.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [편집자 주] Indonesia is one of the many democratic countries faced with the dilemma of simultaneously hosting a nationwide election and local elections amid a pandemic. Forced to balance itself between controlling the spread of the virus and sustaining its economic and political agenda, Sri Nuryanti, a researcher from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, analyzed how Indonesia depended on democracy during the pandemic. The author asks whether democratic values are suitable for coping with the pandemic, based on data showing that democratic countries tend to have poorer performances than authoritarian countries. Indonesia is facing many challenges since the country’s response has a significant impact on the national economy. Therefore, Sri Nuryanti’s research deals with the questions of the dilemma faced by Indonesia, the responses of the Public and Private Sector, the change in behavior of the people after the pandemic, and the impact COVID-19 had on domestic and foreign policy.   ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Abstract Ever since COVID-19 was announced as a global pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO), many democratic countries have faced two challenges: containing COVID-19 and defending democracy. Indonesia is one of the democratic countries, faced with this dilemma of hosting the Simultaneous Local Elections in 270 regions consisting of 9 provinces, 37 cities, and 224 regencies on December 9, 2020, amidst the pandemic. Therefore, the main issue lies in whether the Indonesian government will prioritize controlling the spread of the virus, prioritize sustaining economic and political agenda, or touch upon both problems. This working paper focuses on how Indonesia defended democracy amid COVID-19. The literature review will be utilized to examine how democratic countries responded to the pandemic. This will be followed by an analysis on how difficult the policy-making process is to protect society from COVID-19, especially in a country like Indonesia, and analyze the responses of COVID-19 related policies.   Keywords: COVID-19 Pandemic, Crisis, Democratic Governance, Public Policy, Policy Responses Introduction The first COVID-19 case of an Indonesian citizen was reported to be on March 2, 2020. During the early stage of the pandemic, people thought that the virus would fade away naturally with time. Therefore, Indonesia was already mid-pandemic when policies were applied to contain COVID-19. In the very beginning, Indonesia’s policies consisted of evacuating the Indonesian citizens from Wuhan, China, and designating specific hospitals in Galang Island (Riau Islands province) to only treat COVID-19 patients. The hospital offered services including observation, shelter, and quarantine facilities to control the spread of COVID-19 on Galang Island. The facility could hold 1,000 beds and construction was completed on April 6, 2020. [1] The policy above shows that the Indonesian government tried to counter the spread of the virus by treating the affected patients in a secluded island. Furthermore, the Indonesian government established a special team to accelerate the efforts to combat the spread of the coronavirus under the coordination of the BNPB (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana/ Indonesia National Board for Disaster Management). As creating a coordinated COVID-19 response between the government, ministerial departments, and other stakeholders was complicated and as new policy dilemmas emerged, maximizing efforts to control the pandemic was found to be challenging.[2] Bloomberg, a private financial, software, data, and media company based in the US, launched a report called the “Covid Resilience Ranking.” This report follows the development of the COVID-19 responses, fatality rate, number of infected cases, and PCR tests completed for various countries. Reports are released every month, taking into account the social and economic disruptions. The report also gives an overview of the capacity of local health care sys-tems, the impact of virus-related restrictions, and other COVID-19 related issues. From Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, dynamics of the Covid 19 pandemics in many countries can be observed. This research utilized data that was published in December 2020.[3] ■     [1] Chandra Gian Asmara, “RS Galang untuk Covid-19 Beroperasi, Intip Fasilitasnya!” [Galang Hospital for Covid-19 Operates, Peek at the Facilities!], CNBC Indonesia, April 08 2020, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200408122625-4-150577/rs-galang-untuk-covid-19-beroperasi-intip-fasilitasnya (accessed in 21 December 2020). [2] Agus Wibowo, “Arahan dan Strategi Ketua Gagus Tugas Penanganan Covid-19 untuk Pemerintah Daerah” [Directions and Strategies of the Chairman of the Covid-19 Handling Task Force for Regional Governments], Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, March 17 2020, (accessed in 21 December 2020). [3] Jinshan Hong, Rachel Chang and Kevin Varley, “Best and Worst Places to Be in Covid: Vaccine Not Slowing Deaths,” Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, December 20, 2020, (accessed on January 11th, 2021 at 10.35) https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/ .     ■ Sri Nuryanti is currently researcher at the Research Center for Politics at Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007-2012, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007-2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a council member of APPRA (Asia Pacific Peace Research Association) and IPRA (International Peace Research Association). She is also currently appointed as the Director in charge of the Electoral Research Institute (ERI).     담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원   문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [편집자 주] 지난 6월 영국 콘월(Cornwall)에서 한국, 인도, 호주, 남아공을 포함한 ‘확대 G7 정상회의’가 개최되었습니다. 이후 공개된 정상회의 공동성명문은 참여 민주국가의 전통적인 다자주의 규칙기반 시스템 내에서 민주적 가치를 더욱 강력히 옹호하려는 의지를 내비쳤고, 더 나아가 자유주의 국제질서에 대한 도전을 막아야 한다는 논리를 담고 있습니다. 이는 중국의 반발을 불러오고 있습니다. 이숙종 성균관대학교 교수ㆍ EAI 시니어펠로우는 미중 체제 경쟁 속 민주주의의 위치와 민주국가의 역할에 대해 설명합니다. 저자는 민주주의 대 전제주의라는 체제경쟁은 자칫 다자주의를 블록화할 수 있으며, 미중 양국을 필요로 하는 많은 민주국가에 비현실적인 선택의 문제를 야기할 수 있다고 강조합니다. 민주주의 가치를 체제 경쟁을 초월하여 보편주의적 가치로 접근해야 한다고 주장합니다. 또한, 유럽과 아시아의 민주주의 국가들은 민주주의를 지속해서 보호해야 하며, 민주적 가치와 옹호를 위한 후발 민주국가들 사이에 독자적인 역내 협력을 강화해야 한다고 덧붙입니다.     한국, 인도, 호주, 남아공을 포함한 확대 G7 정상회의가 지난 6월 11일에서 13일까지 영국 콘월(Cornwall)에서 열린 바 있다. 보리스 존슨 (Boris Johnson) 영국 총리는 작년부터 한국, 인도, 호주와 같은 민주주의 3개국을 추가로 초청해 이른바 ‘D10’ 정상회의를 열겠다고 천명해왔다. 이번 G7 확대정상회의는 미국 바이든 대통령이 선거 유세 당시부터 말해왔던 ‘민주주의를 위한 정상회의(Summit for Democracy)’ 구상을 지원하는 첫 버전이다. 민주적 가치와 규범이 지구적 문제에 대처하는 공동행동의 기반이 되며, 기존 다자주의 국제질서의 안정을 돕는다는 생각은 바이든 행정부와 유럽 민주주의 국가 간에 다시 강력하게 공유되기 시작했다. 그 이면에는 세계 도처에서 나타나고 있는 민주주의 후퇴, 그리고 이와 동시적으로 일어나고 있는 자유주의 국제질서에 대한 도전을 막아야 한다는 논리가 있다. 민주주의가 일국의 정치체제를 넘어 국제질서의 문제이기도 하다는 서구의 시각은 중국의 반발을 불러오고 있다. 다자주의에 관한 미중 인식격차, 미중 전략경쟁, 그 속에서 민주주의의 위치가 혼란스럽게 논의되고 있어 이들의 관계를 정리해 볼 필요가 생겼다. 그래야만, 아시아 민주주의 국가들이 미국 및 서구 민주주의 국가들과 자유, 인권, 반부패 등의 이슈에서 협력하면서도 중국과의 긴장 관계를 피할 수 있는 방안들을 모색할 수 있을 것이다.   1. G7 확대정상회의와 워싱턴발 민주주의 연합 논의   G7 확대정상회의 공동성명문은 공유하는 지구적 행동 어젠다로, 상당한 분량을 할애한 코로나19 종식 및 경제회복과 더불어, 미래 성장 확보, 지구보호, 파트너십 강화, 가치의 이슈들도 다루고 있다.[1]변화하는 세상의 도전에 대응하기 위해서 민주주의, 자유, 평등, 법치, 인권존중과 같은 ‘우리의 가치’의 힘을 사용한다는 원칙론적 천명은 이후 어젠다 곳곳에서 다시 녹여지고 있다. 특히 기술 분야에서 이러한 가치들이 들어가 있는 것에 주목할 필요가 있다. 예를 들어 디지털 에코시스템의 경우, ’인간의 자유와 혁신, 신뢰를 지원하는 개방적이고 호환적이며 안전한 인터넷을 지켜야 한다‘라고 말한다. 새로운 기술이 민주적 가치, 개방적 경쟁시장, 인권과 기본적 자유를 위한 세이프가드 등을 반영하도록 국제적 규범과 표준을 만드는 데 서로 조율할 것을 강조한다. 구체적으로는 정부의 인터넷 차단이나 네트워크 접속 제한을 반대하고, 또한 편견을 조장하는 알고리즘 의사결정의 형태를 어떻게 규제할지 논의해야 한다는 것이다. 민주주의 파트너들이 OECD 후원하에 9월에 열리는 ’미래기술포럼(Future Tech Forum)’에서 개방사회를 지지하면서 국제적 도전을 논의할 계획을 언급하고 있다. 이러한 논의는 신기술 규범과 규칙을 만들어 개방적이나 안보 관련 부분에서는 규제를 강화하는 유럽의 그간 노력과도 맞닿아 있다.[2]   공동선언문은 G7이 표방하는 국제질서를 ’개방적이고 탄력적인 국제질서(open and resilient international order)‘라고 표현하면서, 이번에 합의된 어젠다를 다른 국가들과 협력하면서 G20이나 유엔과 같은 기존의 ’다자주의 규칙기반 시스템(multilateral rules-based sys-tem)‘ 안에서 추진할 것이라고 말하고 있다. 여기서 국제법과 유엔과 같은 전통적인 다자주의 규칙기반 시스템 내에서 민주적 가치를 더욱 강력히 옹호하는 연합을 ’별도로‘ 구축하려는 움직임을 볼 수 있다. 민주연합에 대한 논의는 바이든 행정부 출범을 앞둔 올 초부터 급속하게 활성화되었다. Jones와 Twardowski(2021)는 국제 시스템에서 민주주의 국가들의 영향력이 지켜지려면 서구를 넘어서 여타 민주주의 국가들과 새로운 형태의 협력이 필요하다고 강조한다. 다자주의 질서 테두리 안에서 민주주의 국가 간의 조정과 협력을 진전시키려는 전략을 ’민주적 다자주의(democratic multilateralism)’라고 부르면서 러시아와 중국에 의한 기존 질서의 성격을 약화 내지는 변화시키려는 노력을 저지해야 한다는 것이다.[3]   국제기구나 글로벌 거버넌스 차원에서 중국의 영향력 확대를 국제질서에 도전으로 보는 시각은 다른 글들에서 더 잘 설명되었다. 예를 들어, Hart와 Johnson(2019)은 중국의 국제질서를 변화시키려는 노력을 다자적 행동을 중국의 이익에 맞추어 형성하기, 국제법 레짐 교란하기, 국제적 규범 전환하기, 국제기구를 포획하기, 새로운 국제기구를 만들기, 중국 중심의 국제협력 플랫폼 구축하기 여섯 가지로 제시한 바 있다.[4] Nadege(2020)는 중국이 지난 십여 년 경제력에 걸맞게 국제적 위상이 신장하지 못한 것은 말하고 귀담아 들어질 화언권(话语权)이 취약했기 때문이라고 보고, 국제질서의 근간이 되는 아이디어나 지적 정형화를 꾀하는 ‘담론권(discourse power)’ 확보를 위해 노력해 왔음을 주장한다.