EAI는 아시아 지역의 민주적 거버넌스와 인권 증진에 관련된 연구를 진행하기 위해 2013년 11월 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(Asia Democracy Research Network: ADRN)를 발족했다. EAI는 국내 싱크탱크의 대표기관인 동시에 아시아 지역 싱크탱크의 직능대표로서 소속된 연구기관들의 민주주의 관련 연구지원 및 관리를 담당하고 있다.

ADRN은 아시아 지역이 직면한 민주주의 위협 요인을 분석하고 민주주의 전환 및 공고화에 기여할 수 있는 실무형 연구과제를 논의하고 확산하고자 창립되었다. ADRN은 연구에 기반한 정책 제시를 목표로 아시아 민주주의의 위협 요소와 당면과제를 점검하고 지역적 차원에서 바라보는 민주주의 발전을 위한 실천적 의제를 발굴하고 연구하고 있다. 네트워크에는 한국의 EAI를 비롯하여 대만, 말레이시아, 몽골, 미얀마, 방글라데시, 스리랑카, 인도, 인도네시아, 일본, 태국, 파키스탄, 필리핀 등 아시아 14개국 22개의 주요 싱크탱크들이 참여하고 있다. 

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[ADRN Issue Briefing] Australia’s Role Supporting Democracies as a Middle Power

Australia has benefitted from the international rules-based order for more than 70 years. The vision of a region governed by democratic norms, international rules and robust multilateral engagement has not only supported Australia’s economic and social progress (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 2017, 12), but helped to form Australia’s understanding of its place in the world and its identity as an international actor. As the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper states “Australia does not define its national identity by race or religion, but by shared values, including political, economic and religious freedom, liberal democracy, the rule of law, racial and gender equality and mutual respect.” (DFAT 2017, 11). Indeed, these liberal democratic principles shared with the United States are key to the trust and mutual understanding that underwrites the US-Australian alliance and growing cooperation with Korea and other democracies as Australia seeks to navigate complex twenty-first century challenges (Wong 2023).   Key among the challenges is China’s growing influence, military build-up and attempts to ‘rewrite the rules’ in Australia’s near region. Strategic competition between the United States and China is increasingly a contest of alternative narratives and visions for how the Indo Pacific region should operate. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, in a speech to the National Press Club in April 2023, made this geopolitical dynamic unmistakably clear, stating: “strategic competition is not merely about who is top dog, who is ahead in the race, or who holds strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific. It’s actually about the character of the region. It’s about the rules and norms that underpin our security and prosperity, that ensure our access with an open and inclusive region, and that manage competition responsibly” (Wong 2023).   The ideological dimension of China’s aspirations for unchallenged regional primacy, and its illiberal and coercive behaviour both domestically and throughout the region, stand contrary to the agreed upon norms and regional character that Australia favours. At home, China’s behaviour has included the repression and jailing of dissidents, extensive censorship of media, and widespread human rights violations in Xinjiang. Such domestic actions are increasingly congruous with China’s engagement in the region, where its efforts to undermine democratic norms include economic coercion, bribery, and escalating territorial disputes with its neighbours.   Canberra has itself faced extensive pressure from China to undermine Australia’s sovereignty and commitment to democracy– most notably detailed in Beijing’s sharing of 14 grievances with Australia in 2020 (Kearlsey 2020a, 2020b). As a well-developed democracy allied with the United States, Australia has remained resolute in the face of such pressure (Department of Home Affairs 2023). Beyond its shores, however, Canberra is increasingly concerned about China’s efforts in the region, which features far less robust democratic rules and norms. Among Australia’s top concerns is the way these actions may disrupt regional stability, exacerbate geopolitical tensions (Wong 2023), as well as compromise states’ sovereignty — their ability to disagree, be self-determined and exercise choice. China’s actions and the resilience of these regional democracies will ultimately have significant impacts on Australia’s own national security.   The Complexities of Middle Power   While the use of the term is contested (Abbondanza 2022; Carr 2014), recognising Australia’s status as a “middle power” and its close though qualitatively different relationship with both the United States and China is essential to understanding the Australian approach to supporting a democratic order in the Indo Pacific. Australia may be ideologically aligned with the United States about the challenges that China’s ambitions present to the international rules-based order; but, as a middle power, the extent to which Australia alone can rebuff Beijing’s illiberal behaviour, both domestically and in the region, and withstand the potential consequences of such action, is limited.   That is not to say Australia’s commitment to standing up for a democratically led order in the region is weakly held, or that Australia will merely follow in the footsteps of other, more powerful, regional players. On the contrary, Australia has often pursued its interest in a rules-based Indo Pacific without prompting and at considerable expense. This was no more evident than Australia’s experience of Chinese economic coercion following its call for an inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus in May 2020. Rather, Australia’s middle power status means its pursuit of democratic standards involve more difficult strategic calculations.   For Australia, like many other nations in the Indo Pacific, China is an indispensable trading partner and maintaining positive and cooperative engagement with China is a strategic necessity. Nearly 30 percent of Australia’s two-way trade in goods and services, totalling A$287 billion in 2022, is with China alone (DFAT 2022), and China represents the number one destination for many of Australia’s top exports, including coal, iron ore, wine and petroleum gas (Interesse 2023). A stable relationship with China is therefore vital to Australia’s interests and certainly informs how Australia has and will negotiate disparities in the two major powers’ competing visions for the character of the region.   Beijing’s willingness to weaponise economic relations was evident in the massive embargo imposed on Australian exports of wheat, wine, coal and other products in response to the Australian government’s call for an international investigation of the origins of the COVID pandemic. Both Coalition and Labor governments refused to bend to Beijing’s pressure campaign, diversifying its market of effected exports to partners with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and India doubling their purchase of Australian goods since 2019 (Uren 2023). Yet, Australia’s perception of risk in its relationship with China extend beyond trade and include considerations like cybersecurity, foreign investment and interference in the politics (Packham 2018) and have led Australia to strengthen security ties with the United States and others through AUKUS and the Quad. While wearing the fallout in economic relations from China well, Canberra remains careful about which fights it will pick with Beijing. As clarified by Foreign Minister Wong’s speech, the government’s policy on China is to “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must, manage our differences wisely, and above all else, engage in and vigorously pursue our own national interest” (Wong 2023).   Beyond resisting and rebuking China’s illiberal trade behaviours, Australia’s pursuit of its national interest in such a contested geopolitical environment will require Australia to have, according to Minister Wong, “a response of unprecedented coordination and ambition in [its] statecraft” (Wong 2023) and for Australian policymakers to view diplomatic strategy as needing as much vigour and sophistication as traditional deterrence and security strategies. The Albanese government’s increased diplomatic efforts have seen it ramp up Australia’s bilateral diplomatic engagement in the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia, including the delivery of the largest increase to Australia’s overseas development assistance since 2011–12, and the launch of a parliamentary inquiry in September 2022 to evaluate how Australia might promote democratic institutions and support civil society in the region. The resultant report is expected shortly.   Working Together: Australia's Advantages   Amid new geopolitical imperatives, and this new era of Australian ‘statecraft’, Australia cannot afford complacency, and will need to maximise its existing advantages to support regional democracies and the rules-based order. Like its response to emerging security threats and military developments from Beijing, Australia can similarly overcome some of the complications and limitations of its middle power status by cooperating more closely with likeminded states in pursuit of mutual interests.   When it comes to diplomacy, Australia has a key role to play leading multi-state efforts that bolster democratic resilience in the region. Australia has historically punched above its middle power status and outperformed several of its more militarily- and economically- advanced peers (Lowy Institute 2023). Australia’s development and election assistance is more sizeable than any other in the Pacific Islands region (National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and United States Studies Center (USSC) 2023). The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade leads several sophisticated development programs designed to enhance the economic prosperity of small island states including the Pacific Step Up and Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme (DFAT 2023). And, in its history, has led peace keeping missions in several Pacific Islands and Southeast Asian countries, including in Cambodia, Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands (Bishop 2013). When it comes to multidimensional statecraft, Australia appears to be an overachiever (Piper and Patton 2023).   While committed to advancing democratic norms in its foreign policy, Australia usually takes a more circumspect approach to framing foreign policy around democracy. One example is the current Labor government’s formula for regional strategy. Called a “free and open Indo Pacific” approach by the Biden and Kishida governments, Australia’s closely aligned strategy towards the region goes under the monicker “peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific.” In a strategic competition marked by a battle over narratives, this difference is noteworthy in terms of signalling if not substance. Nevertheless, Australia, like Japan and others, implicitly acknowledges that the continuation of US-led liberal values is within regional states’ interests for a peaceful and stable region, and that interconnected democracies do better at averting conflict and maintaining peace. In some respects, Australia’s support for NGOs in the Indo-Pacific both directly and through NGOs such as The Asia Foundation, stands in contrast to Japan and Korea’s approach, which still rely overwhelmingly on seeking approval from host governments to support civil society, even when those governments are authoritarian and hostile to independent civil society. Australia also far outspends other donors on women’s empowerment in the region as a percentage of overall assistance (a new gender strategy is currently under review in DFAT).   The debate about democracy support is often framed in a bipolar construct –often by Beijing, which claims all of Asia shares its scepticism of democracy –and sometimes by Washington, which sometimes lumps Asian democracies in with Western European democracies as occurred in the 2021 Summit for Democracy. In fact, the Indo-Pacific order has strong multipolar dynamics which affords democracies like Australia, Korea or Japan the opportunity to frame democracy more directly in terms of self-strengthening and resilience that will resonate with developing Southeast Asia and the Pacific. This approach would complement and add nuance to the US-led approach and could prove, as Minister Wong said in her speech at the UN General Assembly in 2022, that middle powers are “more than just supporting players in a grand drama of global geopolitics” (Wong 2022).   A Way Forward   As Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report for 2023 portends, freedom in the Asia-Pacific region may have improved slightly in recent times, but the challenge for democracies to uphold and defend their democracies against corruption, human rights violations and pressure from authoritarian regimes persists unabated (Freedom House 2023). There are three areas for regional cooperation where Australia has advantages and aligns with its policy orientation on democracy support that are worth further consideration.   The first is the expansion of development finance and infrastructure initiatives. While Beijing advances development finance and infrastructure programs, like the Belt and Road Initiative, that are seen to pose a security risk to Australian interests, Australia and other like-minded democracies can work together to provide alternatives by establishing the architecture for transparent and fair development programs. Australia’s middle power status and experience in the region allows it to have a unique role in this regard. As Penny Wong said in her press club speech, “we want Australia to be a partner of choice for the countries of our region. Partners, not patriarchs.” Many existing arrangements, including the Quad and the Blue Dot Network – the trilateral partnership between Japan, Australia and the United States – are attempting to establish these mechanisms as credible alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In combination with a continued focus on enhancing the development aid budgets of each allied nation, these allied efforts will ultimately bolster democratic outcomes and help defend against the malign efforts of economic exploitation of vulnerable developing states.   Second, and relatedly, Australia can redouble its efforts in economic development and women’s political and economic empowerment. Evident in the impetus for Australia’s economic programs in the Pacific, Australia’s foreign policy recognises the linkages between economic development and regional stability. It similarly expects women’s empowerment to multiply the effect of positive foreign policy outcomes and engagement. The research on this relationship is instructive. For example, research by the Council on Foreign Relations has found that when women’s representation in parliament improves by just five per cent, a country is almost five times less likely to respond to crises with violence (Robinson and James 2023), and that women’s involvement in peace negotiations makes them significantly longer lasting and less likely to fail (Council on Foreign Relations n.d.). DFAT’s Pacific Women Lead program, which has A$170 million budgeted over five years from 2021–26 to fund and partner with civil society organisations that advance women’s equality, is but one example of Australia’s engagement in this space. Australia, using the models established in its Pacific Step Up and Labour Mobility Scheme, can lead the charge of regional partners collaborating on their efforts.   Finally, Australia can work with other states towards the development of tools for overcoming corruption. As the 2023 Sunnylands Statement on Enhancing Democratic Partnership states, “tackling internal and transnational corruption [is] … a key opportunity for democracy advocates to demonstrate collaboratively that democracy delivers better governance and economic results for citizens” (NED and USSC 2023). Australia strongly upholds the values of openness, transparency and accountability and is recognised for doing so. It is therefore well placed to champion international standards on anti-corruption with other regional states. Working with other nations in the region, this might look like the establishment of an anti-corruption watchdog and accountability mechanisms that monitor trends of corruption and best approaches to holding leaders and agency accountable. For one thing, Australia could lead the charge developing policy approaches that might and resourcing the data collection and intel needed to prosecute and investigate instances of corruption in vulnerable states.   Reference   Abbondanza, Gabriele. 2022. “Whither the Indo-Pacific? Middle power strategies from Australia, South Korea and Indonesia.” International Affairs 98, no. 2 (March 7): 403–421. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab231   Carr, Andrew. 2014. “Is Australia a Middle Power?” Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/is-australia-a-middle-power/   Bishop, Julie. 2013. “Strengthening democracy throughout the Asia Pacific.” Minister for Foreign Affairs. November 5. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/julie-bishop/media-release/strengthening-democracy-throughout-asia-pacific   Council on Foreign Relations. n.d. “Including Women at the Peace Table Produces Better Outcomes.” https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes   Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2017. 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: 1-122. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf   _________________________________. 2022. “Trade and investment.” China country brief. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china-country-brief#:~:text=sister%2Dcity%20relationships.-,Trade%20and%20investment,our%20trade%20with%20the%20world   _________________________________. n.d. “Economic Prosperity in the Pacific.” https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/economic-prosperity-in-the-pacific   Freedom House. 2023. “NEW REPORT: Freedom in the Asia-Pacific Region Improved Slightly in 2022,” June 14. https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-freedom-asia-pacific-region-improved-slightly-2022   Interesse, Giulia. 2023. “China-Australia Trade Relations Growing Stronger.” China Briefing. February 6. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-australia-trade-relations-growing-stronger/   Kearsley, Jonathan. 2020. “China Shows Official List of Reasons for Anger with Australia.” 9News. November 18. https://www.9news.com.au/national/china-australia-tensions-beijing-government-grievance-list-with-canberra/adc10554-e4e9-4a19-970e-81949501a1ad   Kearsley, Jonathan (@jekearsley). 2020. “This is the list of 14 grievances China has with Australia. From banning Huawei from 5G, to calling for COVID inquiry and speaking out on Xinjiang and Hong Kong.” Twitter, November 18, 2020, 6:01pm. https://twitter.com/jekearsley/status/1328986579629613057?s=20   Lowy Institute. 2023. “Australia - Lowy Institute Asia Power Index.” https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/australia/   National Endowment for Democracy and United States Studies Center. 2023. “Sunnylands Joint Statement.” United States Stud Center. April 5. https://www.ussc.edu.au/research/the-sunnylands-initiative/sunnylands-joint-statement   Packham, Colin. 2018. “Australia amends proposed foreign interference law to offer protections for journalists - minister.” Reuters. February 8. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-australia-politics-foreign-idUKKBN1FR3BI   Piper, Hugh and Susannah Patton. 2023. “Taking Australian Statecraft from good to great.” Lowy Institute. March 13. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/taking-australian-statecraft-good-great   Robinson, Linda and Noël James. 2023. Council on Foreign Relations. “Women’s Power Index.” https://www.cfr.org/article/womens-power-index   Uren, David. 2023. “Why China’s Coercion of Australia Failed.” The Strategist. April 26. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-chinas-coercion-of-australia-failed/   Wong, Penny. 2023. “National Press Club Address, Australian interests in a regional balance of power.” Presented at the National Press Club Address, Australia. April 17. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-press-club-address-australian-interests-regional-balance-power   ___________. 2022. “National Statement to the UN General Assembly, New York.” Presented at the UN General Assembly, New York. September 23. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-statement-un-general-assembly-new-york     ■ Michael J. Green is a Professor and CEO of the US Studies Centre in Sydney. ■ Victoria Cooper is a Research Editor at the US Studies Centre in Sydney.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr    

Michael J. Green 2023-07-07조회 : 8656
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[ADRN Issue Briefing] Shifting Paradigms: The Rise of the Move Forward Party and the Changing Face of Thai Democracy

Introduction The 2023 general election in Thailand marks a critical juncture in the country’s trajectory, carrying significant implications for the prevailing ideological divisions and electoral dynamics that have defined its political landscape for over two decades. The progressive Move Forward Party (MFP) emerged as the largest bloc, capturing 151 seats in the 500-member House of Representatives, closely followed by the Thaksin Shinawatra-aligned Pheu Thai Party with 141 seats. In contrast, parties associated with the military generals involved in the May 2014 coup suffered substantial losses, with the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) and the United Thai Nation Party (UTN) securing only 40 and 36 seats, respectively.[1]   The resounding victory of the MFP not only represents a clear rejection of Thailand’s deeply entrenched conservative status quo but also signifies a determination to bring about a broader transformation in Thai politics. This transformation is currently unfolding across two distinct dimensions:(1) a departure from traditional political divisions rooted in urban-rural disparities, giving way to new generational and ideological cleavages centered around reforming the structural foundations of Thailand’s established political order; and (2) a decline in the influence of money politics, patronage networks, and political dynasties, as social media and social movements take center stage, becoming the driving mechanisms behind party-building and campaigning. Despite ongoing challenges that cast a shadow over the prospect of the MFP in forming a viable governing coalition, these developments underscore the far-reaching impact that the MFP’s dramatic rise has already brought to the political landscape in Thailand.   Shifting Landscape     The election held on May 14, 2023 was initially anticipated to be another chapter in the power struggle between the Shinawatra family and the conservative establishment in Thailand. This struggle began with the ousting of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in the 2006 coup d’état, leading to a prolonged period of political turmoil marked by color-coded street protests, crackdowns, government changes, and another military takeover in 2014 by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha.   In the post-coup general election of 2019 that was held on a deeply uneven playing field, Prayut emerged as the prime minister with backing from the military-aligned PPRP and coalition partners including the Democrat Party, the Bhumjaithai Party, and other smaller parties. The prime minister also enjoyed support of the NCPO-appointed Senate, which was empowered to jointly select the prime minister alongside the 500-member House of Representatives for the initial five years of Parliament. Referee institutions such as the Election Commission and Constitutional Court, operating under the influence of the NCPO, played a decisive role in shaping the election outcome by dissolving political parties and determining the party-list allocation method, ultimately securing a narrow majority for the pro-military coalition (Ricks 2019).   Over the course of four years, public dissatisfaction with the Prayut administration has grown due to its failure to effectively navigate the economic challenges posed by the Covid-19 crisis and its crackdowns on pro-democracy activists. The mounting difficulties facing Prayut’s leadership were further amplified by internal conflicts between him and General Prawit Wongsuwan, his brother-in-arms, deputy prime minister, and leader of the PPRP. The uncertainties surrounding the PPRP’s allegiance to Prayut eventually pushed him to sever ties with the party and join the UTN, a splinter party, in order to run as its candidate for prime minister in the 2023 elections.   The stage appeared set for a strong comeback by the Pheu Thai Party, which pledged to win the election by a landslide. It projected to secure as many as 310 seats and put forward Thaksin’s youngest daughter, Paetongtarn, as one of its prime ministerial candidates (The Bangkok Post 2023). However, contrary to expectations, it was the MFP that emerged victorious, overcoming the challenges posed by a new electoral sys-tem that removed the advantages previously enjoyed by its predecessor, the Future Forward Party (FFP), in terms of winning party-list seats. Ultimately, the political landscape was ripe for change, and this change took an unprecedented direction, with the MFP leading the way.   The Emergence of Generational and Ideological Divides     To a certain extent, the impressive victory of the MFP can be interpreted as an indication that the blueprint, which had consistently delivered successive election victories for Pheu Thai since 2001, is no longer as effective as it once was. Pheu Thai has long established itself as a party dedicated to advocating for the interests of the rural majority, a segment of society that has historically experienced political exclusion and economic marginalization within a sys-tem dominated by patronage-ridden politicians and a hyper-centralized bureaucracy accountable solely to itself (Tejapira 2006). In the context of unequal power dynamics and economic disparities between the rural poor and the affluent elites based in Bangkok, Pheu Thai and Thaksin pledged to bridge these divides by establishing a direct connection with its grassroots supporters through policies that have been labeled as populist (Pongsudhirak 2023). These policies include notable initiatives such as the introduction of the 30-baht universal healthcare program during the Thai Rak Thai (TRT)-led government and the controversial rice-pledging scheme implemented under Pheu Thai in 2011.   In the run-up to the 2023 general election, Pheu Thai reaffirmed its commitment to its longstanding tradition of crafting policies that directly benefit the economic well-being of the people. One of the policy initiatives at the forefront of its campaign was the ambitious promise to distribute 10,000 baht to all Thai citizens above the age of 16 through a digital wallet. Building on a sense of nostalgia, the party adopted the slogan “Think Big, Act Smart, For All Thais,” reminiscent of the TRT’s original slogan, and reassembled its team of policy architects, advisors, and leaders from the TRT era. These carefully orchestrated efforts aimed to project a sense of continuity and bolster Pheu Thai’s credibility, particularly in the realm of economic management. However, these efforts no longer guaranteed election victories. The desire for change in Thailand’s 2023 election extended beyond economic concerns, indicating a deeper shift in public sentiment.   The dissolution of the FFP and the subsequent crackdowns on pro-democracy activists advocating for monarchy reform from 2020 to 2022 have served as a wake-up call for a significant portion of Thai society, revealing the structural barriers that hinder meaningful participation in the democratic process (Unno 2022). This awareness is particularly strong among first-time and younger voters who grew up under a regime that sys-tematically stifled freedom of expression, suppressed the power of elected representatives, and prioritized the interests of oligarchic elites over broader societal welfare.   The MFP adeptly tapped into the prevailing disillusionment and deep yearning for structural change among these voters. With its pledge to reduce the military’s influence and amend Article 112, the lèse-majesté law, the party took a resolute stance in challenging the traditional centers of power in Thailand. Additionally, the MFP distinguished itself by refusing to form a coalition government with parties associated with the generals involved in the May 2014 coup. This set the MFP apart from Pheu Thai, which struggled to adopt a decisive or convincing stance from the beginning. As a result, the MFP secured the mandate of 14 million voters out of 41 million in the popular vote. This reflects a burgeoning yet substantial political base that is coalescing around issues that transcend the traditional urban-rural divisions. Such divisions have historically culminated in vicious cycle of power struggles between forces allied with Thaksin and those representing the conservative establishment. A broader aspiration for a more inclusive and accountable political sys-tem – a vision that the MFP has come to represent – now constitutes the new paradigm.   New Electoral Dynamics in the Age of Social Media and Social Movements     In addition to bringing an end to Pheu Thai’s winning streak and giving rise to new ideological divisions, the MFP’s remarkable success in toppling established factions and influential political dynasties poses an intriguing puzzle. The party successfully ousted entrenched families like the Asavahames in Samut Prakan, the Khunpluems in Chon Buri, and the Pitutechas in Rayong. In Thailand, constituency elections, especially outside Bangkok, have traditionally been dominated by candidates associated with political dynasties or factions that wield control over local patronage networks. These networks consist of local government officials, elected representatives, and community leaders who mobilize support for candidates by campaigning door-to-door, attending communal events, and offering personal favors or material benefits in return for votes (Chattharakul 2011). It is widely recognized that only large and well-funded parties can effectively sustain these candidate-network structures.   In contrast, the MFP has charted a different course by openly rejecting traditional campaign tactics. Yet, the party has successfully garnered support not only from urban voters, who often base their decisions on party labels and policies, but also from rural voters. These rural voters have long been characterized as either clients of patronage networks or beneficiaries of populist policies (Kongkirati 2012). The MFP’s success in gaining traction among these segments of the population is a significant achievement, challenging prevailing assumptions and narratives concerning rural voting behavior, as outlined in Anek Laothamatas’ influential work, “A Tale of Two Democracies” (Laothamatas 1996). This shift signifies not only a change in voter sentiments but also the emergence of new electoral dynamics that blur conventional urban-rural divisions.   This transformation can be attributed to two key factors: (1) the MFP’s reliance on social media as a campaigning strategy and (2) its connection to social movements that generate momentum in support of the party’s ideology. First, The MFP embraced a robust digital strategy to connect with and mobilize supporters. Leveraging platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and TikTok, the party effectively disseminated its message, engaged with the public, and organized campaign rallies. This approach allowed the MFP to circumvent traditional vote-canvassing networks and build its own network of “organic” vote canvassers. These canvassers voluntarily and actively created content for the party online, engaged with its activities, and interacted with its candidates. Offline, these followers function as a reserve army of rally attendees, mobilizing quickly to fill MFP rallies, documenting the events, and taking selfies with the party’s candidates. Mostly through the efforts of the party’s followers rather than its candidates or campaign teams, the party successfully established a strong presence both in the digital realm and in the physical world, with the influence of social media shaping real-world dynamics in profound ways.   Furthermore, by aligning itself with the pro-democracy social movements, the MFP has formed alliances with existing networks and communities of activists across the country that have become increasingly vocal since 2020, particularly in their calls for unprecedented reforms concerning the role of the Thai monarchy (Lertchoosakul 2023). Recognizing the shifting political landscape, the MFP transformed itself into a full-fledged movement-based party, adapting to new political realities and filling the vacuum that existed between the demands voiced by youth activists and the realm of parliamentary politics.   In a demonstration of solidarity, the MFP took action by bailing out detained activists and integrating them into its ranks, effectively giving them a platform to advocate for their causes and translating their agendas into tangible policies and legislative action. The party has been at the forefront of addressing a wide range of issues raised by the youth activists, including LGBTQ rights, anti-monopoly measures, and conscription reforms. By incorporating these agendas, the MFP not only draws strength from the movements but also serves as a vehicle for institutionalizing their goals and aspirations.   This symbiotic relationship between the pro-democracy social movements and MFP holds great significance within the context of Thai politics, where parties that oppose established powers are vulnerable to dissolution at the hands of courts—a pattern known as the judicialization of politics or lawfare (McCargo 2014). However, by firmly anchoring itself in social movements, which are often perceived as transient or short-lived, the MFP has established firm roots that enable the party to withstand legal challenges. This strategic alignment has not only broadened the MFP’s support base but has also contributed to its longevity and solidified its position as a driving force for transformative change in Thai politics. In turn, this alignment allows for the continuation of the movements’ ideological agendas within the framework of an established political entity, ensuring that voices and aspirations of the movements remain influential in shaping the policies and actions of the government.   Conclusion     The rise of the MFP in Thailand reflects a long-fomenting potential to transform Thai politics, moving away from old ideological fault lines and political dynamics. This transformation is marked by a commitment to engage in structural reforms of institutions previously deemed untouchable and the adoption of new avenues for political participation and citizen engagement, such as social media and social movements. However, the realization of this transformative potential remains contingent upon the MFP’s capacity and commitment to translate the momentum that propelled it to victory into tangible action, as well as the willingness of entrenched actors within the conservative establishment to adapt and embrace change. While the stage is set for a new era of Thai democracy, the ultimate outcome and lasting impact of this transformation remain to be seen.   Reference     Chattharakul, Anyarat. 2010. “Thai Electoral Campaigning: Vote-Canvassing Networks and Hybrid Voting.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, 4: 67–95.   Kongkirati, Prajak, ed. 2012. การเมืองว่าด้วยการเลือกตั้ง : วาทกรรม อำนาจ และพลวัตชนบทไทย [Electoral Politics: The Discourse of Power and the Dynamics in Rural Thailand]. Bangkok, Thailand: Faadiawkan Press.   Laothamatas, Anek. 1996. “A Tale of Two Democracies: Conflicting Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand.” In The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. R.H. Taylor, 201-223. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.   Lertchoosakul, Kanokrat. 2023. “The May 2023 Elections and the Triumph of Thai Youth Social Movements.” Critical Asian Studies 54, 4. https://doi.org/10.52698/IMCJ3733   McCargo, Duncan. 2014. “Competing Notions of Judicialization in Thailand.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 36, 3: 417–441.   Pongsudhirak, Thitinan. 2023. “The Tide of History Shifts in Thai Politics.” Bangkok Post. https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2583539/the-tide-of-history-shifts-in-thai-politics   Ricks, Jacob I. 2019. “Thailand’s 2019 Vote: The General’s Election.” Pacific Affairs 92, 3: 443–457.   Sattaburuth, Aekarach and Mongkol Bangprapa. 2023. “Pheu Thai Ups Stakes in Race.” Bangkok Post. https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2532015/pheu-thai-ups-stakes-in-race   Tejapira, Kasian. 2006. “Toppling Thaksin.” New Left Review 2, 39: 5–37.   Unno, Anusorn. 2022. “‘Reform, Not Abolition’: The ‘Thai Youth Movement’ and Its Demands for Reform of the Monarchy.” ISEAS Perspective 2022, 3: 1-11.     [1] For information on the results of the May 2023 general election in Thailand, see the official website of the Office of the Election Commission at www.ectreport.com     ■ Napon Jatusripitak is a Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Postdoctoral Fellow at Chulalongkorn University.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr    

Napon Jatusripitak 2023-06-30조회 : 8257
논평이슈브리핑
[ADRN Issue Briefing] The Demise of ‘Hybrid’ Democracy in Pakistan: Case of Ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Arrest

Former PM Imran Khan’s Arrest and the Political Turmoil in Pakistan   Participatory political cultures and genuine democratic norms are nurtured only when democratic processes have been rigorously and uninterruptedly practiced over a significant period (Pavone 2014). The primary cause for the unsuccessful democratization of Pakistan’s social and political structure stems from the persistent interference of the military establishment in the country’s political sphere. This is not only marked by multiple martial laws throughout the country’s history, but also the ceaseless interference by the military even during democratic governments (Altaf 2019, 4). The current political crisis haunting the country can also be seen against the backdrop of this historical problem.   On May 9, 2023, party workers of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) stormed various government and military establishments after its Chairman, Imran Khan, was arrested by the rangers who apprehended him at the Islamabad High Court (The Express Tribune 2023). This arrest had long been anticipated, as various attempts by the government to arrest him from his residency in Lahore were averted by the party workers, resulting in numerous clashes and even deaths. In a show of unwavering support, Khan’s supporters united, proclaiming that the former Prime Minister was their “red line” (Qarar and Gurmani 2022). A state of intense disorder and chaos ensued following the arrest of Khan.   The Aftermath of Arrest   The May 9 attacks were unprecedented. The General Headquarters (Pakistan Army) was attacked and vandalized, and the residency of Lahore’s corps commander was stormed and everything of value was taken away by people before the building was torched (The Express Tribune 2023). For the next few days, images circulated on social media showing people with food, vases, and even peacocks that had been kept in the house. Consequently, Khan was granted bail by the court and his arrest was termed unconstitutional (Arab News 2023). This also resulted in an unprecedented criticism of the military on social media as well as on the streets – it seemed as if the people in Punjab were finally recognizing what those from the periphery had long been trying to draw attention to. A score of people came forward expressing their readiness to confront the military, whom they believed was the prime suspect that removed Khan from power through a vote of no confidence (Baloch and Ellis-Petterson 2023).   But this apparent show of power that had momentarily positioned PTI advantageously during the crackdown soon started to crumble. The military retaliated in the following days—cases were registered in almost every district in Punjab, various members of the party leadership were arrested, and party workers’ homes were ransacked by security forces. In the span of a few days, hundreds belonging to PTI were either detained or forcefully disappeared. This included the majority of PTI’s local leadership, as well as notable pro-PTI journalists and influencers like Imran Riaz Khan, Orya Maqbool Khan, and Khadija Shah (IFJ 2023; Daily Pakistan Global 2023). They were charged with being the masterminds behind the May 9 attacks (Daily Pakistan Global 2023). Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif referred to these attacks as Pakistan’s “Capitol Hill moment” and called for the perpetrators to be punished the same way the US government dealt with the stormers of the Capitol Hill (The Express Tribune 2023).   In the last few days, many notable members of the PTI leadership have been released, only to head straight to a press club and announce that they were either leaving PTI or politics altogether. Shireen Mazari, former Human Rights Minister, Fawad Chaudhary, former Information Minister, Jamshed Cheema, Mussarat Jamshed Cheema, Malaika Bukhari, Asad Umer, Fiaz-ul-Hassan Chauhan, among others, have announced their resignations thus far, with more names anticipated to follow suit. There have also been reports that these individuals were coerced into announcing their resignations through a cycle of repeated arrests. Security forces kept re-arresting them after they were granted bail in a particular case. Shireen Mazari, for instance, experienced this cycle of arrest and release four times (Hussain 2023). The message was clear: give up or we will continue to find new charges to keep you behind bars.   It was also announced during this time that the arsonists and abettors of May 9 attacks will be tried in military courts (Geo News 2023), which many lawyers and human rights activists have termed as unconstitutional and undemocratic. The impact of these military court trials will likely be most severe for party workers, who will not have the chance to clear their names by publicly announcing their retirement from politics in a press conference. They will face trial without significant support from their own party; nearly the entire PTI leadership, including Khan, has condemned the attacks and asserted their lack of involvement (Business Recorder 2023).   The crackdown against PTI seems to be the latest attempt by the military establishment to dismantle a political party, albeit this time targeting a party they had previously helped come into power. During Khan’s regime, Pakistan saw a similar crackdown on dissenters, including women, religious and ethnic minorities, human rights activists, and students. His regime was characterized as a ‘hybrid’ one, where the military would enjoy a sizable political role, supported by a civilian government (IFJ 2023).   In his book, Pakistan’s Hybrid Regime: Growing Democratization, or Increased Authoritarianism, Ian Talbot provides a comprehensive analysis of post-Musharraf Pakistan. Hybrid regimes combine both democratic and authoritarian elements. Pakistan has experienced periodic military interventions and direct military rule. However, since 2009, instead of outright military coups, multi-party elections have been held alongside the presence of military retaining reserved powers, particularly in the domains of security and foreign policy (Talbot 2021, 141). The same relationship was observed during the PTI’s alliance with the military in 2018.   According to PTI’s own narrative, when Khan and the military leadership disagreed on the governance of the country, the military allegedly orchestrated PTI’s allies in the parliament to switch sides and join the opposition. Subsequently, through a vote of no confidence, Khan’s government was ousted from power.   Many of the PTI leaders who left the party before or after the state crackdown against the party post-9 May protests, have joined another “king’s” party: the “Istikam-e-Pakistan Party” (IPP) (Adnan 2023). IPP is a newly launched political party, led by two former close aides of Imran Khan, Jahangir Khan Tareen and Abdul Aleem Khan.     First as Farce, Then as Tragedy   This crisis is a continuation of a tainted chapter in Pakistan’s history, where the military helps build a civilian facade for its hegemony and discards it once it becomes a nuisance. However, this time, the civilian leadership has attempted to fight back. Regardless of the outcome of this crisis, Pakistan’s democratic order will remain dysfunctional until the power to form or dismiss political regimes is taken away from generals and entrusted to the people of the country.   This lesson stands as the most significant takeaway from the Pakistan’s own history. The country’s democratic journey formally started around twenty-three years after its inception, when the first general elections were held in 1970. The Awami Muslim League (AML) in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujeeb, emerged as the most popular political party of the country. However, its mandate was rejected, leading to the tragic events of the Fall of Dhaka in 1971, where the majority of the country chose to separate itself from the minority (Altaf 2019, 2).   The breakthrough in reviving democracy in what remained of Pakistan was the formulation of the 1973 constitution under the left-leaning populist leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Although the constitution of 1973 clearly stated under its Article 6 that any individual guilty of abrogating the constitution would face death penalty, it could not prevent military interventions. Soon, democracy faced another blow with Zia’s martial law, which was preceded by the highly controversial and infamous execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the architect of the same constitution. Zia’s ten-year military rule (from 1977 to 1988) once again relegated democracy into the ‘waiting room of history’ (Altaf 2019, 26).   A decade later, in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf declared an emergency and assumed total control as Chief Martial Law government. Under mounting pressure from democratic forces within and outside the country, Musharraf’s dictatorship ended in 2008, leading to the calling of general elections (Altaf 2019, 49). The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won the elections and formed the federal government under the presidency of Asif Ali Zardari (now Co-Chairman of the party).   The return to democracy saw landmark constitutional reforms that took place during 2008 to 2013. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the incorporation of the idea of decentralization and devolution of power between center and federating units (provinces) in the 18th amendment marked a major step forward in achieving the ideals of a federation and democracy. Another value-adding development for a sustainable democracy was the signing of the charter of democracy between the two most popular and rival mainstream parties, the PML (N) and PPP. For the first time in Pakistan’s political history, an elected government completed a full five-year term and conducted the next general elections without any interruptions.   In the 2013 general elections, the PML (N) emerged as the majority, and Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister of Pakistan for the third time. This was followed by a smooth transition of power from one democratic party to the other. However, the tradition of peacefully transferring power among varying political parties did not last long. During the second half of Sharif’s tenure, he was disqualified from serving as Prime Minister while facing opposition from the military-backed forces of PTI. Following his disqualification, some of his thoughts on his removal bore an uncanny resemblance to Khan’s. As a result, in the 2018 general elections, PTI won majority seats and, through the inclusion of independent candidates and coalition with religious parties, formed the government at the national level as well as in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (Hashim 2018).   Upon assuming power, Imran Khan, the cricketer turned politician and now a former Prime Minister, took swift actions against the opposition parties accused of corruption charges. Apart from raids, arrests, and convictions of opposition parties (mainly carried out under the pretext of corruption charges), PTI also suppressed critical voices raised in favor of the marginalized and powerless. At the beginning, Imran Khan as a Prime Minister reassured that his government and military were on the same page (The Economic Times 2018), emphasizing that the military did not exert excessive influence over the civilian administration. He claimed to have built efficient and effective civil-military relations. However, upon completing the third year of his term in office, Khan faced Pakistan’s historical democratic tragedy of failing to complete the five-year term (IFJ 2023).   In 2020, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), a coalition of major opposition parties, emerged as a united front against the ruling PTI government. Despite the Prime Minister’s own brother being removed from power not long ago, the current government has taken a leading role in cracking down on the PTI and openly supporting military trials of its leaders. On 10 April, 2022, the coalition successfully ousted Khan through a no-confidence motion, after which the PDM formed its own government with the opposition leader Shehbaz Sharif as the country’s prime minister. This surely would not have been possible without both the open and tacit support of the military for the PDM (Chaudhry 2023). Recognizing the military’s significant influence in shaping and dismantling governments in Pakistan, prominent figures in the PDM, including Nawaz Sharif, Shahbaz Sharif, and Asif Ali Zardari, took maximum benefit of the situation and presented themselves as experienced and the only viable alternative in the absence of PTI.   The Gloomy Prospect of Democracy in Pakistan   All of this is happening at a time when Pakistan grapples with a historic devaluation of the Pakistani rupee, rising inflation, unemployment, and the cost of living. These economic challenges have further eroded public confidence in the government’s ability to effectively manage the economy (Profit by Pakistan Today 2023).   Amidst the political chaos within the country, the PDM government lacks popular support, while the most prominent party in the country appears to be facing a rapid decline. The most concerning element is the fact that political polarization has reached new heights, both within the state and in society at large. State institutions themselves also seem to be divided based on their political affiliations.   In order to restore balance in the existing imbalance in the state apparatus, it is crucial to recognize that the fault in Pakistan’s democracy resides in the veto power of the military in the political arena. Given the historical dominance of Pakistan’s military as an “over-developed” institution, it is clear that the its role poses a structural obstacle to the functioning of Pakistan’s democracy. Structural reforms are therefore necessary to curtail the military’s influence and align it with the constitutional framework of Pakistan.   Furthermore, it is imperative that political parties stop negotiating with the military establishment for their own vested interests. Instead, they should realize their own significance, strength, and central role in fostering a functional democracy. They should build a bare-minimum consensus and uphold their integrity by ensuring that the military does not sit in the driving seat of the democratic process.   Whatever the outcome of this power struggle might be, the common people in the country are not represented in any discussion regarding the country’s future. They are the ones bearing the brunt of record inflation and militarization, with little agency in determining which political force will ultimately govern them once the dust settles. ■   Reference   Adnan, Imran. 2023. “Imran Says ‘King’s Party’ in the Making.” The Express Tribune. May 30. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2419401/imran-says-kings-party-in-the-making   Altaf, Hina. 2019. “History of Military Interventions in Political Affairs in Pakistan.” CUNY Academic Works: 1-65. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3194   Arab News. 2023. “Trial of Civilians in Military Courts ‘Totally Unjustified,’ Pakistan’s Top Rights Body Says.” May 31. https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2313561/pakistan   Baloch, Shah Meer, and Hannah Ellis-Petersen. 2023. “Imran Khan Accuses Pakistan’s Military of Ordering His Arrest.” The Guardian, May 14. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/14/imran-khan-arrest-pakistan-military   Business Recorder. 2023. “May 9 Protest Violence Was Pre-Planned: IK.” May 19. https://www.brecorder.com/news/40242978/may-9-protest-violence-was-pre-planned-ik   Chaudhry, Sana. 2023. “A PM No More: How the Historic Move to Eject Imran Khan through a No-Trust Vote Unfolded.” DAWN.COM, April 8. https://www.dawn.com/news/1744819   Daily Pakistan Global. 2023. “Senior Journalist Orya Maqbool Jan Arrested from House.” Daily Pakistan Global. May 13. https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/13-May-2023/senior-journalist-orya-maqbool-jan-arrested-from-house   __________________. 2023. “US Asks Pakistan to Grant Consular Access to Khadija Shah in Jinnah House Case.” June 7. https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/07-Jun-2023/us-asks-pakistan-to-grant-consular-access-to-khadija-shah-in-jinnah-house-case   Geo News. 2023. “Army Calls for Tightening ‘Noose of Law’ around May 9 ‘Planners, Masterminds.’” June 7. https://www.geo.tv/latest/491762-army-calls-for-tightening-noose-of-law-around-may-9-planners-masterminds   Hashim, Asad. 2018. “Seven Things Pakistan’s Election Results Reveal.” Al Jazeera. July 28. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/28/seven-things-pakistans-election-results-reveal   Hussain, Abid. 2023. “Ex-PM Imran Khan’s PTI Hit by More Resignations in Pakistan.” Al Jazeera. May 24. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/24/ex-pm-imran-khans-pti-hit-by-more-resignations-in-pakistan   International Federation of Journalists. 2023. “Pakistan: Journalists Missing amidst PTI Crackdown / IFJ,” June 1. https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/pakistan-journalists-missing-amidst-pti-crackdown   Pavone, Tommaso. 2014. “Political Culture and Democratic Homeostasis: A Critical Review of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s The Civic Culture.” April 7.   Profit by Pakistan Today. 2023. “PKR Plummets below 300, Making History with Its Record Low Value.” Profit by Pakistan Today. May 11. https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2023/05/11/pkr-plummets-below-300-making-history-with-its-record-low-value/   Qarar, Shakeel and Nadir Gurmani. 2022. “PTI Warns Imran Khan a ‘Red Line’ as Reports of Warrants for His Arrest Make Rounds.” Dawn. August 21. https://www.dawn.com/news/1706015   Talbot, Ian. 2021. “Pakistan’s Hybrid Regime: Growing Democratization, or Increased Authoritarianism?” Routledge Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia: 141-150.   The Economic Times. 2018. “Pakistan Government and Military on Same Page: PM Imran Khan.” December 4. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-government-and-military-on-same-page-pm-imran-khan/articleshow/66938319.cms   The Express Tribune. 2023. “May 9 Riots Were Pakistan’s ‘9/11 Attack’ on Its National Interests: Iqbal.” May 21. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2417867/may-9-riots-were-pakistans-911-attack-on-its-national-interests-iqbal   ______. 2023. “Treat May 9 Culprits like Capitol Hill Attackers: PM.” May 26. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2418758/treat-may-9-culprits-like-capitol-hill-attackers-pm     ■ Haider Kaleem is the manager of the Nigar Ahmad Research and Advocacy Fund at the South Asia Partnership - He also works as a multimedia journalist at one of the leading digital media outlets in Pakistan dedicated to covering the voices from the margins of power. He is an independent development researcher with a focus on movements, judiciary, violence, governance, development, climate change and energy transition.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr  

Haider Kaleem 2023-06-13조회 : 7689
워킹페이퍼
[ADRN Working Paper] Horizontal Accountability in Nepal

1. Introduction   Nepal underwent a major political transition in the early 2000s, marked by a shift from an absolute monarchy to a federal democratic republic. This transition culminated in the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, which established a multi-level governance systеm consisting of federal, provincial, and local governments. However, the transition has not been without challenges, including political instability, weak governance systеms, and social and economic inequalities.   The transition, characterized by a decade-long civil war between Maoist rebels and government forces, ended in 2006 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This agreement led to the integration of Maoist rebels into the political mainstream and paved the way for drafting a new constitution. This new constitution established a federal systеm of governance with a bicameral federal parliament and an independent judiciary. It also created several new institutions, including the National Human Rights Commission and the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority.   Despite these significant changes, the transition has been marked by political instability, with frequent changes in government and a lack of continuity in policymaking. This instability has also led to a lack of accountability and transparency, with little progress in addressing corruption and ensuring effective service delivery. Social and economic inequalities have also been persistent challenges in Nepal. The country’s human development indicators remain among the lowest in South Asia, with high poverty levels, malnutrition, and illiteracy. Discrimination and marginalization of certain castes also continue to be a significant problem.   The implementation of the federal systеm has also been challenging, with disputes over the division of powers and resources between the federal, provincial, and local governments. There are concerns about the ability of local governments to deliver effective services, and resource allocation has been a contentious issue, with accusations that the federal government has not provided adequate resources to the provincial and local governments. One of the key challenges of governance in Nepal is the lack of capacity and resources of government institutions. Government institutions at all levels, including the federal, provincial, and local, suffer from a shortage of skilled personnel, inadequate budget, and inadequate infrastructure. This has resulted in ineffective service delivery, weak regulatory systеms, and low admіnistrative efficiency.   Corruption is another significant challenge facing governance in Nepal. Despite having laws and regulations to prevent corruption, there remains a lack of political will to enforce them. Corruption in Nepal is pervasive, with government officials and politicians often involved in corrupt activities, leading to a loss of public trust in the government and public institutions. Nepal has also faced significant challenges in terms of political stability. Since the Constitution’s adoption in 2015, the country has faced multiple changes in government, including the resignation of two prime ministers, leading to a lack of continuity in governance. This has also impacted the implementation of policies and programs, leading to slow economic and social development.   As previously stated, in recent years, there have been efforts to address the governance challenges in Nepal. The government has initiated various reform programs to improve admіnistrative efficiency, service delivery, and accountability. These programs include the Civil Service Reform Program, the Local Governance and Community Development Program, and the Economic Governance and Development Program. Additionally, CSOs are essential in strengthening governance in Nepal. However, there have been challenges in the operations of CSOs, including government interference and restrictions on their activities.   Another significant challenge facing governance in Nepal is the country’s geography, with the rugged terrain making service delivery difficult, particularly in remote areas. The government has launched various initiatives to address this issue, including providing mobile services, extending road networks, and establishing satellite offices.   2. Constitutional and Political Framework in Nepal   2.1. Constitutional Provisions   The Constitution of Nepal guarantees 31 fundamental rights, including communication rights (Article 19) and the right to information (Article 27), which provides an essential purpose for access to information from public officials unless rated as classified. The constitution also clearly states the principles of the separation of powers and checks and balances between the organs of the state, namely the legislative, executive, and judiciary. Similarly, the federal parliament has established ten parliamentary committees for the oversight of ten various thematic areas. Of these committees, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), in particular, attracts interest regarding the surveillance of public finances.   2.2. Judicial Systеm   The preamble of the Constitution clearly states the three organs of the state, which have an “impartial, independent and competent” judiciary systеm in place. The judiciary is organized as a unitary arrangement, with the provision of the Supreme Court, High Court, and District Courts. The Supreme Court has a Constitutional Bench under constitutional remedy, which investigates inter-governmental jurisdictional disputes. At the local level, a Judicial Committee exists comprising the Deputy Mayor or Vice Chairperson of local governments as the head and two members from the elected representatives. The jurisdiction of the committee has been confined to non-criminal cases.   2.3. Oversight Through Constitutional Bodies   Nepal’s Constitution of 2015 envisioned 13 constitutional commissions. These commissions have been formed in order to empower and protect the rights of marginalized communities, backward communities, and other disadvantages. With the executive, judiciary, and legislative being on equal par in terms of their functional independence and autonomy to perform checks and balances, the 13 commissions, which can work in close collaboration with civil society to democratize society, are yet to reach the people and check the government but are limited to their jurisdiction with recommendation power and no executive role.   The 13 commissions include the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), Auditor General, Public Service Commission Election Commission, National Human Rights Commission, and National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission. However, National Women Commission, National Dalit Commission, National Inclusion Commission, Indigenous Nationalities Commission, Madhesi Commission, Tharu Commission, and Muslim Commission are subject to review every ten years.   The work, role, and results of these commissions are brought into question frequently. The appointments of the chiefs of these commissions are strongly influenced by the political systеm and political interest, which are often used as a political weapon at the point of bargaining for political power distribution. This leads the people of Nepal to frequently question the independency and ethical conduct of these bodies, which has also lost its credibility in recent times in the public sphere.   3. Gaps and Challenges with Accountability   Accountability plays a vital role in checks and balances, surveillance, and institutional constraints on the exercise of power. In democracies, a legislative body plays the role of monitoring and providing control over the functioning of the executive body. However, there seem to be gaps in accountability mechanisms in Nepal. The ill development of relevant norms regarding sanctions and the distance between formal institutions and actual practices of accountability at the minute level are some of the main issues of democracies in many developing countries, including Nepal.   3.1. Local Government Operation Act   The federal mechanism of Nepal has a clear division of rights in all three levels of government, and the Local Government Operation Act is a milestone document in strengthening the local governance systеm. The Local Government Operation Act has mandated 35 powers to the federal level, 21 powers for Province level, 25 concurrent powers of federation and province levels, 22 powers of local level, 15 concurrent powers of federal, province and local levels. However, there are major drawbacks to the Local Government Operation Act, as reflected in the absence of planned and targeted investment in the development of marginalized communities. Unlike the former block grant mechanism, there is an absence of mandatory allocation of plans and programs to the targeted communities, while this differs on a case basis across the nation. Social accountability is on the verge of disappearance in this context. Marginalized communities are being continually marginalized due to this provision. Additionally, the situation of the same remains to be stagnant and aloof from the mainstream development.   Fortunately, the introduction of Local Government Institutional Self-Assessment (LISA) has dragged the local governments to invest in targeted thematic areas and communities. Though inadequate, a small step forward has been set in this early stage of Nepal’s federal mechanism.   3.2. Intra-Government Accountability: Local Level   Local-level governance is an essential aspect of Nepal’s political systеm; however, intra-governmental accountability issues often hinder the effective functioning of local-level governments. Intra-governmental accountability refers to the extent to which different levels of government hold each other accountable for their actions.   One of the main intra-governmental accountability issues in Nepal’s local-level governments is the lack of coordination and communication between different levels of government. The country’s federal systеm of governance has created three levels of government: federal, provincial, and local. However, there is often a lack of coordination and communication between these different levels, which leads to inefficiencies and overlaps in service delivery.   Another issue is the lack of clear delineation of responsibilities between different levels of government. This ambiguity often leads to confusion about who is responsible for specific tasks and can lead to a lack of accountability. In addition, there is often a lack of clarity about the allocation of resources, which can lead to disputes and inefficiencies.   A third issue is the lack of capacity at the local level. Many local-level governments lack the necessary resources and expertise to carry out their responsibilities effectively. This lack of capacity can lead to inefficiencies and a lack of accountability.   Finally, there is a lack of transparency and public participation in local-level governance. Citizens often do not have access to information about local government activities, and there are limited opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making processes. This lack of transparency and public participation can lead to a lack of accountability and can undermine citizens’ trust in the government.   3.3. World Justice Project “Rule of Law index”- a Reflection of Case Scenario   The World Justice Project (WJP) is an independent organization with the mission to promote the rule of law around the world. Each year, the WJP releases a report evaluating the rule of law in different countries based on a comprehensive set of indicators. In the most recent report, Nepal was ranked 105 out of 126 countries.   The report evaluates countries based on eight factors: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. Nepal’s performance on these factors varied widely. One of the areas where Nepal performed poorly was corruption. The report found that corruption was a significant problem in Nepal, particularly in the public sector. The lack of effective measures to combat corruption was a major factor contributing to this issue. Nepal also scored poorly in the area of civil justice. The report found that the country’s court systеm was slow, inefficient, and lacked independence. There were also concerns about access to justice, particularly for marginalized and disadvantaged groups.   On the other hand, Nepal scored relatively well in the area of fundamental rights. The country has a constitutional commitment to protecting fundamental rights and a vibrant civil society advocates for these rights. However, there were concerns about how these rights were implemented and enforced, particularly for marginalized groups. Nepal’s performance on the other indicators was mixed. The country scored relatively well in the area of order and security, but there were concerns about the excessive use of force by law enforcement agencies. Nepal also scored relatively well in the area of regulatory enforcement, but there were concerns about the lack of effective regulation in some areas.   Overall, the WJP report highlighted several areas where Nepal needs to improve the rule of law. In particular, the country needs to take more effective measures to combat corruption and improve the efficiency and independence of its court systеm. There is also a need to improve access to justice and ensure that the fundamental rights of all citizens are effectively protected, including marginalized and disadvantaged groups. To address these issues, the Nepali government and civil society need to work together to implement reforms that promote the rule of law, which could include measures to strengthen the judiciary’s independence, improve the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies, and promote greater transparency and accountability in government. There is also a need to increase public awareness of the importance of the rule of law and to build greater public support for these reforms.   4. Conclusion and Recommendations   Nepal’s transition to a federal democratic republic has been marked by significant challenges, including political instability, weak governance systеms, and persistent social and economic inequalities. However, there have been efforts to address these challenges, including reform programs, civil society initiatives, and government initiatives aimed at improving service delivery and accountability. It is essential to continue these efforts to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic and social development in Nepal.   There is a need for improved coordination and communication between different levels of government in order to address these intra-governmental issues. Clear delineation of responsibilities and resource allocation is also necessary. Necessary resources and expertise need to be provided to local-level governments to allow them to carry out their duties effectively. There is also a need for increased transparency and public participation in local-level governance to ensure accountability.   The Constitution of Nepal has provided adequate legal frameworks, mechanisms, procedures, and opportunities for the state and civil actors to strengthen the true essence of the constitution. Longed prosperity is achievable only through confirming ethical accountability and transparency, which may sound utopian in nature, while there are factors contributing to attaining the same within a certain period. The federal mechanism of Nepal is relatively young, despite the fact that the actors involved are the ones who were already used to the prior systеm. Both the bureaucratic organization and the representatives need to work together with civil society to empower the disadvantaged, unreached, and underrepresented communities and construct a strong culture of rationality, accountability, and transparency which must be the ultimate process in attaining synergy. This could be fulfilled through initiatives such as the inter and intra government coordination center. The lack of coordination between the constitutional bodies and the governments is clearly visible due the gap in collaboration among the same. The systеmic crisis in the collaboration leads to degrading quality of service delivery, raises question to the governance mechanism, transparency and accountability of the state against the long run vision of and journey towards the prosperity of the nation.   The WJP report highlights several areas where Nepal needs to improve the rule of law. While there are some areas where the country is performing relatively well, there are also significant challenges that need to be addressed. By working together, the government and civil society can take steps to promote the rule of law and build a more just and equitable society for all Nepalese.   In conclusion, horizontal accountability is crucial for an effective functioning democracy in Nepal. While the Constitution provides a strong framework for horizontal accountability, it is still challenging to implement due to weak institutions, lack of transparency, and political interference. Greater transparency, free and independent media, a strong and independent judiciary, a robust civil society, and responsible private sector behavior are needed to strengthen horizontal accountability. Only by working together can Nepal achieve an authentic and functioning democracy. ■   References   Almeida Lopes Fernandes, Gustavo Andrey, Marco Antonio Carvalho Teixeira, Ivan Filipe de Almeida Lopes Fernandes, and Fabiano Angélico. 2020. “The Failures of Horizontal Accountability at the Subnational Level: A Perspective from the Global South.” Development in Practice 30, 5: 687-693. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09614524.2020.1773764?journalCode=cdip20   Amnesty International Nepal. 2019. “NEPAL: LAND for LANDLESS PEASANTS COMMENTS and RECOMMENDATIONS on AMENDMENT to the LANDS ACT 1964.” Accessed January 9, 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA3112212019ENGLISH.pdf   Bhattarai, Prakash. 2019. “The New Federal Structure in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities for Quality Governance.” External Democracy Promotion: EDP. April 23. https://www.external-democracy-promotion.eu/the-new-federal-structure-in-nepal-challenges-and-opportunities-for-quality-governance/   Bhusal, Thaneshwar. 2017. “Paving the Way for Women: Implication of Nepal’s Local Elections.” BroadAgenda. June 6. https://www.broadagenda.com.au/2017/paving-the-way-for-women-implication-of-nepals-local-electionsnew-blog-post/   Election Commission. 2017 (2074 BS). Election Results. Kathmandu: Election Commission Nepal.   Election Commission. 2022 (2079 BS). Election Results. Kathmandu: Election Commission Nepal.   Gurung, Mahendra Man. 2021. “The Right to Know.” The Kathmandu Post. September 27. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2021/09/27/the-right-to-know#:~:text=Nepal%20is%20the%20first%20country,fundamental%20right%20of%20the%20citizen   Human Rights Watch. 2021. “Nepal: Lack of Accountability Undermining the Rule of Law.” January 13. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/nepal-lack-accountability-undermining-rule-law   Informal Sector Service Centre: INSEC. 2023. “Nepal Human Rights Year Book 2023.” Accessed March 21, 2023. https://inseconline.org/en/human-rights-year-book-2023/   Kisan, Yam Bahadur, Ram Bahadur Charmakar, and Prakash Nepali. 2014. “Nepal: Access to Justice for Dalits.” Samata Foundation Equity Watch 2014. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://samatafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Equity-Watch-2014_Nepal_Access-to-Justice-for-Dalits_English-1.pdf   Nepal Admіnistrative Staff College. 2018. “Nepal National Governance Survey- 2018.” Accessed March 21, 2023. https://www.nasc.org.np/nngs-2018   Nepal Law Commission. 2015. “The Constitution of Nepal.” Accessed March 20, 2023. https://lawcommission.gov.np/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Constitution-of-Nepal.pdf   Paswan, Bhola. 2017. “Technically Included, Practically Left Out.” The Record. May 13. Accessed March 21, 2023. https://www.recordnepal.com/technically-included-practically-left-out   Paudel, Ramesh C., and Anil Kumar Gupta. 2019. “Determinants of Accountability in the Bureaucracy: The Case of Nepal.” Modern Economy 10, 9: 2085-2109. https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=95234   Poudel, Keshab. 2022. “Constitutional Bodies Everywhere, Nowhere.” SpotlightNepal. May 1. https://www.spotlightnepal.com/2022/05/01/constituioal-bodies-everywhere-nowhere/   Sijapati, Bandita. 2017. “The Quest for Achieving Universal Social Protection in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities.” Indian Journal of Human Development 11, 1: 17–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/0973703017696378   Thapa, Deepak, Nyima Dorjee Bhotia, Binay Jung Thapa, Vibhav Pradhan, Shalini Gupta, and Manesh Shrestha. 2021. Resilient Social Protection for an Inclusive Development. Kathmandu: Himal Books.   Timilsina, Krishna Prasad. 2020. “Problems and Prospects of Local Judicial Committee in Nepal.” Journal of Political Science 20: 124–141. https://doi.org/10.3126/jps.v20i0.31798   World Justice Project. n. d. “WJP Rule of Law Index.” Accessed April 30, 2023. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global     ■ Tirupati Pariyar is a Program Manager at Samata Foundation. Mr. Pariyar has keen interest in thematic areas of democracy, governance, human rights, and social inclusion. Mr. Pariyar is a student of law and public admіnistration. Representing Dalit community (marginalized due to caste), Mr. Pariyar is committed to advocating for marginalized and underrepresented groups in Nepal through research, and evidence based policy advocacy and development programming. In addition to advocacy initiatives, Mr. Pariyar is also dedicated to fostering the next generation of leaders and extensively engage in writing for the cause of Dalit and untouchability in Nepal via mainstream media. Mr. Pariyar is the initiator of Dignity app, which is a cell phone based application allowing victims of discrimination and untouchability to report and generate support in accessing justice.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수_EAI 연구원 문의: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr  

Tirupati Pariyar 2023-06-02조회 : 12743
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[ADRN Working Paper] Horizontal Accountability in Mongolia

1. Introduction   The 1992 Constitution is considered the “blueprint of Mongolia democracy” (Sanders 1992). This Constitution served Mongolia’s democracy well as, to date, eight electoral cycles were held regularly, had uncertain outcomes, and resulted in multiparty competitions for people’s votes. In the Varieties of Democracy Project’s liberal democracy index, Mongolia started with a score of 0.41 in 1991 and, with slight fluctuations, ended with a score of 0.49 in 2021 (V-Dem Project 2022). At its height, it reached 0.61 in 1999. Nonetheless, these scores consistently place Mongolia in the “electoral democracy” category. At the same time, the horizontal accountability index (scaled low to high (0-1)) had a score of 0.9 in 1991 and throughout the remainder of the 1990s (V-Dem Project 2022). Yet, it decreased following each constitutional amendment in 1999/2000 and 2019. Eventually, after fluctuations, it ended with a score of 0.78 in 2021 (V-Demo Project 2022). While in the broader historical context, the scores in the last three decades are at their highest level since Mongolia transitioned to democracy, the gradual decrease in the horizontal accountability index follows the general trend of declining government accountability.   Sato et al. (2022) found that in the autocratization process, institutional decay starts with horizontal accountability, followed by declines in diagonal accountability and, finally, vertical accountability. According to recent developments, some early signs of democratic erosion can already be found in Mongolia. As the balance of power between different branches becomes uneven, we will address some of the issues of concern, potentially pointing out some general prescriptions that can counter the process. Further investigation can also offer an institutional explanation of Mongolia’s good democratic performance and ineffective governance.   Consequently, the organization of this study is as follows. We begin with introducing the constitutional checks and balances systеm in Mongolia. Next, we describe the existing hierarchy of power among the government branches. Then, we address the legal procedures available to counterbalance the misconduct found in each government branch. After that, we assess the judicial branch’s independence in more detail. Finally, we examine oversight agencies and their capabilities and conclude the study.   2. Checks and Balances   The Constitution (1992) introduced a semi-presidential form of government. This power arrangement resulted in constant power struggles between the president’s office, the prime minister and his cabinet, and the parliament. This constitutional arrangement is credited with setting the Mongolian democracy on a long-term structural advantage among democratizing post-communist states overall (Fish 1998). On the positive side, during Mongolia’s transition to democracy, no branch could monopolize power, which became an optimistic institutional arrangement preventing it from drifting to authoritarianism seen in the former Soviet Union states in Asia (Fish 2001). However, on the negative side, this arrangement can lead to power disputes and political deadlocks during cohabitation (the president and main parliamentary party from opposing parties) and divided governments.   Historically, the most prominent example was when disputes between different government branches paralyzed the 1996-2000 parliamentary term and contributed to debates about the democratic systеm’s political stability or functionality. However, changing this systеm was never a popular idea based on opinion polls, as most of the population supported democracy as a form of governance (Sant Maral Foundation 2022). Therefore, the introduction of the first constitutional amendments partially addressed constitutional conflicts. Such political deadlocks during cohabitation (the president and major party in parliament from opposing parties) and later coalition governments align with the general research on semi-presidential systеms.   In the first place, the 1992 Constitution’s institutional equilibrium introduced an overlap between the president’s office, the prime minister, and the parliament. The design was based on the principles of checks and balances among different branches of government that relied on coordination. In practice, the Constitution relied on consensus[1] among the executive and legislative branches; an aspiration too difficult to achieve during periods of divided governments and cohabitation in a new democracy. Moreover, the absence or underdevelopment of institutions to ensure the continuity of policies exacerbated the debates about stability and functionality.   Eventually, two major constitutional amendments were introduced to remedy some of these institutional conflicts. As a solution, they shifted the balance of power from the president to the parliament. While the decision rests on an argument that such shifts reduce the possibility of strongman politics that an all-powerful president may entail, due to the one-party dominance, it still led to a power concentration and an all-powerful parliament and prime minister. As a result, the past balance of power between different branches of government became uneven, and the institutional equilibrium that has served Mongolian democracy well since 1992 has changed. It is still early to assess whether this is a positive or negative development, as further constitutional amendments are being discussed and scheduled for 2023. Yet, some recent developments, with the abrupt introduction of legislation without public discussion or minimal oversight, are a cause for concern (examples – August 2022 Constitutional Amendment, Cyber Security Laws, and Human Rights Laws).   In the constitutional design, the separation of power in the legislative and judicial branches is clear. According to Article 20, the unicameral parliament, the State Great Khural, holds the legislative power. Article 47.1 states that courts and the Supreme Court exercise judicial power. However, the executive branch was always more ambivalent due to an overlap between the president and the prime minister. Article 38.1 of the Constitution explicitly states that the cabinet, led by the prime minister, is “the highest executive organ of the State.” Yet, the president’s role in appointments and legislative initiatives given by Article 33.1 implies executive power.   3. Hierarchy of Power   Despite legal ambivalence on the exact political hierarchy, the presidency is considered the top of the political establishment. It is so despite significant constitutional limitations because the presidency symbolizes the peak of political power in Mongolia, backed by a direct national vote and popular legitimacy that comes with it, after which other state positions would be considered downgrading. It is disputable whether the second highest position is the prime minister or the chairman (speaker) of parliament. Constitutionally, the prime minister is a much more powerful position than the presidency and is more visible to the public. Following the constitutional amendments, in 2019, it became clear that the prime minister is the head of the executive and holds most of its powers. For example, in cases where there is no consensus on the structure and composition of the cabinet with the president, the prime minister can form his own cabinet by only presenting it to the parliament and president (2019 amended version Article 39.4). However, according to the Constitution, the prime minister and his cabinet are collectively responsible solely to the parliament (Articles 25.1.6 and 41.2). Also, given the more extensive powers of the legislative branch and, in particular, powers to remove the immunity of parliamentarians (Law on the Parliament 2020, Article 9.1), the speaker of the parliament effectively holds the second highest position. The speaker also replaces the president in case of absence, incapacity, or resignation. Therefore, the prime minister holds the third highest position.   The ideal design of the presidency was to mediate between conflicting parties and factions or be “above politics.” (Chimid et al. 2016) Before the 2019 constitutional amendments, presidents could not afford to be non-partisan in the first term if they sought re-election. After these 2019 amendments, which raised the age of presidential candidates to 50 (formerly 45) and limited them to one six-year term, the president’s incentives for “activism” during their time in office and role in the separation of power have considerably decreased. Currently, the president’s role as a counter-balancing power is minimal, and the most substantial power is veto power, which remains limited by the parliament’s ability to override it by two-thirds of its members. In addition, before the 2019 constitutional amendments, the president played a prominent role in judicial nominations.[2] After the 2019 amendments, the number of appointed judges is limited to five out of ten, and the rest are selected through open hearings (Article 49.5).[3] The Constitution remained ambivalent on who exactly is to make these appointments, leaving it to speculation that it most likely is the parliament. Nonetheless, new laws will presumably detail the nominations and appointments.   Constitutionally, the Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. The Judicial General Council (JGC) is its admіnistrative body. In cases of Supreme Court Justices, the JGC selects and nominates judges for an appointment either by the president or the parliament. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court authority to examine all lower court decisions and provide official interpretation of all laws except the Constitution. Articles 64.1 and 66 give the Constitutional Court the general power of constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, given the appointment systеm, it is highly disputed whether the judiciary and the prosecutors can be truly independent in the existing systеm. Furthermore, in 2019, the Law on the Legal Status of Judges allowed the National Security Council (the President, Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament) to remove judges (Transparency International 2019; Dierkes 2019).   In 2019, the Mongolian People’s Party-led government pushed comprehensive constitutional amendments that shifted the balance of power to the parliament and limited the presidential term. However, these changes did not go far enough in changing the nature of the political systеm, and it remained semi-presidential. At the time of writing, there are talks about further constitutional amendments; however, the contents are not publicly available. It is only a matter of speculation that it will likely be a further shift to a parliamentary systеm. A complete transition to parliamentarism has been a long-sought political goal by political elites. The prevalent belief is that stability in decision-making would result from a shift of power to parliament and the creation of a powerful prime minister position. Ambitious presidents mostly supported the transition to the presidential systеm. Nonetheless, one of the significant changes introduced by the 2019 constitutional amendments was a considerable change in the checks and balances systеm. The institutional equilibrium between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches shifted toward an all-powerful parliament and prime minister.   4. Counter-balancing Misconduct   Due to the numerous laws passed in the last thirty years, there is a saying that Mongolian Law lasts three days. As a result, in comparison to the Constitution, the Law on Parliament and Law on Cabinet (1993) were amended dozens of times (at the time of writing, the count is 38+ times each), making it a highly contested area to interpret for lawyers or anyone, for that matter. Some areas are ambivalent or untraceable after amendments because various political interests clashed, and high-level politics is involved.   Regarding the constitutional procedures for removing prime ministers, a vote of no confidence has removed prime ministers at least three times.[4] Others managed to survive the vote of no confidence. As for presidential impeachments, no president has been removed while in office yet. N. Enkhbayar was arrested following his term in office and is the only former president that returned to party politics. Other former presidents retired from political life. In contrast, the parliament consists of 76 members, and after eight election cycles, there are many more parliamentarians to investigate. From the beginning, the most challenging obstacle for the prosecution was parliament immunity, guaranteed by the Constitution in Article 29.2 and legalized by Article 9.8 (formerly Article 34.7) in Law on the Parliament (May 07, 2020, version). Nevertheless, Article 9.1 states that the parliament shall decide whether to suspend the powers of a member of parliament. More specifically, in Article 9.1.1, when “the State Prosecutor General has submitted a proposal to the State Assembly to arrest him with evidence in the course of his criminal act or at the scene of the crime, and then to suspend his powers.”   Following this, the existing checks and balances are such that high-level public officials rarely get prosecuted. The presence of public outrage and demonstrations is one of the deciding factors in bringing up high-profile cases. Among recent issues that received significant public attention was the dismissal of Speaker M. Enkhbold in 2019 after the public outcry over high-profile corruption scandals (Bittner 2019). Regarding the Constitutional Court, a notable high-profile case was the removal of its Chairman D. Odbayar, due to mounting public pressure over his involvement in the sexual harassment of a South Korean flight attendant on a flight from Ulaanbaatar to Incheon (IKON News Agency 2019). There are other cases involving parliament members; however, many happened after their term in office or were eventually overturned. The main reason is that the judiciary can hardly maintain its political neutrality or independence under existing power arrangements.   5. Judicial Branch’s Independence   As previously stated, constitutionally, the Supreme Court has the authority to examine all lower court decisions and provide official interpretation of all laws except the Constitution (Article 50). The Constitutional Court holds the general power of constitutional interpretation (Articles 64.1 and 66). There is a debate among scholars and politicians about the need for a separate Constitutional Court when a Supreme Court could take over the duty of constitutional interpretation. After much back and forth in arguments, the most plausible clue to date comes from the composition of the Constitutional Court. While members of the Supreme Court are explicitly required to be professional lawyers (Article 51.3),[5] the members of the Constitutional Court had to have high qualifications in politics and law (Article 65.2),[6] and their nominations applied the principle of the distribution of power between different branches. The Constitutional Court has nine members of the following distribution: the parliament nominates three members, the president nominates three members, and the Supreme Court nominates three members (Article 65).   Overall, the existing systеm of judicial nominations is one of the major barriers to judicial independence. The political nominations of justices and the prosecutor general introduce a high risk of politicization of the judiciary. The next big obstacle is the amendments to the Law on the Legal Status of Judges in 2019 that allow the National Security Council to remove judges (Transparency International 2019; Dierkes 2019). There are plausible arguments that it is necessary due to existing corruption in the legal systеm. The problem is that high-level corruption is endemic in the whole systеm, and the removal of judges can also serve political motives. Consequently, the issues with the judiciary’s political neutrality and independence undermine the judicial branch’s function as a counterbalance to the other branches of government.   6. Oversight Agencies and Their Capabilities   Mongolia has a longstanding problem with corruption in the public sector, but the main obstacle to legislation is not as much existence of loopholes and inconsistencies, but the issues summarized as the weak rule of law. According to Transparency International’s assessments, Mongolia’s 2021 corruption ranking stands at 110 out of 180 with a Corruption Perception Index of 35, which places it among countries with a serious corruption problem (Transparency International 2022).   The two major oversight agencies are the Mongolian National Audit Office and the Independent Authority Against Corruption of Mongolia (IAAC). The Mongolian National Audit Office is the country’s central audit institution. The Law on State Audit (2020) gives it a broad mandate.[7] In practice, it is limited in human resources and often runs into issues with overall capacity (ADB 2019). Unsurprisingly, when high-level politics is added, it is rare that a state audit finds any wrongdoings. The Constitution grants the parliament budgetary powers under Article 25.1.7. In response, Article 6.1 of the Law on State Audit gives the Mongolian National Audit Office the mandate to audit all except the parliament.[8]   The IAAC is another oversight institution with an overly broad mandate that allows it to investigate corruption cases and educate the public about prevention mechanisms. According to the Law on Anti-Corruption (2006), the IAAC is in charge of income and asset declarations of the president, the prime minister and his cabinet, members of parliament, and officials appointed by them (Article 11.1.1). To date, the most considerable obstacles to its capacity to actively investigate corruption cases of high-level public office holders are issues of either political immunity or amnesty laws. As of July 2021, Mongolia has passed its seventh amnesty law (Baljmaa 2020). The problem is that some of these amnesty laws would apply to a broad range of cases that would also grant protection from prosecution for corruption or lead to the termination of cases under investigation by the IAAC (UNCAC Coalition 2015). Generally, the IAAC faces frequent accusations of operating at random or with significant political bias. In the past, the president could appoint the head of the IAAC, but in January 2021, the parliament made amendments to the Law on Anti-Corruption that shifted this power to the prime minister (Article 21, updated; Baljmaa 2020). This shift can be seen as further empowering the prime minister’s position.   These institutional factors contribute to the deterioration of proper checks and balances in the systеm and explain why so much of this high-level corruption tends to go undetected or under-investigated.   7. Conclusion   We can conclude that several major factors are challenging the proper functioning of checks and balances in the systеm. Importantly, there is a lack of judicial independence. In the existing systеm, the key judiciary members are most likely to be political appointees; as a result, their political neutrality and independence are questionable. Relatedly, it becomes a further issue when dealing with cases that involve the high office. Correspondingly, due to politicization and limited capacity, the major oversight agencies, such as the National Audit and the IAAC, are not free from political interference. As for other avenues, there is a lack of support and opportunities to involve citizen oversight agencies. Overall, these challenges create considerable gaps in horizontal accountability in the systеm. The long-term institutional advantages and the current weakness of the opposition have also led to a systеm with one-party dominance. Given all of the benefits of the status quo, it is unlikely that the current political elite would push and implement the necessary reforms, leaving citizens’ vigilance and participation as the primary tools leading to policy change. ■   References   Asian Development Bank: ADB. 2019. “Mongolia: Strengthening the Supreme Audit Function.” ADB Technical Assistance Report. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/52285/52285-001-tar-en.pdf   Baljmaa T. 2020. “Law on Anti-Corruption Amended.” MONTSAME News Agency. December 31. https://montsame.mn/en/read/248530   ———. 2021. “Mongolia Adopts Seventh Amnesty Law.” MONTSAME News Agency. July 5. https://montsame.mn/en/read/269044   Bittner, Peter. 2019. “Mongolia’s Crisis of Democracy Continues.” The Diplomat. January 31. https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/mongolias-crisis-of-democracy-continues/   Chimid, Enhbaatar, Tom Ginsburg, Amarjargal Peljid, Batchimeg Migeddorj, Davaadulam Tsegmed, Munkhsaikhan Odonkhuu, and Solongo Damdinsuren. 2016. “Assessment of the Performance of the 1992 Constitution of Mongolia.” United Nations Development Programme. https://www.undp.org/mongolia/publications/assessment-performance-1992-constitution-mongolia   Dierkes, Julian. 2019. “The Beginning of the End of Democracy?” Mongolia Focus (blog). March 27. https://blogs.ubc.ca/mongolia/2019/judicial-appointments-national-security-council/   Fish, Steven Michael. 1998. “Mongolia: Democracy Without Prerequisites.” Journal of Democracy 9, 3: 127–141. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0044   ———. 2001. “The Inner Asian Anomaly: Mongolia’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34, 3: 323–338. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(01)00011-3   IKON News Agency. 2019. “Chairman of Tsets D. Odbayar Was Dismissed from His Post [Цэцийн Дарга Д.Одбаярыг Албан Тушаалаас Нь Чөлөөллөө].” November 22. https://ikon.mn/n/1qba   Law on Anti-Corruption [Авлигын эсрэг хууль] (2006). https://legalinfo.mn/   Law on State Audit [Төрийн аудитын хууль] (2020). https://legalinfo.mn/   Law on the Cabinet [Засгийн газрын тухай хууль] (1993). https://legalinfo.mn/   Law on the Legal Status of Judges [Шүүгчийн эрх зүйн байдлын тухай хууль] (2019). https://legalinfo.mn/   Law on the Parliament [Их Хурлын тухай хууль] (2020). https://legalinfo.mn/   Sant Maral Foundation. 2022. “Politbarometer #21.” https://www.santmaral.org/publications   Sato, Yuko, Martin Lundstedt, Kelly Morrison, Vanessa A. Boese, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2022. “Institutional Order in Episodes of Autocratization.” V-Dem Working Paper 133. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4239798   The Constitution of Mongolia (1992). https://legalinfo.mn/   Transparency International. 2019. “Rule of Law and Independence of Judiciary Under Threat in Mongolia.” July 4. https://www.transparency.org/en/press/rule-of-law-and-independence-of-judiciary-under-threat-in-mongolia   ______. 2022. “2021 Corruption Perceptions Index - Explore the Results.” January 25. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021   UNCAC Coalition. 2015. “International Organisations Call on Mongolian Parliament to Withdraw Corruption Amnesty Law.” October 8. https://uncaccoalition.org/international-organisations-call-on-mongolian-parliament-to-withdraw-corruption-amnesty-law/   V-Dem Project. 2022. “V-Dem Dataset V12.” https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22     [1] Consensus or concurrence (depending on the translation) between the president and parliament was explicitly required in many articles in the 1992 Constitution, but later most of them were reversed by amendments in 1999/2000 and 2019. [2] Before 2019 the president could appoint all judges upon the proposal of the Judicial General Council (Article 51.2) and could appoint the prosecutor general and his deputies in consensus with the parliament (Article 56.2). [3] Amendment of 2019 - Article 49.5: Five members of the Judicial General Council (hereinafter “Council”) shall be selected from among the judges and openly nominate the other five members. They shall work once for four years, and a Chairman of the Council shall be elected from among the members of the Judicial General Council. Report on Council activities in connection with ensuring the independence of judges shall be presented to the Supreme Court. The Organization of the Council, operational regulation, the requirement for its members, and the rules of appointment shall be determined by law. [4] The exact number is difficult to trace due to the absence of open information on the topic. [5] Article 51.3 “A Mongolian citizen who has reached thirty-five years of age with a higher education in law and a professional career of no less than ten years may be appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court.” [6] Article 65.2 “A member of the Constitutional Court shall be a Mongolian citizen who has reached forty years of age and has high qualifications in politics and law.” [7] Law on State Audit, Article 5.1. “The main goal of the state audit is to monitor the planning, distribution, use and spending of public finances, budgets and public property in a legal, economical, efficient and effective manner, as well as improving public financial management and supporting sustainable economic development.” [8] Law on State Audit, Article 6.5 states that it can audit the parliament “if requested by parliament.”     ■ Ganbat Damba is the Chairman of Board at the Academy of Political Education, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. From 1999 to 2010 he worked as an Executive director of the Academy. Since 2009 to 2017 he was an advisor to the President of Mongolia on research and a Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia. Since September, 2017-2021 he was an Ambassador of Mongolia to Federal Republic of Germany. He became Ph.D. in 2002 at the Academy of Science of Mongolia. He has published various articles examining democratization, democratic and authoritarian values, elections, political party development and on principles of foreign and security policy of Mongolia.   ■ Mina Sumaadii is a Senior Researcher at the Sant Maral Foundation, Mongolia. She is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of International Studies, Sichuan University, China. Her research focuses on foreign policy and democratization in Eurasia. She received her PhD at the Graduate School of Global Politics at the Free University of Berlin, Germany, and did her MA in Political Science at the Central European University in Hungary and BA in Political Science and Sociology at the Dickinson State University in the US. In her free time, Mina likes to listen to podcasts.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수_EAI 연구원 문의: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr  

Ganbat Damba 2023-06-02조회 : 10365
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[ADRN Working Paper] Parliamentary Supervision in Taiwan: Consensus Building versus Majoritarian Rule

1. Political Institutions   Taiwan adopted a semi-presidential systеm in which the president is directly elected and can serve up to two terms and nominate the premier. The Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, has 113 members who are elected every four years. It includes 73 geographical seats, 34 party-list seats, and six aboriginal seats. As of 2023, Taiwan has held seven presidential elections and nine parliamentary elections. Taiwan experienced its third transfer of executive power between parties in 2016. The previous two transfers took place in 2000 and 2008. The 2016 election also marks the first parliamentary majority for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), one of the two main parties in addition to the Kuomintang (KMT).   Under Taiwan’s semi-presidential systеm, Congress can file a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister. The president can dissolve the parliament and appeal to the voters as a countermeasure. Taiwan and France have a similar constitutional provision that the president appoints the premier without the consent of the parliament. In France, however, when the president’s party does not enjoy a majority of seats in the parliament, the opposing camp obtains the right to form the cabinet where the president’s party is excluded, which means that cohabitation between the two main political camps occurs. In contrast, the likelihood of proposing a vote of no confidence in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan is very low. The president has the power to dissolve the parliament only if the latter passes a vote of no confidence. The cost and uncertainty of running for the legislature election are very high. When a divided government occurs, the opposition party that controls the parliament does not dare to propose a motion of no confidence but instead chooses to block the minority government’s legislative agenda, resulting in a legislative deadlock. This situation happened during the two terms of President Chen Shui-bian between 2000 and 2008.   Since 2008, the KMT and DPP governments have enjoyed most of the seats in the parliament. The concurrent election of the president and the legislators after 2008 reduced the likelihood of a divided government. In addition, since 2008, the change in the election formula from a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) to a single-member district also tends to boost the seats of the president’s party. Under these conditions, the president’s party can more easily control the executive and legislative branches. The systеm, in essence, is closer to the presidential systеm with a unified government.   However, the new political structure does not guarantee that the presidents can push through their legislative agenda without considerable difficulty. Their legislative power depends on several confounding factors. The first factor concerns whether the president is also the party chairman. The president tends to have more power presiding over the executive and legislative branches with party chairmanship. Most of the time during the Ma and Tsai governments, the presidents also served the president of their parties. Therefore, we will focus on the other factors.   The second factor is associated with the degree of party unity. When there are strong factions within the ruling party, the president may be unable to pass all the bills he wants. During President Ma’s admіnistration, the President and Speaker Wang Jin-pyng were not congruent on many things, hindering the President’s ability to control the legislative agenda. The third factor concerns the law-making rules in the parliament. When the legislative procedures allow the opposition party and civil society organizations (CSOs) to exercise filibuster actions, they are permitted to enjoy de facto veto power on some contentious issues. The president often finds it difficult to pass some important bills. The last two factors are critical to the executive and legislative relationship, and we will explore them in detail below.   2. How the Constitutional and Legal Mechanisms of Horizontal Accountability Fulfilled Their Expected Functions   The arrangement of the legislative process in democracies faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the political systеm encourages consensus building and power sharing. On the other hand, a desired political systеm also needs to allow the ruling party to pass the bills that the government prioritizes.   Since democratization in 1987, Taiwan has witnessed several party turnovers. The smooth transition of executive power has disguised the truth that the majority party is not able to exercise its lawmaking power smoothly. Since the first party turnover in 2000, gridlock in parliament has become frequent. During President Chen’s government, a minority government that did not have majority support in the parliament, the coalition of the KMT and the People First Party blocked many major legislative bills introduced by the DPP government, some of which were drafted under KMT President Lee’s terms before 2000.   Although the KMT has enjoyed a majority of seats in Parliament since 2008, it was unable to push its own agenda forward in many cases. Issues relating to pension reforms, beef imports from the United States, recruitment of college students from Mainland China, and service sector trade agreements across the Strait are some notable examples from President Ma’s tenure. A problem that arises from immobilism is that it harms electoral accountability. It is similar to the divided government situation, where voters cannot tell which party is responsible for the final political and economic outputs.   Unlike the filibuster rule in the U.S. Congress, where only ongoing, non-stop speech is allowed and recognized, the methods of filibusters in Taiwan’s parliament are quite extensive. Multiple amendments, physical clashes, and blocking of the committee and the chamber are all tolerated in the Legislative Yuan. There are no formal rules to end a filibuster. Unlike other democracies, the committee chair and speaker in Taiwan do not have the power to end a filibuster. In many Western parliaments, there are motions to end the debate on a matter, limit the amount of time that members of parliament (MPs) can spend on a particular bill, and timetable a bill’s progress by setting out the time allowed for debate at each stage in advance. As a result, despite being a majority party in the parliament, Presidents Ma remained unable to advance their party’s policy agenda because of filibustering.   The party caucus negotiation mechanism is the central mechanism for ending filibusters and allowing parties to negotiate in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan. Party whips can ask the speaker to send the bills that cannot reach consensus in the committee to the party caucus negotiation mechanism, comprised of all the party whips with a party caucus. With a small number of participants, all with mandates from their respective parties, the meeting can more easily reach a consensus. If all sides agree with the amendment, the bill is sent to the plenary session, and a roll-call vote is held. Almost all such bills approved in the meeting will pass the second and third reading without much difficulty.   Before 2016, given the frequent filibuster actions taken by the opposition parties, this mechanism helped to reach agreements between the ruling party and the opposition parties regarding contentious bills. A bill is not pushed forward into the plenary session unless a consensus is reached in the negotiation process. In other words, the opposition parties enjoyed veto power regarding the bills they strongly opposed. Two notable cases were the pension schemes reform of civil servants and public school teachers and the pension schemes reform of laborers. During this period, the mechanism essentially made Taiwan’s legislative process close to the consensus model proposed by Lijphart (2012). The government institutions of Taiwan, including the semi-presidential systеm that is, in essence, close to a presidential systеm; and the first-past-the-post electoral systеm that entails a high disproportionality of seats to votes, make it a majoritarian systеm. However, filibusters and party caucus negotiation mechanisms essentially convert the political systеm into a consensus model. The ruling party needs to amend the bills to be accepted by the opposition parties, and the opposition party can also block the bills they do not like. The downside of the quasi-consensus model is that the ruling party is unable to push through some of the core agendas.   However, not all bills that failed to reach a consensus in the party caucus negotiation mechanism were killed. In a few highly significant and non-identity bills, such as the US beef cases, the Ma government pushed through a roll-call vote, imposed strict party discipline, and passed the bills.   In some cases, filibusters launched by the opposition party involve a third player-civil society groups, thus increasing the hurdles to passing laws. The Sunflower Movement in March 2014 is a salient example. The issue at stake was the service trade agreement between Taiwan and China. After the DPP blocked this agreement in the committee for a month, the KMT committee chair suspended the review and sent the bill to the floor for a vote, sparking massive student protests that occupied the floor of the Legislative Yuan. One significant reason the student groups acted was that they believed the DPP MPs would back off in the review process.   When the DPP took power in 2016, the opposition party, the KMT, like its predecessor, quickly sought to block several DPP initiatives using various filibuster tactics. The DPP responded swiftly by restricting the debate in the Parliament. More importantly, the DPP changed the rule of the party caucus negotiation mechanism. The ruling party still negotiates with the opposition parties in the party caucus negotiation mechanism; however, if no agreement is reached, a bill is not killed. The retirement of the long-serving KMT speakers who were able to effectively mediate disagreements among parties reduces the mechanism’s effectiveness in fostering agreement. In addition, the DPP is more assertive than the KMT in exercising its majority rights. Both factors contribute to the weakening of the party caucus negotiation mechanism. As a result, the party caucus negotiation mechanism ceased to be the gate through which the opposition parties could block the bills they did not like. If parties cannot reach an agreement in the negotiation, the bill simply moves to the plenary session, and the ruling party can get it passed with its majority seats (Ting 2021).   In general, bills related to the national identity, such as abolishing the Mongolian and Tibetan council and transitional justice, are least likely to reach a consensus in the party caucus negotiation mechanism. But now, the ruling party can bypass the party caucus negotiation mechanism and move on to the second and third readings (Ting 2021).   The positive impact of this new process is that the ruling party is able to pass the bills they want. Fights in Parliament result in immobilism. In a highly competitive international economic structure, delays and immobilism may put Taiwan’s development at a more significant disadvantage, Recent changes in legislative process may set a precedent for future governments, rendering the country’s legislative process closer to a majoritarian model.   Taiwan’s civil society, which includes academics, students, NGOs, the civic tech community, grassroots advocates, and the news media, plays an important role in its legislative process, as mentioned above. When the ruling party controls the executive and legislative branches and the party caucus negotiation mechanism is weakened, the opposition parties have no effective tactics to stop legislation. Civil society’s response has become the sole force that can block the contentious bills. However, the effectiveness of such factor depends on the size of civil society organizations that oppose the bills. In some cases, such as the pension reform of civil servants in 2017, the protesters of the anti-pension reform also sought to break into and occupy the Legislative Yuan but failed because of police interruption. It appears that the police, after the Sunflower Movement, have ramped up their ability to prevent protesters from breaking into the parliament. More importantly, such action did not garner extensive social support to block the bills. The government was eventually able to get the pension reform passed.   After its defeat in the 2018 local elections, the DPP blamed the disinformation war for distorting the truth, demonizing political leaders, and planting a misleading view of the government, putting the DPP at a distinct disadvantage. The government and DPP legislators proposed or planned to propose several items of legislation designed to curb disinformation. The most important one is the Digital Intermediary Services Bill, introduced in 2022, which would have given government agencies the power to initiate legal action against online news stories that were deemed to violate the law or damage the public interest. A court would have 48 hours to decide whether a story had to be removed from internet platforms. Before the court made its decision, the government agency could require the platform provider to add a warning to the post for 30 days. Faced with extensive opposition from civil society organizations, netizens, and internet providers, the government withdrew the bill (Wu 2013).   In addition, before 2016, party caucus negotiation meetings were closed-door; therefore, there are no discussion records. Party supporters were not able to track the positions of individual party whips. As such, party whips were not held accountable for the decision to concede in the meeting. Since 2016, the party caucus negotiations have been videotaped, which tends to increase the pressure on the individual whips and induce them not to concede in the meeting. This factor ihas also likely contributed to the less compromised model after 2016.   3. What are the Determinants of Horizontal Accountability Performance?   Weak control of legislative power by the ruling party in a united government hurts the governability of the democracy. As Galston (2018) points out, gridlock is a significant reason people have lost confidence in representative democracy, as weak governance increases popular discontent with the existing political systеm. This situation points to a dilemma that Taiwan faces. On the one hand, it must ensure majority rule to enhance governability. When checks and balances are pushed to an extreme, they weaken democratic governability. On the other hand, a desired systеm would also need to encourage power-sharing and consensus-building. Especially regarding the Taiwan-China relationship, the threat from China is looming and genuine, and the opposition and the civil society, by and large, are uncomfortable with a closer economic relationship between Taiwan and China. Therefore, people demand that the Ma government step back from its close relationship with China. The 2012 Taiwan Election and Democracy Survey shows that during President Ma’s term, people who considered the rise of China a threat to Taiwan tended to endorse strong checks and balances.   Because of the dichotomous nature of national identity issues and the lack of democratic norms in the legislative reviewing process, the opposition party tried hard to filibuster the main legislative agenda of the ruling party. The deliberation of any issue related to China often escalates to the level of saving Taiwan or selling Taiwan. This attitude exists not only among the elite but also among the public. This national identity cleavage causes great distrust in the political actors representing the other camp. People often question the loyalty of political leaders to Taiwan or the Republic of China. People supporting the opposition party are uncomfortable letting the other party rule alone. They seek many different ways to hinder the government’s policy agenda.   4. What Should Be Done to Improve the State of Horizontal Accountability Performance?   In an ethnically divided society, power sharing is crucial. In the winner-take-all nature of Taiwan’s political systеm, there is not much room for institutional power sharing in the elections and the process of government formation. Under the semi-presidential systеm, the party that controls the presidency also controls the parliament. Moreover, the elections of the presidential and legislature both adopt the single-member-district electoral systеms, rendering the election results highly disproportional. These two institutional features render institutional power sharing largely absent.   Under this institutional structure, tactics such as the division of the government, filibustering, closed-door party caucus negotiation, and even the occupation of parliament essentially serve as non-institutional power-sharing mechanisms. The function of the party caucus negotiation mechanism also serves as a way of encouraging consensus building. These mechanisms prevent drastic changes in important policies. In some sense, this is a good thing for a divided society to maintain social peace. These informal power-sharing mechanisms, however, have their downsides. For instance, they harm the ruling party’s ability to advance its policy agenda. In addition, the current systеm fails to encourage the formation of an accepted quorum in the parliament. In each legislative battle, there are fierce fights until one side eventually concedes. These fights tear society apart without being able to cultivate democratic norms gradually. Taiwan must encourage the formation of a norm in which opposition elites are willing to respect the opponents’ right to govern, and things may slowly change in that direction. Since the Tsai Ing-wen admіnistration began in 2016, the ruling party has been able to force a vote by shortening the debate in committees, employing the police force to prevent social groups from occupying the parliament, and weakening the party caucus negotiation mechanism.   Taiwan is a divided society with different national identities and views of the cross-strait political and economic relationship. It is preferable to encourage deliberation and compromise regarding identity-related issues. It might be better to maintain a party caucus negotiation mechanism regarding identity-related bills and encourage political parties to seek compromise. However, for non-identity issues such as economic reforms, weakening the party caucus negotiation mechanism and allowing the ruling party to advance its policy agenda should be the right direction. It is sometimes challenging to distinguish between the two cases as they often overlap. For example, Taiwan’s trade liberalization is closely related to the trade relationship across the Taiwan Strait. Other issues relating to emigration and foreign student policy involve the China factor but to a different extent. As such, there is no easy solution for this kind of policy. ■   References   Galston, William A. 2018. “The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 29, 2: 5-19.   Lijphart, Arend. 2012. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (Second Edition). New Haven: Yale University Press.   Ting, Ting. 2021. “The Institutional Changes and Institutionalization of the Party Negotiation Mechanism in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan.” (我國立法院黨團協商的制度變遷與制度化). Taiwan Journal of Political Science 88: 1-50.   Wu, Chin-en. 2023. “Taiwan’s Civic Space Threatened by Chinese Misinformation and the Government’s Worrisome Legislative Responses.” ADRN Issue Briefing. February 10. http://adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?idx=294     ■ Chin-en Wu is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Michigan. He is a core member of the Asian Barometer Survey. His main research interest includes political economy, democratization, and political trust. His works appeared in Democratization, Studies in Comparative International Development, and Political Research Quarterly.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수_EAI 연구원 문의: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr  

Chin-en Wu 2023-06-02조회 : 23564
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[ADRN Working Paper] Ensuring Horizontal Accountability in India: The Role of Judiciary

1. Introduction   Vertical and horizontal accountability act as countervailing forces to strengthen democracy. Specifically, horizontal accountability operates through the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches. In a complex federal country like India, it operates via the division of powers at three levels of government: the Union, States, and local bodies (Mitra 2020). Such juxtaposition (division and separation of powers among different democratic institutions) has worked well to maintain the vitality of democracy in a large and diverse country like India. The judiciary, in particular, has played vital roles as the key institution of accountability: acting as the custodian of the constitution and protector of the rights of the most marginalized groups against the state (executive) excesses. By far, the judiciary has made earnest attempts to uphold the rule of law and act as a counter-majoritarian court.   However, with the arrival of a strong executive in 2014, there are increasing tendencies to overrule and control independent institutions, including the judiciary. The judiciary, which earned the distinction of the most powerful branch in previous decades, has been found struggling to safeguard against the violation of fundamental rights in a growing number of cases in recent times. Not only are courts increasingly following executive lines, but they progressively look like mere spectator in the face of growing state excesses, whether on the illegal arrest of democracy defenders, human rights activists, or political opponents, among others. An ineffectual judiciary has emboldened the executive to usurp key constitutional principles of constitutional democracy. Although there are moments of stress in its long-established constitutional principle of ‘separation of powers,’ there have been moments of great courage by individual judges in the recent times (Shah 2020a).   2. Mechanisms of Accountability   The judiciary in India ensures accountability of the executive branch in several ways, ranging from the separation of power, the rule of law, judicial review, writs, and judicial activism, among others.   2.1. Judicial Review   India has adopted the systеm of judicial review primarily from the experiences of the US. The Supreme Court of India has the power to review the enactments of the parliament and state legislatures. Further, state actions must meet the parameters of the rule of law, which makes the higher courts more powerful and grants an instrument of judicial review. The various provisions of the judicial review systеm have been granted by the Constitution in various articles, including Article 13, 32, 131-136, 143, 226, 145, 246, 254, 251 and 372 (Rana and Kamath 2022). The power of judicial review is incorporated in Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as the High Courts are concerned. To the extent that the Supreme Court is concerned, Articles 32 and 136 allow the apex court to review key aspects of state actions. However, there are exceptions to the application of judicial review. While judicial review can be conducted on state and central existing laws and the ordinances of constitutional and executive amendments, the same does not apply to the laws incorporated in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.   In terms of practice or actual enforcement, the judicial records have been mixed. In the initial decades of constitutional governance, the higher courts, particularly the Supreme Court, adopted a cautionary approach. The Supreme Court mostly took a pro-legislature stance, as is reflected in rulings such as A.K. Gopalan’s judgment (Supreme Court of India 1950). However, it did not take long for the Supreme Court justices to make a U-turn in subsequent cases. Soon, several cases involving the right to property created space for the judiciary to be at loggerheads with the executive and legislature. The struggle between the two wings of government continued on other issues, such as the power of amending the Constitution. During this period, the parliament sought to introduce socialist/welfarist policies, which often came into conflict with fundamental rights. Between 1950 and 1975, the Supreme Court declared hundreds of Union and State laws and executive actions, in whole or in part, to be unconstitutional.   During the national emergency (1975-77), the judiciary faced heavy pressure to toe the executive lines. It was under severe pressure from the executive branch and was coerced to deliver several judgments which were considered violative of the basic human rights of Indian citizens. In a shocking letdown, the Supreme Court even supported the suspension of the right to life by the executive branch. After taking flak, the judiciary soon realized its mistakes and loss of reputation. In the next decade, the 1980s, Indian courts began to make vigorous efforts to restore their images through a series of historic pro-poor judgments.   2.2. Safeguarding the Fundamental Rights   Higher courts act as custodians of Fundamental Rights (a set of basic rights similar to the US Bill of Rights guaranteed to all citizens) by protecting them from executive arbitrariness (Singh 2022). In enforcing this, the Supreme Court acts as a Constitutional Court. On numerous occasions, the higher courts have taken suo motu cognizance of violations of fundamental rights. Article 32 of the Constitution, which is a fundamental right, allows the higher courts to issue writs in cases of executive excesses or infringement of personal liberties. These writs are Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Certiorari, and Quo Warranto. Although remedies under this are related to violations of fundamental rights only, over the years, the higher courts have consistently tried to expand the scope and application of these rights (protect individuals/groups against state excesses) through an expansive interpretation of the constitution (Sahoo 2022).   2.3. Judicial Activism   As stated above, in the last few decades, particularly after the national emergency in 1975 (which allowed the executive to suspend the right to life and the judiciary condoned the same[1]), the judiciary took a series of proactive steps to reinvent itself to salvage its lost reputation. It did this by gradually expanding its powers vis-à-vis legislative and executive branches by creative interpretation of different provisions of the fundamental rights. With the defeat of Indira Gandhi’s government and the new Janata Government taking power in 1977, the situation became quite favorable for the judiciary to correct past mistakes and regain the ground that it had ceded to a strong executive over the years. The judiciary tried to undo the damage by adopting an activist course by delivering a series of significant judgments that put numerous checks on state excesses.   The most immediate response from the judiciary was to quickly undo the damage it had done in the Habeas Corpus case known as ADM Jabalpur (which had suspended the right to life during the national emergency in 1975-1977). In the Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India case, the judiciary dramatically expanded the scope of Article 21 by linking it to the grounds of procedural and substantive fairness (Supreme Court of India 1978). Further, the court opened a new dimension of the right to life and personal liberty when it established that Article 21 was both a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law and a restriction on lawmaking. The Supreme Court also struck down the key provisions of the Forty-Second Amendment that had kept judicial review out of the ambit of constitutional amendments in Minerva Mills (Supreme Court of India 1980). However, these judgments were just the beginning of a new era as the judiciary was recovering from the shock of its national emergency policy blunders. Consistently, the judiciary ushered an era of judicial activism in the subsequent decades by creative use of public interest litigation (PIL) which greatly expanded fundamental rights. By actively promoting PIL, the higher judiciary was able to check executive excesses in many areas (Baxi 1985).   2.4. Public Interest Litigation and Restoration of Judicial Supremacy   The judiciary’s PIL journey commenced with the historic S.P. Gupta judgment in 1981 (Supreme Court of India 1981). Justice P.N. Bhagwati, who delivered the landmark judgment, relaxed the locus standi in public interest litigations. This judgment significantly opened spaces for public-spirited citizens – those wanting to take up the causes of the poor and oppressed populations and those wishing to enforce the performance of public duties. The higher judiciary engineered further innovation in public interest matters by granting interim reliefs to the victims of state abuses apart from awarding compensation and supervising their enforcement processes. The higher judiciary’s strong promotion of PILs encouraged scores of public-spirited citizens, human rights lawyers, and civil society organizations to take up the cases of helpless individuals and groups. Thus, PIL allowed the higher courts to imaginatively interpret and expand fundamental rights to include many unarticulated rights, such as the right to live with human dignity, the right to a healthy environment, the right to livelihood, the right to education, etc. Such an interventionist path acted to curb state excesses in many domains while simultaneously accelerating the legitimacy of the judiciary. Of course, the courts overstepped the executive and legislative spheres on multiple occasions. A plethora of literature has documented the benefits or damages that such judicial moves may have brought in (Dave 2020). Overall, such a course helped the judiciary to restore its position in the architecture of separation of powers.   The Collegium Systеm and the Re-assertion of Judicial Supremacy   To further accelerate checks on executive interference, the higher judiciary in India has also put its stamp on the crucial selection of judges. Judicial appointments, which used to be the executive’s domain, had become a major area of contention among judges. In order to gain control over appointments and insulate itself from executive interference, the apex court delivered several verdicts, known as Three Judges Cases, that redefined the appointment process for judges at the higher judiciary. One such judgment was the S.P. Gupta case in 1981, which emerged after the President of India bypassed advice from the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and listened to the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court instead. This judgment was critiqued because it failed to recognize the independence of the CJI. Then came the Second Judges Case in 1993, based on a public interest litigation about whether the CJI’s opinions on the appointments of judges hold any priority. This landmark judgment held that the CJI’s views would have primacy in appointments. The Third Judges Case, which was about the question of whether the consultation of the president should only be limited to the CJI or should involve other judges, came up in 1998 (Lodha 2015). The Court held that this should lead to the creation of a collegium systеm where other judges are actively consulted regarding the appointments of judges.   The collegium systеm was strongly contested by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government headed by Narendra Modi. The NDA government passed legislation in 2015 to set up the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) to make judicial appointments a collective affair rather than judges appointing themselves. The judiciary took a strong objection to this move by the new government. Soon, a five-member Supreme Court Constitution Bench ruled the new legislation as void (Anand 2015). Thus, the judiciary stubbornly resisted executive interference in the sphere it thought was its exclusive domain. This also helped the courts (notwithstanding the Modi government’s recent vociferous attempts to weaken the collegium systеm) to act as a check on the executive without any major institutional hurdles from the former (Suresh 2023).   3. Understanding the Judiciary’s Weakness as an Institution of Accountability   The judiciary, which reached the peak of its power and authority in the 1990s and 2000s by acting as a major restraint on executive excesses, has taken an opposite turn in the last few years. There is considerable erosion in judicial power and authority, particularly with the emergence of a powerful executive led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Shah 2020b). It may be reiterated that the judicial power flourished under successive coalition governments at the federal level, which was often characterized by an ‘unstable’ and ‘weak’ executive. However, the BJP government broke that continuum when it secured a full political majority in back-to-back general elections in 2014.   3.1. Sliding to Become an ‘Executive Court’   Since the arrival of a powerful government led by Narendra Modi, a populist leader with centralizing tendencies, the executive branch has used all levers of state powers to pressure and control key democratic institutions, including the judiciary (Vaishnav 2021). Although the Supreme Court stood up to executive interference, such as in the case of the National Judicial Appointments Commission brought out by the government to dilute judicial power over the appointments, that was an exception. This is because the central government, particularly the Law Ministry, has deployed admіnistrative actions and other tools to delay or even nullify (using official procedures/delay) certain appointments made by the collegium comprising of senior justices, and the Supreme Court has not shown the needed courage and leadership to stop growing interferences into judicial autonomy (Dhawan and Jain 2019). Aside from this, in many instances in recent times, the executive can be found interfering and using transfer options against individual judges who have spoken out or delivered judgments against the government (Venkatesan 2023).   Beyond the judicial appointments, a powerful executive has been able to get individual judges (using post-retirement incentives or coercive tactics) to support its policies (or look the other way), even when they violate constitutional principles. Recently, an investigative report by Indian Express found that of the ten recent judgments of the Supreme Court on free speech, as many as six cases went in favor of the state (Vishwanath 2020). Furthermore, in the four cases that went in favor of the petitioner, the government either supported the petitioner or had no objection at all. Thus, the once “assertive” judiciary speaks “the language of executive and has become indistinguishable from the executive.” (Bhatia 2020) Through its judgments and orders, the judiciary, far from failing to act as a check on an unbridled executive power, has become a facilitator of it. This trend is getting even worse at the level of lower courts, which handles most cases involving police/state excesses (Sumeda 2022).   3.2. Failure to Act as Constitutional Court   The higher judiciary, which in the previous decades made so many landmark judgments that led to the dramatic expansion of civil liberties and protection of the constitution, is today struggling (in the face of a strong and interventionist executive) to pursue cases that can uphold constitutional rights and values. The courts are largely toeing the executive lines and failing in their constitutional duties, and checking state excesses can be found in its failures to uphold fundamental rights in a staggering number of cases since 2014.   In scores of recent cases involving serious legal and constitutional questions and state excesses, such as the abrogation of Article 370, which axed the statehood and special provisions according to India’s only Muslim majority state (Jammu and Kashmir), the constitutional validity of the discriminatory Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), issues of lack of transparency in new political funding law (electoral bonds) and scores of habeas corpus petitions involving illegal detention of activists, democracy defenders, and political dissidents, the Supreme Court has delayed or sided with the executive branch (Mahajan 2020; Narla and Rajagopalan 2020). A weak and inconsistent higher judiciary has largely helped and emboldened an already powerful executive to relentlessly attack and weaken key constitutional principles and values. Notably, by failing on issues of Article 370 regarding citizenship law, the judiciary is increasingly ceasing as a counter-majoritarian court (Shah 2020a).   3.3. Corruption and Lack of Access to Justice Tarnishing the Judicial Legitimacy   What is accelerating the erosion of judicial legitimacy is the widespread corruption and inaccessibility of justice to common citizens. Once viewed above corruption, the judicial branch is news for corruption and favoritism. According to Transparency International judicial corruption survey, some 77% of Indians believe the judiciary to be corrupt.[2] Nearly INR 3600 crores (US$ 300 million) goes into bribing lawyers and judges to get justice and avoid long dragging of cases and frequent adjournments. Several sensational cases of corruption and misuse of official positions by some judges have grabbed the attention of the press and the public in recent years, thereby sullying the judiciary’s image.   However, a major concern is the issue of access to justice. For the average citizens, especially the vast poor and oppressed populations, access to justice remains a distant dream. Many special schemes, such as Lok Adalat and free legal aid, have remained symbolic in nature (Sahoo 2021). According to many reports and studies, the justice delivery systеm in India remains cumbersome, time and money-consuming for most citizens, let alone the poor (Law Commission of India 1999; Department of Admіnistrative Reforms & Public Grievances 2008).   4. Conclusion   Among the vital institutions that have shaped 75 years of India’s fascinating democratic journey, the judiciary occupies the prime place. For most part of its existence since 1947, it has done very well to safeguard individual liberties and protect fundamental rights. Besides, the courts have done well to address the rights of marginalized and dispossessed populations and have served as an essential check against executive excesses. However, over the last nine years and under a government with an overall political majority, the courts have experienced tremendous pressure to call the executive’s bidding. Of course, this is not to deny the positive contribution of many individual judges standing up to an interventionist executive which is hell-bent on using every possible tool to bring pressure. The Supreme Court, on several important occasions, has shown strong determination and common purpose to restrain the executive branch on matters related to Habeas Corpus/personal liberty (Shah 2020a). Of late, there are signals that the judiciary, particularly the higher courts, is slowly recognizing the slide and damage to its reputation. Lately, several high courts have made steady efforts to help revive public faith in the judicial systеm.   Yet, as mentioned in the previous sections, notwithstanding some valiant efforts by the judiciary, the executive branch has considerably succeeded in harming personal liberties and attacking dissent and freedom of expression. Scores of people arrested under all kinds of trumpeted charges and denied bail for a long time are testimonies to the executive branch having the upper hand over the judiciary. As has been consistently brought out by many international democracy reports and watchdogs, India is witnessing significant erosion of judicial freedom and constitutionalism, impacting core aspects of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights (Freedom House 2023). ■   References   Anand, Utkarsh. 2015. “Supreme Court strikes down NJAC, revives collegium systеm.” The Indian Express. October 17. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/sc-strikes-down-njac-revives-collegium-systеm-of-appointing-judges/   Bhatia, Gautam. 2020. “ICLP Turns 7 || A Constitutionalism Without the Court.” Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy. August 1. https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2020/08/01/iclp-turns-7-a-constitutionalism-without-the-court/   Baxi, Upendra. 1985. “Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India.” Third World Legal Studies 4, 6: 107-132. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144549317.pdf   Dave, Dushyant. 2020. “The Supreme Court’s Greatest Gift Is the PIL and It Is Here to Stay, Whatever Critics May Say.” The Wire. September 15. https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-pil-constitution-law   Department of Admіnistrative Reforms & Public Grievances. 2008. “Second Admіnistrative Reforms Commission Reports.” https://darpg.gov.in/arc-reports   Dhawan, Pranny, and Anmol Jain. 2019. “Strong Executive, weak courts: Collapsing edifice of judicial independence.” The Leaflet. October 10. https://theleaflet.in/strong-executive-weak-courts-collapsing-edifice-of-judicial-independence-opinion-supreme-court-of-india/   Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World 2023: India.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2023   Government of India. 1976. “The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act.” https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/amendments/constitution-india-forty-second-amendment-act-1976   Law Commission of India. 1999. “170th Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws.” https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/cat_electoral_reforms/   Lodha, R. M. 2015. “Constitution’s will upheld.” The Hindu. October 20. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/NJAC-Constitution%E2%80%99s-will-upheld/article62116607.ece   Mahajan, Shruti. 2020. “Turning the clock back: How the Supreme Court has dealt with cases arising out of last year’s abrogation of Article 370.” Bar and Bench. August 5. https://www.barandbench.com/columns/supreme-court-dealt-with-cases-abrogation-of-article-370-jammu-and-kashmir   Mitra, Subrat. 2000. “For India, Middle Democracy Works.” Global Asia 15, 1. https://www.globalasia.org/v15no1/cover/for-india-middle-democracy-works_subrata-k-mitra   Narla, Shreyas, and Shruti Rajagopalan. 2020. “The Judicial Abrogation of Right and Liberties in Kashmir.” Article 14. September 25. https://www.article-14.com/post/the-judicial-abrogation-of-rights-liberties-in-kashmir   Rana, Abhinav, and Nishka Kamath. 2022. “Judicial review.” iPleaders. July 24. https://blog.ipleaders.in/all-about-judicial-review/   Sahoo, Niranjan. 2021. “Indian Judiciary at a Critical Crossroad: Issues and Challenges.” Asia Democracy Research Network Working Paper Series: Judicial Independence and Democracy in Asia. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?idx=280   Shah, A.P. 2020a. “The Only Institution Capable of Stopping the Death of Democracy Is Aiding it.” The Wire. September 18. https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-rights-uapa-bjp-nda-master-of-roster   ______. 2020b. “The Supreme Court: Then and Now.” Economic & Political Weekly. October 3. https://www.epw.in/journal/2020/40/perspectives/supreme-court.html   Singh, Amita. 2022. “Judicial Oversight of Executive Actions and Governance.” Impact and Policy Research Institute. January 3. https://www.impriindia.com/insights/judicial-executive-governance/   Sumeda. 2022. “Explained | The clogged state of the Indian judiciary.” The Hindu. May 10. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-judiciary-pendency-data-courts-statistics-explain-judges-ramana-chief-justiceundertrials/article65378182.ece   Supreme Court of India. 1950. “A.K. Gopalan vs The State of Madras.Union of India on 19 May, 1950.” https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1857950/   ______. 1978. “Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India on 25 January, 1978.” https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1766147/   ______. 1980. “Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors vs Union of India & Ors on 31 July, 1980.” https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1939993/   ______. “S.P.Gupta vs President of India and Ors. On 30 December, 1981.” https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1294854/   Suresh, V. 2023. “Executive’s Attempt to Discredit and Undermine Independence of the Judiciary.” The India Forum. January 20. https://www.theindiaforum.in/forum/executives-attempt-discredit-and-undermine-independence-judiciary   Vaishnav, Milan. 2021. “The Challenge of India’s Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy No. 62. https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/62-special-issue/the-challenge-of-indias-democratic-backsliding/   Venkatesan, V. 2023. “As SC Collegium Recalls Pending Recommendation, Chances of Justice Muralidhar;s SC Elevation Are Slim.” The Wire. April 20. https://thewire.in/law/government-sc-collegium-justice-muralidhar   Vishwanath, Apurva. 2020. “10 free speech cases this year: In most, no relief from Supreme Court — except when Centre did not object.” The Indian Express. August 22. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/10-free-speech-cases-this-year-in-supreme-court-6564796/       [1] The National Emergency in 1975 and the supersession of judges which led to rapid politicization judiciary, actively contributed to judicial surrender to the executive in the controversial ADM Jabalpur vs. Shivkant Shukla that backed government’s act of suspending right to life under Article 21 of the Fundamental Rights. The SC overturned the decisions of several High Courts that had declared suspension of habeas corpus illegal and took a stand that supported government’s claims. [2] See the press report here: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/77-per-cent-believe-indian-judiciary-is-corrupt-survey/story-uAiGMs9kWfP9iqFnUsFqpL.html (accessed July 23, 2013)     ■ Niranjan Sahoo, PhD, is a Senior Fellow with Observer Research Foundation (ORF)’s Governance and Politics Initiative. With years of expertise in governance and public policy, he now anchors studies and programmes on democracy, human rights, federalism, electoral reforms (particularly issues related to political funding), and cross-cutting issues of exclusion, insurgencies, affirmative action and inclusion. A recipient of the Asia Fellowship (2009) and a former Sir Ratan Tata Fellow, he currently serves as the South Asia member for the Carnegie Rising Democracies Network, where he debates and writes on democracy, foreign policy, human rights and other related issues.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수_EAI 연구원 문의: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr  

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[ADRN Working Paper] Horizontal Accountability in Sri Lanka: The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption

1. Introduction   Democracy in Sri Lanka has a deep history, with regular elections being held since its independence in 1948 (Parliament of Sri Lanka 2020). In a robust democracy, suitable checks and balances within the branches of government ensure that the executive is held accountable (Landry Signé 2018; Schmitter and Karl 1991). Three sub-types of accountability advance good governance in a democracy; these are vertical, horizontal, and diagonal accountability. Vertical accountability is concerned with the ability of the citizens of a country to hold their government accountable, while diagonal accountability is concerned with oversight of the government by civil society organizations and the media. Horizontal accountability is the capacity of state institutions to hold the other branches of government accountable (Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova, 2017).   Sri Lanka has gone through a political and economic crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission team, discussing IMF support for Sri Lanka in 2022, highlighted reducing corruption vulnerabilities as a macro-critical challenge needing to be addressed (IMF 2022). The Aragalaya (Sinhalese word for ‘struggle’) in Sri Lanka, which began in March 2022, was a rallying call for systеmic change in government and the resignation of former President Gotabaya Rajapakse. The protest movement demanded a more accountable government, specifically holding corrupt politicians accountable. In this regard, protestors have called for allegedly stolen public funds to be returned by public officials and for more public scrutiny of elected representatives (Economy Next 2022).   In the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, Sri Lanka scored 36/100 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) (Transparency International 2022). The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) is a constitutional and legal horizontal accountability mechanism that checks the executive. CIABOC was established with the enactment of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution by the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption Act, No. 19 of 1994. CIABOC has two overarching mandates: (ⅰ) to investigate allegations of bribery and corruption; and (ⅱ) to direct the institution of prosecutions for offenses under the Bribery Act and the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law No. 1 of 1975.   This working paper seeks to assess whether CIABOC’s mandate and performance as an anti-corruption agency are consistent with international conventions and standards. This paper is presented in three sections. The first section identifies the gaps in the legal framework of CIABOC compared to the key conventions Sri Lanka has ratified, international standards, and the salient provisions therein. This section also analyzes critical drivers of the success of Hong Kong’s anti-corruption agency and uses this as a benchmark for comparison with CIABOC. The second section discusses the legal and procedural limitations undermining CIABOC’s ability to fulfill its expected functions. The final section draws conclusions from the preceding analysis and provides recommendations to address these limitations.   2. Comparative Analysis   2.1. Legal Gap Analysis with International Instruments   Sri Lanka ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption (“the UNCAC”) on March 31, 2004. As part of a country’s obligations under the UNCAC, the Jakarta Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies (“the Jakarta Principles”) were developed, providing a benchmark for the independence and effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). At the invitation of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) of Indonesia, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), experts around the world developed the 16 Jakarta Principles. The Jakarta Principles are synonymous with an accreditation systеm, unlike a Convention such as the UNCAC to which member states are bound. Therefore, this working paper will use the UNCAC and the Jakarta principles as benchmarks for its analysis. Table 1 below identifies the salient provisions of the Convention and the Jakarta Principles.   Table 1. Legal Gap Analysis with International Instruments   International convention Salient provisions UN Convention Against Corruption Article 6 – Preventive anti-corruption body or bodies  1. Each State Party Shall... ensure the existence of a body… that prevents corruption by such means as:  (a) implementing the policies referred to in Article 5 and, where appropriate, overseeing and coordinating the implementation of these policies; (b) increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of corruption.    2. Each body should be independent and carry out its function effectively and free from undue influence.   Article 8 – Codes of conduct for public officials  4. Establish measures and systеms to facilitate the reporting by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities, when such acts come to their notice in the performance of their functions. Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies Principle 1  ACAs shall have a clear mandate to tackle corruption through prevention, education, awareness-raising, investigation and prosecution, either through one agency or multiple coordinated agencies.    Principle 2  ACAs shall not operate in isolation and shall foster good working relations with State agencies, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders, including international cooperation.    Principle 3  ACAs shall, be established by a proper and stable legal framework, such as the Constitution or a special law to ensure continuity.    Principle 4  ACA heads shall be appointed through a process that ensures their apolitical stance, impartiality, neutrality, integrity and competence.    Principle 5  In the event of suspension, dismissal, resignation, retirement or end of tenure, all powers of the ACA head shall be delegated by law to an appropriate official in the ACA within a reasonable period of time until the appointment of the new ACA head.    Principle 6  ACA heads shall have security of tenure and shall be removed only through a legally established procedure equivalent to the procedure for the removal of a key independent authority specially protected by law (such as the Chief Justice).    Principle 7  ACAs shall adopt codes of conduct requiring the highest standards of ethical conduct from their staff and a strong compliance regime.    Principle 8  ACA heads and employees shall have immunity from civil and criminal proceedings for acts committed within the performance of their mandate. ACA heads and employees shall be protected from malicious civil and criminal proceedings.    Principle 9  ACA employees shall be remunerated at a level that would allow for the employment of a sufficient number of qualified staff.    Principle 10  ACAs shall have the power to recruit and dismiss their own staff according to clear and transparent internal procedures.    Principle 11  ACAs shall have sufficient financial resources to carry out their tasks, taking into account the country’s budgetary resources, population size and land area. ACAs shall be entitled to timely, planned, reliable and adequate resources for the gradual capacity development and improvement of the ACA’s operations and fulfilment of the mandate.    Principle 12  ACAs shall receive a budgetary allocation over which ACAs have full management and control without prejudice to the appropriate accounting standards and auditing requirements.    Principle 13  ACAs shall develop and establish clear rules and standard operating procedures, including monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms, to minimize any misconduct and abuse of power by ACAs.    Principle 14  ACAs shall strictly adhere to the rule of law and be accountable to mechanisms established to prevent any abuse of power.    Principle 15  ACAs shall formally report at least annually on their activities to the public.    Principle 16  ACAs shall communicate and engage with the public regularly in order to ensure public confidence in their independence, fairness and effectiveness.   When considering how effective CIABOC has been as an anti-corruption agency against these international standards, there are two critical shortcomings in CIABOC’s legal framework. The first of these shortcomings is that the opaque process of appointing commissioners is in contravention of Principle 4 of the Jakarta Principles, which requires that the appointment of commissioners occurs through a process that ensures their apolitical stance and impartiality.   In line with Principle 15 of the Jakarta Principles, CIABOC has consistently published progress and annual reports on its website from 2018 onwards. However, CIABOC has not successfully ensured public confidence in its independence, fairness, and effectiveness in line with Principle 16. There is low public confidence in CIABOC’s effectiveness, evidenced by a survey conducted by Verité Research in 2019 which found that the most common reason for not reporting corruption was because respondents thought no action would be taken (Verité Research 2019). Therefore, the second shortcoming concerns low prosecution and conviction rates, which have resulted in low public confidence in CIABOC.   2.2. Comparative Analysis with Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)   Hong Kong’s ICAC is widely known for its three-pronged approach to battling corruption – deterrence, prevention, and education (Hsieh 2017, p. 5). In Asia, Hong Kong represents one of the most successful models for controlling corruption (Quah 2021). The ICAC’s 2022 annual survey found that 90.1% of the 1,761 respondents were of the opinion that the ICAC deserved their support (ICAC 2022). In the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, Hong Kong scored 76/100 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) (Transparency International 2022).   There are several elements of success notable from the ICAC. First, in setting up the ICAC, there was a clear call for the Commission to be separate from the police, who were notoriously corrupt, and from any other government department. Second, the ICAC’s high conviction rate and investigation of high-profile cases demonstrated that the ICAC is effective in its anti-corruption work (Wong 2019). These elements have enabled the ICAC to succeed in holding the executive accountable.   2.2.1. CIABOC   The first limb of CIABOC’s mandate is that CIABOC can launch an investigation once an allegation of bribery or corruption is communicated to the Commission if it believes that the complaint is genuine and that the complaint discloses material upon which an investigation should be conducted (CIABOC Act, Section 4). The second limb of the CIABOC’s mandate is that once an offense is disclosed to the Commission, it can direct proceedings against such affiliated people (CIABOC Act, Section 3).   The powers of the Commission include, among others, the following: (a) to procure and receive all such evidence, written or oral, and to examine all such persons as the Commission may think necessary or desirable; (b) to require any person to attend before the Commission for the purposes of being examined by the Commission and to answer, orally on oath or affirmation, any question put to him by the Commission relevant, in the opinion of the Commission, to the matters under investigation; and (c) to summon any person to produce any document or other thing in his possession or control.   Compared to Hong Kong’s ICAC, two shortcomings can be observed: 1) CIABOC is connected with the police and the Attorney General’s Department, which affects its independence because the police are perceived by the public as corrupt, and the Attorney General acts as the chief legal advisor to the state and therefore cannot be expected to also prosecute the state for corruption/bribery without a conflict of interest arising and 2) CIABOC’s low conviction rate and its failure to investigate complaints have prevented it from demonstrating that it acts effectively to curb corruption.   3. Limitations of CIABOC as a Horizontal Accountability Mechanism   The comparative analyses above reveal several limitations that undermine CIABOC’s ability to succeed as an effective horizontal accountability mechanism. These limitations are categorized under three distinct challenges: ⅰ) gaps in the legal framework, ⅱ) the appearance of bias, and ⅲ) low public confidence.   3.1. Gaps in the Legal Framework   3.1.1. Lack of Transparency in the Process of Appointing Commissioners   On the recommendation of the Constitutional Council, the President appoints the members of the Commission. Under the 21st Amendment to the Constitution, issues of independence arise in the composition of the Constitutional Council itself. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka has stated that under the 21st Amendment, there is a danger that a majority of the members of the Constitutional Council may be controlled by the government of the day, which impacts the overall independence of the Constitutional Council in appointing members to CIABOC (The Island 2022).   The Anti-Corruption Agency Assessment Report for Sri Lanka, conducted by Transparency International Sri Lanka in 2016, reported that CIABOC’s ability to emerge as an independent body was high. However, the report highlighted that CIABOC’s independence was impaired by the fact that the Constitutional Council’s procedure in recommending the appointment of Commissioners, was not clearly provided for under the 19th Amendment. The lack of a transparent procedure for appointment, gave the Council the freedom to take any steps it deems fit to make recommendations, which made the appointment process less transparent (Transparency International 2017a). This shortcoming is still present in the Constitutional Council under the 21st Amendment, which does not specify how the Constitutional Council selects candidates to be recommended to the President.   The lack of transparency in the process for the appointment of commissioners in Sri Lanka means that the scope for executive influence is higher and is contrary to Principle 4 of the Jakarta Principles, which requires heads of ACAs to be appointed by a process that ensures their impartiality (Gloppen 2014). Therefore, CIABOC is unable to emerge as an independent horizontal accountability mechanism that acts as an effective check on the government due to the gap in the law on the process for the appointment of commissioners.   3.1.2. Lack of Impartial Process for the Appointment and Removal of the Director General   The process for the appointment of the Director General to CIABOC also contributes to the appearance of bias. Principle 4 of the Jakarta Principles requires heads of ACAs to be appointed through a process that ensures their impartiality. Principle 6 of the Jakarta Principles requires heads of ACAs to be given security of tenure and a legally established procedure for removal. In Sri Lanka, the President may appoint a Director General in consultation with the members of the Commission. The power to appoint the Chief Financial and Admіnistrative Officer for CIABOC is vested solely to the President, contrary to Principle 4 since an appointment exclusively by the President is not a process that ensures impartiality. The removal of the Director General is also vested in the President. The disciplinary procedure applicable to the Director General is unclear as disciplinary matters are generally handled by the appointing authority, in this case, the President. The appointment, removal, and disciplinary procedure being controlled solely by the President has restricted the ability of successive commissions to be free from undue influence (UNODC 2018).   3.2. Appearance of Bias and Lack of Sufficient Resources   3.2.1. Investigation and Prosecution of Cases by the Police and Attorney General   Because CIABOC’s investigators are seconded from the police department and its admіnistrative staff are sourced from the Public Services Commission, the appearance of bias increases as it effectively “brings government regulation through the back door” (Transparency International 2017a). A survey conducted by Verité Research in 2019 revealed that 40% of participants incorrectly believed that CIABOC was a department under the Sri Lankan police and that 47% of the sample did not know whether CIABOC was a department under the police or not (Verité Research 2019). In the same survey, when asked to list out three of the most corrupt sectors in the country, respondents listed the police as the most corrupt sector. This perception of the police cannot contribute positively to CIABOC’s reputation since the cultural proclivity of distrust towards the police may extend to CIABOC due to its connection with the police. Therefore, CIABOC being inextricably linked with the police affects CIABOC’s ability to appear as an independent horizontal accountability mechanism. Further, the involvement of the police in CIABOC’s investigations creates a conflict of interest in cases where police officers are being investigated for corruption or bribery. This is contrary to Article 6 and Article 36 of the UNCAC, which requires anti-corruption agencies to be granted independence to carry out their functions effectively and without undue influence.   While CIABOC has an independent legal division to advise on prosecuting cases and to institute prosecutions, CIABOC depends on the Attorney General’s Department to handle prosecutions and hires staff from the Department as consultants (Transparency International Sri Lanka 2017a). The Attorney General’s Department, in effect, plays a dual role as the chief legal advisor to the State while also prosecuting the State in bribery and corruption cases. The role of the Attorney General as the chief legal advisor to the State indicates that the Attorney General represents the State and therefore acts in the best interests of the State (OHCHR 2017). This impedes the Attorney General’s Department’s ability to emerge as an independent prosecutor in cases against the State (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2020). Therefore, CIABOC’s dependence on the Department is contrary to Article 6 of the UNCAC, as it prevents CIABOC from maintaining its independence when it prosecutes cases.   3.3. Low Public Confidence   The Global Corruption Barometer 2019 for Sri Lanka by Transparency International revealed that 46% of citizens were of the opinion that CIABOC was ‘doing very badly or fairly badly’ in relation to fighting corruption in the country (Transparency International Sri Lanka 2019). Also noted was that one of the key restraints to tackling corruption in the public sector was the low degree of certainty that action would be taken on reports of corruption, indicating that the public need to be convinced of effective action being taken (Transparency International Sri Lanka 2019). The survey conducted by Verité Research in 2019 revealed similar findings. Although 80% of respondents confirmed their awareness that the public could make complaints of bribery and corruption to CIABOC, the most cited reason for not reporting corruption was that respondents felt that nothing would be done about it (Verité Research 2019). public perception of CIABOC’s inaction reveals that Principle 16 of the Jakarta Principles has not been successfully implemented since the public does not believe CIABOC to be an effective anti-corruption agency.   3.3.1 Low Prosecution and Conviction Rates   In the survey conducted by Verité Research, 62% of participants were of the opinion that the most effective way of combatting corruption was prosecution (Verité Research 2019). Table 2 below contains a breakdown of proposals for action forwarded to CIABOC’s Legal Division after the investigation of complaints. The information displayed in Table 2 reveals that only 2.5% of the complaints investigated in 2022 and 4.1% of the complaints investigated in 2021 were prosecuted. While low prosecution rates may be emblematic of systеmic issues in the justice systеm, such as delays in prosecution, diminished rates of prosecution of corruption/bribery are concerning.   Table 2. Breakdown of proposals forwarded to the Legal Division after investigation in 2021 and 2022   Decision No. of Files 2021 2022 No. of files proposed for filing cases 103 86 No. of files proposed to be closed 1,370 858 For comparison/ legal advice/ amalgamated/ confidential 929 12 Ordered to record statements 62 2,465 Total 2,464 3,421   Source: CIABOC 2021a; CIABOC 2022b   Regarding conviction rates, 94 cases were concluded in court from January to November 2022. Among those prosecutions, offenders were convicted in 20 cases, resulting in a case-based conviction rate of 21.2% in 2022. In 2021, 69 cases were concluded in court, and offenders were convicted in 11 cases. Accordingly, the case-based conviction rate for 2021 was 15.9%.   Contained in Table 3 below is a breakdown of cases concluded in the Magistrates and High Courts. The information in Table 3 reveals that in 2022, 48% of the cases prosecuted were withdrawn, which suggests that of the 2.5% of complaints that were proposed for prosecution, almost half of the cases were withdrawn. In 2021, 60% of cases prosecuted were withdrawn, so of the 4.1% of complaints that were proposed for prosecution, a majority were withdrawn.   Table 3. Breakdown of cases concluded in court from 2019-2022     2019 2020 2021 2022   Magistrates Court High Court Magistrates Court High Court Magistrates Court High Court Magistrates Court High Court Convictions 05 40 04 21 02 09 03 17 Acquittals 13 32 05 22 01 15 04 25 Other/Withdrawn 01 03 00 03 23 19 25 21 Total 19 75 09 46 26 43 32 63*   * In a case involving two accused parties, one accused pleaded guilty and the case against the other accused is pending which is why there’s a total of 95 cases.   Source: CIABOC 2020; CIABOC 2021b; CIABOC 2022a; CIABOC 2022b   These figures indicate that there may be some truth in the public’s perception that CIABOC would not take sufficient action if complaints were made.   4. Conclusion and Recommendations   For CIABOC to improve performance as a horizontal accountability mechanism, there needs to be an improvement on several grounds, which can be categorized as follows:   4.1. Amendments to the Legal Framework within which CIABOC Operates:   ⅰ) It is important that the procedure by which the Constitutional Council selects candidates to recommend as Commissioners is clearly set out. In the Maldives, commissioners are appointed following a weighted assessment against set criteria (Transparency International, 2017b). If Sri Lanka were to adopt a similar process, it is likely that technocrats with a background in anti-corruption, instead of political appointees, would be appointed. The presentation of the process must be clear to ensure transparency, but it can involve calling for nominations from the public and an interview process. A transparent process will likely create public trust in the appointment process, resulting in public support for CIABOC and confidence in its leadership (Schütte, 2015). Published eligibility criteria would assist in this regard. If the criteria for selection are publicly available, the process would be subject to public scrutiny, thus allowing these criteria to be reviewed and amended as needed.   ⅱ) The Commissioners appointed to CIABOC should not only be independent, but they should appear independent as well. They must exhibit an apolitical stance. In the selection process, the allocation of resources is needed to evaluate the character and affiliations of candidates before they are appointed. Including candidates who are not civil servants or members of the police force may also impact “the actual and perceived impartiality, competence and responsiveness” of CIABOC’s leadership (Schütte 2015).   ⅲ) Section 10 of the CIABOC Act should be amended, so that the Director General is appointed by and placed under the purview of an independent committee in terms of disciplinary matters. The procedure for selection and appointment must be clearly set out. The Director General must also be given security of tenure, and only Parliament should be able to remove the Director General on the grounds of misconduct or incapacity. Granting security of tenure and establishing a procedure for removal is in line with Principle 6 of the Jakarta Principles and will strengthen the Director General’s independence.   4.2. Limit the Appearance of Bias and Allocate Sufficient Resources to CIABOC   CIABOC would require a substantial investigations unit with trained investigators to reduce dependence on the police. In its previous study, Verité Research recommended that CIABOC takes steps to differentiate its investigative officers from the police, for example, by providing CIABOC’s investigative officers with a different colored uniform (Verité Research 2019). In terms of prosecution, either a change to the function of the Attorney General is required – separate prosecutorial and advisory bodies – or CIABOC’s legal division should be trained to undertake complex prosecutions independently of the Attorney General’s department.   4.3. Improve Public Confidence   ⅰ) Internal and external review bodies should be established to ensure the routine and thorough investigation of complaints by the Investigations Division. These review bodies will play a significant role in ensuring that cases are not withdrawn unnecessarily.   ⅱ) Table 3 revealed that a large proportion of CIABOC’s cases fall into the “other/withdrawn” category. CIABOC should be required to specify what “other” encompasses and disclose reasons for the withdrawal of cases. A reform of the rules of proactive disclosure that apply to CIABOC under the Right to Information Act No. 12 of 2016 or a reform of the CIABOC Act can impose this requirement. ■   References   Centre for Policy Alternatives. 2020. “Rethinking the Attorney-General’s Department in Sri Lanka: Ideas for Reform.” Accessed January 9, 2023. https://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Ags-Dept-Final.pdf   Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption: CIABOC. 2020. “Progress Report of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) From 01st January 2019 to 31st December 2019.” https://ciaboc.gov.lk/media/attachments/2020/06/29/report-part---1-english.pdf   ______. 2021a. “Annual Performance Report.” https://ciaboc.gov.lk/images/pdf/2022/4_ANNUAL_PERFORMANCE_REPORT_English.pdf   ______. 2021b. “Progress Report of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption From 01st January to 30th November 2020.” https://ciaboc.gov.lk/images/Reports/2021/progress__Report_English_-_2020.pdf   ______. 2022a. “Progress Report of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption From 01st January to 31st December 2021.” https://ciaboc.gov.lk/images/pdf/2022/Report_December_2021_-_English.pdf   ______. 2022b. “Progress Report of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption From 01st January to 30th November 2022.” https://ciaboc.gov.lk/images/pdf/2022/Monthly_progress__January_-_November_English.pdf   Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption Act, No. 19 of 1994. https://www.ciaboc.gov.lk/images/Publications/Commission_Act_english.pdf   Economy Next. 2022. “Sri Lanka protestors occupy near president’s office to continue agitation.” April 11. Accessed 09 January 2023. https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-protesters-occupy-near-presidents-office-to-continue-agitation-92880/   Gloppen, S. 2014. “Courts, Corruption and Judicial Independence.” In Corruption, Grabbing and Development: Real World Challenges, edited by T. Søreide and A. Williams, 68–79. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.   Hsieh, Ming-Li. 2017. “A Case Study: Lessons from the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption.” In International Journal of Criminology and Sociology. p.5.   Independent Commission Against Corruption: ICAC. 2022. “ICAC Annual Survey 2022: Executive Summary.” https://www.icac.org.hk/en/survey/finding/index.html   International Monetary Fund: IMF. 2022. “IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Sri Lanka.” Press Release No. 22/242. 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Marquard, Valeriya Mechkova. 2017. “Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability.” V-Dem Institute Working Paper 2017: 46. https://www.v-dem.net/media/publications/v-dem_working_paper_2017_46.pdf   Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution. https://www.parliament.lk/files/pdf/constitution/constitution-upto-19th.pdf   Parliament of Sri Lanka. 2020. “Dates of Elections.” https://www.parliament.lk/dates-of-elections   Quah, J. S. T. 2021. “Best practices for combatting corruption: learning from Singapore and Hong Kong.” In Tummala, K.K. (Ed.), Corruption in the Public Sector: An International Perspective, Chapter 2. Bingley: Emerald Publishing. 7-22.   Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. “What democracy is… and is not." Journal of Democracy 2, 3: 75-88.   Schütte, Sofie Arjon. 2015. “The fish’s head: Appointment and removal procedures for anti-corruption agency leadership.” In U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, U4 Issue May 2015 No 12, p. 22. https://www.u4.no/publications/the-fish-s-head-appointment-and-removal-procedures-for-anti-corruption-agency-leadership.pdf   Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution. https://www.parliament.lk/files/pdf/constitution/constitution-upto-17th.pdf   The Island. 2022. “BASL: If 21A fails, that will adversely affect future law reform initiatives.” October 28. 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Resource Material Series No. 7 p. 152 at https://www.unafei.or.jp/publications/pdf/RS_No107/No107_1_ALL.pdf     ■ Shannon Talayaratne is a Junior Research Analyst at Verité Research.   ■ Nishana Weerasooriya is a lawyer specializing in criminal law and public international law. Prior to joining Verité, Nishana was an Assistant District Attorney in New York, where she investigated and prosecuted hundreds of cases for violent and non-violent felony crimes including attempted murder, firearm possession, burglary, robbery, and assault. She received her Bachelor of Arts focused on Government and International Relations with honors from Clark University, her Master of Public Admіnistration with honors from Clark University, and her Juris Doctorate from Temple University Beasley School of Law. Nishana is licensed to practice law in the State of New York.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수_EAI 연구원 문의: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr  

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