for the global technological order.       Author’s Biography Tai Ming Cheung is the director of IGCC and a professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego, where he teaches courses on Asian security and Chinese security and technology. He is a long-time analyst of Chinese and East Asian defense and national security affairs and was based in Asia from the mid-1980s to 2002 covering political, economic, and strategic developments in greater China. He was also a journalist and political and business risk consultant in Northeast Asia. Cheung received his Ph.D. from the War Studies Department at King’s College, London University. Recent publications include The Gathering Pacific Storm: Emerging US-China Strategic Competition in Defense Technological and Industrial Development (ed., with Thomas Mahnken, Cambria, 2018) and China and Cybersecurity (ed., with Jon Lindsay and Derek Reveron, Oxford, 2015).  

Tai Ming Cheung 2019-04-04조회 : 8586
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] China´s Military Power Trajectory

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note In this paper, Seong-ho Sheen assesses China’s overall military power by analyzing its current military posture and reform endeavors in terms of conventional military capability, strategic nuclear capability, and power projection capability. Based on this analysis, he develops a scenario of China’s three-stage future defense reform in line with its economic growth. China’s military power, according to him, is still far below that of the US in all aspects but China’s ongoing efforts to bolster its military strength may eventually lead to a competition with the US as it will pursue increased influence and prestige based on its growing military and economic power.     Quotes from the paper  Introduction In assessing China’s military power trajectory, this paper will focus on three areas; conventional military capability, strategic nuclear capability, and power projection capability. Traditional Chinese military strategy has been based on the concept of mainland defense and preparation for a Taiwan contingency. This strategy has been based on a defensive use of military force. Throughout the Cold War and up until the 2000s, China’s military planning has been built upon large ground forces to defend its mainland from enemy invasion and missile forces to launch an attack on independent Taiwan and foreign interventionists, most possibly the US military in the region. As of 2015, official Chinese military strategy stated “China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and will never seek hegemony or expansion” (China’s Military Strategy 2015). Yet at the same time, Chinese officials increasingly feel the pressure of neighboring countries working to contain China’s growing power and influence in the region, especially the efforts led by the United States in the 21st century. There have been growing Chinese efforts to push back against American encirclement and secure China’s sphere of influence. This strategy has evolved into what is known as Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD). China’s A2/AD uses “a series of interrelated missile, sensor, guidance, and other technologies designed to deny freedom of movement” to keep any potential adversaries, including the United States, from intervening in a conflict off of China’s coast or from attacking the Chinese mainland (Biddle and Oelrich 2016). Some see the new Chinese strategy as more aggressive in nature and posing a grave threat to US power projection capabilities in the region. Still, from the Chinese perspective, A2/AD is an effort to defend its core interests close to its mainland, and are not an attempt to engage in any kind of expansionist ventures in and beyond its regional boundaries.   US vs Chinese Nuclear Force China’s strategic nuclear capability appears even weaker compared to that of the US when you look at the composition, quality, technology, and operational capability of its nuclear forces. As shown in the table below, China does not have a nuclear triad, and its nuclear deterrence mostly depends on a small arsenal of outdated ICBMs against the powerful US triad sys-tem of land-based ICBMs, strategic nuclear submarines, and nuclear bombers.                 Table 1. US-China Nuclear Forces                Source: Sheen (2017, 16)   China's Power Projection Capability China does not have meaningful power projection capability due to the focus of its military goals on mainland defense. China has just finished refurbishing a Cold War era Soviet aircraft carrier and is in the process of building its first indigenous aircraft carrier, while the United States has ten active carrier strike groups. In 2017, the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, concluded its second training deployment to the South China Sea, its first with an embarked J-15 fighter aircraft, and conducted its first port visit to Hong Kong. China’s first domestic aircraft carrier was launched in 2017 and will likely join the fleet by 2019. The new carrier is a modified version of the Liaoning, but is similarly limited in its capabilities due to its lack of a catapult and the smaller size of its flight deck compared to US carriers. China is expected to begin construction on its first catapult-capable carrier in 2018, which will enable additional fighter aircraft, fixed-wing early-warning aircraft, and more rapid flight operations. However, China’s new aircraft carriers are substantially less capable than US Navy carriers. It will take long time and a significant degree of investment before China can match US forces in any meaningful way (US Department of Defense 2018).   China's Defense Reform and Future Military Power  Based on the discussion of China’s current military posture and its reform efforts in terms of its conventional military capability, strategic nuclear capability, and power projection capability, this paper projects the following developments in China’s military power in sync with its GDP per capita growth. First, China will try to finish its first stage of military modernization with the current organizational restructuring focusing on the centralization of command and control, enhanced joint military operation capability with the elevation of navy and air force combat readiness, and a downsize of the army together with the creation of independent nuclear strategic forces. This will be pursued through 2025, when China is projected to achieve the level of 15k GDP per capita. For the second phase of military reform by 2035, China will try to achieve meaningful strategic nuclear deterrence capability against the United States with a focus on enhancing the survivability of its ICBMs with mobile and MIRV capability. It will also try to build its operational SLBMs capability within the first defensive layer in the East Pacific. It may also try to build strategic bomber capability to have a basic level of triad capability. This will be in line with the country’s achievement of a 20k GDP per capita. For the final phase of military reform by 2049, China will try to achieve a world class military power on par with that of the United States. This will include state-of-the-art military technology in terms of conventional military capability, a powerful strategic nuclear capability with a full triad, and a global power projection capability. Within this period, China is projected to achieve economic development to the level of 30k GDP per capita.     Author’s Biography Seong-ho Sheen is Professor of International Security and Director of Institute of International Affairs (IIA) at Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), Seoul National University. He was a visiting fellow at the East-West Center DC, a CNAPS fellow at the Brookings Institution, an assistant research professor at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Honolulu, Hawaii and a research fellow at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), Cambridge, Mass, the U.S. He has taught at University of Massachusetts Boston. In addition, he advised various government organizations including ROK National Assembly. His area of interest includes International Security, US Foreign Policy, Northeast Asian Politics and the Korean Peninsula. Sheen received a Ph.D. and M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and B.A. from Seoul National University.    

