Introduction   Direct democracy includes people’s initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites where citizens vote on specific policies instead of electing candidates. Some scholars limit the scope of direct democracy to mechanisms where secret balloting is conducted. [1] However, others acknowledge citizen assemblies and public participation in government planning and budgeting as equally important forms of direct democracy. [2][3][4]    In a new set of studies conducted under the Asia Democracy Research Network, the broader view of direct democracy—one that encompasses both referendums, recall votes for elected officials, and citizen participation in the budget process—was used to examine the nature and characteristics of direct democracy in seven Asian nations. Each country study explored existing direct democracy mechanisms and the contexts that shaped their emergence. The key mechanisms identified in the studies were referendums, recall of public officials, and people’s initiatives. The various authors examined the claims for or against these mechanisms, and identified the actors, demographics, and levels of government involved in their implementation. They also explored the effectiveness of direct democracy mechanisms in fostering reform and improving the overall quality of democracy. Finally, they provided overviews of the new trends, including the use of digital technology, that are emerging in the exercise of direct democracy.   Referendums, Recalls, and Petitions   The evolution of direct democracy in Asia can be better understood by looking at the underlying historical context. For instance, the rise of vote-based direct democratic mechanisms can be linked to the international surge of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s. [5] The Philippines provides an interesting case of instituting direct democracy mechanisms after the removal of an authoritarian government in 1986, as I discuss in my own paper, “Direct Democracy in the Philippines.” [6] In the Philippines, a new Constitution providing the framework for democratic governance was passed in 1987. Among its key provisions was the people’s initiative, which is one of the modes for amending the Constitution. A people’s initiative requires a petition of at least twelve percent of the total voters registered under the Commission on Elections, among which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent of that district’s registered voters.   The Philippine Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989 is an enabling act allowing voters to directly initiate the passage of new laws and to call for national and local referendums. The 2019 plebiscite on Bangsamoro autonomy and the 2021 referendum on the partition of the Palawan province are two recent examples of Philippine direct democracy. These exercises were undertaken to obtain consent from local residents to create a new region, in the case of the Bangsamoro plebiscite, and to get the people’s approval to divide a province, in the case of the Palawan referendum.   The people’s initiative is a mechanism that allows voters to petition the Philippine government to place new policy proposals on the ballot. One such example is the 2014 People's Initiative Against Pork Barrel (PIAP). In a 2013 political scandal, legislators and officials from national agencies were implicated in the misuse of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), a lump-sum discretionary fund allocated to each member of Congress to make spending decisions on priority government projects. The alleged corruption triggered the One Million People’s March and other protest actions. Under the 2014 PIAP's proposed Pork Barrel Abolition Act, all budgets submitted to Congress would contain only itemized appropriations, except funds for relief and rescue operations during disasters and funds for intelligence work and security. However, this citizen-led initiative did not succeed, as it failed to collect the required number of signatures from voters.   In Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Arithat Bunthueng’s paper, “Direct Democracy in Thailand,” they discuss how the referendum has been used in Thailand to get the people’s approval on changes to the Constitution, including those made in 2007 and the most recent revisions drafted in 2016. [7] Issues surrounding the Constitution were not fully discussed prior to the 2016 referendum, as the military government curtailed debates and stifled any form of opposition against the proposed charter. When the referendum was held, 61 percent of voters chose to ratify the new Constitution. Under the new constitution, which was officially promulgated in 2017, the prime minister does not need to be an elected member of the House, and would be chosen by the full Parliament, including the 250 members of the Senate who are appointed by the military. That said, the current constitution also provides for a system of people’s initiatives to recommend legislation and recall elected officials. Under this institutional arrangement, at least 10,000 signatures are needed to petition the House of Representatives to deliberate on proposed policies, as well as to propose local ordinances or to remove local officials. On the other hand, no less than 50,000 voter signatures are necessary to propose amendments to the Constitution.   Referendums have become a political mechanism and no longer reflect the will of the public in Thailand. There is no way to guarantee that a referendum initiated by the people is held. Though people’s initiatives have increased in popularity, few bills pass through Parliament and become law, since any budget-related bills must be endorsed by the Prime Minister. The recall mechanism is frequently used, but as a political tool to foster authoritarian control rather than to promote democracy, or as a way for the legislature to remove people from political office in the aftermath of a coup d’état. The first such instance was the recall of a member of the Human Rights Commission by a resolution of the newly formed National Legislative Assembly following the military coup in 2006. Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was also recalled by the National Legislative Assembly, which was established after the 2014 coup.   In the paper “Examining Direct Democracy in Indonesia,” Devi Darmawan and Sri Nuryanti explain that the referendum was authorized as a means of amending the 1945 Constitution under Law Number 5/1985. [8] However, this rule is no longer valid, having been revoked in 1999. A notable example of a referendum being conducted in Indonesia was when the residents of East Timor, which was annexed by Indonesia under the Soeharto presidency during the New Order period, were asked whether they wanted to remain a province of Indonesia or become an independent state. The referendum was held following a United Nations (UN) resolution calling for the right to self-determination of the East Timorese people. The economic crisis and political reforms in Indonesia facilitated the government's decision to hold the May 1998 referendum under UN supervision.   In the Verité Research paper, “Promoting Democracy through Direct Public Engagement: The Sri Lankan Experience,” the authors discuss the origins of Sri Lanka’s Westminster parliamentary structure, which was introduced in 1944. [9] The institutions established under this structure were governed by Commonwealth parliamentary traditions, in addition to the constitution that was in effect at the time. Through these traditions, citizens can directly engage in government through instruments including Private Member Bills, Public Petitions, and Parliamentary Questions. However, there are challenges to accessing and being able to meaningfully use these mechanisms. In Sri Lanka, a referendum enables people to directly vote to approve or reject a law or proposal. Articles 85 and 86 of the Constitution empower the President to ask the people to provide consent on any bill through a referendum. However, there has been only one referendum in the country, held in December 1982 when President J.R. Jayawardena proposed extending the term of the existing Parliament for six years without conducting elections. The referendum passed with 54.6 percent of voters approving the proposal, thereby extending the term of the current Parliament for a further six years, through 1989.   In “Direct Democracy’s History and Trends in Mongolia,” Tamir Chultemsuren explains that Article 24 of the 1992 Constitution of Mongolia contains the provision on people’s referendums, while the 1995 Law on People’s Referendums specifies that the authority to initiate a national referendum belongs to the President and the Parliament (though approval by one third of its members). [10] The law has several drawbacks, including the restrictions on citizens’ rights to initiate a referendum. It lacks clarity on the preconditions for holding a referendum, and imposes limits on successive referendums, since the cost of organizing a referendum is equivalent to that of a general election. Since the law’s enactment, not a single referendum has been held in the country. In 2016, the Law on People’s Referendums was amended to make it consistent with the Law on General Elections, which incorporated automated election tools into election procedures.   In Malaysia, though there are no legal mechanisms for holding referendums and filing petitions to recall public officials, direct democracy is carried out through non-institutional means. In his paper, “Malaysia’s Ongoing Tussle with Democracy,” Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim describes how citizen initiatives have been launched through online platforms. For example, a petition called #LetakJawatanTajuddin (‘#TajuddinResign’) was started on change.org following a Light Rail Transit (LRT) collision in 2021. [11] The move sought to remove Dato' Sri Tajuddin Abdul Rahman as Chairman of Prasarana, the public transport company operating the LRT. The petition garnered over 100,000 signatures. Although the government did not formally respond to the petition, Dato' Sri Tajuddin was terminated from the position two days after the train crash.   Participatory Planning and Budgeting   Aside from referendums, recall of public officials, and people’s initiatives on policy reform, citizen participation in planning and budgeting, especially at the sub-national level, has become an important feature of direct democracy in Asia. In his paper, “Can Online Citizen Participation Strengthen Direct, Deliberative and Participatory Democracy in India?”, Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay highlights how the emergence of local governance institutions in the early 1990s created significant spaces for public participation in decision-making related to local development. [11] The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, enacted in 1992, made provisions for Gram Sabha (assemblies of all the eligible voters within the territories of Gram Panchayats) and Ward Committees (committees of elected or nominated members in municipal wards with a population of more than 300,000). The acts detailed the functions of Gram Sabha and Ward Committees, respectively, including participation in planning and monitoring of all local development work. Despite being the only institutionalized space for direct participation, however, the experience of implementing Gram Sabha has been mixed. The efficacy of Ward Committees has been even more disappointing, as most state governments and municipalities have not formed or activated these committees.   In the absence of an institutionalized space for public participation in policy planning and monitoring, several civil society organizations and citizen associations have used social accountability and promoted public participation by engaging in participatory data gathering and analysis, sharing findings with public authorities and the media, and negotiating with public institutions responsible for the implementation of programs and policies. Tools used have included Citizen Report Cards, Community Score Cards, and Social Audits. Such initiatives have helped citizens amplify their voices, but fall short of institutionalization and still struggle to scale up public participation. In cases where Social Audits have been institutionalized, for example in the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), implementation has fallen far short of expectations due to the lackadaisical attitude of public institutions and insufficient capacity of local governments.   In the past two decades, Philippine civil society organizations (CSOs) have become critical players in ensuring the integrity of public service delivery. Formal and informal spaces for citizen participation are now available for issues related to public financial management. With the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Philippines developed a decentralized system of government, which incorporated concepts like devolution, funding of local government units (LGUs), and citizen participation. Local development councils in every province, city, municipality, and barangay determine the use of the local development fund, which represents 20 percent of the Internal Revenue Allotment from the national government. As mandated by the law, a quarter of the seats in these councils and other local special bodies (LSBs) are occupied by CSO representatives.   In certain LGUs in the Philippines, such as Naga City, Quezon City, Cagayan de Oro City, and Dumaguete City, the passage of local ordinances led to the creation of People’s Councils, which appoint CSO representatives to LSBs of the city government. In these LGUs, the representation of CSOs in the LSBs usually surpasses the 25 percent minimum requirement under the Local Government Code. The CSO representatives can observe, vote, and participate in the deliberation, prioritization, implementation, and evaluation of city government projects, activities, and programs. They can propose legislation, participate, and vote at the committee level of the elected city legislative council, and act as the people's representatives in the exercise of their right to information on matters of public concern, allowing them access to official records and documents. However, these practices are not standard across the Philippines; CSO participation in many LGUs is nominal and pursued only as a matter of compliance. For participatory planning and budgeting to work well, the Philippines needs to enhance CSO participation in local planning and budgeting through capacity building measures and the development of partnerships with knowledge institutions that will help in data analysis and policy research.   In the case of Thailand, participatory budgeting was first discussed in the Thai National Economic and Social Development Plan for 2008–2012. Section 2 of the Ministry of the Interior’s participatory planning and budgeting strategy emphasized the importance of strengthening local communities through the people's budget. At the sub-national level, there are local governments implementing participatory budgeting, such as the Amnat Charoen Provincial Administrative Organization, the Yala Municipality, the Yala Province, the Ko Kha Subdistrict Municipality, and the Lampang Province.   In Indonesia, various non-government organizations provide technical assistance and training at the local level (province, municipality, or village) on planning and budgeting issues. This became especially significant as the national goverment implemented Village Law No. 6/2014 to accelerate poverty alleviation in the country. The Indonesian government allocates funds to all villages in Indonesia through this program, which has been in effect since 2015. Under the law, villages have the authority to manage their own resources for development purposes. This program has had concrete results, such as the construction of various basic infrastructural amenities in many villages. However, the number of cases of misuse of village funds by village heads shows that there are still serious governance problems relating to program implementation and accountability. In many cases, problems resulted from the ineffective participation of local residents in program implementation.   In Malaysia, there is an increasing presence of CSOs at government-hosted stakeholder engagement events. Such consultations, either through high-level face-to-face meetings or town hall dialogues, have become more widespread in recent years as the government acknowledges the importance of citizen participation in both nation-building and policymaking. Furthermore, government officials can no longer afford to discount strategic partners or casually dismiss their demands, as doing so would severely hurt their reputation and, consequently, their electability, particularly in city-centric and ethnically mixed seats.   Digital Technology and Online Engagement   The use of digital technology and online engagement platforms as direct democratic mechanisms has garnered significant attention in Asia. In India, several governmental initiatives have tried to leverage technology to consult the public when planning and monitoring policies. For example, Mobile Vaani is a mobile voice media platform created by Gram Vaani. It has a unique model enabling people to call a designated number from their basic analog mobile phone and register their complaints/ grievances in their local dialect. The Gram Vaani team monitors the platform and publishes relevant inputs from the people. People can also listen to other people’s recordings, enabling two-way communication. Hence, the platform serves to disseminate information on various issues, including health, education, etc., field the concerns of the people, and communicate these concerns with relevant authorities.   Another example of digital support for direct democracy in India is Jandarpan, an initiative of the Samarthan Centre for Development Support, which has been working to enable participatory governance in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh since 1995. The Jandarpan platform was developed during the pandemic to facilitate migrant workers’ access to benefits from public programs. Jandarpan supported migrants who were stuck without any resources during the lockdown. Returning migrants faced multiple challenges in accessing services and entitlements, such as rations, pensions, or livelihoods, from the state government. Toll-free helpline numbers for migrant workers were not always functional. Samarthan decided to develop the interface to streamline communication between citizens and their local administration. In the beginning, they had limited program integration, incorporating only ration access (under the Public Distribution System) and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), but they expanded the platform over time. The primary function of the platform is to redress the grievances of citizens who are not receiving the benefits to which they are entitled. The platform mediates between the government and citizens, providing support to citizens in filing their complaints online to help overcome the digital access and literacy gap. The platform also allows administrators to see emerging trends in citizen complaints, which can influence policy planning and implementation.   In Malaysia, the role of social media has evolved to fill the gap in political literacy. Since the twelfth general election of Malaysia (2008), social media has taken center stage. Whenever elections are coming up, infographics begin to pop up all over platforms like Twitter and Facebook on topics ranging from how to register to vote to the proper way to cast a ballot. Social media has also helped to boost movements like Wednesday Vote (Undi Rabu) and Let’s Go Home to Vote (Jom Pulang Undi), which were devised by netizens and CSOs to encourage Malaysian citizens to get out and vote. Many first-time voters gained basic knowledge regarding the state of national politics, voting, and voters’ rights from these platforms. However, this type of discourse does not permeate all social media platforms, and is primarily found on Twitter and Instagram, which are dominated by the “woke” left-wing population. Meanwhile, Facebook and WhatsApp, which are dominated by political fundamentalists, are often used to spread right-wing, race-based propaganda, rather than providing educational material on the fundamentals of voting and the importance of each vote, regardless of candidate.   In Thailand, social media and websites like www.change.org have become tools to send signals to the government, especially on important national issues. Citizens and NGOs in Indonesia also use digital technology to access information and ensure accountability in cooperation with open government partnership programs. In Mongolia, the E-Governance program introduced 25 types of e-services. Since 2013, a call center known as “11-11” has provided a platform for citizens to provide their feedback. The service was expanded in 2019 to become the Government Public Communication Center, which receives feedback and provides referrals to relevant government agencies.   The deployment of civic technology in the Philippines helps to enhance citizen participation in monitoring public service delivery. For example, Development LIVE (or DevLIVE) is a mobile application developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that has been adopted by the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) as an online platform for collecting citizen feedback on the quality of local infrastructure projects under the Assistance to Disadvantaged Municipalities (ADM) and Assistance to Municipalities (AM) Programs. Through DevLIVE, citizens can monitor and submit observations on specific DILG projects. The feedback structure is pre-programmed, tracking variables related to citizen satisfaction with project visibility, functionality, quality, accessibility, timeliness, relevance, and maintenance. [13]   Conclusion   Key direct democracy mechanisms, such as referendums, recall of public officials, and people’s initiatives, are formally entrenched in the legal systems of the majority of Asian countries examined in the studies conducted by this ADRN research group. However, these mechanisms have not been widely applied in practice. Many initiatives at the national level have faltered, though a few cases of successful implementation were seen at the sub-national level. While the principle of democratic governance is extolled in the Constitutional provisions authorizing these direct democratic mechanisms, there are still significant challenges to ensuring that referendums, recall of public officials, and petitions are actually effectively used to promote democracy.   There are encouraging trends among the studies, such as the emergence of formal and informal governance avenues for integrating citizen participation in local planning and budgeting, as well as the utilization of digital platforms to foster social accountability. However, there is still a need to enhance the quality of citizen engagement, as direct democratic mechanisms currently tend to yield less than meaningful results due to the token nature of civil society participation. There is a tendency for officials elected under the dominant representative democratic system to look down on the mandate of non-elected stakeholders in the policymaking process. This dilutes the effectiveness of direct democracy, which is supposed to amplify the voices of those excluded in candidate-focused voting processes. As such, moving forward, it will be important to consider the role of both representative democratic and direct democratic mechanisms in efforts to foster values, institutional frameworks, and practices that genuinely support democracy in Asian countries. ■   References   Altman, David, and Clemente T. Sánchez. 