Political “division” is a natural phenomenon in a democracy in which individuals and groups express their opinions freely and coalesce their interests to press politicians. However, “polarization” is a bimodal division of the public into two opposite sides surrounding identity, values, or issues. Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer define polarization as “a process of simplifying politics by presenting either-or-choices to the public, thus consolidating the political field into opposing, increasingly immovable blocs.” [1] They argue that polarization becomes pernicious or harmful for democracy by dividing the electorate into two mutually distrustful camps. Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue maintain that polarization “weakens respect for democratic norms, corrodes basic legislative processes, undermines the nonpartisan stature of the judiciary, and fuels public disaffection-intolerance-violence. [2]   The American public has been studied frequently as a typical case of increasing political polarization. According to the Pew Research Center, [3] between 1994 and 2014, the overall share of Americans who express consistently conservative or consistently liberal opinions on a 10-item scale of political values has doubled from 10% to 21%. Additionally, the ideological overlap between Democrats and Republicans has been reduced as Democrats moved further to the left and Republicans moved further to the right. This development of “ideological silos” in the political attitudes of Americans is accompanied by the increasing antipathy against the opposing party; in 2014, 27% of Democrats saw the Republican Party as a threat to the nation’s well-being while 36% of Republicans saw the Democratic Party as a threat to the nation’s well-being. Moreover, politics got so personal that 63% of consistently conservative and 49% of consistently liberal stated that most of their closest friends share the same political view. People on either end of the ideological spectrum tend to be more politically active and more partisan tied to a political party of their choice. When the public is divided into “us and them” and develops antipathy or even hatred for each other, mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance, two fundamental norms that Levitsky and Ziblatt argue in their book How Democracies Die are a part of a functioning democracy, [4] are endangered.   The emergence of political polarization encompasses existing socio-political cleavages and political entrepreneurs use such cleavages for their political gains. McCoy and Somer [5] studied 11 country cases including the U.S. and concluded that pernicious polarization is not attributable to any specific underlying social or political cleavages. Rather, they argue, it arises when political entrepreneurs pursue their objectives by using polarizing strategies. These strategies include mobilizing voters with divisive and demonizing discourse and exploiting existing grievances.   When we take a theoretical perspective of agency matters over cleavage structure, we need to identify two things. The first is identifying whether mobilizing capability and influence of polarizing agencies are symmetrical or asymmetrical. When opposing political elites reciprocate with similar tactics, a tit-for-tat mobilization is likely to develop an immobile political deadlock. On the other hand, if an opposing camp is sidelined due to its incapability of mobilizing its supporters, the other majoritarian camp can infringe the rights of an opposing camp and bend the rule of law. The second is examining whether political polarization essentially remains to be a tug of war among power elites or political polarization is deeper with vertical alignment between elites and masses in each camp. The latter case can be found in countries where formative social rifts have been placed a long time ago or populist leaders develop affective ties with people. While the ultimate driver of polarization is likely to be politicians and political parties, individuals or groups, aided by their own SNS influence or upward fandom mobilization, are increasing their roles in political polarization. Based on the ADRN webinar on political polarization in India, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, [6] this brief provides a snapshot comparative report on the roots, agencies, and features of political polarization.   India: Polarization Based on the Hindu Nationalism Led by BJP and Modi   India is a case of asymmetrical populist polarization. The two powerful agencies are Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Modi had risen to power in 2001 when he became the Chief Minister of Gujarat state in western India and used his Gujarat development model as a success story. Aided by Modi’s populism, the BJP, a right-wing party formed in 1980, has expanded its power. Currently, the BJP makes up 56 percent of the Parliament of India while the major opposition party Indian National Congress (INC) makes up less than 10 percent.   The super majoritarian BJP electoral power and the popular leadership of Modi illustrate the effectiveness of their mobilization strategy in utilizing Hindu nationalism. Niranjan Sahoo, a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, writes that the primary source of political and societal polarization in the country has been a fundamental question of nationhood, and adds that this poses an existential threat to pluralist democracy in India. [7] The question of should India be a secular country or a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation) has great national identity driven discursive power that can divide the public into binary camps. Given that more than three-quarters of the population is Hindu, Hindu nationalism dominates other cleavage markers such as caste differences. However, this religious national identity could have been managed in the past through the boundary of plural democracy. The rise of caustic polarization using Hindu nationalism became conspicuous after the BJP won a landslide victory in the general election of 2014. Under the ferocious frame of national vs. anti-national, the BJP further expanded its seats in the 2019 election as the liberals and seculars were pushed to the defensive and as the middle ground was started to disappear. The Indian case shows how the question of nationhood based on the dominant religious identity develops a strong bond between populist politicians and people within a dominant camp.   The features of Indian polarization are ugly and can be characterized by the growing culture of intolerance and hatred between two camps, simplifying politics to religiosity, weakening federal institutions and the rule of law, stereotyping and demonizing minorities, and impunity for violence against them. Starting from 2015, the lynching incidents of Muslims by Hindu locals became more frequent. Ramesh Thakur writes that the “othering” of India’s Muslims by Hindu bigots has portrayed them as fifth columnists loyal to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Modi and the BJP pushed through a social agenda that steadily marginalized Muslims and promoted Hindus as more equal than others. The 2019 BJP victory emboldened the party to scrap Article 370 of the Constitution which had guaranteed Kashmir’s political autonomy as India’s sole Muslim-majority province. Later, in December 2019, the government passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which was arbitrary in the choice of countries of origin and discriminatory in its selection of religious minorities. This further deepened the Muslim community to feel that they were becoming second-class citizens.   All these cases of democratic backsliding have made India fall in rank in various global democracy indexes. During the ADRN webinar, Niranjan concludes that the liberal parties and civil society groups are weak to depolarize the political and social divide and, if not checked soon, the current religious identity driven polarization might be irreversible.   Philippines: Polarization led by Autocratic Populist with Weaker Party Base   In the Philippines, the current polarization emerged with the election of President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. The once-popular Mayor of Davao City ran a war against drugs upon becoming president. Francisco A. Magno, a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Governance at De La Salle University, writes that Duterte offered bounties for the bodies of drug dealers and guaranteed the police that they would be shielded from prosecution. [8] During the first two years of his presidency, about 4,500 people were killed either in police operations or suspected vigilantism. Massive extrajudicial killings invited criticism and opposition from the liberal press and human rights activists. Duterte`s government oppressed free press and tried to silence critics, as in the case of revoking Rappler’s registration papers. Duterte also threatened to abolish the Commission on Human Rights and replace officials of independent bodies who were critical of him.   The party system in the Philippines is fragmented into multiple parties. While being the biggest party, Duterte’s party PDP-Laban has only 20.4 percent of 328 representatives of Congress. However, the incumbent president can control Congress since it is common for elected legislators to jump to the party of the new president after the election. Accordingly, the majority bloc supporting Duterte has 271 congressmen while the minority bloc opposing Duterte has meager 24 congressmen. Under this fluid party system, opposition in the electoral institution can be easily marginalized.   Duterte has relied on social media rather than political parties to mobilize his supporters. Rather than developing institutional ties with interest groups or civil society organizations, he used disinformation tactics filled with fake news and conspiracy theories in order to garner popular support for his policies. The liberal intellectuals and activists of the opposition camp, on the other hand, lack institutional safeguards to protect journalists and media freedom.   The polarizing issue such as a drug war or press freedom is not a deep-rooted social rift as it is not a conflicting identity that divides the public. In this sense, the mobilization of supporters by populist leaders like Duterte remains to be mob-like low politics. Moreover, the president can only serve one 6-year term disallowing a long tenure of an authoritarian populist president. Anthony L. Borja and Ian R. Hecita argue that illiberal tendencies in Filipino politics are sustained since ordinary Filipinos are leader-centric as they give primacy to personal leadership and the executive branch over other institutions. [9]   South Korea: Confrontational Party-Driven Polarization with Lesser Social Rifts   South Korean society has become increasingly divided politically as political polarization is led by two competing major parties. When asked about their ideological leaning, about 40 percent of Koreans answered that they are moderate. According to the EAI South Korean Identity Survey, which is conducted every five years starting from 2005 to 2020, 40 percent identified as moderate in 2005, 43 percent in 2010, 49 percent in 2015, and 43 percent in 2020. People who identified themselves as progressive accounted for 33 percent of the total population, 27.5 percent, 20 percent, and 31 percent respectively in these four surveys. The percentage of people with conservative-leaning ideologies was 27 percent, 30 percent, 30 percent, and 26 percent respectively.   However, in reality, politics is led by those on the far ends of the spectrum rather than by moderates. When the conservatives are in power, far-left groups tend to veto the incumbent president while loyal conservative supporters defend their favored political leaders. On the other hand, when the progressives are in power, the far-right opposes the incumbent president while extreme supporters use all means to defend their leadership. This pattern has repeated each time Korea elects a president. The recent presidential election of May 2022 has shown the full mobilization of two camps during the heated race which resulted in an unprecedented even divide. [10] Both camps engaged in worsening negative campaigns during a tight race. Mudslinging and personal attacks were rampant while serious policy dialogues were short.   Party polarization is a primary engine of South Korea’s political polarization. This is due to South Korea’s electoral system giving two major parties premiums much bigger than partisan voters aligned to either party. Jung Kim, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, argues that electoral strategies of mobilizing voters with strong partisan identities intensified as progressive and conservative voters with ideological leanings are more actively involved in politics in general and elections in particular. [11] The two large parties can conveniently rely on such strategies since median voters are pushed to choose either side. The majority of Korea’s legislative seats, 253 out of 300 seats, are filled by winners in single-member constituencies based on the first-past-the-post rule. As a result, it is difficult for smaller third parties to sustain. Moving to the opposite direction in the ideological spectrum, the ideological distance between politicians of the two major competing parties has become bigger than voters identifying themselves as progressives or conservatives.   The rise of social media is also contributing to the political polarization in South Korea, as in the cases of other divided societies. People who do not trust government or established media tend to seek alternative media outlets to express or listen to extreme views. Many ideologically leaning bigger print media also reinforce opposing views of the two political camps; progressives and conservatives. [12] In addition, some politically oriented civil society organizations join in binary camp politics which aggravates the situation.   This increasing political party-led polarization is pernicious since the mode of politics becomes confrontational and extremely partisan causing the National Parliament to an immobile deadlock. Nevertheless, the ideological divide at the social level is shallow with no clear socio-economic cleavages. As a matter of fact, the difference in the economic policy platform of the two confrontational parties is becoming narrower as the social service and welfare packages are getting thicker in response to the aging population and deprived youth. North Korean issues and the alliance with the U.S. pose some enduring gaps but these are not formative rifts that divide political society in South Korea.   Regional split and generational gap are often regarded as other fault lines together with ideology. Conventionally, the progressive camp has enjoyed strong support from the Southwestern Jeolla provinces (Honam region) while the support of the conservative camp has been based in the Southeastern Gyeongsang provinces (Yeongnam region). But, voters in the Seoul-Incheon metropolitan area, where about half of the population resides, are less tied to regional identity. The cultural and economic inter-generational conflicts also exist, generating different ideological leanings. The older generation is more conservative while the middle-aged, those in their 40s and 50s, are more progressive. Still, generational markers remain secondary reacting to salient contemporary issues rather than a rift dividing politics into two binary camps.   Thailand: Polarization at Elites and People Over Monarchy vs. Democracy   Political polarization in Thailand is severe as it encompasses multiple institutional agencies and is equipped with deep social rifts. In the ADRN polarization webinar, Janjira Sombatpoonsiri explained that the sharp division lies between supporters of royal nationalism and democracy. If Indian polarization is about the national identity, Thailand is divided over the nation’s political system. According to her, royal nationalism underpins Thailand’s political and ideological establishment which associates sovereignty with the monarchy. Supporters of this camp are comprised of the monarchy, the military, their allies in the bureaucracy and private sector, and ordinary people who endorse this ideology. The other camp, which she labeled the “democratic camp,” consists of anti-establishment politicians, pro-democracy activists, academics/students, and ordinary people critical of the establishment.   