.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bangladeshi government took various measures such as the development of a guideline, directives, and committees for COVID-19 management and the provision of stimulus packages. Nevertheless, not only did the said measures not reach vulnerable and minority communities, but the government also undermined democratic principles through both legal and extra-legal measures. Rezwan-ul-Alam, the Director of the Knowledge Management team at Manusher Jonno Foundation, states that the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the linkage between public health outcomes and democracy, human rights, and governance in Bangladesh. The author explains that several cases were filed against journalists and local media that exposed corruption scandals in the health sector –an apparent manifestation of the infringements on the freedom of speech. Furthermore, the distribution of both financial and food support was mired by allegations of corruption and mismanagement. It is important to build the foundations for a more rights-based, effective, and accountable democratic governance to combat future possibilities of a national emergency.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction[1]   Like many countries around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic has triggered multi-dimensional challenges for Bangladesh.[2] This working paper examines the various challenges that are faced by the government and other non-state actors like non-government organizations (NGOs), media and businesses. It also explores the linkages among public health outcomes, human rights, and governance to assess Bangladesh’s democratic governance situation.     Objectives   The following are the three objectives of this analysis: a) To examine the government’s overall response to the COVID-19 pandemic, whilst covering specific aspects: health, economic, social, and political response; b) To analyze the role of NGOs, media, and private sectors to understand the overall public sentiment towards the authorities’ actions in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic; and c) To recommend both policy and programmatic solutions to build public confidence in the state’s capacity in managing novel shocks in the future. ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2]  A total of 7950 people died and more than half a million infected as per official figure, dated 21 January 2021. https://corona.gov.bd/ Accessed on January 21, 2021     Rezwan-ul-Alam is the Director of the Knowledge Management team at Manusher Jonno Foundation, Bangladesh. He has a solid working experience of 23 years at different positions in Advocacy, Communication, Partnership and Media relations in a number of organizations (TIB, World Bank, UNICEF, Bangladesh Government and media). He holds a PhD in Journalism from City University, London.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Managing a global pandemic at the national level is undeniably difficult, but more so in countries with a weak foundation of governance such as India. The outbreak of COVID-19 in India has disclosed several shortcomings of the governance capacity of India as well as its capability to manage its economic impacts and protect the poor, vulnerable, and informal workers. Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay, director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), and Kaustuv Chakrabarti argue that the pandemic has immensely impacted the lives and livelihood of millions of people in India. It has decelerated economic growth and increased the unemployment rate. India’s weak public health governance was manifest in its limited capacity to provide adequate healthcare and medical personnel. The pandemic is expected to push 4000 million informal workers into deeper poverty and instigate discrimination towards migrant communities. Not to mention, a series of protests and assertions of rights illustrates that Indian politics have reached a critical juncture. In order to move past the aforementioned setbacks, the authors state that it is crucial to improve the social and economic security of the migrant workers, enhance the healthcare sys-tem, and develop democratic spaces.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction[1]   The COVID-19 pandemic has shaken the foundation of governance in India as in many parts of the world. The lessons emerging from the pandemic reveal that a capable, accountable, inclusive, and participatory state is essential for effectively addressing the challenges posed by the pandemic that will have long-lasting ramifications. Since the end of January, when India identified its first COVID-19 case, over 10,858,300 cases of infections and 155,280 deaths have been recorded. A total of 10,559,604 persons have recovered which means nearly 99 percent of all the people who got infected have recovered (as of February 10, 2021).