2021. "Citizens at the Polls Direct Democracy in the World, 2020." Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 17 (2). http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/publication/journal/027-048_David_Altman.pdf.   Bandyopadhyay, Kaustuv Kanti. 2022. “Can Online Public Participation Strengthen Direct, Deliberative, and Participatory Democracy in India?” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=25.   Bureekul, Thawilwadee, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Arithat Buntheung. 2022. “Direct Democracy in Thailand.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=252.   Cabannes, Yves. 2015. "The impact of participatory budgeting on basic services: municipal practices and evidence from the field." Environment and Urbanization, 27(1), 257-284. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247815572297.   Chultemsuren, Tamir. 2022. “Direct Democracy’s History and Trends in Mongolia.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=263.   Darmawan, Devi, and Sri Nuryanti. 2022. “Examining Direct Democracy in Indonesia.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=2&sn=s1&st=&acode=Reports&code=001001&at=view&idx=250.   Guce-Medina, Czarina. 2019. “Development LIVE (DevLIVE): Toward a Citizen Participation-Focused Civic Technology for Local Governance in the Philippines.” Department of Interior and Local Government and United Nations Development Programme. https://www.academia.edu/41055066/Development_LIVE_DevLIVE_Toward_a_Citizen_Participation_Focused_Civic_Technology_for_Local_Governance_in_the_Philippines.   Halim, Halmie Azrie Abdul. 2022. “Malaysia’s Ongoing Tussle With Democracy.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=253.   Kersting, Norbert, and Max Grömping. 2022. “Direct democracy integrity and the 2017 constitutional referendum in Turkey: a new research instrument.” European Political Science 21, 2: 216-236. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-020-00309-3.   Magno, Francisco A. 2022. “Direct Democracy in the Philippines.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=261.   Marquetti, Adalmir, Carlos E. Schonerwald da Silva, and Al Campbell. 2012. "Participatory economic democracy in action: Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, 1989–2004." Review of Radical Political Economics, 44(1), 62-81. https://doi.org/10.1177/0486613411418055.   Rubin, Marilyn Marks, and Carol Ebdon. 2020. "Participatory budgeting: direct democracy in action." Chinese Public Administration Review, 11(1), 1-5. https://doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v11i1.246.   Verité Research Legal Research Team. 2022. “Promoting Democracy through Direct Public Engagement: The Sri Lankan Experience.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=264.     [1] David Altman and Clemente T. Sánchez. 2021. "Citizens at the Polls Direct Democracy in the World, 2020." Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 17(2). [2] Adalmir Marquetti, Carlos E. Schonerwald da Silva, and Al Campbell. 2012. "Participatory economic democracy in action: Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, 1989–2004." Review of Radical Political Economics, 44(1), 62-81. [3] Yves Cabannes. 2015. "The impact of participatory budgeting on basic services: municipal practices and evidence from the field." Environment and Urbanization, 27(1), 257-284. [4] Marilyn Marks Rubin and Carol Ebdon. 2020. "Participatory budgeting: direct democracy in action." Chinese Public Administration Review, 11(1), 1-5. [5] Norbert Kersting and Max Grömping. 2022. “Direct democracy integrity and the 2017 constitutional referendum in Turkey: a new research instrument.” European Political Science, 21(2), 216-236. [6] Francisco A. Magno. 2022. “Direct Democracy in the Philippines.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [7] Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Arithat Buntheung. 2022. “Direct Democracy in Thailand.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [8] Devi Darmawan and Sri Nuryanti. 2022. “Examining Direct Democracy in Indonesia.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [9] Verité Research Legal Research Team. 2022. “Promoting Democracy through Direct Public Engagement: The Sri Lankan Experience.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [10] Tamir Chultemsuren. 2022. “Direct Democracy’s History and Trends in Mongolia.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [11] Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim. 2022. “Malaysia’s Ongoing Tussle With Democracy.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [12] Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay. 2022. “Can Online Public Participation Strengthen Direct, Deliberative, and Participatory Democracy in India?” Asia Democracy Research Network.     ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr  

Introduction   A new wave of food insecurity is predicted to hit many countries, including Indonesia. This looming food crisis can be attributed not only to the war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic, which have disrupted the global food supply chain, but also to other conflicts, natural disasters, climate change, and unsustainable agricultural practices that have threatened the global food system for some time. The global food price index began to rise in September 2020, peaking in March 2022 (Food and Agricultural Organization, 2022). As of July 2022, the index was still about 40 percent higher than the 2014-2016 average.   When food prices soar, like during the global food crisis of 2007-2008, there is immense domestic political pressure for food-exporting countries to ban the export of agricultural and food commodities. Although export bans do not necessarily lower prices, as evidenced by Indonesia’s recent palm oil export ban (Wihardja and Patunru, 2022), they usually have adverse repercussions in other parts of the food system, such as raising global prices, especially if the ban is imposed by a major producer and exporter of the food commodity, causing farmers’ incomes to plummet, and disincentivizing future planting and harvesting.   At the same time, the World Trade Organization (WTO), which governs the international trade system, has tools to limit protectionism around imports, but lacks effective mechanisms limiting governments’ ability to ban exports (Barret, 2022). Given that since export bans can amplify panic and engender full-blown crises, this has created an unnecessary and dangerous loophole in the global food system. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, food is increasingly being used as a diplomatic weapon (Schiffling and Kanellos, 2022). As of late May, 10 percent of world calories were under export restriction by at least 23 countries, including Indonesia.   The war in Ukraine has also caused energy prices to soar, particularly oil and gas. Gas is the raw material used to produce urea fertilizer, a key input for the food production system. Similarly, oil is a key input for the global logistics and trade system. After the war in Ukraine broke out in February 2022, the threat of a global food crisis has become apparent, in part because of the skyrocketing input costs of food crop production.   Examples from other countries show that increasing food prices combined with a weak social protection system led to an increased risk of political instability. For example, the global food crisis of 2007-2008 triggered domestic political unrest and civil wars in about four dozen countries, including Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen (Barret, 2022). Fortunately, the impact of the global food crisis on the Indonesian economy was not quite as significant, as the rice production remained normal due to favorable weather. Management of rice stock and price stabilization policies were quite effective, so there was not a significant price surge during the crisis. In part because food prices had remained relatively stable under his leadership, President Yudhoyono was reelected for a second term in the General Election of 2009.   Indonesia’s food prices are already high to begin with in comparison with its neighbors in the region. Between 2012 and 2020, rice prices in Indonesia were, on average, more than double those in Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand, and about 25 percent higher than those in the Philippines (World Bank, 2020a). Moreover, there are weaknesses and gaps in Indonesia’s social protection system (World Bank, 2020b). For example, the current system is unable to update the social registry used for targeting social assistance programs (DTKS) with newly impoverished households (households that fall into poverty as a result of sudden-onset shocks, such as COVID-19 or natural disasters) because the on-demand window/application, which allows households to self-register for assistance, is limited. Social assistance coverage is also biased in favor of poor households with children and against the elderly and disabled.   Amidst the ongoing fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the high inflation rate, which has doubled between March and June of this year, will test whether the Jokowi administration can manage high inflation, especially on food, and maintain political stability. With the presidential election coming in 2024, a prolonged increase in food prices may undermine his party’s chances for reelection. This article analyzes how Indonesia is trying to respond to the looming food crisis to maintain political stability.   The Global Food Economy   The disruptions in the global food supply chain that have emerged since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic have been compounded by geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. In June 2022, the price of wheat[1] reached a record high of US$ 650 per ton, more than three times the average price in 2019. Fortunately, global rice prices, which had been high since the onset of the pandemic, have started to stabilize. Rice production performance in Thailand and Vietnam is quite good, and has contributed to the stabilization of global rice prices. In Indonesia, rice production in 2021 showed signs of recovery, although the harvested area dropped drastically from 10.66 million hectares in 2020 to 10.41 million hectares in 2021, a decrease of 245,000 hectares (2.35 percent).   Vegetable oil prices have also increased in the wake of the food crisis and the global economic crisis. The global price of vegetable oil peaked during the global food crisis of 2007-2008, the period of high commodity prices in 2011, and the COVID-19 pandemic. [2]   As the domestic retail price of cooking oil soared uncontrollably, in April 2022, Indonesia gave in to political pressure to ban exports of crude palm oil (CPO) and its derivative products in order to secure domestic supply. Around the same time, India also prohibited exporting wheat and sugar to secure supplies for its domestic needs. Malaysia banned the export of live chickens to Singapore. In the case of Indonesia, the blanket palm oil export ban caused Indonesia to lose export earnings but did not reduce domestic prices. Moreover, even though the export ban was soon lifted, by May 2022, the effects of the export ban on upstream palm oil farmers were deleterious. The price of fresh fruit bunches (the raw material used in palm oil mills)has remained at a record low of Rp 600 per kilogram since mid-June 2022, which has significantly reduced the incomes of smallholder palm oil farmers.   The threat of a global food crisis has also resulted from the increasing prices of production inputs—primarily fertilizers, but also energy. Farmers are the most severely affected. The war in Ukraine has caused global fertilizer prices to soar, as both Russia and Ukraine are major producers of gas used in fertilizer production. The price of urea in the global market had already increased before the war from about US$ 400 in September 2021 to nearly US$ 1,000 per ton in November 2021 due to an increase in international oil prices. The price of non-subsidized urea fertilizer in Indonesia rose from Rp 7,000 per kilogram in January 2022 to over Rp 10,000 per kilogram in February 2022, making it very expensive for the Indonesian government to offer the subsidized price of only Rp 2,250 per kilogram. Farmers in Indonesia and other countries have had to bear the burden of surging food and agricultural production input costs. Inflation at the producer level, as measured by the producer price index (PPI), has been much higher than inflation at the consumer level (CPI), suggesting farmers have been unable to pass high input costs on to consumers.   Indonesia’s Policy Response   First, since early 2020, Indonesia has introduced policy initiatives to boost food production and productivity through both land expansion and intensification strategies. Indonesia developed food estates outside Java in Central Kalimantan, North Sumatra, East Nusa Tenggara, etcetera. 100,000 hectares of land have been allocated for agriculture in the districts of Kapuas, Pulang Pisau, and Gunung Mas in Central Kalimantan. There, rice, maize, cassava, horticulture crops, and estate crops are cultivated primarily by smallholder farmers and some state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A number of smallholder farmers were also involved in the expansion of food estates in the district of Humbang Hasundutan in North Sumatra, focusing mostly on shallots, chilis, potatoes, and some garlic. New agricultural land was also opened in the district of Central Sumba in East Nusa Tenggara to cultivate rice, maize and sorghum.   Unfortunately, after two years, the food estates have not significantly contributed to Indonesian food production and food security. Problems with acidic soil, low fertility and peat land conversion need to be resolved in a more systematic way for the initiative to meaningfully increase food production and security. Converting forests and peatlands into agricultural land for food production has a high risk of causing sustainability issues, especially if water management and drainage systems disturb natural water storage and peat dome systems. Moreover, new agricultural lands generally take some time to start to be productive. Therefore, we cannot expect to see immediate production increase and productivity gains.   Second, intensification strategies have been implemented in existing food production operations, primarily for rice, maize and horticulture crops. Integrated pest management and more equal distribution and utilization of chemical fertilizers, pesticide and herbicides among smallholder farmers have been promoted across all production centers. Intensification through the use of high-yielding varieties and drought and flood-resistant varieties is necessary to increase food production, and will be an essential element of the adaptation strategy for climate change in the years to come. In the last two years, such intensification strategies have shown positive results, though they still need to be monitored continuously. Data from the Central Agency of Statistics (BPS) shows that rice production in 2021 was recorded at 54.4 million tons of milled dry grain (GKG), the equivalent of 31.4 million tons of rice, which was higher than the 30 million tons of rice consumption. Rice productivity in 2021 was recorded at 5.2 tons per hectare, an increase of 1.96 percent from 2020. By April 2022, rice production had already reached 13.5 million tons, almost half of 2021’s annual figure (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2022).   Third, the government has also transformed its approach to the food system by considering both on-farm and off-farm activities, namely production, processing, distribution, trade, and consumption. This more comprehensive approach aims to achieve improved food security, social welfare, and environmental welfare outcomes in general. In this context, food security includes the dimensions of food availability, food accessibility, and food utilization. Food sustainability entails positive food system outcomes for: (1) social welfare, which includes employment, income levels, human capital, social capital, and political capital, and (2) environmental health, which includes stocks and flows within ecosystems, ecosystem services, natural capital, etcetera. In 2021, the Government of Indonesia’s Presidential Regulation 66/2021 established a National Food Agency (NFA) that will govern the three important dimensions of food security—availability, accessibility and utilization. Together with other government agencies/ministries and state-owned enterprises, NFA is responsible for maintaining adequate food availability, managing food buffer stock, and diversifying food consumption for a healthier and more balanced diet while promoting the consumption of local foods (see also Wihardja and Negara, 2022).   Fourth, the government is working to ensure a sustainable and resilient food system (SRFS) that can provide a healthy and balanced diet. Pursuing SRFS is also highly compatible with poverty alleviation, sustainable natural resource management, ecosystem conservation, and climate change mitigation and adaptation. Food production through chemical fertilizers, excessive pesticides, and the conversion of natural forests into super-intensive agricultural zones is not sustainable. SFRS will be able to restore degraded land and ecosystems back to their natural state, resulting in higher productivity. For example, this can be done through the development of organic agriculture and the combined, balanced use of organic and chemical fertilizers.   Fifth, the government is working to improve the effectiveness of the Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfer program (BLT) and social assistance programs like the Family Hope Program (PKH) and Non-Cash Food Assistance (BPNT) in both urban and remote rural areas. This effort is combined with initiatives to mentor and empower farmers in precision agriculture, digitize food value chains, and support ABGC quadruple helix cooperation (academics, business, government, and civil society), innovation ecosystems and the integration of more inclusive research and development (R&D) strategies.   Regional and Global Food Trade and Cooperation   Very few countries are capable of being both fully self-sufficient and food secure. Indonesia is no exception. Food imports in Indonesia have increased in both amount and share of total goods imports, rising from US$ 11.5 billion (8.4 percent) in 2010 to US$ 22.6 billion (11.5 percent) in 2021 (Comtrade, 2022). Although only about one-quarter of food consumed globally is traded internationally, international trade plays a key role in stabilizing food prices in many food-importing countries, as prices are very sensitive to any marginal deficit in the market (Barret, 2022). Indonesia, as a relatively large food-importing country, depends on international trade to manage its food deficit and stabilize prices.   The issues of import and export bans on food and deciding to engage in international food trade are behavioral in nature and are not unrelated to the lack or non-existence of global and regional food cooperation such as global and regional food buffer stock. Fear of impending food shortages, whether real or perceived, tends to trigger countries and households to shift from “just in time” to “just in case” mode, leading to self-fulfilling prophesies as hoarding by countries and households amplifies panic and engenders full-blown crises. But with cooperation, countries and households can resist hoarding or banning exports when there is a hiccup in food supply or prices. Confidence in the international food trade can ride out the storm. Countries are less likely to resort to the food self-reliance approach and more likely to engage in international trade if there are regional or global food stock buffers available and ready to be deployed when disruptions occur in the supply chain, weather, geopolitics, or elsewhere.   Indonesia, as G20 President and ASEAN 2023 Chairman, could help secure open trade during the ongoing global food crisis and make concrete steps towards global and regional food cooperation. Under the G20, Indonesia could build on and strengthen existing mechanisms, such as the Agriculture Market Information System launched during the 2011 G20 Presidency, and coordinate efforts with the UN Crisis Response Group and Global Agriculture and Food Security Program. Through ASEAN, Indonesia could leverage existing mechanisms, including the ASEAN Food Security Reserve Board, the ASEAN Food Security Information System, the ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice Reserve, and the ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework and Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the ASEAN Region (SPA-FS) 2021-25.   Areas of contention   It is important that Indonesia’s efforts to increase food security align with its commitment to sustainability and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Agricultural activities are responsible for 19 to 29 percent of total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (World Bank, 2021); agricultural emissions make up the largest proportion of GHG emissions in six out of ten ASEAN economies. Greening unsustainable agricultural practices is crucial for sustainable food security.   Moreover, Indonesia’s food security should also be viewed in the context of the government’s ambitious Crude Palm Oil (CPO)-based biodiesel policy, which could create tensions between energy and food security. The CPO-based biodiesel policy, which stipulates that fossil fuels must be blended with 30 per cent palm oil, is aimed to secure energy, reduce carbon emissions, and reduce Indonesia’s trade deficit. However, a study found that this plan, if followed through 2030, could cut CPO export revenues to a greater extent than it saves on diesel imports, and would infringe on palm oil supply for food, necessitating the expansion of land used for palm oil production by 48 to 76 percent to meet the total demand (Halimatussadiah et al, 2021).   Managing a food crisis is crucial for any democracy to maintain its legitimacy and political stability. Indonesia’s response to the looming food crisis has been comprehensive, ranging from expanding and intensifying food production to expanding and reforming social assistance programs. But the response has also been peppered with populist and fallible policies, such as a temporary blanket export ban on palm oil. Given that food supply chains have already been regionalized or globalized, nationalistic protectionist measures can only backfire. Food supply chains need to be regarded as global public goods. Accordingly, countries around the world should work cooperatively to solve the current food crisis.    Reference   Barrett, Christopher B. 2022. “The Global Food Crisis Shouldn’t Have Come as a Surprise.” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/global-food-crisis-shouldnt-have-come-surprise Badan Pusat Statistik. 2022. “Luas Panen dan Produksi Padi di Indonesia 2021.” https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2022/07/12/c52d5cebe530c363d0ea4198/luas-panen-dan-produksi-padi-di-indonesia-2021.html Comtrade. 2022. UN Comtrade Database. https://comtrade.un.org/ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2022. “World Food Situation – FAO Food Price Index.” https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ Halimatussadiah, A., D. Nainggolan, S.Yui, F.R. Moeis, and A.A. Siregar. 2021. “Progressive biodiesel policy in Indonesia: Does the Government’s economic proposition hold?” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews. Vol.150, 111431 Schiffling, Sarah, and Nikolaos Valantasis Kanellos. 2022. “Food prices: how countries are using the global crisis to gain geopolitical power.” The Conversation. Food prices: how countries are using the global crisis to gain geopolitical power (theconversation.com) Wihardja, Maria Monica, and Siwage Dharma Negara. 2022. “Indonesia’s New Food Agency: No Fast Food Solutions.” Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/indonesias-new-food-agency-no-fast-food-solutions/ Wihardja, Maria Monica, and Arianto Patunru. 2022. “To Ban or Not To Ban? How Indonesia Can Overcome the Global Food Crisis.” Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/contributors/maria-monica-wihardja/ World Bank. 2021. “Climate Smart Agriculture.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climate-smart-agriculture World Bank. 2020a. Indonesia Economic Prospect. December 2020. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/december-2020-indonesia-economic-prospects World Bank. 2020b. Indonesia Economic Prospect. July 2020. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/july-2020-indonesia-economic-prospect     [1] SRW [2] Indonesia’s CPO has always been a serious environmental concern for the European Union, who discriminates against biodiesel products coming from Indonesia’s palm oil. Indonesia currently files a legal case of CPO discrimination by the European Union to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the World Trade Organization.     ■ Bustanul Arifin is a Professor of Agricultural Economics at UNILA, Board of Commissioner and Senior Economist at INDEF. ■ Maria Monica Wihardja is an Economist and Visiting Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr  

