.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:24px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 2: economy, energy, and environment, Yul Sohn addressed that in contrast to the Unites States that can leverage its power to increase its strategic and economic counterbalance to China, South Korea is forced to play a more complex game. Given its deep yet asymmetric economic interdependence with China as well as demands for Chinese cooperation with regard to North Korean threats, South Korea needs to accommodate China while at the same time courting US engagement both economically and militarily. In that sense, two countries need strategic consultation and coordination over complex interdependence in the following three areas. 1) A recent development in weaponized trade and interdependence invoking national security boils down to the question of how we can restrain the abuse of a broader definition of security, namely over-securitization, and strike a right balance of national security and economic interdependence. South Korea underwent THAAD retaliation by China, US countervailing duties on steel and aluminum under Section 232, and Japan’s tightening of export controls over chemical components crucial to South Korea’s semiconductor industry. 2) Second question comes down to the China challenge, where the world is struggling to seek a collective approach against China’s disruptive mercantilist behaviors.  3) Last area of concern is the compelling need for a rules-based economic order in the region, which would restrain Chinese predation, America’s protectionism, increase middle power space, and sustain liberal norms.     Quotes from the Paper   Introduction                   For most of the period since the signing of the ROK-US alliance treaty in 1953, relations between South Korea and the United States have been characterized by bilateralism: primarily dyadic links have been developed in economic as well as political- security relationships. In the area of international trade and investment, the KOR-US FTA is a culmination point of bilateralism: by far, the largest bilateral FTA for each other.   Rising Tide of Aggressive Unilateralism By the late-2010s, great powers tended to treat interdependence as a means that would pursue exclusive economic and strategic interests. They put a greater focus on relative economic gains and increased concern over security risks posed by interdependence while ostensibly upholding the tenets of the liberal international order. This trend posed a considerable dilemma for South Korea, which depends on military alliance with the US but economically with China. If economics and security are decoupled, South Korea will find no difficulty. The reality is the opposite: that South Korea has suffered three major trade shocks as economics and security were coupled negatively. All three came as a form of trade retaliations that invoked national security issue.   Beyond Bilateralism Throughout the current co-project, there is a set of agreements (among the EAI scholars) including that either US nor China will win primacy in Asia; there is certainly no choice to thwart China rising; and these dichotomies are destructive for South Korea; and the decay of the US-led rules based order is undesirable. South Korea needs to restore an open, rules-based order that binds great powers to the rules.     Author’s Biography ■ Yul Sohn is the president of EAI and a professor at Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He previously served as the dean of Yonsei University GSIS, president of the Korean Association of International Studies, and president of the Korean Studies of Contemporary Japan. His research focuses on the Japanese and international political economy, East Asian regionalism, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2018, with T.J. Pempel), and Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen).  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Sook Jong Lee addressed that, based on the survey result from 2005 to 2020 conducted by the East Asia Institute on Korean Identity, Korean’s support for the Korea-US alliance has been strengthened since the mid-2000s. Over the past 15 years, support for the Korea-US alliance has increased by 17.6 percent, and the support base has been solid regardless of ideology and political orientation. Meanwhile, regarding a survey question on the awareness of threats from other countries, it shows that people are more supportive to US-Korea alliances when they feel the greater threats from North Korea. In addition, regarding a survey question on US-China competition, more than 64 percent responded that South Korea should take a neutral stance amid US-China competition. However, if they had to choose between the US and China, more than twice as many people responded they would choose the US. As a conflict between the US and China intensifies, the awareness on threat has increased, and this suggests that intensifying US-China competition could negatively affect the South Korea-US alliance. Considering the so-called transactional approach that the Trump administration has shown to its allies, the new Biden administration’s stance of respecting the alliance is comforting to Koreans. It is expected to have a positive impact on Korea-US alliance. In addition, as the Korean government strengthens regional and global cooperation in areas such as democracy, health, and climate change, South Korea will be able to strengthen cooperation with the US in the aforementioned areas.