[2] The COVID-19 pandemic has immensely impacted the lives and livelihood of millions of people in India. The pandemic-induced lockdown has added to unprecedented misery and suffering of the poor, vulnerable, and informal workers including the migrant workers. The economy which was already on a weak footing even before the pandemic has suffered the most. The weak and unprepared health sys-tem in the country proved to be grossly inadequate to handle a pandemic of this magnitude. The pandemic provided a pretext to the ruling dispensation to restrict dissents and civic engagement. ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2]  Worldometer, Retrieved from https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/india/ on 10 February, 2021.     Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a pioneer CSO, who has dedicated more than three decades for work on participation, democratic governance and civil society development. He has twenty-five years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSOs. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a PhD in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India.   Kaustuv Chakrabarti is an independent author, who served as a senior program officer at PRIA. Kaustuv worked on the issues of civic space, multi-stakeholder partnerships, South-South Cooperation, and building CSO capacities. He has been passionately engaged with PRIA’s work on civic space both at the Asian and South Asian level. He co-authored Civic space under Siege: experiences from South Asia; the “State of Democracy: India” report, and the synthesis report on “Civic Space in Asia: Emerging Issues and Policy Lessons from Six Asian Countries 2018.” He has a Master’s degree in globalization and development from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

동아시아연구원(원장 손열)은 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(ADRN)의 사무국으로서 아홉 번째 [민주주의 협력] 온라인 세미나 시리즈, “미얀마 민주주의 회복을 위한 연대의 목소리"를 개최했습니다. 본 회의는 아시아 민주주의 국가들과 지역협력체 및 유엔이 쿠테타 이후 미얀마 사태에 대하여 어떠한 대응을 하고 있는지를 살펴보고, 미얀마 민주주의 복원을 지원하기 위한 국제 협력 방안들을 모색하였습니다.   일시: 2021년 4월 29일 10:00-11:30 (한국 시간)   기조연설자: J. Ramos-Horta (Member of the Council of State, Former President of Timor-Leste (2007-2012) and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (1996))   발표자: Maiko Ichihara (Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University), Hun Joon Kim (Professor, Korea University), Evan A. Laksmana (Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies Indonesia), Niranjan Sahoo (Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation)   사회자: Sook Jong Lee (Professor, Sungkyunkwan University; Senior Fellow, East Asia Institute)  

[Editor’s note] Change has dawned upon Nepal following the declaration of the 2015 Constitution, yet the future of its government seems bleak. Pradip Pariyar, Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation, states that the old game of parliamentary politics is being revived in Nepal through a series of questionable events that unfolded in the Nepalese parliament over the past few months. Prime Minister K.P. Oli’s controversial recommendation to dissolve the House of Representatives was followed by strong backlash from both his faction and rival factions. Amidst the two months of uncertainty following the dissolution of the parliament, Nepali people brought their dissatisfaction to the streets, protesting against the decision. While the Supreme Court ultimately decided against the dissolution, deeming it unconstitutional, it was revealed that there was internal support for Oli’s contentious decision, including backing from Chief Justice Cholendra. Despite the expectation that Oli would resign from the post due to the trouble he brought upon the government as well as his limited capacity to handle national matters amidst the pandemic, Oli remains in power today.   “On recent Supreme Court judgment that overturned PM K.P. Oli's decision to dissolve parliament illegally (In Nepal)” Following the declaration of the 2015 Constitution of Nepal, the successful elections on all three tiers of the government, federal, provincial, and local, became a sign of hope for Nepal, a fledgling democracy. Upon assuming office in February 2018, the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) was expected to deliver its promises on development, good governance, and the implementation, as well as the amendment of the constitution. However, in reality, Prime Minister K.P. Oli failed to deliver all aspects of his promise. It can be said that the peak of Oli's failure was when he announced the dissolution of the lower house of the Parliament after the rift in the NCP began.    