Transitional justice is a government response to past human rights violations (Teitel 2000). Different terms—accountability, truth-seeking, reparations, reconciliation—have been used to refer to transitional justice, and in 2004, it was officially adopted as an international norm with the publication of the UN Secretary General’s report, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies.” However, countries still face a great deal of controversy over how to implement transitional justice and how to resolve the tensions surrounding it.   ADRN’s recent research on transitional justice and reconciliation in Asia explored three country cases: South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. In this issue briefing, I first briefly introduce the relevant human rights violations and transitional justice issues in each case. Then, I explore important similarities between the three cases. Finally, I discuss lessons learned from the three cases and provide concluding remarks.   Human Rights Violations and Transitional Justice   The nature and scope of human rights violations in each country varies. In Sri Lanka, human rights violations primarily occurred during the civil war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. In Taiwan, though the February 28 incident was a civil conflict between the indigenous population and the Kuomintang regime, it was not a civil war per se since no official armed groups representing the indigenous population were involved. In the case of Korea, there was a civil war element, especially during the Korean War, but it would be more accurate to describe that conflict as an interstate war, and furthermore, the war was not the only instance in Korean history of human rights violations occurring. Due to this complex nature, post-Korean War transitional justice efforts have had to address both atrocities that took place during the war and those under repressive authoritarian regimes.   Korea and Taiwan experienced both large-scale massacres during conflicts and systematic human rights violations under repressive authoritarian regimes. Korea had four large-scale massacres: during the Jeju Uprising (1948), during the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion (1948), civilian killings during the Korean War (1950), and during the Gwangju Uprising (1980). Taiwan had one large-scale massacre: the February 28 incident (1948). In addition, civilians in both countries were killed, disappeared, illegally arrested and detained, and tortured under repressive anti-communist authoritarian regimes. In Taiwan, this period has been conceptualized as the White Terror (1949-1987); there is no similar concept in Korea. Moreover, both countries experienced Japanese colonialism, which was marked by political oppression.   In all three countries, varying measures of transitional justice were used to address past atrocities. In Korea, criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, and reparations were the primary methods used. In Taiwan, truth commissions and reparations were widely used, with no notable accountability measures. In Sri Lanka, under pressure from international society, all measures—criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, and reparations—were proposed and adopted. In all three countries, transitional justice projects were also initiated and led by members of civil society.   Important Similarities in Three Cases   1. Complex and Complicated Human Rights Violations   The cases of Korea and Taiwan both show that past instances of human rights violations are not simple. They are multilayered, involving multiple transgressions. For example, in Korea, in addition to four major large-scale massacres, each of Rhee Syngman’s, Park Chung Hee’s, and Chun Doo Hwan’s authoritarian regimes left its own distinct trail of human rights abuses. Taiwan saw at least three types of human rights violations occur during the February 28 incident, the White Terror, and while being subjected to Japanese colonial rule. Some also argue that Taiwan’s indigenous populations have been continuously subjected to human rights violations. In Sri Lanka, civilians were killed by both government agents and insurgents, rendering the transitional justice process even more complex. The existence of diverse human rights violations over a long period of time complicates transitional justice initiatives.   In addition, external forces’ involvement or complicity in human rights violations further complicates transitional justice efforts in these countries. In Korea, some abuses were perpetrated by or occurred under the watch of external forces like Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In Taiwan, human rights violations were committed not only by the Kuomintang regime but also by the Japanese colonial regime. Interestingly, although Japan committed similar abuses in Korea and Taiwan, two countries responded differently. Comfort women and forced labor issues have been at the center of the Korean transitional justice debate, whereas this has not been the case in Taiwan.   2. The Effect of International Politics   Large-scale massacres of civilians in each country mostly occurred within the context of the Cold War. Both the Taiwanese February 28 incident and three of Korea’s four major massacres—during the Jeju Uprising, the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion, and the Korean War—occurred during the early phases of the Cold War. These events were framed as communist challenges to the anti-communist authoritarian regimes. Thus, any attempts to address past abuses or reconcile with victims of these events were framed as “communist instigation”; the label of “communism” was used to obstruct any discourse on transitional justice and reconciliation. It was only after democratization and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s that genuine efforts to address the past ideology-driven atrocities began.   In the case of Sri Lanka, the Cold War provided an important backdrop for the civil war itself. After the peace accord, however, a new dynamic emerged between international politics and the local transitional justice process. The UN, Human Rights Council, and international society constantly pressed Sri Lanka to implement various transitional justice measures; this international pressure interacted with ongoing domestic initiatives to pursue transitional justice. In comparison, there were no such dynamics in Korea or Taiwan. The nature of the tension between international and local agents makes transitional justice in Sri Lanka unique.   3. The Impact of Domestic Politics   Human rights violations and transitional justice initiatives occur within the domestic political context, primarily because perpetrators are typically affiliated with the government, the military, intelligence agencies, or the police. In many cases, perpetrators and their supporters still have a close tie with contemporary political elites and play the role of “spoilers.” Therefore, addressing past atrocities necessarily causes disruptions in the existing political structure. The “politicization” of transitional justice is inevitable. Conservative regimes usually oppose transitional justice while progressive regimes tend to actively pursue these measures.   In all three cases, the “politicization” of transitional justice measures or of past events posed a distinct obstacle to resolving the rights violations. In Sri Lanka, controversy around adopting accountability measures to punish “war heroes” is a clear example of this phenomenon. In Taiwan, examples include the resignation of the Vice Chairperson of the Transitional Justice Commission over his remarks on the local election and the emergence of controversy over the National Chiang Kaishek Memorial. In Korea, backlash against transitional justice efforts has resulted in reduced support for or the abolition of committees and projects. In all three countries, such social controversies have strengthened the opponents of transitional justice and weakened the supporters.   Lessons Learned   1. Culture of Accountability   In all three cases, despite being controversial, some meaningful measures of transitional justice have been adopted and implemented. These measures would have been unimaginable in the past, reflecting “a revolution in accountability” (Sriram 2003), which has also been conceptualized as a “justice cascade” (Lutz and Sikkink 2001). This does not mean, however, that truth, justice, and reconciliation have been achieved in every country. As the social controversies in each country have demonstrated, a “culture of impunity” persists. Nevertheless, the world—even Asia, which has lagged behind on the trend of pursuing accountability for past human rights violations—has undergone transformation.   Impunity for past human rights violations is certainly waning in Asia. With an increasing number of states introducing transitional justice measures, achieving accountability is a more common phenomenon. That being said, accountability is not always realized exclusively through retributive justice. Rather, restorative measures, such as truth commissions and reparations, were used in many cases. Truth commissions and reparations have been enacted in all three countries.   As seen in the Korean case, even after dozens of truth commissions over the past twenty years, truth and reconciliation are still difficult to achieve. This does not mean, however, that no meaningful change has occurred. As a result of transitional justice measures, civil society and the government have changed. In Taiwan and Korea, it is the government which carries out memorialization projects. It is government funds that are allotted as reparations for victims of large-scale massacres like the April 3 incident in Jeju or the February 28 incident in Taiwan. Granting reparations to the victims of past abuses has now become the standard, and many officials, lawmakers, and journalists have internalized accountability as a norm.   2. Transitional Justice as a Process   Transitional justice in Asia is an ongoing process. In all three countries, controversies around transitional justice measures, the revision of laws, or the coexistence of multiple transitional justice initiatives show that transitional justice is not a “one-and-done” process resolving past atrocities. In Korea, even after official investigations concluded, other investigations were later carried out. Similarly, in Taiwan, multiple commissions (e.g., an investigation committee on the February 28 incident, the transitional justice commission, and the commission on ill-gotten assets) were created over a long period of time. Sri Lanka also carried out several transitional justice initiatives to address past atrocities.   As with any other political process, the transitional justice process has its ups and downs, its proponents and its opponents. The overall impact of transitional justice in each country has been somewhat mixed. In Korea, where many transitional justice initiatives have been adopted, scholars generally view the transitional justice process as having had a positive long-term impact. The process as a whole, with all of its moments of forward and backward progress, has helped to consolidate democracy and protect human rights. Even controversies, backfires, and failures have contributed to the overarching narrative in which transitional justice has had an important impact on society. However, in Taiwan and Sri Lanka, a causal relationship between transitional justice and positive outcomes seems less apparent.   3. Transitional Justice as a Whole-of-Nation Response   In Sri Lanka, both civil society and state actors were involved in the transitional justice process. Within the state, both the legislature and administrative bodies were involved. In Taiwan, transitional justice measures were mostly discussed in the Legislation Yuan. The legislative process, however, did not mark the end of transitional justice measures. In Korea, the legislative, judicial, and executive branches cooperated to bring about meaningful changes for victims. For example, in response to the April 3 Jeju Uprising incident, a special law was enacted by the National Assembly in 1999, and the first investigation commission was created in 2000 under the executive branch. After the commission finished its report and the president issued an official apology, victims filed a series of lawsuits against the state. During these lawsuits, the court sided with the victims and ordered the state to make reparations. In some cases, it was not even the central government, but rather legislative and judicial branches of local and regional governments, that were at the forefront of bringing justice to the victims.   The other important players were civil society actors. There has been a significant contribution from civil society in all three countries. In Korea, civil society actors not only initiated the transitional justice movement but also monitored ongoing government initiatives. It was victims and activists who spent a long time pressing the government to adopt transitional justice measures. In Sri Lanka, a Consultative Task Force (2016), which was a civil society body, worked hard to implement transitional justice measures proposed by the international community. In Taiwan, victims and civil society actors were active as well.   It is challenging to compare the three cases, as each country occupies a very different political context. However, conducting such an analysis shows that there are considerable commonalities, such as the complex nature of human rights violations and the dual impact of domestic and international politics. At the same time, important trends are revealed by comparing the three cases. First, although the culture of impunity is still strong, there is increasing demand for and realization of accountability. Second, transitional justice is an ongoing, imperfect process, and progress is not always direct. Finally, the transitional justice process in each country indicates that responding to past atrocities is a process that involves the entire nation—government, civil society, and civilians.    Reference   Lutz, Ellen, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. “The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America.” Chicago Journal of International Law 2(1): 1-34. Sriram, Chandra Lekha. 2003. “Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses.” American University International Law Review 19(2): 310-429. Teitel, Ruti G. 2000. Transitional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.     ■ Hun Joon Kim is a professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His publications relevant to this field include The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea (2014), Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific (ed. 2014), “Are UN Investigations into Human Rights Violations a Viable Solution? An Assessment of UN Commissions of Inquiry” (2019), and “The Prospect of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructive Understanding (2020).”     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경EAI 연구실장∙선임연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr   

동아시아연구원(원장 손열)은 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(ADRN)의 사무국으로서 열여섯 번째 [민주주의 협력] 온라인 세미나 시리즈 "아시아 국가의 소수자 권리 보호: 당면 과제와 새로운 동향"을 개최하였습니다.   대부분의 아시아 민주주의 국가는 소수 집단의 권리를 보호하고, 이들이 다수 공동체와 동등한 자유를 누릴 수 있도록 하는 법적 근거와 제도를 가지고 있습니다. 그러나 이들 국가들은 소수자 권리 보호를 위한 법과 제도를 실행할 능력이 부족하고, 다수결주의와 사회적 편협성이 증대됨에 따라 종교, 정체성을 기반으로 한 소수 집단의 권리가 심각하게 위협받고 있습니다.   이번 온라인 세미나에서는 ADRN의 방글라데시, 태국, 몽골, 네팔, 인도 멤버기관이 한 자리에 모여 소수자 권리 보호 현황과 당면한 과제, 새로운 동향을 탐색하고 진단하며 보다 나은 민주 거버넌스 확립을 위한 방안을 논의하였습니다.   본 세미나는 ADRN “아시아 내 소수자 인권 보호" 연구의 일환으로 진행되었습니다.   일시: 2022년 7월 19일 (화요일) 15:30 – 17:00 (한국 시간)   패널: 샤힌 아남 ( Shaheen Anam), 마누셔 존노 재단 전무이사 (Manusher Jonno Foundation, Executive Director) 지라유드 신투판 (Jirayudh Sinthuphan), 조교수 아시안연구소, 출라룽콘 대학교 (Assistant Professor, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University) 담바 간밧(Damba Ganbat) 이사회 의장, 정치교육아카데미 (Chairman of Board, Academy of Political Education) 프라딥 파리야르(Pradip Pariyar), 집행위원장, 사마타 재단(Executive Chairperson, Samata Foundation) 니란잔 사후(Niranjan Sahoo) 선임연구원 옵저버 연구 재단(Senior Fellow, Observer Research Founadtion)     I. Overview   Democratic countries in Asia face unique challenges in protecting minority rights. Each country’s historical background and cultural dynamics deeply influence the nature of inequality, advocacy, and reform within the state. To examine current issues in minority rights protection across Asia, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) hosted a webinar, inviting scholars from five countries to speak about minority rights and protections in their countries. The panel was moderated by Niranjan Sahoo, a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.   II. Case Studies: India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Mongolia, Thailand   India “India’s situation is very dire, and Muslims today are facing unprecedented threats and attacks”   India is a Hindu-majority (80%) nation with large and diverse minorities, including Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Parsis. With boggling diversity, there are 30 major languages and 300 dialects used within the country. The Indian constitution has a pro-minority bias, providing numerous special privileges for minorities, especially linguistic and ethnic minorities. Part ⅩⅣ of the constitution details an elaborate list of provisions protecting minority rights; Article 29 guarantees cultural and educational rights, and Article 25 protects the right to “freely profess, practice and propagate religion (subject to public order and morality).”   Though the Constitution grants various rights, due to weak policing, politicization, and the absence of an effective justice system, these rights are not honored. Projects are not “actively” implemented, and issues arise with resource allocations and spending. In addition to various structural barriers, the rise of majoritarian politics and increased political polarization have posed additional challenges to protecting minority rights.   Religious minorities—among them Muslims—receive no special attention in the constitution, only a “bundle of rights.” With a population of over 200 million (14% of the country’s population), Muslims are the largest religious minority group. However, Muslims currently rank among the lowest in socio-economic indicators. For example, less than 4% of Muslims serve in the police, judiciary, or elite civil services. In present-day India, Muslims are the most marginalized and excluded minority group, even more so than Dalits (those belonging to the “untouchable” caste) and Adivasis (indigenous peoples in India).   A key driver of Muslim marginalization is its long historical background. Prejudice and intolerance have emerged from extreme Hindu-right organizations since the 1950s, and have sharpened since the 1990s, particularly due to the Ram Janabhoomi movement. Polarization has further intensified since 2014, when Prime Minister Modi took power. Hindu Majoritarianism entails historic marginalization of minorities; shrinking political representation; stereotyping, stigmatizing and demonizing of minorities; growing intolerance (e.g. anti-conversation laws, bans on cow slaughters, and “love jihad” theories); and the collapse of inter-community relations and trust. India has taken a constitutional route toward majoritarianism; in recent years, there have been a series of new legislations targeting Muslims. For example, Article 370, which concerned India’s only Muslim-majority state, was abolished. Furthermore, the Citizen Amendment Act, which discriminates against Muslims living in India, was enacted in 2019.   Bangladesh “I feel very strongly…that the majority population has a responsibility to protect the rights of the minority. Unless there are more…people standing up for the rights of minorities, I think that it will be very difficult to address it only through laws and policies”   Bangladesh emerged from its 1971 split with Pakistan as a secular nation with a constitution guaranteeing equal rights for all. Shaheen Anam provided an overview of minority rights in present-day Bangladesh, focusing primarily on issues facing Bangladesh’s Hindu religious minority, who make up less than 10% of the population (as compared to the 90% Muslim majority). In her presentation, Anam explained that, though Bangladesh claims to be a country of religious and ethnic harmony, the constitution does not explicitly recognize minorities or provide separate provisions for their protection. In practice, the constitutional guarantee of equal rights has not been supported by proper policies and structures to uphold said rights.   Religious radicalism has been on the rise in Bangladesh over the last 20 years as a result of increased globalization, international events in Palestine and India, and social media, among other factors. In tandem, attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh have also risen. These attacks are typically not overt physical violence—like murders or riots—but rather land grabs of Hindu-owned property, often by or benefitting local vested interest groups. Over the last several years, social media has consistently been used to spread false news and instigate attacks.   