[5] 특히 외부세계의 열린 커뮤니케이션 구조를 활용해 중국 스토리를 유포하거나 여론을 조작하는 활동을 정부 차원에서 체계적으로 하고 있다는 것이다.[6] 이러한 이유로 인하여 기존 국제질서에 위협이 되는 중국에 맞서 무역, 기술, 공급사슬망, 인권, 부패 등의 문제에 있어 민주주의 국가들 사이에 다양한 조합의 연합(democratic coalition)을 만들어야 한다는 논의가 Foreign Affairs 잡지를 통해 지난 1월 두 편의 글로 출간되기도 했다.[7]주목할 것은 과거에는 이데올로기와 무관하게 여겨졌던 통상, 기술, 공급사슬망 등과 같은 기술적, 기능적 분야의 문제도 자유와 인권과 같은 가치영역의 문제와 결합하게 되어 궁극적으로 이데올로기적 범주로 들여와 대응해야 한다는 논리가 워싱턴과 유럽 일각에서 대두하고 있는 점이다.   미국이나 유럽 민주주의 국가들이 중국의 영향력 확대를 지정학적 경쟁 차원으로 보느냐 아니면 이데올로기적 차원으로 보느냐는 짚고 넘어갈 문제이다. 트럼프 행정부는 일본이 먼저 꺼낸 ‘자유롭고 열린 인도·태평양(Free and Open Indo-Pacific)’ 구상을 수용해 중국을 지정학적 경쟁자로 보고 그 영향력 확대를 저지하기 위해 인도·태평양 전략을 다듬었다. 이에 따라 군사경쟁만이 아니라 통상 특히 기술 분야 경쟁에 안보개념이 접목되면서 시장논리가 아닌 정치적 탈동조화 논리가 실현 가능성 여부를 차치하고 확산하였다. 이때만 해도 민주주의가 미국 외교정책의 전면에 나서지는 않았다. 그러나 바이든 행정부가 출범하면서 러시아나 중국과의 경쟁이 전제주의냐 민주주의냐 라는 이데올로기적 체제경쟁의 틀 안으로 새롭게 짜이기 시작했다.   취임 이후 거의 반년이 되어가고 있는 시점에서 Brands(2021)는 이러한 시각의 ‘바이든 독트린’을 다음과 같이 정리한다. 민주주의 세계의 세 가지 도전은 첫째, 자유주의 원칙에 토대를 둔 국제 시스템을 러시아나 중국이 자신들의 체제를 위해 바꾸려 하거나(러시아의 사이버 교란이나 가짜뉴스 확산, 중국의 시장지배력을 활용한 강압외교 등); 둘째, 코로나19와 같은 재앙에 처해 권위주의 체제가 마치 민주주의 체제보다 낫게 대처하는 듯이 보이게 하거나; 셋째, 미국을 비롯한 선진 민주주의 국가 내부에서 일어나고 있는 민주주의 퇴행이라고 말한다.[8] 이러한 시각은 모범적 민주국가 대 불량한 비민주국가라는 이분법이 아니라 민주주의의 문제를 국내와 국제관계 안팎이 연결되어 있음을 강조하면서 자국의 민주주의를 지키기 위해서도 민주적 국제질서 보호가 중요하다는 것을 강조하는 것이다. 이러한 각각의 도전에 대응하기 위해 미국의 전략은 전제주의 라이벌에 대항하기 위해 민주주의 공동체의 응집력과 복원력을 강화시키는 것이고, 민주주의 체제가 초국적 문제들을 더 잘 해결할 수 있음을 보여주는 것이고, 국내적으로는 소외된 노동계급과 중산층을 위한 인프라 투자를 강화하는 것이다. 이러한 시각은 모범적 민주국가 대 불량한 비민주국가라는 이분법이 아니라 민주주의의 문제를 국내와 국제관계 안팎이 연결되어 있음을 강조하면서 자국의 민주주의를 지키기 위해서도 민주적 국제질서 보호가 중요하다는 것을 강조하는 것이다. 바이든 대통령은 3월 31일 피츠버그 연설에서도 미중 간의 경쟁은 근본적으로 민주주의가 국민들에게 전제주의보다 더 나은 혜택을 주느냐라는 체제의 성과로 말한 바 있다. [9] 같은 맥락에서 초국적 문제를 해결하는데 있어서도 민주주의 연합이 더 나은 능력을 보여 줄 수 있고 또한 그래야만 한다는 생각이다. 이에 따라, 바이든 행정부는 민주주의 질서 확립의 열쇠는 다른 민주국가 간의 파트너십에 있다고 보고, 아주 구체적인 이슈별로 특정 국가들과 협력을 기울여 가고 있다.[10]   지정학적 영향력 확장을 위한 전략경쟁에 이데올로기적 체제경쟁 층위가 들어서는 것은 지난 15년간 퇴조해온 세계 민주주의 복원에는 도움이 될지 몰라도 파트너십 요청을 받고 있는 아시아 민주주의 국가들에게는 분명히 딜레마로 작용하고 있다. 민주적 가치와 규범은 개별국가 내 개인의 자유, 인권, 법의 지배를 위해 그 자체 매우 중요하며 동시에 그러한 가치와 규범은 다자주의 질서에서 개별국가들의 주권 존중과 상호 협력에 필수적이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 민주주의 대 전제주의라는 체제경쟁은 현실성, 당위성, 효과성에 있어 우려를 낳고 있다. 첫째, 자본주의와 공산주의 진영이 나누어져 있던 과거 냉전체제와는 달리 주요 권위주의 국가들 특히 세계 제2위의 경제 대국인 중국과 아시아 경제는 밀접하게 연계되어 있어 민주주의 국가 간의 협력이 중국 배제로는 이어지기 어렵기 때문이다. 즉, 현실성이 부족하다는 평가이다. 둘째, 미국의 민주주의 체제 옹호가 자칫 지정학적 영향력 경쟁의 수단으로 여겨지게 되면 민주주의를 지키고 지원하려는 정부나 시민사회는 그 진정성을 의심하게 될 것이다. 즉, 민주연합론의 당위성이 충분해야만 국익이란 계산을 넘어 가치연합 자체로서 지속 가능할 수 있다. 셋째, 체제경쟁론은 초국가적 과제에 대처하기 위한 미중 간 국제협력을 분열시킬 수 있다. Pepinsky와 Weiss(2021)도 바이든 행정부가 중국을 이데올로기적 경쟁자로 여기는 것은 중국 체제의 매력을 과대평가하는 것이고, 아시아 및 여타 지역 국가들로 하여금 미국과의 협력을 위축시키고 전제주의 국가들 간의 연합을 자극할 실용적이기 못한 처사라고 지적하고 있다.[11] 기후변화와 재정위기 등 초국적 도전과 위기가 있을 때 영향력이 큰 중국과의 협력은 매우 중요하다. 이 점에서 유럽연합은 2019년 발간된 EU Strategic Outlook on China 2019에서 중국을 기후변화나 WTO 같은 글로벌 문제에 대해서는 ‘협력과 협상의 파트너(cooperation and negotiation partner)’로, 기술 리더십과 시장접근 문제와 관련해서는 ‘경제적 경쟁자(economic competitor)’로, 향후 국가체제와 관련한 문제에서는 거버넌스의 대안적 모델을 도모하는 ‘체제적 경쟁자(sys-temic rival)’로 다차원적으로 규정하면서 균형 잡힌 대중전략을 구상하고 있다. 그러나 중국의 유럽 규범 침해에 대처하면서도 협력과 협상의 파트너로 중국을 대하기가 쉽지 않은 측면이 있다. 예를 들어, 유럽이 신장의 인권침해로 중국 관리들을 제재하자 이에 대한 보복으로 중국은 유럽의 인권활동가들을 제재하여 논란이 되어 왔는데, 유럽의회는 유럽연합과 중국 간의 포괄적투자협정(EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment) 비준을 동결하는 성명서를 지난 5월 30일 찬성 599표, 반대 30표, 기권 58표라는 압도적 차이로 가결하기도 했다.[12] 즉, 인권옹호와 경제협력이 별개로 진행되기 어려운 이슈들이 나오기 마련인 것이다. 그럼에도 이 두 가지 대중관여 전략을 처음부터 통합시킨다면 어느 한 가지의 실현이 불가능해질 것이기에 사안별로 사후적으로 선택적으로 대응할 수밖에 없을 것이다.   2. 중국식 다자주의 질서와 체제경쟁 논의에 중국의 대응   트럼프 행정부는 ‘미국이 먼저다(America First)’라는 기치 아래 중국과 통상 및 기술 마찰을 빚어 왔었다. 2020년에 미국이 코로나19의 최대 피해국이 되면서 트럼프 대통령은 중국 바이러스란 표현을 써가면서 중국에 책임을 돌렸고, 중국에 우호적이라며 세계보건기구 탈퇴를 유엔과 미 의회에 제출한 바 있다. 바이든 대통령은 취임하자마자 1월 20일, 17개의 첫 행정명령에 파리기후변화협정 복귀와 함께 세계보건기구 탈퇴 절차 중단도 포함했다. ‘미국의 귀환(America is Back)’을 유럽은 적극적으로 환영하고 있지만, 체제경쟁을 외교정책에 적극 편입시키고 있는 바이든 행정부의 국제무대 귀환을 중국은 상당한 위기감을 가지고 대응하고 있다.   중국은 중국식 사회주의를 표방하는 체제로 일대일로(Belt and Road Initiative)를 필두로 개도국들의 발전을 돕는 지원자이자 유엔중심의 다자주의 옹호자임을 부각해 왔다. 시진핑이 2012년 11월 총서기, 이듬해 국가주석에 취임하면서 확산하기 시작한 ‘중국몽(Chinese Dream)’은 중국이 미국과의 수평적 관계를 확립해 초강대국으로서 국제적 지위를 얻고, 국내적으로 중국식 사회주의 정체성을 강화하는 것이다. 사회주의 체제 중국의 세계적 영향력 확장이 국제 다자주의 질서와 조화롭다는 논리는 ‘인류운명공동체’라는 공동체관으로 설파해 왔다. 사회주의 정체성과 글로벌 거버넌스에 영향력 강화란 동시적 진행을 우려하는 미국의 시각에 대해서는 미국은 주권 평등과 내정간섭불가침을 어기고, 자국의 이익과 이념을 우선시하는 일방주의자이자 협박자(bully)로 규탄해 왔다. 중국이 책임 있는 다자주의자라는 언설은 특히 트럼프 행정부와 대조하기 위해 강화되어 왔다. 지난 1월 세계경제포럼에서 시진핑은 “다자주의가 인류의 전진을 비추게 하자”는 제목의 온라인 연설에서, 각 나라의 역사적, 문화적, 사회적 독특성을 존중하고, 이데올로기적 편견을 버리고 평화 공존, 상호 호혜, 윈윈(win-win) 협력의 길로 나아가자고 다시 한 번 강조한 바 있다.[13] Yang Jiechi(2021)도 인권이나 민주주의를 구실로 내정 간섭을 하거나 어느 국가를 희생양으로 삼아 이데올로기적 편가르기는 다자주의가 아니라고 비판한다. 전염병, 경제위기, 기후변화와 같은 인류가 공동으로 직면하는 초국적 문제에 대응은 호혜성과 협력을 요구하며, 중국은 유엔 중심 국제체제 다자주의의 챔피언이라고 강조한다.[14]7월 1일, 중국 공산당 창립 100주년을 기념하는 행사에서 시진핑은 오직 중국식 사회주의만이 중국을 발전시킬 수 있다고 강조하면서 공산당의 리더십 강화를 주문한다. 중국은 호전적이거나 패권적인 유전자를 갖고 있지 않으며, 평화와 조화를 위한 인류공동체 건설을 계속 옹호하면서 평화를 사랑하는 국가와 인민들과 함께 “평화, 발전, 공정, 정의, 민주주의, 자유”와 같은 인류가 공유하는 가치를 옹호할 것이라고 말하고 있다.[15]   결국, 서방세계가 말하는 다자주의는 개인의 자유, 인권, 법치 등이 국내에서도 지켜지는 바탕 위에 국제협력을 보는 것이라면, 중국이 말하는 다자주의는 각국이 독자적 정치체제를 지키면서 호혜적 협력을 꾀하는 것이다. 중국은 민주주의나 자유를 공유되는 가치로 말하고 있으나 개인 수준의 가치라기보다 공동체나 국가 수준의 가치에 머문다. 최근 수년간 소수민족과 홍콩문제에 있어 보여준 인권탄압은 정치지도자들의 언설과 큰 괴리를 드러내 온 것이 사실이다. 유엔 인권 관련 감독관과 앰네스티 인터내셔널이나 휴먼라이트워치와 같은 비정부단체들은 신장 위그르 거주지역과 티베트에서 종교, 표현, 결사의 자유란 기본권은 물론 이들 소수민족의 보건권 침해, 구금 및 고문, 문화적 박해 등의 반인륜범죄를 고발하고 있다.[16] 위그르인에 대한 인권탄압은 특히 심각해 유럽연합, 영국, 미국, 캐나다는 지난 3월 이 문제로 5인의 중국 관리들에 대한 제재를 발표했다.[17]   중국이 존중한다는 국제법과 유엔체제는 인권을 보편적 가치로써 보호해 왔다. 유엔 총회에서 1948년 제정된 세계인권선언(Universal Declaration of Human Rights)은 모든 사람이 지니고 있으며 누구도 빼앗을 수 없는 권리와 자유 30가지를 명시하고 있다. 이 선언은 세계 모든 지역의, 모든 사람의 인권을 보호하는 이정표로서 70년대 이후 많이 늘어난 국제인권법들의 토대가 되어 왔다. 유엔을 비롯한 국제사회는 각국의 주권을 중시하지만 심각한 인권침해가 있을 시 인도주의적 관여(humanitarian intervention)를 해왔다. 한편, 중국은 개인의 인권 관련 민주주의 가치의 보편성과 인도주의적 관여를 부정해 왔다. Yan Xuetong은 미국이 민주주의와 자유를 선거정치나 개인의 표현 측면에서 정의한다면 중국은 이를 사회적 안전과 경제발전으로 정의하고 있음을 지적하면서 이러한 차이를 미국이 수용해야 한다고 주장한다. 바이든 행정부가 중국의 기술적 우위를 저지하거나, 홍콩, 대만, 티벳, 신장의 분리주의를 부추길 수 있는 인권문제에 있어 반중 연합을 형성하려는 시도는 배타적 다자주의이며, 중국은 이를 정치적 안정과 국가부흥에 최대 장애물로 간주해 향후 미중 긴장의 원천이 될 수밖에 없다고 말한다.[18] Wang Jisi는 종래 미국은 중국공산당 지배 내부질서를, 중국은 미국주도의 국제질서를 상호 존중해 왔는데 미국이 최근 중국공산당을 약화시키려 하고 중국은 국제기구에서 미국의 리더십과 서구의 가치에 도전하는 것으로 비쳐지게 되면서 갈등의 악순환으로 빠져들고 있다고 관찰한다. 중국공산당은 미국이 중국을 고립시키고 분열시키려는 것을 워싱턴의 새로운 합의라고 인식하면서 중국공산당의 권력과 통제를 강화하고 미국의 간섭에 경계를 강화하고 있다는 것이다.[19]미중 양국의 자유주의와 사회주의 정체성을 존중하면서도 민주적 가치와 규범을 옹호하려면 민주주의를 선거민주주의로 제한하지 않은 채, 중국도 인류의 공유가치로 인정하는 개인의 자유와 안녕의 존중에 합의하고, 굿 거버넌스를 위한 건강한 체제경쟁으로 나아가는 길이 바람직해 보인다.   3. 다자질서 내로 체제경쟁을 순화시키기 위한 민주국가들의 역할   미중경쟁이 군사, 기술 및 통상에 이어 체제경쟁으로 치닫고 있는 이즈음 아시아 민주주의 국가들은 신중한 관여를 추구하는 것이 옳다.[20]민주적 가치와 규범이 체제 이데올로기를 초월해 작동하는 보편적인 것으로 자리매김을 해 다자질서가 블록화되는 길을 막아야 한다. 신중한 관여에는 세 가지의 접근방식이 가능해 보인다. 첫째는 인권문제에 대한 대응이다. 민주적 가치를 중시하는 아시아의 정부나 시민사회도 중국의 인권탄압을 내정불간섭이란 구실로 그대로 수용하기는 어려운 문제이다. 다만, 경제적, 정치적 관계로부터 자유로운 시민사회가 정부보다는 인권이란 보편주의 가치를 옹호하는 시각에서 행동하기 용이하다. 아시아 민주국가들의 정부들도 한계는 있겠으나 유엔 인권시스템의 틀 내에서 집단적 목소리를 낼 수 있을 것이다. 둘째, 기술이나 통상, 보건 등의 기능적 분야에서의 협력은 그것이 미국과의 협력이든 중국과의 협력이든 상호배타적일 필요는 없으며, 공정하고 타당한 원칙과 기준을 마련해 파트너십을 맺어가는 방식이 바람직해 보인다. 이 점에서 유럽이 공정한 규칙과 지침을 마련해 미중경쟁에 대응해 나아가는 방식을 벤치마킹할 필요가 있다. 셋째, 유엔과 현행 기능적 분야의 글로벌 거버넌스 체제에서 민주주의 대 전제주의란 체제경쟁이 미국 주도와 중국 주도 영향권으로 블록을 형성해 분리되지 않도록 이중관여를 해야 한다. 그래야만 전염병, 기후변화, 기술 대전환과 같은 지구적 차원의 문제들에 대한 효과적 대응이 가능할 것이며, 미중 양국과 모두 긴밀한 관계를 맺고 있는 많은 민주주의 나라들이 외교적 자율성을 지킬 수 있을 것이다. 미중 체제경쟁에 대해 유럽과 아시아의 민주주의 국가들은 공정한 심판자로서 다자주의 질서를 지켜가야 한다. 국제사회에서 이러한 심판자의 역할을 제대로 수행하기 위해서는 자국의 민주주의를 계속 아끼고 보호해야 함은 물론 민주적 가치와 옹호를 위한 후발 민주국가들 사이에 독자적인 역내협력을 강화해야 할 것이다. ■     [1] White House, “Carbisbay G7 Summit Communique,“ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/13/carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique/ [2] 이숙종, “중국 통신기업 화웨이의 진출에 대한 유럽의 실용주의적 대응,” 동아시아연구원, 2020년 2월. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=13931&board=kor_issuebriefing&keyword_option=board_content&keyword=%EC%9D%B4%EC%88%99%EC%A2%85&more= [3] Bruce Jones and Adam Twardowski, “Bolstering democracies in a changing international order: The case for democratic multilateralism,” Brookings Institutions, January 25, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/research/bolstering-democracies-in-a-changing-international-order-the-case-for-democratic-multilateralism/ [4] Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnson, “Mapping China’s Global Governance Ambitions,” Center for American Progress, February 2019, [5] Nadege Rolland, “China’s Vision for a New World Order,” The National Bureau of Asia Research Special Report 83, January 2020, https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr83_chinasvision_jan2020.pdf [6] Digital Forensic Lab, “Chinese Discourse Power: China’s Use of Information Manipulation in Regional and Global Competition,” Atlantic Council, December 2020. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/China-Discouse-Power-FINAL.pdf [7] Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How American Can Shore Up Asian Order: A Strategy Restoring Balance and Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs January 12, 2021, How America Can Shore Up Asian Order | Foreign Affairs; Frances Z. Brown, Thomas Carothers, and Alex Pascal, “America Needs a Democracy Summit More than Ever,” Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2021. [8] Hal Brands, “The Emerging Biden Doctrine: Democracy, Autocracy and the Defining Clash of Our Time,” June 29, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-29/emerging-biden-doctrine?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Emerging%20Biden%20Doctrine&utm_content=20210629&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017 [9] “Remarks by the President Biden on the American Jobs Plan,” Carpenters Pittsburgh Training Center, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/03/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-american-jobs-plan/ [10] 예를 들어, 반도체와 5G/6G 기술은 한국과, 기술과 통상정책의 연계는 EU와, 인터넷의 지구적 차원의 개방문제는 일본과, 사이버공격과 정보왜곡은 NATO와 협력한다는 것이다. [11] Thomas Pepinsky and Jessica Chen Weiss, “The Clash of Sys-tems?: Washington Should Avoid Ideological Competition With Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-11/clash-sys-tems [12] European Commission, EU Strategic Outlook on China 2019; China Briefing, “European Parliament Votes to Freeze the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.” May 27, 2021. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/european-parliament-votes-to-freeze-the-eu-china-comprehensive-agreement-on-investment/ [13] XinhuaNet, “Special Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the World Economic Forum Virtual Event of the Davos Agenda,” January 15, 2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/25/c_139696610.htm [14] Yang Jiechi, “Firmly Uphold and Practice Multilateralism and Build a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind,” February 21, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1855530.shtml [15] “Full text of Xi Jinping's speech on the CCP's 100th anniversary,“ https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Full-text-of-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-on-the-CCP-s-100th-anniversary. [16] Amnesty International, “China 2020,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56487162;Human Rights Watch, “China: Crimes Against Humanity in Xinjiang,“ April 19, 2021. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/19/china-crimes-against-humanity-xinjiang [17] BBC, “Uighurs: Western countries sanction China over rights abuses,” March 22, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china/report-china/ [18] Yan Xuetong, “Becoming Strong: The New Chinese Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs July/August 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-22/becoming-strong [19] Wang Jisi, “The Plot Against China?: How Beijing Sees the New Washington Consensus,” Foreign Affairs July/August, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-22/plot-against-china [20] Sook Jong Lee, “Beyond the US-China Rivalry: Developing a Shared Democratic Vision for the Indo-Pacific,” ADRN Issue Briefing, 2021년 1월 25일, http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=20341&board=kor_issuebriefing','kor_workingpaper','kor_special','kor_multimedia&keyword_option=board_content&keyword=Sook Jong Lee&more=       저자: 이숙종_EAI 시니어펠로우·이사, 성균관대학교 교수. 미국 하버드대학교(Harvard University)에서 사회학 박사학위를 취득하였으며, 세종연구소 연구위원, 미국 브루킹스연구소 객원 연구원, 존스홉킨스대학교 교수강사, 현대일본학회 회장, 외교부 정책자문위원, EAI 원장 등을 역임하였다. 최근 편저에는, Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea‟s Role in the 21st Century (편), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (공편), 《세계화 제2막: 한국형 세계화와 새 구상》(공편), 《2017 대통령의 성공조건》(공편) 등이 있다.     담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장            문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [편집자 주] While many of the conflicts that have unfolded in Indonesia have been somewhat resolved, the conflict revolving around separatist movements in Papua remains unresolved. Upon its dawn, the Papua conflict has claimed thousands of lives, most of which are those of civilians. In this Issue Briefing, Gabriel Lele, Senior Lecturer at Universitas Gadjah Mada, explains the paths Indonesia has taken to resolve conflicts both in the domestic and regional realms. From a domestic standpoint, the author claims that the Indonesian government has failed to properly diagnose the conflict and that its measures have been futile as it was unable to take an accommodative approach towards the issue. From a regional standpoint, Indonesia utilized two strategies – litigation and dialogue. While the latter strategy contributed to sustainable political stability in the region, it has failed to yield significant progress towards conflict resolution. In this regard, the author claims that Indonesia should design more approaches that are more accommodative and apply more critical engagement.     As a country composed of thousands of islands and located at a strategic geopolitical location with several neighboring countries, Indonesia has long been facing different types of conflicts, domestically and regionally. Among the conflicts are separatist movements in Aceh and Papua with the former resolved quite successfully while the latter is still being dealt with. Other conflicts are both bilateral and multilateral conflicts surrounding the South China Sea and its proximate regions.   MacLaughin and Perdana (2010) reported that Indonesia has come into many types of conflict. At both the national and local levels, conflicts spread from general crimes to ethnic-religious conflicts. The report also highlights two underpinning features of the conflict in Indonesia. First, ethnic and religious conflicts have developed consistently over the years, and this runs in line with the process of democratization and decentralization. To some extent, democratization and decentralization have opened new avenues for other conflicts to potentially materialize.   Second, while ethnic and religious conflicts stand out as a consistent type at both national and local levels, they are closely related with and mutually reinforce other types of conflict such as election-based and resource-related conflicts. This makes the feature of domestic conflicts in Indonesia very complex, and efforts to deal with them have become more and more burdensome.   To a much lesser extent, Indonesia is still struggling with resolving separatist conflict in the easternmost part of the archipelago: West Papua. After institutionally resolving the Aceh separatist conflict in 2005, Papua is the only remaining – though not necessarily the last – separatist conflict in the country with no less tedious complexity. Led by the Free Papua movement – or Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM – since 1974, the conflict has claimed thousands of lives, most of which are civilians. From President Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999 to current President Joko Widodo, Indonesia has tried many ways to resolve the conflict. Contrary to Aceh, the efforts have failed to tame the conflict.   This issue brief aims to take a critical look at the approach the Indonesian Government has employed to address the aforementioned conflicts. The focus of this analysis is on the reason why Indonesia took different approaches in dealing with conflicts. Domestically, Indonesia has employed a more pragmatic strategy in dealing with different conflicts, combining repressive and accommodative approaches. Meanwhile, regionally, Indonesia has consistently employed a more accommodative approach.   Domestic Approach to Separatist Conflict: Erratic Pragmatism In dealing with separatist conflict, Indonesia has practically combined several strategies from internal diplomacy, accommodative stance, to military repressive measures. The leading feature of these different approaches reflects the absence of a clear strategy.   