신성호 2019-04-04조회 : 8616
멀티미디어
[서울 국제학술회의] "부상하는 중국과 미래 아태 질서"

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px; } #tb1 tr td:nth-of-type(1) {width:100px;} #tb1 tr td {padding:10px;} 현재 진행되고 있는 중장기 연구사업인 ‘중국의 미래 성장과 아태 신문명 건축’의 일환으로 EAI는 11월 16~17일 양일 간 서울에서 국제학술회의를 개최하였습니다. 총 6개의 세션으로 구성된 이번 학술회의에는 한미중일 4개국에서 21인의 연구진이 참여한 가운데, 중국의 부상이 경제와 안보, 기술 발전, 에너지·환경 등 각 분야에 미치는 영향과 도전 요인, 그리고 이것이 향후 아태 질서에 어떠한 변화를 가져올 지에 대한 심도 있는 논의가 이뤄졌습니다.   본 학술회의는 비공개로 이루어졌으며, 일부 공개 세션의 내용은 아래 동영상에서 확인하실 수 있습니다.    Program Rising China and the Future of the Asia-Pacific Order November 17 09:30-11:30 Moderator Yul Sohn, President, East Asia Institute Presenters Barry Naughton, University of California, San Diego The United States, China and the Asia-Pacific: The Shifting Economic Agenda Tai Ming Cheung, University of California, San Diego From Big to Powerful: China’s Quest for Security and Power in the Age of innovation Kiichi Fujiwara, University of Tokyo US Disengagement? Consequences of Power Transition for Alliances Sook Jong Lee, Sungkyunkwan University East Asian Views on Chinese Influence Feiteng Zhong, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Rising China, Developmental Security and the Emerging Order in the Asia-Pacific      

2019-03-29조회 : 9014
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] The Prospect and Trend of Military Spending and Strategy in Rising China

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note In an effort to understand China's national and regional security strategy, Dong Ryul Lee reviews trends in China's military buildup with a focus on defense spending and strategy in response to economic growth. The paper shows that China's defense spending has consistently increased in line with its economic growth and fiscal spending, and that the country has sufficient economic and financial capacity to increase military spending if necessary. However, domestic factors, such as the growing domestic demand for social welfare and population changes, may act as a constraint on this spending in the future.     Quotes from the paper   China's Military Spending The growth in Chinese military spending is tied to its rising GDP. China’s estimated defense budget was $50 billion (USD) in 2001 and $228 billion (USD) in 2017 (2016 base year USD). Although this number represents over a 356 percent increase, these figures run generally parallel with Chinese economic growth. Over the same period, the Chinese economy grew by approximately 950 percent, resulting in a rate of Chinese military expenditure as a percentage of GDP that remained steady at around 2 percent as shown in figure 2.   Figure 2 Military Spending as Percent of GDP         Source: CSIS China Power Project (Data from: SIPIRI Milex Database)   China’s defense spending has certainly increased in absolute terms, but in the long term, the growth rate is tending towards decline. From 1990 to 2013, the average annual defense budget growth rate for the 24-year period was 15.1 percent. Throughout Xi Jinping’s administration (2013-2016), the average growth rate declined to 10.15 percent. In fact, China's defense spending has been rising sharply in recent years, but it still appears to be managed within acceptable limits of the country’s economic capacity.   Variables in Forecasting China's Defense Spending In general, defense spending is mainly affected by three variables: policy wills, capacity, and the presence of  external threats. Therefore, predictions of Chinese defense spending consider the following variables which have the potential to affect China’s future defense spending. First, in terms of policy will, there is the question of how highly the Xi Jinping administration will prioritize “building a strong military (强軍夢)” in order to realize the so-called Chinese dream (中國夢). Second, in terms of capacity, it is necessary to examine the economic and social variables of China that will affect the country’s future defense budget, because the Chinese government has increased its military spending in line with the economic growth rate thus far. Finally, as China has quickly emerged as a powerful country since it launched its reform and opening, it has significantly weakened its perception of direct military threats from outside. Therefore, the manner in which the Xi Jinping administration will recognize and respond to any checks posed by the US against China will become an important factor in determining defense spending.   Policy Will and Military Strategy Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of China’s modernization drive and a security guarantee for China’s peaceful development. The building of a strong military pursued by the Xi Jinping administration encompasses modernizing the military and focusing on the qualitative growth of military power. The key to China’s military buildup is its ability to acquire advanced defense technology. As long as China continues to actively pursue its military modernization, especially if it pursues the development of civil-military integration, the actual defense spending that the government does not include in its official figures will continue to grow in the future.   Capacity: GDP Growth Rate China's defense spending has consistently increased within a certain range of China’s economic growth and fiscal spending. In other words, the Chinese government has stably maintained and controlled the defense budget. Should a situation that demands an increase in actual military strength arise, the country has sufficient economic and financial capacity to mobilize greater defense spending than the current level, depending on the will of policy makers. However, as social diversity expands due to income growth, there is the potential for increased challenges to the legitimacy and stability of the Communist Party sys-tem. Even if China can sustain a medium level of growth, it will face financial limits on the development of its military power if it is to meet the growing needs and expectations of its people. Military spending may be constrained by a growing demand for domestic welfare, an aging population, and a decrease in the working population.   Threat: The United States Variable China is trying to avoid entering into geopolitical conflicts with the US, and gradually seeks a path to a geoeconomic rise (Lee 2017, 329-364). Currently, China seeks to focus on economic development, such as the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” while avoiding direct military conflicts with the United States to the greatest extent possible. China is not currently capable of directly challenging the US militarily, so the situation is likely to be one of long-term competition, not war. As China continues its unexpectedly rapid rise and the United States further implements Indo-Pacific strategy in Asia, many countries in the Asia-Pacific region will face a harsh dilemma between US and China. The United States will push strongly to contain China’s expansion in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, where China’s influence can prevail. Competition for influence between the US and China will gradually increase in the region. If the Trump government pressures China on territorial and sovereignty issues that the Xi Jinping government sees as its “core interests,” such as Taiwan or South China Sea, then the Xi government may encounter difficulties in that its active use of nationalism to secure the legitimacy of the communist regime leave it too rigid to address the issue adequately.     Author's Biography Dong Ryul Lee is a professor in the Department of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women’s University since 1997. He is now President of The Korean Association for Contemporary Chinese Studies and serves as a policy advisor to the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His research area includes Chinese foreign policy, international relations in East Asia, Chinese nationalism and minority. He was a visiting scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University from 2005 to 2006. He received his Ph.D. in international politics from Peking University.    

이동률 2019-01-08조회 : 8863