The political rise of the Shinawartras developed political polarization in Thailand. The anti-establishment camp was in power through Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) and his sister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) both of whom were overthrown by the military coup. Their policies for the poor received strong support from rural areas and urban poor. If the establishment camp is comprised of state institutions including the military, the anti-establishment camp relies on its electoral power to mobilize voters. The two competing camps are currently represented in the National Assembly by the pro-military Palang Pracharath Party and the Pheu Thai Party which has 119 and 135 seats respectively. The Future Forward, a new opposition party, has 54 seats.   The two camps could maintain their rather symmetrical party presence due to popular social support. The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) or “Red Shirts,” and the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or “Yellow Shirts” have launched massive protests. The UDD opposed the 2006 military coup and the royalist movement but was deposed after the military coup in 2014. The PAD supported the 2006 coup and accused Thaksin of corruption, abuse of power, and autocratic tendencies.   Sombatpoonsiri argued that during the tit-for-tat mobilization from 2005 to 2014, the palace and the army devised royal nationalism to drive protests against the anti-establishment governments. They used the narratives of social harmony and relied on cyber troopers to spread disinformation about the overthrow attempt by the anti-establishment force. On the other hand, the anti-establishment camp used the narratives of defending democracy and egalitarian measures. It is also notable that the youth-led public protests erupted from July to December 2020 despite pandemic restrictions. The two events were the final straws triggering the 2020 mass protests that led to the dissolution of the Future Forward Party (FFP) and the disappearance of pro-democracy satirist Wanchalerm in July 2020. [13] Now, protestors changed their narratives from changing government to reforming the monarchy. As a result, many middle-class conservatives withdrew their support for the protests, Sombatpoonsiri says, while some royalists started to endorse parts of the anti-establishment discourses.   The outcome of Thailand’s polarization over the past twenty years has been two democratic breakdowns in 2006 and 2014, and the autocratic consolidation by the military rule since 2014. The new constitution in 2016 allowed the military to select 250 seats in the upper house and to stay in power through several clauses. The long-awaited and delayed election happed in March 2019, but it brought more confusion.   Comparison of Four Countries   If we compare the dividing line of the four countries, the cases of India and Thailand are more fundamental as the divide is based on national identity (Hindu nationalism vs. secular pluralism) and political systems (monarchy nationalism vs. popular democracy). Due to the nature of the identity question, the vertical alignment between established politics and civil society within each camp is strong. Accordingly, the confrontation between the two camps is high. However, there are also big differences between the two cases. The two camps in India are asymmetrical as the ruling BJP has great power and strong support from the Hindu majority. The populist prime minister Modi galvanizes the bonding between elites and the mass. On the other hand, in Thailand, the two major confrontational political parties are equally represented in the National Assembly and the two protest movements groups affiliated with each party are both active. The anti-establishment camp could be more dominant if the military did not intervene to oppress it. The less popular monarchy unlike its predecessor and the emerging pro-democracy youth movement can change the equilibrium and this is a new development to keep an eye on.   The cases of the Philippines and South Korea are less severe. The populist president Duterte divided the public through the drug war and the oppression of the free press. This does not lead to a structural cleavage, however, and remains to be pro-and anti-Duterte government. Moreover, the fragmented parties are too weak to build a solid divide between them and the incumbent, and presidency is limited to a single term. The degree of disinformation aimed at the general public is rampant but a liberal segment of civil society can still organize some opposition. On the other hand, political polarization is driven by the ideologically hardening of the two major parties in South Korea. With a single-term presidency, like in the Philippines, the Korean president is likely to be neither an autocrat nor a populist despite his or her bigger executive power. Instead, the power competition between the two major parties, the progressives and conservatives, increased which led to the introduction of a strategy of mobilizing partisan supporters. South Korea’s electoral system allows this complacency since the centrist, or non-partisan voters, are pressed to choose a candidate from either of the two major parties. Policy differences such as the remaining regionalism and generational conflict exist. But, none of these are strong enough to become an equivalent formative social rift.   The impact of political polarization also varies. Naturally, deeper social cleavages based on national identity bring autocracy when the power of two camps is skewed to one side. Some cases of such consequences include the democratic breakdowns by the military coups in Thailand and the democratic erosion denying equal citizenship to the Muslim community in India. The other two cases are less pernicious. The case of democratic backsliding in the Philippines has a better chance to reverse if people work for participatory democracy away from the oligarchic elite rule. The party-driven polarization of South Korea also has a chance to depolarize by changing its electoral system to be more responsive to the moderate electorate.      [1] Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer, “Overcoming Polarization,” Journal of Democracy Volume 32, Number 1, January 2021, pp. 6-19. [2] Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue., Introduction in Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization, edited by the same authors. Washington, D.C.L Brookings Institution Press, 2019. [3] Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” June 12, 2014 report. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ [4] Mutual tolerance is accepting an equal right of rivals to exist, compete for power and govern, while institutional forbearance is restraining from exercising a legal right that could imperil the existing system. P. 102 and p. 106. Steven Letitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2018). [5] Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies.” The Annals of the American Academy, 681, January 2019, pp. 234-271. [6] “Political Polarization in Asia an Its Imact on Democracy,” (webinar, ADRN, Seoul, South Korea, March 25, 2022). [7] Niranjan Sahoo, “Hindu Nationalism and Political Polarization in India,” in Carothers and O’Donohue eds. (2019). [8] Francis Magno, “Contemporary Populism and Democratic Challenges in the Philippines,” in Sook Jong Lee et als. Eds. Populism in Asian Democracies: Features, Structures, and Impacts (Brill: 2021), p.66. [9] Anthony L. Borja and Ian J. Hecita, “The 2022 Philippine Elections Primer: A Democratic Citizenship Perspective.” ADRN Issue Briefing, March 4, 2022. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?at=view&idx=236 [10] Jung Kim, “South Korea’s 2022 Presidential Election: A Vox Populi that is Evenly Divided.” ADRN Issue Briefing, March 2022. [11] The opposition People Power Party’s Yoon Suk-yeol prevailed over the governing Democratic Party’s Lee Jae-myung by a slender margin of a 0.73 percent point–the smallest in the history of the country. Yoon secured 16,394,815 and Lee gained 16,147,738–the largest number of votes obtained by the winner and runner-up, respectively. Jung Kim, “Party Polarization Without Party Sorting in South Korea: The Centrist Voters in Drift,” ADRN Issue Briefings, September 2020, http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=2&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%… [12] Sook Jong Lee, “The Rise of Political Social Media in South Korea: A Focus on Disinformation and Polarization,” in Social Media, Disinformation, and Democracy in Asia: Country Cases, ADRN Special Report, October 2020 [13] Janjira Somatpoonsiri, “From Repression to Revolt: Thailand’s 2020 Protests and the Regional Implications.” GIGA Focus/Asia, Number 1, February 2021. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/repression-revolt-thailand-s-2020-protests-regional-implications.     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Professor of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Ko-rea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장∙선임연구원    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

정치 양극화는 정치를 과도하게 단순화시키는 현상으로 대중들에게 양자택일을 강요합니다. 유권자들을 선거 캠프 지형에 따라 나누는 등 민주주의를 쉽게 왜곡합니다. 엘리트와 일반 대중을 가리지 않는 현상이지만 주로 정부 및 정당 지도자들이 자신들의 권력 강화를 위한 전략으로 활용하는 경우가 많습니다.   이에 관해 문제의식을 갖고 동아시아연구원(원장 손열)은 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(ADRN)의 사무국으로서 열세 번째 [민주주의 협력] 온라인 세미나 시리즈 "갈라진 민주주의: 아시아의 정치양극화 현상과 영향"을 개최하였습니다. 이번 온라인 세미나에서 ADRN 멤버 기관들은 정치 양극화 연구의 저명한 학자인 제니퍼 맥코이(Jennifer McCoy)와 함께 인도와 필리핀, 태국, 한국의 정치 양극화 사례를 살펴보고 정치 양극화를 해소하기 위한 시민사회의 역할과 제도 개혁을 논의하고자 합니다.   ㆍ일시: 2022년 3월 25일 (금요일) 17:00 – 18:30 (한국 시간) ㆍ패널: 제니퍼 맥코이(Jennifer McCoy), 조지아주립대학(Georgia State University) 교수 이숙종, 성균관대학교 교수, 동아시아연구원 시니어 펠로우 김정, 북한대학원대학교 부교수 니란잔 사후(Niranjan Sahoo), 옵저버리서치파운데이션(Observer Research Foundation) 시니어펠로우 잔지라 솜빠푼시리 (Janjira Sombatpoonsiri), 쭐랄롱꼰 대학교(Chulalongkorn University) 조교수 프란시스코 A. 마그노(Francisco A. Magno), 마닐라 데라살대학교(De La Salle University) 시니어 펠로우    

On March 9, 2022, South Korea held a presidential election, in which the opposition People Power Party’s Yoon Suk-yeol prevailed over the governing Democratic Party’s Lee Jae-myung by a slender margin of a 0.73 percent point–the smallest in the history of the country. The only comparable neck-and-neck two-party electoral competition would be the 1997 presidential race that Kim Dae-jung won by a margin of 1.52 percent point. Out of 34,067,853 valid votes cast in the recent election, Yoon secured 16,394,815 and Lee gained 16,147,738–the largest number of votes obtained by the champion and runner-up, respectively, in South Korean history. As a full-scale two-party electoral mobilization, the only comparable in scale would be the 2012 presidential race in which 30,594,621 valid votes were divided between Park Geun-hye with 15,773,128 and Moon Jae-in with 14,692,632. In terms of both the intensity of competition and the immensity of mobilization, consequently, it seems indisputable that the 2022 presidential electoral outcomes[1] are historically unparalleled, reflecting a strong political division between conservatives and progressives. The problem is that it appears that the observed political division between the two camps amounts to ‘negative’ partisan polarization rather than to a ‘positive’ one.   According to a public opinion survey[2] that was conducted by Gallup Korea immediately after the election, the essential ingredients for this unprecedented political division are made less of programmatic differentiation that renders democracy healthy; but instead made more of partisan sorting that renders democracy dysfunctional. On partisan sorting, it is reported that 39 percent of those who voted for Yoon regarded turnover of executive power as the most important approval cause and 17 percent selected disaffection toward the other candidate as the second-most important approval cause while 27 percent of those who voted for Lee regarded disaffection toward the other candidates as the most important approval cause. For voters, affective partisan identity with or against candidates is one of the most critical factors that determines voting choices. As for programmatic differentiation, on the other hand, the survey reveals that only 6 percent of those who voted for Yoon and 13 percent for Lee regarded policy profiles and electoral manifestoes as an important approval cause. For voters, policy-based competition between candidates is one of the least influential factors that affect their voting decision. Essentially, the presidential election outcomes manifest a ‘pernicious[3]’ polarization–the division of society into mutually distrustful ‘Us versus Them’ camps in which political identity becomes a social identity–in the making in South Korea.   The emergent pernicious polarization that transpired through the election poses multi-level challenges to South Korea’s democratic politics in which the incoming president will play a pivotal role in the following: a divided cabinet in which he is required to collaborate with a coalition partner, a divided government in which he is required to cooperate with the opposition party, and a divided public in which he is required to accommodate those who did not vote for him. An evenly divided Vox Populi that is identified in the election calls upon him to be adept at the fine art of centripetal democratic governance. The following shows how much he would be hard-pressed to navigate.   Challenges of the Divided Cabinet   The new president is supposed to form a coalition cabinet with Ahn Cheol-soo’s People Party. Although the People Party has only three seats in the National Assembly, its presidential candidate Ahn sustained 12 percent of popular support[4] primarily from the centrist voters who are not tied to major parties. When Ahn resigned from the race on March 3 to cut an electoral deal with Yoon, Yoon and Lee were virtually tied. Yoon’s pre-electoral coalition with Ahn paid off handsomely. An exit poll[5] that was conducted by major broadcasting stations KBS, MBC, and SBS on the election day compared the voting behavior between the voters in the 2017 and 2022 presidential elections. 25 percent of those who voted for Moon in 2017 cast ballots for Yoon and 72 percent for Lee. 95 percent of those who voted for the conservative candidate Hong Joon-pyo in 2017 cast ballots for Yoon and 4 percent for Lee. 80 percent of those who voted for Ahn in 2017 cast ballots for Yoon and 18 percent for Lee. Yoon kept most votes from the conservative camps while Lee secured votes from the progressive camps albeit with a substantial loss. Collecting ballots from the former Ahn supporters was decisive for Yoon as he received four times more votes than Lee. In other words, the pre-electoral coalition with Ahn turned out vital for Yoon’s victory under the conditions of looming pernicious polarization.   Yoon and Ahn pledged to form a coalition cabinet and combine two parties of their own. Yoon appointed Ahn as chairperson of the presidential transition committee to show the credibility of the coalition. However, the inherent instability in the coming coalition cabinet formation will continue to distress the new president. While Ahn’s electoral influence was indispensable for winning the presidency, his party’s legislative influence is almost nil for passing bills in the National Assembly. The asymmetric bargaining power between the electoral and legislative arena of the People Party poses as a ‘commitment’ problem for Yoon to maintain the pre-electoral contract to make a post-electoral cabinet coalition. Moreover, Yoon’s People Power Party, which holds 106 seats in the legislature, might be disgruntled with disproportional over-representation of the smaller Ahn’s party members in the coming cabinet portfolio allocation process. South Korea’s presidential democracy makes the commitment problem more complicated as the chief executive can unilaterally appoint and dismiss cabinet members, which reduces the credibility of Yoon’s pre-electoral contract from the perspective of Ahn and his party members. To manage the challenges of a divided cabinet, it is critical for Yoon to keep in mind that his triumph was possible not least because of centrist voters who had supported Ahn. While the abandonment of Ahn in the cabinet may have little effect in the legislative area, it will have a great effect on the public’s support for the new president, which will intensify rather than diminish the tendency of pernicious polarization.   