[Editor`s Note] While the EU had initially focused on engagement with North Korea in the 1990s, the North Korea nuclear crisis served as a turning point, pushing the EU to change its strategy to ‘critical engagement.’ In this commentary, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Professor of International Relations at King`s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance, explains the trajectory of EU’s policy towards North Korea. The EU’s first Asia strategy had called for the EU to become involved in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, establishing diplomatic relations with the country. However, at the onset of the second nuclear crisis and further acceleration of North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons program, the EU responded by ramping up pressure. To this date, the EU has been increasingly critical of the hermit kingdom, using a strategy that admonishes and pressures Pyongyang.     The EU first developed a policy towards North Korea in the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War and the launch of its first Asia strategy in 1994, the EU developed a policy that had engagement at its core. In the early 2000s and mainly as a result of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, the EU launched a ‘critical engagement’ strategy mixing carrots, such as aid and talks, with sticks, including sanctions. Over time, however, the EU’s policy towards North Korea has sidelined engagement in favor of criticism, condemnation, and pressure. As of 2021, the EU’s engagement with North Korea is minimal. In a

■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   [Editor’s Note] While the EU had initially engaged with North Korea through a conciliatory approach, its stance against the authoritarian state has been more critical, manifest in its policy of ‘critical engagement.’ In this commentary, Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Professor of International Relations at King's College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance, claims that the EU, among key players, cannot remain idle amid the growing security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula fueled by mutual hostility. The author claims that the EU should adopt a more proactive approach in order to accommodate reconciliation between the two Koreas and address the issue of denuclearization. The author adds that the EU's role in dealing with issues on the Korean peninsula is irreplaceable, given its experience and technical expertise. Specifically, the union and European countries can support security on the Korean Peninsula by hosting track-2 dialogues or pressing Pyongyang on its human rights record.     The two Koreas, the U.S., and, to an extent, China are the key players in addressing the security dilemma in the Korean Peninsula. But other actors can and should play an important supporting role, helping to reduce tensions and nudge North Korea away from its nuclear program.   The EU is one of the third parties that can support the two Koreas as they struggle to achieve reconciliation. It can also help the U.S., South Korea, and the international community at large as they seek to reach a deal with Pyongyang that will cap and roll back its nuclear power. In particular, Brussels wants to be a more relevant player in Asian security affairs, as part of its ‘tilt’ towards Asia, its launch of an Asian security strategy in 2018, and its recently launched Indo-Pacific strategy. Furthermore, the EU has a strategic partnership with South Korea in 2010, which also covers security. Simply put, the North Korean conundrum is a key security issue that it cannot ignore.   Over the past two decades, the EU has been implementing a policy of ‘critical engagement’ towards North Korea. In theory, this policy mixes carrots and sticks. But in reality, the EU’s policy has clearly veered towards the ‘critical’ component in recent years. Brussels is implementing sanctions on North Korea in relation to its nuclear program, cyber-attacks, and human rights abuses. The EU has also refused to re-start its bilateral dialogue with North Korea, even at the height of inter-Korean and US-North Korea talks in 2018. In addition, economic aid to North Korea was on a clear downward trend even before the COVID-19 pandemic.   Simply put, the EU needs to take a more proactive approach and also focus on the ‘engagement’ component of its policy to become a more relevant and constructive security player in the Korean Peninsula. Its critical engagement policy has been in place for almost two decades, yet arguably the EU is a less relevant actor in the Korean Peninsula today than it was when the policy was launched. To a large extent, this is because Brussels has essentially abandoned any meaningful attempt at engagement with Pyongyang.   Let’s start with inter-Korean reconciliation. The EU itself was born as a project for countries that had fought against each other during World War II to reconcile with each other, most notably France and Germany. Over the decades, the EU and Europe have been home to different reconciliation processes. These include German reunification, the Helsinki Process, Northern Ireland, or the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU itself.   