EAI는 아시아 지역의 민주적 거버넌스와 인권 증진에 관련된 연구를 진행하기 위해 2013년 11월 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(Asia Democracy Research Network: ADRN)를 발족했다. EAI는 국내 싱크탱크의 대표기관인 동시에 아시아 지역 싱크탱크의 직능대표로서 소속된 연구기관들의 민주주의 관련 연구지원 및 관리를 담당하고 있다.

ADRN은 아시아 지역이 직면한 민주주의 위협 요인을 분석하고 민주주의 전환 및 공고화에 기여할 수 있는 실무형 연구과제를 논의하고 확산하고자 창립되었다. ADRN은 연구에 기반한 정책 제시를 목표로 아시아 민주주의의 위협 요소와 당면과제를 점검하고 지역적 차원에서 바라보는 민주주의 발전을 위한 실천적 의제를 발굴하고 연구하고 있다. 네트워크에는 한국의 EAI를 비롯하여 대만, 말레이시아, 몽골, 미얀마, 방글라데시, 스리랑카, 인도, 인도네시아, 일본, 태국, 파키스탄, 필리핀 등 아시아 14개국 22개의 주요 싱크탱크들이 참여하고 있다. 

멀티미디어
[ADRN 인터뷰] 정치적 양극화 및 가짜뉴스 확산 조장하는 SNS 알고리즘과 민주주의 국가들의 대응

동아시아연구원(East Asia Institute: EAI)은 아시아민주주의네트워크 프로젝트의 일환으로 2021년 노벨평화상 수상자인 마리아 레사(Maria Ressa) 래플러(Rappler) CEO를 초청하여 필리핀을 포함한 역내 국가들의 언론자유 현황과 SNS발 가짜뉴스의 확산을 막기 위한 대처 방안에 대해 논의합니다. 레사 대표는 빅테크 회사들이 구축하고 있는 정보 생태계가 특정 편향의 뉴스와 정보만을 선택적으로 재생산하는 현상을 비판하고, 허위정보를 빠르게 확산시키는 소셜미디어의 알고리즘이 극우세력의 득세를 조장하여 민주주의를 와해한다고 경고합니다. 아울러 소셜미디어의 언론통제와 정치의 양극화에 대한 해법으로 레사 대표는 교육, 법제화, 그리고 인식 제고를 제안합니다.     ■ Sook Jong Lee: Hello everyone, it is a great opportunity to have Maria Ressa with us today. She is a well-known journalist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who is working very actively not only inside the Philippines but also internationally. Maria, thank you very much for your time.   ■ Maria Ressa: I'm so glad that it worked. It's good to be here. Thank you for having me.   I. Level of Media Freedom in the Philippines After the Duterte Government   ■ Sook Jong Lee: You faced 10 times of arrest warrant during the Duterte government. Since the Philippines has a new president now, Bongbong Marcos, the son of the former president, I would like to ask if media freedom has improved.   ■ Maria Ressa: I've been asked this a lot, and I will say immediately, “Yes.”   This January, I had four tax evasion charges that could have put me in prison for 34 years. Rappler was also charged with ridiculous criminal tax evasion. After four years and two months, three justices of the Court of Tax Appeals threw it out, and we were acquitted. And when you read the verdict, you actually realize, “How did these even make their way to the court?” The independent judiciary is slowly coming up, which means that the checks and balances are slowly kicking back in. So that's a first step. The last administration used a tactic of harassment and intimidation to make journalists voluntarily give up their rights, which many have called it the “chilling effect.” I would call it “Siberia.” We lived in “Siberia” during that time period and there were costs for standing up to power.   It is still pretty early, but President Bongbong Marcos, the only son and the namesake of Ferdinand Marcos who was accused of stealing 10 billion US Dollars in 1986, has spent more of his first 100 days traveling outside the Philippines. He cares what the rest of the world thinks, and he also seeks to vindicate his family name. I hope that he listens and continues to focus on the economy like his father did. This is a difficult time for the post-COVID world. While the Philippines growth rate is significantly better than the West, whether or not this translates into real policies helping our people is a challenge ahead.   We were so low in the past that everything is in a slight improvement.   II. Duterte’s Legacy of Media Repression and the Philippine’s Way Forward   ■ Sook Jong Lee: Friends in the Philippines were talking about the possible backlash under the new President, since he may try to legitimize his father's legacy and the authoritarian period of your country. What is your opinion on this view?   ■ Maria Ressa: This is happening in almost every country around the world. We are testing history.   With the rise of the far right and with lies spreading faster than facts through social media, it makes every part of history debatable. The facts are debatable.   Everything that we see on social media has two algorithms working: the first is Facebook’s “friends of friends” algorithm, which essentially polarized us. We saw this happen in the Philippines in 2016 when Duterte was elected. If you were pro-Duterte, you moved further right. If you're anti-Duterte, you moved further left. This is what happened in the United States, in Hungary, and in Brazil.   [The second algorithm is] the recommendation engine in YouTube and Facebook, where if you click on a video on SNS, the recommendation engine brings something more extremist. So there's a polarization and downward radicalization. [Both] are embedded in our society, and civil society groups used tactics like name and shame to determine what “right” is. But when lies are rewarded, the world turns upside down and this becomes debatable.   Your question becomes more complicated for Marcos in this information ecosystem. In terms of actions, because the bar was set so low by the previous administration, we now see a little bit of a professional governance from the new President. He shows up and he doesn't curse. Policy is clearer and the appointments are clearer. This administration does listen to the public backlash for bad policy; however, despite the fact that we've suffered from the weaponization of the law, I'm also of the same mind that we need to be fair and look at the actions today and not necessarily the past. Was he a tax evader? Did he fail to pay his taxes? It's ironic because he now encourages Filipinos to pay their taxes.   So, it's very confusing – where is the moral high ground? At the same time, this is where I become slightly pragmatic. As a journalist in Rappler, my task is to hold power to account. We will give you the context of this. Both India's Prime Minister Modi and the Philippines President Marcos could not travel to the United States. But when they were democratically elected by their people, they could travel. A lot of these things go away. And they were overwhelmingly elected. So we need to stay vigilant and we need to keep doing the stories.   Rappler and I still have three criminal cases against us. There's a 5th tax evasion charge, cyber libel case, and securities case connected to foreign control. We have to be optimistic; otherwise, it can be debilitating.   III. Solutions to Political Polarization Caused by SNS Disinformation   ■ Sook Jong Lee: You mentioned about many different perspectives about the history, and it is happening in Korea too about its colonial, the authoritarian period. It is dividing our civil society, not to mention our politicians. We also have not only newspapers, but also YouTube and social media that make us difficult to see whether there is truth or if the divided society can compromise or come up with a consensus about historical interpretations. In this kind of environment, what will be a good advice to control information and encourage the divided politics to come up with a more constructive common ground?   ■ Maria Ressa: First of all, I always felt that Korea was in a better place. When we go back to Milan Kundera's quote, “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.”   The design of social media today turns a lie into a fact—a lie told a million times becomes a fact. As I said in the Nobel lecture, this has now become an individual battle for integrity, for facts, and for values.   This is why it's great that Korea not only just held the regional meeting of the Second Summit for Democracy, but also will be holding the next Summit. It is good that the Third Summit for Democracy is coming to Asia-Pacific where, according to the latest V-Dem report, it has seen the worst decline of the quality of our democracies globally. The rest of the world has gone back to 1986 levels. In Asia-Pacific, we're at 1978 levels.   So, what's the solution? First, because of the culture of Korea, traditional news organizations still have significant power. They're losing business control and their business model is dying quickly. It's interesting that in Korea, Google is not number one, and Naver is. But Korean news organizations have given up too much power and relationships to Naver. We should not be fighting downstream; we have to fight upstream. So the long-term solution is education.   The medium-term solution is legislation, and short-term is the awareness that we are being insidiously manipulated by social media. Our biology, our emotions are being used against us. And on social media, according to an MIT study from 2018, lies spread at least 6 times faster than facts. The fact that [these lies] incite hate, fear, and tribalism, is part of the reason we're so polarized. They appeal to the worst of human nature, of society, and the impact is not just at the individual level, but sociologically at the group level.   We behave differently in groups. In my book, I talked about the Milgram Shock Experiment, in which there were test subjects behind the screen and participants were told to keep giving longer and longer electric shocks to the subjects and watch as they more and more. With authority, the participants continued to give electric shocks. When we're in groups and when authority gives us permission to be our worst selves, we do it. This is where, some of the warnings from Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny, such as “Don't follow the group,” come into play. That’s the second level.   The third level is emergent human behavior of our evolution as a species. This is addictive. Our young generation have higher levels of depression and sleeplessness. One of Meta’s own internal reports, which was one of the 10,000+ documents released by the whistleblower, Frances Haugen, actually showed that young teenager girls on Instagram have increased levels of eating disorders. The impacts and harm [of social media] are very clear aside from killing democracy—more than that is the rise of fascism.   IV. Freedom of Speech vs. Gatekeeping?   ■ Sook Jong Lee: Today, we have ongoing debates about social media and its horrible disinformation effect. But as a journalist, when you face the conflicting principles, namely freedom of expression and protection of privacy and human dignity, how do you reconcile these?   ■ Maria Ressa: It is false to say that they collide because this is not a freedom of speech issue. It is actually a “gatekeeping” issue. News organizations were supposed to be the gatekeepers to the public sphere, and readers were able to hold [the media] accountable. If they distributed or echoed a lie, they could be sued.   Right now, the tech companies make more money in surveillance for profit. We didn't even have a name for that business model until 2019, when Shoshana Zuboff wrote The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. This book goes into how these tech companies use machine learning to create models that know us better than we know ourselves. Those models are then scooped up by AI and become the motherload database that is used for microtargeting.   Microtargeting is not the old advertising strategy we know. It knows your weakest moment to a message and sells it. This advertising marketing model is now what is exploited by geopolitical powers. We have seen experiments before, but that exploitation really began in 2014 when Russian disinformation began to target Crimea, America, and even Korea. As they succeeded, they were replicated in different countries around the world. This is a part of the reason that we are seeing illiberal leaders being elected democratically, because if you don't have integrity of facts, you cannot have integrity of elections.   V. Social Media’s Impact on the Global Information Ecosystem   ■ Sook Jong Lee: If we extend this debate to North Korea, where it not only has an illiberal leader but also a totally closed society with people indoctrinated, what would be a good way for the democracies to intervene in the psyche of North Koreans about the freedom and democracy issues? Have you thought about the North Koreans?   ■ Maria Ressa: If you look at the world today, we have several cases. When Russia invaded Ukraine, the world came together, reacted on it, and the ICC came up with an arrest warrant. That's the quickest the world has acted since the World War II. Syria, for example, was very disjointed. People thought that democracy doesn't really need to get nurtured and that it will survive all of these “death by a thousand cuts.” You also have Taiwan, which is engulfed by information operations by mainland China. You have the Koreas, and you see them as different stages of it.   What I'm worried about is that if we don't do anything significant with our information ecosystem, we will wind up like North Korea. When you say North Korea indoctrinates, I say social media is a behavior modification system.   On January 6, 2021, we saw violence on Capitol Hill for the first time. On January 8 of this year, we saw violence in Brazil. One of the aspects that has not been sufficiently researched yet is the role of YouTube, for example, in Brazil, in the United States, in the Philippines, and in South Korea. In a research by the Harvard Belfer Institute, they clustered the algorithms of YouTube on Zika virus, COVID, and also on Jair Bolsonaro. Their results showed that Bolsonaro, a far right figure, was able to be elected because of Youtube algorithms. The contents recommended by the algorithms clustered together the far rights who would never have been able to find each other in the real world. They were too far fringe, but they had common terrorist idea that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. This is what happened—the clustering algorithm of recommendation engines provided a support base.   Did the same clustering algorithm create the violence on January 6, 2021? I go back to Yuri Andropov, a former KGB chairman, who talked about disinformation in a way that democratic countries take seriously. He said, “disinformation is like cocaine—sniff once or twice, it may not change your life. If you use it every day, though, it will make you an addict—a different man.” This is where we are in 2023 after algorithms have exploited us and used our data to change the way we think and the way we act through our emotions.   ■ Sook Jong Lee: Thank you. Do you have any comments for the Asia Democracy Research Network?   ■ Maria Ressa: One last thing I would like to add on the ADRN is that our research will be inadequate unless we get access to big data. The big tech companies have those data over us, and they are frankly the only way we can hold them accountable. It is almost like we are in the dark, tossing spaghetti against the wall when they have the resources and we don’t.   Thank you very much for having me.       ■ Maria Ressa is the founder, CEO, and executive editor of Rappler, the top digital-only news site that is leading the fight for press freedom in the Philippines. In October 2021, Maria was one of two journalists awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of her “efforts to safeguard freedom of expression, which is a precondition for democracy and lasting peace.” Among many other awards for her principled stance, she received the prestigious Golden Pen of Freedom Award, the Knight International Journalism Award, the Gwen Ifill Press Freedom Award, the Shorenstein Journalism Award, the Columbia Journalism Award, and the Sergei Magnitsky Award. Ressa has been a journalist in Asia for more than 30 years, most of them as CNN’s bureau chief in Manila, then Jakarta. In 2005, she took the helm of ABS-CBN News and Current Affairs, and for six years managed more than 1,000 journalists for the largest multi-platform news operation in the Philippines.       ■ 담당 및 편집 박지수, EAI 연구보조원     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr  