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   Smaller countries tend to seek alliance with a stronger country when their geopolitical environment is unfavorable. South Korea’s alliance with the United States is supported by this geopolitical reason and is also rooted historically. By helping to both liberate South Korea from its 35 year-long Japa-nese colonial rule and defend it against North Korea’s invasion during the Korean War (1950-1953), the U.S. has planted historical legacy of the 1953 mutual security agreement, which continues to this date. However, the transition of South Korea (hereafter, Korea or ROK) from an impoverished na-tion to a developed democracy has made Koreans more conscious of establishing an equal partner-ship with their security patron. This is considered a natural development provided Korea’s progress and democratization.   Autonomy vs. Alliance Snyder (2018) identifies geopolitical environment, rising national capacity, and domestic politics as three major factors that affect Korea’s strategic choice. Among the possible four strategies based on the autonomy vs. alliance axis and the peninsular focused parochialism vs. internationalism axis, he argues that the Korean strategy has evolved from parochial alliance dependency to alliance enabled internationalism. Since Korea is relatively weak compared to surrounding nations including China, Japan, and Russia, it faces limitations in its strategic choice. As such, it is difficult for Korea to withdraw from its alliance with the U.S. and its domestic politics plays less of a determining factor in its strategic choice when compared to other nations.  This is a valid point considering how the Korean government and political parties remain committed to the alliance regardless of their ideo-logical preferences. In terms of public opinion, however, there has been a notable change. Foreign policies tend to be more determined by technocrats and experts compared to other internally orient-ed economic and social policies. Nevertheless, they also lie increasingly under the scrutiny of media and advocacy citizen groups. How foreign policy issues are framed in the context of domestic poli-tics is important in determining the level of public support. Accordingly, managing public opinion is important in sustaining public support for the alliance.   Factors Affecting the ROK-US Alliance Support This section compares alliance support across groups that are divided by different features and views. Nine variables are grouped into five categories in addition to two demographic variables. Survey respondents are divided into three groups. The first group consists of people who favor au-tonomous diplomacy, who selected a score from the 0 to 3 spectrum. The second group is composed of people with a neutral view, who selected from the 4 to 6 spectrum. The third group consists of those in support of the alliance support who selected from the 7 to 10 spectrum. The percentage proportions of these three groups of favoring autonomy, neutrality, and alliance are 19.4%, 47.4%, and 33.3% respectively, of the total number of 1,003 respondents.   Correlation Analysis This section examines the correlation among considered variables. The purpose of correlation analy-sis is to examine the direction and degree of interaction among all variables. Several variables show high degrees of correlation with each other. For instance, the level of support for the alliance posi-tively correlates with the following variables: 1) threat perception of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, 2) favorability of the U.S. over China within the U.S.-China hegemonic competition, 3) favorable sentiment towards the U.S., and 4) weaker commitment to democracy.   Hierarchical Regression Analysis  This section examines the level of influence amongst different variables. Model 1 examines three demographical variables: greater age and lower educational levels were seen to increase support for the ROK-U.S. alliance. Model 2 then takes into account all of the discussed variables in a cross ta-ble to perform simple correlation analyses. Among the threat perceptions, North Korea’s nuclear threat and the U.S.-China competition threat remain most significant in determining the different attitudes within the autonomy-alliance spectrum. The rise of China threat loses its statistical signifi-cance when correlated with alliance attitude in this hierarchical regression analysis. As seen in the simple correlation analysis, threat perception of North Korea’s nuclear program is positively correlat-ed with the level of support of the alliance. It is also notable that the threat perception coming from the U.S.-China competition is significantly significant in determining the alliance attitude in this model unlike the previous simple correlation analysis. In particular, those who see the hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China as a threat to Korea’s national interest are less supportive of the alliance with the U.S. This finding suggests that the Korean public is likely to see the burden of alliance ties with the U.S. as being increasingly costly along with rising bilateral competition be-tween two great powers. The fear of entanglement with regards to the U.S.-led conflict will also increase although the majority still favors the U.S. as a more dependable security guarantor. It is no-table that the desirable position in the U.S.-China competition loses its direct influence upon the al-liance attitude although there was a statistically significant correlation between two variables in the previous model. On the other hand, favorability remains strong in influencing people’s support for the ROK-U.S. In addition, the relationship between higher commitment to democracy and lower level of support for the alliance remains statistically significant in this model.   