In dealing with the separatist conflict of Papua, this unclarity becomes very salient and is combined with the complex nature of the Papua conflict. Some separatist elements raised challenges Jakarta on historical and ideological ground. They see Papua as a distinct race that cannot be fully integrated into Indonesia. They also based their struggle on the promise of the late Dutch colonial government in 1950 to hand over the region to Papua and helped establish an independent country. The conduct of the assumably manipulated plebiscite in 1969 and a series of human rights violations before and after that fuel the resistance even further. [1]   The other element of resistance is the developmentalists who feel dissatisfied with the way development has progressed in Papua. Until recently, Papua is still the least developed province in Indonesia in roughly every aspect. Some Papuans even claim that they have been marginalized and deprived of their land due to the inflow of migrants since the 1970s. Only a limited amount of Papuans have become the leaders in different levels of local government while the majority of bureaucratic and political positions are occupied by migrants. [2]   The last group of resistance contains a more political-economy nature, in which, resistance and conflict mostly deal with access to natural resources. This is more elitist, the settlement of which requires elite accommodation. [3]   Without proper diagnosis of the root of the conflict, or even simply calculated ignorance, Indonesia has launched several different strategies. From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, Indonesia has relied on military operations on a small and fragmented scale. The approach changed in the late 1990s with the coming of democratization. The former president Abdurrahman Wahid offered a more accommodative gesture. First, he allowed the flying of the Morning Star flag – Bintang Kejora – together with but slightly below the Indonesian flag. Then he offered the establishment of several new provinces and districts. In 2001, through Law 21/2001, Indonesia offers more structural concessions by the implementation of the Special Autonomy law, through which, Papua will get a more fiscal transfer, cultural recognition through political representation, and several other affirmative offers. However, after twenty years of implementation, the concessions failed to tame the separatist call.   The absence of an accommodative substance in Jakarta’s policy lies at the very heart of this failure. Special Autonomy has even become the center of the problem. The policy is presumed halfhearted as the promised accommodation and affirmative action relatively failed to materialize. This started with the lack of participation of Papuans, especially the separatist groups, during the drafting of the bill. Not only has the bill had a low sense of belonging among Papuans but it failed to address the root cause of the conflict.   As the conflict continued to escalate since 2019 by claiming civilian casualties and basic government facilities, Indonesia changed the course by declaring the separatist elements as terrorists. Limited but bold police and military operation, involving the well-trained Counter-Terrorism Force, is now underway to locate the movement. Many have questioned the viability of such a measure as it does not solve the real problem. Some even dubbed it a desperate move if not insanity. [4]   How Indonesia employed a very pragmatic approach in dealing with separatist conflict can be seen through the combination of repressive operations and a more accommodative structural transformation. However, the limit of participation has been contained. Indonesia’s failure to present a proper response has helped Papua’s separatist movement receive international attention. Unless a more genuine and sys-tematic structural transformation to truly accommodate the voices of Papuans, the Papua conflict can be settled peacefully though not completely. Indonesia’s erratic pragmatism even confirms some allegations that it has no intention to resolve the conflict though it does not expect the conflict to develop beyond its control. [5]   Regional Approach: Constructive Engagement At the regional level, Indonesia has also been facing a daunting challenge at both bilateral and multilateral levels. It has several territorial disputes with its neighbors, the most notable of which is the long-standing conflict with Malaysia. It started with the campaign of “Ganyang Malaysia” (Destroying Malaysia) in 1963 which was triggered by the establishment of the Confederation of Malaysia. As the confederation was supported by the British Government, President Soekarno saw it as a form of neo-colonialism in the region and had to, therefore, be contested. The silent confrontation sustains up to now, which involves both territorial and other disputes such as migrant and low-skilled workers. Indonesia’s loss over the Sipadan and Ligitan islands dispute in 2002 has only sustained the tension.   At the multilateral level, Indonesia has also been facing the South China Sea and Spratly Islands conflict which involves several countries in the region: China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and Taiwan. The overlapping claim by these countries on many opposing grounds has made this territorial dispute an intriguing political issue. Efforts to bring settlement over the case by involving the International Court have also failed to terminate the dispute. Similarly, no multilateral forum was in place yet to resolve the conflict. Critics have pointed out that the employment of the ASEAN Way in settling the conflict has been used by China to benefit its position and ASEAN might need to reconsider its approach.[6] The resolution of this conflict will significantly put a test on the viability of the regional stability.   In dealing with these territorial conflicts, Indonesia has employed two main strategies. It first adopted a litigation strategy by bringing the case to respective institutions as in the case of the Sipadan-Ligitan dispute. However, as its experiment had brought a significant cost to its territorial integrity, Indonesia has since then changed its strategy. In line with the spirit of the ASEAN way, Indonesia has since then prioritized the employment of both bilateral and multilateral dialogue, the resolution of which depends on consensus. While the employment of the strategy had brought no significant process toward resolution, the strategy has at least sustained the political stability in the region.   In a non-territorial conflict, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries have attempted to confront the domestic conflict of Myanmar regarding democratization and another humanitarian crisis of Rohingya. In its most current development of the political crisis, the Myanmar case has not only endangered regional stability but also put the very existence of ASEAN to the test. Given the escalation of the recent political violence in Myanmar, an ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting was called in April 2021 and resulted in a Chairman’s Statement. Acknowledging ASEAN’s positive and constructive role in facilitating a peaceful solution in the interest of the people of Myanmar and their livelihoods, the meeting resulted in a five-point consensus. First, there shall be an immediate cessation of violence and all parties shall exercise utmost restraint. Second, constructive dialogue among all parties shall seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people. Third, a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN. Fourth, ASEAN shall provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre. Fifth, the special envoy and delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned.[7]   Indonesia has played an important role in trying to resolve the Myanmar conflict. In March 2021, President Joko Widodo has called for a special ASEAN Summit to discuss the Myanmar situation and proposed it to Brunei Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah as the current chair. He openly expressed his concern over the deadly use of force against pro-democracy protesters and called for a stop to the violence.[8] He again raised this message during the Summit, stating that violence must be stopped and democracy, stability, and peace must be restored immediately.[9] To the surprise of many, such a message had never been delivered in such a direct and bold tone previously.   In addressing Myanmar's political situation, Indonesia – as an ASEAN member– was bound by the regional policy framework in dealing with any domestic matters: the ASEAN Way. The framework requires its members to resolve any issue by prioritizing the principles of constructive engagement, non-interference, dialogue, and consensus. It has been broadly criticized for being ineffective to resolve matters of political and economic importance. However, it is also praised for having sustained the political stability in this fast-growing region. Bridging the merit and peril of the ASEAN Way, ASEAN and Indonesia need to change their approach toward a more critical engagement.[10]   Future Outlook Considering the current dynamics and analyzing it in a much bigger framework, the way Indonesia deals with conflict would lie highly on its ability to balance domestic interest and interest reputation. As far as domestic conflict is concerned, a more accommodative approach is called, and this applies to the way Indonesia deals with the Papua conflict. Indonesia has successfully resolved the long-standing Aceh conflict and channeled it into a democratic structural transformation. The same principle should be applied to Papua, the essence of which lies in its willingness to accommodate Papuan voices through a more inclusive process and accommodative policies.   At the regional level, for both bilateral and multilateral territorial disputes as well as supposedly domestic conflict in other ASEAN member countries, Indonesia is bound by the structural framework of the ASEAN Way. Yet, there is room for a transformation to such approach by applying a more critical engagement. This is not up to Indonesia alone but is also subject to other members’ preferences. However, as the biggest country in this association, Indonesia may start such a transformation.■     [1] Kirksey, Eben. 2012. Freedom in Entangled Worlds: West Papua and the Architecture of Global Power. Durham: Duke University Press. [2] Gabriel Lele, 2021. “Asymmetric decentralization, accommodation and separatist conflict: lessons from Aceh and Papua, Indonesia,” Territory, Politics, Governance, DOI: 10.1080/21622671.2021.1875036; Shane Joshua Barter and Isabelle Côté. 2016. “Strife of the soil? Unsettling transmigrant conflicts in Indonesia.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 46(1): 60-85. [3] Antonius Made Tony Supriatma. 2013. “TNI/POLRI IN West Papua: How Security Reforms Work In The Conflict Region,” Indonesia. 95 (April): 93-124. [4] https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/indonesias-approach-to-papua-is-starting-to-look-like-insanity/. [5] Richard Chauvel & Ikrar Nusa Bhakti. 2004. “The Papua conflict: Jakarta’s perceptions and policies.” Policy Studies (5): 1-100. [6] Munmun Majumdar, 2015. “The ASEAN Way of conflict management in the South China Sea,” Strategic Analysis (39) 1: 7-87. [7] https://asean.org/storage/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf. [8] https://www.thejakartapost.com/seasia/2021/03/19/president-jokowi-calls-for-asean-summit-to-discuss-myanmar.html. [9] https://voi.id/en/news/46744/jokowi-violence-in-myanmar-must-stop-democracy-returns. [10] Lee Jones. 2008. “ASEAN's albatross: ASEAN's Burma policy, from constructive engagement to critical disengagement,” Asian Security (4) 3: 271-293.     Gabriel Lele is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada. He is also a senior researcher at the Working Group for Papua at the same university. He finished his PhD from the Policy and Governance, Crawford School of Economics and Government, the Australian National Univerity, Canberra in 2008. His research areas mainly cover the issues of decentralization and separatist conflict, governance reform, corruption and anti-corruption, and international institutions.     담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Northeast Asia - Part II     The outbreak of COVID-19 has proven that new forms of threat can heavily affect the development of democracy as well as democratic practices. COVID-19 is not only a life-threatening issue; it is also evolving into a problem for the maintenance and promotion of democracy. In order to address this global issue, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) has been conducting research on the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance based on country cases since 2020. EAI had published eleven working papers for the first part of this research project in March. This second part of the working paper is the updated version that includes any changes and updates that occurred. The first set of Part II working papers includes the cases of Northeast Asia.     1. Jung Kim | South Korea’s COVID-19 Pandemic Policy Optimization between Health and Economy 2. Maiko Ichihara | The Fairness Trap: Vaccine Reservation Sys-tems and Chaos for the Elderly in Japan 3. Ariunbayar Bazarvaani, Bumdari Dagva-Ochir | Global Pandemic: Challenges and Opportunities for Democracy in Mongolia  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [편집자 주] The State Emergency Committee in Mongolia shifted the country to the “Total Readiness Stage” from “High Level of Readiness” in November 2020 as a strong measure to combat COVID-19. However, this decision failed to earn trust from the society full of uncertainty. There was public frustration with the economic situation due to the lack of clarity on how to regulate daily activities. The high alert regulations, which lasted ten months, also failed to prove any substantive results. In this regard, Ariunbayar Bazarvaani, the CEO of The Academy of Political Education, and Bumdari Dagva-Ochir, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science of the National University of Mongolia, explore the factors of the negative atmosphere among the society that mistrusts the feasibility of government and its capacity to set appropriate recommendations. The purpose of the study is to diagnose political risk management in Mongolia, identify the positive effects of quarantine on governance, and explore the interrelationship of social factors and individuals caused by counter pandemic decisions of government. The authors lead to the conclusion by following the gradual lockdown and vaccination situation in Mongolia while analyzing the impact COVID-19 measures brought on democracy, human rights, and media.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction [1] As countries around the world have begun to implement their own risk management policies, the World Health Organization (WHO) has declared COVID-19, the new infectious disease, a pandemic. According to articles 11.2 and 11.3.3 of the Law on Disaster Protection, issued by the State Emergency Committee (SEC) on February 13, 2020, the “high level of readiness” against COVID-19 was partially initiated in Mongolia. This resolution was pursuant to Article 4, Resolution No. 62 of the February 12, 2020 Resolution of Government of Mongolia. [2] The Law on Disaster Protection identifies and specifies the measures for the three levels of readiness to combat the coronavirus: everyday level of readiness, high level of readiness and all-out level of readiness.   In Mongolia, the first verified community transmission case was announced on November 11 and as suggested by the SEC, the government shifted the country to the “Total Readiness Stage” on November 12. However, there was a strong sense of uncertainty and mistrust in Mongolian society regarding the transition to the “total readiness stage.” The Mongolian government declared the country to be at this level as the first week was filled with panic, as decisions changed daily and there were discrepancies in the information source. Mongolian citizens also became frustrated with the economic situation of businesses and individuals and the lack of clarity on how to regulate day-to-day activities.   However, the ten months of high alert regulations set by the SEC did not yield substantive results. Therefore, this research aims to study the factors that contributed to the social atmosphere that doubts the viability of government and their ability make appropriate recommendations.   The main goals of the research are the following: 1. To determine whether Mongolia has a political risk management sys-tem 2. To identify positive effects of quarantine on governance (the ability to differentiate between populist politicians and whether democratic governance can be more efficient in correcting decisions and information) 3. To identify psycho-social features that are caused by quarantine and government decisions and implementations (Psycho-social refers to the interrelationship of social factors and individual attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors). ■   [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second part will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] “Disaster Protection Law”, Law of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar city, https://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/12458?Lawid=12458; “On transfer to the ready rate”, Article 4, Number 62, Resolution of the government of Mongolia, https://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/15081?Lawid=15081.     Bazarvaani Ariunbayar is the CEO of the Academy of Political Education and the project manager of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mongolia. He holds a Master of Arts in Political Science, Graduate School of Arts and Science, National University of Mongolia.   Dagva-Ochir Bumdari is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science of the National University of Mongolia. She was awarded a doctoral degree by Kokushikan University in 2013.   담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [편집자 주] Japan was one of the earliest countries that signed a contract with Pfizer for 120 million doses in July 2020. However, the subsequent approval process was comparably slow and the vaccine reservation sys-tem caused chaos for the Japanese society. The municipal offices started vaccine reservations for the elderly first, but there were huge problems in the design of the sys-tem; the mismatch between spot availability and eligibility for reservation, and an online-centric reservation sys-tem without sufficient offline support. The elderly were thrown into confusion either because they are vulnerable to the new sys-tem or because the sys-tem went down with an incapable number of people approaching at the same time. Maiko Ichihara, associate professor at Hitotsubashi University, insists that the root of the problem is, paradoxically, the emphasis on the fairness of opportunity and not giving consideration to individual characteristics. The research shows that the problem of superficial fairness is widely ranged in human rights issues in Japan by taking instances of refugees and female politicians in Japan. The author points out that it is time for the Japanese society to reconsider the approach to realize equality by taking into account the features of each vulnerable group.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction COVID-19 vaccination in Japan has caused confusion for the elderly. Although a substantial portion of the elderly is not familiar with the Internet, municipalities used online reservation sys-tems and designated an incomparably large number of elderly people as able to reserve spots at once. The reservation sites went down due to the large number of simultaneous accesses and, unfamiliar with such sys-tems, the elderly users were at a loss to understand the situation. They also tried to make reservations by phone, but the phone lines were jammed and calls could not be answered. In anxiety, the elderly rushed to municipal offices in large numbers and vented their anger when they learned that the offices would not accept their reservations in person.   The root of the problem lies in the fact that many municipal offices tried to ensure fairness of opportunity without taking into account the characteristics of the target population. After explaining the confusion surrounding the vaccine approval process and the characteristics of the vaccine reservation sys-tems in Japan, this paper analyzes how the reservation sys-tems were problematic from the perspective of equity. The final section discusses how fairness should be interpreted in order to protect human rights. ■     Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and a Visiting Scholar in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is also a co-chair of the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications include: “Universality to Plurality? Values in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberalism: Japan and the International Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017).   담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [편집자 주] As the second part of the Pandemic and Democratic Governance in Asia series, Jung Kim, Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, explores the outperformance of South Korea’s COVID-19 pandemic policy trade-off between health and the economy. The author throws a question of why the national performances of the trade-off between lives and livelihoods during the COVID-19 pandemic have varied among nations. This study shows that social risk, rather than social capital, such as social trust or confidence in authorities, is the key factor of large-scale collective action that explains the variation in national pandemic policy performances. This theory is supported by a descriptive comparison of pandemic policy performances across OECD countries over quarterly periods in 2020, and an examination of the determinants of COVID-19 pandemic policy optimization. He further explains that the agility of citizens in South Korea to the pandemic is decisive to the successful pandemic policy optimization.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction How have policymakers and citizens responded to the COVID-19 pandemic policy trade-off between health and the economy? Why have some nations succeeded in minimizing the trade-off between protecting lives and protecting livelihoods, but not others? Why and how has South Korea outperformed most other advanced democracies in dealing with the trade-off? [1]   Building on a growing literature that analyzes the trade-off between health and the economy in designing and implementing national COVID-19 policy responses (Desierto and Koyama 2020; Cheibub, Hong, and Przeworski 2020; Ginsburg and Versteeg 2020), this study attempts to answer the above questions examining the case of South Korea in a comparative perspective. This research argues that contra conventional wisdom that social capital is the explanans of variation of national pandemic policy performances, social risk is much more important to facilitate large-scale collective action, which is the political foundation of voluntary civic compliance with government non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) policy recommendation and ultimately successful pandemic policy optimization between health and the economy.   A simple theoretical framework of pandemic policy optimization will be introduced in the next section. The third describes a quarterly comparison of national policy responses across OECD countries in 2020. The following section provides a case study analysis on the determinants of pandemic policy optimization in South Korea. ■   [1] Why some nations have outperformed others in vaccinating against COVID-19 is the question that this study will explore in the next round of research project. For now, I suggest that the better the health performance of a nation is, the poorer the vaccination performance of it has. See the appendix for a preliminary association between the total COVID-19 cases per million and the people vaccinated per hundred in OECD countries as of May 14, 2021.     Jung Kim is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, South Korea. He teaches courses on International Relations in East Asia and Political Economy of the Two Koreas, among others. Prior to this, from 2009-2015, he was a lecturer at the Underwood International College and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. During this time, Mr. Kim was also a Chief Researcher at The East Asia Institute. He pursued his Bachelors and Masters in Political Science at Korea University and went on to pursue his Ph.D. at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia.   담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [편집자 주] Upon its enforcement, Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) has been condemned both domestically and internationally for its draconian measures. In this Issue Briefing, Neil DeVotta, Professor at Wake Forest University, claims that anti-terrorism legislation in South Asia was instituted on the basis of penal codes from the colonial era. In Sri Lanka, the PTA was designed as a mechanism to counter Tamil rebellion movements that stemmed from the community’s failed pursuit of securing a separate state of Eelam. Nonetheless, Professor DeVotta states that the PTA does more harm than good; the act has, in essence, brutalized the Tamil community and fuelled pre-existing sentiments of Islamophobia in the country. On top of that, the arbitrary enforcement of the PTA, illustrated by the detainment of key Muslim personalities, further supports prevalent claims that the PTA is imposed onto the Muslim community on unfair grounds. In this regard, the author calls for the government to scrap up the PTA for the upkeep of democracy and to mitigate anti-Muslim attitudes in Sri Lanka.     There are many reasons why terrorism takes root in a given society, but often the impulse stems from discrimination and inequality. States seek to maintain a monopoly on the use of force within their territories, and those that fan discrimination and inequality—be it along ethnoreligious or regional lines—prod those marginalized to rebel against state-imposed oppression. The details may vary but this dynamic is more or less fundamental to most secessionist violence. This means that more often than not, it is the state that is most responsible for creating the conditions for terrorism it thereafter seeks to terminate. Prevention of terrorism acts have become a convenient tool in this regard, even if such mechanisms aggravate state-sponsored terror.   Tamil Separatism, Neoliberalism, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act States have used various terminology to create such acts, and in South Asia the draconian policies associated with anti-terrorism legislation were instituted on top of penal codes that date to colonial times. In Sri Lanka’s case, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48 of 1979[1] [2]was no doubt inspired by India’s Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which was designed to pacify so-called “disturbed areas,”[2]and the various similar acts that were passed in the United Kingdom starting from the 1970s. In the Sri Lankan case, the act was set up to counter the minority Tamils’ quest to secure a separate state of Eelam. While the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) eventually became its main proponent, at the time the act went into force, numerous youth secessionist groups had formed in reaction to Sri Lanka’s racist and ethnocentric anti-Tamil policies.   This burgeoning Tamil rebel movement that legitimized the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), however, coincided with the newly-elected, right-wing United National Party government’s attempts to introduce structural adjustment reforms. This reversed the previous socialist government’s autarkist policies, and it transformed the island’s economy in a rightward direction. Referring to the UK’s rightward drift under Margaret Thatcher, Stuart Hall noted that free-market economies mandated strong states.[3]President J. R. Jayewardene’s quest to restructure the island’s economy in a free market direction required the taming of leftists and vested interests that thrived under the previous socialist government. Therefore, the economic reforms most likely also influenced Sri Lanka’s PTA. The megalomaniac Jayewardene could thus justify the PTA using the separatist threat emanating from the northeast while also weaponizing the act against those opposed to his open market reforms.   The PTA affected individuals from all ethnoreligious communities, but it has especially brutalized Tamils, as many were taken into custody with the flimsiest evidence.[4]Those tortured and radicalized played no small role in transforming Tamil moderates into hard-core proponents of Eelam.[5] The civil war that lasted nearly three decades ended in 2009 but Tamils continued to be arrested and abused with impunity. Following a visit to Sri Lanka in 2017, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism referred to the “industrial-scale injustice” the PTA perpetrates against Tamils and warned that its abuses will only reignite the conflict.[6]   Sri Lanka’s government, however, has disregarded such warnings and the international community’s repeated calls to repeal the PTA. Indeed, the present government under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has now authorized additional regulations under the PTA that seems especially geared to target the island’s Muslims. Branded the Prevention of Terrorism (De-radicalization from holding violent extremist religious ideology) Regulations No. 01 of 2021,[7] it stands to further destabilize the island’s ethnoreligious relations.   The Muslims’ Turn Beginning in the 1950s, successive Sri Lankan governments engaged in well-calibrated anti-Tamils policies that made the island into a Sinhalese Buddhist ethnocracy[8] The resultant Tamil rebellion was inevitable, just as its failure to secure Eelam predictable.[9] If, as noted above, the quest for separatism legitimated the PTA, the likes of The Terrorism Investigation Division (TID) continue to use the act to abuse those defending human rights and seeking accountability for war crimes.[10] The new regulations that expand the PTA, however, must be considered in line with the Islamophobia run rampant since the civil war ended in 2009.   Sri Lanka has experienced episodic anti-Muslim violence, but the Islamophobia that was ramped up starting around 2011 ensued with the state’s imprimatur. President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s landslide reelection victory in 2010 convinced him that he did not hereafter need minority support to stay in power[11] and that he could therefore fan anti-minority sentiment—with the Tamils tamed, it was now the Muslims’ turn—to build a political dynasty.[12] This led to various pro-Buddhist groups, many led by monks, attacking mosques and Muslim businesses and homes with the regime’s connivance. The uncompromising and puritanical Wahabi-Salafi strand of Islam that has taken root among many Sri Lankan Muslims may be conducive to armed Islamist movements,[13] but the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings that killed 269 people is hard to explain without factoring in the anti-Muslim agitation and violence that took place post-civil war. It is now clear that Zahran Hashim, the mastermind of the Easter Sunday attacks, used the anti-Muslim violence the government tolerated to recruit bombers.[14]   The Tamil rebels were at the forefront in deploying suicide bombers, but not even they could carry out multiple and coordinated bombings like the Islamists did when attacking Christian churches and upscale tourist hotels. The bombers were inspired by Islamic State (IS) ideology,[15]although there is no evidence that IS planned the attacks (despite claiming to have done so).[16]Following the explosions, nearly 2,000 Muslims with direct or suspected links to the bombers were arrested, and others have since been arrested using the PTA, which allows authorities to detain individuals incommunicado and without charges or access to lawyers for 18 months. While a suspect must be brought before a magistrate within 72 hours of the arrest, the magistrate has no authority to determine if the basis for the arrest is legal. In this light, why would the Sri Lankan state want to further expand the PTA?   Sweeping New PTA Regulations Sri Lanka’s draconian PTA makes a mockery of the rule of law,[17] partly due to its arbitrary enforcement.[18] In this light, the new regulations expanding the state’s ability to abuse individuals represent a monstrosity ginned up by Sinhalese Buddhist supremacism run amok. The so-called “De-radicalization Regulations” allow the security forces to place an individual in “reintegration centers” if the person “by words either spoken or intended” seeks to commission “acts of violence or religious, racial or communal disharmony or feelings of ill will or hostility between different communities.”[19]The suspect can be placed in rehabilitation for a year, with detention extended for another year, without due process. The regulations as written are so vague that “surrendees and detainees” can be arrested without evident proof and merely based on supposed intention. The irony here is that it is Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists and Buddhist monks that are at the forefront when fanning ethnoreligious divisions in the country,[20] yet no one expects such extremist Buddhist monks and nationalists promoting blatant violence against minorities to be affected by these regulations.   Some have referred to China’s reeducation camps for Uighurs in Xinjiang Province and wondered if the expanded regulations under the PTA are part of a sinister plan to similarly persecute Sri Lanka’s Muslims.[21] Although this may be a stretch, there is no gainsaying that the present Gotabaya Rajapaksa government is bent on further empowering Sinhalese Buddhists by demonizing minorities. This regime was set on marginalizing minorities before the COVID-19 pandemic. Ongoing militarization and policies that were introduced to colonize Northern Province, where Tamils constitute a majority, and Eastern Province, where Tamils and Muslims constitute a majority, especially made this clear.   Indeed, neither the COVID-19 pandemic nor the pressure put on the government during the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) meetings in Geneva from February to March curtailed the regime’s anti-Muslim agitprop. Having initially blamed Muslims for spreading the virus, the government kept insisting on cremating those who died from COVID-19, despite Muslims (and some Christians) opposing the policy and the World Health Organization repeatedly saying it was safe to bury COVID-19 victims.[22] Even as the UNHRC was debating the sorry state of human rights in Sri Lanka (including the islamophobia trending on the island), a leading hyper-nationalist minister called for banning the burqa and shuttering over 1,000 madrassas on national security grounds.[23]   Ultimately, the expanded regulations under the PTA may be designed to further whip up Islamophobia and thereby divert attention from the economic woes COVID-19 has aggravated. In this case, the PTA operates as a tool of the ruling elite who have manipulated their Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist credentials to come to power.[24] The continued detention of Hejaaz Hizbullah, a leading human rights lawyer, and the recent arrest of prominent Muslim politician Rishad Bathiyudeen, both under the PTA, fit this mold given that their arrests deal more with optics than credible wrongdoing.[25]In the least, the new regulations will allow the regime to put away detractors amidst less controversy since silencing them within “reintegration centers” will be more convenient than prosecuting them via the court sys-tem. Whatever the government’s intentions, these additional regulations to the PTA further jeopardize minority rights in Sri Lanka. They also stand to further radicalize a Muslim minority that steadfastly supported the Sri Lankan state against Tamil separatism.   Conclusion A draft resolution that is currently making its way through U.S. Congressional committees partly points to the “impunity [that] prevails in the country with the outdated and the excessively harsh Prevention of Terrorism Act, which does not comply with international standards and has still not been repealed despite repeated promises by the government.”[26]This coincides with a resolution adopted by the European Parliament, which notes how the PTA has “led to consistent and well-founded allegations of torture and sexual abuse, forced confessions and sys-tematic denials of due process” and asks the EU Commission to consider temporarily withdrawing Sri Lanka from the EU Genaralised Scheme of Prefernces Plus (GSP+) until the country repeals or replaces the PTA with legislation that “adheres to international best practices.”[27] The GSP+ program reduces tariffs on Sri Lanka’s exports to the EU and its suspension stands to drastically impact the island’s export sectors.   Sinhalese Buddhists especially take umbrage when foreign governments target Sri Lanka in this manner. No doubt, the big powers resort to hypocrisy when conducting foreign policy; and some justifiably feel that such resolutions are influenced less by a concern for the island’s minorities and more by its increasing tilt toward China. This noted, the fact remains that the PTA helped fan Tamil terrorism even as it further undermined democracy and the rule of law. Deployed indiscriminately against Muslims, it could make the country a hotbed of Islamist terrorism as well. Consequently, it is in Sri Lanka’s interest to finally bury the PTA, because this is legislation that has done much harm and little good.■     [1] http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Sri%20Lanka/LK_Prevention_of_Terrorism_(Temp_Provisions).pdf [2] See https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1958-28.pdf [3] Stuart Hall, Drifting Into a Law and Order Society (London: Cobden Trust, 1980). [4] See Amnesty International, Sri Lanka: Countering Terrorism at the Expense of Human Rights, January 2019, at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA3797702019ENGLISH.PDF. Also see Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights whilecountering terrorism A/HRC/40/XX/Add.3 (23 July 2018), para 1. [5] This claim is based on numerous author interviews conducted with Tamils in especially the United Kingdom and Canada who are now part of vocal diaspora communities. [6] United Nations (Sri Lanka), “Full Statement by Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-terrorism, at the Conclusion of His Official Visit,” July 14, 2017, available at https://lk.one.un.org/news/full-statement-by-ben-emmerson-un-special-rapporteur-on-human-rights-and-counter-terrorism-at-the-conclusion-of-his-official-visit/. [7] For the relevant government notification (gazette), see http://documents.gov.lk/files/egz/2021/3/2218-68_E.pdf [8] Neil DeVotta, “Sri Lanka: The Return to Ethnocracy.” Journal of Democracy 32, no. 1 (January 2021): 96-110; Neil DeVotta, “The Genesis, Consolidation, and Consequences of Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalism,” in When Politics are Sacralized: Comparative Perspectives on Religious Claims and Nationalism, eds., Nadim N. Rouhana and Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021): 187-212. [9] Neil DeVotta, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (November/December 2009): 1021-51. [10] https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-free-prominent-rights-defenders [11] Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Sri Lanka in 2010: Regime Consolidation in a Post-Civil War Era,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, no. 1, p. 133. [12] Neil DeVotta, “Sri Lanka: From Turmoil to Dynasty,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 (April 2011): 130-44. [13] Dennis McGilvray and Mirak Raheem, Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict, Policy Studies 41 (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2007). [14] Meera Srinivasan, “Sri Lanka Easter Blasts: ‘Anti-Muslim Riots a Possible Trigger,’” The Hindu, April 27, 2019, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/sri-lanka-easter-blasts-anti-muslim-riots-a-possible-trigger/article26960071.ece [15] Neil DeVotta, “Sri Lanka’s Christians and Muslims Weren’t Enemies,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2019, at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/sri-lankas-christians-and-muslims-werent-enemies/ [16] At the time of writing which is over two years after the bombings, it was found that certain governmental officials and intelligence personnel colluded with certain bombers. See Colombo Telegraph, “ Cardinal Blasts Nandasena Regime For Failing To Investigate ‘Sonic-Sonic,’; Says Bad Leadership Has Left Country Cursed,” June 3, 2021, at https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/cardinal-blasts-nandasena-regime-for-failing-to-investigate-sonic-sonic-says-bad-leadership-has-left-country-cursed/ [17] For a recent report documenting how the PTA further undermines the rule of law, see Ermiza Tegal, Understanding Rule of Law, Human Security and Prevention of Terrorism in Sri Lanka(Colombo: Law & Society Trust, 2021). [18] For instance, when ten family members conducted a private memorial service in May 2021 for a relative who died during the civil war security forces in their area arrested them as the present government renewed the ban on Tamils commemorating the war dead publicly. Since the arrest was under the PTA, the magistrate they could not grant bail. See Jehan Perera, “Power Of Goodwill Gestures Applies Locally and Internationally,” The Island, June 8, 2021, at https://island.lk/power-of-goodwill-gestures-applies-locally-and-internationally/ [19] See http://documents.gov.lk/files/egz/2021/3/2218-68_E.pdf [20] Any number of YouTube videos prove the point. For one despicable example, which shows a monk slapping a Christian pastor while police and a crowd look on, see https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/ampitiye-sumanes-slap-fell-on-the-civility-of-the-sinhala-buddhists/ [21] Shreen Saroor, “Denying Justice While Dehumanizing a Community at Large,” Groundviews, April 21, 2021, at https://groundviews.org/2021/04/21/denying-justice-while-dehumanizing-a-community-at-large/ [22] When the government did finally allow COVID-19 related burials in March, it was because it wanted Muslim states to vote against the UNHRC resolution demanding accountability for alleged war crimes. [23] The dissonance in communication may be due to incompetence, or individuals seeking to burnish their anti-Muslim credentials. [24] Farzana Haniffa, “What Is Behind the Anti-Muslim Measures in Sri Lanka?” Aljazeera.com, April 12, 2021, at https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/4/12/what-is-behind-the-anti-muslim-measures-in-sri-lanka [25] Thyagi Ruwanpathirana, On Hejaaz Hizbullah: The Latest Victim of Sri Lanka’s Draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act, Amnesty International, July 15, 2020, at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/sri-lanka-on-hejaaz-hizbullah-and-the-prevention-of-terrorism-act/; Meera Srinivasan, “MP Held Over Sri Lanka Easter Attacks,” The Hindu, April 24, 2021, at https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/mp-held-over-sri-lanka-easter-attacks/article34402733.ece [26] The draft is available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-resolution/413/text?r=1 [27] For the draft resolution see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2021-0355_EN.html     Neil DeVotta is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University. His research interests include South Asian security and politics, ethnicity and nationalism, ethnic conflict resolution, and democratic transition and consolidation. He is the author of Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and editor of Understanding Contemporary India (2nd edition) and An Introduction to South Asian Politics, in addition to authoring numerous articles. He has also consulted for a number of organizations, including the United States Agency for International Development, Freedom House, Bertelsmann Stiftung, and Global Center for Pluralism.     담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]