EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No.42   Author Patrick Koellner is director of the Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies. He is also a professor of political science at the University of Hamburg. Email: [email protected]. Internet: http://staff.en.giga-hamburg.de/koellner         Abstract   Analyses of the shape and functioning of systems of political rule need to address informal institutions, which exist alongside and can relate to formal institutions in various ways. In this paper, I first discuss some analytical foundations of the study of such institutions. I then suggest that a focus on political regimes — understood as the configuration of formal and informal institutions shaping and reflecting the access to and the exercise of political power — can be particularly useful for analysing the shape and functioning of autocracies. Finally, I use such a regime focus to study the Chinese Communist Party and its leadership succession process, which is characterised by increasing institutionalisation and complementary as well as substitutive relations between formal and informal institutions.   Introduction   Over the past twenty years, it has become increasingly acknowledged that political science has to address not only formal but also informal institutions, as well as the relations between the two. The fact that interest in informal institutions has significantly grown since the early 1990s is no coincidence. The manifold political, economic and social transformation processes occurring in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union; the end of the Cold War; and other local developments have not only opened up new opportunities for relevant observations but have also underlined the empirical importance of informal institutions in the context of such processes and beyond.   Together with the insights generated by recent research on formal entities such as political parties, elections and parliaments in autocracies, the analysis of informal institutions promises substantial potential for understanding and explaining the shape and functioning of authoritarian systems of political rule. Against this background, I set out to achieve two aims with this paper. First, I want to delineate the importance of informal institutions in authoritarian and other systems of political rule. By way of introduction, I briefly discuss why the study of informal elements in politics matters. Thereafter, I present some conceptual and broader analytical foundations of the study of informal institutions. Second, I show how a focus on political regimes can guide an institutionally oriented analysis of the shape and functioning of authoritarian and other systems of political rule. I then illustrate such a regime focus with reference to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, more specifically, the issue of political succession at the top of the country’s state party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In a brief final section, I summarise the main points of this paper.   Informal Institutions in Politics   According to Harold Lasswell, the central question in politics is: ‘Who gets what, when, how?’ The authoritative allocation of political goods of a material and immaterial nature —including political offices — can take place in different ways. In liberal democracies, formal institutions are of central importance in this context. They demarcate in a transparent and enforceable manner the areas of responsibility, the duties and the powers (and limits thereof) of central political actors as well as the procedures involved in political deliberation and decision-making.   Following a broad understanding of institutions, such formal institutions are comprised of rules, norms and agreements — regardless of whether they are fixed (i) in terms of laws, organisational statutes, treaties and other legally binding documents or (ii) in the form of customary law including tribal, clan and other indigenous law. A different modus for arriving at political outcomes consists of the establishment and subsequent use of informal (i.e. not legally framed but not necessarily illegal) inter-subjectively shared relational structures, behavioural and procedural modes, which are often only known to the ‘insiders’ involved. When such structures and modes are not used in an arbitrary or random manner but are based on rules, norms and agreements, we are faced with informal institutions.   Formal and informal institutions are not mutually exclusive. In practice, both types of institutions are used and, indeed, often combined in different kinds of systems of political rule. Even consolidated democracies, having experienced numerous free and fair elections as well as peaceful changes in power, host various informal institutions alongside their better-known formal counterparts. The strength or efficacy of both formal and informal institutions depends substantially on their stability and enforcement, which — in turn — are based on how much political actors value these institutions.   The basic interest accorded by political elites and other political actors to the use, maintenance and expansion of more or less institutionalised informal relational structures and behavioural and procedural modes can be easily explained in rational terms. Informal relations and practices open up room for manoeuvre beyond formal institutions, which can be quite rigid and often require high transaction costs. Formal institutions can also involve obligations in terms of accountability and transparency that not all political actors gladly submit to. The use of informal relational structures can increase the control and steering possibilities of ruling elites beyond and in addition to extant formal institutions. Such institutions can thus help to accumulate and to retain power. The purposes and the kinds of informal relational structures and behavioural and procedural modes used by political actors are affected by the specific systemic political context. For example, in autocratic ‘predatory states’, in which the state’s resources are looted by the ruling elite, material benefits can be maximised through the usage of informal relational systems and practices. Also, where there is no (or only rudimentary) rule of law — as is the case in autocratic and some hybrid political systems — rulers do not have to fear sanctions when using informal institutions that are clearly illegal, such as corruption.   In the following section, I address some basic analytical foundations of the study of informal institutions, which are also relevant for analyses of such institutions in autocracies. In this context, I also address the possible relationships between formal and informal institutions...(Continued)

EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No.39   Author   Min Ye is Director of the East Asian Studies Program and Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. She earned B.A. at Beijing University, M.A. at University of South Carolina, and Ph.D at Princeton. Her specialization includes China politics, comparative political economy, and Asian international relations.   Min Ye’s teaching and research interests include foreign direct investment policies and regional integration in East Asia. Her dissertation examines how economic liberalization in developing countries is shaped by external linkages and domestic interest group politics with a focus on economic reform in China and India since the late 1970s. In studying Asian regionalism, she centers on China and examines how local governments and transnational corporations serve as the driving force for regional cooperation in East Asia.   Ye coauthored (with Kent Calder) The Making of Northeast Asia, Stanford University Press, 2010. She has published articles in various journals and presented papers at professional conferences. She is the recipient of various grants at Princeton, including the Bradley Scholarship and Bobst Peace Foundation. External grants include Japan ’s Millennium Education Scholarship and the Pacific Forum Fellowship in Hawaii. She has been a visiting fellow at Waseda University in Japan, Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing, SAIS John Hopkins University in Washington DC, and Rajiv Gandhi Foundation in New Delhi.         Abstract China has become an influential source of foreign direct investment in the last decade. The growth coincides with a series of regulatory reforms governing China’s outbound direct investment (CODI). Current analyses of CODI and its regulatory environment are largely missing in the literature on China’s political economy, however. This woking paper studies the new regulation of CODI and explains distortion and disjuncture in CODI, particularly the under-representation of private companies, the market-defying geographic and sector concentration, and generally low profitability of China’s outbound investment. The paper uses statistics published by Chinese government and international organizations, as well as a number of interviews at investing companies.         China has the world’s second largest economy and largest accounts surpluses and is becoming an important source of global foreign direct investment. Chinese investors’ footprints have spread to 188 countries on the globe. Yet more publicity than prognosis has been offered in studying CODI. In the former category, the U.S is home to much criticism of investing China, stressing the strong role by the central government. It has been argued that, Chinese companies, due to their government connections, not only create unfair competition to investors of other home origins but also are “Trojan Horse” with unwanted challenge to norms, economy, and security in receiving nations. Such critiques and fears underlie American public opinion and politicians’ position on China’s corporate investments in the U.S, directly leading to the defeat of Chinese oil company CNOOC’s bid for Unocal in 2005, Chinese IT maker Huawei’s bids for Sprint, 3Leaf, and many other big contracts in the past five years. The high publicity, however, has not examined how China’s home institutions have shaped CODI and whether government connection strengthens China’s aspirant companies abroad.   On prognosis, two empirical works, both published in The China Quarterly, are particularly worth re-accounting here. Kevin Cai published the early study of China’s outbound investment and found that by 1997 China was already a leading investor among developing countries and at the time the Chinese government was yet to announce any encouraging policies toward outbound investment. Cai finds, for example, the Chinese share of outward FDI stock among developing economies increased from 0.5 percent in1985 to 6.4 percent in 1996, after only Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan in the developing world. By analyzing the sector and geographic distribution of China’s outbound investment, as well as the motivation of investing companies, Cai concluded that CODI’s patterns were “generally similar to those from other developing and developed market economies.” Indeed, Cai used a general FDI theory, the Dunning theory, to account for China’s rapid progress in outbound investment.   At the time of publication, Cai was optimistic, and argued that three factors would ensure China’s continual improvement in outward FDI. First, Chinese economy has performed quite well and will continue to grow and create very favorable background conditions for Chinese companies going abroad. Second, the Chinese industrial structure has been upgrading significantly and will continue to do so, making Chinese companies more competitive. Third, an increasingly strong political commitment on the part of the Chinese government to further liberalize its policies and to promote outward investment, in pursuing “world class” industrial-commercial conglomerates, “will surely be conducive to the further development of Chinese outward FDI.”   