Certainly, the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and Europe are very different. But the experience of the EU and Europe still holds valuable lessons for the Koreas. One of the key European lessons is the importance of patience. Reconciliation in Europe was not achieved in one day. Or even in one year. It took years – when not decades – of talks and engagement for Europeans in opposite camps to accept each other and decide that leaving past grievances aside was the best way forward. The above-mentioned examples of the EU, Germany, and Northern Ireland are cases in point.   Along with patience, multi-faceted engagement is another valuable European lesson. Having politicians talk to each other is crucial, for reconciliation and peace need brave leaders. But politicians come and go. In sharp contrast, civil society stays. Often for decades. It is therefore civil society that can maintain the momentum for reconciliation over the years. Reconciliation becomes more difficult without civil society groups helping each other, businesses strengthening economic links, and cultural groups exchanging visits.   The EU and European countries should share their experiences of reconciliation with the two Koreas on a more regular basis. This is a value-added that few others can bring to the table. And South and North Korea can learn from these experiences and adapt them to their own circumstances.   Let’s now follow with North Korea’s denuclearization. Even if it is unlikely that Pyongyang will ever willingly give up its weapons, it should be possible to reach a deal with the Kim regime in which it agrees to cap and roll back its nuclear program. In other words, an arms control deal. After all, every single U.S. president dating back to Bill Clinton has reached a deal with the Kim family including a commitment to denuclearization. The Biden administration has indicated that the Singapore joint statement of June 2018 remains valid.   The problem, then, is implementation of any denuclearization agreement that the U.S. and North Korea may sign. When it comes to implementation, the EU can play an important supporting role. To begin with, the EU and different European countries have technical expertise that can help in the dismantlement, transportation, and disposal of nuclear materials. Pyongyang may feel that European experts are less influenced by politics than those of other countries and should therefore participate in this process.   Also, North Korea will demand steep payments in exchange for taking steps towards denuclearization. As long as the EU has a say, it should welcome participation in the provision of an economic package that helps the North Korean economy. The EU does not want a ‘KEDO 2.0’, with Brussels paying while others – essentially the U.S. – take decisions. But the EU and European countries have shown their willingness to help countries that decide to move away from their more provocative behavior. A North Korea moving towards denuclearization would be such a case.   The EU and European countries can certainly also support Korean Peninsula security by hosting track-2 dialogues or pressing Pyongyang on its human rights record. But so can others. When it comes to experience in bringing about reconciliation and the details of denuclearization, however, the EU can play a unique role. This would be to the benefit of the two Koreas, the US, and Brussels itself.■     ■ Ramon Pacheco Pardo is Professor of International Relations at King's College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance. He is also King's Regional Envoy for East and South East Asia. He is the author of North Korea-US Relations from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. Professor Pacheco Pardo holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).     ■ Typeset by Seung Yeon Lee Research Associate   For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | [email protected]  

[Editor`s Note] Propaganda, among other tools, is a widely used means by the North Korean government to bolster the basis of its regime. The use of distorted news through inaccurate publications is one way in which propagandistic information is circulated within not only North Korea, but also in foreign countries online. In this commentary, Dr. Sandip Mishra, Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, argues that the old way of propaganda negatively impacts North Korea’s reputation. To illustrate, Rodong Sinmun has disseminated inaccurate information on North Korea’s international reputation and its diplomatic relations with other countries; this has not been taken seriously by other countries. Notably, he argues that North Korea’s claims on its relations with India have been found to be based on inaccurate or nonexistent facts. The author emphasizes that North Korea must realize that they need to stop producing propagandistic news and focus on their political and economic reforms.    