Challenges of the Divided Government   Yoon also faces the opposition from Democratic Party as they currently hold the majority equating to 172 seats in the National Assembly for at least the next two years. Under this divided government situation, the new president simply cannot accomplish any of his policy initiatives without acquiring the consent of the Democratic Party. Even worse, Yoon’s power to appoint the prime minister, which is key to maintaining the coalition contract, is subject to the approval of the National Assembly that is controlled by the Democratic Party. In other words, without attaining the cooperation of the Democratic Party, Yoon cannot form his executive cabinet let alone enact his legislative initiatives. In order to avoid the worst-case scenario that is expected to be brought on by the divided government, Yoon needs to solve this ‘coordination’ problem by trying to reach an outcome in which both governing and opposition parties are satisfied.   This is a daunting task for the incoming president, especially during the era of increasing pernicious polarization in which parties view one another as competing camps and engage in a legislative battle where the political stakes attached to victory or defeat are extremely high. According to the exit poll[6], however, there are some vital policy realms in which the two can generate mutually beneficial outcomes. 29 percent of those who voted for Yoon and 31 percent for Lee both agreed that ‘economic growth and creation of jobs’ should be the most important policy agenda that the new president deals with. Also, 23 percent of Yoon supporters and 21 percent of Lee supporters both confirmed that ‘stable management of housing prices and real estate market’ should be the second-most important policy agenda. To put it differently, a solid majority of those who supported Yoon as well as of those who supported Lee considered ‘valence’ issues–programmatic values that are broadly shared in the electorate–the highest priority of legislative deliberation and implementation. Consequently, for Yoon, tackling these valence issues first will become a gateway to a political solution to the coordination problem emanated from a divided government.   In this sense, it is unfortunate to note that Yoon as the president-elect pinpointed the electoral pledge of the ‘abolition of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family’ as one of the highest priority policy agendas. As this is one of the most divisive ‘positional’ issues–programmatic values on which parties differentiate themselves in the electorate–in the presidential election, priming the issue will definitely produce political effects that exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the trend of pernicious polarization. It is noteworthy that the Democratic Party appointed a feminist activist as co-chairperson of the Emergency Response Committee to set a counter-attack on and exploit this divisive issue politically. For the president-elect, this serves as a good reminder[7] of his shaky electoral foundation among the voters under the age of 30 in which he secured 59 percent of votes from the male constituency but only 34 percent from the female constituency, which is an exact mirror image of Lee who gained only 36 percent from male constituency but 58 percent from the female constituency. The post-election ‘culture’ war on gender issues along party lines may become a gateway to political deadlock, causing the failure of policy coordination that makes the divided government unworkable.   Challenges of the Divided Public   The difficulties to maintain a Yoon-Ahn coalition cabinet and to cooperate with the Democratic Party under a divided government will undoubtedly put the new president in an awkward and even frustrating position. This can usher him into the temptation of unilateral actions. In particular, as a political novice with no career in the National Assembly, Yoon may have a deep loathing of time-consuming political logrolling necessary to strike policy compromises in a coalition cabinet with collegial partners and divided government with opposition parties. If this is to become the case, Yoon will become more prone to take the strategy of ‘going public’–the president sells his programs directly to the public with the use of skillful opinion manipulation–to galvanize popular support for his policy agenda. In other words, for a president inflicted with political impasse, the going public strategy may be perceived as his last resort to break through the grave situation.   Unfortunately, for the new president, however, the strategy of going public will certainly be counterproductive in rallying popular support for his policy agenda. It will be persistently imperative for Yoon to recall that he won presidency in an election where 48.56 percent of the electorate voted for him and 47.83 percent voted for the opponent. How this balance is going to change will be tested during the local election that will be held three weeks after his inauguration on May 10. In a partisan landscape in which national electoral support is evenly divided between the conservative and progressive camps, it would be political suicide for a president to take the going public strategy and initiate unilateral action as a way of circumventing the cumbersome bargaining in a coalition cabinet and divided government. Unquestionably, such presidential maneuver will provoke the counter-mobilization from the supporters of the opposite camp, which endangers a spiral of conflict escalation that deepens, rather than lessen, the trend of pernicious polarization.   The discussion has now come full circle back to where it started. The intense two-party competition with extensive partisan mobilization that enabled Yoon to win the presidency now constrains his political options as the new president. The increase of pernicious polarization has made it inevitable for Yoon to accommodate Ahn in the divided cabinet, accommodate the Democratic Party in the divided government and accommodate the progressive voters in the divided public in order to get things done. It is not a coincidence that Yoon received a 53 percent presidential job prospect rating[8]–the lowest among presidents-elect–and Moon received a 43 percent presidential job approval rating[9]–the highest among presidents during their last two months of their term. It appears that effective partisanship, rather than policy performance, determines how voters support political leaders. The fact that Moon is likely to be the most popular outgoing president and Yoon is likely to be the least popular incoming president symbolizes that South Korea’s democracy has entered an era of pernicious polarization. This is why the quality of South Korea’s democracy is critically dependent upon how the new president will respond to these multi-level challenges of a divided cabinet, divided government, and divided public.■     [1] The National Election Commission, Election Statistics System (in Korean), Gwacheon-si, Republic of Korea: 2022.http://info.nec.go.kr/ [2] Gallup Korea Research Institute. The Post 20th Presidential Election Survey (in Korean). March 10, 2022. Distributed by Gallup Korea. https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1278 [3] Murat Somer, Jennifer L. McCoy & Russell E. Luke (2021) Pernicious polarization, autocratization and opposition strategies, Democratization, 28:5, 929-948, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2020.1865316 [4] Gallup Korea Research Institute. Daily Opinion No.485(1st week, March 2022)- Presidential Support Map before Ahn Cheol-soo's Resignation, Image of the Candidates in 7 perspecitves (in Korean). March 2, 2022. Distributed by Gallup Korea https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1275 [5] Jang, Seulki. "[Data M] 2017 Presidential vote, Where is it going this Time? (in Korean)” MBC News. March 9, 2022. https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/2022/nwdesk/article/6348716_35744.html [6] Ku, Kyungha. "[In-depth Exit Survey] ② Progressive Unity Higher than the 19th Presidential Election… Degree of cohesion higher among Conservatives (in Korean).” KBS News. March 9, 2022. https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view.do?ncd=5412124 [7] Kim, Youngeun. "[Graphic] 2022 Presidential Election Exit Survey Result based on Gender and Age (in Korean).” Yonhap News Agency. March 19, 2022. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/GYH20220309000900044 [8] RealMeter. [RealMeter March Second Week (10th-11th) Weekend Trend] Yoon Seok-yeol's Prospect for State Administration. 52.7% positive vs 41.2% negative. (in Korean). March 13, 2022. Distributed by RealMeter http://www.realmeter.net/jbshdifkg8owg897gt28/ [9] Gallup Korea Research Institute. Daily Opinion No.486(March 7, 2022)- Support for Candidates D-2 of the 20th Presidential Election, Views on Politics (in Korean). March 8, 2022. Distributed by Gallup Korea https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1277     ■ Jung Kim is an associate professor of political science at University of North Korean Studies (UNKS). Currently, he is a visiting professor at Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College of Yonsei University, a regional coordinator of Asia Democracy Research Network, a research member of Social Science Korea Research, “Quality of Government and Varieties of Governance,” an editorial committee member of Asian Perspective and Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, and a policy advisory committee member of Republic of Korea’s Ministry of National Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency. He earned his undergraduate degree in political science from Korea University and graduated from Yale University with his doctoral degree in political science. He has published numerous articles in academic journals, including Asian Perspective, Asian Survey, and Journal of International and Area Studies, and edited volumes, including Adapt, Fragment, Transform: Corporate Restructuring and System Reform in South Korea and Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia.     ■ 담당 및 편집:백진경 EAI 연구실장∙선임연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

February 8 marked the official start of the campaign period for the upcoming 2022 Philippine National Elections. The presidential and vice-presidential elections will take place alongside elections for Congress and local governments on May 9, 2022. During election day, the President and Vice-President are elected separately based on the first-past-the-post voting rule.   The May 9 elections are seen by experts as a critical juncture in the history of Southeast Asia’s oldest democracy. The upcoming democratic contest will look to replace populist strongman President Rodrigo Duterte. While Duterte is facing allegations of massive corruption related to the government’s COVID-19 response and an impending International Criminal Court investigation on his violent war on drugs, he still enjoys a high approval rating. His rating is still the highest compared to other previous outgoing Philippine presidents (CNN Philippines 2022). The President’s high approval will allow him to leverage political support to influence the trajectory of the upcoming elections even though he has been quiet about whom to endorse as his “official” successor (Teehankee 2022).   The 2022 national elections are seen as a decision to salvage or wipe out the 1986 People Power narrative. Observers have noted that the Duterte presidency paved the way for the “start of the end” of the post-Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) People Power Revolution regime. Activists argue that the outgoing President implemented policies that weakened liberal democratic institutions and shrunk civic spaces (Rama 2018). Also, the rise and popularity of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos who was ironically ousted by the 1986 uprising, as the leading contender for the presidency signals how this election serves as a referendum on the EDSA democratization project.   The Contenders   Bongbong Marcos Jr., former Senator and former Governor of Ilocos Norte, has been the consistent frontrunner of the 2022 presidential derby based on recently released polls. Running under the platform for “national unity”, he holds an unapologetic stance on the grave faults of political repression, violence, and mass corruption during his father’s regime. This is tied to the continuous praise of the supposed golden years under the Marcos dictatorship invoking both political nostalgia and vindication among his supporters. He is running beside Vice Presidential candidate, Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte who is the daughter of President Duterte. Mayor Duterte has also a strong showing in recent polls. The Marcos-Duterte team up is perceived as an alliance of strong political dynasts brokered by traditional political machines of ex-presidents and families (Remitio 2021). Voters who elected President Duterte in the previous election are expected to support this tandem albeit that the current President has not endorsed any candidate for president.   Marcos Jr. is currently facing several electoral disqualification petitions filed by citizen groups mostly composed of human rights victims during the Marcos martial law era.[1] While the cases have been recently dismissed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), observers expect that the final resolution of the cases will go the distance and be ruled at higher courts (Patag 2022). Moreover, the Marcos-Duterte ticket has been criticized for not participating in debates and public forums organized by major media organizations (The Straits Times 2022).   Looking to defeat Marcos Jr. is Vice President Maria Leonor “Leni” Robredo. Consistently placing second on recent surveys, Robredo seeks to replicate her 2016 feat when she defeated Marcos Jr. for the vice presidency. The incumbent Vice President is running on a platform of good governance and the restoration of liberal democratic institutions. Her sustained opposition of the Duterte administration and the criticism of the potential comeback of the Marcoses has earned her both the ire of Duterte supporters and increasingly aggressive support from members of her own camp. Former senior government technocrats, civil society organizations, professional associations, and business groups have expressed their support for Robredo (CNN Philippines 2022).   First term City of Manila Mayor Franscisco “Isko” Moreno Domagoso has also joined the presidential derby. Moreno, a former movie/ television actor who was raised in the slums of Manila is pushing to replicate the success of Manila’s social development programs for the whole country. Armed with his long-standing experience in local government, bravado, youth, and populism, the Manila local chief executive’s campaign is focused on achieving public service delivery results albeit having ambivalent positions about controversial political issues related to Duterte and the Marcoses. Recently, a faction of President Duterte’s supporters has expressed their endorsement of Moreno (Domingo 2022).   Incumbent senator and world boxing legend, Emmanuel “Manny” Pacquiao has also sought the presidency. Capitalizing on his rags-to-success story, the senator is running on a pro-poor platform reminiscent of former president Estrada’s brand. Pacquiao’s views on religion and social mores have earned mass criticism from the more liberal sectors and the LGBTQ community, thus marking him as a clear candidate for social conservatives. Yet his vocal opposition to Duterte’s policies including pro-China policies has placed him outside the latter’s circle.   Another hopeful who threw his hat in the ring is incumbent Senator Panfilo “Ping” Lacson. The former police chief renews his old anti-crime and clean government platform. His strong track record in the Senate substantiates his consistent anti-corruption stance while his record as police chief provides the base for a tough stance on crime. However, some critics have dug up his role in human rights violations during the martial law era of the Marcos dictatorship (McCoy 2011).   Branding himself as the genuine alternative is veteran labor union leader Leodegario “Ka Leody” de Guzman. Ka Leody is campaigning for social democratic advocacies ranging from labor rights and social welfare to various forms of economic redistribution through expanded social programs. This is the first time since 1935 that the Philippine Left has a presidential candidate for the national elections.   A backdrop to the May democratic contest is the threat of COVID-19. Although the COMELEC had laid out health and safety guidelines, civil society organizations and other electoral stakeholders have been clamoring for better effective communications and sound risk planning including the implementation of more simulation exercises (NAMFREL 2021). Multistakeholder and inclusive approaches to planning and implementing COVID-19 related policies have also been advocated. Although the Philippines generally exhibits high voter turnouts in every election cycle relative to other democracies, threats and risks of potential COVID-19 surges serve as a real challenge to electoral administration (Hecita et al 2022).   