The Dissolution of the NCP and the Parliament: the Demise of Oli's Legitimacy   The Maoist Center (MC) merged with the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) to create the Nepal Communist Party (NCP). This coalition was viewed as a historical leap for the "communist movement” as voters for both parties believed that a unified party would not only bring on stability but would also ensure good governance and prosperity. As the party emerged victorious with winning a majority of seats in the federal parliament, even critics hoped for a stable government that would put economic development and good governance at the core of its agenda. However, due to internal disagreement the coalition dissolved with the departure of MC. On December 20, 2020, the cabinet led by Oli recommended the dissolution of the House of Representatives. Oli called for a fresh mandate through parliamentary elections and stated that the lower house would be dissolved based on Article 76(1) and (7), and Article 85 of the constitution. Article 76 (1) states, "The President shall appoint the leader of a parliamentary party that commands the majority in the House of Representatives as the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers shall be constituted under his or her chairpersonship." Article 76 (7) states that if the Prime Minister fails to obtain vote of confidence or cannot be appointed, the President, on recommendation of the PM, can dissolve the House of Representatives and declare a date of election within six months of the dissolution. However, these clauses were insufficient to justify the dissolution. Therefore, PM Oli also took to Article 85 to support his decision: "Unless dissolved earlier pursuant to this Constitution, the term of the House of Representatives shall be five years."  He also stated that the internal disagreement prevented swift and effective decisions from being made regarding development. President Bidya Devi Bhandari also did not question nor call into discussion the seemingly significant political move of the incumbent. It was also found that the recommendation was made based on Oli's misinterpretation of the constitutional provision. Therefore, many opinion-makers and newspaper outlets termed the move to dissolve the parliament as "a coup orchestrated by premier Oli."   As the legitimacy crisis ensued, politicians from the same faction began to ban together against Oli. They questioned the excess of power Oli had in making party decisions and pointed out how he and his government were unable to fulfill any of his promises. His poor performance during the global pandemic and several UML-related political scandals added to the distrust of Oli. These factors, along with the dissolution of the parliament, shattered Oli's much-touted slogan of prosperity. Three senior leaders also asked for his resignation his authoritarian characteristics.   The Voice of the People is Heard as the Parliament is Reinstated   The dissolution pushed Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda, Madhav Kumar Nepal, and Jhala Nath Khanal, members of the UML rival faction, to take to the streets. They called for a street movement and organized huge protests in the capital city and other parts of the country. The civil society movement called Nagarik Aandolan, took to the streets of Kathmandu as they believed that the dissolution of the parliament was unconstitutional and undemocratic. The protestors also stated that President Bhandari was a rubber stamp for the Oli government as she supported and approved every undemocratic decision he made. An editorial of a mainstream daily pointed out that the collusion between President Bhandari and Prime Minister Oli was equally problematic: "President Bhandari has thrown the legitimacy of the revered Office of the President—along with whatever little legitimacy she had—to the trash pile of politics[1]." As there was news of unusual interaction between PM Oli and Chief Justice Cholendra Sumsher Rana before the dissolution of the parliament was declared, many voiced skepticism on the Supreme Court. Though all parties and groups protesting against the dissolution formally stated that they were hopeful about the Supreme Court correcting the wrong move of Oli and Bhandari, very few believed that the verdict by the court would restore the parliament. Civil society members, retired chief justices, lawyers, intellectuals, the majority of opinion-makers, and mainstream media consistently spoke against the move while maintaining hope in the Supreme Court. The issue of dissolution was not merely a legal question but also a question of how to maintain the faith of the people in parliamentary democracy as 13 writ petitions were filed against Oli’s House dissolution.  Two months of uncertainty followed the dissolution of the Parliament. Sporadic protests were organized in different parts of the country and, a huge section of Nepali people supported the movement protesting dissolution. Chief Justice Cholendra Shumsher Rana made a verdict that overturned PM Oli's decision to dissolve the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court found that the decision to dissolve the Parliament was unconstitutional a there was a possibility to form a new government under Article 76 (7). Though members of the Constitutional Bench unanimously agreed to give the verdict against the dissolution, insiders of the Supreme Court say that Chief Justice Cholendra tried hard to support PM Oli's decision of dissolving the House of Representatives.   After the Verdict: the Political Expectations and Reality   It was expected that PM Oli would resign from his post after the verdict overturned his decision to dissolve the parliament. This would have brought the politics back on its normal track. However, Oli did not resign and formally welcomed the Supreme Court's verdict. He stated that he would reinstate the house but also stated that he never regretted his original decision as it was right and democratic. It is interesting to note that the main opposition party Nepali Congress (NC) did not directly or strongly call for Oli’s resignation even though it had previously maintained that Oli's move was unconstitutional. Insiders of the party privately mentioned to journalists that, Party Chairperson Sher Bahadur Deuba is an ally of Oli and that he doesn't want Oli to resign right now. As India is backing Oli, Deuba did not want to make India unhappy by not cooperating. According to these party insiders, Deuba believes that India will play a significant role in the upcoming general assembly of the Nepali Congress. As he is vying for the post of Chairperson, people believe that he wanted India to back him up to win the party election. The other opposition in the parliament, Janata Samajvadi Party (JaSaPa), led by Mahantha Thakur, did not call for Oli's resignation after the verdict. Even though the two top leaders of the party—Baburam Bhattarai and Upendra Yadav—have been very vocal against Oli's authoritarian impulses, the faction led by Mahantha Thakur and Rajendra Mahata, have been saying that the present crisis is the result of an intra-party feud in the communist party. Instead of asking for the resignation of PM Oli and collaborating with NC and Maoist Center to oust Oli from the post, they took this opportunity to bargain with Oli to fulfill some of their longstanding demands such as resolving court cases filed against their cadres who had participated in the Madhesh Movement. According to party insiders, if JaSaPa succeeds in freeing the jailed leaders and cadres, it would help them placate their constituency. To finish his full term, PM Oli promised to fulfill everything that was demanded. From the two cases mentioned above, it can be said that the old game of parliamentary politics that was present when the NCP was first amalgamated has returned. By rule of the same game, Oli is trying to win the support of NC and JaSaPa parliamentarians. The Kathmandu Post editorial on the ongoing crisis paints a clear picture of this disorderly situation, "The citizens’ quest until the end of February was about saving democracy from the authoritarian tendencies of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. After the reinstatement of Parliament, however, it is all about saving that very democracy from parliamentary politics."[2] It should also be noted that although the Parliament has been reinstated, the government has not given it any agenda. Adding to the stalemate, the government announced the end of the ongoing parliamentary session without even informing the Speaker of the House. In other words, even though the parliament was reinstated, the Supreme Court's verdict has not ended the political crisis. Therefore, politics has not returned to normalcy to prioritize the well-being and rights of the people.■     [1] “Democracy Undoing.” The Kathmandu Post, December 20, 2020. https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2020/12/20/democracy-s-undoing [2] “Turning the Tide.” The Kathmandu Post, March 10, 2021. https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2021/03/10/turning-the-tide-1615382336     Pradip Pariyar is Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation. Mr. Pradip Pariyar is an alumnus of American University and Tribhuvan University. He specializes in youth empowerment, peace building and capacity building of media professionals. As the elected president of the Association of Youth Organizations Nepal (AYON), he worked closely with government of Nepal to initiate a youth-responsive budget. He was a member of the government task force that developed Youth Vision 2025: a 10-year national youth development policy. He has trained thousands of youths globally on leadership, peace building, and conflict-sensitive journalism. He founded the Nepal Youth Forum to focus on policy advocacy, awareness, and youth empowerment. In 2011, Mr. Pariyar was selected as a youth fellow by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. He received ‘Asia’s 21 Young Leaders Award’ in 2018 by Asia Society. Mr. Pariyar also serves as the chairperson of the Nepal Policy Center, a youth-led think tank. In 2015, he received the Youth Leadership Award from the Nepali Government’s Ministry of Youth and Sports for his decade-long contribution to youth leadership development across Nepal. Traveling throughout the length and breadth of Nepal, Mr. Pariyar witnessed diverse cultures and had encounters with his socially offended country people have invigorated his dream fuelled by the unholy dogma of casteism. He dreams of a just Nepal; a cohesive society where an individual’s potential, competence, edification and hard slog define a person rather than his/her status.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

