.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Notes Following the democratization in 1987, South Koreans seem to enjoy the free press and various forms of media outlets. In this issue briefing, Prof. Kyu Sup Hahn examines the public preference for news outlets as well as the public trust in the media, based on the findings from the 2020 Korean Identity Survey. Prof. Hahn argues that South Koreans were sharply divided in their preference for news sources along the line of their political orientation, suggesting the polarization of the media outlets. Prof. Hahn further argues that South Koreans’ preference for news sources are not necessarily aligned with their preference for policy issues, suggesting that people do not necessarily trust media outlets representing their policy preference. Prof. Hahn concluded that preference for news sources has become a social identity in South Korea, reinforcing the existing political polarization in the country.     Paradox of Press Freedom in South Korea The 1987 democratization finally granted South Koreans press freedom. More than thirty years have passed thereafter, allowing the Korean news media for plenty of time to mature. South Korea has become a country best known for its high-speed Internet and smartphones. Besides, the rapid growth of one-person media has been regarded as an expansion of free speech. Unarguably, there seems no shortage of the free press in South Korea. As news portals account for a large portion of news circulation in South Korea, the number of news organizations has skyrocketed. If a news source is included in portals’ search result pages, it can lure a fair volume of traffic online. As a result, more than six thousand registered news outlets are currently in operation in the country with a population of just over 50 million. With respect to press freedom, South Korea seems to have become a country that everyone had envisioned prior to the 1987 democratization.  Despite the increased press freedom, the South Korean public have become highly discontent with news media in the country. According to the Digital News Report 2020 published by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism[1], South Korea ranked in the last place in terms of media trust for the five consecutive years since 2016. Only 21% of South Koreans “trusted news media they used”, whereas the global average was approximately 46%. In a similar vein, according to the 2016 Kantar Public poll, more South Koreans expressed their trust in Samsung than they did in all the major news outlets. Quite surprisingly, even the self-identified conservatives and liberals expressed slightly a higher level of trust in Samsung than they did in conservative and liberal newspapers. Clearly, few South Koreans acknowledge news media as a watchdog of society. After enjoying thirsty years of freedom, the status of South Korean news media as the fourth estate has become more of a self-congratulatory gesture.   2020 Korean Identity Survey In May 2020, the East Asia Institute (EAI) administered its fourth Korean Identity Survey. Representative samples of 1,000 Koreans were interviewed face-to-face. This year’s survey asked respondents how much they trusted individual news outlets in the country. As shown in the Figure 1, the list encompassed the total of 34 news outlets, including three major broadcasting networks (KBS, MBC, and SBS), four so-called TV channels of comprehensive programming (TV Chosun, JTBC, Channel A, MBN), two news channels (YTN, Yonhap News TV), and ten newspapers with the highest circulation rates. Additionally, the EAI survey included fifteen Youtube channels specializing in current political affairs that are popular among the public.     Respondents’ trust in news outlets was measured on a five-point scale, based on so-called Polytomous Item Response Model. This type of model is often used to estimate an examinee’s scholastic aptitude in standardized tests such as SAT or TOFLE. In an academic testing, it allows for estimating the difficulty of each question and juxtaposing it with the ability of examinees on the same scale. Based on this model, respondents and news outlets were placed on the same scale. News organizations received a score based on how likely the same respondents rate them as “trustworthy.”   Divided News Source Preference According to the 2020 Korean Identity Survey conducted above, South Koreans were sharply divided in their news source preference. Of 34 news outlets, only nine fell in between the average supporters of the ruling Democratic Party (DP) and the opposition Unified Future Party (UFP)[3].  This shows that liberals and conservatives alike do not trust the news outlets belonging to the opposite political camp. Surprisingly, all three broadcast networks, of which two are publicly funded, fell in the far left end of the ideological spectrum. Two publicly funded broadcast networks appealed mostly to avid supporters of the incumbent government. Such skew in the audience base of public broadcasters can be controversial; for example, BBC’s audience base would consist of a more balanced mix of voters. Likewise, preference for the two publicly funded news channels also fell in close proximity to the three broadcast networks. When compared with the three broadcast networks, even the two most liberal newspaper (Newspapers 4 and 5) attracted relatively moderate news consumers. In short, the cluster of like-minded news consumers seems unmistakably clear. In sharp contrast, twelve out of fifteen Youtube channels were located right for the preference of average UFP supporters. Many Youtube channels seemed to appeal to conservative news consumers. Unlike in Europe or the U.S., government’s influence on publicly funded broadcast networks seems quite pervasive in South Korea. After a transition from one government to another, top executives at major broadcast networks such as KBS and MBC are forced to resign. Likewise, nearly everyone holding important editorial positions in news production is forced out and replaced with those on the ‘winning’ side. Disapproving the publicly-funded broadcast networks, critics of the incumbent government seem to have turned to social media. Likewise, when Twitter first penetrated into the South Korean society in the early 2010s under the Lee Myung-bak government, a disproportionately large number of liberals used it to access political news. Now, with President Moon Jae-in in office, many conservatives seem to have turned to Youtube channels for political news. In short, news from broadcast networks is largely consumed by supporters of the incumbent government, whereas a large proportion of Youtube news consumers consist of supporters of the opposition party.   Finally, it is interesting to see that Youtube channels are located at both extremes of the ideological spectrum. Although a vast majority of Youtube channels appealed to conservative news consumers, the most liberal news consumers also turned to Youtube 2. Likewise, Youtube 7 is located at the conservative extreme. This indicates that ideological extremism can be a highly effective niche marketing strategy to attract news consumers.   News Source Preference as an Affective Choice What accounts for this sharply divided news source preference? Generation, party identity, and gender turned out to be statistically significant predictors of news outlet preference. News consumers in their 30s strongly preferred the liberal news outlets. As expected, DP supporters were more likely to prefer the liberal news outlets when compared with others. Also, male respondents preferred the liberal news outlets. Does news consumers’ policy preference reflect their news source preference? EAI asked respondents about their preference regarding twelve policy issues based on the Polytomous Item Response Model, and attained individual news consumers’ policy preference scores. The analysis showed that policy preference had little to do with news consumers’ preference for new sources. They did not necessarily trust news channels representing their policy preference. It is well-known that South Korean news consumers are strongly inclined to avoid news professing disagreeable views. According to the Digital News Report 2020, 44% of South Korean news consumers said that they preferred the news outlets sharing their political views. Among 40 countries included in the study, the average was approximately 28%. Only Turkey (55%), Mexico (48%), and the Philippines (46%) came ahead of South Korea. On the other hand, over 70% of British, German and Japanese news consumers preferred “neutral” news outlets, whereas only 4% of Koreans did. In conclusion, preference for news sources has become a social identity in South Korea, reinforcing the existing political polarization among the South Korean public. Thirty years after the democratization, South Koreans seem to be caught in a vicious cycle of polarization with the news media facilitating it.■   [1] Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism https://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2020/overview-key-findings-2020/ [2] Editor’s Note: JU refers to Justice Party; DM refers to Democratic Party of Korea (ruling party); MT refers to People Power Party(main opposition), and MS refers to the Livelihood of the People Party. Due to the sensitivity around political orientations of each news outlets, names of each news outlets have not been disclosed in the figure above. [3] Editor’s note: The conservative party changed its name to “People Power Party” as of September 2 2020 https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EA%B5%AD%EB%AF%BC%EC%9D%98%ED%9E%98     ■ Hahn, Kyu Sup is currently a Professor at the Department of Communication at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in communication at Stanford University, and previously taught at UCLA. His areas of research are mainly political communication. His publications include “Economic and Cultural Drivers of Support for Immigrants.” (2019), “The Influence of “Social Viewing” on Televised Debate Viewers’ Political Judgment”, amongst others.     ■ Typeset by Eunji Lee, Research Associate/Project Manager For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) |  [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Notes The “Patriotism Highs” controversy and the “Hell Chosun” discourse have been pervasive in Korean society, reflecting Koreans’ perspective towards their society today. In this issue briefing, Dr. Hanwool Jeong, Senior Research Fellow at Hankook Research, analyzes the reasons behind the sharp rise in national identification and national pride among Koreans based on the results of the Korean Identity Survey conducted in 2020. Dr. Jeong said that the remarkable increase in national pride has resulted from the successes of the response to COVID-19 acclaimed as “K-quarantine” as well as the reappraisal on the Korea’s health/welfare system along with civic awareness. At the same time, Dr. Jeong points out that we should be vigilant of the so-called “patriotism highs (guk-ppong)”, raising the need to address the fundamental problems plagued in our society and also the importance of restoring pride and trust in our communities first.      The Success of K-Quarantine and the “Patriotism Highs” Controversy In the 2020 round of the Korean Identity Survey, a quinquennial survey launched in 2005 conducted jointly by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and the East Asia Collaboration Center (EACC) at Sungkyunkwan University, a remarkable increase was noted in the degree of national identification and national pride expressed by survey participants. In the first round of this survey conducted in 2005, 77% of respondents indicated that they felt a sense of community as a Korean national. This figure has climbed steadily over time to reach 90% in 2020. This result is in contrast to the percentage of those who said they felt an affinity with an ethnic Korean, which increased slightly and then declined to 64%.