With Marcos Jr. enjoying a formidable leadin all the pre-election surveys conducted since last year, observers have been arguing that there is a need to have a “united opposition” or one candidate to stop the son of the late dictator from winning the presidency (Tomacruz 2022). While there have been informal meetings and talks between the non-Marcos camps, the talks did not eventually result in the endorsement of a “united opposition” candidate (Luna 2022). The supposed disunity of the opposition may suggest the erosion of the old administration-opposition dichotomy that has defined electoral politics in the Philippines. Duterte’s endorsement is still pending and earlier attempts to form a united opposition have broken down into a controversy. This illustrates how the admin-opposition dichotomy has been rendered into both practical irrelevance and a frustrating ideal for the upcoming elections. Contributory to this phenomenon are the fundamental weaknesses of the party system in the country. Political parties in the Philippines are limited to being vehicles of the elite to gain political power rather than having a fundamental role in articulating citizens’ interests and being accountable to the general polity. Elections are seen as a means to access power, private accumulation, and rent-seeking (Hutchcroft 1991). The party system is so weak that even the ruling party that President Duterte belongs to, does not have an official presidential candidate (Cupin 2021). In a strategic move to attract more allies outside the political opposition, Vice President Robredo who is known as a staunch critic of the Duterte administration is running for President as an independent candidate (Manahan 2021).   The 2022 Elections as an Issue of Democratic Citizenship   With surveys showing a small number of undecided voters (Pulse Asia 2021), it appears that the Filipino citizenry has reached a level of political “maturity” if one defines it as the solidification of political values, attitudes, and convictions. Contrary to public discourse, Filipinos are neither apathetic nor immature (lacking any firm conviction) (Borja 2017). Instead, the question shifts to where this maturation is leading (e.g. illiberal outcomes). Nevertheless, public discourse has yet to reflect the shift.   Another defining characteristic of the 2022 National Elections is an aggravation of Duterte’s aggressive politics at the level of citizens. This is tied with both the blossoming of Marcos apologetics and conspiracy theorizing and equally perceived illiberal and elitist tendencies among opposition supporters who are trying to revive the discourse of “bobotante” (stupid voters). Furthermore, it is plausible to argue that the political values underpinning the 2022 National Elections are bound together by nostalgia. On one hand, this nostalgia is for a now-defunct liberal democratic regime. On the other, it is for a supposed golden age that Marcos apologists have defended despite all the facts against it; conjuring conspiracy theories or legalist arguments to justify a once repressed sense of vindictiveness which have been widely circulated via social media such as YouTube and Facebook (Soriano and Gaw 2021). One camp seeks to avenge the collapse of the EDSA regime under the guise of restoration and normalcy. The other seeks to re-assert the legitimacy of a deposed dictator and all their personal attachments to it. Overall, the political moral fibers that have been opened back in 2016 are now in full display and aggravated by a sense of desperation from the camps involved.   What matters is that the question of elections, and democratization in general, is ultimately the question of citizenship. How do Filipinos see themselves as political actors? Will the upcoming elections affect their political identity? If yes, to what extent? If no, then what are the psycho-political conditions that would remain constant? The toxicity of daily social media activities is but the tip of an iceberg since only a minority of the citizenry is active online. Underneath, as have been alluded to earlier, lies illiberal political tendencies tied with disempowerment (Borja 2018).   Filipinos have a clear attachment with representative institutions. However, they don’t usually share other liberal ideals. Consequently, they are leader-centric by giving primacy to personal leadership and the executive branch over institutions and the ideal balance of power, respectively. Many are also intolerant, equating plurality with disorder while approving government regulation over the circulation of ideas in society. Alongside illiberal tendencies are sustained levels of disempowerment among ordinary Filipinos (Borja 2020).Though they are interested in politics and see it as important, they do not see themselves as capable of influencing public affairs after elections. They also deem themselves as incapable of fully understanding politics even if they are exposed to it daily through media. Consequently, they hardly participate in politics other than elections despite their habitual enthusiasm to vote.   Pathways to Democratic Renewal: Going Beyond Elections   The prospects of democratization in the Philippines seem bleak with mass disempowerment and resurgent illiberalism among citizens, and chronic weaknesses among key liberal democratic institutions. Nevertheless, there are prospects for democratic renewal beyond contested institutions like elections and the party system. Specifically, efforts for democratization must invest more in fostering strong democratic citizenship that will enable future generations of citizens to be less reliant on representatives and traditional politicians while being closer to the policy process itself. After the elections, the progressive and democratic forces should not focus on short-term and mid-term opposition to anti-democratic forces. Instead, they must lay the foundations for the expansion and development of democratic citizenship.   Under a general civic education program, two opportune and intertwined areas can contribute much to the aforementioned goal. First is e-governance and the maximization of digital technologies to bring government and public affairs closer to citizens (Roberts and Hernandez 2017). The latter point is important since efforts on e-governance are not necessarily democratic. Second and in relation to the latter point, there must be an expansion of democratic and deliberative spaces at the local level in order to bring citizens inside the government. Both can provide opportunities for citizens to see themselves as effective members of the polity and their local communities without being reduced to mere voters. Moreover, alongside the benefits of harnessing local knowledge and building consensus among constituents, participatory governance can provide spaces for common work and deliberation that can offset the impacts of political intolerance that have pitted citizens against each other. Overall, the prospects of democratic renewal in the Philippines are hinged on increasing the value of one’s citizenship; of making Filipino citizenship substantially democratic. This is because democratic institutions are founded not merely on legislation but on civic habits. Political power can thus be redistributed in favor of ordinary citizens while remaining within legal boundaries (Barber 2003).   To conclude, citizenship lies at the heart of democratization (Schneider and Schmitter 2004). One can speak endlessly about structural, institutional, and systemic reforms. But if talk, thoughts, theory, and practice miss the essence of what democratic politics is, then one misses the entire point of democratization. In the absence of an active citizenry, ability to effectively participate in the policy process, democratization is doomed to fail while paving the way for its own reversal.■   References   Barber, Benjamin. Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Borja, Anthony Laurence. “Tis but a habit in an unconsolidated democracy: Habitual voting, Political alienation and spectatorship.” Theoria, 64:50, (2017): 19-40. Borja, Anthony Laurence. “Intolerant leaders for intolerant citizens: illiberal values in the Philippines.”New Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/intolerant-leaders-intolerant-citizens-il liberal-values-philippines/ Borja, Anthony Laurence. “Political parties for the alienated and disempowered: Partisan Politics in the Philippines and the question of Political Alienation.” Access Bangsamoro. https://accessbangsamoro.ph/2020/08/14/political-parties-for-the-alienated-and-disempowered/ Cupin, Bea. “With no presidential, VP bets, ‘ruling’ PDP-Laban assures local candidates of support.” Rappler, December 1, 2021. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/pdp-laban-assures-local-bets-support-2022-polls/ Domingo, Katrina. “Isko thanks Duterte 'die-hard supporters' backing his presidential bid.” ABS-CBN News, February 10, 2022. https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/10/22/isko-thanks-duterte-supporters-backing-his-presl-bid. Hecita, Ian Jayson, Ador Torneo, Aileen Pactao, Jazelle Zerrudo, Randy Cacho. “Philippine Elections in the New Normal: Policy Insights from the Palawan Plebiscite.” Policy Brief. Manila: DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, 2022. https://www.dlsu-jrig.org/policy-briefs. Hutchcroft, Paul, “Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder.” World Politics, 43 (1991): 414-450. Luna, Franco. “Presidential bets 'frustrated' over failed opposition unity talks but still open if invited.” Philstar.com, February 23, 2022. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/01/23/2155824/presidential-bets-frustrated-over-failed-opposition-unity-talks-still-open-if-invited. Accessed February 15, 2022. McCoy, Alfred. “Dark Legacy: Human Rights Under the Marcos Regime” in Memory, Truth Telling and the Pursuit of Justice': A Conference on the Legacies of the Marcos Dictatorship, 129-144. Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila Press. Manahan, Jon. “'Iba na ang laban': Robredo running independent to show openness for alliances.” ABS-CBN News, October 9, 2021. https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/10/08/21/why-robredo-is-running-as-an-independent-candidate. “Marcos to skip Philippine presidential debate as lead widens.” The Straits Times, February 14, 2022. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/marcos-to-skip-philippine-presidential-debate-as-lead-widens. National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections “NAMFREL releases preliminary observations on the 2021 Mock Elections.” NAMFREL Press Release, December 2021. Patag, Kristine Joy. “Petitioners appeal junked disqualification case vs Marcos.” Philstar.com, February 15, 2022. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/02/15/2161016/petitioners-appeal-junked-disqualification-case-vs-marcos. Pulse Asia. “Nationwide Survey on the May 2022 Elections”. Quezon City: Pulse Asia. https://www.pulseasia.ph/january-2022-nationwide-survey-on-the-may-2022-elections/. Rama, Michelina. “Redrawing Battle Lines in the Struggle to for Civic Space: Insights from the Philippines.” In Civic Space: Working Paper Series. Bangkok: FORUM ASIA, 2018. Remitio, Rex. “Political parties of ex-presidents Ramos, Estrada, Arroyo back Marcos-Duterte tandem.” CNN Philippines, November 25, 2022. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/11/25/Political-parties-of-ex-presidents-support-Marcos-Duterte.html Roberts, Tony and Kevin Hernandez. “The techno-centric gaze: incorporating citizen participation technologies into participatory governance processes in the Philippines.” Making All Voices Count Research Report, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. “Robredo wins endorsement of 4 ex-senators, more govt officials.” CNN Philippines, February 21, 2022. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/2/21/Leni-Robredo senators-endorsement.html. Schneider, Carsten and Philippe Schmitter. “Liberalization, transition and consolidation: Measuring the components of democratization.” Democratization Vol. 11, No. 5, (2004): 60-62. Soriano, Cheryl Ruth and Fatima Gaw. “Platforms, alternative influence, and networked political brokerage on YouTube. Convergence.” International Journal of Research to New Media Technologies. (July 2021): https://doi.org/10.1177/13548565211029769. “SWS: Satisfaction with Duterte up in Q4 2021.” CNN Philippines, February 9, 2022. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/2/9/SWS-Duterte-satisfaction-rating- Q4-2021.html. Teehankee, Julio. “The Philippines in 2021: The Twilight of the Duterte Presidency” Asian Survey. (February 2022): 1-11, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.62.1.12. Tomacruz, Sofia. “Marcos Jr. sustains lead in January 2022 Pulse Asia poll.” Rappler, February 13, 2022. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/ferdinand-bongbong-marcos-jr- sustains-lead-pulse-asia-presidential-survey-january-2022/. Accessed February 20, 2022.     [1] Marcos Jr. is currently facing disqualification cases borne out of failure to file income tax from 1982 to 1985.     ■ Anthony Lawrence Borja is Assistant Professorial Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Development Studies of De La Salle University, Philippines. He is a Ph.D. candidate in the Public Administration program of Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s School of International and Public Affairs. His research publications are in political philosophy, political theory, political psychology, and comparative politics. He is currently conducting research on political illiberalism, political participation, and popular sovereignty. ■ Ian Jayson Hecita is Assistant Professorial Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Development Studies of De La Salle University (DLSU), Philippines. Concurrently, he serves as Lead Policy Research Specialist for the Political Participation for Greater Electoral Integrity program of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. His research works are in open government, local governance, civil society participation, and sustainable development. His current research projects involve electoral governance in health crisis situations and citizenship education.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 _EAI 연구실장     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Vietnam is a developing country with about 75% of people living in a rural area as of 2008 (Vietnam Households Living Standards Survey 2008). Although most Vietnamese people’s livelihood depends on agricultural activities, agricultural income is very volatile. This is partly because agriculture is affected heavily by natural disasters such as typhoons, storms, floods, droughts, landslides, animal and livestock epidemics, plant disease, and insects. According to the World Bank report (2010), natural disasters caused the loss of about 1 to 1.5 percent of annual GDP during the period 1989 – 2008 in Vietnam. Vietnam is also one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change in the world (Dasgupta, et al. 2009). In an agricultural society like Vietnam, men play an important role in cultivation, therefore gender inequality still exists. The World Bank (2011) report shows that gender disparity remained in Vietnam even though there has been significant progress in poverty, wellbeing, employment and livelihoods, and political participation. Gender inequality is also reflected in the aspect of domestic violence. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010) reports that 58 percent of women suffered at least one type of domestic violence: physical, sexual, and emotional. Likewise, Luke et al. (2007) carried out a survey in the Nghe An province that indicated that 37% of wives have experienced physical violence.   