Maria Ressa 2023-04-13조회 : 10718
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[ADRN Issue Briefing] Upcoming Elections and Political Turmoil in Pakistan

Historical Background   Historically, elections have been quite tumultuous in Pakistan. The aftermath of the fateful first parliamentary election of 1970 was a civil war in the eastern wing of the country, then known as East Pakistan, and it led to the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. The military government of Pakistan at that time was reluctant to accept the mandate of the East Pakistan-based Awami League – the party that had won an overall majority in the country and an absolute majority in the eastern province. The party wanted a confederation-style autonomy for the provinces in general and the East Pakistan in particular which was not acceptable to the military dominated by West Pakistan.   Pakistan, so far, has conducted ten general elections after the first election in 1970. Pakistan has a parliamentary government with two houses. The parliamentary leader of the majority party or the coalition of parties in the popularly-elected National Assembly is elected as the Prime Minister (PM) and serves as the chief executive of the country. Pakistan is a federation with four provinces. Each province has a provincial assembly that elects its respective chief executive, namely the Chief Minister (CM). Since 1970, elections to the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies are held around the same time with a gap of maximum 10 days between the National and Provincial Assemblies elections in 1970. Starting with the 7th election in 1997, the election to the national and four provincial assemblies take place on the same date. The simultaneous elections to all the five assemblies significantly reduce cost and other complications that the country would face if the elections to different assemblies take place on different dates apart by several months, if not years. The country’s Constitution, however, does not bar staggered elections. Each assembly has a term of five years but the PM and CM can prematurely dissolve the national and provincial assembly respectively in their discretion. The Constitution requires that fresh election to an assembly takes place within 60 days if it is dissolved on the completion of its 5-years term. If an assembly is dissolved prematurely, its fresh election must take place within 90 days of dissolution. [1]   The last elections to the national and four provincial assemblies were held in July 2018 and their respective terms started in August 2018 when the members took oath. Therefore, these assemblies were to complete their term in August 2023 and their fresh elections were scheduled for October 2023.   Political and Legal Crisis for Scheduling Next Elections   Two rather unprecedented developments, however, took place during the last one year, which not only upset the election schedules, but also produced unprecedented political upheavals. In April 2022, the then-PM Imran Khan lost the support of the majority in the National Assembly and became the first PM in the country’s history to be ousted by a no-confidence vote in the parliament.   Soon after Imran Khan was deposed, he decided to launch a movement to seek fresh election to the assemblies. Initially, he asked all members of the National Assembly (MNAs) belonging to his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), to resign from their seats. Imran Khan believed that it would be very difficult for the new government to continue functioning while more than one-third of the assembly seats were vacant. He also thought that holding by-elections on so many vacant seats would force the government to rather hold election for the entire assembly. While 29 MNAs belonging to his party defied his directions, the remaining 123 tendered their resignation. As these resignations awaited processing and transmittal to the Election Commission after acceptance by the Speaker, the new Speaker from the new ruling coalition was elected since the previous speaker from PTI had resigned. The new speaker withheld acceptance of these resignations on the pretext that he wanted to make sure that the resignations were genuine and that the MNAs had tendered these resignations voluntarily. [2]   Following the successful revolt against Imran Khan in the National Assembly, the opponent parties started efforts to dislodge his party’s government in Punjab - the largest province of the country where over 56% of the country’s population inhabited. The effort initially proved to be successful and the PTI-backed CM was replaced by the one from the opposition. The in-house changes took place amid unprecedented violence and assault on the presiding officer within the assembly chamber. This change was challenged and while the cases were being contested in the courts, the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab split along party lines and the two equal groups held two separate assembly sessions in different premises. This was a spectacle that was never seen before in the country’s history.   Finally, after several twists and turns, the Punjab CM supported by Imran Khan’s party was restored. At this point, Imran Khan took a decision that further intensified the political turmoil. He asked the CMs of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) - the two provinces whose government was controlled by Imran Khan’s PTI - to dissolve their respective provincial assemblies. The CMs and many others within the party considered the premature dissolution of the assemblies as a suicidal act because together with the assemblies, their provincial governments would also be wrapped up almost a year before the due date. However, Imran Khan remained adamant and the two assemblies were dissolved at the advice of the respective CMs - Punjab Assembly on the 14th and KP Assembly on the 18th of January 2023. Imran Khan thought that the prospect of the fresh election of the two assemblies which represent about 70% of the country’s population would persuade the PM and the other two provincial Chief Ministers to dissolve the National and the remaining two provincial assemblies too and go for fresh elections in the entire country - an aim which Imran Khan had been resolutely chasing from the day he was removed from his position. Even this assumption of the former PM did not prove to be correct as the federal government decided not to dissolve the National Assembly. The other two provinces – Sindh and Balochistan – also decided that their provincial assemblies would continue and complete their five-years term.   Another political crisis was created when the Provincial Governor of Punjab refused to fix the polling date for the Punjab provincial election because he correctly claimed that he was not the one who dissolved the assembly (It was dissolved upon the advice of the CM and, following the constitution, the assembly stood dissolved 48 hours after tendering the advice) and that the Constitution Article 105(3) only empowered the Governor to fix the date when Governor dissolved the assembly. The Provincial Governor of KP also did not appoint the polling date on the pretext that the law and order situation in his province was so bad that the election could not take place. This confusion about the responsibility of fixing the polling date had arisen because it was the first timethat provincial assembly elections were to be held separately from the National Assembly election. In the past 10 general elections since the Constitution of Pakistan was adopted in 1973, National and Provincial Assemblies elections were held almost simultaneously and the President of Pakistan fixed the polling date. Now that the National Assembly election was not involved and only provincial assembly elections were to be held, the Governors were expected to fix the polling date. Unfortunately, the Constitution was unclear about who assumes the responsibility of fixing polling dates when Assembly is not dissolved by the Governor.   Taking advantage of Section 57 of the Elections Act 2017, which empowered the President of Pakistan to appoint the polling date, President Arif Alvi announced 9th April as the polling date for both provincial assemblies. President’s action was immediately rejected by the PM and almost all political parties except PTI since the President had not consulted the Election Commission, which he was supposed to do according to Section 57 of the Elections Act. In addition, the President, according to Article 48(1), is required to always act on the advice of the PM unless it is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution that it was a discretionary power of the President. As it is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution that appointing polling date was a discretionary power of the President, he was bound to act on the advice of the PM, which neither the President sought nor the PM gave. The President’s action to unilaterally fix the polling date was, therefore, considered unconstitutional by many legal experts besides politicians.   The question of fixing date in Punjab was initially brought before the Lahore High Court where the Judge asked the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to fix the polling date in consultation with the Governor. The ECP considered the judgment not in line with the Constitution and challenged it before the Supreme Court. Finally, while cases were pending before the High Courts in Lahore (Capital of Punjab) and Peshawar (Capital of KP), a 9-members bench of the Supreme Court took it upon itself to decide the matter. Although three judges considered that it was improper for Supreme Court to take up the case while the High Courts were already proceeding on it, a 5-member bench heard the case and directed the President of Pakistan and the Governor of KP to fix the polling dates for Punjab and KP assemblies after consulting the ECP. The country kept plunging deeper and deeper into political turmoil while the constitutional cases were being contested. [3]   Uncertain Elections and Possible Military Intervention   The election dates for Punjab and KP have now finally been decided respectively by the President and the Governor, but the crisis is far from over. In fact, it has intensified. While the Constitution requires the election to an assembly to be held within 90 days from the date of its premature dissolution, various federal government departments like Finance, Interior and Defence have conveyed to the ECP that they would not be able to provide funds, security forces and the military personnel in the current extraordinary situation when the country is facing the worst economic crisis of its history and almost facing a default, the terrorist activities are on the rise and security personnel are tied up in fighting them. On top of that, the new population census is in progress and the subsequent demarcation of constituencies won’t be completed before August. [4] It was decided by the Council of Common Interests (CCI), a constitutional body to guard the provincial interests in the federation, under the chairmanship of the former PM Imran Khan about two years ago that the next election would be based on the new census.   In the meantime, some of the worst clashes have erupted between the police and Imran Khan’s supporters in Lahore when the police tried to arrest the ousted PM. Two non-bailable arrest warrants were issued against Imran Khan on March 13, 2023 by the local courts of Islamabad after he failed to appear in these courts in cases of non-disclosure of profit earned by selling gifts received as PM (Toshakhana - Repository of state gifts - case) and of threatening a female judge. The courts had asked the police to present him before the courts on March 18. Therefore, Islamabad Capital police along with the Punjab police arrived at his residence to arrest him. The government might have acted overzealously while trying to arrest Imran Khan but the arrest would have been lawful. Later clashes between PTI workers and the police in Lahore when the latter entered Imran Khan's residence with a search warrant and in Islamabad when Khan reached for court appearance, have further heightened the political tension. These developments have strengthened the apprehensions about maintining law and order during the upcoming elections, and even holding of election is in doubt.   While the political crisis is deepening, many including Imran Khan think that fresh election is the only way to resolve the crisis. Others, such as the federal government and its 13-party coalition think that election is neither feasible in these circumstances nor meaningful in resolving the crisis.   On March 22, 2023, the ECP postponed the general election of the Punjab Assembly from April 30 to October 8, 2023, invoking Article 218(3) which makes the ECP solely responsible for holding free and fair election while guarding against corruption and Section 58 of Elections Act 2017 which authorizes the ECP to alter the election schedule or issue an altogether new schedule. In a 8-page long notification, the ECP explained the background of the postponement which, in brief, states that it is unable to hold a peaceful and fair election for the following reasons: the Ministry of Finance expressed inability to provide additional funds; Ministry of Defence declined to provide troops for election security; and the provincial government informed that only very limited police security can be provided. The ECP decision is as unprecedented as the severity of multiple crises faced by the country and in a way has further deepened the political crisis. The PTI has reacted angrily and is poised for street agitation against the ECP decision in the Supreme Court, which will have the last word on the election schedule. Meanwhile, the coalition federal government endorsed the ECP decision and welcomed the prospect of simultaneous election of National and all Provincial Assemblies.   Irrespective of the outcome of the anticipated proceedings in the Supreme Court, prospects of crisis resolution are weak. Even if the Supreme Court directs the ECP to hold election according to the original schedule, its enforcement is not guaranteed as was the case a few months ago when the ECP could not hold election for Islamabad Metropolitan Corporation, the local government of the federal capital, despite direction by the Islamabad high court. As a result, the political crisis may further deepen to a point that military decides to intervene in an effort to bring about order before election could be held.       [1] The Senate of Pakistan. 2018. “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.” 59. https://senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/Constitution%20of%20Pakistan%20(25th%20amendment%20incoporated).pdf [2] Arab News. 2023. “Fresh uncertainty in Pakistan with new twist in saga of resignations of ex-PM Khan's MPs.” https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2247086/Pakistan [3] Maleeha, Lodhi. 2023. “The only way out?.” https://www.dawn.com/news/1740674/the-only-way-out [4] Iftikhar A. Khan. 2023. “Governor fixes May 28 for KP assembly polls.” https://www.dawn.com/news/1742266/governor-fixes-may-28-for-kp-assembly-polls     ■ Ahmed Bilal Mehboob is the founder and the President of PILDAT, who has over 25 years experience in senior management and advisory positions and over 8 years experience in design, planning and implementation of projects in the field of Parliamentary development, strengthening democratic institutions, democratisation, political discourse, election monitoring and dialogues for reconciliation. Mr. Mehboob is considered an authority on political, legislative and electoral affairs of the country.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구보조원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr  