[1] Further, in place of the previous trends that had exhibited national pride and embarrassment concurrently, a sense of positive psychological attachment to national pride is strengthening. In 2005, 70% of survey respondents agreed with the statement “If I could be born again, I would want to be Korean,” while in 2020, that figure jumped to 80%. While 48% of respondents agreed with the statement “I feel a little embarrassed about Korea” in 2005, just 31% said the same in 2020, which is a huge drop.       The increasing sense of national pride and unity felt among Koreans is in part due to the international attention that the country’s success in containing COVID-19 has drawn. According to the results of Hankook Research’s biweekly regular survey “Public Opinion Within Public Opinion,” following the two weeks in March when South Korea’s cases dropped rapidly, 70-80% of the public has consistently rated the government response to the coronavirus highly. While this figure fell to 50% after cases increased again following August 15 2020, it climbed back up to 75% when the government lowered the social distancing level to 1 during the first week of October (see Figure 2). Koreans began to use the shortened term “K-quarantine” to refer to their government’s success in combating the coronavirus, as they heard about the widespread reporting in outlets like The Wall Street Journal and CNN on Korea’s declining cases, contact tracing app, and diagnostic kits.[2] In the Public Opinion Within Public Opinion survey conducted in August 2019, which was the pre-coronavirus period, 68% of respondents agreed with the statement “I am proud to be a Korean,” but by April 2020 that figure had jumped to 80%. In the same survey, the number of respondents who agreed with the statement “I am satisfied living in Korean society” went from 58% to an astonishing 76% during the same time frame (Figure 3). There is a growing concern over the so-called excessive “patriotism high” vis-a-vis the tangible feeling of national pride in Korean society right after K-quarantine has yielded success, which is considered the defining moment that has resulted in the strengthened national pride. There have particularly been an increasing number of discussions about the phenomenon of the “patriotism high” among those in their 20s and 30s.[3]       Of course we can also attribute this debate over “patriotism highs” and increasing national pride to the factors such as BTS reaching No. 1 on the Billboard Chart against the backdrop of the ongoing K-pop and K-drama craze and Bong Joon-ho’s film “Parasite” winning the Academy Award this year. Besides, the government-led implementation of K-quarantine in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic (especially the leadership of the health authorities) and the strengths of Korea’s welfare and healthcare systems have been considered another contributing factors. According to a survey conducted jointly by KBS, Sisain, Seoul National University, and Hankook Research, an astounding 53% of survey respondents stated that their trust in the country had increased, and 27% said their trust in the Blue House[4] had increased, while 21% said their trust in the government as a whole had increased, following the outbreak of COVID-19. If we consider that in contrast, trust in religious institutions (-46%), the media (-45%), and the National Assembly (-33%) among many others experienced a drastic decrease, it is difficult to deny the influence of K-quarantine on the recent increase in national pride.[5]   Factors for Increasing National Pride: Rediscovery of “K-Healthcare/Welfare” + “K-Citizens” Looking at the existing debates, it is pointed out that the magnifications of the successes of the government’s K-quarantine combined with media and YouTube content enumerating the failures of foreign governments and exaggerating Korea’s superiority are inflaming the feelings of patriotism intoxication among Koreans, particularly among youths. In other words, there is a growing concern that this tendency has led to an overly positive assessment of Korea and a denigration of other cultures. However, looking at the results of the Korean Identity Survey 2020, the impact of COVID-19 has not been limited to increase in national pride and feelings of superiority about Korea compared to other countries. There has also been a major reappraisal of the formerly unrecognized strengths of Korea’s healthcare/welfare system, along with the citizens’ patient adherence to and implementation of the prevention guidelines. Looking at Figure 4, other categories related to Korea’s sharp rise in national pride increased dramatically compared to the 3rd survey conducted in 2015. There was a 35% (46%→81%) increase in the number of respondents who were proud of the level of Korea’s social security support and a 22% (52%→74%) increase in those who were proud of the maturity of Korea’s democracy. The 2020 survey included “healthcare/welfare system” for the first time in this question category, and a whopping 96% of respondents agreed that they were proud of Korea’s system.           In the 2020 survey, 89% of respondents felt pride in Korea’s “culture and arts”, represented mainly by Hallyu (K-pop and K-dramas), following “Korea’s national healthcare system”, contributing significantly to the overall increase in national pride. However, “culture and arts” only marks an increase of 12% (78%→89%) compared to the result five years ago. Compared to the 22% rise in this category between 2010 and 2015, the trend appears to be falling. There was no change in how Koreans felt about the country’s “economic achievements” compared to the 2015’s survey, while “military power” saw a 12% (45%→57%) increase, as did “Korea’s international standing” (49%→61%). Korea’s national healthcare system, democratic maturity, and the level of social security were previously something of a target for social ridicule. The rapid increase in national pride regarding these categories is, again, difficult to explain without factoring in the variable of the country’s response to COVID-19 outbreak. Looking at the March results of Hankook Research’s “Public Opinion Within Public Opinion” survey, when asked about the principal agents within society that have made the greatest effort to overcome COVID-19, respondents ranked “public health institutions” (96%) followed by “the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA)” (94%) and “private medical institutions” (93%). More than 90% also selected “the people.” Respondents were also amicable towards the efforts made by the government as seen in the Ministry of Health and Welfare (86%) and the Blue House (69%).     The sensitivity of the “national pride” response is in fact closely mirrored among those who are middle-aged and older, rather than the younger generations. According to a comparative research survey titled “Generation Z and Generation X (those born in the 70s)” conducted by Hankook Ilbo and Hankook Research in January 2020, the level of national pride felt among Korea’s youth does not rise to that of the level felt by the older generations. While 71% of Generation X respondents agreed with the statement “I feel proud about the spread of Hallyu such as BTS,” just 53% of Generation Z respondents felt the same.[6] In comparison to the August 2019 “Public Opinion Within Public Opinion” survey, the greatest increase of agreement with the statement “I am proud to be a Korean” was 16% (66%→82%) among those in their 30s and those in their 60s (63%→79%). In contrast, agreement among respondents in their 50s increased by 13% (69%→82%), while 9% more of those in their 40s agreed (75%→84%) and just 7% more of those in their 20s agreed (67%→74%) with the statement. This survey results show that we must exercise caution and not assume that the opinions expressed by younger people online are shared by their entire generation.                   Despite the Increase in National Pride, the Perception of “Hell Chosun[7]” Persists One consideration of the marked increase in national pride is the potential for it to prohibit objective self-assessment and transform it into exclusive supremacy. However, in Korean society, the strengthening of national identification has been accompanied by liberal citizenship, rather than a suppression of liberal citizenship, and this positive function of national pride should not be overlooked. Pride is a factor that connects community members, and as such plays the role of the psychological glue that maintains community standards and shared interests. Further, increased pride in one’s community increases both individual trust in that community and the recognition of one’s social responsibility as a member of the community At the same time, we must not let our guard down when it comes to the harmful effect of the reverse bias “Hell Chosun” discourse. Weak trust capital is the biggest roadblock for Korea on the path to social maturity and growth. Establishing fair rule of law, social networks, a social safety net, and so on have been considered the building blocks to form trust capital [8] Of particular note is that according to the results of the recent survey, psychological attachment to a community can also have a significant effect on the development of social trust between members of that community. At the same time, we must also pay attention to the important role that cynicism and frustration toward a national community play in chipping away at trust capital. In fact, the survey conducted in May of this year by KBS, Sisain, Seoul National University, and Hankook Research confirmed that there is a clear correlation between social trust and national pride. Among those respondents who had strong national pride, 76% agreed with the statement “I trust Korean society,” while just 42% of respondents who indicated weak national pride did so. Further, pride in one’s community can enhance social responsibility and a sense of solidarity with disadvantaged community members. In the same survey, the group with strong national pride also indicated a high level of agreement with the statement “I will pay higher taxes to help the poor,” and a low level of agreement with the statement “I will not pay taxes.”(Figure 8 & 9). This plainly shows that a positive mindset gives rise to positive actions.       Korean Society’s Lack of Trust in Korean Law and Institutions, and the Absence of a Community Mentality It is true that the government’s prevention response and leadership during COVID-19 have allowed us to feel our institutional strengths. However, the underlying recognition within Korean society of the weaknesses of the existing laws and institutions has not changed. As you can see in Figure 10, during the response to COVID-19, trust in the government, social trust, and appreciation for the social welfare system sharply increased. While these changes have inspired optimism, distrust in the rule of law and the fundamental of society has remained steady during this time, and there seems no hope for opportunities for social mobility. Trust in the statement “The law is applied fairly in our society” is stuck at 20%, and just one or two people in ten agree with the statement “there are opportunities for social mobility.” These are the basic principles upon which society rests that offer a basis for hope. Without change to these fundamentals of society, the recent trust in the government and society that has arisen from pride in Korea’s coronavirus response is already showing signs of dropping in the changing environment. Trust in the social welfare system remains steady, but the trend has stopped its upward trajectory (Figure 10). The debate in political circles about universal vs. selective welfare is hot, but beyond disease prevention, the social safety net is extremely weak. The percentage of citizens who can receive financial help from an institution when they are in need or help with household tasks when self-quarantining is just 30%. The percentage of citizens who said they can get help from a personal rather than institutional source does not reach 50%. According to a recent survey, the implementation of the flexible working system to deal with the situation has actually hit those who are already struggling with care burdens with a double whammy. Parents have emphatically had a negative response to flextime.[9] The pride of the people themselves, who are of course the main players in terms of pride in Korean democracy, also rests on this vulnerable foundation. The Korean public has been phenomenal in terms of voluntarily restraining their rights and freedoms by social distancing and enduring the mask crisis under the goal of disease control. However, civic action has also failed to advance to the stage of taking the additional step needed to prevent problems before they arise. The percentage of people who have given either tangible or intangible support to those experiencing difficulties balancing care obligations and financial hardship is less than 20%, and just 15% of respondents indicated they had ever made a charitable donation or participated in volunteer work (Figure 11). In other words, there is no social safety net in place to help those disadvantaged members of society who are either outside the scope of the government’s assistance or who fall through the cracks of the existing system. The government needs to expand the social welfare system, but these results also show that there is a need for a more advanced citizenship in terms of solidarity and social responsibility.[10]     The response to COVID-19 has demonstrated that we should not underestimate the capacity and potential of Korean society. Korea has exulted in its success in achieving this short-term goal, not because of the attention from foreign countries and media, but because for the first time, Koreans have escaped the negative paradigms (Hell Chosun, social inequality, N-po generation[11], 3D society (distrust, discontent, disquietude)), following democratization and industrialization. For the first time, Koreans have experienced the power of a positive framework. Ultimately, if we want to build a society that can solve the remaining tasks ahead of us, we must slough off the pessimism of Hell Chosun and begin building confidence and pride in the community that we live in.■   [1] Kang Won Taek discussed the dual phenomenon of increasing national identity and decreasing ethnic identity and the reasons behind it using the same survey. See “Korea’s National and Ethnic Identity: Fifteen Years of Change” (EAI Working Paper) 2020. [2] “The World Focuses on K-prevention...Government, Press Briefings Held” Yonhap News (2020.05.07) [3] The Korean word “Guk-ppong” translated here as “patriotism high” (or “patriotism intoxication”) is a compound word composed of “nation” and “philopon,” the name for methamphetamine coined by the Japanese and imported into Korea. It is used to describe a state of being high or intoxicated with a feeling of excessive national pride. “Head of National Diplomatic Academy Warns Against Patriotism High over K-prevention...Don’t Get Carried Away with Expectations, Arrogance” (2020.05.28); Weekly Chosun, “COVID-19 is Raising Youths to Be Patriotism High Addicts” (2020.06.18); Kyunghyang Shinmun, “The Patriotism High of K-prevention” (2020.06.29); Hankook Ilbo, “Why 20-30 Year Olds Are Still Clamoring to Leave Korea Despite Being High on Patriotism” (2020.09.16) [4] Blue House refers to the Korean presidential residence [5] Cheon Kwan Yool. “The ‘Korean World’ Emerging from COVID-19 - An Unexpected Response” Sisain. Vol. 663 (2020.06.02) [6] Hankook Ilbo. “Why Should I Live Like You?...Generation Z’s Lack of Support for Unification” (2020.01.03) [7] Editor’s Note: Hell Chosun is a satirical South Korean term that became popular around 2015. The term is used to criticize the socioeconomic situation in South Korea. It is particularly popular among younger Koreans, due to their feelings about unemployment and working conditions in modern society https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hell_Joseon [8] Lee Jae Yeol. If I Were Born Again I’d Still Be Korean: Searching for the Lost Dignity of a Society that Went From the Miracle on the Han to Hell Chosun. (21st Century Books, 2019). [9] For details, see Choi Sun-ah. “Flextime Brought On By Coronavirus, Present and Future” Hankook Research, Public Opinion Within Public Opinion Vol. 101-01 (2020.10.28). [10] Kim Hye-jin. “In the Midst of Overcoming COVID-19, Social Trust and Mutual Trust Thicken, but Half is Self-Sustaining” Hankook Research, Public Opinion Within Public Opinion Vol. 72 (2020.04.08). [11] Translator’s note: The “N-po” generation is used to mean “numerous giving-up generation” or “the generation that gave up N amount of things.” The term is a derivation of and expansion on the Sampo generation which gave up three things: dating, marriage, and childbirth. The Opo generation gave up on five things: dating, marriage, childbirth, home, and career. “N-po” indicates a generation that has had to abandon all of these things plus hobbies, education, human relationships, etc., an “endless number of things,” due to soaring housing and tuition prices and increasingly scarce employment opportunities.   ■ Hanwool Jeong is a Senior Research Fellow and Research Designer at Hankook Research in South Korea. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Korea University, and was the executive director at the Center for Public Opinion Research at the East Asia Institute until 2015. His recent publications include “The Corruption Scandal and Vote Switching in South Korea’s 19th Presidential Election” (2019), “Generation as Group Identity and its Political Effect” (2018), “Rising Swing Conservatives in South Korea: The Causes and Results” (2017) and “National Identity Change in South Korea: The Rise of Two Nations and Two State Identities” (2017).   ■ Typeset by Eunji Lee, Research Associate/Project Manager                    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) |  [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note Since democratization, South Korean party politics has been featured by increasing party polarization and incomplete party sorting. In this issue briefing, Prof. Jung Kim examines several factors that have led to party polarization and incomplete party sorting in the country’s politics. Prof. Kim argues that under the two-and-a-half party system, political representation has been unequal, as it over-represents progressive and conservative voters while under-representing centrists, thereby increasing polarization between progressive and conservative parties. At the same time, Prof. Kim argues that the number of centrist voters who do not fall under the ideological distributions of the major parties remains significant, which indicates that party polarization has not been corresponding with party sorting, leaving centrist voters in drift.     This essay seeks to illustrate party politics in South Korea that has unfolded since its democratic transition that took place in 1987. For starters, it argues that South Korea’s party system has brought about an asymmetric structure of political representation that over-represents progressive and conservative voters while under-representing centrist voters. It also claims that unequal political representation has engendered party polarization in South Korean politics. It further argues that party sorting has been incomplete whereby parties have difficulty shaping political issues in a partisan way to exploit their electoral advantages. Increasing party polarization and incomplete party sorting capture the evolving nature of party politics in South Korea since its democratic transition.    Asymmetric Political Representation South Korea’s party politics has been gradually stabilized since its democratic transition, producing a two-and-a-half party system. The average number of legislative parties has changed from 2.77 in the 1990s to 2.63 in the 2000s, and 2.41 in the 2010s This two-and-a-half party system consists of ‘two’ parties that have managed to maintain the continuity of partisan brands as progressive and conservative respectively, and ‘half’ parties that have inevitably faced the interruption of partisan brand as centrist. Progressives have altered their party labels from Peace Democratic Party (1987-1991) to Democratic Party (1991-1995), National Congress for New Politics (1995-2000), Millennium Democratic Party (2000-2005), Uri Party (2003-2007), Unified Democratic Party (2007-2011), Democratic Unified Party (2011-2014), and Democratic Party (since 2014). Likewise, party labels for conservatives have changed from Liberal Democratic Party (1990-1995) to New Korea Party (1995-1997), Grand Korea Party (1997-2012), Saenuri Party (2012-2017), Liberty Korea Party (2017-2020), and United Future Party (Since 2020). Despite recurrent relabeling, South Korea’s progressive and conservative voters have acknowledged the succession of partisan brands from one party to another, attaching their partisan loyalty, however tenuous it might be, to the ‘two’ parties.  For South Korea’s centrist voters, no such continuity of partisan brand has been established from United People’s Party (1992-1995) to United Liberal Democrats (1995-2006), Creative Korea Party (2007-2012), People’s Party (2016-2018), and Bareun Party (2017-2018), simply because these parties were not successor parties one another.  Consequently, centrist voters have found themselves in a situation in which their efforts to attach partisan loyalty to centrist parties are destined to be interrupted. The National Assembly members are selected by the majoritarian mixed-member electoral system consisting of 85% of seats from single-member districts and 15% from proportional representation lists, which institutionally favors two larger parties at the cost of smaller parties. Under such a ‘winner-take-all’ systemic pressure, centrist voters, which consist of more than 40% of the electorate, according to a recent opinion survey, tend to abstain or to be compelled to cast their ballots for one of the larger parties in order not to waste their votes. Centrist voters with the weak partisan attachment are less likely to have strong incentive to engage in political life. In fact, a study shows that voters with strong partisan identities are more likely to vote than voters with weak partisan identities during recent presidential elections in South Korea.  In sum, South Korea’s two-and-a-half party system has brought about an asymmetric political representation, in which voters with strong partisanship tend to be over-represented, while voters with weak partisanship tend to be under-represented. This is why political scientist Jang Jip Choi claims that the “greatest cleavage in contemporary Korean politics is between a representation system with no social foundation and the nonvoters who resist and cannot gain representation through that system.”    Increasing Party Polarization The asymmetric structure of political representation, in which progressive and conservative voters are more actively involved in politics in general and elections in particular than centrist voters are, has made electoral strategies of two large parties depart from the median voter theorem and resort to strategic extremism. To put it differently, the two large parties are more likely to rely on ‘mobilization’ to push for voters with strong partisan identities who will vote for them to go to the polls rather than ‘persuasion’ to convince voters with weak partisan identities who are more predisposed against, but not adamantly opposed to, them to change their opinion. Once the two parties decide to abjure ‘persuasion’ and to embrace ‘mobilization’ as their dominant electoral strategy, then party polarization would kick in. Figure 1 demonstrates this logic of party polarization with the disappearing centrists.      Note: Author’s representation based on the data extracted from Institute of Korean Political Studies, Seoul National University http://www.ikps.or.kr/board03/list.asp (accessed on August 25, 2020)   Figure 1 represents ideological means and variances of the National Assembly members from progressive and conservative parties from 2000 to 2016. The distance of ideological means between the two parties has clearly inclined from 1.54 in 2000 to 1.96 in 2004, 2.37 in 2008, 3.15 in 2012, and 3.67 in 2016. The average ideological variances that represent the degree of partisan coherence of each party has steadily declined from 1.12 in 2000 to 0.69 in 2016 for progressives and from 1.41 in 2000 to 0.83 in 2016 for conservatives. It is important to note that there were overlapping areas between progressive and conservative parties in the 2000s, in which bipartisan cooperation was expected. Such overlapping areas to expect bipartisan cooperation no longer existed in the 2010s, which indicates that party polarization deepened and widened with increasing intra-party homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity. In other words, it implies that centrist legislators have disappeared in the National Assembly of South Korea.   Incomplete Party Sorting To complete the picture of South Korea’s party politics, it is essential to note that party polarization resulted from the misalignment of representation between politicians and voters. In other words, as ideological distributions of parties have continuously lost correspondence to those of voters over time, progressive and conservative parties have become more distant from each other, leaving the voice of centrist voters unheard. Figure 2 illustrates that such representation misalignment captures part of South Korea’s party politics.       Note: Author’s representation based on the data extracted from Korea Social Science Data Archive https://kossda.snu.ac.kr/ (accessed on August 25, 2020)   In Figure 2, the number of voters who self-identify themselves as centrists is significant among South Korea’s electorate in the 2000s and the 2010s. Specifically, the average share of centrist voters is 32.0 percent in the 2000s and 31.2 percent in the 2010s. The stability of centrist voters in size is remarkable, considering the changes in the average share of moderate progressive voters up from 25.1 percent in the 2000s to 31.6 percent in the 2010s and those of moderate conservative voters down from 29.4 percent in the 2000s to 24.2 percent in the 2010s. In this respect, it is not unreasonable to claim that unlike increasing party polarization, there has been little progress on party sorting – migrating centrists toward progressive or conservative parties – in South Korea.  The finding that the ‘unimodal’ ideological distribution of voters has been at odds with the ‘bimodal’ ideological distribution of parties strongly suggests that party sorting has been incomplete in the country in the sense that centrifugal forces emanated from party polarization are not strong enough to bring about the corresponding party sorting. To simply put, while the two large parties might have become more polarized in the political marketplace, they have not succeeded in polarizing the electorate at large. Compared with the United States where voters’ social identities grow increasingly party-linked and parties become more influential in political decision-making due to escalating party polarization and party sorting, the effect of partisanship on policymaking is less pronounced, which makes voters more open to alternative policy ideas in South Korea.  In conclusion, although the combination of increasing party polarization and incomplete party sorting is far from the best case scenario that helps South Korea’s democracy work, it at least enables the democracy to avoid the worst case scenario that falls victim to the partisan divide in society at large.■     ■ Jung Kim is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, South Korea. He teaches courses on International Relations in East Asia and Political Economy of the Two Koreas, among others. Prior to this, from 2009-2015, he was a Lecturer at the Underwood International College and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. During this time, Mr. Kim was also a Chief Researcher at The East Asia Institute. He pursued his Bachelors and Masters in Political Science at Korea University and went on the pursue his Ph.D. at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia.   ■ Typeset by Eunji Lee, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207)  |  [email protected]   The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

Editor's Note South Korea sets an example for countries undergoing democratic transition, particularly in terms of the transition from military rule to democracy. In this issue briefing, Prof. Nam Kyu Kim examines several factors that made the military retreat from politics and enabled the country to achieve democracy with little risk of authoritarian reversal. Prof. Kim argues that along with the massive pro-democracy movement from below, democratic transition in the country was made possible because of the military’s concession on democratization through bargaining and negotiations, with little incentive for the military to intervene in politics. In this respect, Prof. Kim concluded that searching the ways to incentivize the military to accept the popular demand for democratization is key to successful transition to democracy.   .a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;}   For more than a quarter of the century from 1960 to 1987, South Korea was under the rule of two military dictatorships. When faced with massive pro-democracy movements in 1987, however, the militaries returned peacefully to their barracks and remained in the military domain. Since then, South Korea has become a consolidated democracy that faces little risk of authoritarian reversal. South Korea’s experience of democratic transition provides useful lessons for other transitional democracies. In particular, South Korea’s successful transition from the military rule provides great insight for overcoming what Huntington called “the praetorian problem”[1]— one of the most critical problems plaguing many fledgling democracies. This essay briefly discusses why the South Korean military decided to retreat from politics and what factors prevented the military from intervening in politics following democratization.   Importance of Establishing Civilian Control Democratic accountability requires that elected officials exercise effective governing power without challenges from non-elected authorities. However, newly-established democratic regimes often remain susceptible to military intervention. The military, as a permanent part of the state apparatus, protects the state from internal and external adversaries and thus has privileged access to coercive resources. The military’s special position within the state enables it to contest policies promoted by elected officials and even overthrow democratically-elected governments. Therefore, curtailing the military’s political power and privileges as well as establishing civilian control are critical to successful democratic consolidation. However, these measures are particularly difficult for young democracies transitioning from military rule. Establishing civilian control in these democracies requires two steps. Firstly, the military must withdraw from politics. Secondly, the democracy must institute civilian control that eliminates the military’s reserved domains, establishes the civilian government’s ability to monitor and control military officers, and familiarizes officers with military professionalism and democratic norms. Without the second step, young democracies remain vulnerable to military interventions and coups, as illustrated in countries such as Honduras, Pakistan, and Thailand. Militaries may again intervene in politics when they feel their interests are threatened or believe that their entry into politics is necessary to stabilize the country. Many political science studies demonstrate that democracies established after military dictatorships are much less likely to survive than those transitioning from civilian dictatorships. A recent empirical study shows that a democracy preceded by a military dictatorship is about 50 percent more likely to break down than a democracy preceded by a civilian dictatorship or a monarchy.   Why Concession to Democratic Reforms? South Korea’s democratic transition was driven by pressure from below through the mobilization of the masses rather than by the ruling elites. Although the elite bargaining between military rulers, including President Chun Doo-hwan and his chosen successor, Roh Tae-woo, and opposition leaders, including Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, ushered in direct presidential elections, mass movements for democracy were the ultimate reason for compelling ruling elites into negotiations. These culminated in constitutional reforms that introduced the 1987 presidential and 1998 legislative elections. Bottom-up demands for democracy continued throughout the term of President Chun who suffered from a persistent legitimacy crisis due to both the manner of his entry into power and the Kwangju Massacre in the spring of 1980. In 1987, which was the final year of President Chun’s seven-year presidential term, mass protests in South Korea demanding for direct presidential elections and democratic reform were at their height, posing a significant threat to Chun’s military regime. Faced with such pro-democracy protests, the military regime decided to accept democratic reform rather than to repress the protests. Several factors led the military regime to arrive at this decision. First of all, one of the most important reasons why the ruling elites decided to withhold harsh suppression measures and instead yield to democratization was due to the characteristics of the pro-democracy movement. The movement for democracy was a broad-based and cross-class coalition involving middle class people, workers, students, and church leaders, and had mainly adopted nonviolent tactics after 1987. Nonviolent protests tend to reduce the cost of participation, easing the collective action problem, and have a broad appeal across various societal groups. Therefore, these protests, which are perceived as less threatening, are able to mobilize a larger number of citizens and are more likely to facilitate negotiation with authoritarian elites compared to violent protests. Along with the previous experience of the Kwangju tragedy and pressure from the United States, the cross-class and nonviolent nature of the democracy movement made it difficult for the regime to respond with violent repression. Even inside the regime where hard-liners and soft-liners tended to disagree, hard-liners found repressive options too costly to adopt. Another important reason for the military regime’s decision to agree to democratization was the military ruling elites’ expectation that their positions and interests would not be threatened by the democratic rule that would follow. Their certainty was based on three structural factors. Firstly, economic conditions were favorable to ruling elites when democratic transition was underway. Economic growth rates were 12.6% in 1986 and 12.3% in 1987 respectively. The two military regimes, including that of the predecessor Park Chung-hee, had successful economic records. The successful economic records of past military regimes helped to convince the Chun regime that their military would be able to retain public support even in the case of democratization, and hence contributed to the smooth transition to democracy. Secondly, military dictatorships’ ruling strategies also led to reduced concerns about democracy. Unlike military dictatorships in Latin America, the military did not directly rule as an institution. Under the ‘quasi-civilianized’ rule, the military exercised indirect influence, and only members of the dominant Hanahoe faction were the ones to truly reap the benefits of military rule. Moreover, unlike other military regimes in Pakistan and Indonesia, the military was prohibited from operating enterprises and owning business assets. This lack of perks meant that the majority of military officers who remained in the barracks were not incentivized to strongly defend the military rule in the face of massive protests. At the same time, the ruling and legitimation strategies of the Chun government played an important role. President Chun Doo-hwan allowed multiparty elections for the legislature, though elections were neither free nor fair. President Chun removed all appointed legislative seats under the previous Yushin system established by his predecessor President Park Chung Hee. Like his predecessor Park, President Chun established a political party called “Democratic Justice Party (DJP)”, upon which he relied to mobilize mass support and hold legislative elections. Because of these strategies, the military regime was left with a strong political party that possessed organizational resources and networks. The ruling party’s institutional strength and its confidence helped to prepare for democratic elections. Given that a split in the opposition bloc was also likely to occur because of the coordination failure between the two Kims from the democratic force, military elites anticipated that they might be able to stay in power even after democratization. Lastly, the security environment in the Korean Peninsula provided an important structural context for the military’s decision to retreat from politics without worrying about the loss of their power. Due to South Korea’s hostile relations with North Korea, armed forces did not need to worry about their organizational resources and autonomy being significantly undermined. As a result, the regime was assured that South Korea’s substantial and ongoing security need would prevent the next regime from cutting the national military expenditure.   Why Did the Military not Intervene again? Taken together, bottom-up pressure from the pro-democracy movement and the ruling elites’ strategic calculation brought about democratic transition via negotiation. This transition mode allows military elites to negotiate their withdrawal with the relatively high level of leverage. In the first democratic presidential election held in 1987, Roh Tae-woo was elected, as the two Kims participated in the election and split the opposition votes. President Roh placed officers with close ties to him in key positions in both the government and the military, and did not undertake any major military reform, although he weakened the pro-Chun group in the Hanahoe faction. Military elites remained politically powerful and satisfied during the early years of democratization. Unlike many transitional democracies that often experience economic crises and political instability, the Roh regime inherited a strong economy and was spared any insurmountable political crisis. These economic and political conditions enabled a smooth transition to democracy without triggering military interventions. Combined with citizens’ strong support for democracy, this smooth transition paved the way for the establishment of civilian control. Citizens were satisfied with democracy and strongly supported these reforms, while public criticism over military elites’ continued influence increased. This allowed the next President, Kim Young-sam, to undertake the massive purges on the Hanahoe faction. As the first democratically-elected civilian President following the Yushin system, President Kim enjoyed the high level of popular support, which further protected the democratic regime against any potential opposition that might arise from the military. President Kim also exploited divisions within the military. Non-Hanahoe officers supported the purges and the prosecution of politically-influential officers, which hindered Hanahoe faction officers from resisting the military reform.  In conclusion, South Korea sets an example for countries undergoing democratic transition, particularly in terms of successfully overcoming legacies of the military rule. The South Korean case clearly demonstrates the importance of a strong civil society in driving democratic transition and consolidation. Strong social movements initiated democratic transition and promoted democratic consolidation. At the same time, the South Korean case highlights the importance of both the legacy from the previous authoritarian regimes and the negotiated transition to democracy. These factors allow South Korea to successfully achieve democratic transition and consolidation without any major setback. In the end, searching the ways to incentivize the military to accept the popular demand for democratization is critical for successful transition from the military rule to democracy.■     ■ Nam Kyu Kim is an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His research interests include the politics of authoritarian regimes, civil-military relations, democratization, and the interaction between domestic politics and international relations. His work has appeared in Comparative Political Studies, Democratization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Political Research Quarterly, and others. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Michigan, and previously taught at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and Sungkyunkwan University, before moving to his current post in 2020.   ■ Typeset by Eunji Lee, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207)  |  [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note South Korea is regarded as an exemplary case of democratic transition amongst third-wave democracies in Asia. In this issue briefing, Prof. Jai Kwan Jung examines the trajectory of democratic development in South Korea by focusing on the role of civil society in the transition to and the consolidation of democracy in the country. While civil society mainly constituted a ‘contentious’ civil society against authoritarianism during democratic transition, it has transformed itself to a diversified and peaceful civil society since then. Nonetheless, Prof. Jung argues that while strong civil society is a historic legacy of the country’s democratization, there are also pitfalls: when strong civil society is combined with weak political parties and divided along the ideological spectrum, it can turn into a liability for democracy by undermining institutional politics and fuelling populism.     South Korea’s Democratic Development in Comparison South Korea is one of the most successful cases among 91 cases of democratic transitions since the third-wave of democratization. Using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data, Mainwaring and Bizzarro (2019) categorize the outcomes of those 91 cases that transitioned to democracy from 1974 to 2012 as democratic breakdown, erosion, stagnation, and advance. While 23 of 91 cases (25.3%) are classified as democratic advance, only 8 cases (8.8%) have reached the level of liberal democracy. South Korea is one of those 8 successful cases and the second-best case, following Portugal, which has most improved the quality of democracy from the year of regime transition. Figure 1 compares South Korea’s post-transition trajectory with five other third-wave democracies in Asia – Taiwan, Mongolia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. Since its transition to democracy in 1987, South Korea’s quality of democracy consistently increased and reached the level of liberal democracy (i.e., 0.7 in the Liberal Democracy Index) in 1998, when the Kim Dae-jung government was inaugurated. But South Korean trajectory of democratic development is not unilinear. The liberal principles of democracy came to decay substantively from 2008 to 2016 during two conservative governments. This downward trend was most pronounced in 2014 when the Park Geun-hye government faced a governing crisis after the Sewol ferry disaster, in which 304 people, including 250 high-school students on their field trip to Jeju Island, were drowned. This governing crisis was further fueled by the Park Geun-hye and Choi Soon-sil corruption scandal and led to the massive wave of candlelight protests in 2016. A total of 17 million people participated in 6-month long Saturday protests from October 2016 to April 2017. It was a historic moment in South Korea, not just because of the unprecedented size and peacefulness of mass mobilization. For the first time in the history of Korean democracy, the 2016-17 candlelight protests resulted in the impeachment of an incumbent president through due constitutional procedures. The candlelight protests seem to have saved Korean democracy, since its liberal democracy score increased and passed again the cut-point of 0.7 in 2017. If we look at the post-transition trajectories of other Asian democracies in Figure 1, Taiwan and Mongolia can be also classified as democratic advance. Yet in terms of the level of liberal democracy, only Taiwan is comparable with South Korea. Mongolia’s quality of democracy has been closer to Indonesia, which shows a pattern of stagnation since the transition to democracy. Philippines and Thailand clearly show the vulnerability of third-wave democracies. These two new democracies experienced democratic breakdown in 2004 and 2006 respectively, as 34 of 91 third-wave democracies have done so (37.4%).             Contentious Civil Society and Its Diversification after Democratic Transition How can we understand South Korea’s successful post-transition trajectory of democratic development? There are many factors that can affect post-transition trajectories in general. One particular factor in South Korea is the role of civil society in the transition to and the consolidation of democracy. Conceptually, democracy puts the state and civil society in a horizontal relationship, while authoritarianism uses the state’s power to control or repress civil society in a vertical manner. As civil society tends to be contentious, if not co-opted, in authoritarianism in transforming the vertical relationship with the state to a horizontal one, it can play a critical role in the transition to democracy. Theoretically, civil society mobilization for democracy can compel authoritarian elites to stop defending the old order and signal the collapse of authoritarian rule by creating a united force for democratic reforms. If civil society successfully mobilized popular pressures for democracy and influenced the bargaining between ruling elites and opposition leaders during democratic transition, it would have an enduring effect in the subsequent period of democratic development. This is because the collective experience of making popular pressures for democracy can shape the public perception about the role of civil society and the significance of citizens’ direct action in advancing democracy. Another reason is that the unified pro-democracy coalition may evolve into a variety of civil society groups in widely open and free political opportunities after democratization. Those various groups constitute a vibrant civil society, which is a key component of advanced democracy. From the Syngman Rhee government in the 1950s to the Park Chung-hee regime in the 60s and 70s, South Korean civil society had actively resisted authoritarianism. The April 19 Revolution in 1960 toppled the Syngman Rhee government. Liberal intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, pastors and priests as well as college students constituted a contentious civil society, which is called chaeya, and mobilized democratic opposition against the Park Chung-hee regime. This contentious civil society formed a unified democratic coalition along with opposition political elites during the Chun Doo-hwan military dictatorship in the 1980s and eventually brought about the liberalization of the authoritarian rule. After the transition to democracy, the contentious civil society has been diversified into various sectoral movements (e.g., the women’s movement, the environmental movement, etc.) and civic organizations (e.g., the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, etc.). This historic change can be understood as a transformation of South Korean civil society from a contentious and often militant to a varied and peaceful one. Figure 2 clearly shows the historical transformation of South Korean civil society in terms of its nature and constitution from 1948 to 2019. The V-Dem data include several indicators for civil society organizations (CSOs). By using two of those CSO indicators, Figure 2 presents a historical pattern of change in South Korean civil society. Prior to the transition to democracy, the dominant nature of South Korean CSOs had been “anti-regime” movements, which means that the main purpose and activities of CSOs were to change the political system from authoritarian to a democratic one. This anti-regime nature of South Korean CSOs had increased from the Syngman Rhee government (the average of anti-regime CSO score on the left Y-axis was 2.39) to the Park Chung-hee era (2.53) to the Chun Doo-hwan regime (3.41). After democratization, it dropped substantially. The average anti-regime CSO score became 1.38 for the first 10 years of democratization and 0.66 since 1998. To the contrary, South Korean CSOs became highly diversified after the transition to democracy. Before 1987, the average score for CSO diversity on the right Y-axis was 0.31, which means that most South Korean CSOs used to be state-sponsored and not voluntary with the smaller number of voluntary and anti-regime movement organizations. But since 1988, it jumped into 2.59, which is fairly a high degree of diversification of voluntary CSOs. In essence, the democratic transition in 1987 fundamentally changed the dominant feature and diversity of South Korean CSOs, as we can see vividly in Figure 2.           Pitfalls of Strong Civil Society South Korea’s vibrant civil society is a legacy of the democratization movement during the authoritarian period. This historic legacy is an important asset and has worked well for democratic development so far. But strong civil society is not always good for democracy, especially if it is divided by a politicized social cleavage and when there is a fierce competition for mass mobilization along that cleavage line. In this respect, there are two pitfalls in the foreseeable future of South Korean democracy. First, South Korea’s strong civil society has been combined with weak political parties. This combination of strong civil society and weak parties has led to under-development of democratic institutions, such as party and electoral systems as well as institutional politics often swayed by civil society voices and interests. It has in turn generated a serious concern about the stability of South Korean democracy. One particular problem is so-called “emperor-like presidentialism.” If a president mainly relies on vocal demands of strong civil society in his/her decision-making and is unchecked by the under-developed legislative and judicial bodies of the government, presidential power can be more overly concentrated than it is now and a populist rule might be a real possibility in the near future. Second, South Korean civil society has increasingly mobilized ordinary people along the left-right ideological cleavage. It will be harmful for the future of South Korean democracy, because it can exacerbate the governability problem of its democracy. The 2016-17 candlelight protests and the impeachment of Park Geun-hye has brought about a right-wing counter-movement in the form of Taegukgi (national flag) protests. This ideological polarization in civil society became highly conspicuous in the fall of 2019 when the appointment of Cho Kuk as Minister of Justice brought about the months of street protests by both anti- and pro-Cho citizens. Massive civil society mobilization along the ideological divide has undermined South Korea’s institutional politics further, as major parties and political elites were captured by competing and even hostile claims of the divided civil society. It has also made scholars and pundits worry about the potential instability of South Korean democracy. In conclusion, South Korea’s strong civil society can turn into a liability for democracy under certain conditions. If it is sharply divided along the ideological spectrum while undermining institutional politics, it can be a fertile ground for populism. South Korean civic groups and political elites should be aware of this caveat and reduce the likelihood of the emergence of populist politics. In order to do so, they need to establish a healthy relationship between parties and civil society by seeking a balance between institutional and non-institutional politics of democracy.   ■ Jai Kwan Jung (Ph.D., Cornell University) is Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His research interests include social movements and contentious politics, political conflict and violence, and comparative democratization.   ■Typeset by Eunji Lee, Research Associate/Project Manager               For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

Editor's Note South Korea is considered to be a distinguished case that achieved both industrialization and democratization simultaneously within a short period of time. In this issue briefing, Dr. Seungjoo Lee presents South Korea’s parallel experience of economic development and democratization by examining its interplay between democracy and economic development as well as institutional factors that have changed and continued throughout the periods of authoritarianism, democratic transition, and democratization. Dr. Seungjoo Lee argues that despite a series of challenges it has faced, South Korea has actively sought new solutions in the wake of intense domestic political competition and conflicts, which has shown its capability to turn crises into opportunities, and that the country’s quest for a balance of democracy and economic growth is still ongoing.   .a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;}   The parallel development of democracy and capitalism is a value accumulated from historical experiences of the West. South Korea presents a distinguished case from other developing countries in Asia, as it achieved both industrialization and democratization simultaneously. While the nominal GDP of South Korea was at 2.41 billion USD in 1961, it reached 146.1 billion USD in 1987 with an annual growth rate of 9.7% per year. 1987 was also the year in which South Korea achieved its democratization. Since democratization, South Korea has grown continuously and at a high rate of 8.9% (GDP growth rate) on average, until the country was hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Although the GDP growth rate of South Korea gradually decreased to 4.1% throughout 2000 to 2019, it was still higher than that of other advanced economies. South Korea’s GDP reached a record of 1.63 trillion USD in 2019, placing the country as the 12th largest economy in the world and the fourth largest in Asia. This translates to a 676-fold economic development over a period of less than sixty years since South Korea first embarked upon its process of industrialization. South Korea pursued economic growth throughout periods of authoritarianism, democratic transition, and democratization. South Korea’s interplay between democracy and economic development can be explained by “challenges and responses.” For instance, South Korea was able to effectively manage the uncertainties that arose from the process of democratic transition. Furthermore, despite various challenges that emerged during its period of democratic consolidation, it retained economic stability by turning toward new engines of economic growth. Some of the challenges South Korea faced during this time included weakened public consent on economic growth, new surge of demand for distribution, and division of value systems. How was South Korea able to see continued economic growth even after its democratic transition and democratization? In order to answer this question, we need to examine the linkage between political transition and economic growth in the context of South Korea’s domestic experience. We also need to examine specific variables such as the institutional factors that enabled South Korea to attain high level of economic growth under the authoritarian regime; changes and continuities in institutional factors following its democratization; and if changes have occurred, the new sets of institutional factors that have made its continued economic growth possible.   Authoritarianism, Democracy and Economic Growth The characteristics of South Korea's economic development under authoritarianism include the government’s mobilization of capital as well as strategic promotion of industries and industrial policies. In order to elucidate South Korea’s “sustained” economic growth during the authoritarian era, two issues need to be examined. Firstly, it is true that the government’s capacity to mobilize capital and labor, and its policies played a key role in the early model of South Korean development. However, the government’s capacity and policies do not provide a full account of the variables that contributed to South Korea’s continued economic growth. Due attention needs to be paid to the mechanisms of mobilization and participation. While mobilization and participation can be seen as mutually exclusive, they can co-exist when cooperative relationships are formed in the long-run between the government and businesses, the government and labor sectors, as well as between businesses and labor sectors. For instance, mobilization and participation co-existed during the period of heightened growth in South Korea despite the oppression of labor forces, due to relatively low income inequalities and cooperation between employers and employees based on long-term contracts. The government’s lead on resource mobilization may have been the main feature during this period, but continued economic growth was also made possible due to limitations in the participatory mechanism. The second issue addresses the “rent” caused by the government’s market intervention. A rent is generated when a “strong” state—which is insulated from social pressure to the extent that it can order a certain group to make sacrifices for the society—intervenes in the market economy. What is important to consider is how to utilize the rent that has been generated. During its authoritarian era, the South Korean government utilized the rent in compensation for entrepreneurship in order to make continued economic growth possible. In sum, mobilization and participatory mechanisms as well as the productive use of the rent laid an institutional foundation for South Korea's economic growth during the authoritarian era.    Democratic Transition and Economic Growth: Management of Uncertainty During its democratic transition, South Korea faced a new set of challenges and displayed a feature of “continuity and discontinuity.” The Roh Tae-woo administration inaugurated in 1987 exhibited dual aspects in terms of its policy ideals, institutional framework, and individual policies. The Roh government was faced with external challenges including increased pressure from developed nations to open up South Korea’s market, effects of globalization, pressure for liberalization, and industrial transition. Domestically, a new set of challenges emerged such as the new surge of social demand, the need to re-establish relationships with societal groups including the labor force, and the pressure to expand existing political coalitions. These challenges were fundamentally different from those in the past. South Korea’s democratic transition also displayed a continuity in terms of elite power, since it had been achieved through pacts. Democratization via the establishment of pacts incurs divisions among elites and enables a certain group of elites to take the lead in negotiations with other societal groups. This is different compared to democratization from the bottom which is accompanied by a major shift in the ruling elites. Since its democratization, the South Korean government experienced restricted autonomy on labor. As the need for the government to proactively tackle the demand for policy shift grew stronger, the “discontinuity and shift” tactic emerged. At the same time, “continuity” also took place, as political participation of societal groups including the labor force, had not been systematically expanded in the short term.   Democracy and Economic Growth after Crisis Since its democratization, the main challenge South Korea faced has been respective changes in its economic paradigm. President Kim Young-sam who was elected in 1992 advocated for a “civilian government” model which differed from the government-led growth model that South Korea had adhered to since the 1960s. In doing so, he aimed to eliminate “legacies of authoritarianism.” The Kim Young-sam administration pursued a set of reform policies such as the abolition of the Five Year Plan of Economic Development, the revocation of policy finance, and introduction of the Real-Name Financial System, as well as a globalization policy for joining the OECD through financial liberalization. The Kim administration made a considerable achievement in terms of dismantling the authoritarian economic model. However, its ambitious penchant for reform was met by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In the aftermath of the crisis, the South Korean economy recorded -5.1% of economic growth in 1998, which was the lowest since 1970s. The reason that the South Korean government’s drive for reform ended with the financial crisis largely had to do with the design of the reform, rather than its speed or scale. While the Kim Young-sam government tried to diminish the role of the government in pursuing its liberalization process to dismantle authoritarianism, it failed to put forward a systematic and sophisticated strategy for liberalization. The Kim administration utilized the “retreat of the state” strategy in its liberalization drive in order to set a new political-economic model and institutional framework. However, while liberalization might have been an effective tool for dismantling the state-led authoritarian growth model, it did not lead to an establishment of a new model in itself. As a consequence, the experiment to set up a new economic model following democratization came to an end.      The financial crisis was not only an economic crisis, but also a political and social crisis. At the same time, it acted as a catalyst for a great shift in the country’s economic, political and social realms. Since its democratization, South Korea witnessed a wide range of issues, including government-business relations, concentration of economic power, low efficiency of financial institutions, inflexible labor markets, and inefficiency in the public sector, amongst others. The South Korean government utilized the crisis to alleviate the reform’s opposition. As a consequence, following the crisis, a wide range of reform measures were implemented including the liberalization of foreign investment, merging and acquisition of financial institutions, reform of corporate governance, privatization of the public sector and enhanced labor flexibility. A decade following its democratization in 1987, the Korean-style development model evolved into a new paradigm encompassing “paradox of crisis.”  Since the 2000s, South Korea has faced the dual challenge of democratization and globalization, but has actively played a transformative role. First of all, South Korea has been exploring and experimenting with the government's new role within the democratic system. As the democratic system increases the number of actors involved in policy decision-making, it becomes difficult for the government to make consistent policy decisions and institutionalize cooperation amongst major actors in the short term. Globalization, combined with democracy, has emerged as another challenging factor that demands changes in the government’s role in economic growth. As globalization progresses and the global value chain is formed in major industrial sectors, the South Korean government faces a new task of positioning its industries within the new value chain and upgrading them to a more value-added production stage. Establishing the relationship between domestic industrial capacity and the changing global production system has become the core of transformation. The dual challenge of democratization and globalization served as an opportunity for the South Korean government in its search for new roles in coordinating complex interests and promoting cooperation among various actors. If the change in the number of actors in a democracy is inevitable, the formation and maintenance of an effective competitive environment is a new task expected from the government. Given the characteristics of high-tech industries, the role of the government in balancing competition and cooperation is of great importance, as it is difficult to expect various private actors to voluntarily participate in the development of technology and innovation and create a competitive market environment. The Kim Dae-jung administration’s ICT industrial policy, the green growth policy of the Lee Myung-bak administration, the creative economy policy of the Park Geun-hye government, and the Moon government’s energy transition policy are all examples of the government’s efforts to pursue a new role in a changing environment. For example, in the process of overcoming a crisis, the Kim Dae-jung administration reformed the economic power that had been once concentrated on large corporations and corporate governance, while simultaneously exhibiting developmentalism by intensively fostering the ICT industry. Additionally, while trying to implement policies with Neoliberal characteristics such as deregulation, liberalization, privatization, tax rate cuts, etc., as seen in the green growth policy, to create a virtuous cycle between economic growth and environment, the Lee administration actively supported related industries. The government sought its role as a facilitator of cooperation and coordination of interests.   South Korea’s Search for a New Equilibrium South Korea's quest for a balance of democracy and economic growth is not over yet. South Korea has faced a series of challenges since democratization. Although South Korea has not successfully dealt with each challenge, it has actively sought new solutions in the wake of intense domestic political competition and conflicts. As a result, South Korea has become the most “dynamic country” in the world and has shown collective wisdom that turns crises into opportunities. At this point, South Korea faces challenges that need to be addressed such as finding new growth engines, solving income inequality and strengthening job security for contract workers. These tasks are the result of reforms chosen by South Korea after the financial crisis. In the case of income inequality, during the period of rapid growth before democratization, South Korea had the lowest income inequality among developing countries, but it rose sharply after the Asian financial crisis. The Gini coefficient deteriorated sharply within just two years from 0.267 in 1997 to 0.308 in 1999 and is also at 0.306 in 2019. Based on the income share of the top 10%, as shown by a sharp increase from 35% in 1996 before the crisis to 50.6% in 2017, income inequality is worsening. South Korea has yet to find a complete solution to this problem. However, it is evident that Korea has never stopped its experiments to search for a new equilibrium. ■     ■ Seungjoo Lee is a professor in the department of political science and international relations at Chung-Ang University. His current areas of research interest cover the subjects of East Asian regionalism, mega FTAs and economy-security nexus, middle power diplomacy, and development cooperation.    ■ Typeset by Eunji Lee, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207)  |  [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note Koreans’ attitude towards multiculturalism and immigration has changed over the last 15 years, reflecting a nuanced perspective in which people acknowledge both threats and opportunities associated with multiculturalism. In this issue briefing, Dr. Rosa Minhyo Cho presents findings from the South Korean Identity Survey (SKIS: 2005-2020) and points out that while Koreans exhibited a form of paternalism at the initial stage, this attitude has changed in recent years with problems linked to the presence of immigrants in society. As the Korean society is increasingly faced with the issue of shrinking and aging populations, Dr. Rosa Minhyo Cho argues that Koreans will eventually need to weigh up whether immigration is a viable option to such problems and that efforts need to be made to engage with constructive discourse on the social costs and benefits of multiculturalism in a way that includes ethnic minorities, which is essential to a healthy democracy.     Roughly 2.5 million foreigners are estimated to be residing in South Korea (hereinafter, Korea) as of December, 2019, comprising about 4.9% of its total population. Given its long history of being an ethnically homogenous society, the relatively recent growth in the number of immigrant and foreign populations have led to new challenges. In 2007, the number of Korea’s foreign resident population reached 1 million for the first time. Faced with pressures from low fertility and a rapidly aging society, the Korean government began to promote multiculturalism as an important political agenda introducing several policy measures to support and encourage the integration of these newcomers. Such state-led efforts resulted in multiculturalism being upheld as an issue of ‘political correctness’ with much less attention paid to the complex implications of immigration in general. As a result, Koreans displayed a naïve form of paternalism toward immigrants at least during the early periods of increased migration. However, in recent years problems such as intensified job competition, marriage fraud, cultural clashes, and violent crimes have been linked to the presence of immigrants in Korea, making the risks of a multicultural society more visible. This has led to a change in attitude toward immigration reflecting a nuanced perspective in which people acknowledge both the threats and opportunities associated with multiculturalism. To further examine how Korean’s attitude toward multiculturalism and immigration has changed over the past 15 years, data from the South Korean Identity Survey (SKIS: 2005-2020) is analyzed and reported below.   Change in Attitude toward Multiculturalism and Immigrant Receptivity According to estimates from the SKIS (see Table 1), Korean’s preference toward becoming a multiethnic/multicultural country has declined over the past 10 years, whereas their preference toward becoming a monoethnic/monocultural country remained largely unchanged. Specifically, 60.6% of Koreans were in support of becoming a multiethnic/multicultural country in 2010, but that number decreased to 44.4% by 2020. On the other hand, 37.1% and 39.1% of Koreans were in support of becoming a monoethnic/monocultural country in 2010 and in 2020, respectively.  Generally, exclusionary attitude toward immigrants can be explained by two theoretical perspectives. Social identity theory posits that immigrants are viewed as cultural threats to the positive status of the country’s symbolic establishments as well as to the maintenance of its ethnic and cultural cohesiveness, whereas realistic conflict theory emphasizes strained social relations due to increased competition for limited resources with material threats being the primary concern. To better understand the source of recent decline in the overall support for multiculturalism, it should be important to examine how Korean’s attitude relating to immigrant receptivity has changed over time especially with regard to their perception of immigrants as cultural and material threats.  Based on survey results, it appears that the level of perceived cultural threat has not been increasing over the past 10 years. For example, the proportion of positive responses to the statement “Racial, religious, and cultural diversity enhances national competitiveness” increased consistently from 47.8% in 2010, to 50.4% in 2015, and to 51.8% in 2020. Likewise, the proportion of respondents who agreed that having more immigrants enrich Korea’s culture slightly increased from 33.6% in 2010 to 34.5% in 2020. When asked whether they would allow their child to marry a foreigner, the fraction of positive responses increased from 30.2% in 2005 to 32.5% in 2010, and to 44.3% in 2015 and 2020 indicating a rather open attitude toward marital assimilation. However, Koreans are found to display a more negative attitude on questions either directly or indirectly related to material threat. Examples of direct material threat include immigrants competing for the same jobs as natives, while indirect material threat may occur due to increased taxes for their welfare or congested public spaces and infrastructure. According to findings from the SKIS, the proportion of people who agreed to the statement that foreign laborers threaten the jobs of natives was 39.4% in 2005 but increased to 42.7% by 2020. Also, the fraction of people who thought that we should provide equal voting rights and social security benefits to naturalized citizens dropped from 56% in 2010 to 52.1% in 2020, while those who thought we should make it easier for foreigners to obtain Korean citizenships dropped from 40.7% in 2010 to 34.2% in 2015, and to 33.6% in 2020. Lastly, the fraction of people who agreed that there are limitations to receiving foreigners with different racial, religious, and cultural backgrounds increased from 48.9% in 2010 to 56.9% in 2015, and to 57.1% in 2020. Taken together, it appears that the direction of change in attitude toward immigrants is not uniform in Korea, but rather multifaceted. Koreans tend to display growing acceptance and tolerance on issues relating to the cultural benefits of multiculturalism and international marriages, yet their attitudes are becoming more exclusionary on matters that pose real economic threats to natives who have to compete with newcomers for jobs, benefits, and social services.   Difference in Attitude toward Multiculturalism by Education and Age Generally, attitudes about immigration are closely tied to one’s age and educational attainment. In the case of Korea, findings indicate that preference toward multiculturalism is positively correlated with one’s education level but negatively correlated with age. First, in terms of education, estimates presented in Table 2 show that during the past 10 years, support for multiculturalism has been much higher among people with college education or above than those with middle school education or below. This is not surprising, given that most migrant workers in Korea are unskilled laborers posing direct material threats to the less educated population. Results from cross-tabulations between education level and whether you think foreign laborers threaten the jobs of natives corroborated this finding where the proportion of positive answers was 53.6% for people with middle school education or below but only 35.1% among college educated or above in 2020.     Next, as shown in Figure 1, the pattern of change in preference for multiculturalism by age cohort is not uniform across time. Specifically, in 2010, people in their 20’s and 30’s showed strong preference for multiculturalism with 65.3% supporting the statement that this country should become a multiethnic/multicultural country. However, in 2015, the proportion of supporters among this age group drastically dropped to 47%, making it lower than the fraction of supporters for multiculturalism among people aged 40 and above at 51.1%. Such reverse in attitude was not long lasting, however, since in the 2020 survey those in their 20’s and 30’s continued to show the highest support for multiculturalism at 53.9%. These estimates indicate that although the decline in preference for multiculturalism between 2010 and 2015 was primarily due to the fall in support among the young generation, declining preferences for multiculturalism from 2015 to 2020 occurred by the decrease in support among people aged 40 and above, despite increased support from those in their 20’s and 30’s.     Feelings of Closeness by Immigrant Group Finally, to better understand the recent change in attitude toward multiculturalism among Koreans, feelings of closeness across various immigrant groups are presented in Figure 2. Prior research indicates that Koreans tend to interact differently with foreigners based on factors such as whether the person is a naturalized citizen, Korean ethnic, legal immigrant, and/or whether the person migrated from an advanced (as opposed to a less developed) country. As shown in all three surveys of 2010, 2015, and 2020, Koreans display the greatest degree of affinity toward children of international couples, followed by North Korean defectors, marriage migrants, Korean-Chinese, and labor migrants. Feelings of closeness tend to be stronger for groups that have family ties with native Koreans and weaker for groups that have the potential to compete for scarce resources.     Yet, perceived closeness has been consistently declining since 2010 for all groups. This trend concurs with our earlier finding of a decline in preference toward becoming a multiethnic/multicultural country. The decrease in affinity toward Korean-Chinese, the largest immigrant group currently residing in Korea, is especially noticeable where 60% of respondents in 2010 said they felt this group is close to native Koreans but in 2020 the number declines to only 40.1%. Another group that Koreans display exceptionally low affinity toward is labor migrants. In 2010, the proportion of people reporting that they felt this group is close to a stranger was 60.8%, while those reporting they felt this group is close to native Koreans was 38.2%. However, in 2020 the gap in such proportions increased and 71.1% of Koreans perceived labor migrants to be strangers, whereas only 28.8% reported feelings of closeness.   Transitional Period or Fading Cosmopolitan Dream? Is Korea experiencing a temporary setback in its transition to becoming a multicultural society where cultural differences and racial diversity is embraced or are these statistics indicative of serious underlying conflicts among members of our society? We do not know yet. Probably the answer to this question will ultimately depend on our future actions. However, one thing that is clear is that Korea is faced with a future of shrinking and rapidly aging populations even with the current rates of immigration. Currently, the number of non-working age population is expected to exceed that of the working age population by 2056. This means that, over the next decades ahead, we will experience severe fiscal pressures as the workforce declines and the numbers of elderly soar. Eventually, Koreans will have to decide whether immigration is a viable solution to such problems and learn how to attract promising migrants while successfully integrating them. To achieve our end goal, whatever it may be, we should start making efforts to engage in public discourse regarding the social costs and benefits of multiculturalism from a practical and objective perspective. Also, since changing attitudes among Koreans has the risk of exacerbating the economic and political exclusion of ethnic minorities potentially leading to their social exclusion, making sure that ethnic minorities are adequately represented throughout such discourse should be a priority for a healthy democracy. ■     ■ This brief is a revised version of the paper, “South Korean’s Multifaceted Attitude toward Multiculturalism” (by Choi, Ji- Hye and Cho, Rosa Minhyo), presented at the Conference on the 2020 South Korean Identity Survey held on July 6, 2020 at the Korean National Assembly Hall.    ■ Rosa Minhyo Cho is a professor at the Graduate School of Governance, Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU) in Seoul, Korea. Prior to her appointment at SKKU, she was an assistant professor at Brown University in the Department of Education and Public Policy between 2006 and 2012. Her research interests include evaluating the various effects of social welfare policy, education policy, immigrant policy, and labor policy using large-scale quantitative datasets. Her recent publications include “Collaborative Governance in East Asia” (2020), “Examining the Effects of the Durunuri Programme on Low-wage Workers’ Social Insurance Coverage in South Korea” (2019), and “Exploring the Acculturation Profiles and Adaptation of Children of Multiethnic Families in South Korea” (2016).    ■ Typeset by Eunji Lee, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207)  |  [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.