Per Anam, the “most damaging” phenomenon is that the Hindu minority population feel they are not equal citizens, not as a result of state-sponsored oppression, but rather a social and economic problem left inadequately addressed by the state. She argued that, though the government sets up investigation commissions and vows to punish the perpetrators of crimes, it does not do enough to prevent crimes, and the justice process is slow and not impartial. Current mechanisms to improve the conditions of minorities in Bangladesh include the National Human Rights Commission and an elaborate system of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) who monitor and push for better government response. Moving forward, Anam advocated for more open dialogue and initiatives to embrace diversity, including revising educational curricula. Within the justice system, she called for violence to be prosecuted strongly and swiftly. Anam closed her presentation by sharing her conviction that the majority population has a responsibility to protect the rights of the minority. She believes that more people need to stand up for the rights of minorities—meaningful change will be difficult to accomplish through laws and policies alone.   Nepal “Although untouchability was declared illegal more than a decade ago in Nepal, caste-based discrimination persists across the country, with lingering prejudice contributing to…significant violence in Nepali society”   In his presentation, Pradip Pradiyar provided an overview of caste-based discrimination (CBD) and minority rights in Nepal. Despite the abolition of CBD, untouchability continues to be deeply entrenched in Nepalese society. Dalits in Nepal face the worst form of discrimination across social, economic, administrative, religious, and political spheres: Nepal’s lower castes do not enjoy equal access to education or jobs; their skills, labor, and human rights are exploited; they are unable to access decision-making and justice processes; and they are not properly represented in the political system. Cases of rape or murder perpetrated against Dalits are not uncommon, and Dalit women face three-fold, intersectional discrimination due to their class, gender, and caste. Discrimination against Dalits is a deeply important problem in Nepalese society that needs to be discussed, but current conversations are not enough.   Social, economic, and health indicators demonstrate the effects of this discrimination. Dalit literacy rates, life expectancy, mortality rates, immunization rates, and nutritional access all fall below the national average. 42% of Dalits live below the poverty line, in contrast with the national absolute poverty rate of 35%. The discrimination-induced challenges to finding a good job or getting a good education perpetuate a cycle of poverty. These harmful long-term trends are accompanied by ongoing atrocities committed against Dalits. People are being killed in the name of caste; Pariyar highlighted the case of Sundar Harijan, a Dalit man who was wrongfully jailed as a minor, then had his identity switched with someone who had committed a much more serious crime, leading him to serve an extended prison term. Harijan was found hanging in the prison bathroom.   Recent developments regarding the status of Dalits in Nepal are complex. The COVID-19 pandemic raised new problems, and though and Nepal’s constitution serves as a legal instrument protecting Dalit rights, the law has not been implemented, and those responsible for implementation are not knowledgeable about Dalit issues. Pariyar called for the implementation of these fundamental rights to be ensured via direct order, and for the constitution to be further amended to protect Dalit rights. He also highlighted the need for proportional representation of Dalits in politics, especially in local government, as well as in bureaucracy and law enforcement. Pariyar closed by calling for three key measures: first, to raise awareness on Dalit issues; second, to increase Dalit’s access to resources; and finally, to ensure that laws, policies, and programs promoting Dalit rights are actually implemented.   Mongolia “In comparison with…heterogeneous societies, we have fewer problems, but still we have some concerns, mainly related to education…and getting higher education for the minorities”   Damba Gambat, Chairman of the Board at the Mongolia Academy of Political Education (APE), joined the ADRN workshop to present on a paper prepared by Ukhnaa Tuya, his colleague at APE. Gambat first provided an overview of Mongolia’s history, demographics, and cultural dynamics. Mongolia is fairly ethnically homogenous; though it has 24 ethnic groups, many have only minor cultural differences. The Khalkh majority consider themselves to be direct descendants off Genghis Khan, and therefore the benchmark for “standard” Mongolian culture and “official” Mongolian tradition. Khalkh Mongolian is the nation’s official language, the language of government administration and national exams, and is used for instruction in most schools. The Khalks are generally not challenged on these claims, though occasionally ethnic minority groups will push back against their lack of political representation or particular government decisions. Similarly, racial tensions exist, but disputes are almost always resolved peacefully.   The Tsaatan, Tuva, and Kazakh groups, concentrated mostly in the Northwest, are the most culturally distinct. Kazakhs and Tuva speak Turkic languages, rather than Mongolian dialects. Religion also plays into minority distinctions—after the end of one-party communist rule in the 1990s, there was a popular resurgence of Tibetan Buddhism. As of 2020, 50% of Mongolians were Buddhist, and 40% were non-religious. In contrast, 82% of Mongolian Kazakhs practice Islam, and 27% of Tuvans and 60% of Tsaatans practice Shamanism.   The government has been paying increased attention to respecting and protecting the languages and cultural rights of Kazakhs, Tuvas and other minorities. The first democratic constitution of Mongolia guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities to practice their own culture and use their own language “in education and communication and in the pursuit of cultural, artistic, and scientific activities.” The constitution bans discrimination, and the most recent labor and criminal codes also guarantee equality among ethnic groups. However, in the early 2010s, international organizations found that there was a lack of policies addressing challenges to minority interests, such as poverty and unemployment. In his presentation, Gambat highlighted issues surrounding education equality and the lack of native-language education—compared to the national average, fewer Kazakhs, Tsaatans, and Tuvas have access to primary, general, and higher education. As for particular areas of concern, Gambat explained that there are no curricula optimized to support children of ethnic minorities who are learning multiple languages, no mechanisms collecting data specifically to evaluate the academic achievement of minorities, and no programs available to improve the bilingual education skills of teachers catering to these populations, contributing to the lack of access to high quality education for minority groups.   Thailand “Especially in terms of minority rights, Thai law is still dominated…by conservative, heterosexual assumptions”   Over the last century, Thailand has had about 20 constitutions—despite the changes, every version has emphasized protecting human dignity and the peoples’ rights and liberty. On the other hand, Thai law, developed during Southeast Asia’s colonial era as part of an effort to avoid colonization, has not changed significantly; unfortunately, these laws have since prevented human rights development, infringing on gender, linguistic, and ethnic minority rights. Traditionally, crossdressing, gender fluidity and homosexuality were not cultural taboos, but they were criminalized with the introduction of this “modern” colonial legal system. They have since been decriminalized, but the LGBT community is still excluded from basic rights. As such, since 2012, the Thai LGBT community has been fighting for the right to marry, sparking a public debate on minority rights.   Pre-colonial Thai society was androgynous and quite accepting of non-heteronormative behaviors. LGBT identity was considered a private matter and did not concern the state. In the 19th century, the arrival of Western colonialism replaced informal Thai moral concepts of gender with Western understandings of “virtue” and sexualities. By 1917, a person’s gender was officially recognized and associated with their identity at birth, and gender identity and sexuality norms began to emerge. In 1953, private and non-commercial sodomy between consenting adults was decriminalized.   There was no major Thai LGBT advocacy movement in the 1960s and 1970s. This is perhaps, Sinthuphan posits, because the Thai LGBT community enjoyed a comfortable level of social space and freedom, leading to the absence of an LGBT advocacy group or political union. The official LGBT movement started in the 1980s with the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which had been labelled as a homosexual or a “sinner’s” disease. The Rainbow Sky Association of Thailand is one of the oldest LGBT advocacy groups, and has campaigned for equal social protection and legal rights for the LGBT community since the 1990s.   In Thailand, the issue of same-sex marriage rights entered public discourse around 2012. Since the first draft of same-sex marriage legislation was proposed in 2013, there have been several further drafts. The bill, which came to be known as the “Civil Partnership Bill,” as well as a reformed Civil and Commercial Code, have received preliminary approval from Parliament as of March 2022, though a longer process remains before they can be fully passed and implemented.   There are several key challenges to the protection of LGBT rights in Thailand. Conservative and heterosexual majoritarianism among Thai legislators and legal practitioners and resistance to reform are two key areas for improvement. Sinthuphan also argued that the lack of a unified core movement or nationally recognized LGBT coalition poses an obstacle to progress, and finally, closed by asserting that policymakers should separate their personal religious and moral worldviews from their civil rights obligations. ■   III. Speakers and Moderators Biographies   ■ Niranjan Sahoo is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, India. ■ Shaheen Anam is the Executive Director at the Manusher Jonno Foundation in Dhaka, Bangladesh. ■ Damba Ganbat is the Chairman of the Board at the Academy of Political Education in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. ■ Pradip Pariyar is the Executive Chairperson of the Samata Foundation in Patan, Nepal. He is an alumnus of American University and Tribhuvan University. He specializes in youth empowerment, peace building and capacity building of media professionals. ■ Jirayudh Sinthuphan is an assistant professor at the Chulalongkorn University Institute of Asian Studies in Bangkok, Thailand.

1. Introduction   In the contemporary context, democracy is synonymous with a form of government that is reflective and representative of the general will of the people (Wallace 2021). Throughout history, democratic governance has mainly taken two forms: i) directly by the people; and ii) by representatives of the people. When democratic governance is direct, the people participate in the policy formulation and decision-making processes as individuals (Encyclopedia Britannica 2022). In contrast, when democratic governance is representative, policy formulation and decision making are undertaken by representatives who are elected by the people (Haxhiu and Alidemaj 2021). Due to the complexities involved in policy formulation in modern-day states, and the impracticalities involved in obtaining the views of an entire population, modern democracies are premised on representative democracy.   Nevertheless, direct democracy continues to be regarded as the purest form of democracy. As such, certain governance mechanisms that are premised on direct democracy continue to find their place in modern constitutions and legal frameworks. Traditionally, direct democracy has been concerned with formal instruments, such as referenda and recall elections. However, alternative instruments that allow citizens to be directly involved in governance, such as public petitions, have been formalized through law and practice and have come to be accepted as loosely falling within the scope of direct democracy. Thus, for the purpose of this research study, an expansive scope of direct democracy will be considered so as to include both traditional and alternative instruments of citizen engagement.   Sri Lanka has recognized and formalized traditional and alternative instruments that allow citizens to directly engage in policymaking and matters of governance. This research study explores these instruments, which include: i) the referendum; ii) private member bills; iii) public petitions; and iv) parliamentary questions, with a view to assessing the modalities within which they operate and analyzing their efficacy in promoting direct citizen engagement.   This research study is presented in three sections. The first section explores the instruments that enhance the ability of citizens to directly engage with and be involved in governance in Sri Lanka. The second section discusses inherent and structural challenges that undermine the meaningfulness and effectiveness of these instruments. The final section provides conclusions drawn from the preceding analysis and briefly discusses solutions to address the challenges.   2. The Formalized Instruments Recognized Under Sri Lanka’s Legal System   2.1. Introduction   The evolution of public participation in Sri Lanka’s democratic processes can be traced back to Sri Lanka’s colonial period, from which the country inherited its current democratic structure (Cooray 2005). In 1944, a Westminster parliamentary structure was introduced to Sri Lanka. The institutions established under this Westminster-style structure were governed by Commonwealth parliamentary traditions, in addition to the constitution that was in force at the time. Among these traditions was the ability for citizens to directly engage in government through instruments such as private member bills, public petitions, and parliamentary questions (Sixth Report of the Committee on Public Petitions 2016). In 1972, Sri Lanka adopted the First Republican Constitution, which continued the Westminster parliamentary structure of government (Wasanthakumar and Abeyratne 2015).   In 1978, Sri Lanka adopted the Second Republican Constitution, which introduced a semi-presidential system, that is, a combination of a presidential system and a parliamentary system, which was a departure from the previous Westminster parliamentary system. Article 3 of this Constitution recognizes that the sovereignty of the Republic of Sri Lanka is inalienably vested in the people of Sri Lanka. Article 4 formulates the structure of democratic governance in Sri Lanka, establishing that the executive power of the sovereign people shall be exercised by the executive president, the legislative power of the sovereign people shall be exercised by the parliament, and the judicial power of the sovereign people shall be exercised by the parliament through the system of courts (Ratnapala 2021). The sovereign people shall elect the executive president and the members of parliament as their representatives every five years. Governance in Sri Lanka is carried out through this structure of representative democracy.   However, the constitution and laws of Sri Lanka recognize a number of mechanisms and instruments by which the sovereign people can be directly involved in governance. These mechanisms and instruments are twofold: i) referendums; and ii) other formalized instruments of direct engagement.   2.2. The Referendum   The essence of a referendum is that it enables people to directly vote to approve or reject a law or proposal. Articles 85 and 86 of the Constitution empower the executive president to proclaim that any bill or other matter of national importance shall be to put to the people for their approval (Manthri.lk 2017). The procedure for carrying out a referendum is prescribed in the Referendum Act No. 7 of 1981. The need for a referendum can also arise in two other instances. The first of these is when a bill proposes the amendment, repeal, or replacement of any of the entrenched articles of the Constitution. The second is when the Supreme Court determines that a proposed bill is inconsistent with an entrenched article of the Constitution. [1]   There has been only one referendum in Sri Lanka. This referendum took place when the president at the time, J.R. Jayawardena, submitted a proposal to the people to extend the term of the existing parliament for a further six years without conducting a general election (Jayawickrama 2021). On December 22, 1982, the referendum was held and 54.6% of voters approved the proposal, while 45.3% of voters rejected the proposal, thereby effectively extending the term of the then-parliament for a further six years, i.e., to 1989 (Manthri.lk 2016).   However, there are two critical shortcomings in Sri Lanka’s framework on referenda that undermine its ability to be used as an instrument of direct democracy. The first is that a referendum can only be called by the president. There is no modality through which the people can mandate a referendum. As such, the calling of a referendum is purely at the discretion of the president. The second shortcoming is that referenda are limited to approving bills at the parliament level and matters of national importance. Accordingly, the referendum framework has no application to matters at the local government level, thereby preventing communities from directly participating in policymaking on matters that are likely to impact them on a day-to-day basis (William Horace Brown 1905). By contrast, in Switzerland, the people can request local government bodies (cantons) to initiate legislative processes and propose amendments to existing laws. Furthermore, citizens of Switzerland are empowered to call for administrative referendums, during which the people are entitled to vote on projects that will incur high levels of public expenditure (Electoral Knowledge Network 2004).   2.3. Other Formalized Instruments   Article 74 of the Constitution empowers parliament to formulate standing orders for the purposes of, among other things, regulating the procedures of parliament. The parliamentary standing orders that are presently in force formalize three instruments that are intended to increase citizen engagement and involvement in governance. These three instruments are: i) private members bills; ii) public petitions; and iii) parliamentary questions.   2.3.1. Private Members Bills   A private members bill is a formal instrument that has the potential to be used by citizens to directly impact legislation and policy formulation. [2] Standing Orders 52 and 53 state that a private member can present two types of bills to parliament. The first of these types is bills that are intended to affect or benefit a particular person, association, or corporate body. The second is bills that are intended to be in furtherance of the public interest.   Using private members bills is a two-step process. First, a citizen must advocate for and gain the support of a parliamentarian who is a “private member” for the purposes of introducing a bill to parliament. Secondly, said parliamentarian must sponsor the proposed bill in parliament. Once this process is completed, the bill will be deliberated upon in parliament according to generally accepted procedures; that is, the bill is referred to the Attorney General for their opinion, and if the Attorney General deems that the proposed bill is consistent with the Constitution, the bill is published in the Gazette. Members of the public are then given the opportunity to challenge the proposed bill before the Supreme Court for seven days after the publication of the bill in the Gazette (SL Const Article 121(3)). Thereafter, the bill will proceed for deliberation in parliament.   However, data collected by the Manthri.lk, an independent platform monitoring Sri Lanka’s parliament, suggests that private members bills are underutilized as an instrument of direct citizen engagement. The data revealed that between August 2015 and October 2021, a total of 209 private member bills were presented in parliament, yet only 12 of these bills concerned matters of public interest (see Table 1). Thus, it is evident that private member bills have been predominantly utilized as an instrument to regulate the affairs of incorporated bodies, rather than an instrument to address issues of public interest.   2.3.2. Public Petitions   Petitioning the parliament is a traditional democratic instrument that was inherited by Sri Lanka through the British Westminster system (Huzzey and Miller 2020). At present, the public petition mechanism enables a citizen “to bring to the notice of parliament the flaws in the administrative machinery of the government and seek redress for grievances suffered” (Wijesekera 2002).   An aggrieved citizen can submit a petition to any parliamentarian requesting that the matters contained in the petition be considered and resolved. The petition is required to be submitted in writing and endorsed by the aggrieved citizen. If the parliamentarian to whom the petition is addressed is satisfied that there is a valid grievance, the parliamentarian can endorse the petition and refer it to the Committee of Public Petitions (Manthri.lk 2018). The Committee of Public Petitions is currently comprised of 15 parliamentarians, representing all of the political parties in parliament. The Committee has the authority to entertain an unlimited number of petitions on an unrestricted range of topics (Parliamentary Standing Order 122). If the Committee on Public Petitions is of the view that a petition reveals an infringement of the citizen’s fundamental rights or an injustice caused to the citizen, the Committee may either conduct an inquiry by itself or refer the petition to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman) for consideration and granting of due relief (Parliamentary Standing Order 122(3)).   Statistics published on Manthri.lk revealed that during the tenure of the Eighth Parliament of Sri Lanka (August 2015 to August 2020), a total of 2,401 public petitions were submitted to the Committee on Public Petitions by 181 parliamentarians out of the total of 225 members of the Parliament of Sri Lanka (see Tables 2 and 3). [3] As such, 42 parliamentarians did not submit any public petitions to the Committee on Public Petitions. Of the 2,401 petitions, a total of 1,115 petitions, that is, 46% of all petitions, were presented by only 10 parliamentarians (see Table 4). Similarly, during the tenure of the present Parliament of Sri Lanka (September 2020 to date), a total of 712 public petitions were submitted to the Committee on Public Petitions by 138 parliamentarians, indicating that 85 parliamentarians have not yet submitted any public petitions to the Committee (see Tables 5 and 6).   These statistics indicate that public petitions are neither extensively nor uniformly used by the citizenry of Sri Lanka as an instrument for directly engaging with the government and administration.   