Ahmed Bilal Mehboob 2023-03-28조회 : 6991
논평이슈브리핑
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Indonesia’s ASEAN Chairmanship: Challenges for Strengthening Democracy Agenda in ASEAN

This year marks the fourth time that Indonesia has held the reins of ASEAN chairmanship. Carrying the theme "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth", Indonesia is determined to direct ASEAN cooperation towards sustainability, enhance ASEAN's relevance in responding to regional and global challenges, and elevate ASEAN's position as the centre of regional economic growth.   Many internal and external parties have pinned their hopes on Indonesia, one of the founding countries of ASEAN and the largest country in ASEAN, to be able to make various breakthroughs and innovations in dealing with various global challenges faced by the region. At global and regional levels, the world is facing global problems, such as global democracy's decline , Russia's war in Ukraine, global recession, food crisis, and climate change. [1]   Even though this year's theme focuses more on economic issues, this article emphasizes the importance of highlighting the issue of democracy in the moment of Indonesia's chairmanship. This considers Indonesia's important role as the main promoter of the adoption of democratic principles in ASEAN. In addition, it has been recognized that the future of democracy in ASEAN depends on the political positions and attitudes of countries that already have a better democracy rating. In this context, the journey of institutionalizing the basic values developed in the ASEAN Charter will be heavily coloured by democratic countries, such as Indonesia. [2]   From three chairmanships, previously in 1976, 2003, and 2011, Indonesia has laid a strong foundation for the enactment of the principles of democracy, law enforcement, good governance, and human rights in ASEAN.   With these historical tracks, the moment of Indonesia's chairmanship in 2023 in the midst of global democracy's decline will be a decisive moment for the future of upholding democratic principles in the Southeast Asian region. Moreover, this moment of chairmanship occurred in the midst of the protracted Myanmar problem which has not found a solution up to now. It is hoped that the Indonesian leadership will be able to come up with solutions that will resolve the Myanmar crisis. While we cannot ignore that Indonesia is one of the countries that is experiencing democratic regression in the domestic sphere, this article addresses the challenges and prospects of Indonesia's chairmanship in strengthening the principles of democracy in ASEAN.   The State of Democracy in ASEAN   When Indonesia succeeded in incorporating the democracy agenda into the ASEAN Concord II, many parties considered this step as a major breakthrough because it succeeded in breaking a long-held taboo in ASEAN over the use of the term "democracy". [3] The strenuous steps since this early stage have indeed continued to occur to this day. According to Choiruzzad, there are no signs that ASEAN is really serious about trying to realize its democratic and democratization agenda. [4] In fact, Thailand, which originally supported Indonesia's agenda, is now problematic with regard to democracy. In May 2014, the Thai military seized power on the grounds of maintaining political stability. This complexity is closely related to the ambiguous situation that has been a debate among ASEAN countries since the beginning, namely whether to carry out the democratization agenda together or to maintain the old norm of not interfering in each other's domestic political affairs.   ASEAN Study Team of Research Centre for Politics-BRIN (previously LIPI), has conducted research on the implementation of democracy and human rights principles in ASEAN for four years (2010-2013). By looking at each ASEAN member state, this research found that although the ASEAN Charter refers to universal declarations and documents, the implementation of democracy in ASEAN is highly dependent on the interpretation and the political, economic, and socio-cultural contexts in each member country. [5]   This research categorized the implementation of democracy in ASEAN into three groups. First, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines as the first group of countries to focus more on political and security issues to achieve stability and peace at the national and regional levels. However, democracy in these three countries tends to experience a deficit due to ongoing conflicts between the government/military and groups of people who want political independence. In fact, Thailand has been under military rule since 2014.   Second, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam are the second group that places the fulfilment of economic interests for the welfare of the people as the main pillar compared to the duties and responsibilities of the government in the context of implementing democracy (in the sense of fulfilling people's economic rights) rather than fulfilling political civil liberties.   Third, the four youngest countries in ASEAN, namely Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam as a group of countries that still face many obstacles in implementing democratic principles in a civil and political manner as well as fulfilling socio-economic rights. Meanwhile, the quality of democracy in these countries cannot be separated from external forces or the involvement of large countries that have economic and political interests, especially in the four countries and generally in ASEAN.   Thus, at the procedural stage of fulfilling democracy, ASEAN member countries have tried to implement it, although at different levels, according to their respective political and economic interpretations. With the exception of Brunei Darussalam, all ASEAN member countries have carried out general elections, with various distortions, as happened recently in Myanmar. Under the pretext of election fraud, it became an entry point for the military regime to illegally take power. The promise to re-election was not even carried out until two years after the coup in 2023. Ten years after the research concluded, there are certain developments in some ASEAN member states which retard or even reverse the region's current progress on democracy. According to Freedom in the World 2021, there is no ASEAN country was categorized as “Free”. [6]   Challenges for Indonesia in Strengthening Democracy Agenda in ASEAN   During the handover of ASEAN chairmanship to Indonesia at the closing ceremony of the 40th and 41st Summits, 13 November 2022, President Joko Widodo explicitly mentioned the principles of humanity and democracy in his speech. Then, what is the relevance of the values of democracy on the agenda of the epicentrum of growth? President Joko Widodo in these summits emphasized boldly on how ASEAN should not be a proxy to any powers:   "ASEAN must become a peaceful region and anchor for global stability, consistently uphold international law, and not be a proxy to any powers. ASEAN must be a recognized region, uphold the values of humanity and democracy. ASEAN should not let current geopolitical dynamics turn into a new cold war in our region.” [7]   Additionally, at the 32nd ASEAN Coordinating Council and ASEAN Foreign Minister Retreat in Jakarta, he also emphasized that ASEAN as the epicentrum of growth can be achieved only if it can maintain stability and peace in the region. [8] It can be argued that those statements implicitly assert that by upholding the values of humanity and democracy, and international law, we can maintain the stability and peace in the region, and therefore, can achieve the epicenter of growth.   However, emphasizing the principles of democracy is not an easy matter for Indonesia at this time. There are at least two major challenges facing Indonesia, namely from within the country and from the surrounding environment.   First, Indonesia's current democracy is facing the problems of stagnation and regression. [9] This condition, however, affected the credibility of Indonesia, some doubted by connecting Indonesian efforts to spread democracy in Southeast Asia to the quality of Indonesian democracy. This setback eventually took Indonesia's leadership hostage as a pioneer of democratic principles in the region. In addition, Indonesia's significant contribution to peacebuilding in the region is merely seen as symbolic rather than substantial. These things have finally led to the view that Indonesia's determination to address strategic issues in the region has decreased, including Indonesia's substantial initiatives in ASEAN. While this problem was also reflected in the foreign policy, Indonesia is trying to show that this condition does not necessarily weaken Indonesia's commitment to consistently uphold democracy as Indonesia's foreign policy tool. Therefore, its effort to uphold democracy in Southeast Asia, including in Myanmar, is part of the implementation of ASEAN as the corner stone of Indonesia's foreign policy. The extent to which ASEAN remains the main pillar for Indonesia's foreign policy is something that cannot be denied, since the birth of this regional organization until now. However, for more than five decades, Indonesia's foreign policy towards ASEAN has not been in a vacuum. Fluctuations in Indonesia's foreign policy orientation towards ASEAN are unavoidable, especially in the last decade.   Secondly, at the same time, the environment around Indonesia is also changing rapidly. Each ASEAN country is experiencing domestic changes that have impacts on its commitment to ASEAN. As emphasized by Almuttaqi and Arif, the increasing emphasis on economic performance as a source of legitimacy is now becoming the major source of regime legitimacy in Southeast Asia. [10] As a result, commitment to upholding democratic values and human rights has diminished, marked by the strengthened role of the military in several ASEAN member countries. The military coup that occurred in Myanmar in early 2021 is a signal of weakening ASEAN's pressure as a regional organization on its member countries to implement the points of principles that have been mutually agreed upon in the ASEAN Charter. Additionally, after the May 2014 coup, Thai-China relations has accelerated significantly, left the US-Thai old partnership left behind. Both China and Thailand focus on strengthening economic and military cooperation. [11] As the ASEAN region grows to become an economic as well as a political magnet among the great powers, making the challenges even more complex for Indonesia's leadership. Increasing tensions in the South China Sea in recent years have brought the rivalries of the great powers back into focus in the region.   However, ASEAN's weak influence as a regional organization, especially in the context of implementing democracy, is basically related to ASEAN's uncertainty about this principle. The purpose of the democratic principles referred to in the ASEAN Charter from the beginning was not to change the political system of its member countries or encourage its member countries to conform to liberal democratic values. [12] On the contrary, the concept of political development, which is the forerunner of the principles of ASEAN democracy, actually contains the first strategy in the form of "increasing understanding and appreciation of the political system, culture and history of member countries." This means that appreciation of the diversity of political, cultural and historical systems is seen as a limitation for the implementation of the principles of democracy itself. Luhulima gives the label "gated democracy" for the democratization style of ASEAN which is coloured by conditions where regional and international pressure to carry out political changes in ASEAN countries is hindered by the principles that exist within ASEAN itself. [13]   Therefore, the domestic political system of the member countries remains higher. Thus, the attitude of the Myanmar military junta which seems to ignore the Five Point Principles, a peace agreement signed by the Myanmar junta chief and nine ASEAN leaders in April 2021 to resolve Myanmar crisis, can be understood in this context. This is certainly a challenge that is not easy for Indonesia to maintain its commitment to upholding democracy in the region, including in its chairmanship this year.   Strengthening ASEAN through Commitment to Democracy   Since the inception of the ASEAN Charter which for the first time contained democracy and human rights, ASEAN has realized that it is not easy to implement these principles in the region. However, with the existence of the ASEAN Charter, this can be a signal that ASEAN as a region has adhered to universal values or principles. Therefore, it is no longer possible for an external actor to try to influence or interfere in a member state under the pretext of upholding democracy. Thus, all member countries must realize that the implementation of democracy and human rights is basically an important step to maintain stability and peace in the region.   For this reason, the prospect of implementing the democracy agenda in ASEAN during Indonesia's chairmanship this year lies in the extent to which ASEAN member countries are committed to building a political communication. It is an important element in building a shared understanding of democracy, and ultimately influencing each member to further strengthen the commitment to democracy. Therefore, the Myanmar case can no longer only be seen as a challenge but also a prospect for building political communication among fellow ASEAN members regarding their commitment to upholding democracy in the region. One of them is by sticking to the Five-point consensus as the only agreement among all ASEAN member countries to overcome the Myanmar crisis.   Internal and external environment for ASEAN have changed and the region has reached its peak of significance. For this reason, the biggest challenge today is to remain relevant amidst the rivalries of the big powers. The unity and centrality of ASEAN is the key that must be held in order to survive. In such a context, unity and centrality will only be realized by member countries that are willing to maintain their commitment to maintaining the credibility of the organization, including in upholding democracy and human rights in ASEAN.       [1]IDEA. 30 November 2023. “Global Democracy Weakens in 2022”. https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/global-democracy-weakens-2022   [2]M. Riefqi Muna. 2016. “Demokrasi dan HAM di ASEAN: Kerangka Konseptual” in Ratna Shofi Inayati. 2016. Demokrasi dan HAM di ASEAN. Jakarta. Mahara Publishing. 24.   [3]The Habibie Center. June 2014. “The Bali Concord III: Towards a More Common ASEAN Platform on Global Issues”, Issue 5. 2. http://www.habibiecenter.or.id/img/publication/b64cd9143d8ad9f9bbdd228a7994649e.pdf   [4]Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad. 2015. ASEAN di Persimpangan Sejarah. Politik Global, Demokrasi, dan Integrasi Ekonomi. Jakarta. Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia. 86-87.   [5]Lidya Christin Sinaga. 2016. “Penilaian atas Pelaksanaan Demokrasi di ASEAN: Antara Defisit, Kemajuan, dan Status Quo” in Ratna Shofi Inayati. 2016. Demokrasi dan HAM di ASEAN. Jakarta. Mahara Publishing. 35.   [6]Freedom House cited in Wongpun Amarinthewa. 17 June, 2021. “Encouraging ASEAN Community to Promote Peace in Myanmar”. Hukumonline International Webinar.   [7]Sekretariat Presiden. 13 November 2022. “Presiden Joko Widodo Terima Keketuaan ASEAN 2023, Phnom Penh, 13 November 2022”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4S6XyfPscmE&themeRefresh=1   [8]Detik News. 3 February 2023. “Jokowi Tegaskan ASEAN Tak Boleh Jadi Proxy Siapapun!”. https://www.dw.com/id/jokowi-tegaskan-asean-tak-boleh-jadi-proxy-siapapun/a-64599088   [9]Eve Warburton and Edward Aspinall. 2019. “Explaining Indonesia’s Democratic Regression: Stucture, Agency, and Popular Opinion”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 41. 255-285; Thomas P. Power. 2018. “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 58:3. 307-338.   [10]Ibrahim Almuttaqi and M. Arif. 2016. “Regional Implications of Indonesia-China Ambivalent Relations”. The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2. 93.   [11]Ian Storey. December 2015. “Thailand’s Post-Coup Relations with China and America: More Beijing, Less Washington”. Trends in Southeast Asia. ISEAS.   [12]Lidya Christin Sinaga and Khanisa. 2019. “Pilar Politik dan Keamanan: Evaluasi dan Proyeksi Perkembangan Demokrasi dan HAM di ASEAN” in Lidya Christin Sinaga, Khanisa, Faudzan Farhana, Pandu Prayoga (eds.). 2019. 50 Tahun ASEAN: Dinamika dan Tantangan ke Depan. Jakarta. LIPI Press.   [13]CPF Luhulima. 2016. “Demokrasi dan HAM di ASEAN: Antara Pemikiran, Pemahaman, dan Pengejawantahan” in Ratna Shofi Inayati (ed.). 2016. Demokrasi dan HAM di ASEAN. Jakarta. Mahara Publishing. 98.       ■ Lidya Christin Sinaga is a researcher at the Research Centre for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN). Her research interests are Indonesia-China Relations and ASEAN. She obtained her master degree from School of History and International Relations-Flinders University, Australia in 2016. She is the editor and contributor of several academic books. Her recent edited books are Six Decades of Indonesia-China Relations: An Indonesian Perspective, published by SPRINGER, 2018; and 50 Tahun ASEAN (Fifty Years of ASEAN) published by LIPI Press, 2018. Also, she has written several book chapters and journal articles, including "The Problem of Statelessness of the Ethnic Chinese in Brunei Darussalam" in Marginalisation and Human Rights in Southeast Asia (Routledge, 2023). Email: lchristinsinaga@gmail.com.       ■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구보조원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr  