Conclusion This paper aimed to measure the potential factors that can influence Koreans’ view on the ROK-U.S. alliance. The level of support for the alliance is measured according to a numerical spectrum ranging from 0 (autonomy) to 10 (alliance). Three statistical methods were employed to identify significant relations between these factors and the support towards the alliance. First, a cross-table analysis was conducted to compare group differences on alliance views. Second, a correlation analysis was con-ducted to check the degree of proximity between the different factors and whether they exerted a positive or negative influence upon alliance perception. Third, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to measure the weight of influence of each factor in comparison with others.     Author’s Biography Sook Jong Lee is a Professor of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Ko-rea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Jonathan D. Pollack addressed that, five American presidents have tried to slow down or prevent outright North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, using the full range of political, economic and diplomatic tools and strategies. Fully realized operational nuclear weapons capability by North Korea would be a strategic disaster for China and for the United States. Since it can negatively affect both countries, North Korea’s nuclear weapons can be the task that US and China can cooperate on. To this end, the US and China need to realize through dialogues that North Korea’s nuclear weapon is a common security concern for both countries. Since it is impossible to separate North Korea from China in geopolitical, economic and historical aspects, it is necessary for the US to try to have candid talks with China on the North Korea issue, even though it is likely to be difficult.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   Joe Biden’s election as America’s 46th President and the defeat of Donald Trump necessitate a care-ful appraisal of U.S. Korea policy, and of U.S. strategy and policy in Northeast Asia as a whole. These require an evaluation of the legacy of the Trump Administration; and consideration of three issues that will shape U.S. policy in the Biden Administration: (1) reaffirming and rebuilding Ameri-ca’s alliance relationships; (2) China’s political, economic, and strategic directions and how U.S. pol-icy could influence Beijing’s policy choices; and (3) North Korea’s political, economic, and strategic orientation, and how the actions of the U.S. and other powers could influence the DPRK’s calcula-tions and future behavior. None of these issues are for the United States alone to decide. At the same time, no incoming administration starts with a blank slate. A single short essay cannot address these issues in detail, but it can identify the issues that will most likely shape U.S. policy choices.   What the Trump Administration Leaves Behind Donald Trump will leave office as the most disruptive president in the history of U.S. foreign policy.  (Time does not allow for a comparable accounting of the effects of his presidency on America’s do-mestic politics and institutional integrity.) Trump’s disdain for alliances; his contempt for multilater-alism and withdrawal from negotiated international agreements; his adherence to stark, highly pred-atory views of international politics; his overt preference for authoritarian, anti-democratic leaders; his insistence on “America first” and mercantilist policies; and his dismissiveness of scientific exper-tise and economic logic have been evident from the very outset of his administration. With few ex-ceptions, America’s alliance relationships and international partnerships have been badly undermined, with the U.S. president no longer willing to uphold principles and policies integral to the interna-tional order developed since the end of World War II.   The Road Ahead The upheaval in U.S. policy making over the past four years requires review of how America’s East Asian allies and partners perceive the U.S. in the aftermath of the Trump Administration. Will the damage to the U.S. “brand name” prove lasting, or is America’s reputation recoverable under a very different president? What remedial actions must be taken to prevent further damage to America’s international reputation? Or is the centrality of the United States to international peace and security simply too great for any regional actors to challenge the U.S. role? Is there an alternative strategic rationale to sustain America’s alliances that could garner ample domestic support in the U.S. and among its major security partners, including the ROK?   The China Question The Biden Administration will also need to confront lasting challenges in relation to China. The de-terioration in U.S.-China relations under the Trump Administration has been profound, though it al-so reflects an increasing shift in U.S. thinking about China in both political parties and in U.S. public opinion. The question is not whether there will be “strategic competition” between Washington and Beijing, but what kind of competition. The core questions concern the boundaries of U.S.-China ri-valry; whether there are viable means to manage competition; the areas where cooperation remains essential; and the potential risks if both powers prove incapable of controlling their more intensely competitive instincts and practices. Korea will be at or near the center of many of these issues.   