2.3.3. Parliamentary Questions   Parliamentary questions are another instrument that have the potential to enable citizens to directly engage with parliament and policy formulation. Parliamentary questions are, in essence, the posing of oral and written questions by a parliamentarian to the prime minister or any other minister on matters of public affairs (Policy.lk 2020).   In order to utilize this instrument, an individual or a group of individuals must advocate for and obtain the support of a parliamentarian for the purpose of posing questions on their behalf. The posing of parliamentary questions is governed by the parliamentary standing orders, which allow parliamentarians to direct any questions to any minister regarding matters of government policy that fall within the purview of the minister. While questions posed to parliament must generally be placed on the Order Book of Parliament, Standing Order 27(2) allows the leader of the opposition and any party leader to raise questions relating to matters of public importance without requiring the questions to be included in the Order Book of Parliament. Moreover, following the parliamentary tradition of the United Kingdom, from 2018 onwards, parliamentarians are entitled to direct up to four questions to the prime minister pertaining to governmental policies during the prime minister’s question time. Accordingly, citizens can urge their representatives to take advantage of the opportunity to ask parliamentary questions for the purpose of voicing the questions that the public has on matters of policy and administration.   Statistics compiled by Manthri.lk revealed that during the tenure of the Eighth Parliament of Sri Lanka, a total of 2,372 questions were raised by 105 parliamentarians (see Table 7). Of these 2,372 questions, a total of 1,324 questions (approximately 56%) were raised by only 10 parliamentarians (see Table 9). Similarly, during the tenure of the present parliament, 10 parliamentarians were responsible for raising 397 questions (approximately 64%) out of a total of 619 parliamentary questions (see Table 10).   Thus, as with private members bills and public petitions, the instrument of parliamentary questions also appears to be inadequately and ineffectively used for the purposes of direct engagement with matters of governance.   3. Challenges to the Use of Formalized Instruments Within the Context of Sri Lanka   Analysis of the frameworks within which the aforementioned formal instruments function reveals three critical challenges that undermine the ability of the people to directly engage in matters of governance: i) the absence of mechanisms to mandate the implementation of instruments of direct engagement; ii) the absence of mechanisms to improve parliamentary accountability; and iii) systematic and structural issues that inhibit access to instruments of direct engagement.   3.1. Absence of Mechanisms to Mandate the Implementation of Instruments of Direct Engagement   Although the parliamentary standing orders provide for the presenting of private members bills, public petitions, and parliamentary questions, the functionality of these instruments is premised solely on the discretion of parliamentarians. This is because a private members bill, public petition, or parliamentary question will be presented only if the parliamentarian who has been approached by a citizen agrees to submit the matter before parliament. None of the frameworks contain a mechanism by which a citizen or a group of citizens can trigger mandatory action by a parliamentarian. For instance, if a citizen wishes to submit a petition or ask a minister a particular question, the citizen can only do so if a parliamentarian agrees to submit such a petition or ask such a question. There is no way that the citizen can compel the parliamentarian to do so, regardless of the validity of the concerns raised by such a petition or question. This challenge also arises with regards to referendums, as the ability to call a referendum is vested solely in the president and cannot be triggered by the people with respect to matters of national or local importance.   3.2. Inadequacy of Mechanisms to Improve Parliamentary Accountability   Accountability can serve as a critical check against the tyranny of unbridled discretion. Thus, improving mechanisms that hold parliamentarians accountable can serve as a valuable method of ensuring that the discretion afforded to parliamentarians in terms of implementing instruments of direct engagement is exercised fairly and reasonably.   However, Sri Lanka lacks mechanisms that improve and ensure the accountability of parliament. For instance, there is no mechanism through which a petition submitted by a citizen can be tracked. Thus, an aggrieved citizen has no way to monitor the progress of their petition. Moreover, prior to the publication and compilation of statistics on the submission of public petitions and parliamentary questions by Manthri.lk, there were no mainstream platforms that published statistics on parliamentary attendance or how parliamentarians implemented and gave effect to these instruments. Further, Sri Lanka has yet to implement a mechanism requiring parliamentarians to report their progress as a public representative on a monthly or annual basis. These gaps in holding parliamentarians accountable enable them to exercise discretion without sufficient checks, thereby undermining the ability of citizens to fully instrumentalize the frameworks of private member bills, public petitions, and parliamentary questions. The lack of mechanisms to mandate the implementation of these instruments is thereby compounded by the lack of mechanisms to hold parliamentarians to account.   3.3. Systematic Issues Inhibiting Access to Instruments of Direct Engagement   Access to democratic institutions is essential to the meaningful utilization of instruments of direct engagement, but certain systemic issues in Sri Lanka have significantly inhibited access to such institutions and instruments. A few of these issues are explained as follows.   3.3.1. Limited Access to Parliamentary Proceedings   Parliamentary proceedings in Sri Lanka are physically and virtually accessible to the public, and parliamentary proceedings are telecast on national networks. However, this accessibility is limited to the proceedings of the main chamber of parliament. In contrast, the proceedings of the numerous committees and sub-committees of parliament, which also deliberate on matters of public interest, are not accessible to the public.   3.3.2. Gender Gap in Democratic Institutions   Per the 2021 Global Gender Gap Index, Sri Lanka is ranked 116th overall out of 150 countries and 90th in terms of political empowerment of women (Democracy Reporting International 2021). Sri Lanka’s rank is predominantly premised on the low presence and participation of women in political organizations, government institutions, and elected offices. Limited female participation in public life has been linked to several causes, including Sri Lanka’s patriarchal culture, violence against women, and the negative portrayal of female political candidates in the media and by political rivals. Although Sri Lanka introduced a quota for female politicians at the provincial and local government authority levels, women are still underrepresented in Sri Lanka’s representative bodies. This low level of participation in formal politics by women inhibits female citizens from exercising their democratic rights by effectively engaging with the country’s democratic institutions.   4. Conclusion and Areas for Improvement   4.1. Conclusion   Two findings can be derived from the above analysis. First, it is clear that Sri Lanka has mechanisms in place that enable citizens to directly engage in matters of governance, administration, and policymaking. In utilizing these mechanisms, ordinary citizens seek to achieve a higher level of involvement in matters that will affect their day-to-day lives. Second, there are challenges to accessing and being able to meaningfully use these mechanisms. These challenges stem from issues inherent to the mechanisms themselves, such as their dependence on the discretion of a representative of the people, as well as systemic issues in Sri Lanka’s governance framework, such as inadequate access to parliamentary proceedings.   Thus, in order for citizens to be able to participate more directly and meaningfully in democratic governance, these mechanisms need to be improved on a number of grounds, such as:   i. Expanding the scope of referendums   Although Sri Lanka’s Constitution recognizes referendums as a method of direct democracy, the executive president is the only individual with the authority to call for a referendum. Sri Lanka could resolve this problem by adopting a system similar to that of Switzerland, where the people can trigger legislative initiatives and referenda. Sri Lanka should also explore introducing referendums for resolving legislative and policy issues at the local governmental level by allowing citizens to trigger referenda through proposals once they receive endorsements/signatures from a sufficient portion of the constituency.   ii. Introducing mechanisms to increase accountability of public representatives   Although Sri Lanka recognizes private members bills, public petitions, and parliamentary questions as formalized instruments allowing citizens to directly engage with parliament, the successful implementation of these instruments is contingent on effective implementation and follow-up by parliamentarians. Thus, Sri Lanka should explore the possibility of introducing mechanisms to monitor the use of such instruments by citizens and parliamentarians, while also raising awareness of the utility of such mechanisms among the general public.   iii. Introducing mechanisms to mandate the implementation of formalized instruments   As discussed before, the formal mechanisms of direct engagement currently lack a threshold or trigger that mandates their implementation. Therefore, Sri Lanka should introduce procedures that trigger the automatic implementation of such formalized instruments in specific circumstances, such as when a petition or proposal has been endorsed/signed by a specific number of citizens. ■   References   Combaz E, Mcloughlin C, Accountability and responsiveness of the state and society, GSDRC Publications, August 2014, https://gsdrc.org > ... > Supplements, accessed February 27 2022 Cooray, L.J.M. “Constitutional Government in Sri Lanka 1796-1977.” Pannipitya (2005): Electoral Knowledge Network, Swiss direct democracy, https://aceproject.org > mobile_browsing > onePag, accessed March 3 2022 Haxhiu S and Alidemaj A, Representative Democracy – its Meaning and Basic Principles, Huzzey R and Miller H, Petitions, Parliament and Political Culture: Petitioning the House of Commons, 1780–1918* Past & Present, Volume 248, Issue 1, August 2020, Pages 123–164 Jon Wallace, Hans Kundnani, and Elizabeth Donnelly, The importance of democracy, APRIL 14 2021 Jayawickrama Nihal, ‘THE REFERENDUM – An illegitimate alien mechanism’ (The Island December 26 2021) http://island.lk > the-referendum-an-illegitimate-alien-m..., accessed February 22 2022 Kirinde Chandani, Poor attendance in Parliament a perennial problem, Sunday times January 13 2019) Matsusaka, John, G. 2005. "Direct Democracy Works." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (2): 185-206 Rathnepala S, Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and Port City Commission Bill – an analysis, (Economy Next May 18 2021) Rosenberger S, Seisl B, Stadlmair J, Dalpra E, What Are Petitions Good for?, Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 75, Issue 1, January 2022, https://academic.oup.com > article, accessed February 27 2022 Wijesekera P, Parliamentary Practice in Sri Lanka, Parliamentary Secretariat 2002     [1] The entrenched articles of the Constitution are set out in Article 83 of the Constitution. They are Article 1 (the name of the state: Sri Lanka), Article 2 (the nature of the state: Unitary), Article 3 (recognizing the inalienable sovereignty of the people), Article 6 (design of the national flag), Article 7 (lyrics and melody of the national anthem), Article 8 (declaration of the national day), Article 9 (granting Buddhism the foremost place), Article 10 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion), Article 11 (freedom from torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment), and Articles 30(2) and 62(2) (prescribing the terms of office of the executive president and members of parliament). [2] Standing Order 24(3) interprets the term “private member” to mean any parliamentarian who does not hold the office of the Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Deputy Chairperson of Committees, Prime Minister, Cabinet Minister, State Minister, Deputy Minister, Leader of the House of Parliament, Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, Chief Government Whip or Chief Opposition Whip. [3] The speaker and the deputy speaker are excluded as members of parliament for the purposes of this computation.     ■ Verité Research is a private think tank that provides strategic analysis for Asia. Its main research divisions are economics, politics, law and media. This think tank is a member of the Asia Democracy Research network (ADRN). The Legal Research Team at Verité Research prepared this working paper. Supun Jayawardena and Uween Jayasinghe were the principal researchers.     ■  담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장∙선임연구원     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr  

Although hailed as a democratic outlier in Central Asia, if we consider the essence of direct democracy to be ‘direct voting,’ Mongolia remains a country with limited space for direct democracy.[1] Since Mongolia’s democratic transition in the 1990s, no referendums have been held, citizens’ initiatives are rarely considered, and demands for recalls are disregarded. Institutional mechanisms of direct voting are lacking. Therefore, this working paper examines the institutional mechanisms of direct democracy defined more broadly as public participation, rather than solely direct voting.   Institutional Mechanisms of Direct Democracy   Mongolia has been making progress in institutionalizing mechanisms of direct democracy since its democratic transition in 1990. The first democratic Constitution of 1992 includes three articles that have bearing on direct democracy. Since then, legal reforms have been undertaken to establish and strengthen democracy in Mongolia. During the early stages of reform in the 1990s, foundational laws such as the Law on People’s Referendums of Mongolia (1995) and the Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (1997) were ratified. The 2010s saw another surge in direct democracy initiatives through the ratification of laws promoting government transparency, citizen participation, and participatory budgeting. Notable legislation includes the Law on Information Transparency and Right to Information (2011); the Integrated Budget Law, which allows direct citizen participation in local development funds (2013); the Glass Account Law (2014), which requires transparency of the state budget; the Law on Citizens Halls; and the Law on Deliberative Democracy (2017), which allows Mongolia to exercise various direct democracy mechanisms. This section elaborates on the current implementation of these mechanisms, challenges faced, and changes and reforms needed.   Right to Information   The 2011 Law on Information Transparency and Right to Information (Law on RTI) requires all government organizations (judiciary, parliamentary, executive, and sub-national) to maintain transparency in operations, human resources, budgets, and procurement. The law specifies methods, timelines, and standards of information transparency to facilitate citizens’ access to information and ability to provide feedback and comments to the government. The Independent Research Institute of Mongolia (IRIM) has engaged in regular monitoring of the implementation of the law and documented the gradual improvement of transparency across organizations. Yet, the lack of timeliness, availability and relevance, and user-friendly information persist[2] (IRIM 2021). The 2016 Law on State and Official Secrets has constrained the progress that can be made through the RTI Law and, according to a CIVICUS analysis, “allows virtually all information to be classified as a state or official secret, leading in some cases to the prosecution of journalists exposing corruption” (CIVICUS 2020).   In 2021, laws on public information transparency and the protection of personal information were approved by the Parliament. The laws allow for establishing and using open data and improved mechanisms of information transparency and access to information, but only for information that is not classified as secret. However, as mentioned in the 2022 BTI index, “the new law allows the government to define the scope of state secrets.” Per The Globe International, the number of documents or portions of documents classified as a ‘state secrets’ in Mongolia increased from 60 in 2017 to 565 in 2019, indicating a serious setback for the right to access information (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022).   Petitions, Comments, and Complaint Mechanisms   The 1995 Law on Resolving Petitions and Complaints of Citizens to State Organizations and Public Officials was a significant step forward in formalizing the political participation of citizens. The law aimed to ensure the right of every citizen to receive a response and proposed solution to their problems, offering four mechanisms for participation: petitions, proposals, notices, and complaints. The law has been revised several times. In 2003, improvements in registering and tracking the status of citizen complaints were introduced, and in 2009, articles were added to guarantee that those who lodged a petition or complaint would receive a final response and resolution. In 2016, additional clarifications were issued regarding how to handle cases of disagreement with the government response and how to address higher-level organizations and officials.   Despite these updates to the law, several further changes and reforms are needed. First, the period to respond to a petition or complaint should be shortened to meet the needs of the public in the digital information era. The current law specifies that “a petition or a complaint shall be resolved within 30 days of its receipt,” “this period may be extended for up to 30 days,” and “a response to a petition with the nature of a proposal shall be provided within 90 days.” Second, there should be clarity and criteria about the meaning of “resolve.” Current practice considers a problem “resolved” when a written response has been provided (Myagmartsooj 2013). Third, the distinction between the four types of feedback–petitions, proposals, notices, and complaints—should be revised to meet international standards, and the process for resolving them should be clearly mapped out. The lack of clarity surrounding the definition of these main concepts has resulted in a poor registration and reporting system nationwide, which in turn has affected the ability to engage in adequate planning.   In 2012, the Parliament[3] established a Standing Committee on Resolving Petitions and Complaints for the first time. In 2016, the Committee received upwards of 3,000 petitions and complaints. In 2018, 1,233 complaints/petitions were received from 7,231 citizens, of which 9.2% reflected issues pertaining to the public interest (State Great Khural Committee on Petition 2018).   The Standing Committee is an important mechanism of direct democracy and accountability, as it can form working groups, initiate public hearings, appoint analysts to conduct further investigation, or submit an inquiry from government officials and organizations. However, the current Parliament does not have a dedicated Standing Committee on Petitions and Complaints (State Great Khural 2020).   Referendums   Article 24 of the Constitution of Mongolia (1992) specifies regulations surrounding people’s referendums, and the Law on People’s Referendums of Mongolia (1995) specifies that only the president, government, or parliament (with at least one third of members voting in favor) have the right to initiate national referendums. This law has several drawbacks. First, it restricts the right of citizens to initiate a referendum. Second, it lacks clarity on what preconditions must be met to initiate a referendum. Third, there are strict limitations on repeating referendums if needed, making it difficult to use the national referendums due to their irreversible nature. For example, a resolution of a referendum can only be amended if at least three quarters of the Parliament vote in favor, and within to five years for a referendum that had a clear majority and two years for a referendum that did not have a clear majority. Fourth, the cost of organizing a referendum is equivalent to that of a general election (Chultemsuren 2007). As a result, following its adoption, the law was amended just once (in 2016), and not a single referendum has been held thus far.[4]. Although no substantial changes were introduced in 2016, the Law on People’s Referendums was amended to make it consistent with the Law on General Elections, which uses automated election systems. The Constitutional Amendment in 2019 introduced a clause relating to referendums, stating, “Mongolia shall not allow any attempt to negate its independence and territorial integrity and prohibits a referendum for this purpose.”   Deliberative Polling   The Mongolian Law on Deliberative Polling was ratified in 2017 based on Professor James Fishkin’s (Stanford University) theory of deliberative polling. The law stipulates that executive and legislative organizations at all levels can hold a deliberative poll to identify issues and consult with citizens on policy priorities. A deliberative poll should select a random and representative sample of the population to engage in dialogue with competing experts using carefully balanced briefing materials and questionnaires. This deliberative polling process is required for projects to be funded by the local development fund, for planning of cities and green facilities in public space, and prior to a constitutional amendment (Naran 2019). The organizational cost is covered by the state budget.   Using this law, the first deliberative poll was conducted in Mongolia in April 2017 as part of an effort to amend the Constitution. The quantitative results were used as the basis for recommendations to the Parliament about which proposals had sufficient support to merit consideration (Naran 2019). In total, 1,570 citizens were polled on six topics related to constitutional amendments and received a written explana¬tion and oral consultation with experts (Lundeejantsan 2017). As constitutional researcher Odonkhuu observed, “It was an innovative experiment not only in Mongolia but also around the world” (Odonkhuu 2021). In 2018, deliberative polling was organized on various topics including illegal coal extraction, and in 2020 on rangeland protection.   Public Hearings   The Law on Public Hearing (2015) provides that public hearings shall be held before the approval of administrative legal acts and the approval of administrative decisions concerning the public interest. The law provides mechanisms for direct democracy by allowing government organizations and officials to consult, monitor, evaluate, and obtain expert views on nine types of issues.[5] The initiative to hold a public hearing can be initiated by a citizen, a local government, or a legal entity.   