부적절한 정치자금 제도, 정치 부패와 정치자금 남용으로 이어져 … 정치자금 제도의 투명성과 공정성 향상을 위한 개혁안은 무엇일까? 동아시아연구원 (원장 손열)은 아시아민주주의연구네트워크 (ADRN)의 사무국으로서 여덟 번째 [민주주의 협력] 온라인 세미나 시리즈, "아시아 민주국가의 정치자금제도를 점검하다"를 개최하였습니다. 본 회의에서 ADRN 멤버들은 파키스탄, 인도네시아, 대만, 말레이시아의 정치자금제도에 대한 연구를 공유하고, 투명하고 무결한 정치자금을 위한 개혁 과제를 논의했습니다.   일시: 2021년 4월 20일 (화) 15:30 – 17:00 (한국시간) 발표자: Aira Azhari(Manager of Democracy and Governance Unit, IDEAS), Ahmed Bilal Mehbob (Founder and CEO, PILDAT), Sri Nuryanti(Researcher, Indonesian Institute of Sciences), Chin-en Wu(Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica) 사회자: Aasiya Riaz(Joint Director, PILDAT)  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Responding to a national crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, entails an important challenge – how can policymakers ensure that policies guarantee the safety, health, and political rights of their citizens? While Indonesia’s early response to the COVID-19 pandemic entailed economic sacrifices and several repercussions, the government was able to overcome such challenges through its implementation of comprehensive policies encompassing public health, financial aid, and economic recovery plans. Sri Nuryanti, a researcher from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, explains how the Indonesian government’s successful initiatives, containing the COVID-19 pandemic with the least number of economic repercussions, led to higher level of trust and societal compliance. In this regard, the Indonesian government was not only able to curb the spread of COVID-19 through the implementation of task forces but also conjured economic recovery plans and provided aid and other types of assistance to minimize financial consequences. On top of that, national elections were held with strict health protocols, safeguarding citizens’ political rights.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction[1]   The first Indonesian citizen affected by the coronavirus was reported on March 2, 2020. During the early stage of the pandemic, people thought that the virus would fade away naturally with time. Therefore, Indonesia was already mid-pandemic when policies were applied to contain COVID-19. In the very beginning, Indonesia’s policies consisted of evacuating the Indonesian citizens from Wuhan, China and designating specific hospitals in Galang Island (Riau Islands province) to only treat COVID-19 patients. Hospitals also offered services to act as a facility to observe quarantine and shelter patients to control the spread of COVID-19 on Galang Island. New facilities that could hold 1,000 beds were also constructed and ready to use by April 6, 2020.[2] The policy above shows that the Indonesian government tried to counter the spread of the virus by treating the affected patients on a secluded island. Furthermore, the Indonesian government established a special team to accelerate the efforts to combat the spread of the coronavirus under the coordination of the BNPB (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana/ Indonesia National Board for Disaster Management). As creating a coordinated COVID-19 response between the government, ministerial departments, and other stakeholders was complicated and as new policy dilemmas emerged, maximizing efforts to control the pandemic was found to be challenging.[3] Bloomberg, a private financial, software, data, and media company based in the US, launched a report called the “Covid Resilience Ranking.” This report follows the development of the COVID-19 responses, fatality rate, number of infected cases and PCR tests completed for various countries. Reports are released every month, taking into account the social and economic disruptions. The report also gives an overview of the capacity of local health care sys-tems, the impact of virus-related restrictions, and other COVID-19 related issues. From the Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, the dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic in many countries can be observed. This research utilized data that was published on December 2020.[4]   Figure 1. Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking Source: Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking (December 20, 2020) [5] The Bloomberg resilience score indicates the resilience of the country, the higher the score, the higher the resilience. The Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking is a compilation of many datasets, indicators, and indexes that is based on three fundamental criteria: the comprehensiveness of the data, the recentness of the data, and the reputation of the data collectors. Therefore, the Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking is very useful in comparing the situation of the country amid the COVID-19 pandemic. From the data above, it is evident that democratic countries tend to have poorer performances compared with authoritarian countries. The US and India recorded low performances compared to authoritarian countries such as China and Vietnam which successfully combated the spread of the coronavirus. Hence, the question of whether democratic values are suitable for coping with the pandemic has been raised. Substantial evidence states that succeeding in containing COVID-19 with the least amount of disruption could lead to the development of high levels of trust and societal compliance. However, it is also important to note that the impact of the pandemic and the response of countries have been found to have a significant impact on the national economy. Indonesia, like other countries, is also facing common challenges. Therefore this study aims to form an explanation for the following research questions: 1) What are the challenges faced by Indonesia?; 2) What are the responses of the Public and Private Sector?; 3) How did COVID-19 change the behavior of the people?; 4) How did the COVID-19 Pandemic impact domestic and foreign policy? ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2]  Chandra Gian Asmara, “RS Galang untuk Covid-19 Beroperasi, Intip Fasilitasnya!” [Galang Hospital for Covid-19 Operates, Peek at the Facilities!], CNBC Indonesia, April 08 2020, (accessed in 21 December 2020). https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200408122625-4-150577/rs-galang-untuk-covid-19-beroperasi-intip-fasilitasnya [3] Agus Wibowo, “Arahan dan Strategi Ketua Gagus Tugas Penanganan Covid-19 untuk Pemerintah Daerah” [Directions and Strategies of the Chai of the Covid-19 Handling Task Force for Regional Governments], Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, March 17 2020, (accessed in 21 December 2020). https://bnpb.go.id/berita/arahan-dan-strategi-ketua-gugus-tugas-penanganan-covid19-untuk-pemerintah-daerah#:~:text=JAKARTA%20%2D%20Kepala%20Badan%20Nasional%20Penanggulangan,daerah%20untuk%20menerapkan%20beberapa%20poin. ( [4] Jinshan Hong, Rachel Chang and Kevin Varley, “Best and Worst Places to Be in Covid: Vaccine Not Slowing Deaths,” Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, December 20, 2020, (accessed on January 11th, 2021 at 10.35)https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/ . [5] Jinshan Hong, Rachel Chang and Kevin Varley, “Best and Worst Places to Be in Covid: Vaccine Not Slowing Deaths,” Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, December 20, 2020, (accessed on January 11th, 2021 at 10.35)https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/ .     Sri Nuryanti is currently researcher at the Research Center for Politics at Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007-2012, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007-2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a council member of APPRA (Asia Pacific Peace Research Association) and IPRA (International Peace Research Association). She is also currently appointed as the Director in charge of the Electoral Research Institute (ERI).   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note The outbreak of COVID-19 precipitated the emergence of various unprecedented variables for national governance. Prior to the pandemic, authoritarian rule under the Marcos regime in the Philippines had weakened institutional integrity, transparency, and accountability, increasing the leeway for the drastic economic decline during the final years of his command. Subsequent reforms over two decades earned the country a good sovereign credit rating and steady economic growth. However, institutional safeguards for transparent and accountable governance were yet insufficient for the appropriate response for the transfer of emergency authority and funds to the executive branch amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Adding onto existing studies claiming that established democracies show lower levels of corruption than authoritarian regimes, Francisco A. Magno of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance explores how weak democracies reflect a higher tendency to undergo corruption, a phenomenon that was evident in the Philippines amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. A weak institutional base led to the misuse of PhilHealth funds, diminished the nation’s performance of rule of law, eroded institutional constraints, and challenged the freedom of the press. While measures of a government-led task force and the civil society helped resuscitate democratic institutions, threats to democracy prevailed in the Philippines. The author claims that the revival of democratic institutions is crucial in fighting corruption both judiciously and sys-tematically.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction[1]   Previous studies indicate that established democracies show lower levels of corruption than authoritarian regimes or young democracies.[2] In this regard, it is interesting to consider how authoritarian tendencies have diminished the role of democratic institutions and sys-tems of checks and balances that control corruption. The outbreak of corruption scandals that accompanied the Corona Virus Disease (COVID)-19 health crisis in 2020 exemplifies how the democratic recession has negatively affected the state of public accountability in the Philippines. This study probes into whether the COVID-19 pandemic further promoted democratic recession and corruption in the Philippines. It examines the patterns of irregularities emerging from the implementation of public programs aimed at responding to the crisis. Poorly designed institutional arrangements and weak democratic controls foster opportunities for the commission of illicit transactions in the delivery of public goods and services. Finally, this study considers the importance of reviving democratic institutions as a key effort in fighting corruption on a long-term basis.  The eruption of the pandemic shed light on the severe corruption vulnerabilities in many countries. However, even before the pandemic, it was estimated that the loss of about 10 to 25 percent of a public contract’s value could be attributed to corruption.[3] Currently, over 7.8 trillion USD is allocated annually to public health globally.[4] With more public funds being made available to fight the pandemic, stronger safeguards are needed to prevent corruption. The COVID-19 pandemic was found to have hastened corruption. The potential for corruption in pandemic times is greater especially as pressures for swift government action may lead to shortcuts that damage the integrity of institutional processes. The main risk areas include the withholding of accurate health data, irregularities in public procurement, purchase of sub-standard equipment, and misappropriation of health budgets.[5] As the first case was to have been reported on November 17th, 2020 in Wuhan, China - a city in Hubei Province- the COVID-19 pandemic is acknowledged to have begun during this time. In the following weeks, cases of people infected with the virus piled up. However, the Chinese government hid health data and even reprimanded local doctors who warned of the new disease. It was not until December 31, 2019 that the government informed the World Health Organization (WHO) China Country Office on the existence of the fast-spreading virus. Such lack of transparency prevented health authorities over the world from taking preventive action and containing the transmission of the coronavirus across cities, nations, and borders.[6] ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] Ina Kubbe and Annika Engelbert, "Corruption and the impact of democracy." Crime, Law and Social Change 70, 2 (2018) 175-178. [3] UNODC, Guidebook on Anti-Corruption in Public Procurement and the Management of Public Finances. New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Guidebook_on_anti-corruption_in_public_procurement_and_the_management_of_public_finances.pdf (Accessed on October 18, 2013). [4] WHO, Global spending on health: A world in transition, WHO/HIS/HGF/HF Working Paper, No. 19.4, Geneva: World Health Organization (2019); https://www.who.int/health_financing/documents/health-expenditure-report-2019.pdf?ua=1 (Accessed on February 6, 2020). [5] Sarah Steingrüber, Presentation at the “25 years of fighting with the nation the perennial pandemic of corruption” Virtual Town Hall Discussion, Transparency International-Philippines and Stratbase ADR Institute, August 28 2020. [6] Sarah Steingrüber, Monica Kirya, David Jackson, and Saul Mullard, Corruption in the time of COVID-19: A double-threat for low-income Countries, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2020.     Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note The unprecedented outbreak of COVID-19 stirred up substantial change in the socio-economic landscapes of most countries; Thailand has been no exception. While Thailand was swift to enact a lockdown after the declaration of a state of emergency throughout the country, the lockdown left several business sectors heavily affected, eventually prompting them to shut down and lay off workers. Additionally, the Thai healthcare sys-tem experienced a shortage of medical supplies and the lack of professional knowledge on the coronavirus spawned confusion. Subsequent measures to combat the pandemic and social chaos were taken by both the public and private sectors. Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Nuchaprapar Moksart from King Prajadhipok’s Institute, explain how the government decentralized and distributed power to local governments, provided financial aid, enforced 14-day quarantine measures, and enacted lockdown measures. Moreover, private companies made hefty donations and sought measures to adapt to the “new normal.” The authors also provide policy recommendations for the management of COVID-19. They state that the government should be held accountable, enforce laws to protect its citizens, innovate digital technology, and ensure the social and economic stability of its citizens, to name a few.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   1.Introduction[1] At the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak spread panic throughout the world and since then, the virus has affected many countries. Thailand was one of the first countries to record a case of a COVID-19 infection outside of China after the outbreak in Wuhan, China. On January 13, 2020, the Thai Health Ministry confirmed the first COVID-19 cases in Thailand, which included two Chinese tourists from Wuhan. Thailand became the hub of the pandemic, prompting various countries to warn their citizens against traveling to Thailand. In response to COVID-19, the Thai government launched measures to control the rapid increase of new cases. The first measure was the Bangkok lockdown after Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha declared a state of emergency throughout the country. The lockdown period lasted for three months (March to June 2020) in an attempt to minimize transmission rates and reduce the number of new cases. The measures required people to stay at home in order to avoid infection, which resulted in several changes. For instance, people increasingly adopted and utilized digital platforms in their daily life, which was evident through the rapid increase in food delivery. The usage of online shopping, digital entertainment, digital payment, online learning, work-from-home policies, social distancing also increased during this period. In March 2020, the COVID-19 Situation Management Center was established by the cabinet to provide information and organize emergency measures to protect people from the pandemic[2]. Moreover, laws and regulations were implemented to manage the spread of COVID-19, such as the 14-day state quarantine for people entering the country, COVID-19 checkpoints, and the Thai Cha-na smartphone application to track people. However, methods that were implemented to control the outbreak had significant economic effects. After the lockdown measure, several business sectors were directly affected. Flights were banned from landing in Thailand and the tourism industry, which accounted for 15 percent of Thai GDP, disappeared. As a result, hotels, restaurants, and service sectors were immediately shut down. SMEs were no longer able to operate their businesses, leading to the laying off of a vast number of employees. Millions of people in Bangkok and several other provinces were left unemployed, lacked reserve money, and received no social support, therefore resulting in the return of many citizens to their hometowns. In response to the immediate economic impact, the government launched a 5000-baht allowance for 14 million people who had been financially affected by COVID-19. In addition, the Bank of Thailand created soft loans for business owners to help SMEs during the outbreak. The term “new normal” describes the new way of living for Thai society. Technology became an essential tool for people to communicate during the pandemic, and changes were made in response to COVID-19. This paper explores the challenges that Thailand faced amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the responses of the public and private sector, and how COVID-19 changed Thailand’s socio-economic landscape. The final section offers policy recommendations to cope with COVID-19. Moreover, trust-building, social safety nets, and law enforcement are also discussed.■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] Ministry of Public Health, “The setting of Covid 19-Situation Management Center,” Drug and Medical Supply Infomation Center, http://dmsic.moph.go.th/index/detail/8064 (accessed December 2 2020).     Thawilwadee Bureekul is the director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI)where she is involved in the planning, management, implementation, and coordination of the Institute’s research projects. In addition to her role at KPI, Dr. Bureekul is a professor at several universities in Thailand, including the Asian Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Burapha University, Mahidol University, and Silpakorn University. She succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and she was granted the “Woman of the Year 2017” award as a result.   Ratchawadee Sangmahamad is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes citizenship, gender, and election studies. She has published books such as Value Culture and Thermometer of Democracy (with Thawilwadee Bureekul), Thai Citizens: Democratic Civic Education (with Thawilwadee Bureekul and Eugenie Mario), and many articles.   Nuchaprapar Moksart is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes social policy and political economy theory. She also writes on socioeconomic issues.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]