North Korea: The Strategic Outlier  Joe Biden will be the sixth American president seeking to slow or inhibit North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. These have entailed use of the full range of political, economic, security, and dip-lomatic tools, and none of have achieved lasting success. As a consequence, the DPRK is now much closer to a fully realized nuclear weapons capability that can threaten all the states of Northeast Asia and (prospectively) the U.S. mainland. Pyongyang insists that it is not prepared to negotiate any lim-its on its nuclear weapons inventory, let alone dismantle what it already possesses. It seeks full ac-ceptance as the world’s ninth nuclear-armed state. In its view, nuclear diplomacy can only be for purposes of arms control, not disarmament. Kim Jong-un also claims that (because North Korea now possesses the means of nuclear retaliation) it can deter any American attack. But its continued de-velopment efforts and the possibility of testing new, as yet untested sys-tems indicates that it has yet to achieve what it deems necessary for its strategic needs. Moreover, the DPRK remains unwilling to forego continued weapons development in favor of pressing economic and societal needs. At times, Pyongyang insists upon the removal of multilateral sanctions that it claims have had a crip-pling effect on its long-term development.       Author’s Biography Jonathan D. Pollack is a nonresident senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center and Cen-ter for East Asia Policy at the Brookings Institution. Between 2012 and 2014, he served as director of the John L. Thornton China Center. Prior to joining Brookings in 2010, he was professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War Col-lege, Newport, Rhode Island. He previously worked at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, Cal-ifornia, where he served in various senior research and management positions, including chairman of the political science department, corporate research manager for international policy and senior advi-sor for international policy. His recent publications include Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early 21st Century, Korea-The East Asian Pivot, Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspective on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the 21st Century. His principal research interests include Chinese na-tional security strategy; U.S.-China relations; U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific; Korean politics and foreign policy; Asian international politics; and nuclear weapons and international security. He received his master's and doctorate in political science from the University of Michigan, and was a post-doctoral research fellow at Harvard University.

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Lindsey W. Ford addressed that while extensive cooperation has been pursued in the Indo-Pacific region, led by QUAD countries, South Korea has not actively participated in security cooperation at the regional level for a long time, only focusing on Korean Peninsula issues. It is natural for South Korea to prioritize its domestic security tasks including the North Korean nuclear threat, but considering South Korea’s status at the regional and global levels, as well as its expanding economic cooperation, its contribution to regional security cooperation is still insignificant. South Korea can more actively present a vision on regional peace and security based on Moon Jae-in government’s New Southern Policy; and may contribute more tosecurity cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region. Rather than focusing on South Korea’s official participation in QUAD, the focus should be on enhancing practical defense cooperation between South Korea and the members of QUAD. South Korea can contribute to the expansion of the regional security cooperation network by promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation with QUAD members. As an influential middle power, South Korea has many areas to contribute to regional security cooperation. In particular, it has proposed to strengthen future cooperation with Australia and India in areas such as maritime, space, and defense security at the bilateral level.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the “Quad”) has emerged as one of the highest-profile initia-tives associated with the Trump administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific" concept. Renewed attention to the Quad reflects long-standing U.S. efforts to shift from a bilateral hub-and-spoke model of Asian security toward a networked approach that encourages new “multiparty arrange-ment(s)” with “our strongest, most important allies”.  Yet the Republic of Korea (“South Korea”), one of the region’s leading middle powers and a close U.S. ally, is notably absent from this forum.     South Korea, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and the Quad The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue first met in 2007, emerging from a more informal Australia-India-Japan-U.S. core group that was established to coordinate responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.  Although the group failed to gain traction in 2007, partially due to China’s strong objec-tions, it was revived after a decade-long hiatus in November 2017.  While media reports frequently depict the dialogue as an anti-China containment mechanism or the precursor to a more formal “Asian NATO”, participating nations themselves have pushed back against these characterizations, stressing the positive sum ambitions of the dialogue.  Moreover, official statements from recent dis-cussions consistently emphasize the non-exclusive nature of the grouping, and its role as just one among many elements of a broader, ASEAN-centric security architecture.   Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities Two lessons are apparent in reviewing South Korea’s defense ties with Australia and India over the past decade. First, there are common linkages across South Korea’s defense ties with Quad coun-tries that could provide a solid foundation for multilateral engagement. As per Figure 1 (below), South Korea engages in a high-level 2+2 dialogue, maritime exercises, and defense technology co-operation with Australia, India, and the United States, while both India and the United States have concluded logistics agreements with South Korea. South Korea also has some variation on a classi-fied information sharing agreement with all four countries.    Conclusion As the Moon administration continues to develop its New Southern Policy, defense cooperation should be an integral piece of its partnership-building activities with other Asian partners. Although South Korea enjoys a strong alliance with the United States, its influence as a leading Asian middle power would be enhanced by developing stronger security partnerships with other like-minded In-do-Pacific partners. Current debates around Korean participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dia-logue risk undermining this interest, by implicitly placing form over function and creating an overly narrow focus on a single dialogue mechanism. The more important goal for both Seoul and allied capitals should be to enhance South Korea’s contributions to regional security through its participa-tion in regional defense networks. Instead of looking to the Quad to achieve this goal, policymakers should instead focus on strengthening bilateral and trilateral defense ties between South Korea and Quad countries. This initiative would not only enhance South Korea’s influence beyond Northeast Asia, it would also provide a new area of cooperation for the US-Korea alliance, making it more rel-evant to the needs of the broader Indo-Pacific region.     The Prospect of North Korea’s denuclearization under the Biden administration and South Korea’s tasks Given these backdrop, North Korea policy of the next US Biden administration is likely to be very critical for the future negotiation for denuclearization of the North. Biden’s approach, so far, can be summarized as follows: first, principled pragmatism which will be the guiding line for bottom-up approach with North Korea will prevail; second, cooperation with South Korea and other East Asian allies will be essential in accomplishing denuclearization of North Korea; third, to prevent further development of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is important with a view to the ultimate purpose of complete denuclearization; and fourth, human rights in North Korea will be an essential concern for the Biden administration.       Author’s Biography Lindsey W. Ford is a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Foreign Policy program. She is also an adjunct lecturer at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Her research focuses on U.S. defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, including U.S. security allianc-es, military posture, and regional security architecture. Ford is a frequent commentator on Asian se-curity and defense issues and her analysis has been featured by outlets including the New York Times, the Wall St. Journal, the Financial Times, Politico, Foreign Policy, the Straits Times, CNN, MSNBC, and Bloomberg. She graduated with a master’s in public affairs and Asian studies from the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin, and a bachelor’s in vocal performance from Samford University. director for political-security affairs at the Asia So-ciety Policy Institute (ASPI). From 2009-15, She served in a variety of roles within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She also served as the senior adviser to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affair. She was also a leading architect of the Asia rebalance strategy work for the Department of Defense’s 2012 “Defense Strategic Guidance Review” and oversaw the development of the Department’s first “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” in 2015.  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Chaesung Chun and Young-Sun Ha addressed that as the US-China strategic competition gradually shifts toward a hegemonic challenge, South Korea’s North Korea strategies are faced with increasing difficulties. The Biden administration's foreign policy will focus on strengthening diplomacy based on legitimacy and norms. There is no doubt that South Korea’s strategic purpose is in line with the US. However, South Korea still depends on China, and there is a pending issue of North Korea. Therefore, this must be considered when planning the ways to maintain the alliance-based network between the US and South Korea. For South Korea, it is necessary to strengthen the security sys-tem, among regional alliances, but the key is how to collectively respond to China’s retaliation and minimize damage in the future, as the country has already experienced from THAAD issue. Taking this situation into account, the carefully designed package to continue regional alliance network in Asia and to strategically response to the rise of China.  This includes flexible security network, a solid collective mechanism to respond to China’s potential retaliatory measures, and China’s coercion, and well devised division of labor in jointly responding and cooperating with Asian allies.     Quotes from the Paper US-China Strategic Rivalry and the US strategy                   These days China, in US strategic thinking, is perceived as pursuing hegemonic power not only in Asia, but also globally. Anti-Chinese sentiment following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has fueled this opinion. China’s relatively quick economic recovery adds to the concern over the rise of China. Chinese intrusions into major disputed territories including the South China Sea are in-creasing, and China continues to expand its global presence by supplying global public goods in many areas especially for global health. Challenges posed by China today make the US more nerv-ous than during the 2008 Financial Crisis. During the campaign years for the presidential election, the US China policy has been heavily politicized and is emerging as an important electoral agenda with other overwhelming domestic political issues.   South Korea’s position and the future of cooperation with the United States As South Korea’s critical interests lie in inter-Korean reconciliation and peace with complete denu-clearization of North Korea and South Korea’s economic development influenced by close interde-pendence with China, the US-China rivalry puts South Korea in a very difficult position.   North Korea’s Strategy after the Hanoi summit 2019 After the Honoi no deal in February, 2019, North Korea has searched for a new strategy to further its position both domestically and in dealing with the United States and south Korea. North Korea’s speeches and actions since the breakdown of the February 2019 Hanoi Summit should be interpret-ed from a perspective that encompasses North Korea's survival strategy based on its three revolu-tionary capabilities. Chairman Kim Jong-Un, at the First session of the Fourteenth Supreme People’s Assembly, gave a policy speech under the title of “On Socialist Construction and the Internal and External Policies of the Government of the Republic at the Present Stage,” which adhered to the basic principles of the three revolutionary capabilities.   North Korea in 2020, and the future task of South Korea and the United States North Korea’s effort to break through the impasse in 2019 is facing an even more difficult phase with the global spread of COVID-19 in 2020. It faces practical limitations in increasing its domestic and international capabilities. The improvement in inter-Korean relations over the past two years was expected to contribute to the strengthening of its domestic and international capabilities but has failed to yield any significant developments. North Korea even blew up the Inter-Korean Liason Office, which was built under the auspices of the Panmunjom Declaration of April 27, 2018.   The Prospect of North Korea’s denuclearization under the Biden administration and South Korea’s tasks Given these backdrop, North Korea policy of the next US Biden administration is likely to be very critical for the future negotiation for denuclearization of the North. Biden’s approach, so far, can be summarized as follows: first, principled pragmatism which will be the guiding line for bottom-up approach with North Korea will prevail; second, cooperation with South Korea and other East Asian allies will be essential in accomplishing denuclearization of North Korea; third, to prevent further development of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is important with a view to the ultimate purpose of complete denuclearization; and fourth, human rights in North Korea will be an essential concern for the Biden administration.       Author’s Biograph Young-Sun Ha is chairman of the board of trustees of the East Asia Institute. He is also a profes-sor emeritus at Seoul National University’s department of political science and international relations. Ha currently serves as a member of the senior advisory group for the Inter-Korean Summit Talks Preparation Committee. He also served as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era, president of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and research fellow at Princeton University’s Center for International Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His recent books and edited vol-umes include A New Perspective on the Diplomatic History of Korea, World Politics of Love: War and Peace, U.S.-China Competition in the Architecture of a Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific; Korean Peninsula Among Big Powers: 1972 vs. 2014, Complex World Politics: Strategies, Principles, and a New Order, The Future of North Korea 2032: The Strategy of Coevolution for the Advancement, The Emergence of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century, and A New Era of Complex Networks in Korea-Japan Relations. He received his BA and MA from Seoul National University and his PhD from the University of Washington.   Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and a Professor of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his PhD in international relations at Northwestern University in the United States, and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. His main research interests include international political theory, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsular affairs. He is the co-author of The Korean War: Threat and Peace, and the author of a number of publications including Are Politics Moral and Internation-al Politics in East Asia: History and Theory.  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Jung H. Pak addressed that the continued US-China rivalry has weakened China’s willingness to cooperate on major security issues including North Korea’s denuclearization, while attempts to expand its influence on the Korean Peninsula and reduce US influence in Northeast Asia have increased. Furthermore, China's influence on the security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula has also been boosted by the enhancement of relations with North Korea in 2018, the convergence of interests with China, North Korea and South Korea, and the Trump administration's precarious approach. In order to coordinate strategic understanding between China and South Korea amid consistent effort in regional and global level on North Korean denuclearization, the author points out that the US should take a multilateral approach instead of unilateralism that has been practiced during the Trump administration without outstanding progress. In order to achieve this plan, the US should consider launching and regularizing the trilateral talks with China and South Korea. The US, South Korea and China need to confirm the goal of North Korea’s denuclearization, and the need to implement strong sanctions to prevent nuclear proliferation. Moreover, these countries need to develop a roadmap for negotiations to provide both carrots and sticks in the North Korea’s verifiable denuclearization efforts. At the same time, they need to study on how economic cooperation can increase human enhance, inflow of information into North Korea and integrate North Korea into the regional economy.     Quotes from the Paper   Introduction                   China is seeking to weave engagement with North and South Korea to try to increase its influence over the Korean Peninsula, including on the North Korean nuclear issue, and weaken the perception of Washington’s relevance in the region as it seeks to establish its regional dominance. Chinese pres-ident Xi Jinping almost certainly sees opportunities to make progress on those goals, given the stalemate in U.S.-North Korea nuclear talks and the significant fissures that have opened in U.S.-South Korea ties under the Trump and Moon administrations.   Warming ties to Pyongyang, after a rough start After seven years of icy ties during which high-level exchanges came to a near standstill, Beijing and Pyongyang have jumpstarted robust diplomacy, trading high-level party and military delega-tions and encouraging the growth of economic cooperation. From 2018-2019, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un met five times, including Xi’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2019, the first time a Chinese head of state visited North Korea since 2005.   Beijing’s motivations Yet Xi’s efforts to grow closer to Kim, despite the latter’s highly provocative actions in late 2017 and disregard for China’s preferences, reveal Beijing’s longstanding preferred approach for dealing with North Korea, one that places a premium on stability, puts off denuclearization to a distant fu-ture—or perhaps even accommodate North Korea’s nuclear weapons status, as former U.S. diplomat Evans Revere has suggested—and stresses economic inducements rather than pressure. Using the momentum of summitry that was unleashed by the unprecedented meetings between President Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the latter’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile testing, Beijing has sought to amplify its call for reduction of sanctions pressure on Pyong-yang, putting it at odds with U.S. policy.   Beijing’s view of Seoul While Xi has visited Pyongyang in 2019, he has yet to go to Seoul (as of November 2020), suggest-ing that Beijing is placing a higher priority on building ties to Pyongyang and that tension remains after South Korea agreed in 2016 to deploy THAAD, the U.S. missile defense sys-tem, in response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016. Beijing opposed the THAAD deployment as a threat to China’s security, and in retaliation, implemented an unofficial economic boycott against South Korea, which cost the smaller country $7.5 billion in losses in 2017 alone, compared to Chi-na’s self-inflicted losses of $880 million.   Trying to drive a wedge in the U.S.-South Korea alliance Even as Beijing sought to punish Seoul for its alliance with Washington, Chinese leaders saw mounting signs of deepening U.S.-South Korea cleavages. President Trump has repeatedly criticized the alliance, threatened to end the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, blustered about military action against North Korea, without regard to the potentially devastating impact on South Korea, demand-ed an exorbitant 400% increase in host nation support for U.S. troops stationed on the Peninsula, and hinted at a desire to withdraw U.S. troops.   A wary North and South Korea likely to limit Beijing’s influence  As of late 2020, China’s ties to both Koreas are stable, though tensions exist under the surface. While there appears to be a troubling convergence of interests between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Seoul, mutual suspicion and fundamental differences in national priorities will limit China’s ability to press Pyongyang and Seoul to yield to its preferences.   Implications for the U.S.-South Korea alliance In the near to medium term, Beijing is likely to seek to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula, even if it means putting off the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization to the distant future. To do so, Chinese leaders probably will emphasize the need for “security guarantees,” relaxation of sanc-tions implementation, and discourage U.S. or South Korean actions—such as military drills or criti-cism of the North’s human rights violations—that have the potential to trigger North Korean ire, but which also threaten China’s interests. Moreover, to mollify Kim Jong Un, China since late 2018 has been easing trade restrictions, to the frustration of U.S. and the United Nations officials who have been trying to keep sanctions pressure on North Korea.     Author’s Biography Jung H. Pak is a senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies at Brookings Institu-tion’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. She received her doctorate from Columbia University in U.S. history. Her research interests include the national security challenges facing the United States and East Asia, including North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the regime’s domestic and foreign policy calculus, inter-nal stability, and inter-Korean ties. She is also focused on developing interdisciplinary forums to bolster regional dialogue on counterterrorism, nonproliferation, cybersecurity, and climate change. Her recent publications in-clude Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator.

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} 편집자 주 본 스페셜리포트에서 이동률 EAI 중국연구센터 소장(동덕여대 교수)는 미국의 중국 체제 압박 배경과 갈등의 요인을 설명하고 바이든 행정부의 대중국 체제 압박 전망과 과제, 이러한 미중 경쟁이 한국에 주는 함의를 제시합니다. 저자는 한국이 한반도 문제라는 특수성 때문에 미중 갈등의 영향에 취약하다고 말하며, 심화되는 미중 경쟁 속에서 전략적 유연성을 강화하여 상황에 따라 국익을 최대화할 수 있는 선택지를 모색해야 한다고 강조합니다.   ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   1. 서론 미국과 중국 간 대립이 무역에서 시작해서 급기야 체제와 이데올로기 영역으로까지 확장되면서 최악의 상황으로 전개되고 있다. 미국이 중국 체제와 이념에 대한 공세를 펼친 것은 비단 트럼프 정부에 국한된 것은 아니다. 냉전기는 물론이고 1989년 천안문 사건 직후에도 미국은 중국에 대한 경제 봉쇄를 통한 평화연변(Peaceful Revolution)을 시도했다. 냉전이 종식된 이후에도 매년 최혜국대우(MFN) 연장 중국의 인권, 신장(新疆), 시짱(西藏, 티베트) 문제와 연계시키는 전략을 지속해왔다. 그럼에도 트럼프 정부의 중국 체제에 대한 압박은 기존과는 차원이 달랐다. 일단 미국 공세의 범위와 정도가 역대급이다. 그리고 중국의 국력이 미국의 턱밑까지 추격해오면서 세력 경쟁의 국면에서 전개되었다는 점에서 특별하다. 중국도 미국의 예상 밖의 전면적인 고강도 압박에 당혹해 하고 있다. 미국과의 갈등이 무역에서 시작해서 기술, 환율 등으로 확장되는 상황에서도 중국은 미국과의 갈등이 패권 경쟁도 세력 경쟁도 아니라고 주장해왔다. 그런데 코로나19 책임론을 놓고 공방을 벌이는 과정에서 미국이 중국의 공산당 체제와 핵심이익에 대해 전면적 공세를 펼치면서부터는 중국에서도 미국과의 세력 경쟁, ‘신냉전’의 초기 단계 진입에 대해 우려하는 목소리가 나오기 시작했다. 그럼에도 중국의 입장에서는 체제 문제의 경우 맞대응 할수록 중국 체제의 내재적 취약성을 국제사회에 노출시킬 수 있다는 딜레마가 있다. 그리고 무역, 금융, 첨단기술 등 경제분야와 달리 맞대응할 수 있는 수단도 많지 않으며 체제와 가치대결에서 우위를 확보하기도 쉽지 않다.   미국과 중국 간의 체제 대립은 미국 바이든 정부에서도 지속될 것인가? 미국 민주당 정부는 전통적으로 대외정책에서 인권, 민주주의, 글로벌 규범을 중요시 해왔다. 바이든 당선자는 이상의 가치를 자유민주주의 국가, 동맹국과의 협력, 다자주의 참여를 통해 실현할 것임을 강조해왔다. 바이든 정부에서도 중국과 체제와 가치 문제를 둘러싼 갈등은 불가피할 것임을 시사해주고 있다. 특히 일인 중심의 권위주의 체제 강화라는 새로운 시도를 감행하고 있는 시진핑 정부의 입장에서 공산당 체제에 대한 미국의 공세에 대응 수단도 많지 않지만 타협의 공간도 넓지 않다. 중국은 미국의 공세에 직면하여 대내적으로는 결집과 단속을 강화하고, 대외적으로는 우호국가의 외연을 확대하여 반(反)중국의 국제연대 형성을 억지하는 외교에 주력하는 우회적 대응에 주력하고 있다. 즉, 중국은 미국의 체제 압박에 강하게 반발하면서도 가능한 한 체제 경쟁의 국면으로 확전하는 것은 회피하면서 내부적으로 체제 단속과 집권 정당성 확보에 주력하고 있다. 결국 트럼프 정부에 이어서 향후 바이든 정부가 미국의 어려움에도 불구하고 중국의 체제 취약성에 대해 집중적으로, 지속적으로 압박하고 그에 따라 중국이 현실적으로 어느 정도로 체제 위협을 인식하는가 여부가 양국관계 미래에 중요한 변수가 될 것이다.     ■ 저자: 이동률_ EAI 중국연구센터 소장. 동덕여자대학교 교수. 중국 북경대학교 국제관계학원에서 정치학 박사학위를 취득하였으며, 현대중국학회 회장을 역임하고 현재 외교부 정책자문위원으로 활동하고 있다. 주요 연구 분야로는 중국의 대외관계, 중국 민족주의, 소수민족 문제 등이며 최근 연구로는 “한반도 비핵, 평화 프로세스에 대한 중국의 전략과 역할,” “1990년대 이후 중국 외교담론의 진화와 현재적 함의,” “시진핑 정부 ‘해양강국’ 구상의 지경제학적 접근과 지정학적 딜레마," “Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea,” 《중국의 영토분쟁》(공저) 등이 있다.   ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원·연구실장            문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209) j.baek@eai.or.kr     [EAI 스페셜리포트]는 특정 주제 하의 논평들과 연구 회의의 결과물을 모아 기획·편집한 보고서입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} 편집자 주 본 스페셜리포트에서 김헌준 고려대학교 정치외교학과 교수는 규범부문에서의 미중 양국의 전략을 분석하고 미국 대선에 따른 중단기 전망과 한국의 대응을 제시합니다. 저자는 미중 양국이 인권과 민주주의 규범에서 갈등을 보이는 가운데 한국이 보편적이고 국제적인 원칙을 일관성 있게 추진하고, 두 국가와의 양자관계보다 다자주의를 추구해야 한다고 제언합니다.    ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   I. 들어가며: 미중 관계와 규범 경쟁 국제관계에서 2010년 이후 가장 중요한 요인은 미중 관계이고, 2010년대를 특징짓는 것은 미중 간 다양한 부문에서의 경쟁과 갈등이다. 특히 시진핑 등장 이후 중국은 아시아와 세계에서 외교, 경제 및 군사 영역에서 도전적이고 단호한 모습을 보였고, 이는 중국이 미국 주도의 세계 질서에 도전할 수 있는 충분한 잠재력과 의지를 갖고 있음을 보여줬다. 이에 대해 미국도 쇠퇴론에도 불구하고, 정치, 경제, 군사 및 문화 등 여러 영역에서 국제적 영향력을 행사하고 있고, 이는 트럼프의 미국 우선주의(American First) 구호 아래에 중국에 대한 다방면의 노골적인 압박으로 나타났다. 남중국해 인공섬 건설과 미국의 항행의 자유 작전, 미(美)구축함 디케이터(USS Decatur)와 초계기 P-8에 대한 중국의 위협, 통상 분쟁과 계속된 협상, 화웨이(Huawei)사건, 홍콩 시위와 천안문 30주년을 둘러싼 민주주의와 인권에 관한 설전 등 시진핑과 트럼프 시기 두 국가의 관계는 상당히 나빠졌다. 바이러스의 기원과 정보 공개 투명성 문제와 이와 관련한 책임론, 국가 배상에 관한 논의, 세계보건기구 분담금 문제 등으로 코로나 19는 이미 나빠진 양국 갈등을 급속히 증폭하고 있다. 이 글은 다양한 갈등의 지점 중 규범(가치·이념) 분야를 다룬다. 국제관계에서 규범이란 국제정치에서 적절한 행동이 무엇인가에 대해 국가들이 가지고 있는 집단적 기대로 정의된다(Katzenstein 1996, 5). 중국이 근대 국제질서로 편입된 19세기 이후, 중국과 서구 열강 사이에 규범의 교류, 경쟁 및 갈등은 항상 있었다. 이 상호작용은 2차 세계대전 이후에는 미중 관계로 주로 나타났다. 냉전기에 양국은 비동맹주의(non-alignment), 인도적 개입, 국제원조, 신국제경제질서, 핵-비확산문제, 인권, 주권, 민족주의, 개발, 군비축소에 관한 규범을 두고 국제적으로 경쟁했다. 냉전 종식 이후에는 보호책임(responsibility to protect), 유엔 안보리 개혁, 개발 협력(official development assistance), 재난 대응, 기후변화, 대(對) 테러리즘, 인권, 민주주의, 발전모델, 반부패, 거시경제정책에 관한 규범을 두고 경쟁하고 대립했다. 물론 이 양상은 미국과 중국 사이에 주로 나타났지만, 중국은 다양한 부문에서 영국, 독일, 프랑스 등 유럽의 주요국들과도 관계를 맺어왔다. 이들과의 관계는 많은 경우 미중 경쟁이나 갈등의 양상과 유사한 형태였지만, 대화와 관여를 중요시하는 유럽은 결이 다른 접근을 하기도 했다. 규범과 군사, 정치, 외교, 전략과의 관계는 이미 1976년 저비스(Robert Jevis)의 『국제정치의 인식과 오인』에서 논의됐다(Jervis 1976). 규범은 정당성, 합법성, 도덕성 등 ‘당위성 의식(sense of oughtness)’ 혹은 ‘적절성 논리(logic of appropriateness)’의 영역이다. 19세기 신념으로서 민족주의의 막강한 영향력에서 볼 수 있듯이, 합리성을 뛰어넘는 정당성의 힘은 강력하고 지속적이다. 같은 이유에서 모델스키(Modelski)는 세계 리더십 변화에 있어 탈정당화(delegitimation)가 실질적 전환인 탈중심화(deconcentration)에 앞서 일어난다고 보았다(Modelski 1987). 흥미롭게도 저비스는 정당성 문제가 전쟁의 주요 요인인 적대감을 일으킨 사례로 냉전 초기 미중 관계를 예로 들었다. 미국은 한국전쟁에 개입한 중국의 선택이 정당성이 없었다고 판단했고, 이후 중국을 호전적 적대국으로 보기 시작했다는 설명이다. 정당성에 근거한 판단은 일관성(consistency)의 추구를 통해 군사, 안보 등 다른 분야와 밀접히 연결된다(Jervis 1976, 121). 따라서 미중 간 규범 경쟁은 이해관계에서 비롯된 무역/기술 경쟁을 정당성 갈등의 차원으로 확대·재생산해 결국에는 군사/안보 갈등을 촉발할 수 있는 요인이다. 규범(가치·이념)의 영역은 광범위하므로 상호 밀접하게 연관된 인권과 민주주의에 집중한다. 인권과 민주주의는 냉전기부터 양국 사이에 첨예한 대립이 있던 문제이다. 1989년 톈안먼 사태가 대표적이지만, 그 이전과 사건 이후부터 지금까지도 첨예한 갈등이 있었다. 톈안먼 사태 이전부터 미국은 티베트와 신장·위구르 자치구 등 소수민족 정책, 종교의 자유, 학문과 양심의 자유 등에 대해 중국의 인권과 민주주의 개선을 촉구해왔다. 같은 시기, 중국도 미국의 시민권(Civil Rights) 운동, 인종 차별 및 불평등, 인도차이나 전쟁 중의 학살 등에 대해 맹렬히 비난했다. 현재에도 중국의 신장·위구르 엄격한 통제 정책과 홍콩 민주화 요구에 대한 대대적 탄압, 미국의 인종 갈등(Black Lives Matter), 사회보장 정책과 코로나 19 감염병 대처 등을 둘러싸고 양국은 비난을 주고받았다. 또한, 인권과 민주주의는 보호책임, 발전모델, 경제정책, 반부패 등 양국이 대립하고 있는 다른 규범과도 밀접히 연결돼있다. 따라서 인권과 민주주의를 둘러싼 갈등 양상을 보면 다른 규범의 상호작용도 이해하고 전망할 수 있다. 이 글은 다음과 같이 구성된다. 첫째, 미중 양국의 전략을 보기에 앞서 미중 규범 경쟁에 관한 일반적 두 가지 오해를 밝히고 해명한다. 둘째, 미국의 전략을 살펴본다. 우선 전체적 전략의 개요를 보고, 시진핑-트럼프 시기에 미중 관계의 규범 부문에서 전략이 사용된 실질적 사례를 분석한다. 셋째, 같은 방식으로 규범 부문에 있어 중국의 전략을 살펴본다. 역사적으로 규범 관련 외교를 지속해 온 미국과 그렇지 못한 중국과는 지식의 불균형이 있다. 이를 위해 많이 알려지고 연구된 미국 전략보다 그렇지 않은 중국 전략 부분에 약간 많은 지면을 할애했다. 마지막으로 미국 대선에 따른 중단기 전망과 미중 경쟁 구도에서 한국이 취할 수 있는 정책과 그 이유를 제시한다.     ■ 저자: 김헌준_ 고려대학교 정치외교학과 교수. 서울대학교 외교학과를 졸업하고 미네소타(Twin Cities) 대학교에서 정치학 박사학위를 받았다. 세인트올라프 대학(St.Olaf College) 초빙조교수, 그리피스 대학(Griffith University) 부교수를 역임하였으며 주요연구 분야는 국제 규범 및 제도, 국제인권 및 윤리이다. 최근 저서 및 편저로는 《평화적 세력전이의 국제정치》(2015, 공저), The Massacres at Mt Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea (Cornell University Press, 2014), Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 등이 있다.   ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원·연구실장            문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209) j.baek@eai.or.kr     [EAI 스페셜리포트]는 특정 주제 하의 논평들과 연구 회의의 결과물을 모아 기획·편집한 보고서입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.