Lidya C. Sinaga 2023-03-22조회 : 8857
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[ADRN Issue Briefing] Institutionalizing Downward Accountability: The Bangladesh Experience

Defining ‘Accountability’ and ‘Downward Accountability'   ‘Accountability’ is a principle according to which a person or institution is responsible for a set of duties and can be required to give an account of their fulfilment to an authority that is in a position to issue rewards or punishment. [1]   Meanwhile, ‘Downward Accountability’ refers to organisations being accountable to their target communities and groups. It is a shift from seeing the affected population simply as beneficiaries to viewing them as key partners and stakeholders in their own path to a thriving life. It aims to ensure that communities are meaningfully and continuously involved in decisions that directly impact their lives. [2]   ‘Downward Accountability’ in Development   ‘Downward Accountability’ is not a new concept in the development discourse; however, the effort to include citizens’ voices in the planning process have largely been unsuccessful in many countries including Bangladesh due to factors including the lack of accountability within different tiers of government institutions, weak chain of reporting, and bureaucracy’s limited capacity.   Mega development projects seldom consider opinions of citizens, as they are decided at national level. Due to this nature of a top-down approach, there is hardly any opportunity for ordinary citizens to give their opinions. Furthermore, these megaprojects are often not the priority of the mass people. In some cases, excessive costs of these mega projects even tend to impose long-term burden upon citizens in terms of additional taxes. And sur charges. On the contrary, many smaller development plans are undertaken through a bottom-up planning process with active participation of the local community. They also give local people opportunities to select their priorities and needs. As a consequence, this bottom-up approach tend to ensure community ownership and induce commitment from the local people who need material support the most.   Overview of Development Planning in Bangladesh   At present, the ruling party in Bangladesh enjoys absolute majority in the National Parliament. Opposition voice is weak and debates on controversial issues are rare. Decisions are mostly top-down and the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) headed by the Prime Minister approves all national-level projects. The Planning Commission formulates long-term development plans, and the Ministry of Finance develops annual budgets which is presented in the National Parliament each year in June.   Similarly, the Local Government Institutions (LGIs) are mandated to formulate both long-term (five years) and annual development plans and budgets. However, plans between these two institutions, national and local levels, are delinked. The national plans do not count the local plans and budgets, which are formulated with their own revenue earned from the community. Citizens are finding it increasingly difficult to influence national development planning although some consultation is held with a number of eminent citizens. Therefore, the best chance of ensuring downward accountability is to strengthen local level planning process and increase people’s participation.   While there are some noteworthy cases in which citizen-led initiatives have successfully incorporated transparent planning process to provide better services to the people, Bangladesh LGIs’ capacity to conduct effective participatory planning is still a matter of concern. To address this concern, all LGIs involved in the planning process should be staffed with trained officials who are familiar with the logistical procedures. They also need to engage NGOs, CSOs, and expert individuals more actively.   Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF)’s Experience with Using Social Accountability Tools   A growing number of CSOs have begun to employ Social Accountability tools (e.g. public hearing, social audit, community score card, grievance redressal) as a means of ensuring accountability of public institutions and local elected representatives.   This ‘Social Accountability and Dialogue’ has been proven to be an effective and immediate tool to solve public service-related problems at the local level. Partner NGOs have been assisting citizen groups to monitor community level public services. Last year, 2,643 problems that obstructed service delivery were identified in the pool of 892 service-outlets that were monitored. Solutions and action plans were established through dialogues with local authorities, and citizen groups monitor and assess their implementation in the subsequent dialogues.   The case of MJF demonstrates how it has used this tool.   On one occasion, over 3,000 paddy farmers in a small, marginalized locality in northern Bangladesh resolved a corruption issue at the government-enlisted selling points by taking advantage of public hearings. When buying paddy from the farmers, the storekeepers removed 2kg from every 40kg. During a public hearing arranged by a local citizen support group, the farmers raised this issue to a local agriculture officer. In response, two key decisions enabling fair trade were reached: 1) strengthened surveillance, 2) establishment of mobile courts at the selling points. Thanks to these efforts, the farmers earned a rightful financial benefit of 10,530,000 Taka (approx. 105,300 USD). Afterwards, the local elected Chairman recognized this successful case of downward accountability and instructed every Union to hold public hearings for any grievances raised by ordinary citizens, thereby creating a meaningful ripple effect in multiple local communities.   Conclusion   Some of the biggest challenges in institutionalizing downward accountability are the disconnect between national and local level planning, as well as the lack of transparency at every level. While there have been successful cases of CSOs and NGOs making meaningful intervention at the local level to improve democracy, these are far from the norm. Overcoming this reality requires powerful political will from the top to decentralize its governance structure and empowerment of various tiers of the elected bodies. Better access to information further enhances the credibility of the government.   The ‘Right to Information (RTI) Act’ was enacted in 2009 to address the people’s demand to make all government information accessible to the general public. Based on this Act, marginalized citizens can challenge the local authorities regarding their use of local budget, leakage in public funds, or infrastructure construction. This enabled the local communities to hold numerous public officials accountable for their inefficiency and corruption. When people can check their public institutions through information access, ‘true’ downward accountability that reflects the preamble of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh—“All powers in the Republic belong to the people” —can be realized. [3]       [1] Castiglione, Dario. "accountability". Encyclopedia Britannica, 22 Oct. 2012, https://www.britannica.com/topic/accountability. Accessed 27 February 2023.   [2] ARQAAM monitoring and evaluation, Download accountability, 2022. https://www.arqaam.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Cheat-sheets-Downward-Accountability.pdf   [3] Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, art. 7. (1). 1972. http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-details-367.html       ■ Shaheen Anam is the Executive Director of Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF), a grant making organization supporting Human Rights and Governance work of organizations(approx 250) in Bangladesh. She has worked for CARE Bangladesh as the Coordinator for their largest program and for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs as Project Director for a Gender Equality Project . She has also worked in International Organizations such as UNDP and UNHCR both in Bangladesh and Abroad. Shaheen Anam has a Masters in Social Work from the Hunter College School of Social Work, New York and Masters in Psychology from Dhaka University. She facilitated the process that raised the demand for enactment of the Right to Information (RTI) Act in Bangladesh and is now promoting implementation of law as the Convener of RTI Forum. She is at present involved with a number of policy advocacy and law reforms/formulations. Shaheen Anam is committed to upholding the rights of the most marginalized people. She is known as a human rights and women activist. She is closely linked to the women’s movement and is associated with national, regional and international coalitions/ networks promoting women’s rights. She contributes articles in national dailies and is regularly invited to speak in Bangladesh and abroad.       ■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구보조원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr  

Shaheen Anam 2023-02-28조회 : 8157
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[ADRN Issue Briefing] Restoring Democracy in Myanmar: A Call for Bolstered Anti-Junta Resistance Forces

Two years have passed since the Myanmar’s junta (State Administration Council (SAC)) toppled its civilian government in a coup; however, the resistance movement has not lost its momentum. In light of the second anniversary of the Spring Revolution, pro-democracy activists in Myanmar have recently held a nationwide “silent strike,” rejecting any form of oppressive and predatory military rule.   Meanwhile, the coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing displays no intent to relinquish his power through negotiation. The current military regime has accepted neither the conditions outlined in the speech by the Acting President of the National Unity Government nor the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus’ (Mcpherson 2022). While the ASEAN has been attempting to appease the SAC, this controversial effort has a bleak outlook. Min Aung Hlaing seeks for a total victory, which resembles the goal of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime.   In such context, unless the international community changes its approach to the crisis, Myanmar will inevitably face protracted stalemate and civil war creating millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), approximately 1.5 million people have been internally displaced; 39,000 civilian properties have been destroyed; and one-third of the population is in need of critical humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA 2023). Moreover, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) reports that nearly 3,000 people, including pro-democracy activists and civilians, have been killed by the junta, while more than 13,000 remain imprisoned.   Call for A New Approach by the International Community   In order to restore democracy in Myanmar, the following actions are suggested:   1. The international community, particularly neighboring countries and the ASEAN, must jettison the “inclusive national dialogue” that engages Min Aung Hlaing and his junta to resolve the Myanmar crisis.   Min Aung Hlaing and his military loyalists are the main culprits of all crimes against humanity committed in Myanmar. In other words, Min Aung Hlaing must not be considered as a stakeholder in seeking peaceful resolution. This article wholeheartedly identifies with Igor Blazevik, a long-time Myanmar observer and human rights campaigner in Prague who argues that the Myanmar junta is “not and can never be a part of any solution.”   International players must free themselves from the illusion that the junta will abide by the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus.’ As predicted by Lucas Myers from the Wilson Center, the SAC “has crossed the Rubicon, and it is likely to do everything to stay in power” (Myers 2021). Settlement through negotiation is not on the junta’s agenda. According to Ye Myo Hein from Wilson Center, “the only way to bring the generals to the negotiating table may be to force them to realize that they cannot win by military means” (Hein 2022). As such, the SAC and its chief are not rational negotiating partners for the resolution of the ongoing political crisis.   2. The international community must proactively engage with the National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), ethnic resistance organizations (EROs), and other anti-junta alliances to bring about genuine dialogues and pave way for peaceful and prosperous democracy in Myanmar.   The U.S. Government must take the lead in embedding the Burma Act in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This act enables the United States to provide non-lethal assistance to the NUG and other anti-junta armed groups, such as the People’s Defense Force (PDFs) and EROs. The anti-junta forces in Myanmar needs material assistance, not merely trainings and statements of concern.   Furthermore, Western democracies should provide anti-aircraft rocket launchers to neutralize the junta’s airstrikes (Pongsudhirak 2022). Once the balance is reached on the battlefield, the overstretched junta segments will dramatically lose its capacity to conduct a 4-cut strategy, mainly constituting burning down villages.   In many areas controlled by the NUG/PDFs and EROs, the governance bodies like the People’s Administrations (PaAPha) currently provide services to the IDPs and local communities with highly limited resources (Lipes 2022). However, once the SAC’s airpower is balanced, Burman-majority, ethnic communities will be able to effectively implement humanitarian assistance and resettlement programs. Neutralized airpower would critically weaken both the SAC soldiers’ capacity and morale, compelling the army to engage in negotiations with all stakeholders.   3. The international community should provide humanitarian assistance through every available channel and increase the levels of cross-border aid with flexible banking and reporting rules, as UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar Noleen Heyzer suggests. Measures to protect IDPs and refugees both in and outside mainland Myanmar must be employed in accordance with the ASEAN’s ‘5-Point Consensus’ and other regional frameworks.   UN, U.S., ASEAN, China, India, and other Western democracies should engage and support the NUG, NUCC, and EROs’ alliance platforms to improve coordination with regards to organizing humanitarian assistance and military operations. Doing so will pave the way for genuine negotiations and establishment of federal democratic union of Myanmar once the military is placed under civilian control in the future. Formation of cohesive alliance networks is the key to success for the anti-junta resistance forces.   Call for Internal Reconciliation   As of now, there exists the “Federal Democracy Charter (FDC),” which is a political framework that clearly defines the steps toward the establishment of future federal democratic union in Myanmar (International IDEA 2022). This charter has been drafted by the Committee Represent People’s Parliament (CRPH), mandated by 80% of the MPs elected in the 2020 general election to represent the Union Parliament, and revised by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), and approved by the People Assembly held on January 27-29, 2022.   Yet while meaningful progress is being made to address the long-simmering grievances between Myanmar’s ethnic majority and the minorities, the key to success of the Spring Revolution lies with improved cooperation and coordination among NUG PDFs, local PDFs, and EROs (Hein 2023). Ye Myo Hein points out that the anti-junta forces should not overly focus on the details of the political agreement, as they are unrealistic. Instead, they should increase the military cooperation among within the alliance network and build trust for an inclusive federal state in the future. The NUG must step up to build more viable command-and-control structures, while enforcing a more inclusive code of conduct. This point merits attention, for as explained above, genuine negotiations are only possible when the Myanmar’s military junta is weakened.   The NUG and some EROs have already established the Central Command and Control Committee (C3C); however, some observers point out that although the NUG’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the EROs are cooperating at an operational level, strategic cooperation is not implemented. This current situation must change in order to win the revolution.   Conclusion   Some questions brought up by the international players are as follows: What will happen when the SAC loses power? Will the country descend into a failed state? Will the irregular army of PDFs turn against each other? In addressing these questions, Igor Blazevic consistently points out the international community’s need to address what he calls the “stability bias (authoritarian stability is better than chaos caused by anarchy)”, “David and Goliath bias (the asymmetrically powerful junta will inevitably crush all resistance forces)”, and “authoritarian bias (authoritarianism supports authoritarianism).”   Considering the aforementioned biases, the international community is unlikely to exclude the junta and its chief from the negotiation process (ASEAN 2023). Therefore, anti-junta resistance forces are better to focus on institutionalizing and developing the intra-dialogue among key stakeholders to a new level. In doing so, the alliance must prove that they can govern and maintain stability once the current military junta is removed from power and that there will be no power vacuum. Strengthened national-level coalition will provide greater credibility and legitimacy for the anti-junta forces to govern a democratic Myanmar in the future.   Myanmar’s resistance forces deserve no less global attention than those of Ukraine. Creating a peaceful democratic Myanmar is not merely a domestic issue—it is closely intertwined with achieving regional stability. As long as Min Aung Hlaing’s junta retains power, there will be more refugees, IDPs, narcotic drug production, and transnational crimes that will spill over to neighboring countries.   References   Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2023. “Press Statement by the Chair of the 32nd ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) Meeting and ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat.” https://asean.org/press-statement-by-the-chair-of-the-32nd-asean-coordinating-council-acc-meeting-and-asean-foreign-ministers-retreat   Hein, Ye Myo. 2023. “Greater Military Cooperation is Needed in the Burmese Resistance Movement.” Stimson. Updated January 18, 2023.https://www.stimson.org/2023/greater-military-cooperation-is-needed-in-the-burmese-resistance-movement/   Hein, Ye Myo. 2022. “Myanmar’s Military Knows Only the Language of Force.” The Irrawaddy. Updated January 26, 2022. https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/myanmars-military-knows-only-the-language-of-force.html   International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 2022. “Myanmar's Federal Democracy Charter: Analysis and Prospects.” ,https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/myanmars-federal-democracy-charter-analysis-and-prospects.pdf   Lipes, Joshua. 2022.“People’s Administrations’ supplant junta rule in Myanmar’s remote border regions.” Radio Free Asia. Updated February 15, 2022. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/administration-02152022035938.html   Mcpherson, Poppy. 2022. “Myanmar democracy leader says 2,000 dead fighting junta, urges military aid.” Reuters. Updated December 1, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-democracy-leader-says-2000-dead-fighting-junta-urges-military-aid-2022-12-01/   Myers, Lucas. 2021. “Myanmar Is on the Precipice of Civil War.” Foreign Policy Magazine. Updated April 8, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/08/myanmar-military-coup-ethnic-armed-organizations-civil-war/   Pongsudhirak, Thitina. 2022. “Myanmar's military takeover falters.” Bangkok Post. Updated February 3, 2023. https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2497626/myanmars-military-takeover-falters   United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Myanmar Humanitarian Update No.26. 2023.https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-26-2-february-2023     ■ Lin Htet Myat (pseudonym) analyzes public policy with a focus on economic governance and Public-PrivatePartnership Projects in Myanmar.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구보조원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr  

Lin Htet Myat 2023-02-24조회 : 9212
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[ADRN Issue Briefing] Taiwan’s Civic Space Threatened by Chinese Misinformation and the Government’s Worrisome Legislative Responses

In Taiwan, external and internal threats to its civil societies are all closely associated with China. The first is the Chinese government’s campaign to sway public opinion and restrict freedom of expression in Taiwan. The second comes from the measures adopted by the Taiwanese government to counter these threats posed by China, which also run the risk of restricting its civic space.   External Threats to Civil Society Space   The external threats to Taiwan’s liberal democracy come directly from China. Over the past few years, the authoritarian Chinese government has tightened its control over the civil society both within China and in Hong Kong. It also attempts to use its political and economic leverage to influence public opinion and the policies of political parties in Taiwan. The dissemination of fake news is only one of the numerous measures that China employs to influence Taiwan.   Many Taiwanese companies and mass media outlets have business interests in China. For example, several TV companies sell Taiwan-produced dramas to Chinese TV stations. This situation gives rise to a fundamental security dilemma for Taiwan, as the island’s economy is inextricably intertwined with that of China’s. Taiwan depends on China for its export market and trade surplus. This exposes Taiwanese companies to Chinese government’s influence, forcing firms and individuals to self-censor. In some circumstances, they avoid criticizing the Chinese government and, in the case of media, they are reluctant to report on the darker sides of Chinese society. Indeed, the Chinese government has adopted a policy of differentiating between China-friendly Taiwanese and those who advocate independence. The latter group is threatened to be excluded from doing business with China and has travel restrictions to mainland China, likely further encouraging self-censorship. In another attempt to influence public opinion, a China-based Taiwanese company purchased a mass media conglomerate in Taiwan. The news coverage of this conglomerate’s outlet is generally closely aligned with the Beijing government’s stance.   The Purpose of China’s Misinformation Activities   Some fake news in Taiwan is domestically produced by political parties, their affiliated organizations, and ordinary citizens. A significant amount of its fake news, however, is generated abroad and subsequently disseminated by local people online. According to research conducted by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, Taiwan suffers more than any other countries from disinformation operations run by foreign forces. Social media platforms and websites that are most frequently used to spread disinformation in Taiwan include LINE, Facebook, and PTT (one of Taiwan’s most popular bulletin board systems), as well as content farms and political propaganda websites. Many posts produced by content farms were found to have been copied and pasted from Chiense sources. Netizens have tracked and listed at least fifty content farms producing large-scale fake news about Taiwan. China has three goals in its fake news campaigns.   The first goal is to “tell China’s story well.” Its aim is to manufacture a positive image of the Chinese Communist Party’s performance and a negative image of Western governments. This could potentially enhance the legitimacy of the Chinese government and increase the appeal of China as a distinct model for developing countries and Taiwan. One such example of its misinformation efforts is promoting a story about how Asian Americans, especially those of Chinese descent, and African Americans are are discriminated in the United States. [1] The goal here is to induce Taiwanese to favor the Chinese model and to eventually endorse unification with the mainland.   The second goal is to intimidate the Taiwanese people and create social panic and internal division, especially during a period of heightened military tension across the Taiwan Strait, in the hope that Taiwan will yield to Chinese political and military pressure. An example of this type of fake news is a report that the Chinese government had decided to evacuate all Chinese citizens from Taiwan before August 8, 2022. This was issued just after the visit of U.S. House speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan on August 3, when the Chinese were conducting military exercises in the waters off Taiwan. [2]   The third goal is to influence competition between political parties in Taiwan. Stories of this kind tend to talk down the performance of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government and accuse it of not doing a good job of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait. An example of this type of fake news is a report that the DPP government had spent NT$300 million on lobbyists to arrange the Pelosi visit. [3] The goal of reports of this kind is to lower the approval rating of the ruling party and boost support for the opposition parties which are more closely aligned with Beijing on cross-Strait issues. This tends to distort the competition between parties   DPP Legislation against Misinformation   Civil society in Taiwan, including academics, NGOs, the civic tech community, grassroots advocates, and the news media, has been working hard to come up with effective solutions to the fake news problem. These solutions include establishing fact-checking technology and organizations, enhancing media literacy, and promoting responsible and quality journalism. All those engaged in fact-checking work believe they need more help, such as the construction of a disinformation database and enhanced fact-checking tools that can verify images and videos. The Taiwanese government has also joined the fight against fake news.   The DPP attributed its overwhelming defeat in the 2018 local elections to rampant fake news, and it discovered that a big chunk of that disinformation came from overseas. The ruling party holds that the disinformation war distorted the truth, demonized political leaders, and planted a misleading view of the government in Taiwanese people’s minds, putting the DPP at a distinct disadvantage. The government and DPP legislators proposed several items of legislation designed to curb disinformation. The first of these was a national public security law which would have allowed the authorities to set up security units in various public and private organizations to investigate and question individuals suspected of engaging in activities that might threaten national security. Ruling party legislators subsequently proposed the introduction of an espionage law aimed at strengthening the powers of the National Security Bureau to engage in telephone tapping and the monitoring of suspects. Civil society organizations and opposition parties, concerned about restrictions on freedom of expression, opposed these bills, leading to DPP legislators eventually backing down.   However, the government did introduce legislation to regulate misinformation in specific policy areas, including the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act, the Communicable Disease Control Act, and the Agricultural Products Market Transaction Act. These acts contained clauses aimed at curbing misinformation in those particular areas. The government also proposed two general bills that tackled misinformation, the Social Order Maintenance Bill and the Digital Intermediary Services Bill. We will discuss these in detail below.   The Social Order Maintenance Act and “Fake News”   Under the amended Social Order Maintenance Act, the police are obliged to bring before the courts any individuals suspected of spreading rumors that might disturb social stability. In some cases, the police do this based on evidence provided by pro-government informants, while in other cases, the police proactively surf politically-oriented internet platforms such as specific Facebook pages. Public criticism and expressions of discontent long predated the election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016. However, since 2019, the number of cases brought before the court by the police each year has increased severalfold (Pan 2020). The Social Order Maintenance Act explicitly demands that, after questioning suspects, the police must bring them before the court or risk being accused of malfeasance.   One example of an accusation of spreading misinformation concerns a report that former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Taiwan specifically to get Taiwanese pension funds to invest in his company. The Taiwan government denied this claim and argued that Pompeo was not accompanied by any personnel from his investment company, and that the Taiwanese government did not have such investment plan. [4] A fact-checking organization cited this official announcement as a sufficient evidence to label this story as fake news. However, one Taiwan newspaper reported evidence of Pompeo bringing this issue up the year before his visit and Taiwan government declining the invitation to invest. With these circumstances, it is difficult to simply say that this was entirely a fabricated story. [5]   Another example is a report that the government was planning to move the entire collection of the National Palace Museum from its main campus in Taipei to the campus in southern Taiwan, and that as a result, the museum would be closed for three years. [6] It seems that neither of these reports were accurate, but it would be far-fetched to argue that they could cause social instability, nor easy to accept that people should be punished simply for spreading stories of this kind. [7]   Eighty percent of the cases that are brought before the courts under this law are dismissed (Pan 2020), as Taiwan’s courts tend to uphold the right to freedom of expression. They hold that defaming government leaders or criticizing the government do not threaten social stability, so these cases are beyond the jurisdiction of the Social Order Maintenance Act. But despite the low conviction rate, local police still face pressure from officials to continue to bring cases to court, as they risk accusations by informants of failing to fulfill their duties. Overall, enforcement of the Social Order Maintenance Act is having a chilling effect on public expressions of political opinion online.   The Digital Intermediary Services Bill   The Digital Intermediary Services Bill, proposed by the National Communications Council in 2022, would have given government agencies the power to initiate legal action against online news stories that were deemed to violate the law or damage the public interest. A court would have had 48 hours to decide whether the story had to be removed from internet platforms. Before the court made its decision, the government agency could require the platform provider to add a warning to the post for 30 days. So far, internet platform providers in Western democracies are expected to self-regulate their content rather than being forced to do so by their governments. Even the European Union only requires internet providers to remove content related to terrorism and racist hate speech.   The terms “violate the law” and “damage the public interest” are quite vague, and it is questionable whether the courts would have the capacity to make these decisions so quickly. It would be particularly controversial if government agencies were to make extensive use of this legislation during an election campaign, as it could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and influence the outcome of the election. Faced with opposition from many Taiwanese civil society organizations and internet providers, the government decided to withdraw the bill. The discussion above demonstrates the difficulty a country faces to strike a balance between national security and freedom of expression.   Conclusion   Most fake news stories, whether domestically generated or originating from overseas, are so bizarre or far-fetched that they are hard to believe. Others look suspicious and can be easily checked by reference to mainstream media websites. Taiwan has a highly educated society and a well-functioning democracy. The public is generally quite well informed, and people with different political views tend to live side-by-side in the same neighborhoods, working and socializing together. Given the existence of social networks of this kind, social media users are likely to be exposed to cross-cutting political views to some degree at least, thus hindering the formation of social media echo chambers and the potential negative effects of fake news. In these circumstances, fake news and propaganda are not likely to significantly influence how people perceive the performance of the incumbent government and general functioning of their democracy. Political parties in Taiwan tend to exaggerate the adverse effects of “cyber armies” and fake news. Fake news does result in more political polarization but it is unlikely to significantly influence social stability.   As China has tightened its domestic political and social controls have become more assertive, it is important for the Taiwanese government to work closely with its civil society to safeguard the island’s democracy by regulating misinformation emanating from outside the country. However, in its attempt to roll out measures to regulate fake news, the government remain conscious about the possible damage such legislation could inflict on press freedom and human rights. Illiberal laws may do as much harm to Taiwan’s civil society as spreading fake news manufactured in China does.   The experience of fighting misinformation in Taiwan shows that a vibrant civil society plays an important role both in countering fake news from abroad and in resisting moves by the government that shrink the civic space to which it intends to protect. Moreover, we can see that an independent judicial system is also critical in preventing the government from encroaching on civil rights in the name of protecting national security.   Finally, one often neglected issue is why a certain segment of Taiwan’s society—consisting of “deep Blue” voters—is more susceptible to fake news generated in China. Are deep Blues more prone to embracing authoritarian values, or do they simply feel that their national identity is not being respected? If the government were to be more respectful toward their identity, perhaps they would be less susceptible to fake news disseminated by the Chinese government and its agents. ■   References   Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson and Yi-ting Wang. (2019). Section 2: Threats to Democracy in the Digital Age. In S. I. Anna Lührmann (Ed.), Democracy Facing Global Challenges, V-DEM Annual Democracy Report 2019. Gothenburg: V-Dem.   Liberty Times. (2019, January 14). 中國假訊息鋪天蓋地襲台! 這張圖秒懂散布「最新管道」 [List of the Newest Content Farms Spreading Disinformation from China]. Taipei: Liberty Times. https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2671531   Pan Wei-tin 2020. “Only Twenty Percent of the Transferred Cases Were Punished.” 警方「查水表」去年爆增7倍、僅2成開罰 藍委提案刪《社維法》「散布謠言罪」https://www.storm.mg/article/2883916?page=1     [1] “#StopAsianHate: Chinese diaspora targeted by CCP disinformation campaign.” https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/stopasianhate-chinese-diaspora-targeted-by-ccp-disinformation-campaign/   [2] “Rumors China evacuating citizens from Taiwan deemed fake news.” https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4616144   [3] “Taiwan shoots down Pelosi ‘paid visit’ claim. Rumors swirling online suggest Pelosi received money to visit Taiwan fake news.” https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/   [4] “媒體稱龐皮歐訪台要「政治保護費」外交部:醜化台灣堅定友人” https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3848166   [5] “獨/龐培歐訪台非為保台?駐美代表處電報指向商業考量” https://udn.com/news/story/6656/6139201   [6] “謠言終結站》封館3年,文物南遷? 故宮︰整修期間照常開放” https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/1304823   [7] During the Covid-19 pandemic, most misinformation was related to the origin, spread, and prevention of the disease, treatments, and vaccines.     ■ Chin-en Wu is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Michigan. His main research interest includes the impact of economic development on political regime dynamics and how regime type influences economic performance.       ■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수_EAI 연구보조원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | hspark@eai.or.kr  

Chin-en Wu 2023-02-10조회 : 11034
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[ADRN Issue Briefing] Expanding International Cooperation against Corruption in the Indo-Pacific

The South Korean government will host the Second Summit for Democracy’s (S4D2) Indo-Pacific regional meeting. The second global summit will be conducted online on March 29th, with four regional meetings being held concurrently offline next day. The Korean government chose anti-corruption as a central agenda that requires the cooperation of Indo-Pacific countries to effectively address.   Corruption harms every aspect of human life. Corrupted elites often hold “extractive economic institutions,” designed to siphon off national income and wealth for their self-serving interests rather than for the benefit of the broader society. [1] A predatory and corrupted “rogue state” is the worst form of such. A corrupted government cripples the ability to deliver rational economic management by distorting public demand, drawing the costs of bribery from public money, and taking an inverse selection of firms. [2] Such damaging attributes heighten mistrust between people, thereby limiting market development, as communities lack the solid ties of cooperation necessary for their collective economic growth. [3] Furthermore, Kleptocracy – a government whose leaders seize public funds made available by public institutions – considerably undermines democracy, as leaders are breaking democratic rules to retain their political power for the sake of self-enrichment. Accordingly, kleptocracies tend to be autocracies. [4] Transparency International (TI) has identified a strong association between higher levels of corruption and breaches of civil liberties. [5] Corruption’s negative social impact is no less significant. Rampant corruption that is prevalent across all areas of society reduces people’s ethical values and sense of social justice, making it considerably more difficult to sustain and govern such communities in line with the rule of law. Given the detrimental effects that corruption has on transparency, accountability, and integrity; democratic countries should work together to combat corruption and actively support each other’s anti-corruption efforts.   The State of Corruption in the Indo-Pacific   The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the only legally binding universal anti-corruption instrument, with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as the leading entity in global anti-corruption cooperation efforts. The Convention, adopted in October 2003 and made effective in December 2005, has 140 signatories and 189 parties as of November 2021. It covers many different forms of corruption, including bribery, trading in influence, abuse of functions, and various acts of corruption in the private sector. The UNODC identifies the Convention’s four highlights as preventive measures, criminalization and law enforcement measures, international cooperation, and asset recovery. [6]   Although it has been seventeen years since the Convention’s implementation, corruption remains rampant in many countries. The most recent TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) reports that the global average of perceived public sector corruption remains unchanged for the tenth year in a row, marking just 43 on a scale between 0 (highly corrupt) and 100 (very clean). It is notable to see that 131 countries have made no significant progress against corruption in the last decade. Two-thirds of countries score below 50, indicating that they have serious corruption problems, while 27 countries are at their lowest score ever. [7]   While the Asia-Pacific region has certainly made progress in controlling petty corruption over the last decade, a failure to address grand corruption has kept the region’s average score stalled at 45. New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Singapore take top scores of 88, 85, and 76, respectively. Cambodia, Afghanistan, and North Korea are ranked at the bottom with a score of 23, 16, and 16, respectively. Among the region’s democracies, Australia and Japan received 73 points, while Taiwan and South Korea remained at 68 and 62 points, respectively.   The Rule of Law Index 2022 [8] measures the absence of corruption as one of the elements of its rule of law index, together with constraints on government powers, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. Among the Indo-Pacific countries, Singapore tops the 0 (corrupted) to 1 (not corrupted) scale, with 0.91, followed by New Zealand (0.88), Hong Kong (0.83), Japan (0.82), Australia (0.81), and South Korea (0.66). Other countries in the region, however, received scores below 0.5. The highly ranked ones in the absence of corruption stand out also in the overall rule of law score based on all eight elements, including New Zealand (0.83), Australia (0.79), Japan (0.79), Singapore (0.78), South Korea (0.73), and Hong Kong (0.73).   These indexes follow the conventional definition of corruption regarding the illegal abuse of public office for private gains such as bribery, embezzlement, and vote buying. These forms of corruption are most rampant in poorer countries. However, it is also important to recognize that there exist forms of corruption related to non-illegal exchanges of power and profit among political elites. Cultivating political connections, campaign finance, and revolving-door practices are typical examples of such. Yang argues that these kinds of “undue influence of wealth” are often found in wealthy democracies as a type of “access money” form of corruption. Among the 15 countries of which corruption is measured by four types—petit theft, grand theft, speed money, and access money - 8 countries from the Indo-Pacific region were identified. Among them, Bangladesh and Indonesia were measured as the most corrupt in all four types of corruption. India, China, and Thailand are ranked next, with speed money, access money, and petit theft as the highest forms of corruption, respectively. Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea are ranked as less corrupt, though their access money is a more common type of corruption, as is the case for many wealthy democracies. Singapore again stands out in this data as the least corrupted in all types, with access money corruption being its highest .[9]   Spreading Anti-corruption Institutions and Current Weaknesses in Institutional Independence and Capacity   Although Singapore and Hong Kong are not democracies, they are notable for having a visible absence of corruption. Both possess a strong state bureaucracy able to efficiently maintain order, security, and criminal justice. Furthermore, they introduced independent corruption investigation bodies relatively early, with Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau established in 1952 and Hong Kong’s Independent Commission against Corruption formed in 1974. In the Rule of Law Index 2022 report, however, the two score a lower level in fundamental rights and constraints on government power. This means that, however clean these governments are now, they can fall into corruption when their power structures are autocratized. As Lord Ash’s famous statement goes, “Power tends to corrupt; Absolute power corrupts absolutely.”   Many Asian countries had developed penal codes and election laws to punish corrupt officials. However, the creation of independent bodies tasked with monitoring and investigating corruption had to wait until the 2000s. South Korea legislated the Anti-Corruption Act in 2001 and launched the Independent Commission against Corruption the next year. This was later merged with the Ombudsman of Korea and the Administrative Appeals Commission, which in 2008 came to form the current Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC). Malaysia introduced the Anti-Corruption Act in 1997 but had enacted a new law in 2009 to create the Anti-Corruption Commission as a single entity tasked to investigate any form of corruption and abuse of power. Mongolia formed the Independent Authority against Corruption in 2007, while Myanmar enacted the anti-corruption law only in 2013 and formed a body to punish bribery of public officials. [10]. In the case of India, the country introduced the Prevention of Corruption Act also relatively early, in 1988, to consolidate all its laws relating to Corruption by civil servants. In 2013, however, the act had to be amended to include the bribe-giving offenses. The Lokpal and Lokayuktas were created to inquire about the complaints received about corruption in public functionaries in the same year: [11]   Despite the proliferation of anti-corruption laws and institutions across Asia, they tend to be weak. First, this is largely due to the majority of such institutions taking the form of a special government body. Accordingly, they lack the political autonomy needed to independently carry out their duties and are subject to the budgetary constraints imposed by their governments. Unless the highest audit bodies and other oversight mechanisms are independent, the creation of an anti-corruption entity is not sufficient, in itself, for tackling the corruption posed by aggrandized executive powers. Second, anti-corruption institutions can only work effectively when the government provides open and transparent information. For example, corruption crime is not detected unless decision processes are well-documented and data is easily accessible to the public. Third, anti-corruption bodies usually do not have the authority to directly enforce corruption charges, resulting in them having to work with prosecutors and courts to criminalize and punish those found of corruption. More fundamentally, judicial independence and robust legislature on anti-corruption efforts need to extend to instances of grand corruption committed by powerful leaders, who have often manipulated their political stations to shield themselves with impunity. Finally, anti-corruption reforms often used as a tool of power politics to punish opponents in weak democracies. Such anti-corruption drive tends to be ephemeral with no effect of strengthening anti-corruption institutions.   International Cooperation against Corruption beyond the Summit   Corruption has increasingly become a cross-border crime as politicians, civil servants, private sector actors, and crime syndicates are assembling international networks. Recognizing the rise of transnational corruption, the UN General Assembly (UNGASS) held the Special Session against Corruption in 2021, with UNCAC member states and parties adopting a resolution. [12] The session produced a political declaration that called for strong international cooperation and assistance in the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of corruption offenses, as well as in the recovery and return of confiscated assets. [13]   There are some takeaways to consider for the UNCAC’s Indo-Pacific parties. In the area of preventive measures, the most significant area to focus on would be granting independence to anti-corruption bodies, supreme audit institutions, and other oversight bodies in accordance with the principles of domestic law. Taking the opportunity to convene under the S4D2 corruption agenda, the Convention’s Indo-Pacific states could consider forming a network of anti-corruption bodies that can learn from each other’s experiences. While paying full respect to each other’s varying domestic laws, they could work together in improving the capacity building of anti-corruption bodies. As such, technical assistance on data collection and the digitalization of government services and procurement would be a promising area for cooperation.   In the area of criminalization and law enforcement, the declaration urges state parties to comply with the relevant obligations established for criminal offenses pertaining to the bribery of national public officials, the active bribery of foreign public officials and international organizations, embezzlement, money laundering and obstruction of justice, as covered in the UNCAC. Recognizing the overlapping UN governance mission, the UNGASS anti-corruption political declaration calls for coordination and cooperation with the UN Convention of Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). Dell also emphasizes the combination of UNTOC and other human rights agreements with the UNCAC since corruption is increasingly becoming a multi-jurisdiction issue covering many international agreements. [14]   For the cross-border movement of people and money, the UNGASS declaration suggests using the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative (under the World Bank and the UNDOC), and the new Global Operational Network on Anti-Corruption Law Enforcement Authorities (under the UNODC). The StAR provides forms of both informal assistance and formal ones that require mutual legal requests. [15]   With corruption becoming transnational in scope, current law enforcement responses are largely inadequate for tackling it since they are confined to domestic, state-level boundaries. TI’s Exporting Corruption 2022, [16] which assesses the enforcement efforts of 47 leading export countries in the period 2018-2021, reports that enforcement continues to decline, leaving only Switzerland and the U.S. as the only current active enforcers. On the other hand, 38 countries accounting for 55 percent of all global exports have limited or no enforcement at all. If it is premature to enact a law like the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Indo-Pacific countries can consider the exchange and cooperation among similar law enforcement agencies on countering corruption. In the infamous 1MDB case, thanks to this kind of cooperation, Goldman Sachs was investigated by at least 14 regulators for its role in the scandal. Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States worked together to obtain US$2.3 billion in penalties and US$606 million in disgorgement [17]   Corruption is a common problem for all countries, regardless of their level of democratization. Accordingly, all country leaders invited to the S4D2 Indo-Pacific regional conference should have the incentive to address cooperation, whether it be through technical assistance or law enforcement cooperation. Convening government leaders at the Summit should sustain their efforts for the future by prioritizing action-oriented cooperation needed to effectively combat corruption across the region. ■     [1] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail. 76. New York: Crown. Kindle, 76.   [2] Donatella della Porta. 2000. “Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption.” In Disaffected Democracies, ed. Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam, 202-228. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   [3] Michael Woolcock. 1998. “Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework,” Theory and Society 27, 2: 151-208.   [4] Mayne says, some kleptocratic gains are reinvested in political campaigns or in media companies to help frame the kleptocrat’s narrative. Dariga Nazarbayeva’s ownership of Kazakhstan’s largest media company Khabar is a good example. Thomas Mayne. 2002. “What Is Kleptocracy and How Does It Work.” Chatham House, July 4. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/what-kleptocracy-and-how-does-it-work.   [5] Transparency International. 2022. “Corruption Perception Index 2021.” 9. https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2021_Report_EN-web.pdf.   [6] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2003. “United Nations Convention Against Corruption.” https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/uncac.html.   [7] Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2021.” https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2021_Report_EN-web.pdf   [8] World Justice Project. 2022. “Rule of Law Index 2022”. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2022.pdf. The report measures 140 countries including Hong Kong but not Taiwan.   [9] Yuen Yuen Yang. 2020. “Unbundling Corruption: Revisiting Six Questions on Corruption.” Global Perspectives 1,1. https://doi.org/10.1525/gp.2020.12036.   [10] Asia Democracy Research Network. 2018. “Combating Corruption toward Clean Governance in Asia: Country Cases”. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=5&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Multimedia&code=&at=view&idx=49.   [11] Yashraj Bais. (n.d.). “Anti-Corruption Laws in India with Recent Judicial Pronouncements: A Complete Guide.” https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-9085-anti-corruption-laws-in-india-with-recent-judicial-pronouncements-a-complete-guide.html.   [12] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2021. “Resolutions and decisions adopted by the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption.” https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/COSP/session9-resolutions.html#Res.9-2   [13] This declaration has a long title: United Nations General Assembly. 2021. “Our Common Commitment to Effectively Addressing Challenges and International Measures to Prevent and Combat Corruption and Strengthen International Cooperation.” https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/138/82/PDF/N2113882.pdf?OpenElement   [14] Gillian Dell. 2021. “UN and Grand Corruption: Time to Break out of Silos.” Transparency International. https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/un-grand-corruption-organised-crime-break-out-of-silos.   [15] Informal assistance includes obtaining information from property or company registries, information in police databases or the identity of witnesses. Informal assistance can be extremely useful to determine the direction of an investigation and the need and scope of formal assistance. However, for a judicial process, mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests is required. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) acts as a multilateral MLA treaty, including for the purpose of asset recovery. https://star.worldbank.org/focus-area/international-cooperation   [16] Transparency International 2022. “Exporting Corruption 2022.” https://files.transparencycdn.org/images/2022-Report-Slim-version-Exporting-Corruption-EN.pdf   [17] Ibid.26.     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Professor of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 _EAI 선임연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr  

Sook Jong Lee 2023-01-12조회 : 12951
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[ADRN Issue Briefing] Taiwan’s Local Elections: Defeat of the Ruling DPP Amidst Negative Campaigns

On November 26, Taiwan held its “nine-in-one” local elections, with 11,023 positions up for grabs (excluding those at the national level.) Though the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost many seats amidst negative campaigns directed against it by opposition parties, the election’s biggest loser was ultimately the electorate, who did not receive quality campaigns. Because the lead up to the election was stifled by negative campaigns and trivial accusations, voters were largely mobilized out of fear and outrage, leaving little room to collectively conceptualize and discuss practical policy considerations. Turnout fell from around 66% in 2018 to just under 60% in 2022, the lowest voting turnout in 14 years. Independents chose not to vote, moreover, indicating apathy toward the elections.   Election Results   Substantial interest in the electoral competitions typically surround six municipalities, including the capital Taipei city. This year, Hsinchu city unexpectedly received much media attention, topping the news almost every day since the election commenced. Because the mayors of New Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung sought re-election, their incumbent advantages made competition less intense than those for open seats in Taipei and Taoyuan. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a third party led by Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-che, endorsed Huang Shan-shan, a former city councilor and deputy mayor, to continue his work. The tripartite race, including the candidate nominated by the governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Chen Shih-chung, and the KMT's Wayne Chiang, has been highly unpredictable. A tripartite contest was also held in Hsinchu city, with the DPP, KMT, and TPP all having nominated candidates for the open seat. Hsinchu, though not a municipality, hosts Taiwan’s ‘Silicon Valley,’ an industrial park led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which has helped make Hsinchu become Taiwan’s most prosperous city. Given that Cheng Wen-tsan, the current mayor of Taoyuan, was popular and Lin Chih-chien (the mayor of Hsinchu who have served two terms) was a rising star within the DPP and backed by President Tsai Ing-wen, the electoral competition in Taoyuan was assumed to not be a contentious one. After plagiarism scandals forced Lin to withdraw from the contest, the KMT’s candidate Simon Chang increasingly gained momentum in the election, subsequently making the competition considerably more intense and unpredictable.   The KMT emerged as the winner of the election, while the DPP received the poorest record in its history. Though the TPP made some progress in these elections, the KMT and DPP certainly remain the most dominant forces in Taiwan’s political landscape. As shown in Figure 1, the DPP’s support shrank and became concentrated to southern Taiwan. The KMT, in contrast, saw itself retake three cities in the north, including the capital city, which was previously ruled by Ko Wen-che of the TPP. Hsinchu, however, was secured by the TPP. Although the electoral results confirmed pre-election predictions, the DPP was shocked by the party’s disappointing results. A subsequent soul-searching process was initiated by the DPP after its chairman, President Tsai Ing-wen, resigned from the position.   [Figure 1] Comparisons of Electoral Results in 2018 and 2022   Source: Central Election Commission   Major Election Issues   Topics covering governance, infrastructure, and social policies usually dominate Taiwanese local elections. Four years ago, Han Kuo-yu's declared a candid but accurate statement about Kaohsiung as being “old and poor”. During his campaign, therefore, Han ran on an optimistic platform that promised to restore the city’s prosperity, so residents could once again feel proud of their city. News coverage over this year’s election, however, was dominated less by policy-driven agendas but negative campaigns, particularly character attacks on the TPP’s nominee for Hsinchu mayor, Ann Kao. At the beginning of the campaign season, the DPP held a relative advantage over the KMT, since the party had won two by-elections and referendums in the previous two years. Confidence, however, began to wane when the DPP’s Taoyuan mayor nominee Lin Chih-chien was accused of plagiarism in his master’s thesis. As such, the first half of the campaign was dominated by accusations of plagiarism and concerns over credible credentials. A number of policy attacks also undermined the DPP’s support and the fortunes of its nominees. The campaign’s major issues are outlined below.   Scandals of Plagiarism   Political meritocracy, as Bovens and Wille articulate, has proliferated within most Western democracies. [1] Nowadays, a person's merit is reflected by their highest diploma, indicating their intelligence and effort. Prolonged academic training demonstrates an individual’s capability and endurance for dealing with complex political and social issues. Although modern democracies tend to be disproportionately governed by citizens with the highest educational credentials, empirical research findings suggests that politicians with college degrees are neither more capable of governing nor less corrupt than those with a lower educational background. [2] As Figure 2 depicts, the majority of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan members hold at least a bachelor’s degree. Since 2001, over 40% possess a master’s degree and 15% hold doctorates.   [Figure 2] Distribution of Legislators’ Highest Education   Source: Central Election Commission.   Due an expansion in higher education, a bachelor’s degree is no longer sufficient to demonstrate one’s merit, making a master’s degree appear an increasingly necessary qualification in gaining an edge on Taiwan’s electoral stage. As a result, it is understandable that Taiwanese politicians emphasize their obtainment of a master’s degree or higher. For example, former Hsinchu mayor Lin Chih-chien, who was the nominee for the Taoyuan municipality contest, held two master’s degrees, including one from a top Taiwanese university. However, they were both rescinded after being found guilty of serious plagiarism, forcing Lin to eventually withdraw from the contest. In counterattack operations, supporters of the DPP accused opposition candidates of committing similar frauds. Despite such allegations making politicians more wary of promoting their academic credentials, a positive aspect of this incident is that universities are forced to reconsider their degree-granting processes.   Poor Quality of Infrastructure   It is the responsibility of local governments to provide quality basic infrastructure. Local governments, however, are dependent on the central government due to latter’s command over the distribution of tax revenues. The DPP government passed a special act to improve infrastructure in 2017, spending approximately USD 28 billion (NTD 880 billion). Most local governments use this budget to build stadiums, sports centers, irrigation systems, public transportation, etc. Concerns over the quality over such projects, however, have increasingly been raised. The 1.2 billion cost of renovating the Hsinchu Baseball Stadium, for example, were found to be below standard, with several baseball players being injured in its first two games after reopening. Taoyuan, another municipality ruled by the DPP, faced similar problems. CNN reported the collapse of a ceiling in a sports center when covering the severity of earthquakes at the time, even though the tremor in Taoyuan was relatively minor. Because of poor public work, opposition parties in Hsinchu and Taoyuan have implied the poor quality of such infrastructure as indicative of governmental corruption.   Discredited Pandemic Control Performance   Former Central Epidemic Command Center commander, Chen Shih-chung, was nominated to be Taipei’s mayor by the DPP. Thanks to Chen’s prompt decision to prohibit travelers from mainland China at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, Taiwan topped the resilience list in 2020, holding the lowest infection and mortality rates. As such, the DPP should have had a better chance of capturing the capital in 24 years. In May 2021, however, a pandemic broke out as cases suddenly spiked in Taipei. Local governments in Taipei and New Taipei especially, were put on the front lines to rescue those infected. An official from the Command Center called the Wanhua district in Taipei, where the first cluster infection was detected, a “crack”. This description angered Wanhua residents, who felt they were being scapegoated for the government’s failure to prevent the virus’ entry. There were also not enough vaccines at the Central Command Center, making Taiwan have to rely on foreign vaccine donations for some time. Chen’s other measures and decisions as commander also faced criticism and controversy. As a result, his performance as commander raised doubt over his abilities to lead the capital.   Economic Difficulties and Anti-China Campaign Backlash   Service sectors were also hard hit by the pandemic since in-store dining was banned for a few months and people practiced self-imposed lockdowns by reducing outdoor activities. Service sector employees lost their jobs and became targets of organized crime. In addition, many young people were lured to work overseas and forced to commit scams. In Taiwan, more people were confined to small spaces and treated inhumanely by providing personal information for money laundering. With President Tsai and her government preoccupied in campaigning for DPP candidates, such crimes and concerns for social safety went largely unnoticed.   With Taiwan under pressure from high house prices, inflation, and an aging population, many voters anticipated that electoral candidates would offer a variety of solutions for local governments in addressing issues related to public safety and public services. The DPP’s candidates, however, largely acted on the defensive since most of these problems are related to central government policies. This is especially the case for housing, which has increasingly become a selling point in electoral politics as young voters are unable to afford to buy homes. President Tsai’s failure to deliver on her promise to build 80 thousand public housing units can, in part, also explain why some party candidates who made similar promises in the election have been discredited.   As the campaign progressed, the DPP increasingly leaned on its anti-China sentiment, which was thought to be a winning strategy that could also help divert voters' attention from its poor handling of social and economic issues. Unfortunately for the DPP, voters were mainly concerned with addressing everyday domestic problems, making the party’s anti-China orientation an ineffective electoral tool. In addition, following the visit of US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Chinese military drills around the island led many to believe war was imminent. The government's reaction, however, indicated that it was unprepared for such a conflict, with the US appearing hesitant to assist if needed. As a result, Taiwanese voters reconsidered whether pursuing an anti-China stance was the best strategy to assure Taiwan’s security.   Unwise DPP Campaign Strategies   On the whole, the DPP was defeated by its own actions. Since the DPP controls the central government, local elections provided an important political avenue for voters in expressing discontent with the party's performance. Amidst this anti-DPP atmosphere, however, the party failed to offer voters with policy proposals that could rectify such issues or at least provide sincere apologies for its mistakes. A reliance on extremism, trolls, and negative campaigns has only strengthened anti-DPP sentiment, with the party's nominees suffering the consequences. There are two main reasons why the DPP lost the election.   Nomination strategy   While it was predicted that the DPP would not win much in this year’s elections, the results were much worse than expected. To determine party nominees, the party used to hold open intra-party competitions, however Chairman Tsai broke with this setup by personally designating a number of key battlegrounds. In the first mishap, the party’s nominee for Taoyuan withdrew from the contest due to plagiarism. Its negative effects spread to other contests in northern Taiwan. Second, the party’s nominee for Taipei's contest was hampered by a record of policy failures, including the handling of vaccines and spending on pandemic control, thereby only fueling the KMT with further ammunition to attack the government. In opposition, Chen went on the defensive by attempting to stir up anti-China sentiment by arguing that a KMT victory would send a worrying message to the world that Taiwan would not stand firm against China. It can be argued that nominating Lin Chia-Lung, former Minister of Transportation and Communications and Mayor of Taichung municipality, would have improved the DPP's performance. Yet with no chance of getting nominated, Lin was instead sent to challenge incumbent New Taipei mayor Hou Yu-ih. Overall, the DPP paid a heavy price for its problematic nomination strategy.   Extremists and Personal Attacks   Since 2019, the DPP has increasingly used extreme tactics and trolls to attack its opposition and critics. During this year's elections, extremists attacked KMT and TPP candidates on a wide variety of reasons, from their educational credentials to harboring suspicious ties with China sympathizers. A ridiculous accusation was made against Taipei mayoral candidate Wayne Chiang's father, in which a libel lawsuit was filed by an innocent citizen who was alleged to have had an affair with Chiang's father many years ago. Most of the personal attacks were directed at Hsinchu mayoral candidate Ann Kao. By the end of the election, extremists and trolls exaggerated any mistakes Kao had made, including her comments and leadership style. There was also an accusation involving Kao's former employer, the Institute for Information Industry (III). Despite not being a government agency, most of III's research grants come from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. III disclosed Kao's personal information at the request of the DPP caucus coordinator in the Legislative Yuan, however such a move was questioned on whether the coordinator had the authority to do so. The opposition accused the DPP of abusing its power by using the state’s apparatus and authority to obtain personal information protected by law.   Implications for the 2024 Presidential Race   Despite being the winner in this election, it is too early to say whether the KMT will have an advantage in the upcoming presidential election, since it still faces a number of obstacles in regaining the presidency. To begin with, the KMT must clarify its position on national identity. During the 2020 presidential election, the majority of voters supported the safeguarding of Taiwan's sovereignty. This stance is unlikely to change in 2024. Despite its diminishing effect, the DPP’s anti-China sentiment is likely to hurt the KMT unless the latter party can rid itself of its pro-China image. In addition, the KMT lacks a charismatic politician who can challenge William Lai, the current vice president and a possible DPP nominee in 2024. While Hou Yu-ih is popular within the KMT, he has only just won his second term as mayor of New Taipei and will have to overcome pressure to step down early. Additionally, current KMT chairman Eric Chu is likely to be his biggest challenge. To make the race more complicated, the TPP's chairman Ko Wen-che has already announced that he will run for president. It remains to be seen, therefore, how the KMT will manage such intra-party competition.   The TPP will also be tested by the 2024 presidential election. While the TPP was unable to extend its control over the capital, it won Hsinchu city, a part of the island whose high-tech companies immensely shape its internal well-being and international connectivity. While the TPP offers an alternative to the DPP and KMT by working to improve transparency, accountability, and governance, most observers are not optimistic about the party’s future since most of Taiwan’s third parties have historically subsided. TPP party officials were surprised when their endorsed candidate for Taipei trailed even the much-loathed DPP candidate. This demonstrates that Taipei’s voters don't appreciate what the TPP has done to the capital, and most voters do not believe that the TPP provides a credible replacement to the two mainstream parties. Since Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-che has served two terms, a power turnover is likely to occur, as it has in other open seat contests. The three parties have received 42.29% (KMT), 31.93% (DPP) and 25.14% (TPP) of Taipei’s votes. According to these figures, the TPP holds at least one-quarter of loyal supporters in Taipei, not bad for a party that has only been around for three years. To heighten its electoral competitiveness and become a major political contender, however, the TPP will need to expand its support base beyond young, educated, and urban voters. Coordinating with the KMT to defeat the ruling DPP could be an option in achieving this. ■   References   Bovens, Mark, and Anchrit Wille. 2017. Diploma Democracy: The Rise of Political Meritocracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. 2016. “What Good Is a College Degree? Education and Leader Quality Reconsidered.” The Journal of Politics 78 (1): 35–49.     [1] Bovens, Mark, and Anchrit Wille. 2017. Diploma Democracy: The Rise of Political Meritocracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [2] Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. 2016. “What Good Is a College Degree? Education and Leader Quality Reconsidered.” The Journal of Politics 78 (1): 35–49.     ■ Kai-Ping Huang is Associate Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University. Her research interests include party systems, formal institutions, and democratization focusing on East and Southeast Asia. Her work has appeared in the Journal of Democracy, Comparative Politics, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of East Asian Studies, and several edited volumes.     ■ 담당 및 편집:  백진경 , EAI 선임연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | j.baek@eai.or.kr  

Kai-Ping Huang 2022-12-21조회 : 12955