Citizens Halls were established in 2009 under President Elbegdorj Tsakhia as a permanent venue for public hearings on draft laws, the first of which would be the draft Press Law (Benequista and H 2011). In 2012, the Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Human Rights organized the first public hearing on the protest event of July 1, 2008[6]. Since then, dozens of public hearings have been organized concerning both national and local level issues.[7]   Public hearings are regularly employed by a wide range of stakeholders at different levels regarding a variety of topics. The law has been amended and improved in a timely manner. However, efforts should be made to increase public knowledge about the public hearing mechanism and its potential for use, and monitoring of the implementation of the results of hearings should be increased..   Digital and E-governance   E-governance has become a major focus of the Mongolian government. The e-Mongolia national program was first approved in 2005 with the aim of increasing the number of internet users and improving digital infrastructure in the country.[8] Between 2008 and 2012, the National Data Center was established,[9] and between 2012 and 2016, the e-governance program introduced 25 types of e-services.[10] Since 2013, the call center ”11-11” has provided a platform for citizens to give direct feedback. This was expanded in 2019 to the Government Public Communication Center, which accepts feedback, transfers callers to the relevant government organization, and monitors the implementation of the program. According to the 2018 Index on E-Participation, Mongolia ranked 65th with a rating of 0.736. However, the country slid to 87th place with a rating of 0.607 in 2020 (UN 2020).   Although digital transformation is making services easily accessible to citizens and providing more opportunities to participate in governance, as some studies note, Mongolia’s preparedness remains insufficient, with one in five citizens living with limited access to electricity (L.Galbaatar 2020). The digital divide is real, especially among older people and people with disabilities (IRIM and UNDP 2021). Capacity building to improve the digital skills of marginalized groups, increased support for e-participation, actual implementation of initiatives, and monitoring of and accountability for said implementation, are needed. Furthermore, digital platforms are primarily used to regulate the state-to-citizen relationship rather than to support citizen-to-state relationships and other feedback relationships. The enabling environment within which citizens can use digital methods to directly participate in governance and vote on issues pertaining to their needs remains inadequate.   Other mechanisms of public participation have been created as part of the State Decentralization Policy, such as citizen participation in setting local budget priorities and voting for Local Development Fund investments. However, the scale of these local budgets is relatively small and such participation is not a standard element of general state budget processes.   Prevailing Claims about Democracy and Direct Democracy   Popular Claims in Support of Implementing Direct Democracy Mechanisms   Major claims in support of implementing direct democratic mechanisms relate to Mongolia’s independence and identity as a free and democratic country, the small population (which facilitates participation in decision-making), opportunities for budget efficiency, and the need to ensure accountability. Groups supporting or advancing these views include civil society organizations, media representatives, pro-democracy activists, and politicians.   Table 1: Claims Supporting Democracy and Direct Democracy   Popular Claims Supporting Direct Democracy Which Groups Reasons/Rationale Mongolia is a democratic country, and the principle of citizen participation is enshrined in the Constitution Opposition parties (e.g. Democratic Party), journalists, activists, and CSOs Depending on which party wins elections, the leadership of presidents, prime ministers and the parliament is critical to support efforts to advance direct democracy The opportunity to directly influence decision making should be made available to marginalized and vulnerable groups Marginalized and vulnerable groups (youth, older persons, people with disabilities), CSOs Limited access to other lengthy participatory processes (e.g. writing official petitions and complaints), limited ability to use digital tools, etc. The process of facilitating direct democracy mechanisms has been simplified and the cost has decreased thanks to digitalization. Therefore, direct democracy mechanisms should be used more often. Media, IT, Ministry of Communications Tools, including e-tools, are expanding direct democracy.Digital development/progress is improving access to tools and refining regulations. COVID-19 lockdowns emphasized the need for enhanced direct democracy There is a need for direct participation - Parliamentarians and local representative councils have been ineffective in reflecting and acting on the voices of the public. General public Expressed through demonstrations and social media movements demanding direct participation. Provides opportunities and signals for the population to participate in politics. Reinforced by media and social media. Citizens and businesses should not/cannot afford to wait for the bureaucracy and government to solve social problems. Hence, direct action and implementation are needed CSOs, communities, activists Citizen cooperation and support – citizen groups and NGOs taking initiative to solve social problems There is a need for direct oversight of budget, contracting, and procurement. Accountability should be demanded from politicians Micro, small and medium-sized business owners MSMEs bore the economic costs of the pandemic and suffered from the embezzlement of public funds. This pushed MSME owners and employees to support democracy Popular Claims against Implementing Direct Democracy Mechanisms   Table 2 Claims against (Direct) Democracy   Popular Claims Against Direct Democracy Which Groups Reasons/Rationale Nationalist claims – anti-democratic claims and attacking so-called Pro-American “liberals” Nationalist groups Extremist and discriminatory/far-right views have spread via social media National security concerns should limit opportunities for the intervention of foreign agents and interference in government operations[11] National security, justice and defense sector members Mongolia’s independence from and fear of external actors. For example, over-dependence on Russia and China could hinder Mongolia’s development. A friendly relationship with the two neighbors is needed Unity and need to support each other. There is no need for debate or arguments during emergencies/crisis situations Government, politicians, opposition Prioritizing unity takes precedence over the notion of plurality and democracy CSOs should be restricted and controlled in terms of registration, funding, and operations to avoid money laundering and misuse by political powers[12] Leaders and members of national defense, security, and justice systems Increased risk of money laundering, terrorism, and disobedience Inequality - democracy only enriches the rich and their large-scale businesses. Ordinary citizens are not able to benefit from democracy. Media, journalists, and politicians Declining trust in representative democracy, increased corruption, and unethical behavior of politicians. Increasing poverty and inequality—disappointment with democracy over the last 30 years and unfulfilled expectations. Mongolia should prioritize friendly relationships above all and avoid adopting values that are too “Western” and “liberal” Nationalist movements Unfavorable international environment and disinformation/propaganda from Russia and China Lingering emergency situations justify quick, direct decisions making rather than a lengthy consultative process Government, parliament and some academics Increasing restrictions on demonstrations and protests in public spaces to defend the ruling party’s interests Rather than direct and regular criticisms that risk stalling progress, direct support is needed for the country’s achievement of its long-term vision and prosperity Government/cabinet, politicians Due to several changes in government and instability of civil services, calls for government stability have been increasing.[13] Stagnating economic growth and uncertain times The “masses” are inherently uneducated and incapable of making informed and rational decisions, and therefore should not be included in governance[14] Journalists, influencers, and politicians Elitist arguments A technical, legislative, and cultural environment—as well as leadership of politicians and non-state actors—favorable to direct democracy exists in Mongolia. Nonetheless, recent years have seen accelerating regression, with increasing censorship and limitations on freedom of expression and speech, as well as the outbreak of demonstrations and protests during COVID-19 lockdowns. This has been exacerbated by an unfavorable external environment and series of events, including the mass protests/events in Kazakhstan, Mongolia’s economic dependence on China (felt strongly during border closures during the COVID-19 crisis), and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, the declining support of Western bilateral and multi-lateral organizations in promoting democratic values has been strongly felt. ■    References   Benequista, Nick , and Andy H. 2011. “Mongolia's Citizens' Hall.” Participedia. Accessed March 26, 2022. https://participedia.net/case/1150. Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2022. Mongolia Country Report 2022. Accessed March 9, 2022. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/MNG#pos4. Castagna, Craig. 2022. “Despite Civil Society’s Contributions to Democracy, Mongolia’s NGOs Are Now at Risk.” International Republican Institute. 2 March. Accessed March 19, 2022. https://www.iri.org/news/despite-civil-societys-contributions-to-democracy-mongolias-ngos-are-now-at-risk/?fbclid=IwAR0YwhbhixIkXeJaivQRfNHSrjesdYclhCQJjwktPCw7FHwkh9t9n3-SFzg. Chultemsuren, Tamir. 2007. Ард нийтийн санал асуулгын хуулийг өөрчлөх тухайд. 27 09. Accessed 03 15, 2022. http://www.forum.mn/index.php?sel=article&menu_id=107&obj_id=4342. CIVICUS. 2020. PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER’S BILL IN MONGOLIA BUT DEFAMATION LAWS PUT MEDIA AT RISK. 17 June. Accessed March 18, 2022. https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2020/06/17/progress-human-rights-defenders-bill-mongolia-defamation-laws-put-media-risk/. IRIM and UNDP. 2021. Digital Skills Assessment: The first building block of the “Digital Nation.” Ulaanbaatar: UNDP Accelerator Lab Mongolia. https://www.mn.undp.org/content/mongolia/en/home/blog/2021/ALabDigitalSkillsAssessment.html. IRIM. 2021. Digital Transperency Index: Monitoring of Transparency in Government Operations. https://www.irim.mn/news/1479. L.Galbaatar. 2020. “Засаглалын цахим шилжилт: төрийн үйл хэрэг дэх иргэдийн цахим оролцоо.” In //Монгол дахь ардчилал, иргэний нийгмийн өнөөгийн байдлын нийгэм-улс төрийн судалгаа. Судалгааны үр дүн, бодлогын зөвлөмж. Ulaanbaatar: Сэлэнгэ пресс.   Lundeejantsan, D. 2017. Зөвлөлдөх санал асуулгыг зургаан сэдвийн хүрээнд явуулна. 12 April. http://itoim.mn/article Naran, Amarzaya. 2019. Insights for design of direct public participation: Mongolia as a case study. IDEA, Melbourne Forum on Constituion-Building and Constitution Transformation Network. https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/3224463/MF19-Mongoliaa-paper.pdf. Odonkhuu, Munkhsaikhan. 2021. “The 2017 Deliberative Polling on Draft Amendments to the Mongolian Constitution.” In Democratic Struggles in Challenging Times: Insights from Mongolia and Around the World, edited by Christian Suter, Stephen Brown, Dolgion Aldar and Tamir Chultemsuren, 47-74. Ulaanbaatar: IRIM and WSF. State Great Khural Committee on Petition . 2018. 2018 оны хаврын ээлжит чуулганы хугацаанд Өргөдлийн байнгын хорооны хийж гүйцэтгэсэн ажлын тайлан нэвтрүүлэг - Өргөдлийн байнгын хороо (parliament.mn). 16 August. Accessed March 21, 2022. http://urgudul.parliament.mn/index.php/content?id=289&fbclid=IwAR08LXg8DWxAiD6vF3h0qUQ0WDnsiwpW9bYaf86e4ba4d9NC0VbTuap_N1c#.YkFidYVBxD8. State Great Khural. 1995. LAW ON RESOLVING PETITIONS AND COMPLAINTS OF CITIZENS TO STATE ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS. https://old.legalinfo.mn/law/details/16594. —. 2016. LAW ON STATE AND OFFICIAL SECRETS. Ulaanbaatar. https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail/15787. —. 1992. The Constitution of Mongolia. https://www.conscourt.gov.mn/?page_id=842&lang=en. State Great Khural. 13 January 1992 Amended on 14 November 2019. “THE CONSTITUTION OF MONGOLIA.” https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/9694/file/MONG_constitution.pdf. State Great Khural. 2019. “ЗӨВЛӨЛДӨХ САНАЛ АСУУЛГЫН ТУХАЙ.” https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail/12492. —. 2020. МОНГОЛ УЛСЫН ИХ ХУРЛЫН ГИШҮҮД - БАЙНГЫН ХОРООДООР. Accessed March 11, 2022. http://parliament.mn/cv?tid=2&did=4. UN. 2020. UN E-Government Knowledgebase. Accessed March 26, 2022. https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Data/Country-Information/id/113-Mongolia/dataYear/2020. Н.Мягмарцоож. 2013. Иргэдийн оролцооны эрх зүйн орчны ерөнхий шинжилгээ//Иргэдийн оролцоо ба эрх зүйн орчин ба үнэлгээ. World Movement for Democracy. 2021. Цахим хөгжлийн багц хуулийн төслүүдийг эцэслэн баталлаа. 17 December. Accessed March 14, 2022. https://mojha.gov.mn/newmojha/?p=6881.     [1] Article 3 stipulates “the people of Mongolia shall directly participate in State affairs and shall exercise such right through the representative organ of the State power established by their election.” Clause 12 of Article 16 stipulates “the right to submit petitions or complaints to the State organs and public officials, and get it resolved by those State organs.” Clause 16 of Article 16 stipulates “freedom of thought, opinion and expression, speech, press, and peaceful assembly.” Clause 16 of Article 25 on referendums stipulates that the State Great Khural must “hold national referendums, verify the validity of a referendum in which the majority of citizens who are qualified for elections have participated, and consider the question which obtained a majority vote as decided.” [2] As of 2021, the government digital transparency index was 0.602 out of 1.0 according to the IRIM monitoring. [3] Parliament of Mongolia [4] The Parliament of Mongolia did not hold a referendum when it introduced amendments to the Constitution of Mongolia in 2000. When the second set of amendments to the Constitution were introduced in 2019, deliberative polling (explained later in this paper) was used. [5] Namely: legislation, general oversight, budget oversight, appointments, administrative matters, local planning, hearings on consultations, oversight of human rights and freedom. [6] A mass protest where about 220 civilians and 108 servicemen were injured, 700 protesters were detained, and 5 were shot dead. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mongolia-idUSSP3149220080702 [7] Examples include appointment of head of the Anti-Corruption Agency, local budgeting of Bayanzurh District of Ulaanbaatar city, land use planning, the access and right to education of children with disabilities, socio-economic development planning in Bayanzurkh District, and consultation on amendment of the Law on General Elections. Various international organizations including IRI and Open Society Forum were providing training and technical support in these processes. [8] Resolution #216 of the Government of Mongolia, 2005 [9] Resolution #78, Annex 1 of the Government of Mongolia, 2008 [10] Resolution #101, Annex 1 of the Government of Mongolia 2012 [11] https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2020/06/17/progress-human-rights-defenders-bill-mongolia-defamation-laws-put-media-risk/ [12] https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2020/06/17/progress-human-rights-defenders-bill-mongolia-defamation-laws-put-media-risk/ [13] https://ikon.mn/n/2egn [14] Prominent politicians decried the participation of “ordinary citizens” in a discussion of legal affairs, arguing that only a panel of experts should be allowed to comment on draft laws https://participedia.net/case/1150     ■ Tamir Chultemsuren is the Vice Dean of the National University of Mongolia’s School of Arts, Sciences and Social Sciences, and holds a degree in Sociology from the National University of Mongolia. Chultemsuren is one of the co-founders of the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia (IRIM) and has been Chairman of the Board of IRIM since 2011. Having worked in both the consultative and academic sectors since 1999, Chultemsuren is intimately familiar with democratic studies and Mongolian politics. Having attended various academic seminars and functions across the U.S., Ireland, Hungary, Portugal, Turkey, Finland, Kazakhstan, Austria, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, Chultemsuren has diverse and in-depth experience in engaging partners in cross-cultural settings. His areas of expertise are social research—civic participation, mass protest, and public perception; policy research—education policy and institution strengthening, monitoring, and evaluation; project management; and consultation.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr  

Introduction   In the past two decades, Philippine civil society organizations (CSOs) have become critical players in ensuring the integrity of public service delivery. Formal and informal spaces for citizen participation are now available in the areas of public financial management (PFM). CSOs, both at the national and local levels, have developed and implemented tools and technologies aimed at fostering transparency, accountability, and citizen empowerment in various stages of public financial management: planning, budgeting, implementation, and monitoring. While there are documented best practices of citizen engagement in governance in various sectors aimed at addressing development issues, the comprehensive stocktaking, knowledge generation, and analysis on how citizen technologies and tools have contributed towards fostering transparency, accountability, and integrity of the overall PFM process remain scant and under-publicized. Distilling the lessons from existing CSO practices can serve as inputs in developing key recommendations in improving citizen participation in PFM processes.   History of Direct Democracy   The Philippines experienced the renewal and broadening of civil society during the 1980s as mass mobilizations helped bring down the Marcos dictatorship. As a product of democratic transition, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the importance of civil society and its participation in governance and development. The Charter declares that the State shall encourage non-governmental, sector-specific, and community-based organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. It emphasizes that the right of the people and their organizations for effective and meaningful participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. To pursue this aim, adequate consultation mechanisms will be set up by the government.   The Philippines is a unitary state with a presidential system of government. It is characterized by the formal separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Historically, the executive agencies under the direction of the President enjoyed wide latitude for development planning, spending decisions, and appointments of key people to steer the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, these actions were subject to the oversight authority exercised in the budget and confirmation hearings of Congress as well as the audit procedures of independent Constitutional bodies, including the Commission on Audit and the Civil Service Commission.   Since 1946, free elections were held on a regular basis to choose the leaders from the President to legislators and local government officials except for the fourteen-year interregnum from 1972 to 1986 when the country was placed under martial law. As a platform for voice and accountability, elections leave much to be desired. The combination of a weak political party system, poor election administration, and inadequate voters education led to the low quality of democracy and the failure to convert campaign platforms into effective governance programs. In this landscape, rent-seeking opportunities abound to use campaign finance contributions as a window to get state-conferred business contracts and other concessions. On the other hand, the politicized recruitment of executives for bureaucratic positions from the top down to the level of middle managers distorted efforts to professionalize the government career executive service.   The weakness of democratic institutions like political parties fostered a state that became vulnerable to capture by politicians and their business allies while being unable to provide ordinary citizens with the voice mechanisms to express their demands and gain access to public services. A two-party system shaped the contours of electoral politics from 1946 until it was destroyed by martial law in 1972. The return of formal democracy in the aftermath of the people power revolution in 1986 gave rise to a multi-party system. Nevertheless, the shift from a two-party towards a multi-party system did nothing to alter the general lack of clear programmatic differences among the major parties.   The downfall of authoritarianism led to the establishment of a Constitutional Commission by President Corazon Aquino. In 1987, a new Philippine Constitution was ratified. Reacting to the twenty-year rule of Ferdinand Marcos as president, the new Charter limited the term of office of the President to a single six-year term. Other elected leaders like legislators and local government officials are also governed by term limits but can seek re-election under restricted successive term provisions. Another feature is the introduction of proportional representation in Congress for party-list groups that promote the interests of marginalized sectors. Twenty percent of the seats in the House of Representatives are allocated for proportional representation. A party-list group gains a seat when it reaches the threshold of two percent of the national vote and can occupy as many as three seats in Congress.   As a product of the democratic transition, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the importance of civil society and its participation in governance and development. The Charter declares that the State shall encourage non-governmental, sector-specific, and community-based organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. It emphasizes that the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. To pursue this aim, adequate consultation mechanisms will be set up by the government.   Direct Democracy: Institutional and Non-institutional Mechanisms   Community-Driven Development   Community-driven development is pursued through the provision of grants for community-based social preparation, planning, and implementation of sub-projects such as water systems, access roads, schools, health stations, and daycare centers. The goal is to enable communities in target municipalities to enhance their access to social services and to engage in more inclusive local planning, budgeting, implementation, and disaster risk reduction and management.   The Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services-National Community-Driven Development (KALAHI-CIDSS-NCDD) Program encouraged marginalized communities to engage with their barangay officials in identifying their needs and accessing resources from other government agencies. The program enabled communities to participate in decision-making, exact accountability from local officials, and foil efforts to divert funds.   The Barangay Assembly became a venue for not just for reporting but also for accountability. It introduces the residents to the objectives and processes of the KALAHI-CIDSS-NCDD Program and validates the priority problems and proposed subprojects identified during the participatory situation analysis. The Barangay Assembly approves the various aspects of the chosen subprojects. During subproject construction, the Barangay Assembly instructs the village subproject management committees to report on the progress of implementation.   The Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum is the mechanism for subproject selection within the KALAHI-CIDSS-NCDD Program. Each village presents its proposal to the Forum, followed by an open forum where representatives of other villages are given an opportunity to raise questions about the proposal. After the subproject presentations are completed, proposals are graded using the criteria agreed upon earlier. The scores of the proposals are consolidated to arrive at the overall ranking of the sub-projects. The ranking of the sub-projects is then used for the allocation of the KALAHI-CIDSS-NCDD Program municipal grant.   The Forum is a collaborative activity between the DSWD and the LGU. It aims to elevate people’s understanding of the status of local development, especially in the areas of local governance, poverty reduction, and people empowerment. It provides a platform for face-to-face dialogue between project implementers and beneficiaries. It promotes the use of information by municipal and barangay officials to support better planning, implementation, and reporting.   Participatory Audit   The transition to democracy in 1986 opened windows for civil society participation in monitoring development programs of the government. In 1987, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the central planning agency of the government, signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) to monitor the projects under the Community Employment and Development Program in the province of Abra.   To prepare for the task, the CCAGG volunteers underwent rigorous training on project monitoring. Capacity building was provided by the NEDA – Region I office. The CCAGG conducted community meetings and used local radio and newspapers, to inform residents about the status of public infrastructure projects. In the past, it was common for government agencies to declare the completion of projects and programs that have not been validated especially in remote areas where there are no local monitoring teams.   In a celebrated case, the CCAGG decided to conduct a social accountability check on the then Ministry Public Works and Highways report on the completion of 27 road projects in Abra. Mobilizing its band of citizen volunteers, the CCAGG produced detailed documentation of the actual state of the finished projects. The civil society audit contradicted the government report while many of the projects were only just beginning or were mid-way through the construction stage. The CCAGG report was submitted to the national government. An official audit on the road projects was launched. The COA report concurred with the findings of the CCAGG. As a result of public participation in infrastructure monitoring, 11 public works officials were suspended for dishonesty and misconduct. The Chief Engineer and Deputy Chief Engineer of MPWH in Abra were suspended without pay and debarred from serving in the province. Recognizing the critical role of the CCAGG in corruption prevention, the COA decided to partner with the CCAGG in conducting participatory auditing with the support of the United Nations Development Programme. The lessons from the audit exercises were later incorporated into a Manual on the Conduct of Participatory Audit. Given its pioneering and extensive experience in infrastructure monitoring, the CCAGG was chosen to serve as Chair of the Bantay Lansangan (Road Watch) civil society network that monitored DPWH procurement processes under the Benigno S. Aquino III administration.   The Citizens Participatory Audit was launched in 2012 by the Commission on Audit (COA) and the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP). This mechanism makes it possible for CSOs and private professional organizations to participate in audit teams headed by COA. The CPA is based on the notion that the people have the “primordial right to a clean government and the prudent utilization of public resources”, and that “public accountability can prosper only with a vigilant and involved citizenry” (Department of Budget and Management, 2016). The following lists just some of the projects audited by CSOs under the CPA (Commission on Audit, n. d.):   (a) Barangay health centers in Marikina City   (b) Farm-to-Market Road (FMR) project   (c) KAMANAVA flood control project   (d) Solid waste management (SWM) program of Quezon City   (e) Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) project   Textbook Count, a collaborative initiative between G-Watch and the Department of Education (DepEd), is intended to ensure that the right quantity and quality of textbooks are delivered to the right recipients at the right time. This effort is meant to:   (a) Put an end to corruption in the procurement of textbooks;   (b) Systematize the delivery of textbooks across the country.   (c) Pressure suppliers to become more responsive to the needs of the citizens.   (d) Establish standards regarding the performance of DepEd; and   (e) Organizing citizens for monitoring and inspection efforts to attain greater transparency (Government Watch, 2012).   The CSOs involved in the Textbook Count program monitored DepEd’s delivery of textbooks and teachers’ manuals, the procurement process, counted and checked the materials, among others. Errors or discrepancies discovered by the volunteers during the monitoring process were reported to the G-Watch, which then reports them to DepEd (La Salle Institute of Governance, 2012).   With the assistance provided by citizen volunteers, this initiative succeeded in ensuring the integrity of the bidding process, guaranteeing good textbook quality, assisting high schools and districts in checking that the textbooks were correctly delivered and distributing textbooks to different elementary schools (Government Watch, 2012).   People’s Council   The Philippines developed a decentralized system of government with the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991. Specifically, the Code included the concepts of devolution, funding of local government units, and citizen participation. Local development councils in every province, city, municipality, and barangay determine the use of the local development fund which represents 20 percent of the Internal Revenue Allotment from the national government. Under the law, a quarter of the seats in these councils should be occupied by CSO representatives.   In 1995, a landmark legislation called the Empowerment Ordinance mandated the city government to recognize the importance of public participation, through non-government organizations (NGOs) and people’s organizations (POs) that are federated in the Naga City People’s Council (NCPC), in fostering good local governance. The NCPC was empowered to appoint CSO representatives to local special bodies of the city government. It can observe, vote, and participate in the deliberation, conceptualization, implementation, and evaluation of projects, activities, and programs of the city government. It can propose legislation, participate, and vote at the committee level of the elected city legislative council, and act as the people`s representatives in the exercise of their right to information on matters of public concern and access to official records and documents.   There shall be one representative in the city council from each of the non-agricultural labor, women, and urban poor sectors of the city who shall be elected from among the members of the accredited NGOs and POs in each sector. The term of office of the elected sector representatives shall be co-terminus with the term of office of the regular members of the city council. They shall not be entitled to any salary. They may receive allowances as may be granted by the city council to defray the expenses for attending and participating in official functions, including city council sessions, committee hearings, and other activities in aid of legislation. The sector representatives shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, and exercise the same powers and responsibilities, as the regular members of the city council.   Through the efforts of the Naga City People’s Council and with the support of the United Nations Democracy Fund, capacity-building activities leading to the formation of local CSO networks were undertaken in the peripheral-urban municipalities that form part of the Metro Naga Development Council. The NCPC model is now being replicated in many parts of the province of Camarines Sur. The Naga City People’s Council (NCPC), which was mandated by the Empowerment Ordinance of 1995, is a network of approximately 100 non-government and people’s organizations in Naga. The NCPC functions not only as a watchdog of government actions but also as an active collaborator in making decisions and in the policy-making process. It is also a part of the Sangguniang Panglungsod committees, special local government bodies, and other groups (Naga City People’s Council, 2015).   The Naga City People Empowerment Ordinance, which solidified the role of CSOs in Naga, has also empowered the NCPC to appoint NGO representatives to local special bodies of the city government. Under the ordinance, CSOs can observe, vote and participate in the deliberation, conceptualization, implementation, and evaluation of projects, activities, and programs of the city government.. They can designate representatives to all city council committees, as well as suggest legislative measure and participate in deliberation and vote on a proposed legislation at the committee level of Sangguniang Panglungsod of Naga. They can act as the people’s representatives in the exercise of their constitutional rights to information on matters of public concern and access to official records and documents (Naga City People’s Council, 2015).   Bottom-Up Budgeting   Being the constituents of a democratic state, Filipinos have the right to participate in the decision-making processes regarding public affairs and are encouraged to do so. This is to improve accountability and transparency, which are closely associated with good governance (La Salle Institute of Governance, 2012). In fact, the 1987 Constitution states that: “The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation (Art. 2, Sec. 23).” Another important provision in the 1987 Constitution states that: “The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The state shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms (Art. 13, Sec. 16).”   In addition to this, the 1991 Local Government Code set down the structures of local government units (LGUs) as well as their powers and responsibilities. Aside from requiring LGUs to deliver the necessary basic goods and services to their constituents, the Code also promotes the participation of citizens in all aspects of governance. Some participatory mechanisms that serve as an avenue for the people to participate include mandatory consultations and public hearings. The Code also encouraged the formation of Local Special Council Bodies which are semi-autonomous components linked to local governments that allow for the representation of CSOs as well as the private sector. Furthermore, one of the bodies mandated by the Code, the Local Development Councils, functions as “the mother local planning structure (La Salle Institute of Governance, 2012).” These legal frameworks, supported by an increasing desire of the public for greater accountability, have helped cultivate an environment that is conducive for CSOs inclined with monitoring and evaluation to flourish. Such organizations include the following: Citizen Score Cards, Procurement Watch, G-Watch, Social Watch, Local Government Watch, as well as the Social Housing Watch (La Salle Institute of Governance, 2012).   Over the last few decades since the post-Martial law period, CSOs have greatly improved in terms of effectiveness through “networking and coalition building, campaigning for policy reform, adopting good practice standards, and advancing ‘sustainable development’ as a uniting vision for all organizations” (Asian Development Bank, 2007). The PFM reforms over the last few years were pursued to address the persistent problems of corruption and poverty (Magno, 2015). According to the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) (2005), the Office of the Ombudsman determined that around U.S. $48 billion was lost to government corruption between 1977 and 1997. This led to “the emergence of a set of core civil society beliefs about combating corruption and promoting good governance” (Dressel, 2012).   Citizen participation in the budget process is necessary for “better decision making, better planning, better budgeting, better expenditure and better accountability.” (Department of Budget and Management, 2016). Some of the most notable efforts include the Budget Partnership Agreement (BPA), Bottom-up Budgeting (BuB), and the Citizen’s Participatory Audit (CPA), all of which boosted the partnership between CSOs and the government (Department of Budget and Management, 2016). Today, opportunities for citizens and CSOs to participate in the budget process have widened. They can now take part in budget formulation, decision-making, monitoring the budget execution (Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific, 2010), budget analysis, as well as in public expenditure or input tracking (La Salle Institute of Governance, 2012). Interestingly, the Philippines ranked first among some selected Asian countries in the 2016 CSO Sustainability Index for Asia (United States Agency for International Development, 2016).   The Bottom-Up Budgeting (BUB) Process was introduced in 2012 for the preparation of the 2013 budget. Also known as Grassroots Participatory Budgeting (GPB), the BUB provides a mechanism for locally identified projects to be supported under the General Appropriations Act. It provides for the convening of a general assembly of CSOs who elect their representatives to the local poverty reduction action team (LPRAT) to determine local priority projects. The CSO assemblies are convened by city and municipal level officers of the DILG, with the support of the provincial representatives of the basic sectors in the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC). These projects are submitted for incorporation into the budget of national agencies. Half of the membership in the LPRAT is from the government while the other half is from the CSO sector. The team is co-chaired by the Local Chief Executive and the CSO representative.   The first round of the BUB Process started with 5,898 projects in 609 cities and municipalities with a budget allocation of PHP 8.39 billion. The second round began in December 2012 for the 2014 budget. It expanded to 1,226 cities and municipalities involving 20,047 projects and funding support amounting to PHP 20.04 billion. Joint Memorandum Circular No. 4 was issued by the DBM, DILG, DSWD, and National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) in November 2013 for the 2015 budget preparation. All 1,534 cities and municipalities were covered. A total of 20,899 projects were identified with a budget of PHP 20.8 billion. Two modalities were applied, including the Regular BUB Process for the areas not covered by the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) Program, and the Enhanced BUB Process for LGUs that have graduated from or are currently under the KALAHI-CIDSS Program.   Under the Regular BUB Process, the government representatives include the Chair of the City or Municipal Committee on Appropriation, as well as the City or Municipal Department Heads such as the Planning Officer, Budget Officer, Fishery and Agriculture Officer, Social Welfare and Development Officer, Health Officer, Community, Environment and Natural Resource Management Officer (CENRO) and Public Employment Service Office (PESO) Manager. The representatives of national government agencies that sit in the LPRAT include the DSWD Municipal Links, the DILG Local Government Operations Officer, the School District Supervisor, and the Agrarian Reform Officer.   The CSOs with seats in the LPRAT would come from the following groups: (1) Pantawid Pamilya Parent-Leaders recognized by the DSWD, (2) Leaders from DOH-organized Community Health Teams, (3) Leaders of the Parent-Teacher Associations, (4) Leaders of CSOs accredited by LGUs, (4) Leaders of CSOs accredited by any National Government Agency, (5) Leaders of a women`s group, (6) Leaders of a basic sector organization recognized by NAPC, (6) Leaders of other community or grassroots organizations. In cities and municipalities where indigenous peoples (IP) constitute over 20 percent of the population, one of the elected CSO representatives must come from the IP sector. A representative from a local business association also joins the LPRAT.   Municipalities that have graduated from or are currently implementing the KALAHI-CIDSS Program shall follow the Enhanced BUB Process. The LPRAT shall serve as the technical working group of the Enhanced Local Development Council (LDC). The LPRAT would consist of 10 representatives from the government, 5 Barangay (Village) Development Council Vice-Chairpersons selected through the KALAHI-ClDSS Program, and 5 CSO representatives in the Enhanced LDC who got elected during the CSO assembly.   To encourage the meaningful participation of CSOs in the CSO assembly and LPRAP workshop, it has been suggested that CSOs should be given ample time to consult with their members and prepare for the BUB activities. LGUs should inform CSOs and send invitations ahead of time. The need for a thorough mapping of CSOs is also recommended (Pastrana and Lagarto 2014).   Benefits and Challenges of Direct Democracy   Open Government and Fiscal Transparency   Supply-side governance reforms have led to the institution of open data mechanisms that provide financial and budget information to citizens. The Transparency Seal pushes for the mandatory disclosure of key budgets and major programs and plans on their websites. The Full Disclosure Policy of the DILG has resulted in the mandatory disclosure of key financial documents of local government units including budget, procurement, and special purpose fund reports such as the utilization of the Gender and Development (GAD) Fund, Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), and Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Fund.   The launching of the Philippines-Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has created a tripartite working group involving government, civil society, and business to ensure greater transparency in revenues from extractive industries. The aim is the publication of a report that compares government and industry figures on government revenues in mining, oil and gas. The key challenge is how to make revenue reporting a mandatory, rather than voluntary, effort.   Public Participation in Budget Policy   Over the past five years, various efforts were made to enhance public participation in the budget cycle, from budget formulation to budget oversight. The Budget Partnership Agreement creates a means for CSO engagement with national government agencies in crafting budget proposals. Aside from providing local CSOs with a formal mechanism to engage in national and local budgeting, the Bottom-Up Budgeting Process also sought to make national government more responsive to local needs, as well as to improve the quality of governance and service delivery at the local government level.   The pilot implementation of the BUB Process in 2012 involved 595 cities and municipalities, resulting in PHP 8 Billion worth of locally-determined poverty reduction programs and projects integrated into the 2013 budget. Since then, the Aquino government has gradually expanded the BUB Process. In crafting the 2015 budget, the participation of grassroots organizations in 1,590 cities and municipalities resulted in a larger allocation of PHP 20.9 billion.   Through the KALAHI-CIDSS-NCDD Program, the barangays of target municipalities have been empowered to improve their access to social services and to participate in inclusive local planning, budgeting, and implementation of budgets. On the other hand, the Citizens Participatory Audit has led to the conduct of performance audits with CSOs to help find out whether public funds are efficiently allocated and properly spent.   Public Participation in Performance Monitoring   The key performance monitoring system for local government units is the Seal of Good Housekeeping (SGH) which has been succeeded by the Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG). The implementation of the SGH has enabled citizens to gain better access to information on local government finances and development projects. Through this performance system, local governments started sharing financial documents with the citizens online through the FDP Portal. About 7 of every 10 LGUs have regularly uploaded their financial documents. Due to good financial housekeeping encouraged by the SGH, there is now a decline in the number of local governments obtaining a negative COA Opinion Report.   The implementation of the SGH and SGLG assessment has resulted in more CSOs` engagement in program development and performance monitoring nationwide. Thousands of development projects have been and continue to be implemented with the support of the Performance Challenge Fund (PCF). More communities are able to enjoy public services, including water systems, health centers, public markets, and farm-to-market roads that were created through PCF projects.   In monitoring the compliance of government agencies with the Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007, CSOs join surprise visits to government agencies through the ARTA Watch of the Civil Service Commission. This social accountability mechanism is used by the Commission to promote awareness and compliance with the service standards identified in the Citizen Charters of national agencies and LGUs.   Reforms toward Full Democracy   The divide between government and CSOs has become more blurred today than ever before. However, both actors have begun to work closely together to address societal issues and to achieve greater transparency and accountability. This is known as co-production, which is defined by Elinor Ostrom (1996) as “a process through which inputs from individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization are transformed into goods and services”. This implies that consumers of public goods and services may also serve as producers, which makes them consumer producers (Alford, 2014).   However, for citizens to better participate in co-production mechanisms, they must be empowered and competent, especially since these individuals serve as the backbone of any organization. Human capital development is essential for any group to function. In his book Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen (1999) asserted that freedom is both the end and the means of development. He specified five freedoms: (1) political freedom, (2) economic facilities, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency guarantee, and (5) protective security. These individual freedoms are needed to achieve development, which he defined as the “process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy”. Hence, to build their capacity, it is necessary for individual citizens to have the freedom to make use of opportunities in exercising their rights such as the right to participate in the decision-making process in public affairs; this is what Sen’s (1999) capability approach is all about.   Based on the experiences of the CSOs concerned, it is apparent that the ties between the government, CSOs, the academe, and other stakeholders have become more intertwined. It has become more practical and convenient for them to work together in carrying out tasks, especially since a single actor does not possess all the necessary resources, funds, manpower, and assets to achieve certain functions. From the examples provided above, it is that both the national and local governments working with CSOs are actively engaged in the budget preparation process. The Senate and Congress are the main actors in the budget legislation phase, while CSOs participate in the procurement and accountability phases through monitoring. In short, CSOs play a vital role in planning for projects and programs and in monitoring these initiatives that are then implemented by the government.   In addition, the participation of non-governmental actors, especially in monitoring, has been proven effective in improving transparency and accountability as well as in reducing the incidences of corruption in government. The direct involvement of stakeholders and local CSOs in the budget cycle is necessary because these are the very people who have experienced and therefore understand the issues within their respective localities. After all, most of these concerns are better addressed at the micro-level. Thus, enabling CSOs to assume an active role in the budget process empowers them since they get to somewhat decide for themselves and their community. It is also worth noting that it is clearly important that the citizen volunteers who are involved in conducting projects must be knowledgeable and competent with what they are doing. This is the reason why some CSOs conduct training or capacity-building mechanisms to train and empower their volunteers.   It is also interesting that the media and the Internet are considered important tools in strengthening ties and harmonizing relationships between the government and the citizens. With the massive exposure of people to social media, they can easily post and disseminate societal concerns that can be addressed by the government. This kind of action alone shows that by simply posting and sharing something on social media, a citizen can have the power to influence government actions. In this kind of modem, the Filipinos’ basic right to free speech as guaranteed in the constitution, is better used not simply as a venue for creative expression but, more importantly, as an effective mechanism for positive empowerment in strengthening the democratic process for nation-building in the grassroots level.   Although some issues have been raised regarding the long-term sustainability of CSOs, these can be properly addressed. Such issues include the lack of time of those in urban areas to engage in social causes, convincing local government officials to consider certain plan changes, encouraging citizens to get more readily involved in local engagements (Lacson, de la Rosa and de Guia, 2018), and not gaining the support of LGUs (Naga City People’s Council, 2015). Issues on funding may also exist considering that many CSO initiatives rely heavily on funds provided by international organizations like the United Nations or other foreign governments.   References   Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (2010). Social accountability in the Philippines: A scoping study. Philippines: Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific. Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (n. d.). Social action center of the diocese of Ilagan (SAC-Ilagan); http://www.ansa-eap.net/networking/geographic-focus/northern-luzon-coalition-for-good-governance-philippines/northern-luzon-sub-country-partners/social-action-center-of-the-diocese-of-ilagan-sac-ilagan/ Alford, J. (2014). “The multiple facets of co-production: Building on the work on Elinor Ostrom.” Public Management Review, 16(3), 299-316. Asian Development Bank (2007). Overview of NGOs and civil society: Philippines. Civil Society Briefs; https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28972/csb-phi.pdf Caucus of Development NGO Networks (2007). Looking into the pork barrel: PDAF Watch report 2005-2007. Philippines: Caucus of Development NGO Networks. Collective Action (n. d.). Coalition against Corruption (CAC). Retrieved from https://www.collective-action.com/initiatives-detail/198 Commission on Audit (n. d.). Citizen participatory audit reports. Retrieved from https://www.coa.gov.ph/index.php/reports/citizen-participatory-audit-reports Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government. (2018). Fostering effective partnership for good governance. Retrieved from https://ccagg.org/fostering-effective-partnership-for-good-governance/ Department of Budget and Management (2016). Kuwento sa Bawat Kuwenta: A Story of Budget and Management Reforms 2010-2016. Philippines: Department of Budget and Management. DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance (2016). Institutionalizing civil society participation in local planning, budgeting, and monitoring. DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance (2014). Fostering Knowledge Coalitions for Open Governance through Engaged Universities, Final Report submitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) of Australia, January. Dressel, B. (2012). Targeting the public purse: Advocacy coalitions and public finance in the Philippines. Administration & Society, 44(6S), 65-84. Government Watch (2010). Bayanihang eskwela manual: A guide to citizen monitoring of school building construction projects. Philippines: Ateneo School of Government. Government Watch (2012). G-Watch in local governance: A manual on the application of G-Watch in monitoring local service delivery. Retrieved from http://www.ateneo.edu/sites/default/files/Generic%20Manual%20Nov28_1.pdf La Salle Institute of Governance (2012). Monitoring social accountability: Stocktaking report. Philippines: La Salle Institute of Governance. Lacson, A., de la Rosa, J. and de Guia, T. (2018). Best practices in empowering people’s councils for enabled governance participation. InnovateGov National Summit 2018, Makati, Philippines, October. Magno, Francisco (2015). Public participation and fiscal transparency in the Philippines. Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency;http://www.fiscaltransparency.net/resourcesfiles/files/20150706115.pdf Moses, Michael and Sue Soal (2017). Supporting local learning and adaptation: understanding the effectiveness of adaptive processes, Making All Voices Count Policy Brief, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. Naga City People’s Council (2015). Organizing and operationalization of a people’s council: A guidebook. Philippines: Naga City People’s Council. National Movement for Free Election. (n. d.). A guide to medicine monitoring in public hospitals. Retrieved from http://www.ansa-eap.net/assets/756/mmt.pdf Ostrom, E. (1996). Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development. World Development, 24(6), 1073-1087. Partnership for Transparency Fund (2015). Monitoring procurement, delivery, and dispatch of medicines in the Philippines. PTF Case Study Series No. 15; https://ptfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Case-Study-Namfrel.pdf Partnership for Transparency Fund (2016). Participatory local governance in Northern Luzon; https://ptfund.org/northern-luzon-coalition-for-good-governance/ Procurement Watch, Inc. (2010). Bantay Eskwela: Operational guidelines. Philippines: Procurement Watch, Inc. Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. USA: Anchor Books. United Nations Development Programme, Australian Agency for International Development and Career Executive Service Board (2005). Best practices in anti-corruption in the Philippines; http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/UNDP4/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Best-practices-Anti-c0rruption.pdf United States Agency for International Development (2016). 2016 CSO sustainability index for Asia. Washington D.C., United States. World Bank (2013). Final Evaluation Report: Institutionalizing Civil Society Monitoring of Public Service Delivery to the Poor (P115727).     ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.       ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr  

On May 29th, 2022, the government of Nepal announced an annual budget of Rs 1.793 trillion for the 2022-23 fiscal year, highlighting the 'Make in Nepal’ and ‘Made in Nepal’ campaigns as the rising cost of imports increases the country’s economic vulnerability. During the joint session of the Parliament, Finance Minister Janardan Sharma emphasized that the main focus of the budget is to be on inclusive development, inflation control, providing adequate resources to subnational governments, and building a self-reliant economy. However, this financial arrangement does not improve the status of marginalized people—Dalits, war victims, women and girls, and sexual minority groups. This briefing discusses the current status of minority groups who do not enjoy full rights within Nepalese society.   Underrepresentation of Dalits   Nepal has undergone radical political change, particularly after its decade-long Maoist insurgency. Nepal was declared as a nation free from caste-based discrimination and untouchability (CBDU) in the year 2006. The coalition government introduced reservation policies and quotas for the Dalits and other marginalized communities in 2008. The historic CBDU Act was formulated and implemented for the first time in Nepal in 2011. The Nepalese government introduced strategic policies to emancipate Dalits from social, economic and political constructs that excluded them from fundamental human rights and further marginalized them. But the obstructions to achieving social justice and eliminating caste-based discrimination against Dalits have not been reduced as expected. Reports of Dalit students being denied rental accommodations in big cities make it to the news every other day. Dalits employed through affirmative action programs have reported daily humiliation in the workplace. Inter-caste marriages are failing. Discrimination is not as explicit as in the past, but atrocities against Dalits tacitly persist.   In the last 23 months (July/August 2020 through April/May 2022) alone, in addition to numerous cases of physical assault and verbal abuse perpetrated against Dalits, 22 Dalits were murdered, 14 Dalit girls were raped, and 9 Dalits were abetted to commit suicide (Samata Media Monitoring Report). Police belonging to so-called “higher castes” rarely investigate incidents of caste-based discrimination seriously. Most CBD cases are diverted, or the issues are reconciled within the villages themselves.   The second local election of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal took place on May 13, 2022, and the results are now out. Of the 753 local levels of Nepal, Dalit candidates in 124 wards received the lowest support in the 2022 elections.   The 2017 Constitution mandated that if a man is elected as mayor, the deputy mayor must be a woman, and elected ward councils must include women and Dalit women. However, representation of the Dalit community was very poor in this most recent local election. Only three Dalit community members were elected to the position of mayor, accounting for just 1% of the 293 total local levels (Metropolitan, Sub-Metropolitan, and Municipal). This figure has decreased by half from the previous election. Similarly, the number of Dalits elected to deputy positions is also lower than in 2074 BS (2017). This year, there are only eight deputy mayors, as compared with eleven in 2074 BS, comprising only 2.73% of the total deputy chiefs elected. Dalit representation in rural municipality chairperson positions has increased from 1 in the past election to 7 this year. However, this amounts to only 1.52% of the 460 total available seats. Unlike the number of chairpersons, the number of vice chairpersons elected from the Dalit community is less than in the 2074 BS elections. This year, the number has decreased from 16 to 7, 1.52% of the total appointments. In addition, out of 6,743 wards across the country, a total of 148 ward chairpersons have been elected from the Dalit community.   Dalit women were elected to ward member positions in 98.01% of wards. The Local Election Act (2073 BS) made representation of Dalit women mandatory in every ward, but Dalit women remain underrepresented in political parties, and the constitutional mandate for Dalit women’s representation has not been 100% achieved. Similarly, out of 13,486 ward member allocations, only 878 elected ward members (6.51%) were from the Dalit community.   The preamble of the 2072 BS Constitution of Nepal, as well as various other binding documents and provisions, have mandated an inclusive proportional state system based on population. These recent results indicate that the Dalit community has not been able to enjoy the rights they are entitled to; Nepali political parties have not been able to break free from old feudalistic practices. This kind of indifference on the part of political parties has called into question the validity of the democratic process and practices.   Transitional justice for war victims and survivors   The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) were established in 2015 to resolve issues of deaths, disappearances, and disabilities caused during the Maoist insurgency. Progress in this regard has been quite discouraging. Although there have been 60,000 complaints of abuses committed during the 10 years of conflict (1996-2006), most of the issues have not yet been resolved by successive governments. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has heavily criticized the Nepalese government’s failure to comply with its international legal obligations. Independence and impartiality are the major tenets of the settlement process emphasized by the OHCHR. Authorities have prevented cases of violations during the conflict from going to court hearings on the pretext that they will instead be addressed by the transitional justice process. On the contrary, however, a credible transitional justice process has yet to exist.   Rights of marginalized women and girls   Nepal is known for having one of the highest rates of child marriage in Asia. About 33% of girls are married before they turn 18, and 8% marry by age 15. In contrast, 9% of boys marry before the age of 18. Rulings such as the Citizenship Act of 2006 and the 2015 Constitution contain several discriminatory provisions against women. A draft bill to amend the Citizenship Act, first presented to parliament in 2018, retains several discriminatory provisions. A team of three UN human rights experts raised their concerns in September of 2020, writing, “the bill would continue to discriminate systematically against women, regarding their ability to transmit citizenship through marriage and to their children.” Due to these flawed citizenship laws, an estimated 5 million people are forced to live without citizenship and are at risk of statelessness. The issue of lacking national identification is most prevalent in the Madhesh province.   Reported cases of rape have increased sharply. The Nepal police dealt with 2,534 cases of rape in 2020-21, versus 2,144 the previous year, an increase of 18.19%. Similarly, as many as 735 incidents of attempted rape were reported in 2020-21, compared to 687 in 2019-20. This amounts to an increase of 6.99% (The Himalayan News Service, 2021).   Women in Nepal are back-warded, religious, have high regards for family values, and interface with Nepalese society’s traditional patriarchal cultural values and norms. The society is also stratified by a deep-rooted caste system, which was introduced 300 years ago. The economic, cultural, social and political conditions of the women in Nepal are also influenced by this caste system. The issues of Dalit women can be compared to the issues faced by black women in Europe and America and their stories of discriminations. But when a unique component, "caste," is added, the plight of Dalit women is much more severe.   In Nepal, Dalit women have face unique human rights issues when compared with other Nepalese women. Dalit women face multi-pronged discrimination, based on caste, gender, race and poverty. Whereas general women’s issues in Nepal can be understood through the lens of feminism, a special lens is necessary to understand the plight of Dalit women.   Sundar Harijan, a 20-year-old Dalit youth, was found hanging in a bathroom at the Rolpa District Prison on May 18, 2022. He was 17 years old when he was arrested for alleged mobile phone theft on September 2, 2019. The court sentenced him to one year in prison. . His death leaves behind a trail of mystery. Police records show that he was prison time for someone else's crime. His identity was swapped with Bijay Bikram Shah, who was arrested in Nepalgunj on March 7, 2018 on charges of extortion and illegal arms possession. The police caught him with a pistol, five mobile phones, and 15 SIM cards, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. Sundar Harijan’s death in prison raises serious questions about human rights violations in Nepal, particularly for Dalits, one of the most marginalized and excluded communities. According to the Act Relating to Children 2075 (2018), while detained as a minor, Harijan had the right to juvenile prosecution procedure. The court’s verdict to imprison him is unlawful and violates existing legal provisions. The court originally ordered Harijan’s imprisonment through September 3, 2020, with an additional one-month imprisonment if he failed to pay a NPR 10,000 fine. Suspiciously, Sundar Harijan and Bijay Bikram Shah were transferred to Rolpa district prison on November 23, 2020, where their identities were exchanged. The Rolpa district prison received Sundar Harijan as Bijay Bikram Shah. Consequently, Harijane had to spend two more years in the district jail, whereas Shah was released from prison under the false identity of Sundar Harijan on January 12, 2021. Article 36(4) of The Act Relating to Children, 2075 (2018) clearly states, “If a child of sixteen years of age or above but below eighteen years of age commits an offense, the child shall be punished with two-thirds of the punishment that is imposable on the person of legal age pursuant to the prevailing law.”   LGBTQI+ issues   The bill to amend the Citizenship Act also contains a clause that would require transgender people to provide “proof” of their transition to access citizenship documents corresponding to their gender identity. This violates international human rights law and a 2007 Nepal Supreme Court judgment mandating that gender identity be recognized based on “self-feeling” (Nepal Events of 2021, 2022). Though Nepal is one of the forerunners in LGBTQI+ rights in Asia, there is still more needing to be done for the advancement of political and social rights.   Conclusions   We had hoped that with the new constitution, Dalit and marginalized communities could feel ownership not only of the country, but the state. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Sundar Harijan, at 20 years old, was found hanging a few days ago. He was 17 years and three months old when he was arrested for mobile theft. He was sent to prison instead of a juvenile correction center. A month before release, he was sent to another prison, in another district, where he was received as another prisoner from the upper caste, serving jail time for extortion and illegal arms possession. How is this possible?   His story is an example of how the state deliberately mistreats Dalits who already suffer from systemic exclusion. It is an example of impunity deeply rooted in the Nepali justice system.   A few days earlier before his death, Sundar Harijan was excited. He called his brother and asked for some money, telling him he would be released soon. But he is no more, and his dreams have been slain by caste supremacy and flaws in our judicial system.   His mother asks some questions – and I have come here to seek their answers:   1. Why was a minor sent to prison instead of the juvenile correction system?   2. Why was the family not informed about his transfer to another prison?   3. Is it just that the destitute Dalits are forced to serve jail time for other upper caste convicts? Why was Sundar Harijan, a minor, imprisoned for mobile theft, then later swapped with a convict who had been charged with serious crimes?   Over the last two years, I have met many mothers of children who have been killed after being raped, murdered in police custody, and or lynched by mobs. Thousands of mothers who are forced to suffer the ill fate of their children have one question: are Dalits born just to die? Are they not allowed to live with dignity? Killed on the drop of a hat. Killed with the smallest excuse.   The faces of discrimination have changed. But they have not disappeared. Six years ago, Ajit Mijar from Panchkhal in Kavre was murdered because of inter-caste marriage. His body is still in the Teaching Hospital, waiting for justice. Sometimes I wonder – how low is the price of a Dalit life?    References   National Library of medicine. (2021, September). www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8455144/. Retrieved from www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov.com: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8455144/ Nepal Events of 2021. (2022). Retrieved from www.hrw.org: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/nepal Prajwol Neupane, D. B. (2021). Retrieved from www.jogh.org: https://www.jogh.org/documents/2021/jogh-11-03030.pdf Rege, S. (1998). Dalit Women Talk Differently: A Critique of 'Difference' and Towards a Dalit Feminist. Economic and Political Weekly, WS39-WS46. Rousseau, N. (2013). Historical Womanist Theory: Re-Visioning Black Feminist Thought. Race, Gender & Class: Volume 20, Number 3-4, 2013 (191-204), 196. Sharma, R. P. (2016). Democratization and Development in Nepal. Kathmandu: Himalayan Journal of Sociology and Anthropology. The Himalayan News Service. (2021, August 11). Rape cases increased by 18.19pc last fiscal. Kathmandu, Bagmati, Nepal.     ■ Pradip Pariyar is Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation. Mr. Pradip Pariyar is an alumnus of American University and Tribhuvan University. He specializes in youth empowerment, peace building and capacity building of media professionals.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr