In 2022, after two years of heated negotiations, European Union (EU) institutions reached an agreement on the final text of the Digital Services Act, the new EU law to tackle illegal content online. “The Digital Services Act will set new global standards. [...] We have finally made sure that what is illegal offline is also illegal online,” said Christel Schaldemose, the lead Member of the European Parliament on the file, after the agreement was reached (European Parliament 2022).   In a nutshell, this reflects the ambitions of EU policymakers for the file to become both a new golden standard for platform regulation in the EU and beyond; and to fulfil its primary goal to tackle illegal content online.   This article will focus on these two aspects: on one hand we will explain how, despite its scope being limited to illegal content, the Digital Services Act can also be effective in addressing online disinformation; and on the other hand we will explore the potential impact of the Digital Services Act beyond the EU, in particular on potential regulatory regimes on disinformation in Asia.   Background: The EU Digital Services Act and the Political Context on Disinformation   The Digital Services Act (DSA) is a recently adopted EU Regulation aiming to address the proliferation of illegal content online. Formally signed into law in 2022, the DSA is currently in force. For some rules, particularly, those addressed at Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) - the deadline to ensure compliance was August 2023, while the remaining rules will be applicable as of February 2024.   The DSA was one of the main milestones within the EU digital policy agenda during the current European Commission’s mandate, alongside the Digital Markets Act - establishing rules to ban certain anti-competitive behaviors online; the Artificial Intelligence Act - introducing risk-based obligations for AI systеms; and broader rules on the governance and re-use of non-personal data.   More specifically, the DSA has put forward a series of rules applicable to different kinds of online intermediaries, differentiated by type and size - with obligations applicable in a cumulative way. Such obligations vary from rules and mechanisms for content moderation applicable to all sorts of online platforms to full-fledged risk assessments conducted only by VLOPs and VLOSEs.   The scope of the DSA is limited to illegal content and does not directly address harmful content online. Content such as bullying, harassment, (non-illegal) hate speech,[1] and online disinformation is therefore outside of the DSA’s scope. The exclusion of harmful content from the DSA was a conscious decision taken by the European Commission to avoid discussions on what would represent harmful content and whether it is reasonable to restrict free speech on something that, per se, is not illegal - with the risk of abuses and censorship by the part of platforms and governments alike.   In this framework, the solutions put forward in the DSA against harmful but lawful content are relatively indirect, as they focus on ensuring platforms are transparent and accountable for the moderation of such content. The EU rulebook is, however, not the only proposed solution in Europe. For example, the UK’s Online Safety Bill proposal has put forward a different approach, trying to set out clear policies on harmful disinformation with the largest audiences and a range of high-risk features (Government of the United Kingdom 2022a). Negotiators involved in the bill subsequently backtracked on the inclusion of harmful content due to the concerns of limiting freedom of expression, thus showing how controversial it is to regulate disinformation through legal measures (Government of the United Kingdom 2022b).   At the same time, the issue of online disinformation is becoming salient in the EU political discussions, especially following the start of the war in Ukraine, the recently re-ignited Israel-Hamas conflict and the upcoming EU elections. In this context, while the DSA does not address disinformation directly, it still contains several rules that aim to increase the transparency and accountability of online platforms. EU member states also have individually adopted different approaches to what should be the subject of content moderation when it comes to disinformation. France and Germany enacted restrictive national laws against election misinformation in 2018 and online hate speech in 2017, respectively. Other European states such as Austria, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Spain have also recently introduced or modified regulations to fight disinformation (Hoboken and Fathaigh 2021).   Recent controversies and court rulings surrounding state fact-checking, new legislation, and online content moderation practices have increased attention on this subject (European Digital Rights 2020; Goujard 2021). In Hungary, for example, the 2020 Enabling Acts makes disseminating fake news a criminal act punishable with up to five years of imprisonment. While these laws have been used to tackle disinformation online, they also serve political purposes, as in some cases, they have been used to silence opposition and criticism of the regimes. Even at the EU institution level, the fight against disinformation has already been used to advocate for social media shutdowns in crises and prompt the removal of disinformation that goes beyond the provisions contained in the DSA (Goujard and Camut 2023; Meyers 2023).   In East Asia, there are many examples of such tension between tackling the spread of fake news and government abuses posing threats to free speech. It is a well-known phenomenon in which the governments themselves are actors spreading disinformation or using regulation against fake news to remove content of political opposition (Ong 2021). In Thailand, the ban on the dissemination of ‘false messages’ during the COVID-19 crisis has drawn criticism for trying to shield the authorities from public backlash of their handling of the pandemic (Reuters 2021). In Myanmar, the military regime has been working on a new cybersecurity law that, among other things, seeks to criminalize the use of VPNs to access banned Western social media platforms (Chau and Oo 2022). In Vietnam, ‘toxic content’ has generally been defined as content that is detrimental to the reputation of the authorities and the ruling Communist Party (Luong 2018). Finally, rights groups in Malaysia have called out its fake news law as a smokescreen to suppress online dissent (Guest 2021).   Given the similar challenges of tackling online disinformation and also preventing abuses by governments against free speech in both Europe and East Asia, it is worth considering how the EU solutions to tackle disinformation in the DSA would work in practice and whether they could truly represent the “global standard” that EU policymakers wish for.   How the Digital Services Act Can Be Effective Against Disinformation   While the DSA does not directly regulate neither harmful content nor, more specifically, disinformation, there are still several provisions that have the potential to have an impact on tackling online disinformation.   First, the DSA contains numerous transparency obligations for online platforms and how they moderate content online. For example, under the DSA more transparency is needed regarding the platforms’ terms and conditions; platforms must issue transparency reports on their moderation activities as well as to provide statements of the reason for the content removed; and VLOPs and VLOSEs will be subject to even broader reporting obligations. It will also be possible for users to file complaints against moderation decisions taken against them.   On top of these transparency obligations, VLOPs and VLOSEs will also be obliged to conduct systеmic risk assessments and take related mitigation measures, including those on fundamental rights and freedom of expression and information, civic discourse, and electoral processes. In compliance with the DSA, these assessments will also be subject to external independent audits.   Rules on data access for researchers complement the increased transparency. Research on social media discourse has been crucial in identifying problems and threats of disinformation. Researchers, however, have faced significant limitations in this work, due to problems with accessing data, as it was the platforms themselves deciding on access or signing voluntary commitments for specific categories of data, for example under the Code of Practice on Disinformation. Under the DSA, however, VLOPs and VLOSEs will be obliged to provide research organizations with the data needed to assess their compliance.   The DSA also strengthens platform obligations regarding recommender systеms as it requires them to explain the main parameters behind them and consider them in risk assessments and risk mitigation measures. Recommender systеms also play an important role in facilitating the spread of disinformation as they decide which content will be displayed to users, often using criteria that are not transparent and unknown to users and researchers alike. Some studies also investigated their tendency to favor more polemic or controversial content such as fake news.   Finally, the DSA also foresees the possibility for VLOPs and VLOSEs to sign voluntary codes of conduct to tackle specific challenges linked with systеmic risks which would be monitored regularly by different authorities in charge including the European Commission and the National Digital Services Coordinators.   Furthermore, the DSA is not the only instrument in EU legislation against disinformation and it works along with soft law solutions such as the EU’s new Code of Practice for Disinformation - which could soon transform into a code of conduct under the DSA. So far, this code has 34 signatories, including platforms, tech companies and civil society organizations. It sets out extensive commitments by platforms and industry to fight disinformation. Some commitments concern a cut of financial incentives for spreading disinformation and expanding fact-checking, among other things.   In parallel, work has also been ongoing to ensure media freedom in the EU with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), containing rules to protect media pluralism and independence in the EU; and transparency of political advertising, with the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising Regulation (TTPA).   By working together, these initiatives are set to bring more transparency and, as a result, more accountability in online content removal, potentially reducing the possibility of abuses and censorship.   Potential Impact of the Digital Services Act beyond Europe and in East Asia   The DSA has been drafted as one of the EU’s top priorities concerning its digital agenda. Therefore, the EU has been betting on the new rules becoming an international golden standard that could push forward beyond the EU. The EU has considered the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) an example of the so-called “Brussels effect” and wishes to replicate its success with platform regulation. Thus, it is very likely that the EU will promote the legislation as a best practice to inspire legislation in other countries, including within East Asia.   It is however unclear whether exporting a piece of legislation in different contexts could represent an effective approach in different geopolitical contexts. As highlighted previously, the DSA is far from an isolated set of rules and works. It operates with the previously mentioned complementary initiatives, including the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the EMFA, the TTPA and even the GDPR. Additional activities such as promoting media literacy and sufficient funding for independent fact checkers also remain relevant to support the DSA framework and will make or break the effectiveness of the DSA against disinformation.   Another issue with exporting the DSA is that governments could misuse replicated provisions to restrict freedom of expression. For example, DSA provisions originally meant for illegal content could be misused to target content such as disinformation as a pretext to silence criticism and opposition. This scenario is not unlikely and has already manifested itself in the EU with Commissioner Thierry Breton’s statements on the Israel-Hamas conflict referred to above, which could risk exacerbating censorship, with the incorrect justification that this solution has already been adopted and effective in the EU.   Finally, even if the DSA rules are replicated in a similar context and with the same scope, they could still be abused. Additionally, it is too early to say whether the proposed solutions will be effective, as the rules have not yet been fully implemented.   On the other hand, two positive elements to consider as potential inspiration from the EU law would be the clear scope limited to illegal content and the increased transparency that will make more data available which could indicate how to deal with this issue further.   Conclusions   With disinformation being a major risk for online civic discourse and free elections, and given the unstable international situation, it is essential to continue monitoring the DSA implementation and draw conclusions from available data. While the DSA model still needs to be proven effective, it might represent a guideline and potential best practice for Asian countries by providing them a possible solution to create a healthier and more democratic online sphere. On the other hand, the EU can also learn from the experience in other countries, especially from the abuse of content regulation laws to make sure the enforcement of the DSA is limited to illegal content and does not interfere with free speech by justifying censorship. ■   References   Chau, Thompson, and Dominic Oo. 2022. “Myanmar renews plans to curb internet usage with VPN ban.” Nikkei Asia. January 21. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-renews-plans-to-curb-internet-usage-with-VPN-ban   European Digital Rights. 2020. “French Avia law declared unconstitutional: what does this teach us at EU level?” June 24. https://edri.org/our-work/french-avia-law-declared-unconstitutional-what-does-this-teach-us-at-eu-level/   European Parliament. 2022. “Digital Services Act: agreement for a transparent and safe online environment.” April 23. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220412IPR27111/digital-services-act-agreement-for-a-transparent-and-safe-online-environment   Goujard, Clothilde. 2021. “German Facebook ruling boosts EU push for stricter content moderation.” Politico. July 29. https://www.politico.eu/article/german-court-tells-facebook-to-reinstate-removed-posts/   Goujard, Clothilde, and Nicolas Camut. 2023. “Social media riot shutdowns possible under EU content law, top official says.” Politico. July 10. https://www.politico.eu/article/social-media-riot-shutdowns-possible-under-eu-content-law-breton-says/   Government of the United Kingdom. 2022a. “Online Safety Bill: supporting documents.” March 17. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-bill-supporting-documents   ______. 2022b. “Overview of expected impact of changes to the Online Safety Bill.” January 18. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-bill-supporting-documents/overview-of-expected-impact-of-changes-to-the-online-safety-bill   Guest, Peter. 2021. “Malaysia’s brand-new “fake news” law is built to silence dissent.” Rest of World. March 15. https://restofworld.org/2021/malaysias-brand-new-fake-news-law-is-built-to-silence-dissent/   Hoboken, Joris van, and Ronan Ó Fathaigh. 2021. “Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for Speech and Privacy.” UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law 6, 1: 9-36.   Luong, Dien. 2018. “Vietnam’s Internet is in trouble.” The Washington Post. February 19. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/19/vietnam-internet/   Meyers, Zach. 2023. “Breton’s megaphone enforcement is no way to tackle disinformation.” Euractiv. October 17. https://www.euractiv.com/section/media/opinion/bretons-megaphone-enforcement-is-no-way-to-tackle-disinformation/   Ong, Jonathan Corpus. 2021. “Where the State is the Biggest Bad Actor and Regulation is a Bad Word.” Social Science Research Council. https://items.ssrc.org/disinformation-democracy-and-conflict-prevention/southeast-asias-disinformation-crisis-where-the-state-is-the-biggest-bad-actor-and-regulation-is-a-bad-word/   Reuters. 2021. “Thailand bans “false messages” amid criticism of handling of coronavirus.” July 30. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-bans-false-messages-amid-criticism-handling-coronavirus-2021-07-30/     [1] Not all hate speech is considered illegal everywhere, as it often depends on national legislation.     ■ Sofia Calabrese is a Digital Policy Manager at European Partnership for Democracy.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수 EAI 연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr  

Introduction   In a historic decision, the Indian Parliament in a special session recently passed the long-awaited Women Reservation Bill (officially called the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam, 2023). The legislation (106th Constitutional Amendment Act), which received the president’s approval on September 28, establishes a requirement to reserve one-third of the total seats in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Parliament), Vidhan Sabha (state legislative assemblies), and the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (Pathak and Roy 2023). The law will become effective following the completion of the Census in 2026 and the delineation of constituencies, which will be used as the basis for allocating seats to women (Government of India 2023). As per the new legislation, this reservation will remain in effect for a period of 15 years and can be extended by the Parliament. Furthermore, the allocation of seats set aside for women will undergo rotation after each delineation. The new law, when implemented, will increase women Members of Parliament (Lok Sabha) to 181 seats (from the current 82) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (Vidhan Sabha) to as much as 2000 (currently 740).   The passage of the historic women reservation bill is an outcome of 27 years of relentless struggle by women activists and its strong votaries. While the issue of women’s reservation was flagged up in the 1980s, the first serious attempt to get legislation was made in 1996 by the then Congress government. Though unsuccessfully, further attempts were made by a number of governments at the center in 1998, 1999, and in 2008. The most serious attempt to bring legislation was made in 2010 by the then Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. A bill seeking women’s reservation in the Lok Sabha and state legislatures was passed in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in 2010, but it failed to get the approval of the Lok Sabha due to strong opposition from the politicians of heartland states (Rajvanshi 2023). Finally, the bill was successfully steered by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government with near consensus from opposition parties. Of course, it has taken a few decades of consensus building and political awareness and sensitization on gender equality to get this important legislation passed in a large country with strong patriarchal norms and rigid social mores (Manoj C G 2023).   A Long Struggle for Gender Equality   The compelling reason for having more women in parliament and assemblies stemmed from the very low presence of women in politics. For instance, the latest Global Gender Gap Report ranks India 141 out of 185 countries (World Economic Forum 2023). This is clearly evident from the low presence of women in the upper echelons of politics. As per the latest data, women occupy only 15.2 percent of seats in the Lok Sabha and 13.9 percent in the Rajya Sabha (Fleck 2023). In state legislative assemblies or Vidhan Sabhas, the average representation of women is even lower, standing at less than 10 percent (Bhatt 2021; Ramakrishnan et al. 2021). In some states like Nagaland, women representation in assemblies is as low as 3.1 percent. A meager 14 percent representation of women in the national parliament reflects deep-seated structural gender inequality. A major barrier is that very few women get the opportunity to fight elections. For instance, both the national parties, the Congress and the BJP, fielded as low as 54 and 53 women candidates in the 2019 general elections (India Today 2019).   In terms of global and regional comparisons, India’s gender representation looks seriously abysmal. Based on data from IPU Parline, a global resource tracking national parliamentary statistic, as of May 2022, the average proportion of women in these parliaments worldwide stood at 26.2 percent (14 percent for India). Although the Americas, Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa surpassed this global average in terms of women’s representation, regions like Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) fell short on women representation (Ghosh 2022).   However, it is worth noting that even in the laggard Asia and South Asia in particular, India fares worse as far as gender representation in politics is concerned. As per the latest IPU data, in South Asia, Nepal had 33.6 percent female representation, while Bangladesh had 20.9 percent, Pakistan had 20.5 percent, Bhutan had 17.4 percent. Only Sri Lanka had 5.3 percent (IPU 2022). Afghanistan was not included in this study, but data from the World Bank in 2021 indicated that the last parliament in Afghanistan before Taliban takeover had a female representation of 27 percent. Although a number of women have risen to occupy the posts of Chief Ministers (heading state governments) including in some of the politically charged states as Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Rajasthan, they continue to face multiple barriers particularly patriarchal norms, sexism, institutional discrimination, violence, lack of support from facilities among others to compete for political offices (Brechenmacher 2023).   Table 1. Global Average of Women’s Representation in Parliament     Lower chamber and unicameral Upper chamber All chambers Total No. of MPs 37,248 7,062 44,310 Men 27,425 5,255 32,680 Women 9,823 1,807 11,630 Percentage of women 26.4% 25.6% 26.2%   Source: IPU Parline: Global Data on National Parliament (as of May 2022)   Figure 1. Women Representation in Lok Sabha Source: PRS Legislative Research 2023   Table 2. Women’s Representation in Parliament, by Geographical Region   Region Parliamentary representation of women (in percentage) Region Parliamentary representation of women (in percentage) Americas 34.6 Europe 31.1 Caribbean 39.7 Nordic Countries 44.7 North America 38.2 Western Europe 35.2 South America 30.1 Southern Europe 31.1 Central America 29.5 Central and Eastern Europe 24.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 26.0 Asia 20.9 East Africa 32.0 Central Asia 26.1 Southern Africa 31.8 Southeast Asia 21.8 Central Africa 22.5 East Asia 21.8 West Africa 16.9 South Asia 16.7 Middle East and North Africa 16.8 Pacific 20.9 Middle East 17.1 Australia and New Zealand 42.2 North Africa 16.4 Pacific Islands 6.0   Source: IPU Parline: Global Data on National Parliament (as of May 2022)   Impressive Success Stories at the Local Governments   However, India has done quite well in fostering gender equality at the local level. In the 1990s, India ushered a path-breaking decentralized systеm of governance at the local levels (both rural and urban spheres) (Shanker 2014). The passage of historic 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments which aimed at creating opportunities for local-level planning, more effective implementation, and better monitoring of various social and economic development programs across the country included the most transformative provision of reserving one-third of the total seats in local bodies for women (Joshi 2018; Chawla 2021). Recent studies have demonstrated that this law has led to a remarkable increase in the political engagement of women at the grassroots level (Sahoo and Chavaly 2022). Consequently, 20 out of India’s 28 states have subsequently elevated women’s quota to 50 percent of the elected offices of rural local bodies. As a consequence of this, a mammoth 1.45 million elected women representatives have come up at various levels of local governments.   The significant point is that the gender quota at the grassroots level has bolstered the political empowerment of women. A recent report indicates that approximately 44 percent of local government positions in India are now held by women (Joshi 2022). This remarkable achievement places India at the forefront of nations worldwide that are promoting women’s political empowerment at the local level. India surpasses other major countries like France, the UK, Germany, and Japan in this regard and even exceeds the global average of 34.3 percent. Although concerns have been raised in the past about women in reserved seats being potentially manipulated by male politicians, recent studies demonstrate that exposure to public life and participation in leadership skills training programs have facilitated the emergence of numerous competent and capable women leaders in India’s local political landscape (PRIA 1999). The consistent growth of women’s representation in local politics and the development of political agency among women leaders, thanks to the reservation of seats in local government, offer a blueprint for enhancing women’s political engagement in national and state politics. This becomes especially relevant when the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam law is put into practice.   Some Concerns but Hopeful Prospect   While the passage of the women reservation bill is long overdue and likely to open up crucial democratic space for women at the top levels, the path to greater gender equality is still going to be a long struggle. To begin with, there are numerous roadblocks to the new legislation. First, the women’s quota legislation is not going to be implemented with immediate effect. Its implementation is predicated upon the completion and publication of the new Census and the delimitation exercise which is slated to begin in 2026. The real risk to the new legislation is serious uncertainty over the fate of delimitation. It may be recalled that delimitation, which is a major bone of contention between the southern and northern states, has been frozen since 1976. Given the exercise likely to open up fault lines in India’s fragile federal systеm, it is uncertain whether the government will take a call on this. Thus, the delimitation sword hangs on the fate of the reservation bill.   Second, there is speculation about the nature and contours of the new law and its subsequent rollout. Given the new legislation has not specified the issues of representation of women from the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) that constitutes a sizeable section of the population, there are apprehensions that women from such backward groups might remain deprived from the benefit of the quota law (Dahiya 2023). Also, a number of political parties particularly from Hindi heartland states have also demanded a sub-quota for women from the backward classes and religious minorities (Sinha 2023). Caution needs to be exercised in order to ensure that the quota law does not only benefit political dynasties and urban and economically better-off women. (Agnes 2023).   Third, some analysts fear that women candidates are likely to be nominated by male family members or patrons who ultimately will influence or control their decisions. Thus, there are chances of proxies that would call the shots in parliament and assemblies.   Fourth, the bill does not address the inadequate women representation in the Rajya Sabha as well as State Legislative Councils (upper house of state-level legislatures) which also has elected an extremely low proportion of women as members so far.   Finally, there are strong apprehensions that the new systеm with the rotation of seats every five years is likely to create uncertainty and instability in the electoral process (Agnes 2023). The change of constituencies every five years would negatively impact the continuity and accountability of elected representatives to their constituents.   Notwithstanding these infirmities and some uncertainty over its actual rollout, the new law holds plenty of promise on gender equality and governance which is responsible to women in India. Given many positive outcomes that have emerged due to gender quota at the local levels, many analysts see increased women presence in parliament and state assemblies can make the policy space more sensitive to the needs and aspirations of women. Plus, as seen from the global experience and from India’s own experiment at the local level, having more women in crucial decision-making bodies can lead to increased spending on health, education, sanitation, and developmental schemes that benefit women and children. In short, the new legislation can be a game changer for gender equality in a large country marked by rigid patriarchal norms and social conditions. ■   References   Agnes, Flavia. 2023. “Real commitment to women’s representation will be seen in 2024 Lok Sabha polls.” The Indian Express. September 25. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/womens-reservation-bill-the-inclusion-test-8954328/   Bhatt, Pankhuri. 2021. “Women’s Representation in India’s State Legislative Assemblies.” Samvidhi. July 11. https://www.samvidhi.org/post/women-s-representation-in-india-s-state-legislative-assemblies   Brechenmacher, Saskia. 2023. “India’s New Gender Quota Law Is a Win for Women – Mostly.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. September 26.   Chawla, Akshi. 2021. “A revolution in local politics.” IDR Online. January 22. https://idronline.org/a-revolution-in-local-politics-women-participation/   Dahiya, Himanshi. 2023. “‘Quota within quota’: Understanding Caste Dynamics of Women’s Reservation Bill.” The Quint. September 19. https://www.thequint.com/news/politics/womens-reservation-bill-caste-politics-bjp-congress-bsp-rjd   Fleck, Anna. 2023. “India’s Path Towards Greater Gender Equity in Parliament.” Statista. September 26. https://www.statista.com/chart/30910/share-of-women-in-indias-lower-house-and-upper-house/   Ghosh, Ambar Kumar. 2022. “Women’s Representation in India’s Parliament: Measuring Progress, Analysing Obstacles.” ORF Occasional Paper No. 382.   Government of India. 2023. “The Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023.” September 28. https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2023/249053.pdf   India Today. 2023. “724 women, 4 transgender candidates in fray for 2019 Lok Sabha polls.” May 23. https://www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha-2019/story/724-women-4-transgender-candidates-in-fray-2019-lok-sabha-1532288-2019-05-22   Inter-Parliamentary Union: IPU. 2022. “Parline – global data on national parliaments.” https://data.ipu.org/women-averages?month=5&year=2022&op=Show+averages&form_build_id=form-8t9vx839F4GPWWbSuGDMqsgQed3R3GlWQbSgtwIS96M&form_id=ipu__women_averages_filter_form   Joshi, Madhu. 2018. “Promoting women in grassroots governance: Strategies that work.” IDR Online. September 26. https://idronline.org/promoting-women-in-grassroots-governance-strategies-that-work/   Joshi, Ritika. 2022. “Data Reveals 44 Percent Of Seats In Local Government In India Are Held By Women.” Shethepeople. August 27. https://www.shethepeople.tv/news/un-women-in-local-government-seats/   Manoj C G. 2023. “Hanging fire for 27 years: How Women Reservation Bill kept lapsing through its tumultuous journey.” The Indian Express. September 19. https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/hanging-fire-for-27-years-how-women-reservation-bill-kept-lapsing-through-its-tumultuous-journey-8945864/   Pathak, Vikas, and Esha Roy. 2023. “Women’s reservation Bill gets Parliament seal.” The Indian Express. September 22. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/womens-bill-gets-parliament-seal-33-per-cent-quota-for-women-in-lok-sabha-state-assemblies-set-to-become-law-8950720/   Participatory Research in Asia: PRIA. 1999. “Women’s Leadership in Panchayati Raj Institutions: An analysis of six states.” https://pria.org/knowledge_resource/1533206139_Women’s%20Leadership%20in%20Panchayati%20Raj%20Institutions.pdf   Rajvanshi, Astha. 2023. “Why India’s Women’s Reservation Bill Is a Major Step Forward.” Time. September 22. https://time.com/6316383/india-womens-reservation-bill/   Ramakrishnan, Anoop, N R Akhi, Manish Kanadje, and Mridhula Raghavan. 2021. “Explained: Share of women, youth in new state Assemblies.” The Indian Express. May 5. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/assembly-elections-benal-tamil-nadu-kerala-share-of-women-youth-in-new-assemblies-7300884/   Sahoo, Niranjan, and Keerthana Chavaly. 2022. “Decentralisation @75: How the third-tier institutions have deepened India’s Democracy?” ORF Expert Speak. August 15. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/decentralisation-75-how-the-third-tier-institutions-have-deepened-indias-democracy/   Shanker, Richa. 2014. “Measurement of Women’s Political Participation at the Local Level: India Experience.” https://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/mexico_nov2014/Session%206%20India%20paper.pdf   Sinha, Shishir. 2023. “Political parties urge passage of women’s reservation Bill in Parliament’s special session.” The Hindu businessline. September 17. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/political-parties-urge-passage-of-womens-reservation-bill-in-parliaments-special-session/article67319025.ece   World Economic Forum. 2023. Global Gender Gap Report 2023. https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2023/       ■ Niranjan Sahoo, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.   ■ Ambar Kumar Ghosh is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수 EAI 연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr  

※ This issue briefing has been published as a sequel to the ADRN Online Seminar titled “Democracy and New Generations.” Ian McAllister (Professor, The Australian National University), Woo Chang Kang (Professor, Korea University), Janjira Sombatpoonsiri (Research Fellow, German Institute for Global and Area Studies), and Ganbat Damba (Chairman of the Board, Academy of Political Education) presented the findings from precedent research and country cases. For more details of the event, please follow this link.   As we approach the second quarter of this century, millennials have firmly established themselves as the mainstream of society. The subsequent generation, often referred to as Generation Z, has taken their initial steps into the workforce. This trend is also evident in the political landscape of democratic countries in Asia. As time passes, the proportion of new generations among voters naturally increases, prompting political parties to consider their demands when formulating election strategies and policies.   Several Asian countries underwent democratization during the third wave of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. This wave allowed the new generations in these countries to embrace democracy as an inherent value and norm. As democracy has progressed towards consolidation, it has not only become “the only game in town” but also “the only game in a lifetime” for the new generations. Furthermore, significant advancements in information and communication technologies have opened up new avenues for accessing information and taking into actions for political change. This has led to a widespread belief that younger citizens are generally more pro-democratic compared to their elders.   On the flip side, there are concerns that younger generations are relatively less engaged and apathetic towards politics. These concerns often stem from worrisome indicators such as lower voter turnout and occasionally result in a skeptical outlook on the future of democracy. Therefore, it has been increasingly important to delve into the perspectives of the younger generation on democracy, as well as the factors influencing their attitudes toward politics. This brief article reviews previous research conducted through survey analysis and examine youth participation in the Asian region as a case study.   Youth Demand for Substantive over Procedural Democracy   Young Asians exhibit several distinct attitudes compared to their elderly counterparts. Chu and Welsh (2015) conducted an analysis of the results from the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) and identified a noteworthy trend among Asian youth: their inclination to view democracy as a substantive concept. When asked to select the meaning of democracy from four values, “good governance” was the most frequently chosen, with 31 percent of respondents, followed closely by “social equity” at 28 percent. This suggests that 58 percent of respondents conceived of democracy in substantive terms, while the remainder placed greater emphasis on procedural aspects, namely “norms and procedures” (23 percent) and “freedom and liberty” (21 percent).   While the data also indicates that young generations consider all four principles important, the authors interpreted this as a sign that youth expect tangible outcomes from democratic governance. If democracies perform poorly in addressing issues such as economic recession and corruption, young citizens have the potential to become skeptical about democracy, even if procedural legitimacy remains intact.   A generation gap is also evident when citizens are classified based on their democratic orientation. In countries classified as “free” by the Freedom House Index, the proportion of “critical democrats” who embrace democratic values but are less supportive of their own democracy is relatively higher among younger cohorts. Among Generation Z, the percentage of critical democrats surpasses that of consistent democrats who uphold both democratic values and support for democracy. It is important to note that this correlation is partly contingent on the level of democracy, with the specific country playing a significant role as a variable. Nonetheless, the survey challenges the optimistic belief that youth are inherently more progressive.   Drawing from these indications, the lower enthusiasm of the younger generation toward politics may stem from a sense of inefficacy of their own democracy. This has led to a waning interest in traditional institutions of representative democracy among the new generations. They express less satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in their countries, compared to older age groups. ABS data reveals that they vote less frequently and are less engaged in politics through conventional means, such as joining political parties.   Still Lagging Youth Voting Participation and Electoral Barriers against Young Politicians   In recent years, South Korea has experienced significant dynamics within its democracy, marked by the impeachment of the president in 2017 and the successive change of government. Voter turnout for presidential, general, and local elections has seen improvement as the public felt stronger political efficacy. The youth generation was not an exception. However, their turnout rate is still the lowest among all cohorts. According to the National Election Commission (NEC), the turnout rates for individuals in their 20s and 30s in the 2022 presidential election were 71.0 percent and 70.7 percent, respectively. These figures are notably lower than the overall turnout rate of 77.1 percent and that of individuals in their 60s and 70s, which stood at 87.6 percent and 86.2 percent respectively. This age-related disparity in turnout is even more pronounced in general and local elections, where youth turnout falls further behind that of presidential elections.   This pattern of voter turnout mirrors the typical life cycle of a Korean citizen. Young voters aged 18 and 19 exhibit slightly higher turnout rates than those in their 20s and 30s. However, as young people enter the labor market, their turnout drops, only to recover when they reach their 50s and 60s, before declining again as health issues become a factor in their later years. This similarity suggests that the intense competition for a stable life with employment and housing may discourage young people from engaging in political matters.   Figure 1. Voter Turnout by Age Group and Election Year: South Korean Presidential Elections 2012-2022         South Korean youth are notably underrepresented in the realm of representative democracy. In the 2020 general elections, only 1.5 percent of candidates were in their 20s, and 6.1 percent in their 30s, while nearly half of the candidates were in their 50s. The underrepresentation of youth is even more pronounced among the elected representatives. In the same elections, out of 300 members elected to the National Assembly, only two were under 30, and thirteen were in their 30s. Given that the young voters under 40 constitute about a third of all voters, the gap between the demographic proportion of young voters and their representative proportion among elected politicians is big.   This gap is caused by the higher entry bar in politics against youth. Running for election in South Korea requires candidates to pay a deposit to the NEC with the amount varying based on the level of the election. For example, candidates for legislative elections in the district pay 15 million won, approximately 11 thousand US dollars. Additionally, there are campaign expenses to consider. Parties may cover their candidates’ deposits and campaign costs and the government reimburses these expenses based on the approval rate. Nevertheless, the competition to secure nominations from major parties is fierce, and new generations face challenges in mobilizing support due to their limited recognition and career experience compared to older candidates. These expenses pose significant barriers to youth participation.   Both the government and political parties have recognized the issue of lower youth participation and underrepresentation, and have made efforts to cultivate youth engagement and provide opportunities. Young voters have shown relatively greater fluctuations in their voting choices compared to older generations, who tend to align with conservatives and liberals. This has prompted major parties to focus their election campaigns on youth, pledging more financial support and featuring young politicians on the frontline of the campaign. However, most of these strategies lose momentum after the elections conclude. At the government level, each ministry in the cabinet has begun recruiting youth secretaries and advisory panel groups to incorporate youth voices into the policy-making process. Nevertheless, these entities have limitations due to their ambiguous authorities and lack of representativeness, as they are appointed by government officials rather than elected by young people.   South Korea’s example highlights the challenges in ensuring political opportunities for youth and how these challenges are linked to their lower participation. At the regional level, the participation of Asian youth in legislative bodies has been less active compared to youth in Europe or the Americas. When comparing the lower and single chambers worldwide, the average proportion of parliamentarians under the age of 40 in Asian countries was 16.01 percent, while European and American young parliamentarians accounted for 24.13 percent, respectively (IPU 2021). Ensuring youth representation in political processes is crucial for incorporating their perspectives and achieving sustainable and responsive outcomes (OECD 2021). Addressing the problem of underrepresentation is essential for enhancing the efficacy of democracy, as it contributes to younger citizens’ sense of involvement and revitalizes the sustainability of democratic norms and procedures.   Youth’s Expressive Politics and Potential as Agent of Political Change   Yet, the new generations possess the potential to serve as a driving force for political change. Chu and Welsh observed that the youth can be both disengaged and engaged, depending on the political context. ABS data has revealed that the young Asians are less active in the electoral process and formal methods of participation but have a relatively strong sense of their ability to participate in and influence politics. This self-evaluation is rooted in their characteristics, such as being highly educated, having easy access to sources of information, and actively expressing their thoughts through the internet and social networks. Their potential as a game changer at the critical political juncture is globally observed.   In Asia, youth in Thailand has recently demonstrated their capacity as a game changer. Young advocates for democracy have grappled with the challenges posed by the hybrid regime and have sought to mobilize reformative forces in recent years. The 2019 general election served as a catalyst for their efforts to achieve democratic governance. The Future Forward Party (FFP) embodied the aspirations of the new generation and rose to become the third-most-voted party with over six million votes. However, their political impact was short-lived as the party was dissolved by a ruling from the constitutional court, citing an illegal loan. This decision triggered mass mobilization led by young FFP advocates.   A series of massive protests unfolded between 2020 and 2021. Participants voiced their opposition to military rule and called for democratization and constitutional amendments. As the protests reached their peak in October 2020, social media users played a highly active role during the same period. The incumbent government responded to the movement with various and sophisticated repression strategies, including targeted harassment, surveillance of activists, as well as smear campaigns and online stigmatization.   Although the enthusiasm of the new generation expressed through protests has somewhat waned, party politics has continued to provide a platform for young citizens. The Move Forward Party (MFP), established in 2014, emerged as the successor to the dissolved FFP. Led by Pita Limjaroenrat, who is in his early forties, the MFP proposed reformative agendas targeting the military, the incumbent government, and even the monarchy. The party has relied on support from younger generation while striving to persuade the broader electorate to endorse for a better future.   In the 2023 House of Representatives election, the MFP secured 151 out of 500 seats, becoming the largest party in the House of Representatives. However, due to the presence of members nominated by the military government in the Senate, the MFP failed to form a coalition, and Limjaroenrat did not garner sufficient support to become the prime minister. As the institutions that restrict the possibility of regime change further discourage young advocates, the youth in Thailand stand at the crossroads between continued resistance and a sense of despair.   Conclusion   Young citizen’s perceptions, interests, and participation in democracy exhibit distinct characteristics compared to older generations and are sometimes adversely affected by social circumstances. It is essential to differentiate these characteristics from mere indifference or passivity.   Participation through online platforms and mobilization, which younger generations often engage in, can have a significant impact on their countries’ democracies and lead to change. However, it is representative democracy that ultimately determines most of the institutions and policies that affect the lives of future generations. To strengthen the influence of youth, political parties should encourage their younger members to pursue opportunities to run in elections and reflect the young generation’s perspectives into their policies. Additionally, it is crucial to lower the barriers for young politicians to enter the political arena.   The efficacy of democracy for young people cannot be improved solely by increasing the number of young representatives and public officials. It is vital to continually work towards enhancing the performance of democracy in terms of economic opportunities and social justice. Advocates of democracy should remember that the key to sustainable democracy lies in whether politics can effectively address the substantive concerns of the younger generation and deliver better outcomes. ■     References   Chu, Yun-han, and Bridget Welsh. 2015. “Millennials and East Asia’s Democratic Future.” Journal of Democracy 26, 2: 151-164.   Inter-Parliamentary Union: IPU. 2021. “Youth participation in national parliaments.” https://www.ipu.org/youth2021   OECD. 2021. Government at a Glance 2021. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/1c258f55-en     ■ Ganbat Damba is the Chairman of Board at the Academy of Political Education, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. From 1999 to 2010 he worked as an Executive director of the Academy. Since 2009 to 2017 he was an advisor to the President of Mongolia on research and a Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia. Since September, 2017-2021 he was an Ambassador of Mongolia to Federal Republic of Germany. He became Ph.D. in 2002 at the Academy of Science of Mongolia. He has published various articles examining democratization, democratic and authoritarian values, elections, political party development and on principles of foreign and security policy of Mongolia.   ■ Hansu Park is a Research Associate at the East Asia Institute.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수 EAI 연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr  

On August 12th, Malaysia held elections in six states, with voters from nearly a third of the country’s population eligible to vote. The results were a rebuke of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s eight-month leadership. The conservative Islamist ethno-nationalist opposition Perikatan Nasional, comprised of the Islamist party PAS and ultra-ethnonationalist Malay party Bersatu led by former prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin, gained 61 seats out of 245 and 49% of the popular vote.   Given the unevenness of Malaysia’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery and the challenges of Anwar’s coalition ‘unity’ government, it is important to note that this coalition comprises his pro-reform Pakatan Harapan, his former political foe, the Malay nationalist United Malays National Organization (UMNO)-dominated Barisan Nasional (BN), and regional parties from Borneo. This alliance came together after the 2022 general election, which resulted in a hung parliament. Anwar’s preoccupation with promoting himself rather than focusing on policy programs made these election results somewhat expected. Little had been done to effectively communicate a cohesive program to the electorate or to shore up the legitimacy of a new friends-and-foes elitist government that holds the majority in parliament but remains unknown to the majority of voters. Instead, Anwar’s government relied on short-term populist initiatives that only served to fuel perceptions of seeking political security rather than leadership confidence in government.   Election Results: Anwar’s Weak Support and Growing Ethnic Divisions   The results show an across-the-board loss of support for Anwar’s unity government in all six states. In the Malay heartland states of Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu, where the Islamist party PAS held power, it emphatically won two-thirds of the seats.   Table 1. 2023 Malaysia State Election Results     Total Seats Anwar's Unity Government Seats Seat Change from 2018 Opposition Perikatan Nasional Seats Seat Change from 2018 Kedah 36 3 -9 33 13 Kelatan 45 2 -5 43 7 Terengganu 32 0 -10 32 10 Negeri Sembilan 36 31 -5 5 5 Penang 40 29 -6 11 10 Selangor 56 34 -11 22 17 Total 245 99 -46 146 61   In the three states on the more multiracial West Coast, Anwar’s government lost ground, losing the two thirds of support that Anwar’s party held as the incumbent state government in Malaysia’s richest state of Selangor.   The drop in seat numbers and the opposition’s gain of almost half the popular vote does not fully capture the ongoing shifts taking place in Malaysian politics. There are major political realignments taking place, including greater political polarization and a narrowing of the space to engage in democratic political reform.   First, the results show that the party that performed the worst was actually Anwar’s ally, UMNO, the Malay nationalist party that governed the country from 1957 through 2018. UMNO lost its power with its leader with its former prime minister Najib Razak mired in the 1MDB kleptocracy scandal. The current UMNO president is Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Anwar’s deputy prime minister and close ally. His corruption charges shockingly dropped after the polls, despite the earlier findings supporting the need for prosecution and weeks of testimony. UMNO had 41 seats going into the state elections and emerged victorious in only 19 of the 108 seats (18%) that it contested. The erosion of support for UMNO started from 2004, but has reached the point that the party is no longer a national party, only holding power in the south and west of the country. With 26 seats in parliament, UMNO’s (and Zahid’s) support is deemed so vital for the Anwar government that he is now not facing criminal charges.   Second, not all of the parties in Anwar’s coalition Pakatan Harapan performed evenly. The Chinese-dominant Democratic Action Party (DAP) won 46 out of 47 seats (98%) it contested, while Anwar’s party Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) only gained 26 out of 59 (44%) seats contested and the progressive Islamist party Amanah won 8 out of 31 seats (26%). Pakatan was able to galvanize most of its traditional base of support, only losing turnout of some supporters. However, with the exception of one seat won marginally in Kelantan, it was not able to gain any electoral ground. The implication is that Anwar’s leadership has not been able to translate into political gains across the coalition, making Pakatan dependent on the support for the DAP.   The reason for this lies with the third feature of the results, a widening ethnic polarization in voting. The unity government relied heavily on the support of Chinese Malaysians, an estimated 96 percent of those that voted and to a lesser extent Indian support at an estimated 87 percent. Meanwhile, the opposition gained a significant share of the majority ethnic group of Malays, estimated 73 percent of those voted. Perikatan’s increase in Malay support came largely from UMNO, where it captured nearly half of the party’s traditional support compared to the result in the 2022 November General Election. In that election, UMNO only managed to capture 26 of the seats out of 222 and 32 percent of the Malay vote. Anwar’s Pakatan relies on non-Malay support, even in its collaboration with UMNO/BN in the 2023 state elections, as shown in the chart below.   Figure 1. Estimated Electoral Support by Ethnicity for Pakatan Harapan Peninsular Malaysia, 2008-2023   The results show that ethnic differences in voting in Malaysia have widened and become more entrenched since 2008. The parties that were the most secure in the state polls are those traditionally on the more ethnic extremes of Malaysian politics, Islamist PAS and the Chinese-dominant DAP. With ethnic polarization in voting, Malaysia’s political realignment has shifted to one of polarized parties as well, with the middle ground hollowed out by UMNO’s political collapse.   Understanding the Results: Losing the Referendum   Explanations of the election results have centered on the campaigns, rise of conservative Islamist forces and shortcomings in Anwar’s leadership.   The Islamist opposition party PAS had made gains in the 2022 General Election, in its collaboration with Muhyiddin’s party Bersatu in a new branded coalition of Perikatan Nasional. PAS was able to build on its stronger social connections from religious schools, provision of social services, business ties and calculated campaign projecting itself as less ‘extreme’ than in the past. It was part of the federal government from 2020 through 2022 and part of a rebranded Malay ethnonationalist coalition, Perikatan Nasional, served to strengthen its electoral outreach.   PAS was able to extend its electoral gains in the state polls. What made PAS even stronger in the state polls was its ability to harness dissatisfaction with the economy, becoming a more acceptable opposition party. What occurred in the state polls was not a rise in conservative forces, but rather a normalization of them. A reliance on social media, calculated use of misinformation and emotional appeals further strengthened the Perikatan opposition.   With a focused campaign, Perikatan Nasional gained most of its support from political erosion of UMNO, a party that has corruption-tainted leadership that refuses to give way and give up access to the spoils of power. The relationship with UMNO president Zahid allows Anwar to hold power, as his coalition did not win its own electoral mandate in 2022. The relationship has also served to delegitimize both UMNO and Pakatan among their traditional core supporters. The electoral impact has been most evident for UMNO in the state results and among Harapan voters, especially with the post-election decision to drop Zahid’s corruption charges.   The results also indicate weaknesses in Anwar’s government. Their campaign for the state polls was ad hoc, lacking coordination and clear messaging, never controlling the political narrative. They underestimated political dissatisfaction. In Selangor, Malaysia’s richest state with PKR-led government, it lost its two-thirds majority. In fact, if it was not for the popularity of state leaders, the results might have been more even worse for Anwar, as the anger against his federal government was palpable.   The main weakness Anwar’s government faced was the weak economy, with high inflation and an uneven recovery from the COVID-19 economic contraction. With uneven competency in Cabinet, there has been a lack of coordinated policy reform, with measures that have been introduced poorly communicated. A focus of the government around Anwar’s persona rather than policy deliverables further undercut support. Anwar continues to have a trust deficit among large shares of the population, shaped by decades of political attacks he endured as a leader in the opposition from 1999.   Perikatan was effective in capitalizing on Anwar’s weaknesses through the campaign, making the election a referendum on him and his leadership.   Dampening Public Aspiration for Democratization Amid Polarization   Conditions were ripe for the opposition to gain ground. Part of this involves the legacy of COVID-19 on the economy and on the youth, who now comprise a large share of the electorate. Electoral reforms implemented in 2022 lowered the voting age to 18 and introduced automatic voter registration, bringing in large number of voters in their 20s and 30s into the electoral roll. Over a third of the electorate is under 30 years of age. Anwar’s government had yet to introduce substantive youth policies or programs where the young can recognize tangible benefits. Another part of this is the prominence of social media in Malaysia campaigns, especially TikTok which is a medium that has proven effective in capitalizing on anger and discontent.   What was striking in the 2023 state polls was a lack of messaging harnessing positive emotions compared to earlier polls. Calls for democratic reform have anchored support for Pakatan for decades, galvanizing voters through five general elections. Promises of hope and meaningful change were missing in these 2023 polls. With the election of pro-reform Pakatan Harapan government then led by Mahathir Mohamad in 2018 and its collapse in 2020, as well as the formation of the Anwar government in 2022 allied with the target of calls for reform, UMNO, the momentum for reform has precipitously slowed. Liberals hoping for meaningful policies to promote rights and inclusion have been repeatedly disappointed. For many Pakatan supporters, their vote was largely one against the opposition, more pragmatic and realistic, rather than one filled with the idealism of the past. This idealism is eroding with a focus on holding power rather than delivering promises to voters, the same voters that voted for reform for over two decades. More Malaysians do not believe that its leaders will deliver the meaningful reforms they voted for.   As such, an important shift is taking place in Malaysian politics; reform as an effective political mobilizer by parties is declining, contributing to the new political realignments and less trust in political parties across the political divide. Contestation over reform – strengthening checks and balances, more competent political institutions, electoral fairness, ethnic inclusion, decentralization and greater freedoms – has long anchored Malaysia’s political divisions, along with differences over race and religion. With reform no longer as prominent, identity politics have become even more salient, cutting into the social fabric of Malaysia’s ethnic relations.   The opposition Perikatan Nasional have positioned themselves to capitalize on this shift by combining race and religion in their messaging, articulating a neo-Malay nationalist agenda blended with political Islam. The opposition’s state polls campaign explicitly attacked the Anwar government for its collaboration with the non-Malay DAP and billed itself as the only legitimate representative for the Malay community. They articulated a more exclusionary Malay-only vision of governance on their campaign in the 2022 General Election, and claimed their opponents as lacking religious credentials. The Anwar government is being attacked for its supposed liberal policies of protecting the LGBTQ communities, allowing concerts and supposedly empowering non-Muslims, part of a heightened racialized culture war that has aimed to strengthen the opposition and put the Anwar government on the defensive.   What has happened, however, is that democratic political reforms are on the defensive in conditions with heightened racialized electoral polarization. Anwar’s government is relying more on its elite relationships, the levers of power against opposition leaders, with many facing legal charges, and is focused on holding power rather than on using power for concrete programs and new initiatives.   The implication is that Malaysia’s window to introduce meaningful democratic political reforms is closing. The 2023 state election results and aftermath, suggest that a government led by a leader who promised progressive reform to gain office is falling short in the delivery of promises and facing less favorable conditions to do so. This is a lesson many countries have learned before, but it nevertheless is a hard one for Malaysians seeking meaningful political change.   As Malaysia celebrates its 60th anniversary as a nation, the August state polls highlight that the challenges for nation-building remain as salient as they did decades ago; improving ethnic relations, reducing polarization, developing substantive policies to address inequalities and promote growth. At the same time, the hope for change and better governance is strong, with an electorate more demanding and confident in its aspirations. Reformasi may not yet be garnering traction among elites, but it continues to remain alive in a society looking for a stronger Malaysia in the years ahead. ■     ■ Bridget Welsh is currently Honorary Research Associate with the University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute Malaysia (UoNARI-M) based in Kuala Lumpur. She is also a Senior Research Associate of the Hu Feng Center for Eats Asia Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University and a Senior Associate Fellow of the Habibie Center. She specializes in Southeast Asian politics, with a focus on Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Indonesia. She is committed to fostering engagement, mutual understanding and empowerment.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수 EAI 연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr  

1. Introduction   1.1. Background   Recent socio-economic and political shifts in Mongolia depict a concerning trajectory of diminishing democratic values. The once-promised democratic systеm, deeply rooted in transparency, accountability, and justice, now appears under threat. Like many emerging democracies, Mongolia confronts a multitude of challenges. Central to these challenges is the delicate balance of institutional design and its operation, with horizontal accountability emerging as a pivotal concept. This principle ensures that state institutions keep each other in check, preventing power abuses and guaranteeing operations within legal bounds.   These challenges are evident in the annual unveiling of corruption scandals involving substantial embezzlement of public funds that shake the foundation of Mongolian society. Furthermore, the country’s legal foundation has witnessed considerable changes. Since 2000, the Mongolian Constitution — the bedrock of its democratic systеm — has undergone four amendments. Remarkably, three of these changes occurred between 2019 and 2023, spearheaded by the Mongolian People’s Party and often carried out with limited public consultations. Historically, the robust constitution of Mongolia has been celebrated as a pillar of democracy in Central Asia, ensuring a balanced distribution of power among the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. However, recent sentiments indicate growing concerns. As reported in 2023, the individuals entrusted with upholding the Constitution now appear to be undermining it (Tumurtogoo 2023). The post-2019 amendments have generally curtailed presidential authority, bolstered executive power, and imperiled the foundational balance of power across the branches. While rationalized as measures to augment state policy ownership, ensure stability, and heighten accountability within the executive branch, these changes pose risks to the power balance between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches.   In these times of declining public trust and legal changes present the debate surrounding the role and power of the judiciary and oversight institutions in Mongolia. On one side, there are increasing concerns about institutional inefficiency and potential biases among these institutions and a push to decentralize, reduce funding, and staffing of the judiciary and oversight bodies due to waning trust. Conversely, on the other side, there are arguments that robust and well-resourced judiciary and oversight institutions are foundational for maintaining checks and balances, especially in overseeing the executive branch. Empowering these bodies is crucial not just for governance but also for restoring public trust.   As such, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate by assessing the judicial and oversight institutions’ independence, responsiveness, and capacity. In particular, the Independent Authority Against Corruption Agency was focused among the judicial bodies. In order to measure the accountability level of judiciary, its trust level, independence and impartiality, and responsiveness and timeliness will be key elements of accountability questions.   In answering the questions, the paper will rely on the review of secondary and publicly available information retrieved from media, news and public hearing testimonies published. Furthermore, the paper examines opinions from international bodies, NGOs that have closely followed the selected corruption case and the commentary and analyses of experts and scholars. Public perception survey results as well as international indices were used to provide contextual and historical information about the Judiciary and horizontal accountability.   2. Description of Corruption Scandals   In 2017, the “60 billion tugrugs (MNT)” (25 million USD) deal ahead of the presidential election was exposed when voice recordings of high-level officials’ plan to rearrange government positions for set bribery were released. In 2019, after the Speaker of Parliament M. Enkhbold was dismissed in relation to the MNT 60 billion case to sell key government offices in exchange for election financing, several ruling party members were sentenced to four-year imprisonment by the district court. However, at the appellate at Capital City Court, the decision was dismissed (Шүүхийн шийдвэрийн хураангуй 2019). An independent media source exposed the ‘SME embezzlement’ corruption scandal in 2018. The district-level courts also made decisions to prosecute affiliated officials in 2020. One former member of parliament (MP), B. Undarmaa, was sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment but was released on the grounds of ‘poor health.’ A new scandal called ‘Coal Mafia’ arose in December 2022. These cases show that even today, there were no clear court decisions and prosecutions against the ruling party members and their affiliates involved in corruption scandals. The scale and depth of the scandal were unprecedented, allegedly reaching MNT 40 trillion (more than one billion USD) (Davaabazar 2022).   Since its beginning in February 2023, the ‘Development Bank’ case encompasses 80 defendants and 460 individual lawsuits (S. Undarmaa 2023). The state-run Development Bank of Mongolia (DBM) is grappling with a substantial bond repayment of approximately 800 million USD due by the close of 2023. Despite this, the bank has been under continuous examination for issues since its foundation in 2012, especially regarding sizable enterprises that have secured long-term project loans from the DBM over the years. Due to a recent economic downturn and overly rosy forecasts, 69 companies have reportedly lagged in their repayments. By early 2022, the DBM’s non-performing loans surged to 500 million USD. Few years ago, the government initiated a corruption probe, which led to a criminal investigation focusing on several debtors, including prominent legislators. Several politicians from the Mongolian People’s Party and one member from the opposition HUN Party were involved in the case for ‘abuse of power and money laundering’ (Adiya 2022).   The aftermath of each scandal typically sees a surge of public outrage, often culminating in mass protests and significant media scrutiny (Adiya 2022; Bayartsogt 2018; Bekmurzaev 2023; Dierkes 2022; Lkhaajav 2017). These widespread demands for accountability often go disregarded, with tangible results rarely materializing.   It should be noted that prior corruption scandals, such as the Chinggis Bond under the Democratic Party’s majority, have also occurred. However, for the sake of relevance and timeliness, this paper narrows its focus to the most prominent and publicly recognized cases from the past eight years.   3. Horizontal Accountability Trends in Mongolia   The Horizontal Accountability Index from V-Dem provides an empirical metric to measure the extent to which state entities in a country can hold one another accountable. Analyzing the data for Mongolia from 1990 to 2022 reveals interesting trends and fluctuations that offer insights into the country’s evolving governance structure and democratic practices.   Figure 1. V-Dem Horizontal Accountability Index: Mongolia 1992-2022 Source: V-Dem 2023   • Initial Surge (1990-1992): Beginning with a score of 0.686 in 1990, there is a sharp rise to 0.909 in 1992. This period corresponds with Mongolia’s shift towards democracy, and the spike suggests rapid institutional reforms aimed at introducing checks and balances. • Stability and Marginal Fluctuations (1993-1999): Post the initial surge, the index stabilizes in the high 0.8 to low 0.9 range. This period reflects a consolidation phase, with Mongolia striving to maintain a balance of power among its state institutions. • Decline at the Turn of the Century (2000-2005): Starting in 2000 was a noticeable dip, which reached a low of 0.839 in 2005. This downward trajectory could indicate challenges in sustaining institutional checks, possibly due to political or economic factors. • Relative Stability with Mild Resurgence (2006-2012): The period sees the index oscillating in the mid-0.8 range with a slight rise to 0.869 by 2012, suggesting efforts to re-strengthen horizontal accountability mechanisms. • Dips and Peaks (2013-2020): This period is marked by significant fluctuations, from a dip to 0.825 in 2013 to a resurgence in 2019-2020. Such fluctuations indicate political changes and institutional reforms impacting the balance of power. • Recent Decline (2021-2022): A concerning decline has been observed in the last two years, with the index dropping to 0.724 in 2022, the lowest in the dataset. This drop suggests recent challenges or setbacks in ensuring horizontal accountability.   Over three decades, Mongolia’s Horizontal Accountability Index has seen notable shifts. While the 1990s reflected a promising start in institutionalizing checks and balances, subsequent years presented a mix of challenges and recoveries. The most recent decline signals a potential need for a renewed emphasis on bolstering mechanisms that ensure state entities remain accountable to one another. Analyzing whether these trends and the varying public trust in institutions central to horizontal accountability—especially in terms of how the judiciary and oversight bodies address corruption scandals—would be insightful.   3.1. Public Trust in Institutions   While public perceptions don’t directly measure the judiciary’s capacity to hold the executive accountable, they can, especially when grounded in tangible events, offer valuable insights into its performance. The implications of these high-profile corruption scandals and the delayed and unclear court decisions have resulted in public distrust in the court. However, distrust in the judicial systеm has been high since the democratic transition more than three decades ago.   • According to a 1994 survey conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Academy of Sciences, court was the second most corrupt institution at soum levels (Mont 2002). • In 2005, a public opinion survey conducted as part of the ‘Judicial Reform Program’ found that 90 percent of the respondents believed court decisions favor wealthier and more influential individuals over ordinary ones (Чимид 2006, p. 157). • In 2008, the Open Society Foundation surveyed professionals in the judicial systеm and found that 54 percent of the participants believed ‘conditions for impartiality and independence are not met in Mongolia’ (White 2008, p. 15). To the statement ‘interference of other organs of the state and politicians is high,’ 42 percent agreed and 38 percent said not sure. The research also collected anecdotal evidence from anonymous judges on how prominent political figures directly attempted to interfere in their decisions. • The Asian Barometer Survey in 2018 found that the proportion of respondents saying they trust the Courts was 36.7%, slightly higher than trust in parliament (34.7%) and much lower than trust in the president and prime minister (68.0%). Figure 2 shows that trust in the courts has been lower than in other institutions (Asian Barometer Survey). • As the Sant Maral Foundation’s public opinion surveys between 2007 and 2022 show, the proportion of respondents indicating trust in the courts is higher than those reported in the Asian Barometer Survey mentioned above. However, a similar trend of lower levels of trust in the courts compared to other institutions is observable.   Figure 2. Proportion of respondents answering ‘trust or trust a lot’ in different institutions, ABS 2002-2018 Source: Asian Barometer Survey, author’s calculation   Figure 3. Confidence in institutions 2000-2022 Source: Sant Maral Foundation, 1992-2022   4. The Judicial Branch’s Independence   To assess the judicial branch’s independence, we look at the factors that affect it, including legislation and structure of the judicial systеm, budget allocation, selection and dismissal procedure of judges, and ethical and disciplinary proceedings of the judges.   Table 1. Legal and institutional capacity of the Judicial Branch (2017-2022)   Key capacity areas Status Legislation Constitution of Mongolia (1992) stipulates the independence of court and impartiality of judges.  Laws: The organization and operations of courts and the Judicial General Council are regulated by law. Law on the Judiciary (2021); Law on Judicial Admіnistration; Law on the Legal Status of Judges; Law on the Legal Status of Citizens’ Representatives in Court Trials; and Law on Mediation. Structure Three-tiered systеm: Supreme court, provincial and capital city courts (appellate), and soum/inter-soum and district courts (first instance).  Courts: Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction (civil and criminal cases); Admіnistrative Court (admіnistrative cases) and Constitutional Court (constitutional disputes and cases) Budget allocation (% of total government expenditure) Courts are financed by the State. Between 2012-2022, on average 0.70% of the government expenditure was spent to finance judicial sector. The highest was in 2015 reaching 0.85% and the lowest in 2018 at 0.62%. Selection and dismissal procedure of key persons Judicial General Council is responsible for selection.  President of Mongolia is in charge of appointing.   The Constitution of Mongolia (1992) assures the structure and independence of the judicial systеm in Articles 48-55. Mongolia’s three-tiered judiciary comprises the Supreme Court, aimag (provincial) and capital city courts, and soum and district courts. As stated in Article 48, courts operate based on specific laws, receive financing from the state budget, and the state guarantees their economic operations. The Law on Courts (2012) governed these institutions until the Law on the Judiciary superseded it in 2021. Other pertinent legal documents include the Law on Judicial Admіnistration, the Law on the Legal Status of Judges, the Law on the Legal Status of Citizens’ Representatives in Court Trials, and the Law on Mediation.   4.1. Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary   An understanding of the historical and legislative context is required to understand whether the Judiciary branch has handled the Development Bank of Mongolia and other prominent corruption cases with independence and impartiality. Article 49.2 of the Constitution asserts, “Judges shall be impartial and bound only by the law. Interference in the judges’ duties by any individual or official—including the President, National Parliament members, Government officials, political party representatives, or members of other voluntary organizations—is prohibited.” The Judicial General Council plays a crucial role in safeguarding judicial independence, overseeing the selection of judges, and protecting judges’ constitutional rights (Article 49). However, the practical implementation of Article 49, beyond mere rhetoric, remains questionable.   Political figures influence the selection of judges. While the Judicial General Council conducts preliminary selections and proposes candidates, Parliament nominates them. Ultimately, it is the President of Mongolia who appoints them. Some scholars posit that since the Judicial General Council conducts the initial presentations, this ensures a degree of independence for judges from political sway. However, opposing views, including those from the OSCE (2021), emphasize the President’s considerable influence over aspects such as court organization, judges’ statuses, appointments, and dismissals.   In 2019, legislative amendments granted the National Security Council, comprising the president, prime minister, and the speaker of parliament, authority over judge appointments and dismissals. These amendments led to the removal of 17 judges in June 2019. Many civil society organizations, including Transparency International, voiced their disapproval, highlighting significant threats to the rule of law (Transparency International 2019). Nonetheless, the reformed Law on Judiciary in 2021 provided clearer guidelines on judicial appointments and bolstered measures to ensure the judiciary’s independence (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022).   The Judicial General Council’s autonomy has historically been in question. The specifics of its organization remain ambiguous in the Constitution. Ex-Member of Parliament Lundendorj, referencing the 1992 Constitution draft, revealed that the UN Human Rights Council had cautioned about a nebulous Judicial General Council structure, warning of potential dominance by the ruling parliamentary party (Лүндэндорж 2021). Over three decades, the Judicial General Council’s structure underwent five notable shifts:   • 1992-1996: Dubbed the ‘President- Judicial General Council’ phase. The President appointed 10 out of the 12 council members, with the Council selecting its chair. • 1996-2002: A ‘Ministry of Justice-President’ hybrid era saw the Ministry’s amplified role. Given the period’s parliamentary instability, the Council experienced turbulence; the Judicial General Council Chair switched five times in six years, highlighting the Council’s political susceptibility. • 2002-2012: Termed the ‘President – Self Governance of Judges’ phase. Of 14 members, 57% were judges chosen by aimag/capital city judges’ assemblies. • 2012-2020: Essentially evolved into an ‘Extension of the President’s Office’. All Judicial General Council members were presidential appointees, sidelining representatives from the Ministry of Justice and Parliament, which underscored the President’s accruing power. A survey revealed 44 percent of 144 judges felt the president overly dominated the judicial systеm (Мөнхсайхан, Цагаанбаяр, Алтансүх 2015). Notably, 13 out of 173 judges claimed unjustified presidential rejections for various appointments. • 2021 onwards: The ‘Self Governance and Parliament’ era commenced. A pivot toward parliamentary inclusion took place to mitigate the president’s outsized role. Subsequent amendments mandated that half of the Judicial General Council members were to be chosen by the Judges’ General Assembly and the rest by parliament (Law on the Judiciary of Mongolia, Article 76.2, 2021). The OSCE’s 2021 evaluation of this Law recommends excluding top executive officials and MPs from potential membership, a stipulation not yet incorporated, which might perpetuate concerns of undue executive and political influence on the Judiciary (OSCE 2021).   Numerous international monitoring bodies have underscored the importance of improving Mongolia’s judge selection and appointment procedures to exclude political entities, particularly the president and parliament. Yet, the modifications to the structure of the Judicial General Council and the judge selection process suggest enduring political sway. It is interesting to note that prior assessments of Mongolia’s judicial reform, including its independence, have highlighted both political party influence and the co-opting of donor-funded judicial reform initiatives by the country’s judicial elite (White B. T. 2009).   4.2. Responsiveness and Timeliness   Assessing the timeliness and responsiveness of the judiciary, especially in the context of a corruption case, requires a keen focus on the duration, efficiency, and adaptability of judicial proceedings.   A 2018 assessment by Transparency International showed that only 24 percent of corruption cases in Mongolia were prosecuted, while 76 percent were dropped by prosecutors. Mongolia should eliminate any interference by the National Security Council in the independence of the anti-corruption agency and establish a well-resourced and specialized anti-corruption court (Merkle 2018). The Development Bank corruption case shows that lawsuits related to corruption cases generally take significant time to resolve. Some disputes have been pending in court for 69 months.   5. Conclusions   The assessment of horizontal accountability in Mongolia, particularly focusing on the judiciary’s role in combating corruption scandals, highlights several critical points. The analysis of Mongolia’s V-Dem Horizontal Accountability Index shows recent declines suggesting a need for renewed emphasis on reinforcing mechanisms for state entities to hold each other accountable. Public perceptions provide valuable insights into the judiciary’s performance, high-profile corruption scandals and delayed and unclear court decisions have contributed to public distrust in the judiciary. This distrust is not a recent phenomenon, as it has persisted since Mongolia’s transition to democracy more than three decades ago.   Assessing the timeliness and responsiveness of the judiciary in corruption cases underscores the need to focus on the efficiency, duration, and adaptability of judicial proceedings. The delays in lawsuits related to corruption cases call for enhanced efficiency and effectiveness in the judicial systеm.   While the Mongolian Constitution and subsequent legislative amendments assert the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, the practical application of these provisions suggests significant political influence, especially from the executive branch. This influence is evident in the appointment process of judges, the structure and evolution of the Judicial General Council, and the considerable sway of political figures over judicial decisions and reforms. Despite international concerns and recommendations, political interference in Mongolia’s judicial sector persists, and the judiciary’s autonomy remains questionable.   Addressing Mongolia’s horizontal accountability challenges demands comprehensive reforms to enhance the independence, capacity, and transparency of its judiciary. These reforms should prioritize reducing political influence in the judiciary, improving efficiency in handling corruption cases, and fostering public trust in the judicial systеm. Furthermore, the potentials for establishing a specialized anti-corruption court should be carefully examined to combat corruption and bolster judiciary’s capacity to hold the executive accountable. ■   References   Adiya, Amar. 2022. “Backlash over Development Bank of Mongolia Exposes Social and Political Tensions.” Mongolia Weekly, April 27. Accessed June 15, 2023. https://www.mongoliaweekly.org/post/backlash-over-development-bank-of-mongolia-exposes-social-and-political-tensions   Asian Barometer Survey. (n.d.). Datasets from the Asian Barometer Survey Wave 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Asian Barometer Survey.   Bayartsogt, Khaliun. 2018. “A scandal in Mongolia: heads roll in government after US$1.3m SME fund embezzlement.” South China Morning Post, November 6. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2171965/scandal-mongolia-heads-roll-government-after-us13m-sme-fund   Bekmurzaev, Nurbek. 2023. “Mongolia embroiled in a major corruption scandal over the allocation of educational loans.” GlobalVoices, May 29. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://www.scribd.com/article/649063238/Mongolia-Embroiled-In-A-Major-Corruption-Scandal-Over-The-Allocation-Of-Educational-Loans   Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2022. BTI 2022 Country Report — Mongolia. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Accessed April 16, 2023. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/MNG#pos4   Davaabazar, B. 2022. “ТООЦООЛОЛ: 40 их наяд төгрөг яаж гарсан бэ?” ikon.mn, December 9. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://ikon.mn/n/2qpk   Dierkes, Julian. 2022. “Mass Protests in Mongolia Decry ‘Coal Mafia,’ Corruption.” The Diplomat, December 6. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/mass-protests-in-mongolia-decry-coal-mafia-corruption/   Guarnieri, Carlo. 2003. “Courts as an Instrument of Horizontal Accountability: The Case of Latin Europe.” In Democracy and the Rule of Law, ed. J. M. Maravall and A. Przeworski, 223-241. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   Law on the Judiciary of Mongolia, 2021 Article 76.2.   Lkhaajav, Bolor. 2017. “Ahead of Presidential Election, Mongolia Corruption Scandal Has a New Twist.” The Diplomat, June 19. Accessed June 15, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/ahead-of-presidential-election-mongolia-corruption-scandal-has-a-new-twist/   Merkle, Ortrun. 2018. “Mongolia: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption.” Anti-Corruption Helpdesk. Transparency International. Accessed April 16, 2023. https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Country-Profile-Mongolia_2018.pdf   Mont, Robert La. 2002. “Some Means of Addressing Judicial Corruption in Mongolia.” Policy Documentation Center. Accessed April 8, 2023. http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002274/01/Judicial_Corruption_in_Mongolia.pdf   OSCE. 2021. Opinion on the Law on the Judiciary. Warsaw: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Accessed April 8, 2023. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/8/509672.pdf   S. Undarmaa. 2023. “Хөгжлийн банкны 460 гаруй хавтаст хэрэг, 257 оролцогч.” News.mn, February 15. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://news.mn/r/2627570/   Sant Maral Foundation. 1992-2022. Politbarometer Dataset. Ulaanbaatar: Sant Maral Foundation. https://www.santmaral.org/publications   Transparency International. 2019. “Rule of Law and Independence of Judiciary Under Threat in Mongolia.” July 4. Accessed April 8, 2023. https://www.transparency.org/en/press/rule-of-law-and-independence-of-judiciary-under-threat-in-mongolia   Tumurtogoo, Anand. 2023. “A charter under siege.” Asia Democracy Chronicles, February 15. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://adnchronicles.org/2023/02/13/a-charter-under-siege/   Varieties of Democracy. 2023. Country Graph: Mongolia Horizontal Accountability Index. https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/   White, Brent T. 2008. Report on The Status of Court Reform in Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar: Open Society Forum.   ______. 2009. “Rotten to the Core: Project Capture and the Failure of Judicial Reform in Mongolia.” East Asia Law Review 4, 209-275.   Лүндэндорж, Н. 2021. “ШЕЗ-д нэртэйгээр нь намайг оруулахгүй гээд журамдаа биччихгүй яасан юм бол гэж инээд хүрч сууна.” ikon.mn, Accessed April 6, 2023. December 13. https://ikon.mn/n/2ep5   Мөнхсайхан, О., Цагаанбаяр, Г., Алтансүх, Ж. 2015. Монгол улс дахь шүүхийн захиргааны загвар: тулгамдсан асуудал, шийдвэрлэх арга зам. Улаанбаатар: ННФ.   Чимид, Б. 2006. Монгол Улсын Шүүхийн эрх мэдлийн стратеги төлөвлөгөөний биелэлтийг зохион байгуулсан нь. Улаанбаатар.   Шүүхийн шийдвэрийн хураангуй. 2019. Capital City Court of Civil Appeals. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://appealcourt.mn/site/huraangui/       ■ Tamir Chultemsuren is the Vice Dean of the National University of Mongolia’s School of Arts, Sciences and Social Sciences, and holds a doctoral degree in Sociology. Dr. Chultemsuren is one of the co-founders of the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia (IRIM) and has been Chairman of the Board of IRIM since 2011. Having attended various academic seminars and functions across the U.S., Ireland, Hungary, Portugal, Turkey, Finland, Kazakhstan, Austria, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, Tamir has diverse and in-depth experience in engaging partners in cross-cultural settings. His areas of expertise are social research—civic participation, mass protest, and public perception; policy research—education policy and institution strengthening, monitoring, and evaluation; and project management.   ■ Dolgion Aldar is a research professional focused on promoting evidence-based policy-making and social cohesion in Mongolia. She spent five years as CEO of the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia (IRIM), one of the first organizations to promote independent and third-party research in the country. Dolgion is currently working with the Asia Foundation in Cambodia as Program Director for Ponlok Chomnes Data and Dialogue for Development. Prior to this role, she served in UNDP in Timor-Leste as a Socio-Economic Expert. She currently serves as a Secretary of the Research Committee on Social Indicators of the International Sociological Association. She is a member of the Social Well-Being Research Consortium in Asia and the Asia Democracy Research Network. Dolgion holds a master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Manchester, and both a master’s and a bachelor’s degree in Sociology from the National University of Mongolia.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박한수_EAI 연구원 문의: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr  

※ This issue briefing has been published as a sequel to the ADRN Online Seminar titled “How Grassroot Democracy Contributes to Make Democracy Works.” Sam Yip (Former Hong Kong District Councilor; Spokesperson of the Japan-Hong Kong Democracy Alliance), Irine Hiraswari Gayatri (PhD Candidate at Monash University Gender, Peace and Security Centre; Senior Researcher at BRIN), Khine Win (Executive Director, Sandhi Governance Institute), and Mardi Mapa-Suplido (Chairperson, INCITEGov) presented their respective country cases. For more details of the event, please follow this link.   Democracy’s authority and legitimacy relies on people’s participation. In modern democracies, representatives elected by the people are the main actors in political processes, as society has been more complex and policies have become increasingly specialized. Nevertheless, people’s direct participation is an essential part of democratic governance, especially at the local level. This direct democracy includes referendums, recalls, petitions, as well as participatory planning and budgeting. Moreover, active approaches such as mobilizing civil society organizations (CSOs) or protesting can be considered “grassroots democracy.” The word “grassroots” is mostly used as a metaphor for ‘sub-national level’ or ‘marginalized sectors,’ but citizens’ direct and collective actions for bringing about political change and improving democracy are not confined to a certain region or group.   Citizens in several Asian countries have struggled to resist against authoritarian regimes and establish democratic constitutions and governments. Movements against dictatorship, military regimes, or the suppression of fundamental rights are still ongoing in some regions. In addition, people under democratic regimes continue spontaneous actions to oversee officials, ensure and solidify civil rights, and push politicians to implement policies and budgets in favor of citizens’ common interests. This article will cover cases from four Asian countries, demonstrating how grassroots democracy efforts have incited more democratic and participatory regimes.   Case Study #1: Hong Kong   2014 Hong Kong protests emerged to resist Beijing’s decision to change the electoral systеm for electing the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Admіnistrative Region. Protesters were concerned that the Chinese Communist Party might pre-screen the candidates to be more cooperative with Beijing. In a political movement called the “Umbrella Movement,” the protestors used umbrellas to defend against sprinklers and pepper gas from the police. This movement took place in three main regions in Hong Kong: Admiralty, Mong Kok, and Causeway.   One of the key points, and later reason for contention, of the Umbrella Movement is that it was a grassroots movement with an organized, internal hierarchy. Student groups led the overall movement. Other leading groups, led by scholars and activists, organized the “Occupy Central” movement, aiming for civil disobedience through a sit-in protest. Participants from self-organized groups provided barricades and supply bases for the protestors. In this hierarchical structure, participants acted mostly within their roles. However, there were conflicts between the leaders and self-organized participants, as only the latter had the manpower and resources for the movement. This conflict is one of the reasons that the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (ELAB) Movement in 2019 was considered a leaderless movement.   During the Anti-ELAB Movement in 2019, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) organized most assemblies and peaceful rallies, but its decisions were not extended to participants in the front lines of protests. A volunteer group gathered information regarding police movement from the participants and created a real-time map visualization to help participants decide whether to move forward or retreat.   In 2020, COVID-19 restrictions and the enactment of the National Security Law (NSL) caused complications with the democracy movement in Hong Kong. The NSL stipulates that those convicted of sedition to disunite or overthrow the nation can be punished with a three-year sentence. Its enactment led to over 200,000 citizens leaving Hong Kong. Diaspora groups headed to Europe, the United States, Canada, Taiwan, and Japan. They established organizations for protest and policy advocacy.   In terms of the global context, Hong Kong democratic movement activists are seeking international solidarity and support. For example, cooperation with regions such as Taiwan, Uyghur, and Tibet, which have been suppressed by the CCP, could provoke worldwide concern. Moreover, activists have built networks with citizens in Thailand and Myanmar struggling for human rights and democracy, commonly known as the “Milk-Tea Alliance.” Hong Kong citizens who moved to Japan established the “Japan-Hong Kong Democracy Alliance” and have tried to direct the Japanese people’s attention to Hong Kong. Considering the lack of attention to political issues in Japan, the Alliance employs “Art Activism” and expresses their message through art. For example, martial artist and actor Bruce Lee became an artistic symbol of the Hong Kong democratic movement. His quote “Be water” served as a slogan for protestors, implying that the protestors ought to be as ‘voluntary and flexible’ as the flow of water.   Hong Kong’s case demonstrates that despite brutal suppression, citizens’ movement can find avenues for international solidarity. Beyond spoken solidarity, the crucial next step is to connect worldwide attention and support to practical actions, such as sanctions or trade restrictions against the authoritarian regime.   Case Study #2: Indonesia   In 1998, Indonesian people protested President Suharto’s despotic government. The protests, primarily led by students, resulted in the collapse of the regime. However, this movement was contextualized by complex political and economic dynamics. In the late 1990s, several Asian countries suffered from the financial crisis, including Indonesia. Indonesia’s economic crisis peaked from mid-1997 to 1998, contributing to impending unrest.   The military regime under Suharto had ruled for 30 years, but it ultimately failed to prevent or deal responsibly with the economic crisis. Students pointed out the government’s lack of action and responsibility and responded with protests in major cities. Successive demonstrations in Yogyakarta and Jakarta from May 8 to 9, 1998, resulted in fatalities and therefore increased tensions between the students and the military. On May 12, four students were killed, and eighteen students were injured during the peaceful demonstration at Trisakti University in Jakarta. This incident was later referred to as the “Trisakti Tragedy.”   The memorial ceremony the following morning quickly escalated into riots in Jakarta and the surrounding cities. Nationally, peaceful demonstrations continued during this time. Suharto announced he would not run for the next elections but refused to resign immediately. Citizens countered with a massive nationwide protest and students held a sit-in strike at the Jakarta Parliament building. Consequently, Suharto announced his resignation from the presidency on May 21. Students’ active participation and sacrifice at the forefront were crucial to the downfall of the authoritarian regime, but their role extended beyond a specific moment in 1997-98. In fact, students have struggled for democracy against the military regime for nearly three decades.   Major political reforms in 1998 established a democratic order in contemporary Indonesian society, institutionalizing the political process of the parliamentary systеm and discovering future democratic leaders. After democratization, Indonesia emerged as a regional leader in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, promoting political freedom and increasing economic prosperity. However, government institutions face challenges in controlling corruption and safeguarding civil rights. Therefore, grassroots democratic movements in Indonesia have been focusing their efforts on confronting corruption and protecting civil rights. CSOs have been involved in various programs aiming to reduce poverty, encourage government accountability, and build democratic resilience, which students are also participating. For example, there have been collective actions pushing for the establishment of the Human Rights Commission and the formulation of human rights norms, along with the enhancement of human rights information systеms for more practical policies. Additionally, there have been initiatives to support minority groups such as women, disabled, and Indigenous communities to encourage and increase their influence in the decision-making process.   Thus, Indonesia’s grassroots democracy movements have transformed into more organized, specialized, and continuous movements with program-based approaches in the last few decades. Simultaneously, each sector of grassroots democracy seeks inter-sectoral cooperation, as their agendas are linked under aspirations of democracy and human rights.   Case Study #3: Myanmar   Myanmar’s modern history is filled with the darkness of military dictatorship and persistent efforts from civil society to restore democracy. Since Ne Win staged a coup and seized power in 1962, citizens have continued their resistance through strikes and uprisings. The Saffron Revolution in 2007 and the Spring Revolution in 2021 can be understood from this historical perspective.   People’s aversion to military rule and struggle to live full and free lives triggered multiple protests throughout Myanmar’s modern history. In the case of the Saffron Revolution, the government’s decision to increase the price of petroleum directly sparked a nationwide uprising. When monks protested in Pakokku, a town in northern Myanmar, and were arrested in conflicts with the military, the monks displayed their social influence. As most of the populations are Buddhists, monks showed their willingness to act and led the movement.   Following the military coup in 2021, young people, mostly associated with student unions, initiated protests through a Civil Disobedience Movement against the military junta. However, during this period, protestors recognized the limitations of nonviolent actions through civil disobedience and thus organized the people’s defense forces (PDF) to combat the military. However, there is more to strategy evolution than just using armament. Protest movements extended from major cities to rural parts of Myanmar and even gained traction online. The junta’s intense surveillance and punishment against resistors made consistent protests difficult. However, digital platforms have provided useful venues to reveal the true situations of people and garner their online solidarity.   Citizens in pursuit of democracy in Myanmar continue the hard fight against the military’s crackdown. The annual report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) published in August 2023 presents evidence of serious war crimes committed against the people of Myanmar by the junta, including indiscriminate attacks and mass executions.[1] Millions of people have fled Myanmar, mostly seeking refuge in Thailand. Those who successfully escaped the military regime are trying to draw global attention and gather advocacy groups to the situation in Myanmar. However, considerable global public attention has shifted to Ukraine or other countries facing democratic crises. The current situation surrounding Myanmar requires domestic momentum and international solidarity in order to press the military regime to restore democracy.   Case Study #4: The Philippines   The Philippines has a history of civil disobedience against authoritarianism. A series of democratic movements resisting election fraud, commonly known as the “EDSA Revolution” or “People Power Revolution,” led to the resignation of then-dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986. The democratic movements in the Philippines were part of the wave of democratization in other parts of Asia such as Taiwan and South Korea.   Following democratization, a new Philippine Constitution implemented in 1987 emphasizes the importance of participatory civil society in promoting democratic governance. In response, NGO workers continue pushing for collaboration with the government to call for political reforms. Activists seek to establish institutions that open access for marginalized communities to participate in decision-making processes.   President Duterte’s tenure from 2016 to 2022 was a challenging period for activists and their efforts. They had to contend not only with strong leadership but also with public fascination towards it. This provided CSOs with an opportunity to recognize the significance of social media marketing and network expansion to influence people’s political opinions. During this period, a democracy watchdog organization called Tindig Pilipinas (“Stand up Philippines”) and women’s groups exposed human rights violations and the erosion of the rule of law under Duterte’s regime.   Throughout the concurrent national and local elections period in 2022, the minority and underrepresented groups united to encourage people’s meaningful participation in the elections. They fostered active participation in political elections, candidates’ forums, electoral watchdog groups, and so forth. These groups included Bangsamoro, an autonomous region with a Muslim majority located on Mindanao Island, as well as youth, women, urban poor, young professionals, development NGOs, and overseas Filipinos.   Despite their efforts to establish more democratic governance, they faced setbacks and the authoritative rule continued under President Bongbong Marcos. Along with the continuation of an oppressive government, civil society is facing disinformation and emerging trends in social media as the new battlefronts of democracy. In these circumstances, CSOs strive to enhance their ability to open spaces for citizens to empower themselves as a political force.   Conclusion   The cases of these four Asian countries suggest several principles for enhancing grassroots democracy in the region. Social media, one of the new battlefronts between democracy and counterpressure, has the potential to be used to promote citizens’ participation. It has served as a means of communication to organize protesters, such as a real-time mapping in Hong Kong with police action information and G-Talk messenger used among Myanmar’s protest leaders to spread information and rendezvous for protests. Furthermore, it is possible for citizens worldwide to express their support and advocacy for democratic movements via social media. The Milk Tea Alliance shows a new way to build solidarity that originated online.   Effective resistance against anti-democratic powers must include more than just actions at the grassroots level. Grassroots movements can create impacts during the critical junctures and lead to political change. However, many fail to bring sustainable change since they are essentially temporal mobilization. Grassroots movements need representing CSOs and other forms of institutional backups such as media support to reflect their demands to policies. CSOs in Indonesia and the Philippines, which intervene in policy-making processes and elections, demonstrate that grassroots democracy may and ought to evolve into institutionalized actions for the efficacy and sustainability of the movement.   On a global level, solidarity is not only a matter of individual citizens’ efforts but also requires pro-democracy governments’ cooperation. ASEAN merely took symbolic actions, like banning Myanmar from meetings and stood by meekly. Following the military coup in Myanmar, Japan and South Korea had joined the western democracies in sanctioning the military junta. But, pro-democracy governments have failed so far to push the military to restore democracy. Civil societies of pro-democracy countries should press their government to act firmly against the violation of human rights in Myanmar. Every grassroots struggle for democratization should matter to both pro-democracy governments and global civil society. ■     [1] United Nations. 2023. “Press Release: War crimes by Myanmar military are more frequent and brazen – Myanmar Mechanism Annual Report.” August 8. https://iimm.un.org/press-release-war-crimes-by-myanmar-military-are-more-frequent-and-brazen-myanmar-mechanism-annual-report/ (Accessed August 18, 2023)     ■ Dr. Sri Nuryanti is an acting Director of Regional Research and Innovation Policy, The Indonesian National Research and Innovation Agency. She is former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007-2012 whom which successfully conducting the Parliamentary election and Presidential Election 2009, as well as local elections 2007-2012. She is actively participating in various academic activities at national level as well as in international level. She currently serves as Secretary General of APPRA (Asia Pacific Peace Research Association) and executive council member of IPRA (International Peace Research Association).   ■ Hansu Park is a Research Associate at the East Asia Institute.     ■ 담당 및 편집: Sandi Khine EAI 인턴, 박한수 EAI 연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | hspark@eai.or.kr  

※ This article was first published by the CFR.   Introduction   The foreign policy of any state is formulated by calculating national interest and normative ideals. If national interest is based on tangible economic and security gains, normative ideals are often understood as universal and transformative values. However, this distinction is often blurred in reality, as normative choices are made in the context of long-term national interest. Furthermore, a state’s normative alignment can change due to ideologically different new governments or contentious domestic challenges. The worst-case scenario occurs when a strong state withdraws from leadership of a normative coalition of like-minded states. Like-minded states tend to disperse when they lose their leader; the decline of the Community of Democracies after the United States’s neglect is such a case. States fail to pursue consistent foreign policy because normative politics are in flux domestically and internationally.   Despite this complexity, a strong power can exercise normative foreign policy more effectively than a weaker power, as it can employ both hard and soft power. The United States played such an enforcement role during the post–Cold War unipolar world. A newly emerging strong state, such as China, can challenge an existing norm or establish a new norm. What about middle powers? Lacking unilaterally exercisable power, middle powers frequently champion multilateral rules and norms that can protect their interests from great power coercion. Professor Andrew Cooper characterizes a middle power as normatively more virtuous and trustworthy in the global order and describes its preferred diplomacy as pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, embracing compromise positions in international disputes, and adopting the notions of “good international citizenship” (Cooper et al. 1993, 116). The government of former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak pursued middle powermanship under the Global Korea slogan, emphasized value-based international contributions by expanding foreign aid, and hosted the Group of Twenty (G20) and other global meetings.   Now, the Yoon Suk Yeol government has scaled up its middle-power ambitions to those of being a global pivotal state by highlighting South Korea’s international contributions and values-based diplomacy (Yoon 2022a). Like the Lee government, the Yoon government is building its proactive multilateral diplomacy while deepening its long-standing alliance with the United States. But the U.S.-China relationship has changed significantly between the Lee and Yoon governments: geopolitical competition between the United States and China has intensified during the intervening fifteen years, expanding beyond the economic and military spheres to include technology and ideology. Under U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, an ideological narrative dividing the world between democracies and autocracies has set in. The Russian war in Ukraine has caused Western European countries to merge democratic unity and collective security. In Northeast Asia, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities now threaten not only South Korea but also the faraway United States. Facing all these high-risk challenges, the Yoon government has tightened military and economic ties with the United States.   The two countries’ shared democratic values and liberal norms have emerged as a crucial component of deepening bilateral ties. This normative alignment has invited criticism from Beijing, but the Yoon government has so far not rolled back its advocacy for those values—although it has carefully dubbed them as “universal values” rather than liberal or democratic values. The national confidence gained by globally successful popular Korean culture and deteriorating public opinion against China have helped fuel this value assertiveness.   Summary of the CFR Workshop   The Council on Foreign Relations held a virtual workshop on June 26, 2023, on “U.S.-South Korea Policy Coordination Toward China on Democratic Values and Human Rights.” The workshop’s core takeaways included the following:   ㆍ Leadership change has made South Korea reflect values in its foreign policy and expand “contributive diplomacy” for collective goods in the region and the world. South Korea’s recent values-based diplomacy has been shaped by President Yoon Suk-yeol himself. Yoon has emphasized individual freedom, human rights, and the rule of law as universal values. Obviously, those values are better kept in democracies than autocracies. But, by framing them as universal, Yoon has avoided wading into the ideological divide between democracy and autocracy and allowed himself to engage illiberal democracies. His speeches at his inauguration, the UN General Assembly, and the U.S. Congress all point out that threats to freedom and human rights can be checked when people are united to confront them. In the two main strategy reports on the Indo-Pacific and national security released by Yoon’s administration, those universal values are championed to preserve the peace and prosperity of the region and South Korea itself by strengthening rules-based order. Both reports are based on the vision of South Korea as a global pivotal state, under which leadership in multilateral diplomacy is sought. More official development assistance, humanitarian support, and peace-keeping activities are regarded as instruments of achieving this leadership.   ㆍ Several concrete actions have been taken demonstrating the Yoon government’s commitment to values-based diplomacy. South Korea joined the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) voting to check China’s human rights violation against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang in June 2022. Although this vote did not receive enough support to be adopted a resolution, it was an important move to bring China’s treatment of Uyghurs into the UN framework. South Korean governments have historically avoided condemning China’s human rights violations in international organizations like the United Nations; the Yoon government’s vote in favor reveals values-based diplomacy in action. At the same time, the Yoon government has also taken a more assertive position on North Korea’s human rights issues in the United Nations, cosponsoring two resolutions, one by the General Assembly and the other by the HRC. The Yoon government also hosted the Summit for Democracy Indo-Pacific Regional Meeting on March 30, 2023. President Yoon pledged to implement $100 million over the next three years.   Common values and partnership for rules-based order have been also called for as the basis of improving sour relations with Japan. Facing domestic opposition over forced labor compensation issues and other thorny historical conflicts, overturning the bilateral relations with Japan was a difficult task for Yoon. However, the Yoon government managed to push bilateral deals to cooperate with Japan. Responding to the security challenge posed by North Korean nuclear and missile threats is the primary reason for this rapprochement. At the same time, improving South Korea-Japan bilateral ties has been regarded as crucial for trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan to build the rules-based liberal order in the region. Yoon’s diplomatic overtures have expanded to Europe, including his participation in NATO Summit and humanitarian support for Ukraine and forthcoming reconstruction aid after the war is over.   ㆍ U.S. leadership should support the values-based diplomacy of the Yoon government consistently and reciprocate with material benefits to win South Korean domestic public support. South Koreans regard the United States as a favorable and trustworthy partner that shares their values. On the other hand, China has been losing its appeal due to coercive diplomacy and perceived China-centered cultural hegemony. However, this state cannot be permanent. Domestically, Yoon’s approach to China is facing attacks from his opposition, who claim that his position is contributing to an unprecedented trade deficit with China and hurting the economy. Therefore, U.S. leadership needs to provide material benefits that can quiet this vein of criticism.   Furthermore, severe partisanship in American politics makes it difficult to predict the next U.S. government’s position on values-based diplomacy. As in the past, South Korea relies on support and joint action from the United States. If the United States wants South Korea to continue to champion values-based diplomacy, U.S. institutions—including official entities working on democracy assistance and civil society organizations—should deeply engage their counterparts inside South Korea. This should not be a difficult task: bipartisan congressional support for South Korea’s values-based diplomacy is strong. Last, but not least, to sustain South Korea’s values-based diplomacy, the United States should allow South Korea room to engage China on universal values.   Presidential Discourse and Basic Foreign Policy Tenets   South Korea’s new diplomacy is the result of government and presidential change. President Yoon Suk-yeol has indicated since his election campaign that he would more explicitly align South Korea with the United States. Those remarks implied that, if elected, he would reject the so-called strategic ambiguity previously used to balance Seoul’s relationships with Washington and Beijing (Gallo 2021). Yoon’s explicit alignment with the United States seems to be based on personal belief, though couched in the language of universal, not U.S., values. Compared to previous South Korean presidents, Yoon is rather unique in using the word freedom in his speeches. In his inaugural NATO, UN General Assembly, and U.S. state visit speeches, President Yoon emphasized freedom as the most important universal value to be protected individually and collectively. Three speeches reveal his thinking on freedom as a political value:   ㆍ In his inaugural speech on May 9, 2022, Yoon revealed his philosophy of freedom. To overcome external and internal crises, he said, “Belief in shared values is paramount … And the most important core value is freedom.” He went on, saying that, “Human history shows that when political and economic freedom reigns supreme, that is where prosperity and abundance flourished. When prosperity and economic freedom flourishes, that is when freedom reaches even the darkest corners. Freedom is a universal value. Every citizen and every member of society must be able to enjoy freedom. If one’s freedom is infringed upon or left uncorrected, this is an assault on everyone’s freedom … everyone must be guaranteed the right to receive quality education and everyone must be granted the freedom to access and experience various cultural activities” (Yoon 2022b).   ㆍ In his UN General Assembly speech titled “Freedom and Solidarity: Answers to the Watershed Moment,” Yoon’s belief in freedom as an individual right to escape poverty and receive quality education led him to support global health funds. He introduced his speech by highlighting human rights violations globally and appealed for solidarity for freedom and commitment to norms consolidated within the UN framework. “Today, the global community is yet again witnessing freedom and peace of its citizens put in jeopardy,” he said. “Attempts to alter the status quo by force endanger the lives of innocent people; nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction pose increasing threats to humanity; pervasive violations of human rights leave millions of children deprived of their future. Such threats to freedom and peace must be overcome through solidarity and fearless commitment to the framework of universal global norms consolidated over the years within the UN framework” (Yoon 2022c).   ㆍ In his April 23, 2023, address to the joint meeting of the U.S. Congress commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, titled “Alliance of Freedom, Alliance of Action,” Yoon said that “[t]ogether with the U.S., Korea will play the role as a ‘compass for freedom.’ It will safeguard and broaden the freedom of citizens of the world” (Yoon 2023).   In addition to Yoon’s speeches, two reports released during the past half year detail the direction of the Yoon government’s foreign policy. South Korea’s overriding national interests—security, prosperity, and a heightened international profile—are described as better served by advocating for universal values and cooperating with like-minded states. Both reports emphasize the benefits of harmonizing normative values and the national interest, a strategy referred to as contributive diplomacy.   ㆍ The Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in December 2022, argues that the region’s peace and prosperity are better preserved when those values are kept. The report says that as a trade-dependent democracy, South Korea’s next leap forward relies on a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region and that South Korea will remain committed to promoting freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. International cooperation to promote the rule of law and human rights is noted as one of nine core lines of the Yoon government’s Indo-Pacific strategy.   ㆍ The National Security Strategy, released in June 2023, proclaims that “as a global pivotal state grounded in the spirit of freedom and solidarity, the Republic of Korea endeavors to actively address the rapidly evolving security environment. … Undoubtedly, pursuing freedom will continue to present us with even more opportunities, while maintaining solidarity will pave the way for an even greater future. Therefore, we commit to joining hands with the international community to safeguard universal values, such as freedom, human rights, and the rule of law, and to uphold the international order based on rules and principles.” In the section titled Defending Liberal Democracy and Contributing to Global Prosperity, advancing leadership in multilateral diplomacy to uphold a rules-based international order is prioritized. Expanding official development assistance and peacekeeping operations are mentioned as its tools. Supporting the realization of humanitarian values is described as one of major points of international development assistance. Continuing the provision of humanitarian support to war-stricken Ukrainians is pointed out as an example.   Actions Taken to Promote Liberal Norms   The Yoon government was vocal at the United Nations in condemning human rights violations by China and North Korea. The Yoon government also supported Biden’s democracy agenda by cohosting the second Summit for Democracy. During its efforts to normalize bilateral relations with Japan, the Yoon government emphasized shared values within the Korea-Japan partnership. Some of the notable actions taken by the Yoon government in its values-based diplomacy include the following:   ㆍ Joining UN voting to check China’s human rights violations. In October 2022, the forty-seven-member UN Human Rights Council voted on a resolution to hold a debate the following year on alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China. This highly debated resolution was rejected by a narrow margin of nineteen votes against to seventeen in favor, with eleven abstentions. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Michele Taylor noted that evidence of human rights violations in China’s Xinjiang province was recorded in a previous UN report and that it was crucial to hold a debate in a neutral forum. The report, issued on August 31, 2022, by former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, documents credible evidence of torture or other ill-treatment against the Uyghur minority and states that the violations could constitute crimes against humanity (Schlein 2022). However, the United States was unable to secure enough swing states to keep the issue on the UN agenda (Wintour 2022). South Korea’s vote against China is a clear departure from previous South Korean governments that had avoided condemning China’s human rights violations in the United Nations.   ㆍ Becoming assertive on North Korea’s human right issues. The Yoon government cosponsored a UNHRC resolution (Kim 2023), adopted on April 4, 2023, denouncing North Korea’s gross human rights violations, a break from the Moon Jae-in government’s five years of muted criticism (BBC News Korea 2022). This followed South Korea’s cosponsoring of the UN General Assembly’s resolution on North Korea’s human rights violations that was adopted on November 15, 2022. Previous progressive governments in South Korea had been less vocal about North Korea’s human right issues in the United Nations due to their priority on improving inter-Korean relations.   ㆍ Hosting the Summit for Democracy. The South Korean government hosted the ministerial Indo-Pacific Regional Meeting of the second Summit for Democracy, titled “Challenges and Progress in Addressing Corruption,” in Seoul on March 30, 2023 (MOFA 2023). The participating Indo-Pacific countries adopted the Seoul Declaration on Challenges and Progress in Addressing Corruption, reaffirming the importance of promoting democracy and the need to combat corruption. President Yoon called the meeting an opportunity to affirm the willingness to implement the Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, and attached great significance to Indo-Pacific countries reaffirming their commitment to protect democracy. He also stated that to repay the international community for its support for South Korea’s democratization, South Korea would implement development cooperation projects worth $100 million over the next three years in areas such as the e-government framework, digital transformation, strengthening technological capabilities, transparency, and anti-corruption efforts. The “democracy promotion for future generations,” a 1.5 track youth forum, will also be carried out by South Korea to contribute to shared values. Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin stated that the international community should utilize the Summit of Democracy as an opportunity to cooperatively protect democratic principles and stressed South Korea as a living testament to the truth that democracy remains the most effective means to freedom, peace, and prosperity.   ㆍ Embracing Japan as a partner for rules-based order. Regardless of ideological differences between progressives and conservatives, all South Korean leaders have emphasized their commitment to preserving the rules-based order. The May 21, 2021, Biden-Moon joint statement stated that the two countries “oppose all activities that undermine, destabilize, or threaten the rules-based international order and commit to maintaining an inclusive, free, and open Indo-Pacific” (The White House 2021). The freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea and beyond was included, and the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait was emphasized. A year later, less than two weeks after President Yoon’s inauguration, the May 21, 2022, Biden-Yoon Joint Statement envisioned a “heightened role in advancing freedom, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond,” and noted their respect for international law including freedom of navigation, overflight, and other lawful use of the seas, including in the South China Sea (The White House 2022). In this sense, both Moon and Yoon showed the same support for the standing rules-based order. However, the fundamental difference between Moon and Yoon is their contrasting positions on diplomacy toward Japan. In his 2022 Liberation Day speech, Yoon stated that Japan is Korea’s partner as they face common threats to the freedom of global citizens, and that the two countries can move to resolve their historical problems by collaborating on shared universal values (Lee 2022). Despite strong criticism from the opposition party, Yoon initiated a de facto resolution for the dispute over wartime conscripted labor that has historically strained Korea-Japan relations.   ㆍ Engaging Europe through liberal values. Yoon’s rules-based order expands to Europe. At the June 29, 2022, NATO summit, Yoon, the first Korean leader to attend a NATO summit as an observer, said, “[a]s a new structure of competitions and conflicts is taking shape, there is also a movement that denies the universal values that we have been protecting.” Voice of America quoted an anonymous South Korean official who stated that Yoon was referring to the Ukraine war, and like most countries, raised concerns about Russia’s and China’s respective responsibility (Shin 2022). Ten months later, Yoon condemned Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in the Biden-Yoon joint statement and clearly implied that the “global comprehensive strategic alliance” between the United States and South Korea is equally applied to the war in Europe as the alliance rooted in shared values. The South Korean government has offered $100 million worth of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine so far.   Recommendations for Sustaining the South Korean Government’s Value Diplomacy   The South Korean government under Yoon has pursued value diplomacy to an unprecedented degree. If this policy shift is to continue, three factors should be considered: the backlash to South Korea’s relations with China, domestic politics inside South Korea, and potential political changes in U.S. leadership.   ㆍ China has been criticizing the United States’ formation of smaller coalitions as weakening the United Nations. In response to the U.S. narrative of democracy vs. autocracy, China has pushed a counternarrative arguing that its political structure is a different, better-functioning form of democracy. When South Korea hosted the second Summit for Democracy, China criticized South Korea as championing U.S. ideology rather than universal values as Yoon claimed. As conflicts mount between South Korea and China, economic retaliation and icy diplomatic relations could grow, similar to China’s 2016 economic retaliation over South Korea’s deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in Sangju. To make South Korea’s democracy diplomacy sustainable, narratives of universal values need to include China as a partner in certain areas. It will be very challenging for South Korea to address China’s human rights violations and, at the same time, engage China in commonly valued areas such as youth and women’s rights. South Korea should consider cooperating with European democracies and international organizations as it tries to adapt its values diplomacy to China.   ㆍ According to a 2022 survey by the East Asia Institute, China is disliked and mistrusted, and about twice as many Koreans answered that South Korea should take a tougher position against China’s human rights violations. When asked which country was more favorable, 56.7 percent of South Koreans answered the United States while only 10.9 percent answered China. The United States is also ten times more trusted than China, as 85.1 percent of South Koreans answered that they trust the United States while only 8.2 percent answered that they trust China. This clear preference for the United States over China is also demonstrated in value alignment: 86.1 percent agreed that a strong U.S.-South Korea alliance is natural as both countries share values and orientations. When asked if South Korea should take a similar stance as other democratic countries in taking a tougher position against China’s human rights violations, 60.7 percent answered yes while 27.5 percent didn’t feel the need.   ㆍ However, economic concerns are likely to influence South Korean attitudes. South Korea has been facing economic difficulties including an unprecedented trade deficit with China. South Korea’s post-pandemic economic growth still relies on the Chinese market. Opponents of Yoon’s values diplomacy argue that it is likely to hurt South Korea’s economic interests by provoking China. Korean businesses are now building bigger factories in the United States for a stable supply chain, which is expected to decrease South Korea’s trade dependence on China. During this transitional period, Yoon should counter the economic loss argument at home. In this aspect, whether the Biden administration can extend subsidies to Korean firms operating battery factories in the United States or exempt Korean semiconductor manufacturers in China from restrictions will be important issues for Yoon to secure domestic support for values diplomacy.   ㆍ The Yoon government’s values diplomacy dovetails with South Korea’s alliance with the United States and the Biden administration’s adoption of diplomacy supporting democracy. This means that a possible government change in the United States—and consequently weaker support for democracies abroad—could dampen Yoon’s initiative in advocating universal values and contributing to democracy assistance. Therefore, regardless of new leadership following the U.S. presidential election in 2024, bipartisan recognition of Yoon’s initiative and accompanying support will be desirable.   Conclusion   Amid the intensifying ideological competition between the United States and China, the Yoon government has aligned with the United States normatively, risking souring relations with China. President Yoon’s consistent messages of commitment to freedom and human rights have been articulated through a series of speeches and accompanying major national reports on foreign policy. Several concrete actions, such as joining the UN Human Rights Council, voting against China, and hosting the Summit for Democracy, have followed. Reversing diplomacy toward Japan and supporting Ukraine with noncombatant support have followed the logic of democratic cooperation. In order for the Yoon government’s values diplomacy to sustain, engaging China in common interests and cultural values, securing economic gains from values diplomacy, and consistent U.S. democracy diplomacy will be critical. ■     References   BBC News Korea. 2022. “북한인권: 유엔, 북한 인권결의안 채택… 한국 또 공동제안국 불참.” April 2. https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-60964381.   Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgott, Kim R. Nossal. 1993. Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. University of British Columbia Press: 1-118.   Gallo, William. 2021. “S. Korean Conservatives Vow to Get Tougher on China.” Voice of America. November 23. https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korean-conservatives-vow-to-get-tougher-on-china-/6324216.html   Kim, Soo-yeon. 2023. “UNHRC adopts resolution on N. Korea’s human rights.” Yonhap News Agency. April 4. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230404010851320   Lee, Haye-ah. 2022. “Full text of Yoon’s Liberation Day speech.” Yonhap News Agency. August 15. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220815001600315   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. 2022. “우크라이나 추가 인도적 지원 결정.” Press Release. June 21. https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=372432   ____________________________________________________. 2023. “Indo-Pacific Regional Meeting of 2nd Summit for Democracy Takes Place.” Press Releases. April 10. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322175&page=1   Office of National Security. 2023. “The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration’s National Security Straegy: Global Pivotal State for Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity.” June 8. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_25772/view.do?seq=16&page=1   Schlein, Lisa. 2022. “UN Council Rejects Uyghur Resolution on China by Narrow Margin.” Voice of America. October 6. https://www.voanews.com/a/6778903.html   Shin, Hyonhee. 2022. “South Korea’s Yoon warns at NATO summit of threat to ‘universal values.’” Reuters. June 30. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-warns-nato-summit-threat-universal-values-2022-06-30/   The Government of the Republic of Korea. 2022. “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Propserous Indo-Pacific Region.” December 28. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133   The White House. 2021. “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement.” Statements and Releases. May 21. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/   _______________. 2022. “United States-Republic of Kore Leaders’ Joint Statement.” Statements and Releases. May 21. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/#:~:text=President%20Yoon%20and%20President%20Biden%20reaffirm%20their%20commitment%20to%20maintain,South%20China%20Sea%20and%20beyond   Wintour, Patrick. 2022. “UN vote to ignore human rights abuses in China leaves west in dead end.” The Guardian. October 6. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/06/un-vote-ignore-human-rights-abuses-china-leaves-west-dead-end   Yoon, Suk Yeol. 2022a. “South Korea Needs to Step Up.” Foreign Affairs. February 8. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2022-02-08/south-korea-needs-step   ______________. 2022b. “Inaugural Address by President Yoon Suk Yeol.” Office of the President of the Republic of Korea. May 10. https://eng.president.go.kr/speeches/kJDwcanX   ______________. 2022c. “Freedom and Solidarity: Answers to the Watershed Moment.” Office of the President of the Republic of Korea. September 20. https://eng.president.go.kr/speeches/qY7JzqeX   ______________. 2023. “Alliance of Freedom, Alliance in Action.” Office of the President Republic of Korea. April 27. https://eng.president.go.kr/speeches/dZfAH6rj     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute and the Representative of the Asia Democracy Research Network.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수 EAI 연구원     문: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr  

※ This issue briefing has been published as a sequel to the ADRN-International IDEA Joint Online Seminar, titled "Climate Change and Democracy.” Joo-Cheong Tham (Professor, Melbourne Law School) spoke about the major findings of the recently-published “Climate Change and Democracy: Insights from Asia and the Pacific” report by the International IDEA, while Niranjan Sahoo (Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation), Marlea P. Munez (President, Women’s Initiaitves for Society, Culture, and Environment), and Tsuji Yuichiro (Professor, Meiji University) presented their respective country cases. For more details of the event, please follow this link.   Asia is the most populous and one of the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world. Long coastline, vast low lying areas comprising many small island nations make it highly susceptible to climate change such as rising sea level and extreme weather events like floods, landslides. For many critics, democracies' response to climate change is much impeded due to their slow decision-making process and short-termism governed by electoral compulsions. Some analysts go as far as to claim that authoritarianism is needed to tackle the crisis more effectively.   However, close examination of different governance structure's climate actions strongly supports that democracies are inherently better at handling climate crisis compared to authoritarian regimes. This article explores the multifaceted impact of climate change to democracy and delves into the case studies of India, the Philippines, and Japan to identify strengths as well as areas of improvement that democracies should consider to establish meaningful climate actions.   Climate Change: A Risk and an Opportunity for Democracy     Climate change not only threatens the natural environment but also undermines the very fabric of democracy. The perils it poses to democratic societies encompass food insecurity, deepening inequality, societal instability, the erosion of democratic values, and threats to the integrity of free and fair elections. The prevalence of short-term thinking, the capture of policies by vested interests, self-referential decision-making, and the weakening of multilateralism all hinder the concerted and efficient efforts required to address the urgent climate crisis at hand.   Nevertheless, research proves that democracy centrally matters in addressing climate change (Tham et al. 2023). Democratic governance plays a pivotal role in shaping climate action and responding to the threats that arise from climate crisis to democratic framework. However, the following circumstances also matter: the level of climate vulnerability; the extent of state capacity and resources; the dependence on international funding; and the structure of the economy, specifically the significance of climate-vulnerable industries and fossil fuel industries.   There are both threats to and from the state regarding the implementation of efficient climate actions. Threats to the state manifest as conflicts arising from escalating food and land scarcity, while threats from the state stem from top-down decision-making processes. As extreme weather events like floods, droughts, and bushfires become increasingly prevalent, the climate crisis is inevitably rising to the top of the political agenda. Politics will have to grapple with these calamities, leading to an amplified role for the government in managing these emergencies.   The extreme danger that climate change poses to democracy also includes opportunities to improve the quality of democracy. It includes the “democratic planning state,” which stipulates that states can plan for the future in a democratic way (Tham et al. 2023, 27). Additionally, fostering an ethos of solidarity that embraces broad inclusivity and intergenerational collaboration, encompassing solidarity between nature and humans, is essential. Revitalized multilateralism and the promotion of fair and inclusive politics, ensuring a just transition, are also of utmost importance.   In the context where the deep nexus between democratic actors and vested interest groups has been somewhat neglected, there should be more innovations in the democratic planning state. Additionally, policy recommendations encompass revitalizing multilateralism, drawing valuable insights from communities most vulnerable to climate change, and establishing effective democratic mechanisms as the basis for international funding allocation. These measures will enable a path toward more inclusive, accountable, and effective democratic responses to the climate challenges.   Case Study #1: India     Climate change debates are increasingly taking the center stage in India’s policy circles. This is largely because of India’s growing vulnerabilities to climate change events. The world’s largest democracy faces most acute challenges from the vagaries of climate change. There are climate refugees and migrants without economic support to sustain their lives.   While the Indian Constitution has evolved to cover issues relating to environmental protection and sustainable development, comprehensive action against the climate crisis is still hindered due to an absence of overarching national institution and national legislation specifically dealing with the challenges of climate change.   At the federal level, India’s Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change is the most central organization that mobilizes national response and coordinates statutory bodies on the environment. However, its climate response continues to remain centralized and top-down under successive governments at the centre. A noteworthy feature of India’s climate response is that the higher judiciary has been particularly acclaimed for taking hundreds of litigations and cases that shaped the cumulative national response to climate change and environmental protection.   Meanwhile, real actions have also been taking place at the sub-national level. State governments have been building regional partnerships, investing in climate mitigation strategies, and launching green initiatives. Meanwhile, at the local level, the governing bodies are increasingly instituting climate-friendly policies and civil societies are putting great effort into bringing climate change initiatives to the mainstream. Numerous activists have been at the forefront of innovative environmental movements, and many pioneering civil society organizations are carrying out advocacy work to reframe global debate on climate change.   The major challenges to India’s democracy are political short-termism that is exacerbated by hesitancy and incrementalism, competitive populism, and low state capacity. In particular, India’s competitive federal structure means the sub-national governments and adversarial politics block a coherent national response. Furthermore, under-funding and limited empowerment of vital institutions mean many of India’s areas that are fragile to climate change risks remain extremely vulnerable to frequent climate disasters.   Nevertheless, there is still hope that India’s democracy will be able to respond to climate change. India’s democratic institutions are paying closer attention to climate threats and they are increasingly becoming key electoral issues. Deliberative aspects of democracy led to the National Action Plan of Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008. India has also expanded its reliance on renewable energy since COP 21 and increasing multilateral efforts such as the Solar Alliance in 2015 and the 2020 Roadmap that is in collaboration with the U.K.   Case study #2: The Philippines     In the Philippines, the discourse surrounding climate change and democracy revolves around the role of natural resources. During the martial law period, there was widespread exploitation of these resources, resulting in significant degradation and a decline in productivity in many regions. The post-martial law era witnessed a concerted effort to democratize access to and management of natural resources.   Climate governance in the Philippines traces its origin back to the implementation of the Bill of Rights, which upholds the rights to life and rights to equal protection under the law. Furthermore, the Constitution recognizes the economic, social, and cultural rights of indigenous cultural communities. The Indigenous Peoples' Act establishes democratic principles that grant them rights to their lands and outlines procedures for land management.   To effectively address climate change, the Philippine government has established a structured approach. The Climate Change Action was reformed to the Task Force on Climate Change, and the Climate Change Commission has been positioned directly under the Office of the President, highlighting its significance. Additionally, a dedicated group was created to focus on adaptation and mitigation efforts. At the national level, the Philippines embraces participatory approaches to planning, involving government bodies, NGOs, and diverse communities in the consultation process for national frameworks and strategies. This inclusive approach ensures that different perspectives are considered in the pursuit of effective climate governance.   However, the performance of democracy in the Philippines has been disappointing. For democracy to work, concrete sets of actions that address the country's specific vulnerabilities are required. The paramount importance lies in crafting rules and laws that are practical and yield tangible results, rather than simply aiming for widespread community consensus. The key is to actively encourage all stakeholders to participate in the implementation of climate actions, as their engagement is vital to achieving meaningful progress.   When considering the ongoing debate between authoritarianism and democracy in effectively addressing the climate crisis, democracies continue to hold an advantage. The democratic framework enables greater public participation, fostering transparency and accountability by allowing individuals to demand due diligence. Democracy also nurtures an environment conducive to innovation and diversity, facilitating the development of novel approaches to combat the climate crisis. Furthermore, democracy upholds the principles of respect for others and recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples.   Case Study #3: Japan     Japan’s energy self-sufficiency is low as Japan relies on fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and LNG that are imported from overseas. In fact, Japan is dependent on other countries for nearly 85% of its energy resources. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has further affected Japan’s energy policy. Japan aims to increase the usage of power generation methods such as renewable energy and nuclear power to 59% in 2030. This will increase the energy self-sufficiency ratio to 30% by 2030.   One obstacle for Japan's implementation of climate actions is that the government’s policy process has been heavily influenced by interest groups such as the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren). Keidanren, in particular, has a significant impact on Japan’s political processes and supports policies that maintain thermal power plants. This is an obstacle to democracy as interest groups exerting strong influences on the government can impact policy decisions. If a powerful interest group comes into play, the representatives in parliament will lean toward satisfying its needs over all else.   Another significant challenge for Japan's democracy lies in the lack of sufficient public discourse regarding the public's willingness to bear the risks associated with government policies. In a democracy, “popular sovereignty” implies that the public assumes the risks resulting from their choices, while the government bears the responsibility of explaining policy decisions. Unfortunately, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has shown reluctance in being held accountable for policies that directly impact the lives of the public, and has failed to engage the entire nation in comprehensive deliberative discussions.   Japan maintains government accountability through parliamentary politics, where the government elucidates its fundamental national policies and each faction has the chance to pose “representative” questions to the prime minister or ministers. However, in practice, opposition parties sometimes fail to effectively engage in demanding explanations from the government regarding the risks associated with energy policies. In essence, it is imperative that Japan's energy policy becomes a subject of public concern, which can subsequently foster greater government accountability in addressing potential future risks.   Conclusion     In short, it is evident that democratic societies face challenges in effectively responding to the escalating threats of climate change. However, the presence of short-termism driven by competitive party politics, cumbersome and sluggish decision-making processes, and the intertwining of business interests with politics are impeding the adoption of bold and timely policy responses from key democratic nations in Asia.   Despite the flaws in their responses, it is still reasonable to conclude that democracies, with their inherent openness and well-established checks and accountability, are significantly better equipped than authoritarian regimes to address the intricate challenges posed by climate change. Authoritarianism lacks the necessary safeguards against abuse and often conceals key decision-making processes. It is crucial to recognize that climate change is an inter-generational and moral problem. Its holistic nature necessitates a comprehensive approach, making democracy naturally more suitable to effectively tackle these issues. ■   Reference   Tham, Joo-Cheong et al. 2023. "Climate Change and Democracy: Insights from Asia and the Pacific.” International IDEA. June: 1-239. https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2023.25     ■ Niranjan Sahoo, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation's Governance and Politics Initiative. ■ Jisoo Park is a Research Associate at the East Asia Institute.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구원     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr