I. Introduction   Democratic nations worldwide are currently facing a myriad of domestic and international challenges (Bartels et al. 2023). On the global stage, the conflicts between the democratic and the authoritarian camps has been intensified, along with the spread of authoritarian regimes. The Democracy Report, issued in 2023 by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, assessed that the global democracy in 2022 had regressed to the level of 1986. Furthermore, this report evaluated the level of democracy in Asia-Pacific regions had more sharply regressed, falling to merely the level of 1978. According to the report, over the past decade, the freedom of the press has receded in 35 countries, government censorship has strengthened in 47 countries, repression of the Civil society by the government has intensified in 37 countries, and the quality of vote has deteriorated in 30 countries. Within democracies themselves, concerns regarding democratic backsliding have heightened (Graham and Svolik 2020; Grumbach 2023; Svolik et al. 2023). Democratic backsliding appears in various forms, including political polarization, increased populism, spread of fake news through social media, and the erosion of democratic institutions and norms leading to an authoritarianism of the political process (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019; Orhan 2022).   South Korea’s democracy is also not free from such challenges. The emergence of political polarization, voters with a strong partisanship, and the spread of populism raised concerns about the gradual regression of South Korean democracy (Kwon 2023; Shin 2020). Nonetheless, South Korea’s democracy still maintains a high level from the perspective of global standards. According to the Democracy Report by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, 32 countries retain a liberal democratic framework, with South Korea ranking 28th in the world in 2023. South Korea has firmly established itself as a representative liberal democracy in Asia alongside Japan and Taiwan. With the elevated international stature of South Korean democracy, there is a growing call of South Korea to support vulnerable nascent democratic states within the international society. South Korea’s co-hosting of the second Summit for Democracy in March this year with the United States, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, and Zambia, as well as its plans to host the third Summit for Democracy in 2024, are responses to these demands. However, for South Korea’s efforts to bolster global democracy to extend beyond one-time events, they must be supported by an institutional framework. From this background, the East Asia Institute (EAI) held two roundtable discussions under the theme of “South Korea’s Role in Establishing Democracy and Protecting Electoral Integrity.”   II. Milestone 1: Examples of Support from Oversea Organizations for the Advancement of Global Democracy   During the first meeting held in November 2022, experts from National Endowment for Democracy (NED), National Democratic Institute (NDI), Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) participated and introduced the projects of their respective organizations for the promotion of democracy.   1. National Endowment for Democracy (NED)   National Endowment for Democracy (NED) of the United States was established as an independent non-profit foundation in 1983. NED annually receives congressional approval for its expenditures and utilizes the budget allocated through the Department of State to implement over 2,000 grant projects in more than 100 countries. While its activities are sustained by ongoing support from Congress and the White House, the NED Board of Directors independently wields authority over the execution of the allocated budget. NED strives to enhance institutional foundations and procedures to ensure free and fair elections worldwide, establish the rule of law for the consolidation of liberal democracy, protect individual freedoms, and promote social diversity. Serving as a non-governmental organization, NED plays a crucial role in complementing the official endeavors of the U.S. government in democracy promotion. This is due to its ability to continue its operations in the situations where official government-to-government relations may be lacking or where U.S. government involvement may be complicated. Moreover, NED’s relatively small size and non-bureaucratic nature allow it to respond swiftly and flexibly to abrupt political change and crises. Its independence is also advantageous when working with groups that may be wary of direct financial support from the U.S. government.   NED’s inception stems from bipartisan efforts, jointly by both the Democratic and Republican parties. This became the basis for its activities receiving continuous and broad support from the U.S. congress, irrespective of the political spectrum. NED maintains special relationship with four organizations, which are so called “core grantee”: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), Solidarity Center, and Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). Each of these organizations represents the Republican parties, Democratic parties, labor communities and business communities with distinct objectives. NDI and IRI focus on diversity, free and fair elections, CIPE concentrates on free market and economic reforms, and the Solidarity Center strive to promote independent labor unions. NED ensures equitable allocation of grants to maintain balance among these organizations. Through these efforts, NED can integrate bipartisanship into its institutional framework, thereby assuring the U.S. Congress and other stakeholders of NED’s commitment to a multifaceted and balanced approach to democracy. Furthermore, NED engages in transparent disclosure of all facets of its operational activities, including grant funding, and undergoes financial audits conducted not only by the U.S. Congress but also by the Department of State and independent bodies.   2. National Democratic Institute (NDI)   Since its establishment in 1983, NDI has actively operated in more than 150 countries and currently manages a network of more than 50 local offices. NDI secures funding from a diverse pool of more than 160 entities, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), NED, U.S. Department of State, and various international development organizations. NDI also receives financial support from individuals who share its mission of promoting democratic values. Since NDI is a non-profit and non-governmental organization, it maintains political neutrality and retains independence from government influence. Although it maintains a loose affiliation with the Democratic Party, NDI refrains from engaging in domestic activities within the United States and does not take any stance on U.S. domestic election. NDI is committed to supporting various initiatives on the global stage, including capacity building for political parties, civil society, and government institutions. They also focus on enhancing governance, promoting free and fair elections, and increasing citizen participation. To achieve these objectives, NDI forges close collaboration with local partners, offering invaluable advice for advancing democracy and assisting them in applying it in ways that are tailored to each country’s circumstances and requirements.   3. Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)   ANFREL, established in 1997, is a non-partisan and independent international organization dedicated to the promotion of democracy within the Asian region. ANFREL is a coalition of civil society organizations that collectively advocate for the establishment of governments through free and fair elections. As of 2023, ANFREL encompasses 28 member organizations hailing from 18 different countries. ANFREL’s core activities are structured around three pillars: Election observation, Capacity Building, and Campaign & Advocacy. Election Observation entails the monitoring of electoral processes to ensure compliance with both national legal frameworks and international standards. Since its inaugural election observation mission during the 1998 Cambodian general elections, ANFREL has conducted more than 65 missions across Asia. Furthermore, ANFREL routinely conducts workshops designed to enhance the capabilities of civil society organizations, media outlets, and other stakeholders actively engaged in the pursuit of free and fair elections throughout the Asian region. To support these efforts, ANFREL has also established the Asian Electoral Resource Center. Campaign and advocacy efforts encompass activities aimed at bolstering awareness of election-related issues within the Asian region and enhancing the quality of elections. ANFREL collaborates closely with the NDI and the NED to execute these activities.     In conjunction with succinct overviews of the respective initiatives of NDI and ANFREL, representatives from these organizations have proposed several key considerations pertaining to South Korea’s role in advancing democracy. Firstly, it is advisable to integrate democracy promotion initiatives as fundamental principles within comprehensive and long-term plans, such as national security strategies and development agendas, rather than treating them as distinct endeavors. South Korea’s rich experience in the evolution of democracy and its attendant lessons can offer valuable insights to emerging democracies currently navigating the democratization process. Hence, an expansion of South Korea’s existing development aid programs, aligning them with the promotion of democracy, is a plausible proposition. The implementation of democracy promotion programs can also foster a deeper appreciation of democratic values among the South Korean government and its citizens. Secondly, efforts aimed at supporting democracy should extend beyond intergovernmental relations to encompass the entirety of society, including the legislative branch, civil society, and the media. The promotion of global democracy transcends partisan interests and has the potential to foster bipartisan cooperation. This is exemplified in the United States, where political polarization often impedes cooperation on domestic issues between the Democratic and Republican parties, but not when it comes to supporting global democracy. In this context, the South Korean National Assembly might contemplate fostering dialogue with legislative bodies in neighboring Asian nations through bipartisan endeavors and supporting non-partisan civil foundations that maintain political independence, akin to American democracy institutes.   III. Milestone 2: Discussion among Korean Experts on South Korea’s Role   During the second roundtable meeting held in May 2023, South Korean domestic experts extended the discourse initiated in the inaugural meeting to deliberate on South Korea’s role in the establishment of democracy and the assurance of fair electoral processes. The participants encompassed members of the National Assembly, scholars from academia, representatives from the National Election Commission, delegates from the Association of World Election Bodies, and civil society organizations. They collectively reached a consensus on the significance of enhancing the proactive involvement of the South Korean National Assembly in the global promotion of democracy. While South Korea has been actively engaged in various forms of parliamentary diplomacy through forums such as the Parliamentary Diplomacy Forum and the Parliamentary Friendship Association, it was noted that the extent and substance of these endeavors fall short of the international community’s expectations for South Korea. In terms of the role of the South Korean National Assembly, the following key points were deliberated upon.   First and foremost, it is worthwhile to contemplate the establishment, endorsement, and oversight of politically independent private foundations by the National Assembly, as exemplified by entities such as the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Taiwan’s Taiwan Democracy Foundation (TFD), and the UK’s Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Through this initiative, the National Assembly could directly contribute to the advancement of global democracy. Furthermore, akin to the U.S. NED, such initiatives have the potential to serve as a catalyst for fostering bipartisan cooperation within the South Korean National Assembly. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that not only members of the National Assembly, but also public sentiment reflects growing concerns about the state of democracy in South Korea, attributed to escalating political polarization and controversies surrounding the integrity of elections. Considering this context, the persuasiveness of the argument advocating South Korea’s commitment to global democracy promotion faces inherent limitations. Consequently, the establishment of a democracy foundation in South Korea, supported by government funding, may currently encounter substantial challenges. Instead, adopting a more long-term perspective and strategy may be imperative.   Secondly, in the medium to long term, there is a need to consider enacting new legislation or enhancing existing laws to facilitate the smoother implementation of South Korea’s ongoing global democracy support initiatives. In 2010, South Korea promulgated the Framework Act on International Development Cooperation upon becoming a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a consultative entity comprising contributors of development aid. Subsequently, in 2020, the National Assembly passed a comprehensive amendment addressing concerns related to the absence of a comprehensive development strategy, fragmentation of programs, and insufficient post-project management. However, the portion of South Korea’s democracy support endeavors within official development assistance and international cooperation projects remains relatively meager. This is due to concerns related to the perception that development aid is being utilized for political intentions, such as requiring democratization as a condition for aid or transferring democratic values. Democracy-related development assistance has predominantly centered on knowledge dissemination concerning institutional development and training programs. Notably, assistance for electoral processes has been chiefly conducted through the National Election Commission, where South Korea imparts its expertise and insights to the National Election Commissions of developing nations, aiding in the enhancement of their electoral management institutions. Presently, South Korea’s efforts to contribute to the establishment of democratic governance on the international stage are quantitatively and qualitatively constrained. To devise and execute projects characterized by professional and precise considerations for democracy, regulatory reforms are imperative to manage these initiatives in an integrated and efficient manner. Particularly, via legislative means, it is pivotal to delineate the scope of initiatives related to the establishment of democratic governance within the existing framework of foreign aid, ensuring the seamless allocation of budgets for such projects. This can augment funding source stability and initiative sustainability.   Thirdly, for these legislative endeavors to come to fruition, South Korea must forge a consensus on its role in the international community concerning the promotion of democracy and the assurance of electoral equity. Furthermore, mechanisms or forums must be established to harness the collective efforts of interested members of the National Assembly. Initially, efforts should be directed toward heightening the National Assembly’s interest in the implications of South Korea’s democratization experience for the advancement of global democracy. Given that South Korea’s National Assembly elections primarily revolve around domestic issues, endeavors to promote democracy and contribute to the international community may not significantly enhance the re-election prospects of its members. Even if there are members of the National Assembly who express interest, a structured framework for translating these interests into concrete policies is currently lacking. Hence, strategies to rectify this situation must be contemplated. One approach entail organizing workshops and seminars on the promotion of global democracy for members of the National Assembly, complemented by expert lectures, to augment their awareness of the international community’s expectations and the significance of South Korea’s role in global democracy support. Furthermore, the establishment of a platform for like-minded members of the National Assembly to convene for discussions is paramount. Moreover, collaborative activities aimed at rejuvenating public interest in these issues, such as public hearings involving not only National Assembly members but also experts, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders, should be undertaken.   IV. Conclusion   In recent times, there has been an escalating call from the global community for South Korea to amplify its contributions to the advancement of global democracy, recognizing its successful experience as a recent case of democratization. South Korea’s decision to host the Third Summit for Democracy in 2024 can be construed as a response to this mounting demand. The legislative body of South Korea, the National Assembly, which symbolizes South Korean democracy, should also actively partake in endeavors aimed at augmenting the principles of democracy and human rights on a worldwide scale. Regrettably, the current awareness level within our National Assembly concerning international issues, such as the promotion of global democracy, remains relatively subdued. This is partly linked to prevailing apprehensions surrounding domestic democracy, including the intensification of political polarization and disputes concerning the integrity of elections. Consequently, there exists an insufficient consensus within both public sentiment and the National Assembly regarding the proposition that South Korea should engage in the promotion of global democracy.   Hence, it becomes imperative to initiate efforts to stimulate interest within the National Assembly for fostering global democracy. To convey the international community’s expectations for South Korea’s role, share South Korea’s experience with democratization, and ultimately contribute to the global promotion of democracy, a platform should be established to facilitate discussions among National Assembly members concerning the specific roles that the Korean National Assembly should undertake. In this context, the creation of a bipartisan forum, tentatively labeled as the “Democracy Caucus”, could serve as a starting point. Even in the United States, where political polarization is currently perceived to be at its zenith, lawmakers from both the Democratic and Republican parties form bipartisan groups to address critical national issues, transcending their partisan differences. A notable example is the “Problem Solvers Caucus,” established in 2017, comprise over 60 members from both parties who collaborate to articulate nonpartisan perspectives on issues such as pandemic response, infrastructure development, healthcare reform, and immigration. Given that the issue of supporting global democracy can garner bipartisan support, a “Democracy Caucus” could provide an avenue for lawmakers from different political parties to exchange ideas and foster cooperation.   Furthermore, it should be considered to amend relevant laws and, if necessary, enact new legislation to ensure that South Korea’s current initiatives in supporting global democracy are conducted in a more precise and sustained manner. Currently, South Korea’s development assistance initiatives predominantly concentrate on economic advancement and societal progress. Initiatives within the political sphere, encompassing support for democracy, not only remain relatively modest in scale but are also executed in a disjointed fashion. Consequently, these initiatives face limitations in terms of their capacity to engender a sustained impact on the democratic progress of recipient nations. Specifically, the availability of stable funding assumes paramount importance in the successful execution of international support initiatives. The accessibility of these projects and their feasibility, as well as long-term sustainability, hinge significantly on the consistent provision of funding. Insufficient or erratic funding can undermine the viability of these projects, potentially culminating in the failure of the initiatives themselves.   In the medium to long term, considering our current reality, South Korea need to contemplate the structure and approach for supporting global democracy. Creating independent institution or foundation like NED, which operate independently from the legislature or government, is one approach. Meanwhile, it is also worth considering the establishment of organizations such as a Global Democracy Support Center within the National Assembly’s purview or akin institutions, which could delineate the scope of their activities.   Currently, South Korea occupies a pivotal juncture where it can impart its democratization experiences and provide aid to other nations undergoing analogous democratic transitions. In a global context marked by challenges to democratic principles, the South Korean National Assembly must acknowledge its potential as a stalwart advocate of democracy on the international stage and actively engage in such pursuits. With the impending 2024 Democracy Summit, the present moment presents an opportune occasion for the South Korean National Assembly to deliberate upon its role and prepare for its participation in the promotion of global democracy. ■   References   Hyeok Yong Kwon. 2023. “Democratic Backsliding in South Korea.” Korean Political Science Review 57, 1: 33-58.   Tae Kyoon Kim. 2022. “The Implications of Korea’s Experience Supporting Democracy as a Global Narrative.” East Asia Institute Issue Briefing 1-14.   Bartels, Larry M., et al. 2023. “The Forum: Global Challenges to Democracy? Perspectives on Democratic Backsliding.” International Studies Review 25, 2.   Graham, Matthew H. and Milan W. Svolik. 2020. “Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States.” American Political Science Review 114, 2: 392–409.   Grumbach, Jacob M. 2023. “Laboratories of Democratic Backsliding.” American Political Science Review 117, 3: 967–84.   Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2019. How Democracies Die. Crown.   Orhan, Yunus Emre. 2022. “The Relationship between Affective Polarization and Democratic Backsliding: Comparative Evidence.” Democratization 29, 4: 714–735.   Shin, Gi-Wook. 2020. “South Korea’s Democratic Decay.” Journal of Democracy 31, 3: 100–114.   Svolik, Milan W., Elena Avramovska, Johanna Lutz, and Filip Milaèiæ. 2023. “In Europe, Democracy Erodes from the Right.” Journal of Democracy 34, 1: 5–20.   V-Dem Institute. 2023. Democracy Report 2023.     ■ Woo Chang Kang_Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Korea University.     ■ Typeset by Juncheol Oh, EAI Research Assistant For inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 205) [email protected]

I. Introduction   A distinguished development that emerged in public demonstrations calling for President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment following the declaration of martial law on December 3 had been the mettlesome presence of young women. Instead of candles, the traditional symbol of street protests, they carried light sticks; rather than conventional protest songs, they rejuvenated the atmosphere with K-pop tunes, such as Girls' Generation's Into the New World and Rosé's APT. This new form of political expression, rooted in idol fandom culture largely led by young women, transformed the usually solemn protest atmosphere into something more festive and vibrant. In contrast to the active political engagement of women in their 20s and 30s in pro-impeachment demonstrations, however, their male counterparts were conspicuously absent. This disparity underscores a significant gender gap in political participation among those in their 20s and 30s in both the martial law crisis and impeachment protests.   This disparity reflects a broader, ongoing trend in Korean politics rather than being an isolated case. The 20th presidential election revealed a lucid political divide between young men, in support of Yoon Suk-yeol, and young women, in support of Lee Jae-myung. A similar trend manifested in the 22nd National Assembly election, where young men favored the People Power Party (PP) while young women gravitated toward the Democratic Party (DP). This gendered divergence in behavior persisted during the December 3 martial law crisis, albeit in a different context: while elections primarily reflected democratic competition between different political actors, the crisis sparked by the declaration arrantly transcended these boundaries with its suspension of constitutional governance and characteristic adjacencies to a coup'detat. Nevertheless, the persistence of gendered differences in political action among young people during this crisis warrants further examination, as it indicates a divide that goes beyond political preferences to fundamental differences in their core beliefs about democracy.   This paper intends to examine the political behaviors and values of the younger generation, with particular emphasis on potential divisions along gender lines. It also explores how these value-based distinctions may have influenced public perception of the martial law crisis, henceforth shaping participation in subsequent protests.   The study utilizes survey data commissioned by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and conducted by Hankook Research following the declaration of martial law on December 3, 2024. The survey, completed in January 2025, gathered responses from a nationally representative sample of 1,514 adults aged 18 and older.   II. Gender Differences in Political Participation Among the Youth Generation   An empirical analysis of survey data shows that about 9.7% (147 individuals) participated in demonstrations supporting President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment, while 90.3% (1,367 individuals) abstained, highlighting a distinct limitation in direct participation. Among the 147 participants, women in their 20s constituted the largest contingent at 19.1% (28 individuals), followed by men in their 40s at 12.2% (18 individuals) and men in their 50s at 11.6% (17 individuals).   [Figure 1] Participation in Yoon Suk-yeol Impeachment Demonstrations   [Table 1] Participation in Yoon Suk-yeol Impeachment Protests   Participation was marginally lower in anti-impeachment demonstrations, with 5.28% (80 out of 1,514 respondents) reporting involvement. Among these 80 participants, men and women in their 70s, along with men in their 50s, represented the largest groups, each comprising approximately 11.25% (9 individuals per group). Within these demographics, men in their 70s exhibited the highest participation rate, with approximately 9.5% having attended demonstrations opposing impeachment.   Several noteworthy observations emerge from the data. As illustrated in [Figure 1] and [Table 1], gender disparities in demonstration participation related to impeachment were most pronounced among individuals in their 20s compared to other age cohorts. While men generally demonstrated higher participation rates than women across most age groups, women in their 20s exhibited more active engagement, and this pattern remained consistent in both pro- and anti-impeachment protests.   [Table 1] indicates the mean participation rate in pro-impeachment demonstrations was approximately 9.7%, and in anti-impeachment demonstrations approximately 5.3%, with men in their 20s exhibiting average participation rates. [Figure 1] reveals most demographic groups maintained participation rates within the 5-10% range. Therefore, men in their 20s displayed neither particularly high nor low levels of engagement in either pro- or anti-impeachment demonstrations, as their participation rates approximated the average. In essence, while men in their 20s showed typical participation compared to other demographic cohorts, women in their 20s exhibited substantially higher engagement in impeachment-related demonstrations compared both to their male counterparts and to other age cohorts.   [Figure 2] Evaluation of Yoon Suk-yeol's Impeachment and Martial Law   [Table 2] Evaluation of Yoon Suk-yeol's Impeachment and Martial Law   It is important to note that demographic groups with limited demonstration participation, such as men in their 20s, do not necessarily oppose Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment or endorse martial law. According to [Table 2], respondents generally supported impeachment (with a mean score of approximately 3.8) and viewed martial law unfavorably (with a mean score of approximately 4.1). Moreover, as depicted in [Figure 2], respondents aged 20–59 generally supported impeachment and viewed martial law negatively (with scores between 4 and 5). However, respondents aged 60 and above exhibited a more neutral stance regarding both impeachment and martial law (with scores between 3 and 4).   Despite a general consensus among respondents in their 20s supporting impeachment and opposing martial law, clear gender disparities emerged within this demographic. According to [Table 2], women (with scores of 4.29 for impeachment and 4.54 for martial law) demonstrated stronger support for impeachment and stronger opposition to martial law compared to men (with scores of 3.72 for impeachment and 3.98 for martial law). This gender disparity was particularly pronounced among individuals in their 20s.   In summary, respondents predominantly expressed negative views of martial law and supported impeachment. However, in terms of political activism, women in their 20s demonstrated the highest level of participation in demonstrations.   1. Emotional Polarization and Discontent Toward the Yoon Administration   What factors, then, catalyzed such active political engagement among women in their 20s? Participation in demonstrations necessitates substantial commitment of effort and time, typically motivated by profound dissatisfaction and institutional distrust. Survey data indicates that women in their 20s expressed the lowest approval ratings for President Yoon Suk-yeol and the ruling PPP, and gave the lowest rating to the Yoon administration's performance.   [Figure 3] illustrates comparative preferences for President Yoon Suk-yeol and the PPP versus Lee Jae-myung and the DP, while [Figure 4] presents evaluations of the Yoon administration's governance over the preceding three years, measured on a 10-point scale. According to [Figure 3], women in their 20s registered the lowest approval ratings for both Yoon Suk-yeol (9.95) and the PPP (15.14), and [Figure 4] reveals their profoundly negative assessment of the Yoon administration (2.39 points), the lowest among all demographic groups.   Furthermore, [Figure 3] demonstrates that women in their 20s exhibited the most extreme preference differentials between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, and between the PPP and the DP. [Table 3] indicates that the preference differential among women in their 20s between Yoon Suk-yeol (9.95) and Lee Jae-myung (44.88) was -34.94, the most substantial gap across all groups. Similarly, the preference differential between the PPP (15.14) and the DP (52.71) was -37.57, again representing the largest disparity. An analogous magnitude of difference was observed among men in their 40s, with preference differentials of -30.24 between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, and -32.98 between the PPP and the DP. As previously noted, these two demographic groups demonstrated the highest levels of engagement in pro-impeachment demonstrations.   In contrast, men in their 20s exhibited a preference differential of merely -2.37 between Yoon Suk-yeol (22.56) and Lee Jae-myung (24.93), and only 0.84 between the PPP (32.61) and the DP (31.77). This suggests a relative indifference toward both political figures and parties, pointing to a more cynical political orientation among men in this age group.   [Figure 3] Political and Party Favorability   [Table 3] Political and Party Favorability (0–100) [Figure 4] Evaluation of Yoon Suk-yeol Administration's Governance Over the Last Three Years   The low favorability of Yoon Suk-yeol among women in their 20s, combined with accumulated dissatisfaction toward the incumbent administration over the past three years, seems to have laid the groundwork for direct action such as participation in protests calling for his impeachment, in the context of the martial law declaration. Particularly noteworthy is that young women exhibited the most polarized views toward both Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung compared to other demographic groups. This polarization likely drove their increased engagement in political protests, positioning them as more active participants than other cohorts.   The 20th presidential election featured a contest between Yoon Suk-yeol of the PPP and Lee Jae-myung of the DP, with women in their 20s reportedly providing substantial support for Lee Jae-myung. [Figure 5] presents survey results regarding respondents' perceptions of the fairness and integrity of both the 20th presidential election and the 22nd National Assembly election. Significantly, women in their 20s provided the least favorable assessment of electoral fairness, particularly in comparison to men in their 40s or women in their 30s, who, despite registering low approval ratings for Yoon Suk-yeol, expressed relatively more positive views regarding electoral fairness.   In sum, political sentiment among women in their 20s demonstrates considerable polarization relative to other demographic groups. Dissatisfaction with the results of the 20th presidential election was especially pronounced, and this negative sentiment likely played a pivotal role in driving their active participation in demonstrations calling for Yoon's impeachment. Women in their 20s had long harbored dissatisfaction with the Yoon administration, and the martial law situation provided a catalytic opportunity to express their legitimate grievances.   A comparative analysis of men and women in their 20s reveals that men did not exhibit similarly intense emotional responses and instead adopted a more cynical approach toward politics. While they were critical of martial law, this sentiment did not translate into active political engagement.   Interestingly, despite concerns about the far-right radicalization of young men and their potential involvement in electoral conspiracies, male respondents in their 20s and 30s did not demonstrate significant differences from their female counterparts in their assessment of the fairness of the 22nd National Assembly election.   [Figure 5] Perceived Electoral Fairness of the 22nd National Assembly Election and 20th Presidential Election   III. Divergent Perceptions on Democracy Between Young Men and Women   The declaration of martial law on December 3 marked an unconstitutional and unprecedented coup, transcending mere political disagreement and posing a direct challenge to the constitutional order. The manner in which the nation's constitutional foundation was disrupted was fundamentally distinct from the typical disputes over the outcomes of presidential or general elections.   In examining the mobilization of young women in their twenties in response to the imposition, a focus solely on personal or political preferences related to Yoon Seok-yeol or the PPP proves inadequate. Although dissatisfaction with the Yoon administration and the PPP undeniably shaped the context for their actions, the exceptional nature of this crisis suggests that young women's protest participation was driven by a complex interplay of democratic values and indignation over an event that threatened the constitutional structure, rather than by mere political opposition. This points to the conclusion that their activism was fundamentally driven by a commitment to democracy, rather than a straightforward reflection of political affiliations.   To explore this possibility, an analysis was conducted on participants' perceptions of the democratic systern . Respondents were asked to select the statement that most accurately represented their views from three provided options: "Democracy is always preferable to any other systern," "In certain situations, dictatorship is preferable to democracy," or "For people like me, it makes no difference whether the systern is democratic or dictatorial." The following figures and table present the survey results categorized by demographic group.   [Figure 6] Perception of Democracy [Table 4] Perception of Democracy   According to the data presented in the figure and table, the proportion of respondents selecting "Democracy is always preferable to any other systern " was highest among women in their 30s (86.5%), men in their 50s (82.6%), women in their 20s (80.9%), and women in their 40s (80.3%). Conversely, the proportion selecting "In certain situations, dictatorship is preferable to democracy" was highest among men in their 70s (27.4%), men in their 20s (23.6%), men in their 30s (21.1%), and men in their 60s (19.4%).   Overall, women exhibited a stronger preference for democracy as a systern of governance compared to men, who, under certain circumstances, were more inclined to favor dictatorship. Gender disparities in democratic preference were most pronounced among younger generations (20s-30s), while these differences significantly diminished among middle-aged (40s-50s) and older (60s and above) generations. Among those in their 20s, the response rate gap between women and men reached 18.3 percentage points, and this gap widened further to 22.3 percentage points among respondents in their 30s.   Taking into account the generational differences in democratic perceptions and the previously outlined patterns of protest participation, it is reasonable to infer that young women's steadfast commitment to democratic values was key in motivating their proactive defense of democracy in the face of such a grave threat to the systern.   IV. Conclusion   Through its investigation of the inter-gender and inter-generational dynamics surrounding public reactions to the martial law incident, the study uncovers several valuable insights.   While respondents in their 20s, regardless of gender, shared a critical perception of the declaration, young women exhibited significantly higher levels of engagement in impeachment protests that surpassed both that of their male counterparts and other demographic groups. These young women not only expressed acute dissatisfaction with Yoon Seok-yeol and the PPP but also demonstrated the most substantial preference gap in the political rivalry between Yoon Seok-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, as well as between the PPP and the DP. Such emotive polarization likely functioned as a significant driving force behind their engagement in the protests.   Furthermore, young women in their twenties also demonstrated greater commitment to the democratic systern than their male counterparts. Consequently, their commitment to defending the democratic constitutional order from Yoon Seok-yeol's actions likely exceeded that of their male peers, leading to their proactive participation in impeachment demonstrations.   While this analysis employs fundamental statistical methodologies and thus necessitates cautious interpretation, several substantive implications emerge from the findings. First, the participation of young women in impeachment protests represents a constructive manifestation of their resolute commitment to democratic preservation. However, underlying this commitment resides a pronounced polarization in attitudes toward politicians and political parties. Such extreme positions risk evolving into ideological allegiance predicated on personal preferences rather than policy considerations—a development that warrants vigilance.   Second, it is particularly noteworthy that among young men in their twenties, a comparatively higher proportion expressed preferences for dictatorship over democracy or demonstrated indifference between the two systerns relative to other demographic groups (as evidenced in columns (B) and (C) of Table 4). Although the survey did not yield definitive evidence that young men either vehemently opposed Yoon Seok-yeol's impeachment or endorsed the election fraud conspiracy theory concerning the 22nd general election, their skepticism toward the democratic systern suggests a profound disillusionment with the constitutional framework itself, transcending mere discontent with the current administration.   While young women actively engaged in public demonstrations to articulate their dissatisfaction and pursue tangible solutions, young men tended to exhibit political cynicism and disengagement from both political parties and their representatives. This trend holds the potential to foster an endemic form of political apathy, a concerning societal shift warranting ongoing attention. ■     ■ Hanna Kim is Professor at Chinju National University of Education.     ■ Translated and Edited by Chaerin Kim, EAI Research Assistant     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

I. Introduction   The polarization of domestic politics has, as a corollary, led to the polarization of foreign policy. Partisan confrontation and conflict are repeatedly played out over key foreign policy issues. This phenomenon is not confined to a single nation but is a global trend. In advanced democracies such as the United States and Europe, political polarization has manifested in heightened partisan hostility, legislative paralysis, and the rise of populism. Diverging perceptions of external threats among political factions have widened, resulting in differing policy responses. In the United States, the ideological divide between the Republican and Democratic parties on major international issues has deepened, with significant policy shifts occurring after changes in administration. This growing polarization has fueled legitimate concerns, culminating in the 2018 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey, in which experts identified domestic political polarization as the foremost threat facing the nation.   For South Korea, with its perennial challenges of national division, geographic proximity to major powers, and structural reliance on external economic relations, formulating a prudent foreign policy holds significance beyond mere national interest and conveys existential importance. However, rather than advancing a bipartisan grand strategy rooted in national interest amid global upheavals—including the Trump contingency, great power strategic competition, and nuclear threats—South Korean foreign policy is increasingly subjected to domestic partisan pressures.   An analysis of a series of public opinion surveys conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) from 2021 to 2025 yields seven key insights.   First, South Korean foreign policy fundamentally rests on a bipartisan consensus regarding the U.S.-ROK alliance as a cornerstone, support for an open international economic order, and active engagement in multilateral institutions as a responsible member of the international community. However, substantial partisan differences emerge in specific policy areas. Regarding U.S. policy, conservatives (supporters of the People Power Party (PPP)) prioritize strengthening the alliance, whereas progressives (supporters of the Democratic Party (DP)) emphasize establishing a more equal bilateral relationship. In policy towards North Korea, conservatives advocate for reinforcing security measures, while progressives emphasize expanding inter-Korean engagement. On Japan, conservatives call for future-oriented cooperation in functional domains, while progressives stress the resolution of historical disputes.   Second, the degree of polarization varies across issue areas in foreign policy. While overall polarization has intensified, policies toward North Korea and Japan exhibit far greater divisions than other areas, whereas partisanship exerts a comparatively weaker influence regarding the United States. A case on point is the rare bipartisan convergence on policies towards China, which largely stems from widespread anti-Chinese sentiment among the general public.   Third, partisan differences in policy stances stem less from fundamental divergences in ideological convictions, values, or worldviews concerning international politics and more from the spillover effects of domestic political polarization. The tendency to oppose policies championed by the opposing faction, irrespective of substantive content, is replicated in foreign policy debates. This dynamic suggests that obstructing or discrediting the opposition’s achievements is often prioritized over advancing shared national interests.   Fourth, as illustrated by the highly polarized debates on North Korea and Japan policies, both factions tend to perceive each other in stark moral binaries as they cast the opposition as unpatriotic or even unethical. This dynamic leads to the outright rejection of meaningful political negotiation or compromise. Terms such as ‘pro-North forces,’ ‘anti-state elements,’ ‘pro-Japan collaborators,’ ‘domestic traitors,’ and ‘humiliating diplomacy’ exemplify how foreign policy discourse is increasingly driven by emotional and ideological prejudices rather than rational deliberation.   Fifth, the public divisions revealed in the survey are, to a considerable extent, a product of political manipulation by partisan leaders. The polarization among political elites is transferred to their supporters, intensifying public fragmentation (Bullock 2011). In extreme cases, major policy issues are deliberately framed as ‘wedge issues’ to divide the electorate and force binary choices, thereby consolidating political support. Presidents, in particular, tend to dismiss opposing viewpoints and unilaterally push their agenda, relying on the unwavering backing of their partisan base. Such practices undermine democratic accountability in governance.   Sixth, domestic polarization not only weakens diplomatic leverage but also frequently results in policy delays or superficial stopgap measures. In the context of the ‘two-level game’ of international negotiations, the inability to secure domestic approval and support undermines a nation’s credibility in external negotiations, thereby diminishing its bargaining power. The domestic discord surrounding the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systern between 2014 and 2017 significantly weakened the South Korea’s negotiating position with China, culminating in the controversial 2017 ROK-China agreement. Similarly, the internal divisions following the South Korean Supreme Court’s rulings on forced labor during the Japanese colonial period (2018–2019) led to government inaction and the adoption of makeshift measures, ultimately exacerbating diplomatic tensions with Japan.   Finally, if partisan strife persists, the voices of the moderate majority will be drowned out, making the establishment of a bipartisan foreign policy increasingly unattainable. Amid the fundamental transformation of the global order—marked by the decline of U.S. hegemony, the retreat of globalization, intensifying technological competition, and the escalating threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile advancements—the South Korean faces an unprecedented imperative to forge a “coherent and enduring national strategy.” Institutional reforms aimed at overcoming polarization will not only be crucial for restoring democratic governance but also serve as a fundamental prerequisite for enhancing the South Korea’s international role and influence.   II. Public Opinion and Polarization   Polarization, in general, refers to the increasing divergence and hardening of political, social, and economic views, as well as emotional responses, behaviors, and interests among different groups. Ideological polarization specifically denotes the phenomenon wherein the ideological positions of opposing groups move further apart, leading to a contraction of the political center. For instance, this occurs when conservative groups shift further from progressive groups, while the proportion of centrist or independent individuals decreases (Ha 2022, 330).   Conversely, when the size of the centrist or independent group remains stable while partisan allegiances grow more pronounced, particularly as supporters of one party develop strong emotional hostility toward the opposing party, this phenomenon is known as affective polarization or partisan polarization. Unlike ideological polarization, which arises from policy disagreements on specific issues, affective polarization is defined by the intensity of animosity toward the opposing political faction (Ha 2022, 332).   Cross-reference of the EAI’s national surveys on presidential success conditions from October 2021 with the January 2025 survey exploring polarization and democratic perceptions reveals an enduring ideological landscape among South Korean citizens, characterized by negligible variations in overall political orientation. The proportion of progressives and conservatives stands at 27% and 26%, respectively, while centrists constitute 46% of the population, indicating no significant ideological polarization ([Table 1]).   [Table 1] Ideological Landscape of Koreans: 2021 and 2025   Despite this relative stability in ideological alignment, more than half of the respondents expressed unfavorable sentiments toward both the DP and the PPP. Specifically, 54.1% of respondents reported a dislike for the DP, with 25.7% expressing strong disapproval, rating the party below 10 on a scale of 100. The PPP faced even greater disapproval, with 68.7% expressing dislike and 40% assigning it a score below 10. Notably, these figures reflect an increase of over 10 percentage points compared to four years prior (Tables 2 and 3).   The intensity of partisan hostility felt by the supporters of each party to their counterparts is particularly striking. An overwhelming 93.3% of PPP supporters viewed the DP as “unfavorable,” with 58.8% assigning it a score below 10. Similarly, DP supporters exhibited analogously strong aversion toward the PPP (Tables 4 and 5). Among those who expressed disdain for the DP, 44% remarked a “disgust” and a desire to see the party completely expunged from politics, while 60.6% of PPP detractors shared a similar sentiment (Table 6). These findings indicate that nearly half of respondents feel such strong antipathy that they advocate for the complete exclusion of the major party they oppose from political affairs.   [Table 2] Party Favorability: DP   [Table 3] Party Favorability: PPP   [Table 4] PPP Supporters’ Favorability Toward the DPM   [Table 5] DP Supporters’ Favorability Toward the PPP   [Table 6] Emotional Reactions to Political Parties/Politicians   It is evident that the state of political polarization in South Korea is deeply intertwined with partisan identity, manifesting in strong emotional responses such as outright rejection of opposing parties. This division is reflected in patterns of unconditional loyalty toward one’s own party and its leadership, coupled with intractable aversion to rival parties and their leaders. The consequences of this growing polarization are especially alarming in the realm of foreign policy, where bipartisan cooperation is imperative in safeguarding national interests.   III. Polarization and Foreign Policy   In recent years, political polarization has emerged as a key subject in international political science due to its impact on U.S. foreign policy. Excessive polarization in U.S. politics has raised concerns that it could diminish U.S. hegemonic influence, weaken its bargaining power abroad, and undermine its international image and soft power (Walt 2019). Against this backdrop, researchers have conducted various studies examining the widening perception and policy differences between the Democratic and Republican parties on major international issues, the institutional consequences of political polarization, and its impact on foreign policy execution (Friedrichs and Tama 2024). Polarization is not limited to the United States, however; it is a ubiquitous phenomenon in Europe and other advanced countries, and South Korea is no exception.   Though internal disagreements over salient foreign policy issues, such as the stance most germane to North Korea, have always existed, both the public and political leaders have generally upheld bipartisan support for key diplomatic principles. The majority of conservatives and progressives, as well as supporters of the PPP and the DP, share a consensus on the imperative nature of the ROK-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of security, support an open international economic order, and agree on active engagement with international organizations addressing global issues.   However, notable differences emerge in the policy priorities of the two parties’ supporters when examining more specific policy areas beyond the broader picture. According to the EAI public opinion survey in 2025 ([Table 7]), conservatives (PPP supporters) emphasized fortifying the ROK-U.S. alliance as the top priority in policy towards the United States, while progressives (DP supporters) prioritized establishing a more equal and impartial partnership. Among conservatives, 50.4% chose “strengthening the alliance” as the most important issue, compared to 26.6% among progressives, reflecting a gap of 23.8 percentage points. Conversely, 32.6% of progressives prioritized an “equal partnership with the United States,” compared to 9.8% of conservatives, showing a difference of 22.8 percentage points.   [Table 7] Top Policy Priority toward the United States (By Political Ideology)   When it comes to the appropriate policy direction toward North Korea, conservatives prioritize strengthening South Korea's security, while progressives emphasize expanding inter-Korean exchanges. While 41.5% of conservatives selected “strengthening security posture” to be of utmost importance, 17% of progressives said the same, showing a 24-percentage-point difference. Meanwhile, 44.6% of progressives ranked “expanding inter-Korean exchanges” as a priority, compared to 15.7% of conservatives, a gap of 28.9 percentage points ([Table 8]).   [Table 8] Top Policy Priority toward North Korea (By Political Ideology)   In policy towards Japan, conservatives generally center on functional, future-based cooperation, while progressives advocate for the resolution of historical tensions. Among conservatives, 55.5% prioritized “future-oriented” cooperation, compared to 26.8% of progressives, a 28.7-percentage-point gap. In contrast, 56.2% of progressives prioritized “resolving historical issues,” compared to 24% of conservatives, a difference of 32.2 percentage points ([Table 9]).   [Table 9] Top Policy Priority toward Japan (By Political Ideology)   Finally, a notable confluence between conservative and progressive ideological camps is observed in perceptions of policy priorities towards China. Both groups prioritize the expansion of economic exchanges, with 28.1% of conservatives and 33.6% of progressives identifying this as their primary concern, reflecting a marginal difference of 5.5 percentage points. The second priority for both groups is collaboration on non-governmental issues such as fine dust pollution, climate change, and infectious diseases, with 22.6% of conservatives and 23.6% of progressives selecting these matters. Similarly, the third priority, responses to economic sanctions, shows little variation, with 19.7% of conservatives and 20.8% of progressives supporting this issue ([Table 10]). Furthermore, both conservatives and progressives hold strongly unfavorable views toward China.   [Table 10] Top Policy Priority toward China (By Political Ideology)   Though it is often perceived that fortification of trilateral military cooperation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan largely enjoys bipartisan support, polarization is evident on this issue as well. An overwhelming majority of conservatives (84.6%) support such cooperation, while the support rate among progressives is 55.1%, which is 29.5 percentage points lower. Meanwhile, opposition to cooperation stands at 32.9% among progressives and 12.6% among conservatives, showing a difference of 20.3 percentage points ([Table 11]).   [Table 11] Opinion on Strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Cooperation on Military Security [By Political Ideology]   Hence, it may be extrapolated that the degree of polarization in foreign policy varies significantly across different issue areas. While overall polarization is increasing, policies related to Japan and North Korea exhibit notably higher levels of partisan division compared to other domains. In contrast, policies toward the United States reflect smaller partisan differences, and approaches toward China reveal minimal partisan divergence.       This pattern suggests that the differences in foreign policy stances between the two political camps do not necessarily stem from fundamental differences in beliefs, values, and ideologies regarding international politics. Within the progressive camp supporting the DP, it is challenging to identify a clear ideological common denominator that connects policies such as expanding engagement with North Korea, recalibrating relations with the United States on a more equal basis, prioritizing the resolution of historical issues with Japan, and expanding economic exchanges with China. Similarly, the policy preferences of PPP supporters, which emphasize deterrence toward North Korea, strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, prioritizing functional cooperation with Japan, and expanding economic exchanges with China, cannot easily be explained by conservative ideology.   While South Korea’s polarization is frequently characterized as a conservative-progressive dichotomy, it should be understood not as an expansion of ideological differences but rather as a widening of emotional distance between the two political camps, manifested as increased mutual antipathy. Consequently, foreign policy preferences should be viewed as extensions of domestic political and partisan polarization. The policy preferences of the conservative camp are fundamentally based on criticism of and opposition to the policies implemented by their political competitors (the Moon Jae-in administration), while the policy preferences of the progressive camp similarly result from criticism of and opposition to the policies of their political rivals (the Yoon Suk-yeol administration). This dynamic indicates that preventing or diminishing the achievements of the opposing side takes precedence over advancing common interests (i.e., national interests).   An examination of the increasingly polarized South Korea-Japan relations clearly demonstrates how partisan interests influence perceptions of Japan and preferences for Japan-related policies. Over the past four years, public opinion trends regarding the South Korean government’s approach toward Japan (specifically regarding relationship improvement) reveal that conservatives transitioned from a negative stance to a positive one, while progressives shifted from a positive position to a negative one. Among conservatives, there was a marked increase in positive sentiment following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s proposal of the “third-party compensation plan” for the forced labor issue in March 2023, which led to an improvement in bilateral relations. Conversely, progressives exhibited a sharp decline in support beginning in 2022, coinciding with the governmental transition. This evidence suggests that support for and opposition to Japan-related issues are distinctly divided along partisan lines.   [Table 12] Government’s Attitude Toward Improving Korea-Japan Relations [By Political Ideology]   Generational disparities are also evident. Since 2024, individuals in their 70s have rapidly shifted toward supporting the South Korean government’s efforts to improve relations with Japan, making them the most supportive age group ([Table 13]). This change is particularly noteworthy given that this demographic has historically maintained the most negative perceptions of Japan. Previous data from the “ROK-Japan Relations as Seen in Public Opinion: 2013-2023,” jointly conducted by EAI and Japan’s Genron NPO, indicate that younger generations (those in their 20s and 30s) have consistently held more favorable perceptions of Japan, while the 70-and-older demographic exhibited the most negative views (Son and Lee 2024). Concurrently, individuals in their 40s demonstrate the most negative perceptions of the government’s Japan policy, a pattern that corresponds with their strong support for the Democratic Party.   [Table 13] Government’s Attitude Toward Improving Korea-Japan Relations [By Generation]   The public divide evident in polling on national policy towards Japan as well as a general assessment on bilateral relations uncovers an evident delineation between DP and PPP supporters, progressives versus conservatives, and between those in their 40s versus those in their 70s. This polarization is often characterized by negative partisanship, where opposition to the ruling party is driven less by substantive policy disagreements and more by a fundamental aversion to the party itself. As a result, both sides frequently prioritize the failure of their opponents over the achievement of shared national objectives. Even when recognizing the strategic importance of improving bilateral relations or strengthening trilateral security cooperation with the United States, partisans may withhold support to prevent the opposing party from claiming credit.   The ruling party leadership, particularly the president, frequently advances policy through unilateral decision-making, prioritizing internal party consensus over broader political dialogue. The Yoon administration epitomizes this problematic governance style. In proposing a “third party compensation” plan to resolve historical disputes, the administration initiated a series of high level summits that ultimately restored government-level trust. However, these diplomatic initiatives were pursued through a unilateral process devoid of consultation with the opposition, thereby exacerbating political polarization.   IV. Conclusion   The state of entrenched political polarization in South Korea is inimical to democratic norms, as it fosters popular support for authoritarianism, augments populist tendencies, and undermines effective governance and policy innovation. This bifurcation extends beyond domestic affairs and to create significant divisions in public opinion on foreign policy. However, these divisions do not primarily stem from ideological or principled differences concerning international affairs. Rather, they reflect an extension of domestic partisan conflicts, often exacerbated by political elites. The adversarial nature of political leadership further intensifies polarization, allowing these divisions to permeate the broader public.   Internal fragmentation risks not only significantly weakening South Korea’s diplomatic leverage but also leading to a protracted decision-making process and inadequate compromise. Most critically, persistent partisan confrontations marginalize the moderate majority, making bipartisan foreign policy increasingly difficult to achieve. At a time when South Korea faces pressing geopolitical challenges, including the restructuring of the global order amid the relative decline of U.S. hegemony, economic disruptions caused by de-globalization, intensifying technological competition in fields such as artificial intelligence, and escalating threats from North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, political consensus is crucial for developing a ‘coherent and sustained national strategy.’   Institutional reforms aimed at mitigating polarization will be essential not only for revitalizing South Korean democracy and improving governance but also for strengthening the country’s international influence. While current efforts for reform primarily focus on restructuring the systern of ‘imperial presidency,’ equally important are measures that amplify and represent the perspectives of the centrist majority, whose voices have been increasingly sidelined by partisan polarization. ■   V. References   Friedrichs, Gordon and Jordan Tama, eds. 2024. Polarization and Foreign Policy: When Politics Crosses the Water’s Edge. London: Palgrave.   Ha, Shang E. 2022. “Political Polarization among Korean Voters (In Korean).” Korean Social Trends 2022. Statistics Research Institute.   Sohn, Yul, and Junghwan Lee. 2024. ROK-Japan Relations as Seen in Public Opinion: 2013-2023 (In Korean). Seoul: East Asia Institute.   Sohn, Yul. 2024. “Polarization and South Korea’s Japan Policy: Key Takeaways from the 2024 Public Opinion Survey on Korea-Japan Relations (In Korean).” EAI Issue Briefing. https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22716&board=kor_issuebriefing.   Walt, Stephen. 2019. “America’s Polarization is a Foreign Policy Problem, Too.” Foreign Policy. March 11. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/11/americas-polarization-is-a-foreign-policy-problem-too/.     ■ Yul Sohn is President of East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor at Yonsei University.     ■ Translated and Edited by Chaerin Kim, EAI Research Assistant     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

I. Introduction   This paper aims to analyze the political attitudes and characteristics of the ideological “centrist” group, which remains somewhat distanced from partisan and ideological confrontations, amidst the escalating political strife caused by the declaration of martial law by President Yoon Suk-yeol on December 3, 2024.   Political polarization and the subsequent birth of adversarial party politics have led to a state of extreme confrontation between the two institutions of the president and the legislature under a divided government. Ultimately, such bifurcation resulted in the mobilization of military forces by the president and the impeachment of the president by the legislature—both extreme measures—driving South Korea’s political landscape into a state of unprecedented crisis. Though the National Assembly impeached the president in response to the declaration of martial law, partisan conflicts have not subsided. On the contrary, with the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the impeachment looming, tensions surrounding this issue have erupted not only within the political sphere but also on the streets, even leading to extreme acts such as the storming of the judiciary. This paper seeks to examine whether Korean society has become even more polarized due to the martial law–impeachment incident.   Foremost, there must be a rudimentary recognition that President Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law was an unjustifiable act, as it went well beyond the legal requirements and procedural legitimacy of exercising such authority and went as far to mobilize the military to incapacitate the legislature. In this sense, the incident represents both a challenge to the constitutional systern and a threat to Korean democracy that transcends partisan interests. Even after the lifting of martial law, however, “Yoon Suk-yeol” remains at the epicenter of partisan conflicts between the ruling and opposition parties, further intensifying disputes among their respective supporters. Despite the seismic disturbance caused by the martial law crisis, the state of polarization that was existent in Korean politics seems yet largely unchanged.   This paper attempts to specifically examine the degree in which the issue of “Yoon Suk-yeol” has divided South Korean society along ideological or partisan lines in the aftermath of the martial law crisis. In particular, it spotlights those who define their ideological stance as “centrist.” While holding a centrist ideological position does not necessarily equate to an absence of partisan preferences (Kang 2007), these individuals are likely to exhibit relatively lower partisan loyalty and ideological intensity compared to those who explicitly align themselves with a specific ideological spectrum. Furthermore, their voices and opinions are often overshadowed in the heated political debates unfolding between opposing factions. This may be due either to their reluctance to actively participate in political discourse or to the overshadowing of moderate voices by the loudly dogmatic opinions of logically extreme and politically active individuals at both ends of the ideological spectrum (Noelle-Neumann 1974). However, if the political preferences of Korean society form a single-peaked distribution centered around moderate voters, rather than a bimodal distribution where the entire population is completely divided into two ideological camps, then the relatively “silent” centrists are bound to play a decisive role in shaping public opinion on critical issues and determining electoral outcomes (Downs 1957).   Although political attitudes are often classified into the binary categories of conservatism and progressivism amid real-world political confrontations, this paper begins with the recognition that various political attitudes exist within these dichotomous classifications. Even within the broad categories of conservatism and progressivism, there are multiple subgroups with differing ideological orientations and intensities. This perspective seeks to move away from conventional interpretations of Korean politics that, under the guise of partisan polarization, have excessively emphasized dichotomous confrontation while neglecting the diversity of political interests within. By focusing on the centrist group, this paper seeks to highlight not only the elements of “difference” and “exclusion” within partisan polarization but also the elements of “similarity in perception” and “possibility of compromise” in political attitudes. The data used in this analysis come from an online survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) through Korea Research on January 22–23, 2025, targeting 1,514 respondents.   II. Ideological Divergences on Perceptions of the Political Climate of Martial Law and Impeachment   The primary analysis sought to assess respondents’ overall perceptions of the proclamation of martial law and the president’s impeachment, both of which remain subjects of ongoing controversy. As illustrated in [Figure 1], the assessment of President Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law is predominantly negative. A substantial 72.7% of all respondents deemed it “wrong”; among them, 58% showcased a particularly fervent critical stance by characterizing the declaration as “very wrong.” Conversely, only approximately 14% of respondents evaluated the proclamation positively. This indicates that, irrespective of political affiliation or ideological stance, President Yoon’s decision to declare martial law is met with widespread disapproval, reflecting a rare point of convergence in public opinion.   On December 14, 2024, the National Assembly passed the motion to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol with 204 votes in favor, 85 against, 3 abstentions, and 8 invalid votes out of 300 legislative seats. The final decision now rests with the Constitutional Court. An analysis of respondents’ attitudes in this context yet reveals a strong level of public approval for impeachment. A total of 64.5% of respondents expressed support for the impeachment of President Yoon, with more than half—51.5%—stating they “strongly support” the motion. Despite prevailing support for impeachment, however, a significant minority—23.4% of respondents—opposed the motion, with 12.8% stating that they “strongly opposed” it. When compared to the positive evaluation of the martial law declaration, the opposition rate to impeachment is approximately 10% higher. Notably, the proportion of respondents who “strongly oppose” impeachment is roughly twice as high as the proportion of those who “strongly support” martial law.   [Figure 1] and [Figure 2] encapsulate the broader societal climate regarding the martial law crisis. The overwhelming majority expresses a negative evaluation of the declaration of martial law, with three-quarters of all respondents reporting to possess a negative view. This suggests that beyond ideological or partisan preferences, most of the populace perceives the action as a wrongful measure. However, while support for “President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment” is still relatively high, it remains somewhat lower than the negative perception of the martial law proclamation. Moreover, the intensity and proportion of opposition to impeachment are more pronounced compared to responses regarding martial law. This discrepancy underscores the underlying tensions fueling the current political conflict. Specifically, the presence of individuals who hold the ostensibly paradoxical position of “opposing martial law yet rejecting impeachment” emerges as a critical factor exacerbating the political discord surrounding the impeachment proceedings.   [Figure 1] Evaluation of Martial Law Declaration [Figure 2] Position on Impeachment of Yoon Suk-Yeol   When taking into consideration South Korea’s long record of political polarization, it is comprehensible that responses to the declaration of martial law and attitudes toward President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment varied across partisan lines. With this in mind, an analysis was conducted to assess the correlation between respondents’ perceptions of the two incidents and their choice of candidate in the 2022 presidential election between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol.   As shown in [Table 1], the results confirmed a clear divergence in positions based on one’s supported candidate. Both sides largely viewed the declaration of martial law as a misstep, with the median score being 3. Even among Yoon’s voters, the average rating was 2.76, indicating a generally negative assessment. Lee’s supporters were even more critical, with an average rating of 1.15, reflecting overwhelming disapproval. Despite a shared negative perception, however, the difference in mean scores between the two groups remained statistically significant.   A clear partisan divide emerged regarding President Yoon’s impeachment. Lee’s voters strongly supported impeachment, averaging 4.8 on a 1-to-5 scale, whereas Yoon’s voters averaged 2.67, slightly below the neutral midpoint of 3, indicating a tendency toward opposition. This disparity underscores the partisan nature of the political conflict surrounding the impeachment.   Regarding President Yoon’s overall governance, Lee’s supporters assigned an exceptionally low average score of 1.73 on a 10-point scale. In contrast, Yoon’s voters provided a more moderate evaluation, generally positioning themselves around the midpoint of a negative-to-positive (-10 to 10) scale.   As illustrated in [Figure 1] and [Figure 2], while public sentiment is largely critical of the declaration of martial law and a significant portion supports impeachment, substantial variations persist based on partisan alignment.   [Table 1] Perceptions on Voting Procedures of the 2022 Presidential Election and the Political Climate of Martial Law and Impeachment • Martial Law Declaration: 1 (Very wrong), 2 (Wrong), 3 (Neutral), 4 (Somewhat right), 5 (Very right) • Impeachment Ruling: 1 (Strongly oppose), 2 (Somewhat oppose), 3 (Neutral), 4 (Somewhat support), 5 (Strongly support) • Evaluation of Yoon’s Governance: 1 (Very poor) – 10 (Very good) • n: Lee voters: 594, Yoon voters: 588   The current political conflict can be fundamentally attributed to ideological differences regarding the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol. In contrast to the resolute position held by Lee Jae-myung’s supporters, Yoon Suk-yeol voters demonstrate a somewhat opposing perspective on this issue. However, as evidenced in [Table 1], while Yoon Suk-yeol voters generally oppose the impeachment decision, the relatively large standard deviation indicates considerable diversity in viewpoints within this group. This suggests that although the average opinion leans slightly toward opposing impeachment, significant internal variation exists among these voters. Given this variability, a linear regression analysis was conducted to examine Yoon Suk-yeol’s voters’ perceptions of martial law and impeachment. The results are summarized in [Table 2].   [Table 2] Perceptions of Martial Law and Impeachment Among Yoon Suk-yeol’s Voters: Linear Regression Analysis • Dependent Variable: Attitude toward impeachment (1: Strongly Support, 2: Somewhat Support, 3: Neutral, 4: Somewhat Oppose, 5: Strongly Oppose). • Independent Variables:     o Evaluation of Martial Law Declaration: 1 (Strongly Wrong) – 5 (Strongly Right)     o Justification for Martial Law (National Security, Opposition Recalcitrance, Power Retention): 1 (Not at all) – 10 (Strongly Agree)     o Trust in Institutions: 0 (Strongly Distrust) – 10 (Strongly Trust)     o Favorability: 0 (Highly Negative) – 100 (Highly Positive)     o Perceived Electoral Fairness: 1 (Free and Fair) – 4 (Not Free and Unfair)     o Political Interest: 1 (Not at all Interested) – 4 (Highly Interested)     o Political Ideology: 0 (Most Progressive) – 10 (Most Conservative) • *p < .001, **p < .05   In [Table 2], independent variables are categorized into six groups: Martial Law Declaration, Trust in Institutions, Favorability, Perceived Electoral Fairness, Political Attitudes, and Socioeconomic Background. Among these, all four variables under the Martial Law Declaration category were found to be statistically significant.   The findings indicate that a more positive evaluation of the martial law declaration, along with the belief that it was necessary for maintaining national security and order or was inevitable due to the recalcitrance of the opposition party, is associated with a higher likelihood of opposing impeachment. Conversely, these respondents did not perceive the declaration as an attempt by President Yoon to maintain his power. This suggests that impeachment opponents include both supporters of martial law itself and those who believe its implementation was justified under the given circumstances.   Additionally, favorability toward Yoon Suk-yeol and unfavorability toward Lee Jae-myung emerged as significant predictors of impeachment opposition. However, attitudes toward electoral fairness and trust in the National Election Commission, which were central to President Yoon’s claims of alleged election fraud during the martial law declaration, were not found to have a statistically significant effect on impeachment opposition among Yoon voters in the 2022 election. Ultimately, opposition to impeachment among Yoon Suk-yeol’s voters appears to be primarily driven by supportive attitudes toward the circumstances that led to the martial law declaration, particularly dissatisfaction with the opposition party.   However, as shown in [Table 1], while Yoon voters leaned slightly toward opposing impeachment, the strength of this stance was not particularly strong. Moreover, the relatively high standard deviation indicates substantial variation in opinions within the group. This suggests that Yoon voters are not a homogeneous bloc and hold diverse perspectives on the issue. The same logic applies to Lee Jae-myung’s voters, who are not necessarily uniform in their political attitudes. Even among those who self-identify as conservative or progressive, variations exist based on ideological intensity, from the moderates to hard-liners, as well as those who identify as centrist.   To account for this variation, respondents were classified into five subgroups: moderate conservatives, hard-line conservatives, centrists, moderate progressives, and hard-line progressives. The frequency distribution of these ideological groups is shown in [Figure 3]. Notably, 46.4% of respondents identified as centrist, making up nearly half of the sample. Additionally, the proportions of moderate conservatives and moderate progressives were nearly identical, as were those of the hard-liners. As illustrated in [Figure 3], the ideological distribution exhibits a symmetrical, unimodal pattern, indicating a balanced left-right distribution.   [Figure 3] Ideological Distribution of Respondents   The ideological orientation of centrist voters merits further examination. Even though individuals may identify as centrist, it is not accurate to consider them as completely neutral in terms of partisanship. According to the ‘directional theory’ employed in explaining voting behaviors, the centrist position is neither characterized by a lack of emotional responses nor the paucity of strong directional preferences (Rabinowitz & Macdonald, 1989). In highly polarized political environments, such as recent Korean politics, even centrist voters are compelled to select one candidate over another. Hence, understanding the characteristics of centrist voters requires examining their candidate preferences in the 2022 presidential election.   [Table 3] Supported Candidate in the 2022 Presidential Election by Ideological Orientation   [Table 3] reveals a litany of intriguing results. 92.9% of hard-line progressives voted for Lee Jae-myung, while 91.9% of hard-line conservatives voted for Yoon Suk-yeol. Among moderate progressives, 86.1% voted for Yoon Suk-yeol, and 79.1% of moderate conservatives also cast their ballots in favor of him. These figures indicate that individuals with clear ideological preferences overwhelmingly supported candidates aligned with their respective political affiliations. In contrast, among those identifying as centrist, support for the candidates was nearly equally split, with 49.1% voting for Lee Jae-myung and 50.9% voting for Yoon Suk-yeol. The data presented in [Table 3] underscores the extent of political polarization in South Korea, as individuals with firm ideological stances overwhelmingly supported their respective party’s candidate, while centrist voters were almost evenly divided. Both [Figure 3] and [Table 3] showcase the severity of ideological bifurcation within South Korean society.   To better understand the polarized partisan conflict in the context of the martial law-impeachment situation, it is crucial to examine how each ideological subgroup perceives political leaders and the two major political parties along the ideological spectrum. [Figure 4] and [Figure 5] illustrate the average ideological positions of Yoon Suk-yeol, Lee Jae-myung, and the two major political parties (People Power Party and Democratic Party of Korea) as perceived by voters of Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, categorized into six groups: hard-liners, moderates, and centrists from each side.   In [Figure 4], hard-line conservatives exhibit an average ideological score of 8.88, positioning them at an extreme end of the ideological spectrum. Notably, while they perceive Yoon Suk-yeol as highly conservative, their own ideological stance is even more pronounced. Despite this, their perceived ideological distance from Yoon Suk-yeol is minimal (0.15), indicating a strong ideological affinity with him. In contrast, they position Lee Jae-myung at 0.54 on the ideological scale, placing him at the far progressive end. Furthermore, they perceive a substantial ideological gap between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung, with the distance between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party approaching 7. This suggests that, from the perspective of this group, political compromise between the two parties is highly improbable.   In contrast, the moderate conservative group exhibits a comparatively levelled orientation, with an average ideological score of 6.44. They perceive the ideological distance between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol as 6, and between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party as 5.32, indicating a slightly narrower gap between the two parties than that observed by hard-line conservatives. Notably, they position themselves as more moderate than both Yoon Suk-yeol and the People Power Party, maintaining an ideological distance of 0.88 from Yoon Suk-yeol—a significantly larger gap than the 0.15 observed among hard-line conservatives.   Meanwhile, centrist voters who supported Yoon Suk-yeol (center-right) perceive the ideological divide between the two major parties as even smaller than moderate conservatives do. They estimate the ideological distance between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung at 4.61 and between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party at 4.1, both of which are smaller than the distances perceived by moderate conservatives. However, centrist voters also exhibit an ideological distance of 1.93 from Yoon Suk-yeol and 1.82 from the People Power Party, suggesting a notable ideological divergence between themselves and the party they supported.   Across all three subgroups, both Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung are perceived as more ideologically extreme than their respective political parties. The People Power Party and the Democratic Party are regarded as comparatively centrist, implying that the public largely perceives political polarization to be attributed to the two leaders rather than the parties themselves.   [Figure 4] Ideological Perceptions of Political Leaders and Parties among Subgroups: Yoon Suk-yeol Voters [Figure 5] Ideological Perceptions of Political Leaders and Parties among Subgroups: Lee Jae-myung Voters   These patterns are similarly observed among Lee Jae-myung voters. The self-identified ideological average of hard-line progressives is 1.09, positioning them at an extreme end of the ideological spectrum. As hard-line conservatives averaged at 8.88, it can be induced that both groups are situated at the far ends of the spectrum; such a state of polarization and the domination of political dynamics by these ideologically rigid groups would make it far more likely that conflicts exacerbate into entrenched opposition.   Similar to hard-line conservatives, hard-line progressives perceive Lee Jae-myung’s ideological position as highly extreme, though at a more heightened degree than their conservative counterparts. They place Lee Jae-myung at 1.39, which is in close proximity to their own position, with an ideological distance of only 0.3. Conversely, they view President Yoon Suk-yeol’s ideological position as extremely conservative, assigning him an ideological average of 9.30. Just as hard-line conservatives regard Lee Jae-myung’s position as 0.54, hard-line progressives perceive Yoon Suk-yeol as positioned at the farthest extreme. Hard-liners, both conservative and progressive, assess the two leaders to be at the very opposite poles of the ideological spectrum. While hard-line progressives perceive the ideological gap between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party as slightly smaller than the Yoon Suk-yeol–Lee Jae-myung divide, it still remains substantial at 7.30, suggesting that they perceive the likelihood of political compromise to be highly unlikely.   The moderate progressives report an ideological average of 3.54. Given that moderate conservatives hold an average score of 6.44, this indicates that moderate conservatives are positioned 1.44 points to the right of center, while moderate progressives are 1.46 points to the left, demonstrating relative ideological symmetry between the two groups. As with moderate conservatives, the perceived ideological distance between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol is 6.12, while the gap between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party is 5.64, both of which are narrower than those perceived by hard-line conservatives. Additionally, moderate progressives position themselves as ideologically more centrist than either Lee Jae-myung or the Democratic Party.   Meanwhile, centrist voters who supported Lee Jae-myung (center-left) perceive the ideological divide between the two parties as even narrower than moderate progressives do. They estimate the ideological distance between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung at 3.98 and between the People Power Party and the Democratic Party at 3.91, both of which are reduced compared to the perceptions of moderate progressives. However, centrist voters maintain a greater ideological distance from Lee Jae-myung (1.37) and the Democratic Party (1.24) than the previous two groups, indicating a more pronounced divergence between their own ideological stance and the party or candidate they supported.   Interestingly, this group also evaluated the ideological stances of Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung to be closer to the extreme ends of the spectrum compared to their respective parties. With the exception of the case of the People Power Party among the centrist progressives (where the difference is only 0.06), moderate progressives and centrists perceive both the People Power Party and the Democratic Party to be more moderate than Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung. In voters for both candidates, extreme ideological positions are equally attributed to the two political leaders rather than the parties themselves.   [Figure 4] and [Figure 5] effectively illustrate the characteristics of the ongoing political polarization. Regardless of partisan affiliation, it is difficult to argue that individuals with centrist or moderate ideological positions hold extreme views on the current political landscape. Notably, the centrist group, which constitutes 46.4% of the ideological spectrum—nearly half of the total—demonstrates a tendency to converge toward the ideological center, whether on the conservative or progressive side. Given their political attitudes and perspectives, compromise or agreement between the two major political factions does not appear entirely unfeasible. Ultimately, the current state of extreme polarization and conflict can be attributed to the dominance of hard-liners in shaping political debates and contentious issues, rather than by the centrist or moderate ideological groups. As shown in [Figure 3], hard-line conservatives and hard-line progressives each account for only 9.6% of the population. Together, these extreme positions, comprising less than 20% of the total, are driving the political climate and intensifying national division.   III. Political Issues and Characteristics of Ideological Subgroups   As previously noted, while the respective support bases of Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung may rally around their chosen candidates, they exhibit notable internal divergences in their political perspectives. These differences are particularly pronounced among Yoon Suk-yeol’s supporters, as recent affairs placed them to be on the ‘defensive.’ Given the ongoing debate surrounding martial law and impeachment, it is essential to analyze how groups with varying degrees of ideological intensity within each political faction respond to these issues.   [Table 4] Mean Values by Ideological Subgroup • “For security and order”; “Due to the opposition’s recalcitrance”: 1 (Not at all) – 10 (Very much so) • Electoral Fairness:     1: It was free and fair.     2: It was free and fair, but there were small issues.     3: It was free and fair, but there were significant issues.     4: It was neither free nor fair. • Scale for Favorability: 0 (Very unfavorable) – 100 (Very favorable)   [Table 4] presents the average values for each ideological subgroup regarding their level of agreement with the justifications for declaring martial law, perceptions of the politically contentious issue of electoral fraud, and favorfavorability toward the two political leaders. Among Yoon Suk-yeol voters, analysis of variance reveals statistically significant differences across all items. In terms of agreement with the two justifications for martial law, support decreases progressively from hard-line conservatives to moderate conservatives to center-right voters. Notably, there is clear disagreement with the claim that martial law was necessary for security and order, and the justification attributing it to the opposition’s recalcitrance received an average score below the median value of 5.5. A similar trend is observed in perceptions of electoral fairness, with significant differences in assessments of the highly contested 2022 general election.   Regarding favorability toward Yoon Suk-yeol, hard-line conservatives report an average score of 78.49, whereas the center-right provide a significantly lower evaluation of 34.87. While moderate conservatives offer a relatively neutral assessment, the favorability rating among center-right voters is notably lower, falling below 50. In the same vein, though Lee Jae-myung receives overwhelmingly negative evaluations from Yoon Suk-yeol voters, center-right conservatives reported relatively higher favorability that was substantially bigger when compared to that of hard-line conservatives.   The findings in [Table 4] indicate that even within Yoon Suk-yeol’s support base, center-right conservatives display substantial differences in political perception and judgment, particularly in contrast to hard-line conservatives.   Conversely, among Lee Jae-myung voters, statistical differences across most items were generally not significant. Regardless of ideological subgroup, there was a strong consensus on trust in electoral fairness and an overwhelmingly low favorability toward Yoon Suk-yeol. However, favorability toward Lee Jae-myung exhibited notable variation. Hard-line progressives rated him highly, with an average score of 76.5, whereas moderate progressives assigned him a score of 66.27, reflecting a 10-point decrease. Center-left voters provided a more neutral evaluation, with an average score of 51.79.   When in respect to the claim that martial law was declared due to the opposition’s recalcitrance, all three subgroups expressed relatively low levels of agreement, though moderate progressives demonstrated slightly higher acceptance. These variations in favorability toward Lee Jae-myung underscore the differing perspectives between his hard-line and centrist supporters.   The subsequent analysis examines variations in trust toward key state institutions, as well as perceptions of martial law and favorability toward the two major political parties, based on ideological intensity within the Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung voter groups. A focus on trust in state institutions is particularly relevant given the significant roles played by the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, the Election Commission, and the Judiciary in the martial law-impeachment context. The National Assembly initiated impeachment proceedings, the Constitutional Court presided over the impeachment trial, the Election Commission was central to the ‘election fraud’ controversy and the deployment of the military by President Yoon, and the Judiciary is overseeing the trials of Lee Jae-myung.   To explore these relationships, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted, using “hard-line conservative” and “hard-line progressive” groups as reference categories. The analysis categorized variables into four groups. The first pertains to the evaluation of Yoon Suk-yeol’s emergency martial law measures. The second examines institutional trust, specifically concerning the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, the Election Commission, and the Judiciary. The third assesses favorability toward the two major political parties. Lastly, socio-economic background variables—including age, education, wealth, and income—were incorporated into the analysis.   [Table 5] Differences in Perceptions by Ideological Group: Multinomial Logistic Analysis: Yoon Suk-yeol Voters • Nagelkerke Pseudo R² = 0.377, n = 550. • Center-right (5): 247 (44.9%), Moderate Conservative (6, 7): 178 (32.4%), Hard-line Conservative (8, 9, 10): 125 (22.7%) • Reference category: “Hard-line conservative” • *p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.1   [Table 5] presents an analysis of attitudinal differences among three ideological subgroups within the Yoon Suk-yeol voter group. Compared to the reference category of hard-line conservatives, those on the center-right exhibit significant distinctions across multiple variables.   First, the center-right expressed a higher level of negative evaluation regarding the declaration of martial law. In terms of institutional trust, they demonstrated relatively greater confidence in the Election Commission—an institution criticized by certain conservative factions in relation to the ‘election fraud’ controversy—compared to hard-line conservatives.   Additionally, they reported lower favorability toward the People Power Party and displayed comparatively less negative sentiment toward the Democratic Party than hard-line conservatives.   Furthermore, individuals identifying as center-right tended to be older and possessed higher levels of education than their hard-line counterparts.   Notably, within the moderate conservative group, favorability toward the People Power Party was lower than in the hard-line conservative group. The findings in [Table 5] suggest that the 44.9% of either center-right or moderate conservatives among Yoon Suk-yeol voters exhibit distinct political perspectives and judgments compared to hard-line conservatives.   [Table 6] Differences in Perceptions by Ideological Group: Multinomial Logistic Analysis: Lee Jae-myung Voters • Nagelkerke Pseudo R² = 0.258, n = 535. • Center-left (5): 238 (44.5%), Moderate Progressive (3, 4): 179 (33.5%), Hard-line Progressive (0, 1, 2): 118 (22.1%) • Reference category: “Hard-line Progressive” • *p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.1   The same analysis was conducted for the Lee Jae-myung voter group, and the results are summarized in [Table 6]. Compared to hard-line progressives, both moderate and center-left progressives exhibited relatively lower negative evaluations of the martial law declaration, which can be attributed to the exceptionally strong negative evaluations within the hard-line progressive group. An interesting observation for both moderate progressives and center-left progressives is that their favorability toward the Democratic Party was lower than that of hard-line progressives.   In the context of martial law and impeachment, there are relatively few issues on which the progressives would hold divergent views, as there is general agreement that “the declaration of martial law was unjust and President Yoon Suk-yeol should be impeached.” However, the results presented in [Table 4] and [Table 6] reveal a noteworthy distinction in favorability toward Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party across ideological subgroups.   To recapitulate, it can be concluded that notable ideological distinctions exist within the conservative camp. The perception of martial law as “inevitable” and opposition to impeachment are positions predominantly held by hard-line conservatives, whereas moderate conservatives—particularly those on the center-right—demonstrate a markedly different stance. Though the progressive camp exhibits less internal divergence on core issues, significant variation is observed in levels of favorability toward Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party, suggesting differences in partisan alignment and leader evaluation within the group.   IV. The “Silent” Centrist?   Recent empirical studies have established that ideological subgroups—even when broadly categorized as conservative or progressive—demonstrate heterogeneous perceptions and evaluations regarding contemporary political dynamics. However, the political discourse remains predominantly shaped by more extreme ideological positions. This phenomenon raises a significant question: Why do centrist perspectives maintain limited visibility in public political discourse, and could this be attributable to comparatively reduced political engagement and expression among centrist-identified individuals?   As a systernatic investigation of the question, this study examined dimensions of political efficacy and corresponding levels of political participation across ideological subgroups. Political efficacy has been conceptualized in the literature through two distinct dimensions: internal efficacy and external efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to an individual’s self-assessment of possessing adequate resources and capabilities to influence political decision-making processes. External efficacy, conversely, pertains to an individual’s perception of governmental responsiveness to citizen demands and input. Higher levels of internal political efficacy have been consistently associated with increased likelihood of engagement in various political activities.   [Table 7] presents a comparative analysis of internal efficacy measurements across ideological subgroups. In response to the statement “A person like me cannot influence what the government does,” both moderate conservatives and center-right conservatives demonstrated significantly lower efficacy scores relative to other ideological subgroups. Additionally, on the measure “I am well aware of the key political issues in our society,” both center-right and center-left respondents reported the lowest efficacy levels among all subgroups examined. These findings suggest that centrist-identified individuals generally exhibit comparatively diminished internal political efficacy, with center-right conservatives demonstrating particularly pronounced deficits in this dimension. [Table 7] Internal Efficacy Measurements across Ideological Subgroups Low political efficacy often correlates with low political participation. To explore this, an analysis was conducted on differences in rally participation—both for and against impeachment—as well as levels of political interest across ideological subgroups. As shown in [Table 8], among progressive groups, moderate progressives reported the lowest levels of participation in pro-impeachment rallies, while among conservatives, moderate conservatives had the lowest participation in anti-impeachment rallies. Moreover, political interest was found to be lowest among those in the ideological middle, regardless of whether they leaned conservative or progressive. In other words, centrist groups demonstrate relatively low engagement with political issues and exhibit more passive political participation. Compared to their more ideologically committed counterparts, moderates remain relatively “silent,” which explains why their perspectives are often underrepresented in political discourse. As a result, political debates tend to be dominated by more extreme and hard-line positions.   [Table 8] Political Participation and Political Interest by Ideological Subgroup • #1: Never attended, 2: Wanted to attend but didn’t, 3: Attended once, 4: Attended twice, 5: Attended more than three times (n=1,514). • ## 1: Not at all interested, 2: Slightly interested, 3: Fairly interested, 4: Very interested.   V. Conclusion   This study first commenced with the question of whether the radical politics that has rocked the country since the martial law-impeachment political crisis are accurate reflections of the actual state of South Korean society. Fundamentally, I aimed to examine the validity of the prevalent narrative that society has bifurcated into two opposing factions, with individuals constrained by factional logic, resulting in confrontation between extreme positions.   To address this question, methodology used in this paper included categorizing both conservative and progressive ideological groups into three distinct subgroups—centrist, moderate, and hard-line—and analyzing the differences in political and ideological characteristics among these subgroups. The findings revealed significant heterogeneity in viewpoints within both the conservative and progressive camps. Notably, within the conservative group, a substantial moderate conservative subgroup demonstrated distinct views, perspectives, and assessments that diverged markedly from those of hard-line conservatives. Similarly, within the progressive group, although internal differences were less pronounced due to the nature of the issues examined, there were still observable variations in attitudes toward Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party across the subgroups.   This study proved that alternative perspectives and viewpoints well exist within the political landscape, with their proportional representation in the population being actually greater than commonly perceived. However, due to the centrists’ comparatively weak internal efficacy and subsequent lower levels of political participation, today’s political discourse is disproportionately shaped by the extremities voiced by the “politically active minority” that inch further and further away from moderation and rationality.   The seemingly perplexing results of recent public opinion surveys can also be attributed to this “disparity in participation.” The perspectives of extremist groups, who actively engage in political processes, receive excessive representation, while the more politically reticent moderate majority, who tend to abstain from participation, find their views underrepresented. This imbalance yields survey outcomes that fail to accurately reflect genuine public sentiment, resulting in political decision-making processes that are inappropriately influenced by minority viewpoints.   Political deliberations and processes dominated by extreme rhetoric and polarized positions cannot be considered conducive to healthy democratic functioning. There appears to be a compelling need for structural reforms in political communication mechanisms to ensure that the perspectives of the quiescent, moderate, and rational majority are adequately represented in political discourse. ■   VI. References   Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller. 1954. The Voter Decides. Evanston: Row, Peterson.   Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.   Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. 1974. “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion.” Journal of Communication 24(2): 43-51.   Kang, Won-taek. 2007. “The Characteristics and Significance of ‘Subjective Centrism’ Among Voters in South Korean Politics: Focusing on the 2004 National Assembly Election (In Korean).” National Strategy 13(4): 129-150.   Kim, In-Kyun. 2025. “The Relationship Between the National Assembly and the President in South Korea and the Politics of Budget Deliberation (In Korean).” Ph. D. Diss., Seoul National University.   Rabinowitz G, and Macdonald S. 1989. “A Directional Theory of Issue Voting.” American Political Science Review 83(1): 93-121.     ■ Won-Taek Kang is Director of the Institute for Future Strategy at Seoul National University and Chair of EAI's Democracy Research Center.     ■ Translated and edited by Chaerin Kim, Research Assistant     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]    

[Editor's Note] Although Korean democracy is not “backsliding,” Korea has been witnessing signs of crisis in Democracy. Professor Won-Taek Kang of Seoul National University states that these “signs of crisis” poses challenges that need to be solved to strengthen the resilience of Korean democracy. This issue briefing analyzes South Korea’s democratization process, signs of crisis, and challenges in strengthening democratic resilience. The author argues that the most critical factor in safeguarding and maintaining the values of democracy is the role of a conscious citizen. Therefore the importance of tolerance and coexistence needs to be emphasized in civil education.     I. Introduction   Democratization was a global trend three decades ago. It began in southern Europe in the mid-1970s, passed through Latin America in the 1980s, and continued to many countries in Asia. The fall of communism led to the democratization of Eastern European countries. Democratization continued its march in the international community, such as in the Republic of South Africa, with a symbolic figure, Nelson Mandela. Samuel Huntington labeled it as the ‘third wave of democratization,’ and Francis Fukuyama dared to call it the ‘end of history,’ where the competition of political systems has ended.   However, we are witnessing signs of democratic backsliding around the world. The retreat of democracy is not limited to emerging democracies, such as Hungary, Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines, and Russia. The recent rise of Trumpism in the United States, the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, and the rise of far-right and populist parties in European countries suggest that democracy is never perfect and constantly challenged, while the importance of its resilience is ever more highlighted.   II. Democratization Process of Korea   Since democratization in 1987, Korea has consolidated democracy in a relatively stable and continuous manner. Before the democratization process, Korea was under an authoritarian regime for a long time. Although the previous system was undemocratic, it was not a complete departure from the liberal democracy. Elections were periodically held, and opposition parties were allowed to exist. Of course, the fairness of the election was often questioned, and the opposition party could never seize power. However, the elections were highly competitive. Even under an authoritarian regime, public dissatisfaction with power was expressed through elections, which gave a serious political warning to the ruling powers. Military juntas who came to power through a coup d’etat were aware of the fundamental weakness in their legitimacy and wanted to justify their regime through elections. For this reason, leaders of the opposition party believed in the possibility of a power change through elections as long as free and fair elections could be guaranteed.   Korea went through democratization under such circumstances. The establishment of procedural democracy is the key factor in Korea’s democratization. For instance, the ‘revision of the constitution for direct presidential election’ was the most important agenda of democratization in Korea in 1987. Later, establishing the fairness of elections became quintessential to the process of democratic consolidation. However, the establishment of electoral democracy and the possibility of regime change resulted in a centripetal form of competition among major political leaders. This, in turn, lowered the degree of political instability in the early stage of democratization. In addition, political leaders competitively recruited new figures to win the elections, and many hardliners were displeased that the ‘compromises’ had to be made for democratic transition. Bringing new blood into institutional politics helped recruit new elites and prevent political polarization and fragmentation. The regionalist party structure and simple majority voting system that emerged along with democratization also limited the number of effective parties to three or four, which maintained a stable and moderate multiparty system. Indeed, a change of government took place, and now it has become a common phenomenon. Delegation of power through elections was established as ‘the only game in town.’   The early depoliticization of the military in the initial stages of democratization also played an essential role in consolidating democracy in Korea. Young-sam Kim, the second president after democratization, tried to exterminate the vestiges of authoritarianism to meet the high public expectations for the new president and bolster the democratic legitimacy by replacing military generals from the era of military authoritarianism with new figures. Those disadvantaged under the rule of a faction within the “New Military Regime” organized around Chun Doo-hwan welcomed such reforms and became loyal to the new system formed by democratization. Meanwhile, Korea achieved remarkable economic growth along with the consolidation of democracy, and economic inequality has yet to become a severe issue. Until the Asian financial crisis in1997, most people considered themselves middle-class and believed in the possibility of social mobility.   In addition, just as democratization in 1987 was achieved through citizen participation, citizens’ role was crucial in the process of consolidating democracy. Citizens directly participated in politics to pressure institutional politics when the political system was deemed dysfunctional, or the political responsiveness was significantly reduced. The massive candlelight vigils in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2016 are examples. Many citizens participated in these vigils, which sometimes lasted for an extended period. However, they did not become violent. Democracy was stably and smoothly consolidated in Korea with different factors combined.   III. Is South Korean Democracy Backsliding?   Recently, Korea has been witnessing signs of a crisis in democracy. Korean democracy is not ‘backsliding’ nor is it sliding into authoritarianism. However, it is worrying that the ‘quality of democracy’ has been jeopardized.   First of all, Korea encountered a problem related to procedural democracy, the core of the ’87 system.’ During the 2012 presidential election, the National Intelligence Service mobilized cyberwarfare to rig the election. In the 2017 presidential election, Druking, an online blogger, and his accomplices developed a comment-rigging software program. Both cases posed a serious threat to the political system as they were intended to influence public opinion on elections. Moreover, after the 2020 National Assembly election, disputes related to the election’s fairness have continued. A series of controversies on the fairness of elections and possibilities of political intervention may hint that the foundation of a sound democracy has been undermined.   Controversy over the integrity of election processes is even more serious. It is also related to questions about the neutrality or independence of ‘judgment agencies’ such as the Board of Audit and Inspection, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the Election Commission. It is also concerning that the doubts about the neutrality or independence of the prosecution continue, while the judicial branch, whose principal value should be fairness and independence, is often the subject of political controversy.   There were cases or legislation that may infringe on the political freedom of citizens. Examples include the Civil Service Ethics Division during the Lee Myung-bak administration that took the lead in civil inspection and the May 18 Special Act and anti-North Korean flyer law passed under the Moon administration. The recent controversial amendments to the law on media arbitration are also examples of cases that may limit freedom of speech.   As partisan polarization becomes severe, negative phenomena concerning the core values of liberal democracy, such as pluralism, tolerances, and consideration, are appearing. In 2019, there was a social conflict over the appointment of Cho Kuk, Minister of Justice. The incident shows that Korean society has recently been divided into two groups, ideologically and factional. Political conflicts and different opinions are natural and expected components of a democratic society. However, the problem Korea faces these days is political polarization without compromises. Korean society, divided by regionalism immediately after democratization, is being tested by the different dimensions of ideology, generation, and social class. The complex divisions are not dispersed by several political parties. Instead, in Korea, the two major factions are overlappingly monopolized, further exacerbating the extreme confrontations. Radical and extreme opinions have a stronger influence in each political camp than rational and moderate opinions, which naturally escalates the conflict to a point where extremists of each camp justify it as a confrontation between good and evil. This binary perspective disables any possibilities of compromise or reconciliation. Political competition degenerates into good overpowering evil, and mutual understanding and respect become impossible.   The problem of political polarization is even more visible among online and social networks. In online platforms, discussions on public issues are limited to communications between like-minded people, creating a so-called filter bubble, which exacerbates political polarization. The filter bubble reinforces a political belief, instead of allowing a process of genuine communication and reaching a mutual agreement.   Unfortunately, institutional politics, which are supposed to resolve these social conflicts and ideological polarization, instead encourage adversary politics. Social issues lead to factional conflicts through institutional politics such as the National Assembly or political parties, which, in turn, fuels the ideological and factional polarization in civil society, creating a vicious cycle.   On the other hand, the concentration of power in the president and central government continues despite the 30 years of consolidating process after democratization. In addition, recently, the so-called ‘Blue House government,’ which supports centralized power on the presidential aides, has become more prominent. The ‘Blue House government’ greatly undermines the autonomy of each department or institution, and negatively affects the efficiency of government and continuity of policy execution. Also, despite local autonomy, local governments are still administratively and financially weak compared to the central government. In other words, Korea is still the ‘Republic of Seoul.’ These are the political ‘omen’ of Korean democracy. Despite the relatively stable implementation and consolidation of democracy, Korea continues to encounter challenges of democracy.   However, it seems unjust to label Korea’s situation as a ‘collapse of democracy’ or a ‘fundamental retreat.’ The essential values of democracy have not been damaged; instead, the executions of power are at fault. The ‘signs of crisis’ of democracy in Korea can be resiled and recovered by civil participation and the operation of the system.   IV. Challenges in Strengthening Democratic Resilience   A remarkable trait of the development of Korean democracy after democratization is that the democratic system itself was never seriously threatened. Korea has undergone a series of crises that could put a strain on the democratic system. The Asian financial crisis in 1977, the attempt to impeach President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004, and the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2017 brought about severe political and economic crises. However, they were resolved through the political system. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the first peaceful change of government between the ruling and opposition parties was achieved. Although the impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004 was a serious political crisis, the 17th National Assembly election served as a referendum over the de facto impeachment, in which the ruling Uri Party obtained a majority of seats, politically settling the issue of the impeachment. The impeachment was rejected by the Constitutional Court. In 2016, the monopoly of state affairs and corruption in the Park Geun-hye administration were resolved through citizen’s candlelight vigils and the response of the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court. Political crises were all eased through the participation and judgment of the public and the constitutional system.   Likewise, the current problems of ‘signs of crisis’ or ‘declining quality of democracy’ can provide opportunities to show the resilience of Korean democracy. Citizen’s interest and participation in political phenomena and democracy are of utmost importance. Fair elections, the establishment of political accountability, and the popularization of regime change are also critical elements of institutional foundations concerning the resilience of democracy. From Korea’s experience, at the core of democratic resilience lies the procedural establishment of democracy, such as fair and free elections and the possibility of regime change.   The current ‘signs of crisis’ present challenges that can improve Korea’s democracy. First of all, party politics should be reformed to connect civil society and the state. It is important to recover the competitiveness of party politics that can break away from the bipartisan cartel structure based on regionalism. In elections or competitive political markets, it should be possible for new and competitive political forces to emerge, which will naturally lead to a more open and pluralistic political environment along with changes in the ecosystem of party politics.   The political system becomes unstable when dissatisfaction rises against the existing parties for only representing the interest of specific groups of people. Populism and extremist politics also benefit from this situation. Therefore, socially diverse interests must be expressed through party politics, and new demands and opinions should be reflected in institutional politics by introducing new political forces. However, under the current simple majority system, it is not easy to guarantee such diverse representations. Under the electoral system centered on the simple majority system combined with regionality, the possibility of the emergence of a new party that can challenge the vested interest of the two major parties is extremely low. While being protected by the institutional loophole, each mega political party binds its supporters through polarization, which results in intensified social conflicts. Therefore, an electoral system with high proportionality is demanded. Institutional changes should be made in the form of proper implementation of the principle of proportionality, instead of deceptive compromises, such as the so-called ‘quasi-interlocking proportional representation system’ made before the 21st National Assembly election. During the process, representative nature should not be biased, regardless of class, gender, status, educational background, occupation, and affiliation.   At the same time, it is crucial to institutionally strengthen the role of judges who can monitor power. The independence and neutrality of the judicial branch, as well as administrative bodies such as the National Election Commission and the Board of Audit and Inspection, are very important. Controversies over the autonomy of independence of institutions, including the judicial branch, are relevant to the president’s status and the concentration of power in the president. Therefore, in the long run, through the process of a constitutional amendment, the role of the president must return to the position of head of administration. Also, as the revival of the judge recommendation meeting in the Supreme Court, it is necessary to prepare an institutional improvement plan that enables each institution to be independent of power. It is also necessary to dismantle the presidential system, which often verges on being ‘imperial.’ It is also important to realize decentralization, which boldly transfers administrative and financial powers concentrated in the central administrative departments and Seoul to local governments. The core task of Korean society during democratization was limited to establishing procedural democracy. This goal has now largely been achieved. After more than 30 years after democratization, efforts are now needed to revise the constitution to build a new national governance system from a future-oriented perspective.   However, the most critical factor in safeguarding and maintaining the values of democracy is the role of a conscious citizen. Power to monitor power and the operation of political institutions and, if necessary, restore democracy through active participation originate from citizens. Citizen education that enlightens people to learn the values of democracy and the importance of protecting it is significant to democratic resilience. Also, another point about expanding the scope of representation and inclusiveness is that the composition of party elite selection should be expanded. It should not discriminate against candidates based on their class, gender, status, educational background, occupation, affiliation, and many other aspects.   In this regard, the importance of tolerance and coexistence needs to be emphasized in civil education. Citizens should be informed that disagreement and diversity, rather than homogeneity and unity, are natural, and the consensus should be ‘achieved’ through compromises and concessions between different people. The pluralistic value of ‘agree to disagree,’ which is the basis of the liberal democracy, should be socially internalized. In fact, during the development of liberal democracy in Korea, the emphasis has been on democracy rather than freedom. Democracy has always been a core value in Korean politics since the April 19 Revolution in 1960. Even under the oppressive regime, the desire for democratization continues to persist. In contrast, liberal values have not yet been discussed much in Korean society. Liberal values, such as individual freedom, acceptance of differences, tolerance, and solicitude, and respect for diversity were relatively neglected. It is impossible to achieve a society of harmony and reconciliation through institutional politics alone. Citizens should be the active agents who directly create such values. The foundation for the restoration of democracy is the consciousness of citizens to protect these values. ■     ■ Won-Taek Kang is a professor at Seoul National University's Department of Political Science and International Relations. He received his Ph. D. in political science from the London School of Economics (LSE). He previously served as the president of the Korean Political Science Association and the president of the Korean Association of Party Studies. His research focuses on Korean politics, election and political parties, and comparative political institutions. His recent publications include The Decisive Moments in Korean Politics (2019), and Korean Political Theory (2019).     ■ Typeset by Ha Eun Yoon Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

According to the Varieties of Democracy Institute, the freedom and fairness of South Korea’s elections have improved dramatically since the country first democratized. Figure 1 below shows how the quality of South Korea’s elections has changed between 1948 and 2020 (“election was free and fair” is indicated in blue) and the country’s rating on the Electoral Democracy Index (indicated in red). There was little change in election quality and the democracy index in the 40 years that followed the constitutional election of 1948. With the change to a direct election system implemented in 1987, the freedom and fairness of South Korea’s elections shot up, and the country’s rating on the democracy index increased greatly as well.     Changes in the Quality of South Korea's Elections 1948-2020     The primary factors that affect election quality can generally be categorized into structures, systems, and actors. Structural factors include economic development, political and social divisions, and geopolitical positions. The institutional factors of an independent judiciary and supervising body also play an important role in the oversight and control of the constitutional and legal basis and election processes supporting the separation of powers. At the actor level, the capacity and strategic choices of the government and members of the opposition forces including political elites, civil society, and the media, affect the quality of elections. In addition, voter perceptions of election quality may depend on whether the party or candidate they supported won or lost the election. Korea’s economic development was achieved during a time when social inequality was relatively low.   Although political conflicts based on regionalism existed, there were no violent confrontations or conflicts between members of society, or civil-war level religious, ethnic, or cultural conflicts. Further, following democratization, the peaceful transfer of power between Kim Young Sam (conservative) and Kim Dae-jung (liberal), Roh Moo-hyun (liberal) and Lee Myung-bak (conservative), and Park Geun-hye (conservative) and Moon Jae-in (liberal) increased the ability of the opposition to check the government and made it difficult to mobilize administrative control, further improving the quality of elections. A broad social consensus on regime change through elections was formed through this process. Finally, we cannot leave out the growth of the country’s capacity for election management. Figure 2 shows Korea’s ability to manage elections. This figure illustrates that the improvements in the freedom and fairness of elections go hand in hand with the changes in the autonomy and capacity of the National Election Commission (NEC).     Changes in the Role and Independence of South Korea's Election Commission 1948-2020     Korea has a fundamentally high state capacity, and its bureaucratic capacity is also the best in the world. The resident registration system in particular has been the basis for effective and efficient election management by facilitating easy identification of voters compared to other countries where eligible voters have to be identified and registered. This article will focus on the capacity of the NEC in terms of the constitutional and legal status, organizational capacity, and the capacity and motives of its members.   I. The Neutrality and Independence of the NEC   The electoral process includes "the establishment of election laws, planning of electoral districts, confirmation of election schedules, voter confirmation, party registration, candidate registration, election campaign management, provision of election information to voters, management of election costs and political funds, oversight of ballot casting, vote counting and tallying, confirmation of election results, and dispute resolution" (Eum Sun Pil, 2015). Therefore, election management means executing and supervising the election process to ensure that free and fair competitive elections take place. However, different countries place different parts of the election process under the management of election commissions. In Korea, the role of the NEC includes the creation and oversight of the electoral register, registration of political parties and candidates, election campaigns, voting, ballot counting and tallying, and certification of election results. Election laws and the drawing of electoral districts fall under the authority of the National Assembly, and election-related disputes, in principle, fall into the jurisdiction of the courts.   Elections are the process of reorganizing the administration and legislature according to the will of the people. Election management can affect the election process and results. If election management is affected by political interests, then trust in the fairness of elections is weakened. Therefore, election management must be carried out by an independent organization free from political interests, including the interests of the administration, and the organization must have the administrative capacity to efficiently handle the entirety of the vast electoral process, from keeping track of eligible voters to calculating election results.   The Korean Constitution guarantees neutrality and independence of the election commission members. Following the establishment of the Korean government, the administration established an "election commission" within the executive that controlled elections. Historical reflection on the fraudulent 3/15 election of 1960 led to the establishment of the National Election Commission, a constitutional body independent of the executive, judiciary, and the National Assembly, in the third revised Constitution. Since then, the independence and neutrality of the NEC has been strengthened with each revision of the Constitution, with an exception to the revision made in 1972. The third revised Constitution in 1960 only stipulated how the NEC was to be composed, delegating matters related to organization, authority, etc. to the purview of the law. However, since then, rights, term lengths, political neutrality, status guarantee, rule-making authority, and details regarding the relationship between the NEC and various levels of administrative agencies have also been included in the Constitution. The Constitution goes beyond symbolically and declaratively defining the NEC as neutral and independent. It also attempts to lay the foundation for practical independence by providing the NEC with a basis for its activities. This is because even if the NEC's authority is mandated at the constitutional level, if its composition and operations are left to be decided at the legal level, the independence and neutrality of the NEC may be affected by changing political forces as determined by election results. The current Constitution gives the NEC the following powers and duties.   Article 114 (1) Election commissions shall be established for the purpose of fair management of elections and national referenda, and dealing with administrative affairs concerning political parties. (2) The National Election Commission shall be composed of three members appointed by the President, three members selected by the National Assembly, and three members designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected from among the members. (3) The term of office of the members of the Commission shall be six years. (4) The members of the Commission shall not join political parties, nor shall they participate in political activities. (5) No member of the Commission shall be expelled from office except by impeachment or a sentence of imprisonment without prison labor or heavier punishment. (6) The National Election Commission may establish, within the limit of Acts and decrees, regulations relating to the management of elections, national referenda, and administrative affairs concerning political parties and may also establish regulations relating to internal discipline that are compatible with Act. (7) The organization, function and other necessary matters of the election commissions at each level shall be determined by Act.   Article 115 (1) Election commissions at each level may issue necessary instructions to administrative agencies concerned with respect to administrative affairs pertaining to elections and national referenda such as the preparation of the poll books. (2) Administrative agencies concerned, upon receipt of such instructions, shall comply.   Article 116 (1) Election campaigns shall be carried out within the scope prescribed by law under the management of the election commissions, but equal opportunity shall be guaranteed. (2) Except as otherwise prescribed by law, expenditures for elections shall not be imposed on political parties or candidates.   II. The Capacity of the Election Commission   Korea’s NEC maintains the independence of its personnel by independently managing the recruitment, promotion, appointment, and transfer of its employees. According to the 2020 Ministry of Personnel Management statistics yearbook, the number of official positions at the NEC is 2,867, while the current number of actual staff employed is 3,085. Compared to the executive (1,078,516) and the judiciary (17,751) branches, the number of people is small, but these figures only reflect permanent employees. Table 1 uses data from the Electronic Learning and Capacity Training conducted by the Electoral Integrity Project in 2016 to compare the size of election management organizations in different countries. According to Table 1, Mexico has the largest number of permanent employees among the countries surveyed, with a staff of about 15,000. It is followed by Iraq (4,000), Panama (3,000), and Korea. Looking at the number of temporary hires employed during the election, Korea has one of the highest employment rates with about 200,000 people during elections followed by to Afghanistan and Thailand, which hire more than one million people, Indonesia (550,000 people), Kenya (300,000 people), and Tanzania (250,000 people). In addition, it was found that Korea rarely relies on unpaid volunteers.   The Organizational Capacity of Election Commissions by Country   Country Permanent staff Additional staff (hired during election time) Additional staff (from other gvt during election time) Does EMB use unpaid volunteers during elections Afghanistan 455 1155859 0 Never Argentina 80 100 35 Never Bahamas 18 10 75 Never Bhutan 171 126 126 Never Cambodia 300 7000 200 Rarely Canada 328 231 1 Never Costa Rica 900 300 0 On a regular basis Cote d'Ivoire 301 537 60000 Rarely Dominica 5 800 4 Occasionally Ghana 2000 1000   On a regular basis Guam 14 330 30 On a regular basis Guinea 25 2442 684 Occasionally Indonesia 40 547073 0 Rarely Iraq 4000 300 100 On a regular basis Kenya 868 300000 0 Never Rep. of Korea 2800 200000 0 Rarely Kyrgyzstan 164 30 7000 Rarely Malawi 280 90000 30 Never Maldives 60 4800 3900 Never Mexico 15000 65000 0 Never Mongolia 30 20000 10000 Never Mozambique 500 48000 170 Rarely New Zealand 106 18018 11 Never Palestine 100 200 0 Rarely Panama 3000 1000 200 On a regular basis Peru 150 100 50 Never Rwanda 50 75000 0 On a regular basis Samoa 45 10 1500 Never Sao Tome and Principe 32 54   Occasionally Senegal 14 18163 11972 Never Sierra Leone 200 40000 0 Never Suriname 19 700 10 Never Tanzania 143 250000 43 Never Thailand 2000 1000000 2000000 Never Zimbabwe 490 100 100000 Rarely   Interestingly, except for Korea, the countries that employ a large number of permanent or temporary staff differ. Mexico, which employs the largest number of permanent employees, employs only about 65,000 temporary workers, and Afghanistan, which has an overwhelming number of temporary workers, has only 455 permanent employees. In contrast, Korea hires relatively more permanent workers as well as temporary workers to perform regular administrative and legislative election management tasks.   Such institutional and organizational capabilities of the NEC help the organization perform both its regular work and election management tasks effectively. Korea’s NEC has been entrusted with a variety of election tasks since 2005, including the oversight and operation of union leader elections for the National Forestry Cooperative Federation, the National Agricultural and Livestock Industry Cooperative Federations, and the National Federation of Fishery Cooperatives; following the legal institutionalization of corporate restructuring, general shareholders' meetings of private corporations; elections for national university chancellors; selections of executives for the Korean Federation of Community Credit Cooperatives; and union leader elections for apartment cooperatives. The consistent oversight and management of peacetime elections has helped further strengthen the capacity of the NEC. The NEC also introduced early voting in 2014, making it possible for voters to cast their ballot no matter what city or region they happen to reside in and greatly increasing the convenience of elections. The Commission additionally instituted electronic counting, reducing the potential for post-election by counting and announcing ballot counts in a prompt, public manner. An example of this is Korea’s presidential and legislative elections. The voting and ballot counting are broadcast in real time on election day, and election results are announced within 10 hours.   Next, Table 2 shows the degree of recognition that employees of the NEC have of the Commission’s independence and expertise. In terms of independence, Korea’s NEC scored 100 points along with Afghanistan and Costa Rica, but in terms of expertise, it scored 80 points after Bhutan, Malawi, Mexico and Peru. The results show that Korea’s NEC has a relatively positive assessment of its capacity compared to that of other election commissions. Of course, it is worth keeping in mind that Canada and the Netherlands, which are known to have high quality elections, were scored relatively low with regard to independence and expertise, while Mexico and Bhutan, which were rated highly for independence and expertise, received relatively low scores on the quality of their elections. This difference may simply be reflecting the stricter standards applied by New Zealand and Canadian election officials in their self-evaluations as compared to the standards applied by Mexican and Bhutan employees in evaluating their independence and expertise (Jaedong Choi and Jinman Cho, 2020).   The Independence and Professional Capacity of Election Commissions by Country   Country INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL Afghanistan 100 60 Argentina 20 60 Bahamas 0 60 Bhutan 80 100 Cambodia 40 0 Canada 20 40 Costa Rica 100 80 Cote d'Ivoire 20 80 Dominica 80 40 Ghana 60 60 Guam 20 20 Guinea 20 40 Indonesia 60 60 Iraq 60 60 Kenya 60 80 Rep. of Korea 100 80 Kyrgyzstan 20 60 Malawi 80 100 Maldives 80 40 Mexico 80 100 Mongolia 20 80 Mozambique 40 60 New Zealand 40 80 Palestine 20 60 Panama 80 60 Peru 80 100 Rwanda 20 40 Samoa 40 60 Sao Tome and Principe 40 20 Senegal 80 40 Sierra Leone 60 80 Suriname 0 40 Tanzania 60 80 Thailand 40 60 Zimbabwe 60 60   The positive self-evaluation of the independence of Korea’s NEC reflects the historical experience of the Commission members. For example, in 1964, the year after the NEC was created, President Park Chung-hee went to inspect the NEC during his annual new year’s inspection of government departments, but President of the NEC, Sa Kwang-wook, refused to allow the visit, saying it was not appropriate for the executive to visit agencies that were designated as independent under the Constitution. In addition, during the National Assembly by-elections in Donghae City in 1988, Lee Hee-Chang, President of the NEC, filed a simultaneous complaint with the prosecutor's office regarding all five candidates and the election manager in a show of his strong will to have fair elections. This was the first case in the history of the NEC wherein the Commission charged a candidate, and later served as an opportunity to raise public interest in the NEC’s work through the media and engender positive public opinion on the importance of fair election management. These experiences are good examples of the importance of not only the legal and institutional foundation of the NEC but also the active will of the Commission’s members in maintaining the organization’s independence.   III. Fair Elections   The public's trust in political organizations reflects whether or not these political organizations are living up to the public’s expectations. The trustworthiness of the NEC is assessed subjectively by voters on the basis of the NEC's activities. Therefore, when the public recognizes that the NEC contributes to improving election quality, public trust in the organization will increase. This trust in turn creates a basis for the National Election Commission to effectively carry out its management and oversight tasks during future elections.     Rating of the Fairness of the Activities in South Korea's Election Commission     The Korean public generally has a favorable opinion of the NEC. According to Cho Jinman, Kim Yong-cheol, and Cho Young-ho (2015), 71.4% of the public trusted the National Election Commission during the 2012 presidential election. The results of the World Values survey conducted around the same time showed that public trust in the National Assembly was just 24%, 26% for political parties, and 46% in the executive branch of the government. In comparison, trust in the NEC was relatively higher. Figure 3 shows voter perceptions of how fair the NEC’s monitoring and enforcement actions during elections are. In the seventeenth presidential election held in 2007, 61% said the NEC’s actions were fair. Despite the aftermath of the National Intelligence Service's manipulation of public opinion during the eighteenth presidential election, about 52% of the public gave the NEC a positive rating, and similar figures were recorded during the eighteenth general election. Seventy-two percent of the public positively rated the NEC’s activities In the nineteenth presidential election that followed the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, and the proportion of positive respondents in last year's twenty-first general election rose to 76%.   IV. Restrictions on Freedom   However, unlike the function and role of the NEC in ensuring fair elections, which has received quite positive feedback, there are concerns that the restrictions placed on elections by the NEC, especially with regard to election campaigns, are overly limiting. Article 58 of the Public Official Election Act defines election campaign activities as an “action to be elected, or to facilitate or prevent the election of a person,” and regulates all campaign matters including campaign durations, who may perform election campaign activities, how election campaign activities can be performed, and the criteria for examination (Cho YoungSeung 2018). The Article contains very detailed and complex regulations on election campaigns, such as stipulating the allowed and disallowed campaign period, who can and cannot campaign, and what types of campaign activities are and are not allowed. However, as information and communication technology advances and the desire of voters to express their political opinions increases, criticisms have been raised against the Public Official Election Act, stating that the blanket application of election management regulations restricts the freedom of expression. For example, the NEC decided ahead of the 2021 special election that advertisements placed by ordinary voters in daily newspapers calling for the unification of opposition candidates and the "Why have a special election" campaign run by women's organizations were in violation of the Public Official Election Act. The current law prohibits the posting, distribution, or installation of facilities or print materials supporting, recommending, or opposing specific political parties and candidates by banning paper banners and ads between 180 days prior to Election Day and Election Day itself. Another example is the NEC’s request to delete 17,101 online posts made ahead of the twentieth National Assembly election in 2018. A civic group performed an analysis on the posts which were targeted for deletion and found that the majority of the posts simply cited polling results or were critical of candidates with regard to verifying their qualifications. The civic group criticized the deletion of these posts as a violation of the right to know and freedom of expression of voters.[1]   In response to these criticisms, the National Election Commission stated that the decisions on violations of the election law were "to ensure equal opportunities for candidates to campaign and prevent the fairness of elections from being violated by illegal activities."[2] Despite the criticisms that the Public Official Election Act violates election freedom, this statement from the NEC is consistent with the Constitutional Court's view that the Public Official Election Act is generally constitutional. Article 116(1) of the Constitution stipulates that equal opportunities should be guaranteed for candidates in election campaigns, and Article 1 of the Public Official Election Act stipulates that “elections should be conducted fairly through the free will of the people and democratic procedures, and election-related corruption must be prevented.” This focus on fair election management is not irrelevant to the fact that the NEC was established in the Constitution as an independent organization following the corruption in the 315 elections to ensure freedom and fairness in elections. Every time a complaint has been filed against the Public Official Election Act on the grounds that it is unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court has ruled that restrictions intended to prevent election campaigns from overheating and incurring socio-economic losses, or to stop unfair situations from arising wherein campaign opportunities are unbalanced due to economic differences between candidates, do not violate freedom of political expression (Kim Hwan-il, Hong Seok Hwan 2014).   However, following the institutionalization of free and fair elections after democratization, there has been a consensus that Korea’s overly detailed regulatory election management has not been able to keep up with the heightened political consciousness of the public and the other changes of the times. Reflecting this, in April of 2020, the NEC submitted an amendment to the Public Official Election Act to expand political expression through the abolition of Articles 90 and 93(1) of the Public Official Election Act, which comprehensively banned the posting, transmission, and distribution of facilities and printed materials that could influence an election for the 180 days preceding election day. In May of the same year, a revision to the Political Relations Act was submitted to the National Assembly to expand the campaign period for prospective candidates and allow the establishment of gu, city, and county-level parties to boost participation in political parties. However, the amendment also includes provisions for the transparent management of political funds to prevent past harms. If these efforts lead to actual revisions of the laws, voters may participate more actively in the election process, and conditions could be created for political parties and candidates to engage in more diversified political competition with increased accountability.   V. International Democracy Aid   The Korean Election Commission has made efforts to improve their overall election management capabilities and spread the values and norms of democracy necessary to hold free and fair elections by sharing the experiences and knowledge of Korean democracy with new democracies. In particular, in 2014, he led the creation of the Association of World Election Bodies (A-WEB) and established its headquarters in Songdo, Korea. As of 2021, 118 election management bodies from 108 countries from around the world are participating members. Korea, as the leading founding country, provides various supports for the operation of A-Web such as financial support. Members include the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), National Democratic Institute, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and other international organizations that cover election management. These members cooperate with civil society organizations to run various programs to strengthen the election capabilities of new democratic countries. For example, the Election Management and Capacity Building Program focuses on fostering expertise for election officials to cope with possible problems in the election process, and the Specialized Training Program on ICT aims to enhance their understanding of how to use information and communication technology in election management system and operation. In addition, the Election Visitor Program provides election officials with the opportunity to experience and observe election management processes in other countries. These programs provide opportunities for election officials in each country to understand different election systems, share and spread better election management techniques, and contribute to seeking an election management system suitable for each country's situation.   VI. Conclusion   This article attempted to clarify how Korea’s National Election Commission has contributed to improving the quality of Korean elections. The NEC has been guaranteed its independence and neutrality by the Constitution on the basis of strong state capacity and bureaucracy. In addition, the NEC is relatively rich in terms of the human and material resources necessary for election management compared to election commissions in other countries. Members of the NEC have worked to maintain the independence and neutrality of the organization even amid institutional changes, and worked hard to hold fair elections. As a result, the NEC enjoys a higher degree of public trust compared to the National Assembly and the national government and receives positive ratings on the fairness of the elections that it manages. The demand for the new role of the NEC and an externally the call for Korea to contribute to the promotion of global democracy based on its democracy success experience has increased due to the maturity of Korean democracy and the changes of the domestic political environment. The following are just some strategies that should be further examined   First, a legal institutional framework should be established to guarantee the freedom of campaigning from regulatory-oriented election management. After democratization, during the process of establishing procedural democracy, there were concerns of government intervention and financial influence on elections. Therefore, the agenda of the NEC prioritized securing a fair election process. However, various forms of campaigns have emerged due to the increase in the public’s desire for political participation due to the diversification of society and due to the development if information and communication technology. It is difficult to clearly determine whether or not these new forms of campaigns are restricted under the existing Public Official Election Act. As a result, the effectiveness of a “positive” campaign regulation that only allows the method of campaigning as prescribed by law is decreasing. In the future, matters to be prohibited during the election campaign should be specified by law. However, actions that are not prohibited by law should be converted into a comprehensive “negative” type of election management that focuses on and allows for candidates and parties to freely campaign fulfill the voter’s right to knowledge and a t the same time create a space that allows voters to express their opinions freely. Additionally, it is necessary to enhance the people’s right to knowledge and political rights by strengthening the transparency of political funds through the regular disclosure of income and expenditure of political funds.   Second, democratic citizenship education should be strengthened. The quality of elections and democracy is closely related to civic culture. The quality also improves when voters cultivate consciousness and ability as democratic citizens and when civic culture is established through society as a whole. Pre-WWII Germany was thought to have one of the most deeply rooted authoritarian cultures in the world. However, studies have shown that, as constitutional and reforms were implemented, German civil culture began to outpace the U.S. by the 1970s. The German case is a good example of how democratic citizenship education can form civic culture and improve the quality of democracy. Korean voters’ civic consciousness and Korean citizenship culture have also improved substantially compared to the past, but research and education on democratic citizenship education, including media literacy, need to be established to effectively cope with the flooding of fake news and polarization. Furthermore, these experiences can be important assets that Korean democracy cans share with new democracies. In the case of new democracies, conflicts between tribes or religions often appear in the form of violence, not voting. Therefore, it is necessary to improve civic awareness through democratic citizenship education that can cultivate a basic understanding of the value of elections and voting, dialogue and compromise. Currently, there are education programs available for election officials in developing countries but in the future the target for these programs should be expanded to the general public.   Third, more research is needed on the experiences and achievements of Korean democracy. Although extensive research on specific areas such as election law, party law and election management has been conducted until now, very little research has been done on the comprehensive, political and empirical perspective of election governance. Therefore, support and help from academia as well as various institutions such as the election commission, research foundations, and think tanks is needed. In particular, it is necessary to establish a system that can efficiently manage and share statistical data to empirically analyze Korean democracy. Currently, data related to the National Assembly and the legislative process are produced by the National Assembly and data related to the election process and results are produced by the NEC. However, there is not system for systematically managing, disclosing and disseminating data. This demonstrates a common issue that is present in Korean democracy aid in constructing data. Since the enforcement of the Data 3 Act in August 2020, studies using administrative information that has undergone de-identification process have been actively conducted in areas such as health, medical care, and finance. It is necessary to consider ways to apply this development to elections and political fields.   Fourth, legal foundation and financial support are needed to establish a system that can continuously contribute to the development of global democracy based on Korea’s democratic experience. Through various programs and projects, Korea is contributing to the democratic governance of the international community. However, a limitation is that current ongoing projects are carried out individually and segmented into different subjects. Establishing a legal basis for democracy aid can contribute to planning and proceeding with projects from a more systematic and long-term perspective. Additionally, the recent decrease of education for committees due to the budget cut of the World Economic Commission shows that stable financing is essential for continuous aid projects.   Fifth, it is necessary to establish a network and expand partnership with a third party international organization, international NGO and civil society of the aid recipient country. Election management is closely related to the political situation of each country and efforts to establish democratic governance often requires national legal and institutional reform. Therefore, there is a limit of how directly the Korean or other foreign government can lead the aid projects. In order to effectively carry out aid programs, cooperation with international organizations and NGOs is necessary. Creating connections with the local civil society is especially crucial as they can be a partner for the aid projects. In the case of new democratic countries the capabilities of the local civil society is also limited. Therefore, the civil society of the aid recipient country should be supported to strengthen their capacity to discover and publicize various problems of democratic governance.■     References Cho Jinman, Kim Young Cheol, Cho Yeong Ho. 2015. “Assessing the Quality of Elections and Trust in the National Election Commission.” Korean Journal of Legislative Studies 21(1). 165-196 Cho YoungSeung. 2018. “A study on the guarantee system of freedom of election campaign- Constitutional grounds and protection area.” Public Law Journal. 19(2). 155-183. Choi Jaedong, Cho Jinman. “Do National Election Commission's Institutional Design and Workforces Have an Impact on Electoral Integrity?” Journal of Parliamentary Research. 15(2): 145-170. Dahl, Robert A. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Eum Sun Pil. 2015. “Status and Roles of Election Commissions in the Korean Constitution.” Hongik Law Review. 16(1). 219-249. Kim Il-Hwan, Hong Seok Han. 2014. “A Comparative Study on the Regulation of Election Campaign.” Study on the American Constitution 25(1). 31-63.     [1] People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. https://www.peoplepower21.org/Politics/1451265 (Accessed 2021/9/7) [2] National Election Commission https://m.nec.go.kr/site/nec/ex/bbs/View.do?cbIdx=1090&bcIdx=144141 (Accessed on 2021/9/7)     ■ Woo Chang Kang is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His research interests are in political behavior and quantitative political analysis, with particular attention to Korea and the United States. He received his Ph.D. in politics at New York University, and previously taught at the Australian National University.     ■ Typeset by Ha Eun Yoon Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

[Editor's Note] Korea, like every other country, suffered serious and systematic human rights violations but was able to implement a variety of successful transitional justice policies. Human rights violations and transitional justice on the Korean Peninsula is an important factor in the development of democracy due to the diversity of the issue areas. Professor Hun Joon Kim of Korea University outlines Korea’s experience of human rights violations and transitional justice and explores the implications and limitations that this experience can teach other countries. He states that the Korea experience is both universal and unique.Therefore, when seeking international implications for Korea’s transitional justice, it is important to discover and distinguish the universal and unique aspects of the Korean case.     I. Introduction   Transitional justice is a government-level response to past human rights violations (Teitel 2000). During the twentieth century, Korea, like every other country, suffered serious and systematic human rights violations. The victims of oppression rose to the surface following democratization, and official discussions of this issue became full-blown once Kim Dae-jung took office. A variety of successful transitional justice policies that bore results were implemented. South Korea's experience includes issues that other countries can relate to.   A variety of terms are used to describe transitional justice, including punishment, fact-finding, restoration of honor, and compensation. This principle was adopted by the United Nations in 2004 (United Nations 2004), but its universal application to individual countries is controversial. Therefore, it is important to conscientiously and thoroughly catalog the individual experiences of each country to identify the limitations and possibilities of transitional justice. This work was carried out by private organizations, governments, and academia in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Czech Republic, and South Korea (Bickford 2007; CEVRO 2021; Dancy et al. 2014).   The English word "transitional justice" has been used to mean justice in a transition, a changeover or turning point, or a transformation (Cho Jung-hyun 2014; Lee Byung-jae 2015; Kim Hun Joon 2017). The word transition means “to move or change to another state,” changeover or turning point means “to change to another direction or state,” and transform means “to change or move from one state into another.” However, the phrase "transitional justice" is a word linked to the transition to democracy, and so this is the phrase used to refer to the concept in Korea. While the concept itself may be unfamiliar, the phenomenon it refers to is not. In Korea, transitional justice has been called “liquidation of the past,” “punishment for the person in charge,” “restoration of victims' honor,” and “fact-finding.”   The following events well depict the state of Korea's transitional justice. In 2020, President Moon Jae-in attended a memorial service for victims of the Jeju 4.3 Incident. In his memorial address, the President emphasized that “internationally established universal standards” would be applied to the resolution of the Jeju 4.3 Incident. The next day, the Chosun Ilbo argued that "the state should appropriately comfort, apologize to, and compensate any civilians who suffered unjustly," but that those who perpetrated violence should be distinguished from such civilians. Interestingly, while the two perspectives on the 4.3 Incident are different, the Chosun Ilbo also believes that the state should "appropriately" comfort, apologize to, and even “compensate” those who sacrificed unjustly.   The common denominator between the two is that the state's response to serious human rights violations is "appropriate" and "an internationally established universal standard." The conservative media's mention of appropriate "comfort, apology, and compensation" for the 4.3 victims shows that Korean society has reached some level of agreement on this. This suggests the possibility that the Korean case will be presented as a model in the international community. This article aims to outline Korea’s experience of human rights violations and transitional justice and to explore the implications and limitations that this experience can teach other countries.   II. South Korea’s Human Rights Violations and Transitional Justice   Modern Korea endured the Japanese occupation (1910-1945), liberation and the U.S. and Soviet military government (1945-1948), the Korean War (1950-1953), Rhee Syngman’s dictatorship (1948-1960), the April 19 Revolution, and Second Republic (1960-1961), the May 16 military coup d’etat and Park Chung-hee’s military dictatorship (1961-1979), Park Chung-hee’s assassination and the Seoul Spring (1979-1980), the December 12 military coup d’etat, the May 18 Gwangju Democracy Movement, and the authoritarian regimes of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo (1980-1988), and the June 1987 struggle and institutional democratization. During these processes, numerous human rights violations occurred, including genocide, torture, forced disappearances, suspicious deaths, and judicial and extra-judicial killings. Authoritarian power persisted even after democratization, making it difficult to deal properly with the past at the time. As a result, the limited efforts that began with Kim Dae-jung’s civilian government reached their peak during Roh Moo-hyun’s tenure in office. These efforts were flagged under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, but the Moon Jae-in government has been active in its efforts to "address past problems to the satisfaction of the public," listing it as the third priority of the top 100 national policy tasks.   Human rights violations in Korea are diverse and heterogeneous. Since they have occurred over a long period of time, the perpetrators (Japanese imperialists, dictators, authoritarians, democratic leaders) and the scale of each instance differ. The nature of each case (rights violations that occurred during subjugation, the war, abuse of power by personnel, or rights violations that occurred during the process of enforcing coercive policies, etc.) and the scale of damages are also different. Incidents, where more than 1,000 civilians were killed, include the March 1st Movement, the Gando Massacre, the Kanto Massacre, the Jeju 4.3 Incident, the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident, the post-Korean War civilian massacres (including the Bodo League massacre, the prison inmate massacre, the No Gun Ri Incident, the slaughter of collaborators, US military bombings, the massacre of the North Korean military and its allies, and massacres of civilians in North Korean territory), the military purge, the period of the National Defense Forces, and the Geochang Massacre. Incidents, where just 100 people were killed, include the Daegu October Incident, the April 19 Revolution, the Brothers’ Home, the 5.18 Gwangju Democratization Movement, and the Samchung Re-education Camp.   There are also many incidents that are important even though less than 100 civilians were killed. These include the Jaemri Massacre, the Japanese military sexual slavery system, forced labor, the Daegu February 28 Incident, the People’s Revolutionary Party Incident/Civil Servant Re-education Camp Incident, the Bu-Ma Democratic Protests, The Academy Recording Incident, Seongam Academy, the Seosan Development Group, the Sabuk Coal Mine Labor Struggle, the Silmido Incident, Kim Dae-jung’s kidnapping, the suspicious deaths of Chang Chun-ha and Choe Jong-gil, suspicious military deaths, and others. There have also been incidents wherein hostile foreign governments target civilians, such as the 1983 Korean Air 007 shooting incident, and the 1985 bombing of Korean Air 858, which was perpetrated by North Korean agents. While incidents with large numbers of civilian victims have decreased since democratization, human rights violations such as torture and fabricated espionage accusations have continued.   Bereaved families have made continuous demands for compensation, fact-finding, and punishment for those responsible. The dictatorships and authoritarian regimes completely ignored and silenced these families. One example of this is the Park Chung-hee administration's inhuman oppression of the June 25 Korean Society of Bereaved Families of Massacre Victims organized in 1960. However, after the civilian government took over, they began the process of handling the past in earnest, starting with the creation of the Review Committee for the Restoration of the Honor of the Victims of the Geochang Incident and Others. During Kim Dae-jung’s tenure in office, the Jeju 4.3 Committee and the Presidential Fact-finding Committee on Suspicious Deaths were established, and the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, the Fact-finding Committee on Suspicious Military Deaths, the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism, the Truth Commission on Forced Labor under the Japanese Imperial Republic of Korea, and the Committee to Investigate the Assets of Japanese Collaborators were established. At the same time, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of National Defense, and the National Intelligence Service established and operated their own committees. The Moon Jae-in government has established a Committee to Investigate Past Prosecutions, the 5.18 Democratization Movement Fact-finding Committee, and a Second Truth and Reconciliation Committee, and is currently organizing a committee on the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident.   The characteristics of North Korea, which has maintained an abnormal Communist Party dictatorship with successive leaders from Kim Il Sung’s family, are quite different. Massacres, murder, torture, forced disappearance, forced imprisonment, and forced labor have all taken place, and after the great famine, known as the Arduous March, occurred in the 1990s, there was a second round of abuses against North Korean refugees, forced repatriations, and North Korean refugee women and children. The issue of forced kidnappings and detainees also remains unresolved. Some well-known examples of civilian victims include religious oppression, the execution of the Kapsan Faction, the Changpyeong prison camp massacre, the Frunze Military Academy incident, the Shim Hwajo purge, the Songnim Steel Mill massacre, and the Hoeryeong prison camp massacre. Transitional justice in North Korea emerged when defectors began to talk about the reality of life in North Korea. The term transitional justice was specifically mentioned in a report written by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea organized in 2013, and discussions of fact-finding and punishment of those responsible have also been held in Korea and in other countries (Teitel and Baek 2013; Lee Kyu-chang et al. 2016). The following year, civil society organizations, including the Transitional Justice Working Group, began preparations for a transition in North Korea by engaging in work such as monitoring the country, recording human rights violations, and other related tasks.   The scope of human rights violations and the targets for transitional justice on the Korean Peninsula are broad. They span over one hundred years and geographically encompass South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Manchuria, and international waters. The perpetrators are also diverse and include the Japanese imperialists, Korean dictators, authoritarians, and members of democratic regimes, North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Therefore, it is not easy to find a comprehensive model for human rights infringement and transitional justice or understand the implications.   III. International Implications for South Korea’s Transitional Justice   Human rights violations and transitional justice on the Korean Peninsula is an important factor in the development of democracy due to the diversity of the issue areas. The Korean case has the following international implications as a model for transitional justice.   1. The Positive Impacts of Transitional Justice: Cementing a Culture and Institution of Protecting Human Rights and Democracy Transitional justice helps to form and solidify systems and cultures that protect human rights and democracy. More than any other country, Korea has attempted to resolve human rights violations in the past by utilizing various (fact-finding/compensation/investigation) committees, criminal and civil trials, and compensation/reparation systems. Efforts have been made by the government to apologize, revise textbooks and official documents, restore the honor of victims and provide reparations through retrials, commemorate victims and excavate their remains, establish commemorative foundations, support victims, and bereaved families, and designate national memorial holidays (Kim Hyunjun 2017). These efforts have generally resolved the injustices inflicted on victims and raised public awareness of human rights. The National Human Rights Commission of Korea or commemorative foundation, which was made at the recommendation of various committees, protects human rights and keeps past human rights violations from being distorted or disparaged.   Of course, the domestic evaluation of the effectiveness of these transitional justice efforts is not very generous. From the perspective of victims and activists, efforts thus far have been insufficient and there is still a lot to be solved. The victims of the Jeju 4.3 Incident have yet to receive compensation or trauma healing; fact-finding and reporting on the 5.18 Gwangju Democracy Movement still need to be performed, and a memorial foundation and research institution need to be established for the civilian victims of the Korean War. These level-headed assessments and reflections should continue. However, in addition, the achievements of transitional justice need to be objectively and separately evaluated and disseminated.   2. The Positive Effects of Ongoing Controversy: The Mutual Interaction of Transitional Justice Although Koreans seem to be severely divided on the topic of transitional justice by ideology, political orientation, region, age, and gender, everyone is ultimately a member of the same community. Human rights violations and transitional justice have been the main concerns of the community regardless of the nature of the government. The unusually rough battle over the past is proof of the public's interest in the topic. There has never been a case in which past human rights violations have reached a general settlement or passed without controversy. During the Moon Jae-in administration, there was controversy over the legislation regarding the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident and the rulings of trials regarding the Japanese forced labor and comfort women. During the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administration controversies included the March for Lover (Nimel Wihan Haengjingok, symbolic protest song commemorating the 5.18 Gwangju Uprising) controversy, reduction of support for victims of Jeju 4.3, and the careless agreement over the comfort women issue. As the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations ran the Presidential Truth Commission, the 4.3. Commission, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and committees relating to colonization at the same time, controversy emerged each time a report emerged or a trial was held.   Similar debates will continue when liberal governments come to power in the future, and issues of North Korean human rights, abductees, and persons who performed special military missions will be discussed during conservative rule. Interestingly, the promotion of transitional justice for one period or incident has raised the expectations of victims of other incidents to experience the same, regardless of the nature of the government. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Jeju 4.3 had an influence on the handling of the victims of Gwangju 5.18, and the handling of the Soviet Union's Korean Air shooting incident was passed on to agencies investigating North Korea. The North Korean human rights investigation by the Transitional Justice Working Group led to an investigation of the adoption of Korean children overseas. In other words, the experiences of fact-finding, reparations/compensation, trials, and restoration of honor were shared within the community regardless of the nature of the incident, the region, the perpetrator, and the size of the case showing a synergy effect.   3. Transitional Justice as a Process and Not an End Transitional justice in Korea is ongoing and will continue to be so. Revision and re-revision of laws about history, the ongoing investigations by local autonomous governments, the National Assembly, the Ministry of Defense, and the Fact-finding Committee into the Jeju 4.3 and Gwangju 5.18 incidents, the separate committee formed within the Commission to Investigate Suspicious Deaths to investigate suspicious military deaths, and the investigation into assets following the investigation of Japanese imperial collaborators all show that transitional justice is not a “once-and-for-all” resolution to historical wrongs. In the case of Jeju 4.3, even after the official investigation was closed and the government report published in 2003, there were other investigations carried out by the Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation, records discovered in the process of fact-finding, and investigations focusing on the damage to education and religion. All of this is the process of transitional justice and is necessary to consolidate democracy and embed human rights within society.   Of course, since many attempts have occurred over a long period of time there is increasing fatigue, and depending on the nature of the ruling party, there has been backlash to these efforts resulting in reductions of support or the abolition of committees and projects. Such actions give rise to social controversy, and opposing forces actively make legal and political efforts to reverse the previous government's decisions. However, all of these controversies, battles, failures and efforts that have run aground, oppositions, and new attempts are part of the human rights and transitional justice development process and are important factors in the development of democracy. They teach and remember that the slaughter of civilians that occurred during Jeju 4.3, Gwangju 5.18, and before and after the Korean War not only cause direct harm to the victims themselves, but again through the suppression of bereaved families by dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, and the obstruction of fact-finding by military and intelligence agencies.   IV. Limitations of South Korea's Transitional Justice   There are also limitations in discussing Korea as a model of transitional justice. This is entirely due to the specificity of the Korean case   1. The Divided System and the Role of Foreign Countries Korea's most unique aspect and its biggest limitation is its division. The country’s division causes two problems. First, North Korea's human rights violations are continuing, and no proper attempt at transitional justice has yet been made. The North Korean Human Rights Center, the Transitional Justice Working Group, and the Korea Institute for National Unification are performing investigations and preparing for eventual transitional justice, but actual discussions will only become possible after some limited changes occur in North Korea. Second, the division is behind some ideological attacks and splits over Jeju 4.3, the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident, and Gwangju 5.18, and this interferes with the ability to perform comprehensive fact-finding investigations in Korea. Some predict that these events can only be historically assessed and properly commemorated after the country is no longer divided.   Another limitation is the human rights violations that were caused or that occurred under the watch of external forces such as Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Discussions or policies that cover past human rights violations easily become current diplomatic controversies. A well-known example of this is the rulings on the Japanese comfort women and forced laborers which elicited a strong response from the Japanese government. Since Jeju 4.3 also began under the US military government, it has repeatedly been suggested that the US should bear some responsibility and apologize, but it remains to be seen whether the US will respond. After some of the confidential U.S. documents relating to Gwangju 5.18 were released, it was suggested that the US has some responsibility in this incident as well due to the acquiescence of its new military authority. Of course, as seen in the controversy over Germany and Namibia and France and Algeria, the controversy over past human rights violations between imperialist countries and former colonies is not solely a Korean problem. However, Korea has suffered the unique triple structure of Japanese colonization, the US-Soviet military government, and the international support and intervention in the civil war.   2. The Long Path to Reconciliation The ultimate purpose of transitional justice is to achieve social integration and reconciliation by reaching an agreement on the legitimacy, necessity, effect, and expectations of the relevant measures taken. As mentioned above, the presence of controversy alone is not a negative thing. However, if there is only controversy and society does not come close to reconciliation, then there is no reason for other countries to take this path. Of course, there have recently been meaningful reconciliation attempts in Korea regarding Gwangju 5.18 and Jeju 4.3. The recent apologies and visits to the graves of the victims from the opposition party regarding Gwangju 5.18, President Roh Tae-woo's son visiting the graves of the victims, the testimonies of soldiers who participated in the 5.18 Military and Police Offender Committee, and their individual apologies and reconciliation attempts are not enough in and of themselves, but they are important starting points. In Jeju, there have also been important opportunities for resolution such as reconciliation meetings between the families of the victims and the perpetrators, joint memorial services, apologies from the Vice Minister of National Defense and the National Police Agency, and joint visits to the graves of victims by the ruling and opposition parties.   However, despite these reconciliations, there is still a sharp divide when it comes to determining the scale of and targets for transitional justice. When looking at the extreme chasm between opinions over the rulings regarding the comfort women and forced laborers, or the targets of the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident and Gwangju 5.18 laws, it is clear that there is still a long way to go before meaningful social reconciliation can be achieved. When discussing the international implications of the Korean case, it is necessary to distinguish between incidents where domestic agreements have been reached, those where reconciliation has yet to be reached, and incidents where it seems that it will remain difficult to agree. We already know from other cases, like South Africa, that there is a difficult distance between the implementation of a transitional justice system and actual reconciliation. As it is still unknown precisely to what extent reconciliation will be possible in Korea, there will inevitably be limitations in deriving international implications from the Korean example.   V. Conclusion   Korea, or more broadly, the transitional justice attempted on the Korean Peninsula, is both universal and unique. Human rights violations themselves exist in any political community and humanity has suffered through the shared experiences of imperialism, colonialism, two World Wars, and the Cold War. The Jeju 4.3 incident alone is similar to the Greek Civil War, the Taiwan 2.28 incident, and the 1965 massacre in Indonesia. As human rights violations are universal, efforts to resolve them are also universal. The recent US racial issues (the recognition of the Tulsa Massacre), the Canadian/Australian indigenous issues, attempts to reconcile Germany and Namibia, Germany's continued efforts to pay reparations for the deeds of the Nazis and to reconcile internationally (Merkel's recent visit to Auschwitz) show   However, the South Korean transitional justice is also clearly unique. One recent example is how the recent domestic rulings by the Korean court regarding forced laborers and comfort women have had not only domestic but also international political ramifications on the sensitive ROK-Japan relations. The continued division of the two Koreas is also a unique factor. The issue of past human rights violations is sensitive in any country due to perpetrators, victims, ideological divides, and persistent conflicts, but in Korea, it tends to spark unusual political disputes. The recent controversy over whether to move the National Cemetery, the debate over whether to enact the Special Act on May 18 Democratization Movement which would designate victims national meritorious persons, opposition to the passage of the Special Act on the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident and the controversy on the proposed bill to punish acts of spreading false information about the Gwangju 5.18 Democratization Movement are all clear examples of this.   When seeking international implications for Korea’s transitional justice, it is important to discover and distinguish the universal and unique aspects of the Korean case. However, there is one note of caution. We must not be limited by what we decide is universal or unique about Korea’s experience. South Korea developed through the influence of not only the transitional justice experience of countries like South Africa, Taiwan, and Argentina but also by the development of international criminal law and the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Conversely, Korea's transitional justice experience will utilize the developments, achievements, controversy, and conflict to contribute to creating a new international trend.   The following suggestions can be made to countries that are considering implementing transitional justice policies.   Transitional justice regarding decolonization is the first suggestion. South Korea formed a committee to restore the victim's honor and to administer compensation. Although a settlement agreement was signed with Japan, the historical issue has recently become a point of conflict with Japan due to the recent independent rulings of the Supreme Court and continuous uprising from the civil society. This suggests to countries dealing with similar issues that dealing with human rights violations from the past could become a diplomatic issue in the present. Awareness for Human Rights, development of democracy, and transitional justice may not always go hand with efficient foreign policy and sometimes will contradict it. However, the comfort women issue is not just a colonial issue between Korea and Japan. It is a part of the new trend which includes the development of women's rights in international human rights norms and the new victim-centered principle of international law. Therefore, various political and diplomatic solutions that can simultaneously resolve short-term national conflicts should be implemented.   Transitional justice relating to human rights violations during the Korean War and the authoritarian regime is the second suggestion. Korea has promoted various policies to resolve serious human rights violations that occurred pre and post-liberation and during the Korean War, dictatorship, and authoritarian period. In particular, efforts have been made to reveal human rights violations through the overlapping establishment of various central, local, private, and public truth committees. This has, of course, has been met with criticism as a waste of national finances and was stigmatized as a "committee republic” by the opposing party. Various fact-finding and committee operations seem to be conducted individually in a free-for-all manner without a central command. However, from a perspective over time, all these processes have converged in a positive direction towards democracy, the development of human rights, and victim relief. Therefore, countries with similar issues need to continue the truth investigation at the central, local, private, and government levels and must keep records as the basis for future truth committees, trials, reparations, and compensation. Furthermore, this process will provide justification for the reform of major power agencies such as the military, prosecution, and intelligence agencies when the time comes in the future. ■     References Kim Hun Joon. 2017. “The Diffusion of Global Transitional Justice Norms and Its impact: A Case of South Korea.” Journal of Korean Politics, no. 26(1), pp. 101-126. Lee Gyu Chang, Kim Heon Jun, Do Kyeong Ok, Baek Beom Seok. Measures and Tasks for Identifying Responsibility for North Korean Human Rights: Focusing on the Question of Criminal Prosecution within the Scope of the Roman Regulations. Seoul: Korea Institute of National Unification. Lee Byung-Jae. “Transitional Justice and Human Rights: A Framework for Causal Effect Analysis.” Korean Journal of International Relations, no. 55(3), pp. 85-121. Jung Hyun Cho. 2014. “A Study on Transitional Justice in the Context of Reunified Korea.” Seoul International Law Journal, no. 21(1), pp. 25-42.     ■ Hun Joon Kim is a professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His publications relevant to this field include The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea (2014), Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific (ed. 2014), “Are UN Investigations into Human Rights Violations a Viable Solution? An Assessment of UN Commissions of Inquiry” (2019), and “The Prospect of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructive Understanding (2020).”     ■ Typeset by Ha Eun YoonResearch Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

[Editor's Note] With many developing countries in need of help in settling democratization processes and systems, Korea is in a position to act as a bridge between developed and developing countries by sharing its knowledge and experience in democracy and political reform. Taekyoon Kim, a professor at Seoul National University, describes the main contents of Korea’s democratic aid, how to share the Korean democracy experience and the challenges and strategies for Korean democracy in the future. Through this, the author states that the direction of Korea’s democracy should move forward based on its experience and that Korea should use its democratic aid as an asset so that Korea can be recognized as a symbol of peace and democracy in East Asia.     I. The Position of South Korean Democracy in the International Community   South Korea became a part of the club of developed donor countries when it joined as a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010. In 2021, Korea was removed from the list of developing countries and added to the list of developed countries during the 68th UN Trade Development Conference (UNCTAD). Korea's improvement in status in the international community is often explained by focusing on the country’s rapid economic growth, with Korea’s GDP ranking in the top ten countries globally in 2021. However, efforts to shed new light on Korea's role in the international community by focusing on the country’s history and experience of democratization and political development that accompanied economic development are still in need of supplementation. The international community is just as interested in Korea’s democratization as it is in Korea’s economic miracle. Many developing countries hope to receive guidance in their own democratization and improvement in institutions through the sharing of Korea’s experience in the democratization process and implementation of democratic systems.   In many respects, Korea is in a position to share its knowledge and experience in democracy and political reform with developing countries and to provide a bridge between developed and developing countries. To start, like most developing countries in the Global South, Korea has endured colonialism, become independent, and undertaken the project of nation-building. When World War II ended in 1945, Korea became independent and established the First Republic in 1948, at which time the country was divided and embarked on nation-building. These experiences are likely to be the same as those of many developing countries. Second, Korea endured a three-year-long civil war beginning in 1950 and can share its experience of peacebuilding and development with developing countries that have endured similar civil conflicts or clashes. Third, Korea experienced military coups in 1961 and 1979, respectively, as well as a military dictatorship, and the consolidation of democracy after the 1987 democratization. Telling the story of how Korea’s civil society grew and the country’s democratic consolidation will provide important perspectives on potential solutions to problems such as the recent military coup in Myanmar and subsequent democratic crisis, and the military dictatorships and government corruption easily found in Africa. Finally, Korea's historical path, which is compressed into the division of the two Koreas and the efforts to build peace on the Korean Peninsula, has the potential to offer its experiences to countries that are faced with ideological conflict.   As such, the narrative of Korea’s compressed modern and contemporary history spanning colonialism and independence, war and restoration, military dictatorship and democratization, and division and peacebuilding will offer attractive experience and knowledge to partner countries in the Global South. Korea is the only country in the world that has transformed from a developing to a developed country in a relatively short period of time in terms of political development and democracy. This is why there is a growing number of requests for Korea to mediate between the groups of developed and developing countries, and growing interest from developing countries to learn from Korea’s know-how to drive the reform of political systems.   Telling the stories of Korea's experiences in political development and democracy and telling stories that reflect Korea’s political development and democratic experience to support developing countries are rather different in nature. As the former case is Korea’s internal political and historical narrative, it is not necessary to consider the relationship with a third partner developing country, while in the latter case, Korea’s position as a donor country and the third partner developing country’s position as a recipient country should be considered. Since the sharing of Korea’s democratic experiences has not been centered in overseas aid as a key issue like economic and social development, it has yet to occupy a mainstream position in Korea's official development assistance (ODA) and other international cooperation projects. The reason why experience sharing of democracy has not been a key agenda for Korea’s ODA is because political agendas such as democratization, peace, and human rights have not been recognized for their importance compared to economic development/ social development sectors. Additionally, the fact that the term “democracy aid” is itself politically sensitive is another reason. The possibility of donor countries demanding democratization as aid conditionality before providing aid or democracy aid being used as political intervention to instill the donor country’s democratic values cannot be ruled out. In fact, there are many instances of uncomfortable truth in which powerful countries like the US have a history of unilaterally supporting democracy aid with the aim of democratizing authoritarian developing countries. In other words, democracy and political institutionalization are cultural products and political processes that occur naturally depending on the local conditions of the recipient country, not projects that can be imported and transplanted from abroad. Thus, it can be said that the sharing of Korea’s democratic experiences has not received systematic attention from Korean international development cooperation agencies and academia due to having been treated as relatively insignificant in comparison to economic/social development and due to the political sensitivity of democracy aid itself.   Nevertheless, although Korea does not conceptually distinguish democracy aid, it has been implementing development cooperation projects to cultivate values related to democracy and improve institutions, such as strengthening the governance capabilities of governments in developing countries and the capacity of civil society. Although Korea is not yet operating an integrated system for democracy aid, as each development cooperation agency has contributed to improving the democratic system in developing countries in different ways, there will be an important significance in organizing the contents of democratic aid and sharing method at the current stage and the limitations and future improvements to share Korea’s democracy aid experience as a single narrative.   II. The Main Contents of Korean Democracy Aid and Implementing Agencies   Following the end of World War II, democracy aid established itself as a foreign aid policy to transform the political systems of US-centered allies and friends into democracies. As shown in Table 1 below, various conceptual analyses and theoretical and empirical studies share an approach that divides the components of democracy aid into election processes, state agencies and institutions, and civil society areas. This approach focuses more on content related to the establishment, reconstruction, and solidification of the democratic system in recipient countries than on donor countries providing democratic values and political ideologies to recipient countries. Having itself transformed from a recipient to a donor country, from a developing to a developed country, and from a military dictatorship to a democracy within a brief period of time, Korea has shown the strength of its development cooperation regarding knowledge sharing and training projects related to institutional maintenance. In fact, Korea has thus far focused the content of its democracy aid within this scope, strengthening the capacity for management and sustainability as well as the improvement and maintenance of instrumental systems. In other words, development cooperation projects have been planned to support democratic institutions by improving public administration and election systems. In the civil society sector, support for civil society organizations (CSOs) in recipient countries strengthened the advocacy role and service delivery functions of these organizations. With the declaration of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) began to promote stronger cooperation on its multi-layered SDG16 programming strategy based on its link with the components of democracy aid (law, institution building, peace, accountability, etc.) with a particular focus on implementation.   Template for Democracy [1]   Sector Sector Goals Method of Aid Korean Aid Organizations Election Process ㆍFree and fair elections ㆍPolitical party system ㆍElection support ㆍAid for construction of political parties, etc. ㆍNational Election Commission (A-WEB) State Institution ㆍDemocratic constitution and rule of law ㆍIndependent judicial system ㆍRepresentative legislature ㆍAccountable central/local governmental system ㆍDemocratic military system ㆍSupport the building of a constitutional system ㆍAid to support rule of law ㆍSupport for the judicial system ㆍSupport for the development of local government ㆍSupport for civil society- military relations ㆍKorea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) ㆍKorea Institute of Public Administration ㆍJudicial Research and Training Institute ㆍLocal government, etc. Civil Society ㆍStrengthen the advocacy of NGOs ㆍStrengthen civil political education ㆍStrengthen independence of press/ media ㆍStrengthen independence of unions ㆍSupport for NGOs ㆍSupport for citizenship education ㆍSupport for the strengthening of the media ㆍSupport for establishing unions ㆍKOICA ㆍKCOC ㆍKorea Democracy Foundation ㆍKorea Labor and Employment Service, etc.   In Korea, democracy aid has not yet been discussed within the domain of ODA. In addition, planned democracy aid projects within Korea have not yet been organized under a unified conceptual framework or system. Accordingly, each institution selects the content and scale of its budget for such projects very differently, making the dispersal of democracy aid appear quite segmented. Despite this segmentation, the donor targets and the methods through which Korea’s democracy aid is implemented can be categorized into three groups as shown in Table 1.   The National Election Commission (NEC) has become a key player and has shared Korea's experience and knowledge with election agencies in developing countries in an effort to improve their local election management capabilities. The NEC has also shared content supporting the improvement of election management systems and the establishment and development of democracy with countries that are undergoing democratic transitions. The NEC began its work supporting developing countries in 2006 with KOICA's consignment. In 2013, the NEC began to operate an invitational training program at the Korean Civic Education Institute for Democracy organized using the ODA budget. In 2014, the Association of World Election Bodies (A-WEB) was established in Incheon Metropolitan City, and A-WEB provided assistance to the invitational training program before taking it over completely in 2016. The training program primarily focuses on sharing the current status of election management and major issues in developing countries, sharing best practices for election management, inviting experts from international organizations to provide case analysis, and preparing an action plan to address the electoral management situation of each country. As shown in Table 2 below, the budget allotted to the NEC and A-WEB for the training program has been reduced by more than half since 2019, which is one factor reducing the sustainability of Korea’s democracy aid.   Budget Progression for Provision of Capacity-building Training in Developing Countries   Year Budget (million KRW) 2014 250 2015 734 2016 837 2017 628 2018 933 2019 360 2020 360 2021 444   Second, regarding state institutions, Korea’s example can be summed up as grant-type ODA support for the public administration field and the judicial system of governments in developing countries. The main institution in Korea that plans and delivers democracy aid in the public administration field is KOICA. Since 2010, KOICA has strategized public administration as one of the key sectors of foreign assistance, but since 2021, public administration has been restructured into the field of "peace and governance" and detailed goals established for mid-term strategies. Currently, these detailed strategic goals consist of (1) the prevention of armed conflict and the creation of a peaceful foundation for living (peace), (2) the expansion of participatory and inclusive democracy (governance), (3) the building of a safe and just judicial and security system (governance), and (4) the building of an accountable and effective administrative system (governance). If the existing projects planned in the public administration sector focused on building administrative systems by improving the education and training system for public officials, modernizing administrative systems through e-government, and modernizing tax administration, the trend emerging in 2021 is the expansion of democracy aid to democracy promotion, peace, and other such areas. In this context, major programs are being planned to strengthen political accountability for the public by building a fair election and voting system, improving transparency by strengthening audit capabilities to prevent corruption, and enhancing the accessibility of administrative services for local residents by strengthening local administrative capacity. In addition, in order to improve the inclusivity of laws and institutions, key programs are being shared that promote the rule of law by strengthening the personnel and institutional capacity of the judicial sector, protect the human rights of women and vulnerable groups, strengthen security capacity to promote peace and create a safe society and ensure citizenship and social rights. As mentioned earlier, KOICA is planning content and implementation methods for its major programs in the field of peace and governance based on Korea's know-how in improving public administrative institutions, the core values of SDG16, implementation programming strategies, and the phased introduction of a human rights-based approach.     The Scale of KOICA’s Peace and Governance Aid (2016-2019, Unit: million KRW) [2]     Figure 1 shows that the overall scale of support for KOICA's peace and governance programs has continued to increase over a four-year period (2016-2019). Looking at a breakdown of the figures by year, 15.6 percent of a total of 99.6 billion KRW was allocated to peace and governance in 2016, followed by 16.0 percent of 101.7 billion KRW in 2017, 18.1 percent of 123.7 billion KRW in 2018, and 16.9 percent of 127.4 billion KRW in 2019. On average, 16.7 percent was dedicated annually to peace and governance sector. The stable provision of 15 to 18 percent of the support budget to peace and governance sector means that there is sustainable demand for such programs from partner countries, and indicate the incredible importance of these programs to ensure a safe and sustainable living situation for individuals. Despite this fact, records show that KOICA's budget for the public administration sector in the 2000s accounted for about 23-24 percent of the total budget, meaning it is necessary to reconsider the current budget.   Looking at the percentage of the budget dedicated to the establishment and implementation of each sub-goal in the peace and governance sectors in 2021 in accordance with KOICA’s mid-term strategy compared to the total amount of support provided over the past four years (Figure 2), an overwhelming 81 percent of the total spent is in the legislative, judicial, and administrative sectors in service of governance goals including participatory and inclusive democracy, safe and just justice and security system, accountable and effective administrative institutions. In contrast, just 19 percent was spent in pursuit of the peace sector goals. If we examine the allocation of support among the various governance goals, we find that the majority (62 percent) was put towards the administrative (responsible and efficient administrative system) sector, followed by the judicial (safe and just judicial and security system) sector (19 percent) and the legislative (participating and inclusive democracy) sector (5 percent). The most important initiatives of KOICA’s democracy aid thus far have been its public administration capacity building to improve administrative institutions and the invitational training programs. Public administration and the improvement of administrative institutions are sectors where Korea has a comparative advantage.     Scale of Support for Each Strategic Sub-goal in Peace and Governance (Unit: million KRW) [3]     In addition to KOICA, the Judicial Research and Training Institute, the Korea Institute of Public Administration, and local government groups provide active support for state agencies, government systems, and public administration of developing countries. The majority of this support is contributed at the invitational training program for civil servants in developing countries, with each organization contributing by sharing expertise and capacity building based on its own professional strengths. The Judicial Research and Training Institute, primarily achieves its goal of contributing to social integration, an independent judiciary, and the improvement of judicial systems of recipient countries. It achieves this through cooperation and exchanges with developing countries via ODA projects and foreign legal training targeting developing countries, generally held at the International Judicial Cooperation Center. In 2020, the Institute held training sessions and online seminars for trainees from Nepal and Uzbekistan. Similar to the Judicial Research Institute, the Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA) mainly conducts training programs for public officials from developing countries and joint research and consulting projects with domestic and foreign institutions. However, KIPA’s budget is significantly smaller than that of KOICA. Local governments, which generally operate on small budgets, have been increasing the number of international cooperation programs, having primarily focused on friendship exchanges with local governments in developing countries. In July of 2021, ODA Korea decided to award local governments an ODA support budget, and the governments receiving the money plan to expand their activities into the local government public administration sector.   Third, based on the benefits they received from overseas institutions such as Misereor, the Asia Foundation, and German EZE during the country’s democratization, Korea's CSOs have also been engaged in a variety of activities to support the work of civil society in developing countries. First of all, KOICA has a budget to support CSOs through a civil society cooperation program, which is being promoted as a project to improve the quality of life of residents of partner countries in cooperation with private partners including civil society, academies, and social economy organizations to reduce poverty and increase welfare in developing countries. The budget for this program has been continually increasing, with 26.7 billion KRW allocated in 2017, 27.1 billion KRW in 2018, 29.4 billion KRW in 2019, and 37.6 billion KRW in 2020. However, when KOICA's support for the public administration sector is viewed under the OECD DAC CRS codes, public policy and administrative management account for 41.86 percent of the total spent, while public administration accounts for 29.1 percent, totaling about 71 percent of the budget. In contrast, the budget for the main issues of democratic governance breaks down to 0.18 percent spent on elections, 0.37 percent on anti-corruption organizations and institutions, 0.44 percent on civic group strengthening, 0.23 percent on human rights, and 2.37 percent on gender equality. It is clear that outside of public administration, the budget for democratic governance, particularly civil society and cooperation, is quite small.   As one of Korea’s most well-known development cooperation consultative bodies, the Korea NGO Council for Overseas Development Cooperation (KCOC) is one of several key organizations contributing to the field of democracy aid in civil society. According to the KCOC, in 2019, 27 Korean development cooperation CSOs cooperated with local partner CSOs in developing countries on 111 projects in 31 countries, spending 6.8 billion KRW (97.3 percent) of their own funds and 180 billion KRW (2.7 percent) government funding. This confirms the minor scale of government funding for such projects. The Korea Democracy Association, which also works in the field of civil society, aims to strengthen its status as a key democratic organization contributing to the mutual promotion of international civil society, locate personnel from overseas who contributed to the Korean democratization movement and promote related commemorative projects, increase youth participation, and enhance international cooperation through democracy and public diplomacy. However, its budget for pursuing such goals remains small.   In order to support unions and the institutionalization of labor-management relations, the Korea Labor and Employment Service (KLES), which operates under the Ministry of Employment and Labor, has been implementing development cooperation projects in developing countries since 2011. The KLES carries out these projects by sharing their know-how on topics such as labor-management relations, labor policies, and policies to improve the labor environment. For international exchange and cooperation projects, the KLES provides support for overseas investors as well as professional services relating to labor and employment targeted at domestic companies that are or are planning to enter overseas markets. The KLES has also cooperated with the ILO on aid projects including employment education for foreigners, but with a budget set at 800 million KRW for foreign exchange and cooperation aid projects, these efforts are limited and suffer from a lack of funding.   Overall, the current democracy aid provided by Korea that falls into the category of development cooperation can be said to fit within election processes, state agencies/institutions, and civil society, which form the basic sectors in the internationally shared democracy aid template (Table 1). We can see that the primary democracy aid from Korea is in the form of knowledge-sharing and training programs on policy development and institutional improvements. However, at the same time, there are three problems to address. First, Korea's democratic experience is not being properly discussed and reflected in the current democratic governance aid being provided to different sectors. It is necessary to supplement the current content with narrative elements to tell the story of Korea's experience. Second, it is difficult to expect that an organic linkage or synergy effect will be created between the segmented aid provided for election processes, state agencies/institutions, and civil society. This is because individual aid entities do not jointly develop or integrate the planning and implementation of their aid content. Third, the small budget problem faced by all Korean organizations providing democracy aid highlights the mobilization of financial support from the government and civil society as a necessary condition for a future narrative project on the experience of democracy aid.   III. Methods of Sharing South Korea’s Democracy Experience   In addition to analyzing the democratic governance content provided by Korean development cooperation agencies, it is necessary to understand how said content is delivered to partner countries. For convenience, we will use the example of KOICA, the organization that delivers the majority of Korea’s democracy aid. The methods of democracy aid delivery to developing countries can be categorized as shown in Figure 3 below.     Scale of KOICA’s Support for Peace and Governance Programs by Type (Unit: million KRW) [4]     Looking at the scale of support by type of peace and governance program provided by KOICA over the four-year period between 2016 and 2019, we can see that project methods received 45.4 percent, invitational training programs got 16.8 percent, volunteer groups received 17.8 percent, development consulting was given 10.5 percent, public-private partnerships were given 4.0 percent, international agency cooperation projects got 3.1 percent, small-scale grant-type aid received 2.1 percent, and humanitarian aid received 0.3 percent of the total support. The majority of peace and governance programs are delivered in the form of projects. Development consulting, small-scale grant-type aid, and national cooperation projects together account for about 60 percent of the total. This means that most projects, such as establishing legal institutions and systems and improving institutions, are performed at the request of recipient country governments. In other words, partner country governments can officially request to receive the opportunity to improve their institutions from Korea using the country’s democracy experience. However, it is difficult to accurately grasp how often recipient country governments actually request grant-type support from the Korean government as a result of advanced sharing of knowledge of the specific details of Korea's democratic experience and the advocacy role of civil society. In addition, it can be said that the training program to strengthen the capacity of public officials indirectly provides democracy aid by actively improving awareness of democratic governance, human rights, and gender issues, and cultivating expertise on election systems, state institutions/public administration, and civil society.   Domestic CSOs have continued to criticize the low amount of democracy aid (4.0 percent) allocated for civil society cooperation and public-private partnerships. In 2019, the "Basic Policy of Government-Civil Society Partnership in the Field of International Development Cooperation" was signed, emphasizing that Korean civil society will contribute to the establishment of international development cooperation policies for donor and developing countries, ensuring the participation of the people in their implementation and the creation of a democratic society. To this end, the government plans to expand cooperation with civil society in developing countries and increase the budget allocated to support civil society public-private partnerships. There are plans to expand the efforts on the basis of this 2019 policy partnership to tell the story of Korea’s civil society so that they can share their knowledge of democracy and peacebuilding.   In addition to these national cooperation projects and support through civil society, democracy aid is also rendered by KOICA through cooperation with third-party partners. Two examples of this are KOICA’s humanitarian support and cooperation projects with international organizations. However, cooperation projects with international organizations are allocated just 3.1 percent of the total KOICA peace and governance program budget, while humanitarian aid receives 0.3 percent. For international cooperation projects, the UN organizations and multilateral development banks recommend that Korea share its historical experiences of economic and political development with other developing countries, create a development cooperation knowledge-sharing program (KSP), and expand the projects that it offers to developing partner institutions. Advanced donor countries prefer multi-bi methods, where aid is delivered through international organizations rather than given as direct support to partner recipient countries, and budgets for this type of aid are increasing. Since the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an increased emphasis placed on untact methods of aid delivery, and as there is likely to be a similar emphasis on humanitarian and cooperation projects with international organizations going forward, it seems there will be an opportunity for Korea to actively connect its democracy aid experiences and know-how with multilateral aid provision. In addition, there is a need to diversify KOICA’s project types in order to meet the demand from multiple, diverse stakeholders to participate in the KOICA peace and governance program.   Finally, an approach to connect the method of Korea's delivery of democracy aid and loan-type aid should also be sought. This is because when it comes to building infrastructure to improve democratic systems and institutions, it is more important to mobilize loan-type aid methods to provide infrastructure services such as media centers or broadcasting station systems than grant-type aid centered on technical cooperation and knowledge sharing. However, Korea’s democracy aid is still in the early stages, and the conceptual discussions and demands for institutional efforts to connect loan-type aid with Korea’s democracy experience have not yet begun.   IV. Limitations and Response Strategy: Agenda for South Korean Democracy Aid   The sharing of Korea's experiences with democracy with developing countries to support their democratization, help encourage the consolidation of a healthy democracy, and efforts to revise the content and delivery method of foreign aid provide important meaning to both Korea as a donor country and its partner recipient countries. It is important to understand the following current limitations and seek ways to respond to these limitations to systematize and fully construct the story of Korea’s democracy aid in the future.   First, it is necessary to reorganize the domestic system and create a knowledge network to share Korea’s experiences of democracy through public-private cooperation. It is highly likely that organizations related to development cooperation in Korea are still not familiar with the concept of democracy aid. Instead, they use similar individual concepts and focus on areas such as peace, human rights, gender, refugees, civil society, and governance rather than democracy as a whole. There is no need to go overboard and intentionally integrate all of these efforts, but it will be important to cooperate and exchange information on various democracy aid-related projects to establish a loose type of knowledge network and avoid overlapping areas and projects. In addition to government-civil society public-private partnerships, it will be important to link academic research and organizations to the knowledge network platform so that they can assist in the work of organizing the narrative of Korea’s democracy aid experience. If a basic foundation is established so that various stakeholders can participate in the democratic knowledge network, it will create an effective space in which a variety of voices and approaches are reflected.   Second, it is necessary to find aid strategies to support democratic governance at the pan-government level. Rather than trying to establish Korean-style democracy aid as a model, which runs the risk of appearing to be an aid condition for developing countries, efforts should be made to improve the support system so that democratic governance that encompasses individual freedom, human rights, protection for minority rights, and rule of law can be established within the historical and political context of the recipient countries. This consolidation of democratic governance is expected to have a more practical socioeconomic aid effect by improving the resilience of recipient countries to overcome the internal and external crises that they frequently face. Korea's development aid has thus far shown public administration and institutional improvement to be its strengths. However, efforts must be made to systematically overhaul the existing Korean development aid model by connecting it with the universal language of development cooperation of establishing effective democratic governance and further expanding the content and modules of the country’s democracy aid. To this end, a system that controls the political sensitivity of democracy aid and first identifies what the demand of recipient countries is and reflects it in project design and democracy aid strategies should be established.   Third, in order to sustainably institutionalize Korea’s contributions to the development of global democracy, it is necessary to clarify the relevant laws through legislation. Korea is already contributing to the development of democratic governance in the international community through a variety of projects and programs, although the name democracy is not used. This is why it is important to institutionalize these contributions in a more systematic, integrated, and effective manner. Such legislative efforts can systematically support the democratic development and resilience of developing countries and will help increase the amount of financial resources on an institutional level within the legal framework compared to the current situation, where the entities running projects are fragmented and have to secure their budgets individually. Legislative activities on Korean democracy aid can contribute to planning and implementing projects that reflect more professional and in-depth considerations of democracy as compared to current projects, and can also contribute to the development of domestic democracy capabilities by demonstrating the effects of introspection and education on democracy to domestic groups participating in democracy aid projects as well as to recipient countries. Specifically, "democracy promotion" can be added to paragraph 1 of the Framework Act on International Development Cooperation, and specific implementation measures can be stipulated in subordinate statutes such as the "Basic Plan for International Development Cooperation” or “Comprehensive International Development Cooperation Implementation Plan.” It is also possible to implement specialized democracy support projects by enacting laws to establish funds or foundations related to democracy support.   Fourth, aside from enacting laws related to democracy support, it is possible to create a liberal democracy fund with some degree of financial support so that various organizations can seek democracy aid. As discussed earlier, democracy aid-related organizations besides KOICA are engaging in projects with very small budgets that are not sustainable in the long term. While it is important to increase the government budget, it will also be important to simultaneously seek ways to create and autonomously manage private funds so that such organizations do not have to rely solely on the government for funding. Korea does not yet have a foundation that shares Korea's democratization experience with developing countries and supports democracy in developing countries. The ASEAN Human Rights Fund Act was recently proposed in the National Assembly in May 2021, but legislative efforts are needed to support democracy in developing countries globally without regional, organizational, or funding restrictions.   Fifth, it is necessary to expand the channels that can strengthen the involvement of local civil society in order to support the democratic governance of intended partner countries. Since recipient country governments are unlikely to ask Korea to improve its politically sensitive democracy-related institutions, civil society needs state support to expand the capacity and opportunities to engage in institutional improvement and raise issues related to democratic governance. Civil society organizations in recipient countries can publicize various issues in democratic governance areas such as anti-corruption, freedom of the press, and human rights advocacy more directly than the government. Civil society groups from developing countries can cooperate with local groups through a Korean CSO alliance or they request support for democratic governance improvement from the Korean government directly.   Sixth, there is a data problem. Since the methods and entities by which Korea's democratic experience is disseminated are diverse and fragmented, relevant statistical data is not systematically linked. It is an urgent task to unify the statistical data between institutions, and the knowledge network platform mentioned above will be able to take on the role of managing statistical data and documents for smooth communication.   Seventh, in order to formulate the experience of Korean democracy aid into a single narrative, it will be important to institutionalize the unique expertise and experience of each aid organization into a knowledge-sharing program and lay the foundation for continuing to accumulate such knowledge in the future. This KSP will make it possible to offer developing countries assistance in improving democratic institutions in the manner they request through support for development consulting on issues such as human-rights based approaches, responses to gender issues, and so on. The current KSP project being promoted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and KDI is centered on Korea's economic development experience, so there is clearly a limit to the inclusion of Korean democracy and political and social development experiences. The most realistic way forward at the moment would be to use the Development Experience Exchange Partnership Program (DEEP), a development consulting project run by KOICA.   Eighth, efforts should be made to expand partnerships so that a variety of actors can participate in development cooperation projects which share Korea’s democracy experience. Knowledge-sharing does not have to be limited to civil society associations. It can be expanded to support the improvement of the parliamentary system through participation in the National Assembly, fundraising through private companies, and fostering private companies in developing countries.   Ninth, it will be important to emphasize that Korea’s cooperation with developing countries to share its democracy experience is not intended to convey the uniqueness of Korea’s experience, but rather is intended to convey the connection that Korea’s democracy experience has to universal democratic values shared by the international community. It is important to seek to strengthen multi-layered cooperation centered on the core values of SDG16, and to make an effort to emphasize that the strategies and implementation focus of SDG16 are within the same context as Korea's democracy aid projects. In addition, efforts should be made to ensure that human rights-based approaches, environmental, and social, and human rights impact assessments, and the principle of accountability are embedded in the planning and implementation of Korean democracy aid. This will allow the more active pursuit of multilateral cooperation methods with international organizations (multi-bi aid, trusts, and so on).   Finally, Korea's democracy experience and aid have implications at the macroscopic level as a global narrative, and offer an important rudder to steer Korea’s democracy forward. Currently in East Asia, the realist national interest-oriented politics of great powers such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia are sharply opposed, and discussions on peace and democratic governance are easily derailed as they seek the protection of their own national interests on issues such as North Korea’s nuclear weapons, territorial disputes, and historical disagreements. It is time for Korea to harness its historical experience of democratic governance to play the role of “Northern Europe of East Asia,” and democracy aid should be used as a soft power asset so that Korea can be recognized as a symbol of peace and democracy in East Asia.      [1] Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p, 88. [2] KOICA Statistics on Grant-based Aid (2016-2019) [3] KOICA Statistics on Grant-based Aid (2016-2019) [4] KOICA Statistics on Grant-based Aid (2016-2019)     ■ Taekyoon Kim is a professor of International Development and an associate dean for academic affairs at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. He currently serves as an executive director of the Korea International Cooperation Agency and a member of the Sustainable Development Committee for the city of Seoul. He also served as a visiting professor at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, USA, Lingnan University, Hong Kong and Tübingen University, Germany. His recent publications include "Tax Reform, Tax Compliance and State-Building in Tanzania and Uganda," Africa Development 43(2), 2018 (co-authored), and "Social Politics of Welfare Reform in Korea and Japan: A New Way of Mobilizing Power Resources," Voluntas 30(2), 2019 (co-authored). He received his Ph.D. in international relations from Johns Hopkins University-SAIS and D.Phil. in social policy and intervention from the University of Oxford.     ■ Typeset by Ha Eun Yoon Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]