Confirming Cai’s optimism, Eunsuk Hong and Laixiang Sun published a 2006 article in The China Quarterly, investigating China’s “going out” strategy and companies in exploring global markets. They remarked, “in parallel with success in attracting inward FDI, China has achieved initial success in implementing its ‘going out’ [zouchuqu] strategy, which encourages domestic enterprises to play a part in international capital markets and to invest overseas.” In the early 2000s, Chinese companies scored many gains in overseas market. Haier, after succeeding in the U.S, acquired the microwave division of Japan’s Sanyang and formed strategic alliances with Sony and Toshiba. Lenovo acquired IBM’s notebook division in 2004. Other cases included Konka (color televisions), TCL (multi-electronics), Jianlibao (beverage), Tsingtao (beer), Galanz (microwave), and others. Hong and Sun’s overall assessment of CODI was similar to Cai’s 1997 conclusion, “Generally speaking, China’s outward FDI is similar in character to that of other third-world multinationals.”   Hong and Sun meanwhile stress the importance of government policies, especially the “going out” policy announced in the Tenth Five-Year Plan in 2001. Although no clear regulatory documents were inaugurated in connection to the policy, visible changes took place, according to them. Government officials in charge of screening and approval changed their attitude and became friendlier to commercial investment overseas, aiming to acquire resources, technology and strategic assets acquisition, and at the firm level, companies were increasingly interested in reputation and brand building, and in innovative investment mechanisms and financing channels. These trends, Hong and Sun argue, “will continue to deepen in the future,” as the government continues to liberalization outbound investment policies and companies make internationalization an imperative to acquire strategic assets and proprietary knowledge in developed economies...(Continued)

EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No.38   Author Yuan-kang Wang is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Western Michigan University. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago, and was an International Security Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. Wang specializes in international relations, East Asian security, and U.S.-China relations. His research examines the nexus between international relations theory and historical China. He is author of Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (Columbia University Press, 2011), which examines the influence of Confucian culture on Chinese grand strategy, use of force, and war aims. Wang has published articles on peripheral nationalism in China, nationalist mobilization during Taiwan’s democratization, and U.S. extended deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.             Much has been written about China’s rise, but few analysts have examined the issue from a historical perspective. Short-term analyses, important as they are, lack the depth and breadth of longitudinal studies. Both the academic and policy communities are in need of a long-term view of the impacts of a rising power in East Asia. As we assess the influence of China’s rise on East Asia and beyond, what can we learn from the past? Can international relations (IR) theory offer guidance? East Asian history contains rich, yet mostly untapped, deposits of empirical data for IR scholars to build and test their theories. Employing IR theory, this article examines the experience of the latest East Asian regional hegemon, Qing China (1644-1912), and uses insights gained from the research to shed light on China’s broad international behavior today.   The central question is two-fold: How does a state become a hegemon in its region of the world? And once it becomes dominant, what strategies does the hegemon employ to maintain supremacy in the international system and minimize resistance by lesser states?   In the aftermath of the Cold War the field of international relations began an intense debate about balance of power theory. Realists and their critics have argued over whether balances of power recurrently form in general, and specifically whether a balancing coalition against the United States, the current hegemon, will emerge. Some argue that the “unipolar moment” of American preponderance of power will be short-lived due to the tendency of states to balance power, while others consider that American primacy will be enduring because the balancing mechanism is weak. An important but oft-neglected question is how a hegemon maintains, and prolongs, its leading position in the system. The focus on power balancing, however important, only tells half the story; it neglects how states pursue power and maintains dominance. Classical realist Hans Morganthau sees international politics as a “struggle for power.” Offensive realist John Mearsheimer views “maximizing relative power” as the primary behavior of states. A domination-seeking state can maneuver to expand its power while preventing a counterbalancing coalition from forming. In contrast to strategies of resistance, strategies of domination have received scant attention in the international relations literature. This is unfortunate because domination, along with resistance, is an integral part of international politics. International relations theory should seek not only to analyze a state’s decision to resist and balance power, but also to explore how a state becomes dominant and maintains hegemony.   The People’s Republic of China inherited much of the territories of the Qing empire. The Manchus of the Qing dynasty expanded from a small area in present northeastern China to become “the most successful dynasty of conquest in Chinese history.” The territorial reach of the Qing empire more than doubled that of its predecessor, the Ming dynasty. The Qing conquered vast swaths of territory and became a regional hegemon. It established a hierarchical tribute system to manage its foreign relations. For foreign polities, interactions with the Qing followed tributary “rules of the game.” The Qing empire was a multiethnic state comprising Manchus, Han Chinese, Mongolians, Tibetans, Uighurs, and other minorities. Qing China enjoyed two centuries of preeminence in East Asia, with lesser states deferring to its power. It was not until the Opium War in 1839 that Qing power was substantially challenged.   The next section proposes a theory of hegemonic management. I argue that a hegemon will expand political interests abroad and establish rules of the game for the system. I then examine the Manchu state-building process, conquest of China, consolidation of conquest, and westward expansions. Upon becoming the regional hegemon in Asia, Qing troops marched westward and conquered a vast swath of territory in Inner and Central Asia, doubling the size of Ming China. To dictate the boundaries of appropriate behavior, the Qing adopted the tributary rules of the game to govern diplomatic interactions between Asian polities. Finally, I discuss the implications of this study for understanding China’s rise today.   A Theory of Hegemonic Management   The term “hegemony” is used in different and confused ways. Some use it interchangeably with “empire,” others consider it as a form of legitimate authority, and still others views hegemony as morally repugnant. In this article, I adopt a narrow definition of “hegemony” and distinguish it from “empire.” Hegemony rests on material power. For a state to be a hegemon, there must be a preponderance of military force over other political actors in the system. John Mearsheimer defines hegemon as the great power that dominates the system and enjoys so much military supremacy that "no other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it." Except for the hegemon, there are no other great powers in the system. In addition to military superiority, hegemony is also about possessing a preponderance of economic resources, such as raw materials, capital, market access, and productive capacity. These economic resources are necessary to support the hegemon’s military capabilities. Having preponderant power, however, does not mean that the hegemon will always get the outcome it prefers, but it certainly creates unprecedented opportunities to do so. The emphasis on material capabilities does not rule out the social dimension of hegemony, such as authority, legitimacy, status, or prestige. These social aspects do not operate in a vacuum; they are usually derivative of the power relations underlying interactions among political units. Material resources are the necessary condition for a hegemon to exercise authority, enjoy prestige, or generate legitimacy. Compared to non-material factors, material power has more causal weight in producing the desired outcome.   Hegemony should be distinguished from empire. Hegemony is about possessing an overwhelming power advantage over others. A hegemon’s military power and wealth must be “stronger than all second-ranked powers acting as members of a counterbalancing coalition.” An empire, on the other hand, is about relationships of political control. It is the rule exercised by one political actor over subordinate ones in order to regulate their external and internal behaviors. A state can have an empire without itself being a hegemon. For instance, Britain had an overseas empire in the nineteenth century, but its land power and share of world GDP was far from hegemonic. The United Kingdom built a large formal empire, covering nearly a quarter of the world’s land surface, while indirectly ruling parts of Asia and Africa through local potentates. Yet, it was “never truly hegemonic.” In contrast, the United States was a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, but its direct imperial reach was much more limited, covering only fourteen dependencies throughout the world, about one-half of one percent of the world’s land surface. A hegemon can have a small formal empire, or none at all, but it can still exert significant political influence in the system. Hegemonies require more material capabilities than do empires. Compared to empires, regional hegemony is more difficult to achieve, but it is still possible. Recent examples of regional hegemons include the Mughal dynasty in South Asia (1556-1707), the Qing dynasty in Asia (1683-1839), and the United States in the Western Hemisphere (1900-present)...(Continued)

Jaewoo Choo is a professor of Chinese foreign policy at the department of Chinese studies, Kyung Hee University.         It is already a daunting challenge to predict Xi’s foreign policy stance and outlook for Xi has been in the office for less than a month. The article will attempt to read Xi’s foreign policy by making references to public remarks, statements, addresses, and records of talks by Xi and other members of the standing committee of the Politburo during the past couple of years. Contents analysis approach is possible for the availability of such documents to public. Furthermore, they are sufficient in quantity for Xi alone has travelled overseas for more than fifty occasions and received countless foreign visitors since his nomination as a successor to Hu in 2008. Of the seven members, Xi, Li Keqiang, a number two man in the standing, and Wang Qishan have also had chances to express their perception of the world, China’s changing international profile, and their own discourse on China’s foreign policy. Others while in the office at local level also have had chances to receive high-level foreign guests and travel abroad, but the scope and focus of their public talks do not expand beyond the local level.   The article will first discuss the historical implications of Xi’s ascendance to the leadership so as to saturate our curiosity and anxiety to learn early where and in what fashion Xi will lead his country in the foreign policy realm. Xi and his colleagues’ perception of the world affairs and China’s international profile will be inferred from their public statements. Based on this understanding the article will attempt to forecast what position Xi’s leadership will hold on some of the thorny issues to China’s national interests, ranging from US-China relations, territorial disputes in South China Sea and East China Sea, US-South Korean alliance in the context of containment, North Korea’s possible missile launch to Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), China-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and China-South Korea-Japan trilateral FTA. In the last part of the article will conclude with some thoughts on South Korea’s policy to China and the challenges confronting South Korea.   Historical Importance of Xi’s Rise   Unlike in the past, has the world never been so anxious to learn early about the direction of a new Chinese leadership’s foreign policy. The unprecedented level of anxiety can be reasoned by the context of the occasion in Xi’s succession. The context of such occasion itself bears much significance to world politics as well as China’s own domestic politics.   From China’s own domestic political perspectives, Xi rose to the occasion in which China expects to be at a critical stage of its development. It is conceived to be a strategically critical opportunity, an opportunity that China must seize to achieve the second goal of China’s economic reforms and open door policy. That is, realizing a so-called “Xiaokang” society (an affluent society) in 2020. Granted his tenure to be two terms (2012-2022), Xi has the world of responsibility on his shoulder.   However, Xi’s ability to seize the occasion has been widely questioned by the alleged power struggles inflicted by one of the major political scandals in the history of People’s Republic of China (PRC). The subsequent purge of the son from the first general revolutionary family, Bo Xilai, and his clan only gave rise to the surmounting suspicion on Xi’s political basis within the party and his ability to seize power. Uncertainties seemed to have loomed larger than ever on the transition question, inviting skepticism on his relations with his predecessors who are supposedly to have much say in the formation of the collective leadership at the top.   From international perspectives, China’s global profile has made a quantum leap-like jump in recent times. China became a number two economic power in 2010, surpassing Japan. It has also successfully displayed its economic prowess following the global financial crisis in 2008, flexing its economic muscles in the right way by making significant contributions to the stability of world economy. In return, China was able to successfully garner more voting power stakes in the world financial institutions including the World Bank and IMF. Hence, regardless its likings, China is now often dubbed as one of the great powers or so-called “G-2” with the US.   Secondly, China’s rapid rise in the international profile also gave a drastic rise to the change in power configuration and therefore structure in East Asia. East Asian states are now conscientious of predominant regional actors, i.e., China and the US, in professing their foreign policy. Conversely, China is never been more challenged by America’s check and balance efforts in the foreign policy realm. Lastly but not least, it is largely because China and the US will have to resume the relationship and policies that were left off by the leadership change in both countries. The story is soon to be picked up where it was left - and it already has with Obama’s visit to Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar (November 17-20) immediately following his successful re-election. As both China and the US assert no significant change but continuity of the ‘current policy,’ it is most likely the US will continue its “pivot to Asia” policy as the cornerstone of Obama administration’s Asia policy, and China most likely continue to seek ways to defend its so-called ‘core interests’ in East Asia.   For the aforementioned reasons, the political succession in China at this particular juncture has drawn more attention from the world than ever. The second decade of the 21st century will be predicated on how China will conceive and respond to US pivot to Asia policy. Will China be immensely intimidated? Will it find ways to secure peace and stability and realize its national goal of becoming a xiaokang society or an affluent society? How will it manage its relations with the US for this end? These are some of the critical questions not only to China’s interest but also that of the world.   Some Propositions for Better Reading Xi’s Foreign Policy   Given the historical meanings of the leadership change in Beijing, the following propositions are offered for a better understanding on the prospective Chinese foreign policy in Xi Jinping’s era.   First, it is most likely that Xi will inherit the legacies of the fundamental framework and policy lines of his predecessors, and therefore, few changes are expected. Xi’s leadership will continue to view the theme of the current world affairs to be peace and development, while upholding long-held fundamental foreign policy principles including the five principles of co-existence, independent diplomacy, non-alliance, anti-hegemon diplomacy, and peace diplomacy. Newly adopted principles such as New Security Concept, peaceful development, and harmonious world will remain effective also. The backbone of China’s regional policy is to be good and friendly neighbor policy. However, in practice, Xi’s foreign policy in the first couple of years will be framed by the basic stance undertaken by Hu. In other words, Xi’s government will be persistent in seeking cooperation to realize mutual interests with others while stand adamantly against any foreign interference on the so-called China’s ‘core interests.’   Second, Xi will become much more fast moving with founding efforts on what I would term ‘uniquely Xi’s own feature of foreign policy.’ His group of leaders was reduced to seven members from what it used to nine for the past two decades for enhancing the effectiveness of collective decision-making process purposes. Moreover, all seven members share a similar world outlook and an attitude highly appreciative of China’s peaceful rise. Never the less, they are not hesitant in expressing displeasure against foreign criticisms and what they conceive as excessive demands, and are assertive and aggressive in fending them off.   Furthermore, Xi’s simultaneous succession of both Secretary-General of the party and Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), coupled with the pending presidency next year, will enable him to pursue his own foreign policy and strategy unlike his predecessors. In other words, Xi is better equipped with a greater room for maneuverability in making a foreign policy. Hu Jintao, for instance, on the other hand, was not able to deliver his own foreign policies (e.g. “peaceful development” and “harmonious world”) until it was confirmed he be transferred of the Chairmanship of the CMC from his predecessor, Jiang Zemin. Although Hu succeeded the party leadership in 2002, it was not until his succession to the CMC leadership was pronounced in 2004 that Hu finally was emancipated from the political shadows of his predecessor and became independent in pursuit of his own policy. It was then his government delivered successive foreign policies, one that contained the direction of the policy as in “Peaceful Development” and the other the goal, a “Harmonious World.”   Last but not least, continuity over changes in the foreign policy of the last government will prevail at least for the short term in Xi’s government because both China and the US is skeptic about one another’s strategic intentions of the policies that are to resume. While many expect the new leadership in China will have to focus on surmounting domestic challenges vis-à-vis the US, however, their argument on the likelihood of the rise of conflict between the two states is gaining grounds as few changes but continuity are conceived to follow as evidenced in recent Obama’s diplomatic maneuvers and Hu’s address at the transfer of power to Xi.   Although Hu emphasized China would be a more responsible state and make greater contribution within its capacity, he also firmly asserted on the needs to protect China’s core interests and so has the US Secretary of the State on fundamental interests of the US in Asia in recent times. Hence, it is most likely that they will remain unyielding and undodging to the pressure to compromise some of the strategically thorny issues such as currency devaluation, freedom of navigation issues in South and East China seas, and US resumption of pivoting in Asia policy. It is in large because these issues directly concern the fundamental strategic interests of both nations, so-called ‘core interests’ of China and ‘fundamental interest’ of the US. It would otherwise be a landmark achievement if they can compromise on any of them.   Xi’s Similar Perception but Different Approaches   Luckily for us, there are many documents we can refer to for our understanding of Xi and his colleagues’ perception of the world, China’s international profile, and Sino-US relations. Xi has travelled more than 50 times abroad since his designation as the successor in 2008. He also received many top foreign leaders in Beijing. There were also many occasions in which he would deliver public speeches, addresses, congratulatory remarks at world gatherings, and other occasions alike. From these references, we may be able to draw how China’s new collective leadership perceives the current world affairs including China’s position and relations with the US. In the same vein, we can detect what we can call some uniquely own of the new leadership and distinguish how it will be different from the past one.   The followings are some of the important features in the new collective leadership’s outlook of the world.   First, Xi, like his predecessors, sees the main theme of the world is peace and development. He will not deviate too much, however, two points are noteworthy. One is that Xi rather professes the other side of the ‘peace coin,’ i.e. security. Whereas Hu was prolific in advocating the importance and value of world peace to the world development, Xi takes a rather realistic approach in addressing the world peace problem in the context of security. Furthermore, in addition to inheriting the same world outlook, Xi elaborates the logic behind the causal relationship of security and development in his own fashion. Xi claims that security will be secured through development; security will be sought through equality, implying equality’s prerequisite status of security; security will be guaranteed through mutual trust; security will be guaranteed by cooperation; and security will be pursued by innovation, implying innovative approaches and measures in solving international conflicts. Such logic indicates that Xi may be more security-oriented in his outlook of the world than his predecessors.   Second, with respect to China’s international profile, Xi has a conception of China being one of the “great powers,” alas not in the same connation of a super power but rather a big power. Xi disclosed it during his meeting with Vice-President Baiden last February. It was the first time that a top Chinese leader to define China’s states as such. Xi has justified his conception on the basis of China’s past and future economic role. In the past five years, Xi explained, China has made a consistent contribution of more than 20% to the growth of world economy. In the next five years, Xi predicts, China will import more than 8 trillion US dollars of goods and make an annual overseas investment of 100 billion US dollars.   Thirdly, Xi does not at the same time forget to defend China’s long-held definition of its global status, i.e. the largest developing nation. His logic of argument rests upon the realistic aspect of Chinese economy that China’s ranking in the world’s GNP per capita standing is well beyond number ninety and there are still 150 million Chinese living under poverty, i.e. one US dollar per day of living expense. Fourthly, Xi recognizes that China is now an important prerequisite to peaceful solution of international conflicts.   Lastly, Xi calls for a new paradigm for China-US relations, i.e., so-called “New Type of Great Power Relations (Xinxing daguo guanxi).” Although the idea was originally presented by Hu during his visit to the US in January 2011, it had different connotation for it was rather out of concerns on peaceful rise of China. Xi, on the other hand, sees it as an effective means to accrue a greater respect for being one of the big powers from the US. It is inferred from his pronouncement that mutual respect is the profound basis on which the “new type of great powers relations” should be built upon. Xi further elaborates that such a new type of relations is predicated upon mutual respect of the two countries. Furthermore, such mutual respect demands both nations to be objective and rational in each other’s strategic intentions while respecting respective party’s interest and stipulating cooperation as the legitimate means to solve international conflicts.     What to Expect from Xi’s Leadership in 2013   (1) On China-US Relations   How will the relations work out between the US with a re-elected leader and China with a newly elected one?   In the post-cold war era, and since China began to limit the office term of its top leader on five years, there’s not a case in which the leaders of the two nations were inducted into office roughly at the same time, only off by a couple of years in most cases as seen in [Table-1].   [Table 1] Chronology of the US and China Leaders Inauguration in the Post-Cold War Era     There seems a consistent pattern of cycle merging from changes of leadership and highs and lows in the relationship. In the first term of a newly formed government of both countries had a strong propensity to go about as hard as possible in their dealings with each other. Once they were re-elected, there seems to a great turnaround in their approach to each other, i.e. a much more accommodating, cooperative, and friendly one. Then a critical set of questions naturally arises: Will the pattern uphold for the second term Obama?; Will a newly elected leader of China pursue a much harder stance on the US?; Or will President Obama retreat to a more accommodating and cooperative stance on China from a hard line policy that he adopted in the second half of his first term?; Will Xi be rigid and inflexible as if to attest his grip on new leadership and power?   Xi and Obama both recognize the importance of cooperation and potential for mutuality aspect of the interests the two countries pursue in the bilateral relationship. Moreover, the two believe that as long as the relationship will be predicated on these common bases, convergence in their policy outlook can be facilitated. On the contrary, it seems that they are also highly aware of the underlying conflicts that could facilitate them to delineate from such cooperative stance.   The former perception lies in the following facts inferred from their perception of each other. First, China and the US highly recognize the value of cooperation as the basis of their constructive partnership. Both understand that without one the other cannot solve international problems confronting one or the world. Cooperation hence becomes the coupling medium of a relationship that has potential to evolve into a constructive one. Second, the relationship must be built on the notion of interworking. Constructive interworking of the bilateral relationship could advance mutual interests of the two nations. Already the trade volume of the two nations standing at 440 million US dollars, it reflects the economic structure of the two is complementary and mutually benefiting while mutually ‘win-win’ in nature. Hence, both recognize such mutuality facilitated by common interests can inherently advance towards more constructive way of development. Third, future relationship should fully reflect important historical lessons. History defines common interests as an inherent generator that advances the relationship forward, while the three joint statements that realized the normalization of the relationship is the institutional guarantor of the relationship’s development.   The latter recognition is manifested in some of the obvious different, yet controversial, outlook of the two nations in approaching East Asia and its order. First, the US, while placing a high value on cooperation with all regional states, still extends priority to cooperation with its allies. The US is, and will remain, persistent in its reliance on the allies as the means of preserving its predominance in the region. It will treat other regional members as an auxiliary yet complementary cooperation partner to promoting its strategic interests. China and Russia, for instance, are perceived to be so in Washington. Second, value-oriented approaches upheld by the US in its pursuit of multilateralism may strain cooperation with China and instead function as the cause of trouble for the two nations. The US is adamant with its insistence that the basis of regional order be founded on the values that it has consistently proclaimed, that is, market economy/free trade, democracy, liberty, and freedom. While the economic side of American value is well embraced by China, however, politico-social values are not. Lastly, US persistent demand of China to share more responsibilities for regional as well as world affairs is a source of conflict for the two nations.   While the two nations realize the criticality of cooperation by the two to effectively solve international conflicts, pressure on China to be more responsible in cooperating with the US will continue to be burdensome. US demand for further devaluation of Chinese currency Yuan, for instance, has been troubling and burdensome to decision-makers in Beijing. Others issues also, including the notion of freedom of navigation as advanced by the US in recent times, gave rise of conflicts in the area where cooperation between the two is highly sought.   (2) US Pivot to Asia Policy   China obviously is very much intimidated by the US determined efforts to continue in pursuing pivot to Asia policy. There is a growing perception in both Chinese government and military that it is designed to contain China, let alone engaging it. China on numerous occasions has already expressed its discomfort of America’s encroachment through relocating its military to the region as well as strengthening of its alliance s ystem. Unlike the US, China only sees the military and security aspects of US pivot to Asia policy, nothing more or nothing less. It is therefore skeptical about US strategic intentions behind the policy. Xi’s government will share a similar, if not the same, perception on this particular matter. Hence, it will be defensive in its posture against America’s return effort to Asia as well as aggressive and assertive in defending its national interests including the core. As a result, it will be equipped with a never ending justification for its continuous efforts in modernizing its military forces, especially the navy and air forces.   (3) US-Japan-South Korea Alliance   As a part of America’s scheme of returning to Asia, Beijing is sensitive about the developments in US alliance in the region. Since 2010, it has been persistent in expressing its concerns on the strengthening of the alliance at the bilateral level. For instance, China once criticized US-South Korean alliance as a legacy of the Cold War and therefore the negative effect to the stability and peace in the region. It has also been overtly concerned with US response to Japan’s call of strengthening the alliance and expanding the scope and range of Japanese defense perimeter at the wake of territorial disputes over Senkaku Island (or Diaoyudao in Chinese) with China. Against this background, the US invited South Korea to join as an observer of the joint military exercise vis-à-vis with Japan, raising alarm in Beijing on the possibility as a founding cause of trilateral alliance. China has not been too explicit about South Korea’s participation in the US-Japan joint military exercises and Japan’s in the US-South Korea ones. It is, however, most likely that Xi’s government will not withhold itself in one way or the other. Considering their unrestrained way of expressing emotions and opinions on what they believe is unjust, unfair, and irrational, especially when it is related to the endeavors of foreign states, the new leaders will not hesitate to be vocal in delivering their concerns and dislikes. They will counteract in one way or the other, either by strengthening relations with traditional socialist states in the region or by aggressively modernizing China’s defense program.   (4) North Korea’s Missile Test   North Korea was allegedly ready to, and did on December 12, launch a missile test to commemorate the anniversary of the passing of the late leader Kim Jung-Il at the directive of his son and successor, Kim Jung-Eun. China has been quite proactive in taking the initiatives in communicating with Pyongyang, if not to dissuade it, to express its concerns on this issue. China has repeatedly stated that North Korea’s missile launch would be harmful to the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula, one of the ultimate goals in China’s Korean peninsula policy. To convey this concern, China has also dispatched an envoy following the party congress in November. It is doing so may be out of the concerns on the consequences of the North’s missile launch. Hence, it offered economic aid promise as a reward if the North were to show some restraint. International community and public opinion have been critical of North Korea’s planned action for its potent violation of the current UN sanction 1718. They have also been calling for more sanction to be placed upon the North’s missile launch. China at this stage is particularly not interested in seeing a challenge merging from its lone ally’s ignorance of warnings from the world. If North Korea were to carry out the missile launch as scheduled, it will significantly undermine China’s strategic position both at global and regional levels. It will be distasteful to China’s national interest. Hence, China has been compelled to take proactive actions to keep the North from launching the missile. In the end, it has expressed its disappointment but again demanded the world to show restraints as the UN Security Council was called upon to discuss a possible sanction. Insisting on no further sanctions necessary for there is already enough of it, Beijing will remain persistent with calls for talks and dialogue as solution, and perhaps oppose any more severe action on its lone ally. South Korean government, in collaboration with the world community, must seek ways to talk to China first and not North Korea as to what should be done if the North continues to violate the sanctions that it agreed following the North’s nuclear tests.   (5) North Korean Nuclear Problem and Resumption of the Six-Party Talks   China has been consistent with its efforts in calling for the resumption of the Six-party talks. In the recent discourse of the North Korean nuclear problem, both Hu and Xi have expressed the importance of the resumption of the talks to peacefully solve the problem on numerous occasions. Whether their statements have been mere rhetoric or not will have to remain for further observation with Xi’s government. Xi and his colleagues have emphasized the value of re-opening the talks even in unconditional terms. As long as Xi’s government will uphold and adhere to the principles of so-called “New Security Concept,” it will continue to seek opportunities to resume the talks for its firm belief in no better alternatives. It will be a daunting challenge to Xi’s government. If the new leadership will want to succeed, it will have to fulfill some critical diplomatic prerequisites. That is, China will have to be conflict-free in its relations with the concerned parties of the talks. However, at this particular moment, China’s external challenges alone will not be too serving to its own cause in pursuit of the six-party talks. China will enhance its efforts next year for it will be the 10th anniversary of the talks that is so meaningful to its multilateral diplomacy, however, it won’t be fruitful as long as it remains in conflict with the concerned parties over other externally challenging issues. At the end of the day, sanctions on North Korea will remain effective, if not furthered, for the foreseeable future unless China can induce it to the talks or create an environment conducive for the talks to hold at the cost of conceding much patience and tolerance against external challenges to its strategic interests, even the core interests.   (6) Territorial Disputes with Japan and Implications for Korea   China’s nationalistic stance on the territorial disputes against Japan will only stand pending on the next leadership in Japan. China has felt the mounting external pressure to not to aggravate the situation. America’s repetitive confirmation on its commitment to the alliance with Japan and warnings to China to restrain its action in recent times has successfully had a constraint effect on both China and Japan from direct physical confrontations. While the US has never been explicit about its position on the issue but the demand for a peaceful solution, it nevertheless remained firm with its warnings to both parties, repetitively demanding both to show restraints. At the same time, South Korea was experiencing political confrontations over its own territorial dispute with Japan, known as Dokdo (or Takeshima in Japanese) and China wanted to utilize it to its own advantage by expressing its sympathy to South Korea’s hard fought efforts against Japan. China also perceived South Korea’s isolation of Japan on international stages such as APEC of last September as an opportunity for collaboration to solve the origin of the problem, i.e. straightening of the distorted history by Japan. As manifested, China will facilitate the dispute for not only its own nationalistic interest but also for the alignment purposes against Japan. Nationalistic interests will extend to the enhancement of CCP’s legitimacy at times of difficulties. Alignment aspiration against Japan will be sought at any time if deemed necessary so as to garner support to the claim of its core interest. Hence, Xi’s government will most likely to manipulate the dispute whenever it rises to the occasion for the justification of uncompromising and unyielding nature of its core interest.   (7) China-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA)   Xi’s leadership will highly likely want to conclude a free trade agreement with South Korea in the first term of office. The tenure of incoming president of South Korea will eclipse with Xi’s leadership for the next five years. Hence, if China persists with its efforts as it has with the resumption of the negotiation that was once called off, it realizes the prospect for the conclusion of FTA with South Korea can never be better. China’s aspiration for this end has been addressed in an explicit manner in the past. Xi and his colleagues have also expressed their desires during their visits to Seoul. On surface, they extol on the merits of a FTA with South Korea as mutually beneficial and winning to the cause of sustainable development of both countries. What will facilitate the FTA on China’s end is the strategic value embedded in the economic ties bounded by the agreement. As demonstrated in China’s precedent FTA cases, Beijing is not motivated by economic gains from FTA. Its counterparts, instead, are the economic beneficiary of FTA with China. Never the less, China has a strong interest in FTA for economic benefit reasons and political purposes. An affluent Chinese society will have a greater appetite for consumption and the government must saturate it at an affordable cost. At the same time, FTA can function as a strategic hedging tool by which Beijing can exercise greater leverage over heavily dependent states in political and diplomatic discourse. Although dependent states of China may not be an ally of China, they will have to take China factor into a serious consideration when making a strategic choice. Furthermore, as aggressive as China is in pursuit of a trilateral FTA with South Korea and Japan, a successful conclusion of a FTA with South Korea will offer China an upper hand in its negotiation with Japan. On the contrary, it could have an opposite political effect on Japan. It could further isolate Japan if it does not comply with China and South Korea’s aspiration for regional economic integration. Moreover, a FTA can offer China to occupy a niche in South Korea’s strategic calculation as well as in its alliance relationship with the US. It is feasible in part because 98% of South Korea’s GDP depends on trade revenue, and of the 98%, 24.2% ($220 billion) comes from the trade with China in 2011. A FTA with China in its strategic calculation will rise to a dilemma to South Korea’s alliance with the US. Hence, Beijing’s new leadership will be aggressive in its pursuit of FTA with South Korea in the foreseeable future.   (8) Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)   Xi’s leadership will not be too concerned about the prospect of TPP becoming a regional economic entity with an isolation effect of China. Many American experts uses TPP to justify the non-military aspect of America’s pivot to Asia policy, often treating it as a political leeway in emphasizing the multi-dimensional perspective of the policy. China is, however, not enticed by the justification in large part because there has never been a regional case outskirt of the American continent in which the US succeeded in institutionalizing the regional economic integration process. At the global level, the US was effective in institutionalizing global financial institutions where global governance based on a global leadership was required At the regional level, however, the US has no successful stories but one that is geographically limited to its own perimeter, i.e. American continent. NAFTA, for instance, was merely driven by fundamental changes in US industrial structure and hence by sheer economic interests. In the same vein, neither is China much interested to be part of institutionalized regional multilateral establishments. While Beijing does not hesitate to take part in the institutions at global level, it has much reservation on those at the regional level, especially when they are against its principles of regionalism and multilateralism. These principles are based on the notion of ‘openness’ and ‘loose’ formation, implying a framework of institution that is not legally-binding and exclusive. Furthermore, another reason for China’s indifference is attributed to US persistent insistence that the multilateral institutions that it pursues must be value-oriented. Such orientation is not appealing to China and is conceivably designed to exclude it. However, even if China were to embrace the founding values designed by the US, there is not a case in which the US succeeded with institutionalization of such institutes with American values. APEC is the case in point and so are ARF and EAS in the non-military realm. Beijing therefore will not be too intimidated by the progress of TPP and it being excluded because already most of the members are heavily dependent on China.   Implications for South Korea’s Newly Elected Leader   Regardless of the party affiliation, the newly elected leader of South Korea will have to be prompt in reading the foreign policy stance of President Obama and Secretary-General Xi. As of now, many claim that there will not be too much change in President Obama’s East Asian policy but much continuity will prevail. Many Chinese constituencies of Xi also hold a similar view in their outlook of China’s policy towards East Asia in general and the Korean peninsula in particular for the next five years. They all based their argument on mounting domestic socio-economic problems confronting the two leaders. They claim that they will prevail in the policy order of priority over other issues including foreign affairs. To South Korea, however, all these claims and justifications could be misleading. They are misleading in a sense that no change will mean continuity of the policy with a great potential for conflict.   While the US persistent position on ‘no change’ will only demonstrate the prevalence of “Pivot to Asia” policy, and simultaneously, China will be adamant in defending its ‘core interests.’ Pivot to Asia policy prerequisites strong alliance in the region and will continue to push the US to seek ways to strengthen the alliance. Although the US also perceives one viable way to facilitate its strategic interests in the region is promoting multilateralism, however, it is a multilateralism dictated by American values. Composition of such multilateralism at this stage can only be made up of American allies and no one else. Whether China will be embraced in America’s regional architecture based on multilateral cooperation will remain to be seen. It will be also a daunting challenge to China if it will want to participate in American multilateralism largely because it is not ready to see its core interest agenda be handled at multilateral level or in the multilateralism context.   In the economic realm, the newly elected president of South Korea will also have to be aware the way Korea generates trade revenue. On the surface, China is South Korea’s largest export market. However, in reality, the final products that are assembled in China with South Korea’s exported parts and intermediary goods are destined to US market where hard currency of South Korea’s export are actually earned. Hence, such trade mechanism only enhances the value of US market to South Korea’s trade. Almost two-third (64.8%) of South Korea’s export to China are for process trade purposes, although China’s export dependency on process trade dropped from 57.4% in 2005 to 35.9% in 2011 as a result of a consistent turnaround efforts in the national economic policy to focus more on domestic consumption. However, South Korea’s market share in Chinese domestic market has remained in the low 30% at 34.1% in 2011. Furthermore, South Korea’s export market share for Chinese domestic consumption stands at mere 5.9% as of November 2012. Although most of the heavily dependent economies on China share a similar trade structure with South Korea, however, two states are exempted. They are the US and Japan and their Chinese domestic market share against stand at 66.7% and 51.7%, respectively. Thus, as long as South Korea’s China trade structure and share in Chinese domestic consumption do not drastically improve, South Korea will have to think hard on such economic issue as the devaluation of Chinese currency.   The foreign policy of South Korea’s newly formed government will have to be under great influence of the bilateral relationship outcomes between the US and China, especially at the early stage of the inauguration years. Hence, following policy suggestions are recommended: First, South Korea’s new government should emancipate itself from polarization in its thinking when comes to its relationship with the US and China, respectively. South Korea’s respective relations with the US and China is no longer played by ‘zero-sum’ game or relativity. South Korea can be free from this long-held perception by the realization that the alliance with the US is a fixed variable. The alliance with the US is not going to vanish overnight. Neither will it retreat to the extent that the efficacy of the alliance will not be felt at both global and regional level. Instead, it will perpetuate as long as the division in the Korean peninsula remains. Hence, there is no erosion in the relationship with the US because South Korea chooses to take a more cooperative stance on China. The US will always be with us. It is not going anywhere.   Conversely, there is no such notion as strengthening of alliance. We cannot be misled by any allegation on the strengthening of the alliance put forward by many pundits. Joint military exercises will continue to remain at the current scale and frequency if not drastically enhanced. Furthermore, there could be a rise in the number of formation for communication channels as witnessed in the recent establishment of “2+2” dialogue comprising of the foreign affairs and defense departments of the two nations respectively, however, it does not extend any military meanings beyond the sheer scale of military strength of the alliance.   Second, South Korea as a middle power should continue its efforts to found more multilateral cooperative channels. China is still a socialist state that holds different values, ideology, political s ystem, social institutions and thus outlook of the world. As long as China remains so, it will be extremely difficult to expect it to embrace the values we cherish in the same context. The only viable way for China to embrace extensively of the values that the rest of East Asian countries all enjoy and respect is to induce it to a greater participation in multilateral establishments that are architected on such values. The more China participates in such multilateral framework, the more it will be acquainted with the values we all share and eventually will embrace them. It will take a lot of patience and hard thinking, however, with strong and proactive collaboration from the regional states, it is not impossible.   Last, South Korea’s newly formed government will have to be highly aware of China’s unswerving tradition ties with North Korea. Many South Korea media depicted Xi Jinping as one of the most knowledge leaders of South Korea, if not pro-South Korea, in comparative context. However, Xi is not the lone decision maker in a collective leadership like China’s. He will be subject to collective bargaining and decision making process. Although he will have the casting power at the final voting, however small or large such power will be, it is important to fully grasp the backgrounds and experiences that help formalize their perception of North Korea and the alliance at individual level if not at the collective one. Such approach is valid largely because a consensus formalized by an individual perception is most likely to converge into a collective one in case of North Korea. At least official statements from the top leadership in Beijing have proven otherwise.   Individual perception is usually formulated through two channels: One is through official visits and the other personal experiences. It has been the tradition since the third generation of the Chinese leadership that when a successor is designated, the first overseas trip arranged for the heir apparent is to Pyongyang. In a way, it is designed to equip him with an opportunity to gain a first-hand experience and understanding of the value of the alliance with North Korea. Xi, for instance, has a family background in his ties to North Korea. His father, Xi Zhongxun, a first generation revolutionary on par with Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai, had a close personal relationship with Kim Il Sung. Xi Zhongxun was one of the Chinese delegates that received Kim at the train station upon arrival in Beijing. The tradition continued in 1983 when Kim Jong-Il made his first non-official visit to Beijing. Others also have had education experience in Pyongyang and extensive economic ties with North Korea in the past. Hence, South Korea’s new leader will have to be much smarter in talking inter-Korean relations and North Korean issue with his/her Chinese counterparts. ■         Acknowledgement The author would like to thank Chaesung Chun and Dong Ryul Lee for helpful comments.

EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No.37   Author Peter Van Ness is a visiting fellow at the School of International, Political & Strategic Studies, in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the ANU. For many years a member of the faculty at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver in the US, Van Ness is a specialist on Chinese foreign policy and the international relations of the Asia-Pacific region. He first went to the PRC in 1972, and he has served as a member of the board of directors of both the National Committee on US-China Relations and the Human Rights in China organization. Awarded grants from SSRC and ACLS and two Fulbright fellowships to Japan, he has taught at four Japanese universities, including Keio University and the University of Tokyo. He has been a research fellow at the ANU, the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, and the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies in Taipei. He is Coordinator of the project on Peace Building, Linking Historical Reconciliation and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia, which has convened five international workshops to date, the most recent at the University of Hawaii in March 2011 on “Avoiding an Arms Race in Space.” Papers from that workshop are available in a special issue of Asian Perspective, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2011.         Introduction   This paper investigates how the moral authority of national leaders in two very different countries in different historical periods collapsed when those leaders, the most prominent in each country, conspicuously linked their foreign policies to a set of fundamental principles which they then violated in practice. I analyse this phenomenon from the perspective of a concept of Civilizer State: a state that claims a civilizing mission in its international relations (Van Ness, 1985).   The first case is Mao Zedong’s successful program of global opposition to US imperialism during the Vietnam War, which involved support for third world revolutions, black radicalism in the US, and student-led rebellions throughout the world, including the one in Paris in May 1968 that almost brought down the French government. The collapse came when Mao met with Nixon in 1972. Maoist radicals around the world simply could not understand how the Chairman would make peace with American “devil.” In the US case, after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, in September 11, 2001, there was a spontaneous outburst of international public sympathy for the United States and support for President Bush, who had proclaimed a mission to bring democracy and human rights to the world. But a combination of the US invasion of Iraq and, especially, the systematic torture of prisoners taken in the President’s “war on terror,” began to deflate and finally collapsed that international support for George W. Bush and the United States.   I have spent my professional life as an academic trying to understand the politics of the People’s Republic of China and its relationship with the United States. After completing a PhD at Berkeley, where I studied with Chalmers Johnson and Joseph Levenson, both of whom had a major influence on my thinking, I published my first book, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, on Beijing’s support for wars of national liberation in the third world. The book came out in 1970, right in the middle of China’s cultural revolution and America’s domestic convulsions over the Vietnam War. Much of my research centered on trying to understand the impact of Maoist ideas, not just in the third world, but also on the student movement in the United States and Europe. Official Washington at the time was deeply worried about China. For example, during the 1960s, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara appeared to calculate that the ideological influence of the Chinese revolution and Maoist ideas constituted a greater threat to American national security than the Soviet Union — at a time when the PRC did not even have the material capacity to cross the Taiwan Strait. However, within days after Mao’s meeting with Nixon in February 1972, that influence collapsed. Maoist radicals around the world were astounded that their revolutionary hero, Mao Zedong, would make peace with the super imperialist Richard Nixon.   My most recent book is Confronting the Bush Doctrine (edited with Mel Gurtov). When Mel and I were working on the book, we mainly wanted to critique the strategic design and the implementation of Bush’s “war on terror.” Evidence of the systematic torture of prisoners by the US had only just begun to surface, and President Bush was still enjoying much of the spontaneous world support prompted by the 9.11 attack on the US. But later as it became clear that none of the purported justifications for the US invasion of Iraq were true, and the Red Cross and other independent authorities began to document in detail the systematic abuse by the US of prisoners held at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and Bagram air base in Afghanistan, moral support for Bush and his campaign against terrorism began to sink. By the time he left office in 2009, the collapse was so extensive that some members of Congress were calling for his impeachment together with Vice President Cheney; and other opponents wanted to convene a war crimes commission.   In these two books, just by chance, I had the opportunity to observe and to write about the peak of the moral influence of Mao and Bush, and then to examine how China and the United States have dealt with each other in the period that followed.   Understanding a Collapse of Moral Authority   My task in this paper is to explain a phenomenon that occurred in two separate historical periods to two very different governments and leaders, but which surprisingly appeared to have very similar effects. How should we try to understand this phenomenon?   First, we are talking about foreign policy, not domestic politics. The role of moral authority is universally recognized as important for successful governance in domestic politics, but it is more contested with respect to its influence on foreign policy. Second, we note how the same message from a head-of-state or foreign minister is likely to be understood differently by a domestic audience as opposed to a foreign audience, and how the foreign policy of any country, especially a major power, has many international audiences, some intended and others not, each receiving a particular message in its own way. For example, among Americans, Mao Zedong’s call for world revolution in the 1960s was perceived by many activists in the anti-Vietnam War movement as a message of support, while for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, it was seen as a threat to US national security.   Foreign-policy analysts often distinguish between so-called “declaratory policy” and “operational policy,” roughly meaning what governments say, compared with what they actually do. What they say is often dismissed as not very important, but in fact declaratory policy often includes important statements of principle, ideological positions, and ethical rationales for operational policy. Mao Zedong during the 1960s and George W. Bush after the 9.11 attack on the US in 2001 repeatedly articulated declaratory foreign policies that had clear operational implications.   Is this just “ideology”? It is indeed ideology, but in addition, Mao and Bush described their countries and their foreign policies as exemplars or ideal models of the ideological position they articulated. Their message was especially powerful for prospective true-believers, those for whom the ideas appeared to provide an answer to their most serious life problems: for Mao, revolutionaries in the third world working to liberate their countries from Western imperialism; for Bush, people hoping for foreign intervention to overthrow tyrants, and activists trying to build democratic societies.   For some, this was almost a religious experience. An example of this kind of commitment, again from a different historical era, is the collection of essays written by prominent Western writers in the famous book The God that Failed (Gide et al. 1950). These writers, all inspired by the 1917 revolution in Russia, had become Communists in the 1930s, but later rejected Communism after Stalin made peace with Hitler and signed the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in August 1939. Their commitment reshaped their lives. Arthur Koestler, for one, was prepared to give up his job as a successful newspaper editor to spend his life in service to the Soviet Union, but then felt betrayed when Stalin made peace with Hitler’s Fascism. Statements of principle or declaratory policies, repeatedly proclaimed by Mao and Bush as the moral foundation of their foreign policies, had this kind of impact for many foreign listeners...(Continued)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 26   Author Jung-nam Lee is associate professor of Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University, Seoul, Korea. Her research interests include contemporary Chinese politics, and focus especially on political transformation and China’s foreign policy. Her published works include: “Outlook on Chinese Foreign Policy in the Coming Era of Xi Jinping from China’s Perspective,” in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 24, 3 (September, 2012); Democracy and China (ed.) Seoul: Asiatic Research Institute Press, 2012; “China’s idea of East Asian Order: A Comparative Study of ‘Harmonious World Theory’ and Sino-centric Tributary System,” in The Korean Journal of International Relations 50, 3 (Spring 2010), “A Critical Analysis of the theory of Chinese‐Style Democracy” International Area Review 13, 2 (Spring 2010), “China’s soft power in East Asia: an estimation based on the outcome of surveys of six countries” in The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21, 2 (June 2009), and a number of other articles in academic journals.         I. Introduction   Since diplomatic relations were established between Korea and China in 1992, the relationship between the two countries has developed rapidly, according to various numerical statistics. In terms of economic exchanges, the countries’ trade volume—which totaled no more than 6.4 billion USD in 1992—increased to 240 billion USD in 2011, multiplying 37 times over and exceeding Korea’s aggregate trade volume with the U.S. and Japan. Last year, the volume of direct investment flowing from Korea to China amounted to 50 billion USD, with the number of Korean firms in China reaching 50,000. China has become Korea’s top economic partner, and according to the 2011 figures, Korea is now China’s third-largest economic partner after Japan and the United States (U.S.), although the figures exclude Hong Kong (Cheong 2012). The number of people travelling between the two countries has also increased apace: from 130,000 people in 1992 to 6,410,000 people in 2011, recording a remarkable 49-fold growth. A total of 130,000 people currently participate in student exchange programs (64,000 Chinese students in Korea and 68,000 Korean students in China) and direct flights run between the two countries 837 times a week (Kang 2012, 5).   The nature of Korea–China relations has also evolved since the “the good neighbor” days of “friendly cooperative relations” at the time when diplomatic relations were first established in 1992; in 1998, the countries announced they would pursue “cooperative partner relations in the 21st century,” and in 2003, a new framework of “comprehensive cooperative partner relations” was inaugurated. More recently, as a result of the Korea–China summits in 2008, the countries’ diplomatic relationship has been enhanced even further, to the level of “strategic cooperation relations”, the highest grade of diplomatic ties recognized by China since 1978 (Lee 2009, 103-108).   However, although Korea–China relations have developed and strengthened without any major hindrances for years—and the two countries have enjoyed a sort of diplomatic honeymoon—conflicts rose to the surface around the dawn of the 21st century. The Garlic Dispute in 1999-2000 put an end to the special honeymoon period for the two countries and relations were normalized based on mutual interests (Chung 2011, 262-286). Thereafter, many diverse conflicts and disputes rose to the surface: the dispute over the history of Goguryeo Kingdom during 2003–2004; the dispute over the Registration of Danoje Ceremony in Gangreung as an intangible cultural heritage site of UNESCO; the negative statement of the speaker of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Department on the Korea–China Alliance in 2008; the conflicts between South Korea’s strong stance against North Korea and China’s comprehensive policy for North Korea; the conflict related to the sinking of the Cheonan warship, and bombing on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010;the murder of a Korean Maritime police officer by Chinese fishermen, the delicate conflict related to the funeral process of Kim Jeong-il at the end of 2011; and the issues concerning North Korean expatriates in 2012. These conflicts have soured the public perception of state relations in both Korea and China and have stood as obstacles to the further development of a healthy strategic partnership between the countries. The results of public opinion polls readily corroborate this claim. As seen in Table 1, people in both countries appear to be recognizing that the relationship between the two countries is not improving, but rather deteriorating (see Table 1).     It is worth noting that early on, the conflicts between Korea and China were mostly economic and cultural in nature, but from 2008, strategic concerns such as the Korea–U.S. alliance, relations with North Korea, and the North Korean nuclear weapons program began to appear as major sources of diplomatic disagreement. In light of these pressing issues, the two countries upgraded their diplomatic relationship to the level of a strategic cooperation partnership to solve strategic issues with mutual cooperation; ironically, conflicts over strategic issues have become the core subjects of dispute between the both countries.   In fact, the two countries of Korea and China have not managed to create a substantial cooperative relationship in the political and diplomatic sense, in spite of their conspicuously successful economic partnership. Although more than 40 summit meetings have been held and military exchanges have been made, summits consisting of reciprocal visits have been made no more than seven times and military exchanges have been made only superficially. The reason why cooperation between the two countries has been weak (in terms of the diplomatic and security sectors) is mainly owing to the presence of a perceptual gap between China’s recognition that Korea still stresses the importance of its relationship with the U.S. concerning its security issues, and Korea’s recognition that China is overly sensitive about the public debate pertaining to the North Korea problem. This gap has been too large for a diplomatic quick fix and has impeded the development of better relations between the two countries (Kang 2012, 5).   With the rapid economic rise of China, the concept of the G2 (“The Group of 2”- the United States and China) has gained international currency, however informally. G2 is the term used to refer to the group of the strongest two countries in the world, U.S. and China, which tackles together political and economic issues in the international community (Bergsten 2008, 57-69; Kissinger 2009; Brzezinski 2009). What may be called the emerging “G2 era,” marked by the renewed and heightened interest of the United States in East Asia, solidly defines the China–U.S. relationship as a key variable and determinant of Korea–China relations. With the onset of the G2 era, the gap in recognition between the Koreans and the Chinese has been reinforced, worsening the relationship between the two nations. As strategic competition has exacerbated between China and the Unites States, the latter nation has tried to contain China by reinforcing the Korea–U.S. relationship. Meanwhile, China has tried to reinforce its relationship with North Korea to maintain security and the status quo on the Korean Peninsula and to secure a strategic buffer zone against the United States. Therefore, whenever strategic issues arise (such as nuclear threats), Korea is suspicious that China takes a loose position to secure the benefit of a buffer zone by maintaining the current North Korea regime, and China, in turn, is suspicious that Korea–U.S. relations plays a certain role in containing China as the United States returns to East Asia.   Therefore, this study claims that, with the emergence of the G2 era, mounting tensions between Korea and China have hampered the practical progress of these two countries’ “strategic cooperation partnership”. For this purpose, I look into the popular perception of current strategic threats and diplomatic challenges in the two countries, analyzing the results of Korean and Chinese public opinion polls. Next, this study observes how such public perceptions affect the recognition of Korea–China relations. In conclusion, this study discusses how, and along what lines, Korean and Chinese perceptions should change to promote the strategic relationship between Korea and China in the G2 era.   II. Theoretical Discussion and Research Methods   1. Public Opinion Polls and the Study of Foreign Policy   According to constructivist theory, the most important factors that comprise social structure are not physical matters, but perceptual ones. Further, the identity of the actors and the benefits they derive in that structure are not given naturally or from the outside, but are developed through shared concepts in the society (Wendt 1999, 1). From this viewpoint, the actors and structures are social entities and they are developed and reproduced through the process of mutual interactions (Chung 2000, 20). Viewed from this constructivist approach, the foreign policy of a country is not determined externally, but is composed of shared concepts in the society. Moreover, through the interactions between international society and domestic opinions, foreign policy is developed and reproduced based on socially shared concepts. From this standpoint, then, it is very important to analyze the direction and characteristics of a given country’s foreign policy by way of public opinion polls...(Continued)

중국은 2003년 “화평굴기”(和平崛起)를 천명한 이래 2010년 국내총생산 기준으로 일본을 제치고 세계 2위의 경제 대국이 되었고, 올해 하반기 새로운 제5세대 지도부로의 이행을 앞두고 있다. 중국의 차기 지도부가 향후 어떤 전략적 행보를 선택할 것인가에 따라 동아시아지역 내 국가들이 맞이할 지역질서는 매우 다른 모습을 띄게 될 것이다. 이에 동아시아연구원은 2012년 8월 20일 대만 국립중흥대학교 차이동지에(蔡東杰, Tung-Chieh Tsai) 교수를 초청하여, “중국 동아시아 정책의 전략적 딜레마와 향후 정책 전망”(中國對東亞區域政策之戰略困境與可能選項)이라는 주제로 제28회 스마트토크 포럼을 개최하였다. 차이동지에 교수는 중국의 부상(中國崛起) 후 현재 중국이 추진하고 있는 동아시아 정책과 2012년 중국 지도부 교체 이후 미래 중국이 선택할 수 있는 전략에 대해 설명하였고 이어서 토론자들과 질의응답 시간을 가졌다. 주요 논의 내용은 다음과 같다.   중국의 부상   ○ 역사상 가장 넓은 행정구역 : 많은 사람들은 한(漢), 당(唐), 청(清)의 영토가 지금의 중국보다 넓었다고 생각하지만, 영토가 통치권(sovereignty), 즉 ‘온전한 통치’(intact control of land)를 의미하는 것을 염두에 둘 때 가장 넓은 행정구역을 거느리고 있는 현재 중국이 역사상 가장 넓은 영토를 보유하고 있다고 볼 수 있다. 티베트를 예로 들자면, 청왕조 당시 중국과 티베트의 관계는 통치의 관계가 아닌, ‘우호적’(穩定) 관계였으며, 티베트는 역사상 처음으로 현재 중국의 지배를 받고 있다고 볼 수 있다.   ○ 국제환경의 변화 : 중국의 부상은 중국 스스로의 노력에 의해 가능했던 부분 못지않게 다음 몇 가지 국제환경의 변화 또한 중요한 작용을 하였다.   1) 1972년 데탕트는 미국과 소련이라는 두 패권국과 동시에 대치함으로 인해 “두 개의 전선 전략”(兩條線戰略)을 채택할 수 밖에 없었던 중국이 그러한 부담에서 벗어나는 계기가 되었다. 1978년 덩샤오핑(鄧小平)의 개혁개방 정책이 남긴 영향력은 엄청났지만, 이는 덩샤오핑 개인의 선택이라기보다 외부환경의 변화로부터 시작된 것이라고 보아야 한다.   2) 2003년 이라크 전쟁 당시 “선택적 전략”(selective strategy)에 의해 중동 지역에 집중하고자 했던 미국은 동아시아 지역의 평화를 원했고, 이러한 미국의 태도로 말미암아 6자회담이 순조롭게 시작될 수 있었다. 이는 당시 동아시아지역의 평화를 유지함에 있어 미국이 중국에게 의지하였음을 보여준다.   3) 2006년까지 지역 내 중국 최대의 라이벌이었던 일본은 고이즈미 총리 이후 평균 1년에 한번씩 총리가 바뀌고 있는데 이러한 일본 정치의 불안정성은 중국에게 커다란 기회를 제공했다.   4) 미국과 유럽 국가들에게 상당한 피해를 입혔던 2008년 세계금융위기 또한 후진타오(胡錦濤) 주석이 세계에서 가장 영향력 있는 지도자 중 하나로 평가되는데 일조하였다.   중국의 동아시아 정책   단기•중기•장기 정책   ○ 단기 : 단기적으로 중국은 동아시아 국가들과 협력을 강화하고 이를 통해 동아시아지역 내 미국의 영향력을 약화시키고자 한다.   ○ 중기 : 외화 보유량은 중국 영향력 증진의 토대가 되고 있다. 특히 세계금융위기를 거치면서 중국이 “지역적•국제적 금융 중심”(regional and global financial center)으로 거듭날 수 있도록 그 위상을 제고하는데 결정적인 기여를 하고 있다. 중기적으로 중국은 먼저 국제무대에서 금융의 흐름을 주도한 후 정치 영역으로 자신의 영향력을 확대해 나가려는 정책방향을 가지고 있다.   ○ 장기 : 장기 정책에 있어서 핵심은 1) “중국식 체제”(China-style system)를 실현하고 얼마나 오랫동안 유지할 수 있을지 여부와 2) “지역 운송망”(regional transportation network)의 확대로 인해 중국이 대외정책 차원에서 다루어야 하는 대상 권역이 정치, 경제, 군사적으로 다원화될 때 이에 어떻게 대비할 것인지에 달려있다.   대외변수   ○ 향후 중국의 동아시아정책에 영향을 미칠 수 있는 대외변수로는 1) 양자 및 다자적 조치로 대중국 봉쇄 네트워크를 구축하고 있는 미국의 정책, 2) 국내정치 불안정으로 인해 중국과 자주 충돌할 가능성이 있는 일본의 행보, 3) 인도 및 태평양 세력과 연대를 강화하고 있는 동남아시아 국가들의 정책, 4) 중국에게 기회이자 도전으로 다가오고 있는 세계금융위기의 향배, 5) 지역 내 민족주의 등을 들 수 있다.   대내변수   ○ 정당성 문제 : 정당성(legitimacy)은 정치적 안정(政治穩定, political stability)의 기초가 되기 때문에 향후 중국 대외정책의 향방을 결정함에 있어 매우 중요한 요소이다. 많은 사람들이 덩샤오핑 서거 이후를 “포스트 덩샤오핑 시대”(後鄧時期)라고 보았지만, 장쩌민(江澤民)과 후진타오는 덩샤오핑이 지명한 지도자이기 때문에 진정한 의미에서 포스트 덩샤오핑 시대는 이번에 등장하는 제5세대 지도부부터라고 할 수 있다. 따라서 새로 등장하는 시진핑 중심의 리더십이 포스트 덩샤오핑 시대에 어떠한 방식으로 정당성의 토대를 확보해 나갈 수 있을지 하는 문제는 다음 지도부가 해결에 나가야 할 결코 쉽지 않은 과제이다.   ○ 사회 문제 : 현재 중국 사회에서 미혼이면서 실업상태에 있는 인구가 2천만 명을 넘어섰다. 이는 기본적인 욕구가 해결되지 않는 대규모 집단이 사회 내부에 존재하고 있음을 의미하는데, 잠재적으로 사회동요의 요인이 될 수 있다.   ○ 중국식 민주주의의 한계 : 중국은 ‘경제에서는 비효율 극복을 위한 적극적이고 질적인 변화를 추구하지만 정치영역에서는 변화를 최대한 절제’하는 “정좌경우”(政左經右)를 추진할 것이라고 강조한다. 그러나 사실 이것이 장기적으로 유지되는 것은 거의 불가능하다. 단적인 예로 중국 공산당은 “반계급”(反階級)과 “프롤레타리아 독재정치”(無產階級專政)를 기본 이데올로기로 삼아 통치를 하고 있지만, 현재 중국 사회에서는 부자 및 부자 2세(富二代)로 불리는 집단이 새로운 계급으로 등장하고 있다. 공산당 이데올로기와 실제 사회 현실 사이의 괴리는 중국 정치가 마주한 가장 심각한 문제이다. 이같은 문제는 사회 내 존재하는 다양한 목소리가 표출되는 것을 용인할 경우에만 해결될 수 있고, 그러기 위해서는 중국이 일당 독재체재를 포기하고 민주화의 길을 걷는 수 밖에 없다.   ○ 인민해방군 : 2012년 제18차 전국대표대회 전까지 중국 내부에서는 정치무대에서 군부의 영향력을 완전히 제거하려는 움직임이 있었다. 그러나 중국이 주변국과 다양한 분쟁에 연루되면서 국가안보가 심각한 문제로 부상했고, 군부 인사 일부가 정치 무대로 들어오게 되었다. 이는 아직 군부가 정치적으로 완전히 제압되지 않았음을 의미한다.    중국이 연루된 분쟁 지역   ○ 북한 문제 : 북한이 스스로 전면적인 경제개혁을 실행하지 않는 한 궁극적으로 북한 문제가 해결되기는 어렵다. 하지만 개혁은 권력 재분배(power redistribution)의 문제를 야기하기 때문에 김정은이 김정일이 시도한 개혁보다 더 획기적인 수준의 개혁을 시도할 수는 없을 것이다.   ○ 댜오위다오(釣魚島) 분쟁 : 중국에게 있어 댜오위다오 분쟁은 서태평양 해양세력과의 경쟁이 걸린 문제이기 때문에 시간이 갈수록 더욱 심각해질 것으로 예상된다. 만약 댜오위다오 문제에서 중국의 입장을 관철시킬 수 있다면 나머지 서태평양 제도 지역 문제 해결에 있어서도 중국이 유리한 고지를 점할 수 있을 것이다.   ○ 남중국해 : 최근 계속해서 부각되고 있는 남중국해 문제는 이해관계가 걸린 여러 나라들의 입장이 팽팽히 맞서고 있다.   ○ 인도와의 국경 분쟁 : 중국과 인도는 오랜 기간 국경 분쟁 문제를 겪어왔다. 특히, 2010년 인도가 히말라야 부근 국경지역에 병력을 대규모로 증강한 이후 국경 분쟁이 지속되고 있다. 이 지역은 티베트와 맞닿은 곳이기에 중국은 예민하게 대응할 수 밖에 없다.   ○ 서태평양 문제 : 서태평양은 한국 서해로부터 동중국해로 이어지는 비교적 좁은 지역에 해당하지만, 많은 배들이 통행하는 지역이기 때문에 이 지역을 두고 중미간 충돌이 일어날 가능성이 있다.   ○ 양안문제 : 만약 대만에서 국민당이 계속 집권할 경우 양안문제는 현상유지 국면을 지속할 것이다.   ○ 중국이 이러한 동아시아 분쟁지역에서 군사적 조치를 취하는 것은 바람직하지 않다. 그 이유는 1) 동아시아지역에서 미국이 연루되어 있지 않은 곳은 거의 없기 때문에 동아시아지역 내 분쟁은 중미 분쟁으로 쉽게 확대될 수 있다. 2) 미국의 군사력을 제외하더라도 동아시아지역 국가들의 군사력 수준은 상당히 높은 편이기 때문에 군사적 조치를 취할 경우 관련국 모두 심각한 피해를 입을 수 있다. 3) 반세기 가까운 기간 동안 동아시아에서는 전쟁이 발발하지 않았기 때문에 지역 내 국가들은 분쟁에 민감하며, 군사적인 조치를 취하는 것을 매우 위협적으로 인식할 수 밖에 없다.   향후 중국의 동아시아 정책 시나리오   ○ 현대 국제관계이론은 서양 국가들의 역사와 전통적인 문제해결 방식에서 비롯된 것이다. 서양과 다른 역사와 전통을 가지고 있는 동양의 현실 문제에 대해 서양의 국제관계이론이 얼마나 적실성을 가지는지에 대해서는 의문의 여지가 있다. 또한 현재 논의되고 있는 국제관계 이론들은 세계화 시대 이전(pre-global era)의 이론이라는 점도 커다란 한계이다. 한편, 중국은 주변국 문제를 다룸에 있어서 천 년을 넘게 이어온 고유한 방식이 있다. 중국이 지속적으로 부상하여 능력 및 영향력의 차원에서 전세계적인 리더십을 발휘할 수 있는 수준에 이르게 되면 중국 나름의 전통에 입각한 정책을 추구할 가능성이 있다.   ○ 시나리오 A : 한 국가 지도자의 정당성은 그 지도자에 대한 지지율과 밀접한 관련이 있다. 민주주의 국가에서 정당성은 제도로부터 온다. 물론 제도적 노력으로 정당성을 구축함에 있어 한계를 보일 때는 종종 주변 국가들과의 분쟁과 같이 강력한 수단(硬手段)을 활용하여 이를 보완하려 하기도 한다. 그런데 애초에 제도로부터 정당성을 확보할 수 없는 중국은 주변 국가들에 대해 더욱 공세적인 조치를 취함으로써 지지율을 끌어올리는 선택을 하기 쉽다. 이런 맥락에서 향후 중국은 주변 국가들과의 충돌을 통해 정치적 정당성을 확보하려는 정책을 취할 수 있으며 이것은 중국 입장에서 가장 적극적인 형태의 정책이라 할 수 있다.   ○ 시나리오 B : 진정한 정당성은 국가 내부로부터 오는 것이기 때문에 정당성 확보를 위해 주변 국가들과의 갈등을 이용한다고 해도 결국에는 한계를 맞이할 수 밖에 없다. 따라서 궁극적으로는 내부적으로 쌓여있는 많은 문제들을 해결함으로써 정당성을 확보해야 한다. 이런 맥락에서 중국 정부는 국내 문제 해결에 집중하기 위해 대외적으로 안정적인 환경을 조성하려 할 수 있고, 따라서 현재 취하고 있는 정책보다 더 보수적이고 협조적인(協調, coordinating) 동아시아 정책을 펼칠 가능성이 있다.   ○ 시나리오 C : 비교적 소극적인 정책으로 중국은 동아시아 문제를 대응함에 있어 대전략을 구축하지 않은 채 개개 사안별(case by case)로 접근할 수도 있다. 이럴 경우 사안의 중요성에 따라 우선순위를 정하고 이에 입각하여 문제를 처리하려 할 것이다(頭痛醫頭腳痛醫腳). 북한문제에 대한 중국의 입장이 바로 이러한 접근법의 전형이라고 볼 수 있다.   ○ 시나리오 D : 가장 소극적인 정책으로는 노자가 한 말 중에 “아무 것도 하지 않는 것이 모든 것을 하는 것이다”(無為而無不為)라는 말처럼 행동하는 것이다. 동남아시아지역 문제에 대한 중국의 대응방식이 전형적인 예라고 할 수 있다.   ○ 현재 중국은 비교적 시나리오 A와 B 사이에서 정책을 운용하고 있는데, 지금으로서는 중국이 앞으로 1-2년 안에 더욱 강경한 대외정책을 선택할 가능성이 높다. 왜냐하면 장쩌민과 후진타오 시대에는 덩샤오핑의 지지에서 비롯되는 정당성을 확보할 수 있었지만 시진핑의 경우는 다르다. 현재 중국 국내정치 상황을 감안할 때 향후 시진핑이 연임할 가능성은 낮아 보인다. 따라서 시진핑은 권력을 유지하기 위해 동아시아지역에서 더욱 공세적인 정책을 펼칠 가능성이 높고 그 구체적인 모습은 재임 후 첫 2년 동안 나타나게 될 것이다. ■         발표자 차이동지에(蔡東杰) 대만 국립중흥대학교 교수는 대만 국립정치대학교 외교학과를 졸업하고, 동대학원에서 석사 및 박사학위를 받았다. 주요 연구관심은 국제관계사, 당대 중국 외교 정책, 동아시아 구조의 변화와 발전, 제3세계 발전 문제 연구 및 양안 관계 문제 등이며, 대표적인 저작으로는 《근대외교사 Q&A》(近代外交史Q&A), 《대만과 멕시코의 민주화 비교》(台灣與墨西哥民主化之比較), 《서양외교사》(西洋外交史), 《중국외교사》(中國外交史) 등이 있다. 현재 <정치학보>(政治學報)와 <명신학보> (明新學報)의 편집위원을 역임하고 있다.   사회자 이동률, EAI 중국패널위원장; 동덕여자대학교 교수   토론자 김애경, 명지전문대 교수 박병광, 국가안보전략연구소 연구위원 이정남, 고려대학교 아세아문제연구소 연구교수 주재우, 경희대학교 교수 한석희, EAI 중국연구센터 소장; 연세대학교 교수

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 24   Author Dong Sun Lee is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. His research interests include East Asian security and international relations theory. Dr. Lee received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago, conducted research for the East-West Center, and served as a visiting scholar at George Washington University before assuming his current position. He is author of Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and International Conflict (Routledge, 2008) and of articles in scholarly journals, including Asian Security, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Journal of East Asian Studies, and The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. He also contributed to edited volumes such as The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press, 2008) and The International Encyclopedia of Peace (Oxford University Press, 2009). His current research focuses on North Korea and alliances of the Asia-Pacific region.       I. Introduction   What will be the character of military relations between China and the United States in 2025? Will they be embroiled in a competition for power or will they have forged a cooperative relationship? If elements of competition and cooperation coexist, what will be the nature of that coexistence, and which aspect will prevail to what degree? This paper aims to answer these questions by utilizing international relations theory and empirical data on the national powers of China and the United States.   This paper has both academic and practical significance. In the year 2025, the United States and China will be the two greatest nations in terms of national power, and their military relations will not only define the basic atmosphere of the Asian security environment, but will also affect the international security order. Given that security problems occupy the core of international relations, changes in U.S.-China military relations could have great ripple effects in economics and other issue-areas. In particular, it could be said that South Korea’s fate depends on the bilateral relations between the United States and China, since they exert the greatest influence over the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, an accurate analysis of that crucial relationship is essential for South Korea’s search for a long-term national strategy enabling the country’s wise adaptation to the international environment and maximization of its national interests. Besides this practical necessity, the central question has an academic importance as well: the future of U.S.-China military relations is one of the most heatedly debated subjects in the discipline of international relations. Schools of thought and individual scholars have offered a variety of projections, seeing this debate as an ideal chance for testing their theories. It is expected that as the passage of time makes new facts available for assessing the accuracy of predictions, it will be possible to distinguish gems from pebbles among numerous contending theories. As eminent philosophers of science have stressed, the process of prediction and verification constitutes the foundation of scientific advances (Lakatos 1976; Hempel 1933). This research has an academic value in that it participates in this process.   I argue that moderate competition will take place between the United States and China by 2025. As Beijing’s regional leadership strategy and Washington’s offshore leadership strategy come into collision, each country will form its own sphere of influence. The United States will remain the leader of maritime Asia by relying on its superior air and naval forces; China with its superior ground forces will be able to establish its leadership in the adjacent continental region, except for Russia and India. Beijing and Washington will engage in competition, particularly over gray zones where the two spheres of influence abut (for example, the Korean Peninsula) and over sea-lanes that both powers need. However, the two states can avoid an all-out power competition, since neither of them will strive for regional hegemony. Also mitigating the competition is the fact that China will accommodate the United States in regions outside of Asia, due to China’s lack of effective power-projection capability.   The rest of this paper comprises five sections. The first section, which presents an analytical framework, lays out key theoretical assumptions and concepts. In particular, this section offers exposition on the elements of national power and interests, as well as a typology of security strategies and military relations. The second section seeks to portray the Chinese and U.S. national interests, drawing upon international relations theory and historical experience. It also examines the past and current trends of national power and predicts future trajectories. Building upon the analysis of national power and interests, the third section predicts the two countries’ security strategies. The fourth part analyzes the nature of military relations produced by the interaction of those security strategies, and considers other factors that are believed to shape international relations. The last section summarizes the research findings and attempts to predict U.S.-China relations beyond 2025.   II. Analytical Framework   U.S.-China military relations are primarily dependent on the type of security strategy each state adopts. The properties of their security strategies will determine the nature of the mutual relations between them. Again, those properties are substantially affected by their national interests and power. The causal relationship is depicted in the figure below.   [FIGURE 1] Determinants of Military Relations     This research assumes that the United States and China will rationally choose optimal security strategies, taking into consideration their given national interests and power. Although policymakers do not always make the best choice in reality, it is relatively rare that they make an irrational decision that diverges widely from the optimal one. Also, the rationality assumption is highly useful for predicting the future, by allowing pertinent simplification of reality. Assuming rational policy decisions is reasonable for this research which aims to predict the future, since it is practically impossible to predict an irrational choice.   1. Types of Security Strategy   It is security interests and national power that mainly determine the nature of security strategy. Other factors including domestic politics may have some impact. However, when national survival is at stake, states will primarily pursue national interests based on their evaluation of national power—the most important policy instrument. Power is defined as military force that a state possesses for self-defense, along with tangible and intangible assets (economic power, population, technology, natural resources, and so on) that can be used to cultivate military power. Among numerous factors comprising national power, military strength (which is readily available for responding to a security threat) is the most important, followed by diverse resources including economic power that are necessary to support military power. Hard power clearly has limitations, and soft power—cultural and ideological attraction—can be useful for security under certain circumstances. However, it is less important than hard power. Therefore, military power can be viewed as the most important factor determining the nature of security strategy...(Continued)