Women’s Empowerment Caused by Relative Decline of Men’s Contribution to Household Income     A large body of literature shows that improving the socio-economic status of women can increase their power within households. Allendorf (2007) argues that women’s ownership of land increased their power in household decisions. Panda and Agarwal (2005) find that women with immovable property (land or a house) tend to face a significantly lower risk of marital violence than women without property. In addition, female participation in the labor force increases women's power and gives women more control to allocate the resources within households (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003, Anderson and Eswaran 2009). Women’s participation in microcredit programs is positively associated with women’s empowerment while men’s access to credit has negative impacts on women’s empowerment (Pitt et al. 2006; Hashemi et al. 1996). Women with higher educational levels were found to be more empowered in decision-making processes (Sofia and Pervaiz, 2018; Samarakoon and Parinduri, 2014). The employment of women also positively impacts their participation in decision-making on their own health care, large household purchases, visits to family or relatives, and daily spending (Sofia and Pervaiz, 2018).   These findings suggest that women have more bargaining power within the family when they participate in economically sustaining the household. However, little is known about how the decrease in men’s economic contribution to the family impacts women’s empowerment. In the case of farming-dependent households, natural disasters reduce men’s economic contribution to household income. Natural disasters usually devastate farming conditions so that men who used to be primary breadwinners fall into unemployment or under-employment. The reduction of the male contribution to household income is expected to lead to the loss of power vis-à-vis female members in decision-making processes. Accordingly, one can predict the effect natural disasters has on women’s empowerment through the decreased men’s economic status.   Analysis of the Vietnamese Data   The main objective of this study is to investigate the association between natural disasters and women’s empowerment in rural Vietnam. This study leverages the 2008 and 2010 Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys, and household fixed-effects to establish the causal relationship between natural disasters and women empowerment. The types of natural disasters include floods, droughts, typhoons, landslides, animal/livestock epidemics, plant disease, and insects, which had occurred in a commune in the past three years.   Natural disasters cause rural households to lose income significantly. Table 1 reports the estimated results on household loss by share of farm income. There is strong evidence on the positive impact of the number of natural disasters on the household loss due to natural disasters (Column 1). The number of natural disasters also has significant and positive impacts on household loss for all subsamples (Columns 2 to 4). However, natural disasters have greater impacts on households with a decrease of the household loss by 8.7 percent for households with a low share of farm income, by 10 percent for households with an average share of farm income, and by 14.6 percent for households with a high share of farm income.   Table 1: Impacts of natural disasters on the household loss by share of farm income   * p < 0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for characteristics of households such as: household size, education of household head, number of household members of active age (15-55/66), number of girls aged less than 5, number of females aged 15 to 60, number of females aged 60 above, and characteristics of communes such as: dummy variable for bank for social policy, dummy variable for bank for agriculture and rural development, dummy variable for having irrigation facilities, dummy variable for good quality of main irrigation canals, dummy variable for good quality of tertiary canal, dummy variable for good quality of public well, dummy variable for good quality of dike. The regressions also control for household-level fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level.   Table 2 shows that the number of natural disasters is positively associated with women’s empowerment. The results are strong for different measures of women’s empowerment. Specifically, an additional number of natural disasters increases the probability of women’s empowerment on visits to family or relatives by 0.5 percent. The figure is similar for women’s empowerment on daily purchases. Also, an additional number of natural disasters increases the probability of women’s empowerment on contraception by 0.8 percent, on their own health by 0.5 percent, on child schooling by 1 percent, on child health by 0.9 percent, and on having a child by 0.6 percent.   Table 2: Impacts of Natural Disasters on Index and Number of Women Empowerment   * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for characteristics of households such as: household size, education of household head, number of household members of active age (15-55/66), number of girls aged less than 5, number of females aged 15 to 60, number of females aged 60 above, and characteristics of communes such as: dummy variable for bank for social policy, dummy variable for bank for agriculture and rural development, dummy variable for having irrigation facilities, dummy variable for good quality of main irrigation canals, dummy variable for good quality of tertiary canal, dummy variable for good quality of public well, dummy variable for good quality of dike. The regressions also control for household-level fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level.   This study also indicates that the number of natural disasters undermines men’s power relative to women’s power due to a fall in agricultural income. In an agricultural society, men’s physical strength plays an essential role in cultivating activities. As such the decrease in agricultural income leads to a fall in men’s power and an increase in women’s power. Likewise, Table 3 provides strong evidence on the positive impact the number of natural disasters has on women’s empowerment in households with a high share of farm income in 2008. There is no evidence of the impact the number of natural disasters has on women’s empowerment in households with a low share of farm income. In a nutshell, female power increases in farming-dependent households when natural disasters hit rural Vietnam.   Table 3: Impacts of Natural Disasters on Women’s Empowerment by Share of Farm Income in 2008   Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for characteristics of households such as: household size, education of household head, number of household members of active age (15-55/66), number of girls aged less than 5, number of females aged 15 to 60, number of females aged 60 above, and characteristics of communes such as: dummy variable for bank for social policy, dummy variable for bank for agriculture and rural development, dummy variable for having irrigation facilities, dummy variable for good quality of main irrigation canals, dummy variable for good quality of tertiary canal, dummy variable for good quality of public well, dummy variable for good quality of dike. The regressions also control for household-level fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level.   Conclusion   To draw a solid conclusion, the findings are put into perspective. Natural disasters make most rural households suffer economically. However, there is a silver lining effect in increasing female power vis-à-vis men in the household decision-making. Other negative shocks such as the current COVID-19 pandemic and war also positively change gender inequality. For instance, Alon et al. (2020) find that the economic downturn due to the current COVID-19 pandemic increased gender equality. Child care needs have increased dramatically following the closures of schools and daycare centers. Many fathers have to take main responsibility for child care, which leads to erosion in social norms as to a lopsided distribution of the division of labor in housework and child care between men and women. Shatnawi and Fishback (2018) state that World War II caused a substantial increase in wartime demand and post-war demand for female workers in manufacturing compared with the setting in 1941. How negative shocks and crises change female household power needs to be studied further.    * This issue briefing article is written based on the findings of the article entitled “The impact of natural disasters on women’s empowerment in rural Vietnam”. This article was published in Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 62 (2021), 101-123.   References   Anderson, S. and M. Eswaran (2009). "What determines female autonomy? Evidence from Bangladesh." Journal of Development Economics, 90(2): 179-191. Allendorf, K. (2007). "Do women’s land rights promote empowerment and child health in Nepal?" World development, 35(11): 1975-1988. Alon, M, T., Doepke, M., Rumsey, O, J & Tertilt, M. 2020. The Impact of COVID-19 on Gender Equality. Working Paper 26947, NBER, available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w26947 Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante, S. Murray, and D. Wheeler (2009), Sea-level Rise and Storm Surges: A Comparative Analysis of Impacts in Developing Countries, Washington D.C.: The World Bank. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010). "Keeping silent is dying’: Results from the National Study on Domestic Violence against Women in Viet Nam." Hashemi, S., Sidney R. Schuler, and Ann P. Riley. 1996. “Rural Credit Programs and Women’s Empowerment in Bangladesh.” World Development, 24(4) :635–53. Luke, N., S. R. Schuler, B. T. T. Mai, P. Vu Thien and T. H. Minh (2007). "Exploring couple attributes and attitudes and marital violence in Vietnam." Violence Against Women, 13(1): 5-27. Panda, P and Agarwal, B. (2005). Marital Violence, Human Development and Women’s Property Status in India. World Development, 33(5), 823-850. Pitt, M. M., Khandker, S. R., and Cartwright, J. 2006. Empowering women through micro finance: Evidence from Bangladesh. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 54(4), 791-831. Quisumbing, A. R. and J. A. Maluccio (2003). "Resources at marriage and intrahousehold allocation: Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 65(3): 283-327. Samarakoon, S & Parinduri, A, R. 2014. Does Education Empower Women? Evidence from Indonesia, World Development, 66, 428-442. Shatnawi, D & Fishback, P. 2018. The Impact of World War II on the Demand for Female Workers in Manufacturing, Journal of Economic History, 78(2), 539-574. Sofia & Pervaiz. 2018. The impact of women’s education and employment on their empowerment: an empirical evidence from household level survey. Quality & Quantity, 52, 2855-2870. World Bank., 2010. Weathering the Storm: Options for Disaster Risk Financing in Vietnam. Washington DC. Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/569191468108554653/pdf/70394-REVISED-Box391475B-PUBLIC-Viet-Nam-Fiscal-Impact-Study.pdf World Bank (2011). Viet Nam Country Gender Assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank.     ■ Trung Xuan Hoang is a research fellow at the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences. He received his Ph.d. in Economics from Deakin University, Australia in 2012. He specializes in applied economics, labor economics, and health economics. His work has been published in leading-refereeing journals such as the Journal of Development Economics, Health Economics, Economic Development and Cultural Change, World Development, and European Review of Agricultural Economics.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Authoritarian legacies have shaped party politics and electoral instability in Asian democracies. The article on the determinants of electoral instability in 19 Asian democracies found that contained electoral competition during the pre-democratic period distorted the formation of free and fair electoral environments after democratic transition.[1] This briefing focuses on how different types of authoritarian regimes before democratic transition influence the development of democratic party systems after transition and over time.   This essay has implications for the current debate on the crisis of representative democracy in Asia. Although highly stabilized electorates may strengthen rather than reduce political polarization, past studies suggest that high levels of electoral volatility can be a major roadblock to democratic consolidation, programmatic representation, political accountability, and good governance.[2] Where volatility is so high that voters feel disillusioned with the existing system and become ambivalent about the “relative merits of the democratic status quo versus strong, decisive, albeit less democratic, leadership,”[3] such disillusionment and ambivalence may pave the way for the electoral success of illiberal politicians, such as Duterte of the Philippines, and the rise in support for anti-political-establishment parties.[4]   Overall Electoral Volatility in Asia, 1948-2017   Original data on all 154 elections in 19 Asian democracies, broadly defined as all democracies in the Asian continent, namely from the regions of East, Southeast, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East, since the end of WWII, were collected and analyzed. To determine which countries and which time periods to include, Polity scores that classify a political regime ranging from 6 to 10 as “democracy” were utilized.   Electoral volatility was measured using Pedersen’s index as it is commonly used in the political science literature and captures “the net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers.”[5] Specifically, it is called total electoral volatility (TEV), as it is calculated by estimating the difference between the vote share of the ith party at a given election (t) and the vote share of the same ith party at the election immediately prior (t-1), whose absolute values are then summed up and divided by 2. Therefore, to measure electoral volatility meaningfully for all occasions, a country is required to hold two elections in a row under “democracy” status and without interruption.   Figure 1 presents the mean volatility since the first democratic elections for 19 countries in Asia. The volatility scores range from 0 to 100 on a continuous scale, with higher scores indicating higher volatility. The average electoral volatility for the whole period in Asia is 18.7 percent. Compared with democracies in other regions, this is higher than the levels obtained in more consolidated Western European democracies but lower than those observed in other newly democratic regions, such as Latin America, Africa, and post-communist Europe. Yet, given that two-thirds of Asian democracies display an average level of 20 percent or higher, most countries in the continent seem to experience enduring systemic electoral instability.   Figure 1. Average Volatility Scores in Asia: East, Southeast, South, Central Asia, and the Middle East Source: Lee and Casal Bértoa (2021)   Further looking into the different sub-regions of Asia, no clear trend is visible thus far across East, Southeast, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East. Within the sub-regions, countries like Japan (East Asia), Israel (Middle East), Sri Lanka (South Asia), Georgia (Central Asia), and Myanmar (Southeast Asia) are all among the most electorally stable, while South Korea (East Asia), Turkey (Middle East), Pakistan (South Asia), Kyrgyzstan (Central Asia), and the Philippines (Southeast Asia) are located at the opposite end of the volatility spectrum.   Over time, however, with an exception of the three most consolidated democracies in the continent (i.e. India, Israel, and Japan) together with Indonesia and Taiwan, in the other continuous Asian democracies, namely East Timor, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Turkey, electoral volatility scores have never been so low as during the current decade. [6]   Authoritarian Legacies as Determinants of Electoral Instability in Asia   In explaining what shapes electoral volatility in Asia, there are two clear reasons as to why the impact of authoritarian legacies is focused on in this study. First, while scholars have significantly contributed to understanding the causes of electoral volatility, they tend to focus on some common and conventional factors explaining electoral stability, such as political institutions and social cleavages, with a few exceptions of recent studies. Second, Asian democracies are ideal to examine the impact of authoritarian legacies, because, in contrast to other regions where all countries had an authoritarian past under military dictatorships, such as Latin America, or experienced the same type of legacy (e.g., communism in Eastern Europe, fascism in Southern Europe) before transition, Asia presents a rich variation in types of authoritarian legacies: communist (e.g., Mongolia), non-communist one-party state (e.g., Taiwan, Malaysia), military (e.g., South Korea, Thailand), personalist (e.g., Philippines, Nepal), and no legacy (e.g., Israel, India). Thus it is expected that this rich variation in authoritarian legacies will help to explain some variation of electoral volatility in Asia.   Recently, some Asian scholars have paid attention to the role of a country’s authoritarian past before democratic transition in shaping electoral stability after democratization.[7] With particular reference to some of the most highly institutionalized party systems in Asia – Taiwan and Malaysia – which have carried with them significant authoritarian legacies, the basic notion is that in these systems, hegemonic parties were dominant in the past. This helps to manage low levels of electoral volatility due to some constraints on competition. However, while contained electoral competition during the pre-democratic period may distort the formation of free and fair electoral environments after democratic transition takes place, this study argues that it may also be true that not all authoritarian regimes are the same.   That is, the detrimental impact of authoritarian legacies on democratic party system development depends on the degree to which they disrupt political development after transition. In countries where strong authoritarian parties existed, the same parties tend to re-emerge after transition because voters already have some attachment to them, and thus the level of electoral instability is expected to be lower. On the other hand, if parties were created by and strongly linked to authoritarian dictators, these artificially created parties to fall apart and electoral volatility is likely to be high after transition. Lastly, in countries where parties were non-existent or simply functioned as an electoral vehicle for military cliques, electoral instability is even higher as voters lack cues or attachment that will help them to make choices in a routinized manner. In sum, even after transition, the existence and re-emergence of hegemonic parties help the democratic system to manage low levels of electoral volatility. Although authoritarian interruption should undermine party system stabilization, certain types of authoritarian legacies were found to be less detrimental to electoral stability than other types.   Impact of the Three Types of Authoritarianism on Post-Transition Electoral Volatility   To estimate electoral volatility varying within and across countries, multivariate statistical models were employed to measure the impact of authoritarian legacies while controlling for various conventional factors proven in the literature to be influential. To present the results intuitively, the effect of authoritarian legacies in different measures after holding all other variables constant was graphically described.   Figure 2 presents two panels. The left panel shows an aggregate impact of pre-transition authoritarianism based on the multivariate analysis, and the right panel displays the effect of its legacy types based on the multivariate analysis. Figure 2 suggests that authoritarian legacies are indeed strong predictors for explaining electoral dynamics in Asian democracies and increase electoral instability in particular. For example, on the left panel, political systems with authoritarian legacies are characterized by 1.9 times higher volatility than those without such a legacy. On the other hand, the right panel shows that authoritarian legacies have a substantively significant as well as nuanced impact on political systems after transition: countries with military legacies show 85 percent higher volatility, while those with personalist authoritarian legacies display 58 percent higher volatility compared to countries without any authoritarian legacy. Countries with party-based authoritarian legacies also show 27 percent higher volatility than those without authoritarian interludes which is, however, not statistically significant.   Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Authoritarian Legacy in Different Measures Notes: Estimation is based on the multivariate regression analysis. A baseline category is “no authoritarian legacy.”   In summary, as shown in the figure above, it can be observed that electoral volatility is lower in countries where political parties could participate in free (even if not always fair) elections or played a monopolistic ideological role (even if under authoritarian conditions — e.g., Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia) than in countries where they presented a functional (simply at the service of the particular dictator or military clique in power) and non-ideological character or they were simply inexistent (e.g., Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, Thailand). In the latter countries, electoral instability has become endemic.   Does this mean that countries with military or personalist authoritarian legacies are doomed to experience eternal instability? There is no way to change the past, but eventually, one can change the institutional design or introduce different economic policies that might help to stabilize electoral competition.   Impact of Authoritarian Legacies in Conjunction with Age of Democracy   Further to these findings, the effect of historical legacies in conjunction with time factors and the extent to which they are influential is examined. Taking into consideration that research on electoral volatility in Asia has emphasized the role of 1) the passage of time and 2) the characteristics of pre-transition regimes in shaping electoral dynamics and party systems,[8] the impact of the interplay between types of authoritarian legacies and age of democracy is further examined. To clearly illustrate how the nature of pre-transition regimes has long-run effects, co-varying with the maturation of democracy in reshaping electoral dynamics, graphical display is once again relied on. The power of this interaction effect is presented as plots in Figure 3.   Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism Type over Age of Democracy Notes: Estimation is based on the multivariate regression analysis. A baseline category is “no authoritarian legacy.”   According to Figure 3, immediately after democratic transition (i.e. at the observed minimum “age of democracy” value), authoritarian legacies have significant effects on volatility, particularly for political systems with military or personalist legacies (2.8 and 2.6 times higher volatility, respectively, vis-à-vis those with no legacy). These effects still last but are less considerable after the passage of the observed mean “age of democracy” value (22 years). Compared to political systems with no authoritarian interlude, those with military legacies show 2 times higher volatility. However, with sufficient maturation of democracy (at the observed maximum value of 67 years), the difference in volatility between countries with no legacy and those with military legacies is no longer statistically significant.   All is not Lost but We Need to Earn It   The findings of this research indicate that there is hope behind the shadow of the authoritarian past, provided that post-transitional leaders manage to keep democracy as “the only game in town.”[9] This is because, following the analyses, it is possible for the routinization in political behavior generated by years of democratic experience to wash away even the worst authoritarian heritage. This is certainly good news for countries like Mongolia or East Timor which, despite years of authoritarianism, can expect a brighter (or more democratic) future. Consequently, by putting democracy at risk, political leaders in countries like India, the Philippines, and, most dramatically, Kyrgyzstan, might have re-started the clock, putting in peril not just democracy but the stabilization of party politics in the near future.   All in all, this analysis shows how history can be a millstone that determines the future of party politics and should not be tossed in the bin during political analysis. However, and more importantly, for the future of electoral politics and democracy in the region, political leaders — if willing to do so — can amend the mistakes of their fathers.      [1] This research is published in the academic journal previously. Don. S Lee and Fernando Casal Bertoa, “On the Causes of Electoral Volatility in Asia since 1948.” Party Politics, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688211046858. [2] For example, Mainwaring, Scott. 2018. Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay and Collapse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [3] Hicken, Allen. 2015. "Party and party system institutionalization in the Philippines (324)." In Allen Hicken and Erik Martínez Kuhonta (eds.) Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies and the Shadows of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [4] Casal Bértoa, Fernando and José Rama. 2020. “Party Decline or Social Transformation? Economic, Institutional and Sociological Change and the Rise of Anti-Political-Establishment Parties in Western Europe.” European Political Science Review 12, no. 4: 503-523. [5] Pedersen, Mogens. 1979. “The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility.” European Journal of Political Research 7, no. 1: 3. [6] Casal Bértoa, Fernando. 2017. “Separation, Divorce or Harakiri? The ‘Crisis’ of Asian Democracies in Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Northeast Asian History 14, no. 2: 76. [7] Hicken, Allen, and Erik Martínez Kuhonta (eds.). 2015. Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies and the Shadows of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [8] Ibid. [9] Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.     ■ Don S. Lee is an Assistant Professor in the School of Governance and the Department of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University (South Korea). Formerly, he held a position as an Assistant Professor and a Leverhulme Trust fellow at the University of Nottingham (United Kingdom). He has published 18 peer-reviewed articles on politics and public administration in Asia, including Comparative Political Studies, Governance, Journal of East Asian Studies, Party Politics, Policy & Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Public Administration, Public Administration Review, Public Management Review, and Regulation & Governance. His book, titled “The President’s Dilemma in Asia,” is under contract (Oxford University Press). ■ Fernando Casal Bértoa is an Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham (United Kingdom). He is co-director of REPRESENT: Research Centre for the Study of Parties and Democracy. Member of the OSCE/ODIHR “Core Group of Political Party Experts”, he is also an International IDEA and Westminster Foundation for Democracy collaborator as well as Venice Commission and United Nations expert. His latest monograph is titled Party System Closure: Party Alliances, Government Alternative, and Democracy in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2021).     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Overview of the State of Indonesian Democracy   Indonesia, which is currently entering the 24 years of the reform era, has experienced a recent democratic setback. This can be seen from the scores of Indonesia's democracy index published by the Indonesian Central Statistics Agency, the Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).   The Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) published by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS) showed a slight increase in the area of civil liberties However, scores of political rights and democratic institutions showed a decline in 2020. The score of political rights had increased in 2019 to 70.71 from 65.79 of the previous year, but it decreased to 67.85 in 2020. The score of democratic institutions had increased in 2019 from the previous year but decreased to 75.66 in 2020 (BPS, 2020).   Additionally, the Freedom House’s democracy index has reported the continuous fall of Indonesia’s democratic performance over the last three years with a score of 62/100 in 2019, 61/100 in 2020, to 59/100 in 2021 (Freedom House, 2021). While categorizing Indonesian democracy as “partly free,” the Freedom House assessed that Indonesia is still struggling to face the challenges of systemic corruption, discrimination and violence against minority groups, and politicized defamation and blasphemy. Accordingly, the Freedom House highlighted the issue of political rights and civil liberties as problematic in the state of Indonesian democracy.   The EIU ranked Indonesia 64th globally and 11th in the Asia and Australia region. This placement is based on scores on five assessment indicators, namely 7.92 for the electoral process and pluralism, 7.14 for government functions, 6.11 for political participation, 5.63 for democratic political culture, and 5.59 for civil liberties. Indonesia's democracy index score reached 7.03 in 2015. Unfortunately, this number has continued to decline in the last five years, scoring 6.97 in 2016 and decreasing again to 6.39 in 2017 and 2018. However, Indonesia's democracy score had slightly increased to 6.48 in 2019 before finally dropping again in 2020 to 6.3, placing Indonesia as a flawed democratic country (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2020, 10-29).   From the data above, three issues of democratic institutions, discrimination and violence against minority groups, and civil liberties are commonly observed throughout the different indices for causing the decline of Indonesian democracy. This paper focuses on three specific factors that contribute to this setback; the corruption of political officials and efforts to weaken the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi; KPK), identity politics by political elites, and the overreaction of state officials in responding to freedom of expression.   Corruptions and Efforts to Weaken Anti-Corruption Measures   Eradication of corruption and the establishment of an independent anti-corruption institution is one of the reform agendas formulated more than 20 years ago but has not been fully successful until recently. Cases of corruption that ensnare political officials continue to occur, both at the national and regional levels. The minister of social affairs and the speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR) are the most vulnerable positions to being involved in corruption cases. Since 2003, the KPK has named 12 ministers as suspects from 3 different periods of government. (Kompas, 2020).   Among the 12 ministers charged for corruption, 3 of them served as ministers of social affairs. One of the ministers even embezzled social assistance funds amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The alleged ministers were caught in corruption cases on the grounds of abuse of power, procurement of goods through direct appointments, bribes and gratuities, and collecting funds through officials in their ministries. The sentences handed down to them varied from 1 to 10 years in prison (Kompas, 2020).   In the legislative sphere, 3 DPR speakers were entangled in corruption. Taufik Kurniawan (PAN faction) was caught in a corruption case as he received a cash reward of Rp 4.85 billion (more than US$300 thousand) for managing the Special Allocation Fund (DAK) for Kebumen and Purbalingga regencies. Setya Novanto, from the Golkar Party faction, was caught in a corruption case for intervening in the budgeting process and procurement of goods and services in the e-KTP project which caused state losses of Rp. 2.3 trillion or more than US$160 million. Azis Syamsuddin, the successor of Setya Novanto, also tripped over the DAK. He was caught in a corruption case related to the handling of the alleged corruption case of the DAK in the Central Lampung district (Tempo, 2021).   At the regional level, 429 local heads who were directly elected through elections were caught in corruption cases. Their abuse of power included accepting bribes, procuring goods and services, and infrastructure development, extending agreements and buying and selling official positions (Detik, 2021).   In addition to the rampant corruption cases of political officials, efforts to weaken the KPK through the revision of the KPK Law and the National Insight Test (TWK) also contributed to the decline in Indonesia's corruption perception index score. Since 2001, the score of the Indonesian corruption perceptions index has been consistently increasing. However, when the government revised the KPK Law in 2019, the corruption perception index score in 2020 decreased significantly from 40 (2019) to 37 (2020). It also caused Indonesia's ranking to drop from rank 85 (2019) to rank 102 (2020) out of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2021).   In addition to the revision of the KPK Law, the transfer of the status of KPK employees to civil servants (ASN) through the assessment for the national insight test (TWK) is also controversial because the TWK is not regulated in the law but is still included by the KPK leadership. This test led to the dismissal of 51 KPK employees who did not pass the test. Therefore, several academics and human rights and anti-corruption activists, concluded that the TWK was used as a tool by the KPK leadership to get rid of the employees based on subjectivity (Transparency International, 2021).   Spread of Identity Politics   After the 1998 reform, Indonesia was lined up as a model of a tolerant country where democracy and religion could coexist. Unfortunately, recently the phenomenon of identity politics has strengthened. Discrimination and violence against minority groups did not stop during the COVID-19 pandemic and the public highlights 5 popular such cases. First, the mass organizations were forcibly disbanded and subjected to physical and verbal violence during a midodareni event (a traditional Javanese ethnic event before the wedding day), in Surakarta because it was deemed not in accordance with Islamic law. Second, the destruction of the Al Hidayah Musala (a place of worship for Muslims) in North Minahasa, where the majority of the population is Christian. Third, the officials sealed the tomb of the Karuhan Urang, a traditional leader in the Kuningan Regency, arguing that it did not have a building permit (IMB). Fourth, the authority did not allow the construction of the St. Joseph Parish Church in Karimun although it already had an IMB permit. Fifth, the Sukabumi Regency government sealed the doors of mosques belonging to Ahmadiyah congregations with the claim of avoiding the risk of another arson incident (2008) (Indonesia Indicator, 2020).   The rise of identity politics cannot be separated from the behaviors of political elites who tend to take advantage of this issue during local elections. Candidates and their supporters tend to take advantage of identity politics surrounding religious and ethnic differences to win the elections. Therefore, in almost every election the jargon “choose natives of the region” or “choose the same religion” appears. The campaign strategy of candidates focuses on the religious or ethnic background of themselves and their partners (Romli 2021, 141).   The identity politics-driven case that caught the public's attention the most was the Jakarta governor election in 2017 as a series of demonstrations colored this election. The protesters demanded that the candidate for deputy governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnamato be punished because his speech in the Thousand Islands was considered blasphemy against Islam. Fondly called Ahok, he was a double minority, ethnic Chinese and Christian. The largest mass demonstration was known as the 212 Defending Islam Action (taken from the date of the demonstration on December 2, 2016) (Romli 2021, 142).   Even though Ahok was imprisoned, the 212 masses still hold demonstrations which are called the 212 Reunion, every December 2. Apart from commemorating their 'success' in imprisoning 'blasphemers', the supporters of the 212 Reunion also demanded the government to repatriate their leader, Rizieq Shihab, from Saudi Arabia. At the 212 Reunion in 2018, they called for not choosing a candidate who supported religious blasphemers in the next presidential election. In 2021 the Jokowi government did not permit them to have a reunion applying the social distance rule of the COVID-19 pandemic (Sindo, 2021).   Limiting Freedom of Expression   The government has not been able to provide a comfortable and safe space for the citizens to express their opinions in public spaces. According to the Advocacy Team for Democracy (TAUD), there were 12 cases of criminalization of activists throughout 2021, and 10 criminalization of activists from 2019 to 2020 (CNN Indonesia, 2021). There are 3 prominent cases that have caught the public's attention the most. These activists were charged with the hate speech article of the Law of Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE). The public knew that they were arrested because of their criticism on social media. One of them criticized the violence in Papua. The other wrote about the poor performance and the conflict of interest of a presidential staff member related to data management for COVID-19 victims (Tempo, 2019; Tirto, 2020). The third criticized the TNI at an offline discussion event (Media Indonesia, 2019).   Demonstrators were also met with violence when they held street protests addressing the revision of the KPK Law which went viral through the hashtag #ReformasiDikorupsi (Reform Corrupted) and against the Omnibus Law. The student demonstrators cast a vote of no confidence because the DPR approved the revision of the KPK Law without listening to the public’s criticism. After #ReformasiDikorupsi trended on Twitter, the movement became a national action. Unfortunately, this led to a riot. Videos showing demonstrators being hit with blunt objects and being kicked circulated on social media. In Jakarta, at least 90 demonstrators were rushed to the Pertamina Central Hospital (RSPP) and KontraS, a human rights organization, noted that at least 5 young people died (Kompas, 2021).   Likewise with the demonstration against the Omnibus Law, according to the Advocacy Team for Democracy, there were at least 390 complaints about acts of violence by the authorities (Kompas, 2021). In addition, according to data from Amnesty International Indonesia, during the protest, there have been 43 incidents of violence by the state apparatus, 402 victims of violence by the state apparatus in 15 provinces, and 6,658 people were arrested including 18 journalists in 21 provinces (Amnesty International Indonesia, 2020). The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) further cited that there were at least 56 cases of violence against journalists on duty during the demonstration (Amnesty International Indonesia, 2020).   Conclusion   This year, Indonesia is celebrating its 24th year of democratic reform. Although procedurally, Indonesia is considered successful in carrying out a peaceful transfer of power, many issues still need to be fixed by the government and its officials to save Indonesia from democratic setbacks.   There are three salient problems to account for the fall of Indonesia's democracy, namely weakening democratic institutions, discrimination and violence against minority groups, and infringement of civil rights. These problems are rooted in the behaviors of the political elites. Many public officials and politicians are corrupted and also have tried to weaken anti-corruption measures. Politicians also used identity politics for their political gain and are contributing to religious and ethnic conflicts. The Indonesian authority is also punishing activists who criticize the government or raise public issues. This trend is shrinking the civic space for freedom of expression.   Eradication of corruption and the establishment of an independent anti-corruption institution is one of the reform agendas that remains as homework for Indonesia. Conflicts between religious communities should be alleviated if the government is consistent in realizing freedom of religion and belief and does not ignore the issue of intolerance. Indonesia's constitution guarantees both religious freedom and freedom of expression. Therefore, the government should provide a comfortable and safe space for its citizens to express their political opinions freely.    References   Amnesty International Indonesia. (2020). Usut Bukti-Bukti Kekerasan Polisi Sepanjang Demo Tolak Omnibus Law (Investigate Evidence of Police Violence During Demonstration Against Omnibus Law). https://www.amnesty.id/usut-bukti-bukti-kekerasan-polisi-sepanjang-demo-tolak-omnibus-law/. 2 December.   CNN Indonesia. (2021). Kriminalisasi Aktivis Disebut Buat Indeks Demokrasi Menurun (Criminalization of Activists is Said to Have Lowered Democracy Index). https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210916034015-20-694978/kriminalisasi-aktivis-disebut-buat-indeks-demokrasi-menurun. 16 September.   Detik. (2021). Pimpinan KPK Catat Ada 429 kepala Daerah Hasil Pilkada Terjerat Korupsi (KPK Leaders Record There are 429 Local Heads from Local Elections Entangled in Corruption). https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5498530/pimpinan-kpk-catat-ada-429-kepala-daerah-hasil-pilkada-terjerat-korupsi. 18 March.   Freedom House. (2021). Freedom in the World 2021, 2020 Indonesia Country Report. https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-net/2021.   Indonesia Indicator. (2020). Menelisik Kasus Diskriminasi Minoritas di Indonesia (Examining Minority Discrimination Cases in Indonesia). https://indonesiaindicator.com/99-publication/release/408-menelisik-kasus-diskriminasi-minoritas-di-indonesia.html. 17 August.   Kompas. (2020). Deretan Menteri yang Dijerat KPK dari Era Megawati Hingga Jokowi (Ministers who were Ensnared by the KPK from the Megawati Era to Jokowi). https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/11/26/08214321/deretan-menteri-yang-dijerat-kpk-dari-era-megawati-hingga-jokowi?page=all. 26 November.   Kompas. (2021). Menilik Kembali Aksi #ReformasiDikorupsi Dua Tahun Lalu (Looking Back Action #ReformasiDikorupsi Two Years Ago). https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/09/20/10420161/menilik-kembali-aksi-reformasidikorupsi-dua-tahun-lalu?page=all. 20 September.   Media Indonesia. (2019). Kasus Robertus Robet Ancaman Serius Kebebasan Berkespresi (Robertus Robet Case A Serious Threat to Freedom of Expression). https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/221356/kasus-robertus-robet-ancaman-serius-kebebasan-berekspresi.html. 7 March.   Romli, L. (2021). Politik Identitas Pemilu 2019 dan Masa Depan Demokrasi (Identity Politics for the 2019 Election and the Future of Democracy), in Amalia, L.S. Dinamika Sosial Politik Pemilu Serentak 2019 (Socio-Political Dynamics of the 2019 Simultaneous Elections). Jakarta: LIPI Press. 141-172.   Sindo. (2021). Momen Reuni 212 dari Tahun 2017-2021 (212 Reunion Moment from 2017-2021). https://metro.sindonews.com/read/616379/170/5-momen-reuni-212-dari-tahun-2017-2021-1638421952. 2 December.   Tempo. (2021). Daftar Pimpinan DPR yang Terjerat Kasus Korupsi (List of DPR Leaders Caught in Corruption Cases). https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1510703/daftar-pimpinan-dpr-yang-terjerat-kasus-korupsi.27 September.   Tempo. (2019). Diperiksa Hampir 4 Jam Dandhy Laksono Dibebaskan Polisi (Examined Almost 4 Hours Dandhy Laksono Freed by Police). https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1252907/diperiksa-hampir-4-jam-dandhy-laksono-dibebaskan-polisi/full&view=ok. 27 September.   The Central Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik). (2020). Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia (IDI) Menurut Aspek dan Provinsi (Indonesian Democracy Index by Aspects and Provinces). https://www.bps.go.id/indikator/indikator/view_data/0000/data/599/sdgs_10/1.   The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2020). Democracy Index 2020 In Sickness and in Health? https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/.   Tirto. (2020). Dugaan Rekayasan Kasus Ravio Patra Cara Baru Kriminalisasi Aktivis (Alleged Ravio Patra Case Engineering New Way of Criminalizing Activists). https://tirto.id/dugaan-rekayasa-kasus-ravio-patra-cara-baru-kriminalisasi-aktivis-eRXB. 24 Spril.   Tirto. (2020). Kasus Intoleransi Terus Bersemi Saat Pandemi (Cases of Intolerance Continue to Bloom During a Pandemic). https://tirto.id/kasus-intoleransi-terus-bersemi-saat-pandemi-f5Jb. 11 October.   Transparency International Indonesia. (2021). Pelemahan KPK dan pemecatan pegawai KPK melemahkan reputasi Indonesia di mata dunia (The Weakening of the KPK and the Dismissal of KPK Employees Weakened Indonesia's Reputation in the Eyes of the World). https://ti.or.id/pelemahan-kpk-dan-pemecatan-pegawai-kpk-melemahkan-reputasi-indonesia-di-mata-dunia/.     ■ Luky Sandra Amalia is an Associate Researcher at Research Center for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) ([email protected])     ■ 담당 및 편집:백진경_EAI 연구실장     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Five Divisive and Inequal Democracies Hit by the Pandemic   The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc on public health in most countries, but it has had especially severe effects on five major democracies: the United States, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. These states have five of the highest death tolls and caseloads from COVID-19 of any countries, and all have struggled to control the pandemic. Democracy itself is not the reason for their public health failures. Other democracies, such as Australia and Canada, have not only produced effective public health responses but also taken robust measures to mitigate the pandemic’s effect on inequality.   Instead, the vast social and economic inequalities in these five ethnically and racially diverse countries have made the pandemic harder to control. These states have failed to handle the novel coronavirus in part because they have never addressed their historical internal divides, which COVID-19 has brutally revealed. In addition, leaders in these states who have attacked political systems and social cohesion have hindered the pandemic response.   Today, all five states are extremely economically unequal. The United States is the most economically unequal of the seven developed states in the Group of Seven and has the fourth worst income inequality in the world. Brazil is the most economically unequal country in Latin America, despite efforts by a succession of Brazilian governments to use cash transfers and other programs to combat inequality, and the Philippines also has high income inequality.[1] Indonesia and India both face sharply rising income inequality.[2]   The deep economic and social inequality in the United States, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines has undermined how these states have responded to the pandemic. Beyond revealing inequalities and devastating public health, the pandemic has made socioeconomic inequality worse, and also added to democratic backsliding. In these five states, caseloads and death tolls of the novel coronavirus are falling hardest on racial, ethnic, and sometimes religious minorities and on the poor; poor and minority communities significantly overlap, and many of these same citizens have the preexisting conditions that make them more susceptible to getting extremely sick or dying from COVID-19.   Furthermore, as often has happened during past major emergencies, political leaders have taken advantage of the emergency to corrode democratic norms and institutions—in these five democracies and across the globe.   Populist Leaders Undermine Public Health Responses   Politicians often have only made inequality worse, which further hampered efforts to control the virus. Indeed, the five recent leaders’ rhetoric and policies, combined with their states’ histories of inequality, have ensured the pandemic hits minorities and the poor harder than middle-class, wealthy, and racial, religious, and ethnic majority citizens. In many ways, COVID-19 also has deepened inequality in these countries.   The Donald J. Trump administration, for instance, repeatedly sought to undermine the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which has helped expand access to health insurance, particularly among minorities and the poor. In the end, the Supreme Court rejected overturning the ACA. Overturning the ACA would have resulted in over twenty-one million, mostly lower-income Americans, losing health insurance.[3] The Trump administration also took a hard-line approach to policing and voting rights, refusing to countenance police reforms and trying to undermine voting rights in numerous ways. The effects of this voter suppression fell hardest on the poor and minorities. [4]   Recently, leaders in these large democracies also used public rhetoric to divide and polarize societies, often further harming minority groups. On Twitter, former President Trump routinely claimed that politicians of color such as Georgia gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams and New York Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez were unqualified for office and should be feared; he also routinely demonized immigrants and other minorities as dangers to the United States.[5] Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has claimed that indigenous Brazilians are only now “evolving [into] humans” and complained that Brazilian cavalry had not wiped out more indigenous peoples during the conquest of the Brazilian interior.[6] Bolsonaro’s demonization of indigenous people and evisceration of protections for the Amazon Rainforest have contributed to a wave of illegal mining and foresting and a spike in violence against indigenous people in the Amazon basin.[7]   These policies exacerbated inequality and added to the pandemic. The Trump administration’s campaign against the ACA, for instance, combined with some Republican-led states’ refusal to expand Medicaid to allow their poorer citizens to access the ACA, kept the number of uninsured Americans high and hindered the pandemic response. [8]   Historical inequality is also hindering the vaccine rollout in many of these countries, even though vaccination campaigns are now the best weapon for ultimately controlling the pandemic. Many minority populations in the United States harbor deep distrust of government public health efforts, due to the lasting effects of systemic racism and a history of the U.S. government conducting illegal experiments on minorities (such as the Tuskegee study, which infected Black men with syphilis to study its effects when left untreated) and demonstrating disinterest in issues that damage minorities’ public health (such as the water crisis in Flint, Michigan). A study on views of vaccination conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation found massive skepticism of the COVID-19 vaccine among Black Americans, with nearly 50 percent saying they will not get vaccinated “even if scientists deem it safe and it is available for free to anyone who wants it.” [9]   The populist leaders have also taken anti-science positions in general. Trump repeatedly mocked scientific consensus on effective measures to control the pandemic, adding chaos and confusion to the response effort and polarizing the public in ways that made it harder to develop anti–COVID-19 public health campaigns.[10] Bolsonaro, Jokowi, and Duterte also have denigrated scientific expertise throughout the pandemic, polarizing the response and undermining public health efforts.   These leaders often also have used the pandemic to boost their powers. For example, Modi has used the pandemic to further clamp down on the press, political opponents, and activists. Duterte has used the pandemic, and lockdowns, to clamp down on opponents as well. Meanwhile, the Trump administration stepped up its campaign against nominally independent inspector generals within government agencies during the pandemic and increasingly kept cabinet heads in their positions without congressional approval and against the law, among other efforts.[11] Although the new Joe Biden administration has promised to restore institutions and norms, whether it can fix much of the damage remains unclear.   These five large democracies are part of a global democratic regression. The 2021 version of Freedom in the World, the flagship publication of the monitoring organization Freedom House, was entitled “Democracy Under Siege” and noted that “democracy’s defenders sustained heavy new losses in their struggle against authoritarian foes, shifting the international balance in favor of tyranny. Incumbent leaders increasingly used force to crush opponents and settle scores, sometimes in the name of public health.”   The Way Forward   Without a doubt, the five large democracies of the United States, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines are plagued by massive political, economic, and social problems. These challenges have been exacerbated by polarizing and often ineffective top leadership, both before and during the pandemic. The enormity and deep roots of these problems mean they cannot be solved rapidly or easily. Any list of ideas for progress can only be a jumping-off point. Some U.S. politics experts, for instance, believe political polarization, socioeconomic inequality, and the breakdown of social cohesion have become so bad that the country’s politics are unsalvageable and the United States has essentially become ungovernable. [12]   Yet effective governance has both policy and political rewards, even for highly polarizing leaders as it bolsters leaders’ popularity and potentially their election prospects. The severe effects of the crisis, meanwhile, offer an opportunity for leaders to go big in response and push major reforms to address their countries’ deep economic and political challenges. Many of these reforms should create a policy agenda focused on what Zia Qureshi of the Brookings Institution calls “predistribution”—putting measures in place that address inequality and making growth more inclusive from the bottom up. [13]   Even in these five large and highly polarized democracies, polling suggests that a significant percentage of people want to overcome polarization in dealing with COVID-19—and possibly in combating broader issues of inequality as well. For example, despite the United States’ seemingly bitter COVID-19–related partisanship, polling has shown that Americans generally want to work together to address the virus and that a significant majority of Americans share views about the best ways to address COVID-19.[14] More broadly, research by the organization More in Common suggests that, across multiple countries, “the pandemic has created a new sense of togetherness” and some common desire to work together to solve problems and rebuild public trust, which is essential to government functioning, in a pandemic or in normal times. [15]   During this difficult time, leaders should push for systemic, democratizing reforms of political and electoral systems, and punish actors who aggressively promote polarization. This could include promoting ranked-choice voting, public financing of campaigns, and the drawing of fair, representative districts for state and federal elections, among other measures. The Biden administration has embraced comprehensive governance reforms designed to bolster voting rights and curtail partisan gerrymandering, which tends to dilute the power of minority voters.[16] Ultimately, as in the 2022 Philippine presidential election, voters will have the final say.■     [1] Schaeffer, “6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S.”; Juzhong Zhuang, “The Recent Trend of Income Inequality in Asia and How Policy Should Respond,” Group of 24 and Freidrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York, October 2018, http://g24.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Rising_income_inequality_in_Asia.pdf; Tjoe, “Two Decades of Economic Growth Benefited Only the Richest 20%.”; “Income Inequality in India Continues to Rise: Report,” Wire, November 19, 2020, http://thewire.in/economy/income-inequality-india-china-report. [2] Reed Abelson and Abby Goodnough, “If the Supreme Court Ends Obamacare, Here’s What It Would Mean,” New York Times, February 10, 2021, http://nytimes.com/article/supreme-court-obamacare-case.html; Andrew Keshner, “Obamacare is Closing the Coverage Gap Between Rich and Poor, Black and White,” MarketWatch, August 20, 2019, http://marketwatch.com/story/obamacare-is-closing-the-coverage-divide-between-rich-and-poor-black-and-white-2019-08-19. [3] Chris Megerian and Noah Bierman, “Trump Ignores Calls for Police Reforms,” Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2020, http://latimes.com/politics/story/2020-06-04/trump-ignores-calls-for-police-reforms; Joel Shannon, “USA Today Poll: Americans Want Major Police Reform, More Focus on Serious Crime,” USA Today, June 29, 2020, http://usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/29/us-police-reform-poll-finds-support-more-training-transparency/3259628001; Perry Bacon Jr., “Five Ways Trump and GOP Officials Are Undermining the Election Process,” FiveThirtyEight, August 11, 2020, http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/five-ways-trump-and-gop-officials-are-undermining-the-election-process; Theodore R. Johnson, “The New Voter Suppression,” Brennan Center for Justice, January 16, 2020, http://brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-voter-suppression. [4] Katherine Schaeffer, “6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, February 7, 2020, http://pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economic-inequality-in-the-u-s; Valentina, “Brazil is Latin America’s Most Unequal Country in Terms of Income Distribution,” Brazil Reports, January 21, 2019, https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/inequality-and-social-unrest-latin-america-tocqueville-paradox-revisited; Anakwa Dwamena, “How Jair Bolsonaro and the Coronavirus Put Brazil’s Systemic Racism on Display,” New Yorker, July 9, 2020, http://newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-jair-bolsonaro-and-the-coronavirus-put-brazils-systemic-racism-on-display. [5] Eugene Robinson, “Trump Stokes Resentment Toward Minorities. Republicans Just Smile.” Washington Post, November 5, 2018, http://washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-stokes-resentment-toward-minorities-republicans-just-smile/2018/11/05/10e059e0-e13b-11e8-8f5f-a55347f48762_story.html; Eugene Scott, “Trump’s Most Insulting—and Violent—Language Is Often Reserved for Immigrants,” Washington Post, October 2, 2019, http://washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/02/trumps-most-insulting-violent-language-is-often-reserved-immigrants. [6] Fiona Watson, “Bolsonaro’s Election Is Catastrophic News for Brazil’s Indigenous Tribes,” Guardian, October 31, 2018, http://theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/31/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-indigenous-tribes-mining-logging; “Brazil’s Indigenous to Sue Bolsonaro for Saying They’re ‘Evolving,’” Reuters, January 24, 2020, http://reuters.com/article/us-brazil-indigenous/brazils-indigenous-to-sue-bolsonaro-for-saying-theyre-evolving-idUSKBN1ZN1TD; Katy Watson, “The Racism Denier in Charge of Defending Black Rights in Brazil,” BBC, February 15, 2020, http://bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51501111. [7] Letícia Casado and Ernesto Londoño, “Under Brazil’s Far-Right Leader, Amazon Protections Slashed and Forests Fall,” New York Times, July 28, 2019, http://nytimes.com/2019/07/28/world/americas/brazil-deforestation-amazon-bolsonaro.html; Shanna Hanbury, “Murders of Indigenous Leaders in Brazilian Amazon Hits Highest Level in Two Decades,” Mongabay, December 14, 2019, http://news.mongabay.com/2019/12/murders-of-indigenous-leaders-in-brazil-amazon-hit-highest-level-in-two-decades. [8] Frank J. Thompson, “Six Ways Trump Has Sabotaged the Affordable Care Act,” Brookings Institution, October 9, 2020, http://brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/10/09/six-ways-trump-has-sabotaged-the-affordable-care-act; Phil McCausland, “Residents Suffer as Mississippi and 13 Other States Debate Medicaid Expansion,” NBC News, November 4, 2019, http://nbcnews.com/news/us-news/residents-suffer-mississippi-13-other-states-debate-medicaid-expansion-n1075661; Dylan Scott, “Thousands Will Go Uninsured in the COVID-19 Outbreak Because Republicans Rejected Medicaid Expansion,” Vox, May 5, 2020, http://vox.com/2020/5/5/21247204/coronavirus-unemployment-medicaid-eligibility-health-insurance. [9] “New Nationwide Poll by the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Undefeated Reveals Distrust of the Health Care System Among Black Americans,” Kaiser Family Foundation, October 13, 2020, http://kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/press-release/new-nationwide-poll-by-the-kaiser-family-foundation-and-the-undefeated-reveals-distrust-of-the-health-care-system-among-black-americans. [10] Zeke Miller and Jill Colvin, “Trump Attacks Dr. Anthony Fauci, Says ‘People Are Tired of Hearing’ Him and ‘All These Idiots’ on Coronavirus,” Chicago Tribune, October 19, 2020, http://chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-nw-trump-fauci-coronavirus-20201019-rofykxwrabcxdghjpa3r6tdjmu-story.html; Toluse Olorunnipa, Ariana Eunjung Cha, and Laurie McGinley, “Drug Promoted by Trump as Coronavirus ‘Game Changer’ Increasingly Linked to Deaths,” Washington Post, May 15, 2020, http://washingtonpost.com/politics/drug-promoted-by-trump-as-coronavirus-game-changer-increasingly-linked-to-deaths/2020/05/15/85d024fe-96bd-11ea-9f5e-56d8239bf9ad_story.html; Libby Cathey, “Timeline: Tracking Trump Alongside Scientific Developments on Hydroxychloroquine,” ABC News, August 8, 2020, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-tracking-trump-alongside-scientific-developments-hydroxychloroquine/story?id=72170553; Libby Cathey, “Trump, Downplaying Virus, Has Mocked Wearing Masks for Months,” ABC News, October 2, 2020, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-downplaying-virus-mocked-wearing-masks-months/story?id=73392694; Robin Givhan, “Trump’s Refusal to Wear Face Masks Turned Them Into a Sad National Symbol,” Washington Post, October 3, 2020, http://washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/03/trumps-refusal-wear-face-masks-turned-them-into-sad-national-symbol; Michael D. Shear and Sarah Mervosh, “Trump Encourages Protest Against Governors Who Have Imposed Virus Restrictions,” New York Times, April 17, 2020, http://nytimes.com/2020/04/17/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-governors.html. [11] “Under a Lawless Trump, Our System of Checks and Balances Is Being Destroyed,” Washington Post, September 18, 2020, http://washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/18/trump-law-checks-balances/?arc404=true; Kimberly Wehle, “Congress Has Lost Its Power Over Trump,” Atlantic, February 4, 2020, http://theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/checks-and-balances-trump-has-swept-away/606013; Glenn C. Altschuler, “President Trump’s Assault on Checks and Balances: Five Acts in Four Weeks,” Hill, February 24, 2020, http://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/484299-president-trumps-assault-on-checks-and-balances-five-acts-in-four-weeks; Melissa Quinn, “The Internal Watchdogs Trump Has Fired or Replaced,” CBS News, May 19, 2020, http://cbsnews.com/news/trump-inspectors-general-internal-watchdogs-fired-list; Becca Damante, “At Least 15 Trump Officials Do Not Hold Their Positions Lawfully,” Just Security, September 17, 2020, http://justsecurity.org/72456/at-least-15-trump-officials-do-not-hold-their-positions-lawfully; Kyle Cheney, “Trump Calls on GOP State Legislatures to Overturn Election Results,” Politico, November 21, 2020, http://politico.com/news/2020/11/21/trump-state-legislatures-overturn-election-results-439031. [12] Thomas B. Edsall, “Is America Ungovernable Now?,” New York Times, January 20, 2021, http://nytimes.com/2021/01/20/opinion/joe-biden-inauguration.html. [13] Zia Qureshi, “Tackling the Inequality Pandemic.” Brookings Institution paper, 17 Nov 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/tackling-the-inequality-pandemic-is-there-a-cure/ [14] Quarcoo and Kleinfeld, “Can the Coronavirus Heal Polarization?”; Jamie Ballard, “Two-Thirds of Americans Would Support Their State Instituting a One-Month COVID-19 Lockdown,” YouGov, November 10, 2020, http://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2020/11/10/americans-support-covid-19-lockdowns. [15] “The New Normal?,” More in Common, September 2020, http://moreincommon.com/newnormal. [16] “Biden Announces a First Priority for a Biden Administration Will Be Comprehensive Reforms, as Reflected in H.R. 1,” Democracy 21, April 17, 2020, http://democracy21.org/news-press/press-releases/biden-announces-a-first-priority-for-a-biden-administration-will-be-comprehensive-reforms-as-reflected-in-h-r-1; Kim Soffen, “How Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black People of Political Power,” Washington Post, June 9, 2016, http://washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/09/how-a-widespread-practice-to-politically-empower-african-americans-might-actually-harm-them; Olga Pierce and Kate Rabinowitz, “‘Partisan’ Gerrymandering Is Still About Race,” ProPublica, October 9, 2017, http://propublica.org/article/partisan-gerrymandering-is-still-about-race.     ■ This article is adapted from the CFR Discussion Paper “COVID-19 and its Effect on Inequality and Democracy: A Study of Five Large Democracies,” which can be viewed at: https://www.cfr.org/report/covid-19-and-its-effect-inequality-and-democracy   ■ Joshua Kurlantzick is Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations ([email protected])     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경_EAI 연구실장     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]