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note 30 years have passed since North Korea’s then “nascent” nuclear program was identified as a “gravely serious threat.” Since 1991, its once budding nuclear program has amassed into a large-scale program, posing a grave challenge for the nuclear proliferation regime and regional security in Northeast Asia. In the following Global NK Commentary, Ben Forney, PhD candidate at the Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies, explains that international coordination efforts to deter North Korea from developing its nuclear weapons have been inconsistent and ineffective. Manifest in cable exchanges between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo and President George H.W. Bush’ solo enactment of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, unaccompanied by any consultation of his international counterparts, the US stance towards North Korea since 1991 has been contradictory and erratic. With the Biden administration facing a long list of domestic and international concerns not pertaining to the North Korean nuclear regime and the Moon administration’s difficulties into its final year, Forney asserts that prospects for meaningful progress on the North Korean nuclear issue seem bleak.     On August 13, 1991, the US State Department sent a classified diplomatic cable to Tokyo, summarizing the key points of a meeting held between US and South Korean officials the previous week. The topic of the meeting was North Korea’s nascent nuclear program. In the cable, the Japanese were informed of the threat this posed to the region and were encouraged to present unified opposition against Pyongyang’s increasingly defiant behavior. Thirty years later, it is a testament to the failure of the international community’s approach to North Korea that the language used in the cable remains relevant and repeated in current policy discussions.   “Both sides agreed that the development by North Korea of nuclear weapons usable materials posed a gravely serious threat to security in North East Asia[...] We agreed that we should exert maximum efforts diplomatically to find a solution to this problem[...] The importance of pressure from the broad international community was stressed[...] inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities by the IAEA should be devised to maximize pressure at each stage.” (emphasis added)[1]   As even the most casual North Korea watcher will recognize, variations of these phrases have been repeated by American administrations ever since. Policymakers have called the North Korean nuclear weapons program a “grave concern”[2], while “maximum pressure” remains a catchphrase for security establishment hawks.[3] At the same time, Washington continues to pursue unified collaboration with Seoul and Tokyo. Secretary of State Blinken recently emphasized the Biden administration’s intention to engage in “close cooperation and consultation with the Republic of Korea, with Japan and with other key partners, including resuming pressure options and the potential for future diplomacy”. [4]   However, this cable is most revealing not for its continued relevance to policymakers, but for the context in which it was written and the actions taken by the George H.W. Bush administration in the months following its release. The year 1991 saw the final collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the zenith of America’s “unipolar moment” of global dominance. It was during this brief period of optimism and relaxed tensions that President Bush enacted one of the largest unilateral disarmament initiatives in history. Known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), this policy saw the US withdraw most land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, remove strategic bombers from alert, and stand down portions of the ICBM program. Crucially, the PNIs were launched without guarantees of reciprocation from Russia or any other nuclear power. [5]   The president announced the PNIs on a primetime television address on September 27, 1991. The announcement was remarkable because, unlike most nuclear weapons policies requiring years of planning and multiple agencies, the PNIs went from idea to implementation in less than a month and involved few people outside a core group of administration security officials. [6]   US allies also had little warning that the announcement was forthcoming and had only a few opportunities to provide input. Nowhere was this more apparent than in South Korea, where the US stored approximately 100 nuclear warheads, down from around 540 in 1976. [7]   Just four days prior to his address, President Bush met with his South Korean counterpart Roh Tae Woo at a General Assembly meeting of the United Nations in New York. According to officials, the PNIs were not discussed in the meeting. The upcoming nuclear weapons withdrawals were only made known to the Roh administration via a secret exchange between US Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Korean National Security Advisor Kim Jong Hwi. In these talks, it was left ambiguous as to whether air-delivered nuclear weapons, which were housed at a US base in South Korea, would be included in the PNIs. [8]   When The Washington Post reporter Don Oberdorfer exposed this lack of consultation in an article on October 19th, the South Korean administration reacted with disappointment and frustration. It had just been announced that the air-delivered nuclear weapons would, in fact, be removed from the peninsula, and the Roh administration looked as if it had been forced into accepting a unilateral move from the US that the North would interpret as a weakening of US commitment to South Korean security. The timing was particularly sensitive, as a planned North-South meeting was just days away. Kim Jong Hwi, who was to be a member of the South Korean delegation, made his displeasure known to the American ambassador, Donald Gregg. Gregg immediately cabled Washington:   “Kim said that people in Seoul were ‘really concerned’ about the absence of specific pre-consultation [...] Kim caustically noted that non-consultation was ‘nothing new’ and cited earlier unilateral announcements on the closure of U.S. air bases in Korea. He also pointedly referred to the contrasting pattern of prior consultation with our European allies.”[9]   Uncoordinated Efforts Deemed Less Useful Than No Efforts – An Insight into Why the North Korean Nuclear Regime Remains a “Grave Concern".   Anxious to assuage Seoul’s concerns, Wolfowitz replied that “[...] we do take seriously any signal that could be erroneously interpreted by both the North and the South regarding the strength of our commitment” and promised to meet with Kim in the coming weeks. [10]Subsequent exchanges continued, culminating in President Roh’s November 8, 1991 Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This, in turn, led to the North-South Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on January 20, 1992.   The eventual collapse of the Joint Declaration and buildup of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities are too large a topic to discuss here, but the question remains: Between August and September 1991, why did the US advocate for maximum pressure on North Korea and close consultation with allies while secretly planning to deliver the greatest military concession to North Korea since the Korean War without informing Seoul?   In the optimism of the moment, the Bush administration hoped that a major concession like the unilateral removal of nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula would encourage North Korea to abide by its IAEA obligations. The administration, however, had misread Pyongyang’s intentions at the time; this undercut the policy of united diplomatic action and maximum pressure described in the cable. It cleared the way for the North to be the sole possessor of nuclear weapons on the peninsula and weakened US leverage in future negotiations. Of course, one could argue that it was reasonable back in 1991 to assume that North Korea wanted to dismantle their nuclear program and integrate into the international community. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was about to lose its biggest benefactor and increasing engagement efforts from a democratic South offered the Kim Il Sung regime new avenues to relax tensions. If Pyongyang had reciprocated, the PNIs might be heralded today as the breakthrough arrangement that convinced North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.   Instead, US actions in 1991 are symbolic of the contradictory policies towards North Korea that it has pursued in the subsequent decades. Despite statements proclaiming US-ROK solidarity, administrations in Washington and Seoul are frequently out of step and even when they align, policymakers continue to confine themselves to ineffective “maximum pressure” campaigns or one-sided concessions that fail to change the calculus of the North Korean regime. Such was the case with President Trump’s 2017 threats of “fire and fury”, made just months after President Moon was inaugurated with the promise to improve inter-Korean relations. The following year, the summits between Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore and Hanoi and the 2019 trilateral meeting at Panmunjom, while rich in symbolism, bolstered Kim’s claims of legitimacy without requiring any reciprocity or change.   Perhaps President Bush could have been forgiven in 1991 for trying a tentative carrot and stick approach towards North Korea and for rushing through a symbolic piece of disarmament legislation that captured the spirit of the time. But after thirty years, many policymakers still do not accept that North Korea is too sophisticated at evading sanctions to succumb to loophole-ridden pressures and too ideologically entrenched to be enticed into fundamental reforms through concessions. This causes Washington and Seoul to engage reactively when Pyongyang raises and lowers tensions, hoping that the right balance of sanctions and summits will tempt the regime to denuclearize. The result is that policies continue to be inconsistent, both in application and duration. If Washington and Seoul want to present unified opposition to Pyongyang’s provocations, they must commit to coordinated, sustained, high-level engagement with the issue. But considering the Biden administration’s long list of domestic and international concerns, the myriad difficulties facing the Moon administration in its final year, and the underlying tensions in ROK-Japan relations, meaningful progress on the North Korean nuclear issue seems unlikely in the months ahead. ■      [1]“Telegram, State Department to Tokyo, etc., August 13, 1991, Subject: U.S.-ROK Hawaii Meeting on North Korea (Secret)” https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176666-Document-01-Telegram-State-Department-to-Tokyo. (See also “Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: The Next Steps in the North Korea Nuclear Issue, ca. September 1991 Secret/Eyes Only”https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176667-Document-02-Memorandum-for-Under-Secretary-of and “Paper, US-ROK Basic Positions, ca. August/September 1991, Secret (two versions: a and b)” https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176669-Document-03b-Paper-US-ROK-Basic-Positions-ca) [2]Alexander, David. “Obama says North Korea nuclear test a ‘grave concern.’” Reuters, May 25, 2009.https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-usa/obama-says-north-korea-nuclear-test-a-grave-concern-idUSTRE54O14220090525. [3] Byun, Duk-hyun. “U.S. must use maximum pressure to convince N. Korea it is safer without nukes: McMaster.”.. Yonhap News Agency, March 03, 2021. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210303000300325. [4] Pamuk, Humeyra and Shin, Hyonhee. “Blinken says U.S. weighs pressure, diplomacy on North Korea over denuclearisation and rights abuses.” Reuters, March 18, 2021.https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-asia-southkorea-idUSKBN2BA08D. [5] Fuhrmann, Matthew and Early, Bryan R. “Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991–1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.” Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 4, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 21–43. [6]Koch, Susan. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. National Defense University. 2012. Accessed at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA577537.pdf. [7] Woolf, Amy F. and Chanlett-Avery, Emma. “Redeploying U.S. Nuclear Weapons to South Korea: Background and Implications in Brief.” Congressional Research Service. Accessed at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44950.pdf. [8] Oberdorfer, Don. “U.S. Decides to Withdraw A-Weapons from S. Korea” The Washington Post, October 19, 1991.https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/10/19/us-decides-to-withdraw-a-weapons-from-s-korea/3759ee3f-e9bf-4944-bfdf-2f9ea727b546/. [9] “Cable, Amembassy Seoul 11234 to SecState, Subject: Further Korean Reaction to the [redacted] Initiative, October 21, 1991 (Secret)” https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176670-Document-04-Cable-Amembassy-Seoul-11234-to. [10] “Cable, Amembassy Seoul to Secretary of Defense, November 1, 1991, Subject: Consultations in Seoul, Secret” https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4176672-Document-06-Cable-Amembassy-Seoul-to-Secretary. [11] Bush, George H. W., et al. A World Transformed, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1998. [12] Koch, 2012. [13] Bush, 1998. p. 545.     Ben Forney is a PhD candidate at the Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies. He previously worked as a Research Associate at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, focusing on North Korea`s overseas networks and sanctions evasion measures. He has a MA in International Area Studies from Seoul National University and was a Fulbright Grantee to South Korea in 2009.   Typeset by Kwang-min Pyo Senior Researcher For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I [email protected]      

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note Humanitarian aid carries connotations of emergency, urgent response, and acute threats to human morbidity, mortality, and dignity. Despite the end of the famine emergency since the mid-1990s, however, the DPRK has continued to receive international humanitarian aid. This article argues that while concepts of development and humanitarianism highlight the challenges to bringing structural change in the DPRK, the long-term nature of need in the DPRK does not signal an inappropriate match with humanitarian aid. In a sanctioned and highly politicised environment with questions of denuclearisation and human rights abuses, seeking to improve daily lives is an inherently structural act. Without structural changes, acute needs have and likely will continue even in times of non-emergency.     2020 quietly marked a quarter century of international humanitarian aid in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea), an effort that began with the DPRK’s landmark appeal in 1995 during a period of famine known as the Arduous March. Humanitarian aid, sometimes referred to as ‘humanitarian relief’, carries connotations of emergency, urgent response, and acute threats to human morbidity, mortality, and dignity. The Relief Web Glossary of Humanitarian Terms, for example, defines humanitarian assistance as ‘aid that seeks, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population.’[1] However, the role of humanitarian aid in long-term contexts of need, including but certainly not limited to the DPRK, questions the contemporary utility of this understanding. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Red Cross and United Nations (UN) bodies began working in the country on both a resident and non-resident basis in the mid-1990s. They were met with a context in some ways different from many others in which they had worked – there was no violent armed conflict, power vacuums, local civil society, or traditional threats to aid worker security.[2] As the famine subsided, it became clear that even without an acute crisis, humanitarian need persisted. Humanitarian staff and agencies have come and gone, geopolitics have created and narrowed opportunities for engagement, and programmes have shifted from famine relief to include efforts geared more at sustainability and capacity building – but despite the end of the famine emergency, the DPRK has continued to receive international humanitarian aid. Humanitarian efforts contend with the discomfort between two realms: access and the structural nature of need. Agencies work in the country to their attempts to positively impact the lives of North Koreans, and work within the constraints of both externally-imposed challenges (e.g. funding amounts and sanctions) and internally determined structural impediments to better humanitarian conditions (e.g. human rights abuses and state choices regarding resource use). The DPRK is not unique in its position as a long-term humanitarian aid recipient. In 2019, the DPRK was one of 40 countries with more than 700,000 people determined to be experiencing humanitarian need. 27 countries were part of UN-coordinated humanitarian or refugee response plans for five or more consecutive years, but the DPRK is one of only three of the 27 whose humanitarian need is not rooted in conflict and/or displacement.[3] Instead, Development Initiatives characterises the DPRK, along with Haiti and Tanzania, as having ‘natural hazards’ as the cause of humanitarian crisis. This summary characterisation overlooks the deep political and economic roots of humanitarian need. In the mid 1990s major failings of the humanitarian sector, such as genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, raised discussions of the value of the so-called humanitarian principles and the relationship between humanitarianism and politics.[4] These conversations have circled back in recent years, with renewed focus on tackling the root causes of need and questioning the relationship and constructed dichotomy between life-saving humanitarian and structural development work.   Deep roots in a protracted context – the blurring of the humanitarian/development divide While there is no singular definition of humanitarianism, the mainstream international sector generally focuses around four areas: protecting life, health, subsistence, and physical security, with primary and secondary aims being protection of ‘human life where this is threatened on a wide scale’ and reduction of ‘excessive human suffering,’ respectively.[5] Though the boundaries of these ideas are not neatly drawn – what is the threshold for ‘excessive’? – they do highlight the importance of not just preserving or saving life but considering the quality of those lives. The mainstream sector cites a group of four principles, known as the humanitarian principles, as guiding concepts in their work. They are humanity (addressing human suffering wherever it is found), neutrality (not taking sides in conflicts or disputes), impartiality (allocating aid based on needs, without discrimination), and independence (autonomy from political or other aims). Development is also rooted in ideas of quality of life. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee definition of official development assistance (ODA) focuses on the ‘the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries.’[6] OECD concepts of development have been criticised for being too simple, relying on the premise that ODA flows will bring economic growth which will in turn bring development.[7] Other ideas of development are broader, such as Sen’s seminal argument of freedom as both the ends and the means of development.[8] In both cases, development strikes closer to the political, economic, and societal core of not only times of uniquely acute need, but also day-to-day life. Dr. Stephen Linton, founder and president of the DPRK-focused NGO Eugene Bell Foundation, discussed the humanitarian/development divide in a 2018 interview:   I think one of the problems is that, particularly recently, this term ‘humanitarian assistance’ has been expanded. And many international organisations and large NGOs, and even small NGOs, are providing what they call capacity building, or development assistance. And they call this humanitarian aid. But the intent of these programmes is to make life better for people, and there’s certainly nothing wrong with that. But genuine, emergency aid is not necessarily to make life better, it’s to save life that is in danger of ending … So I think pulling this term back apart where a distinction is made between life-saving aid, which no one, including the US government, objects to, and developmental aid, that can look in a certain sense like economic aid, has been a challenge.[9]   Linton’s remarks drill to the issue of the humanitarian-development nexus in the DPRK: in a sanctioned and highly politicised environment with questions of denuclearisation and human rights abuses, seeking to improve daily lives is an inherently structural act. Without structural changes, acute needs have and likely will continue even in times of non-emergency. Notably in 2005, the DPRK attempted to halt humanitarian aid and requested the departure of all NGOs, for the UN to shift to longer-term development work, and decried other countries such as the US for making humanitarian aid political.[10] It is unclear exactly what the DPRK envisioned for its UN-supported development work. Additionally, the nuclear issue had already halted donor appetite for involvement in more overtly structural and therefore political assistance, and humanitarian actors had also already been involved in work aimed at sustainability, not just emergency relief. The announcement did cease or interrupt work, such as by the World Food Programme, but the DPRK continued to receive humanitarian aid though at much lower funding levels.   Role of humanitarian aid in contexts of chronic need In May 2016, over 9,000 participants from government, civil society, humanitarian agencies, and the private sector gathered in Istanbul for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), following then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s call to improve the humanitarian sector. Notably missing was Médecins sans Frontières (MSF, also known as Doctors without Borders), who pulled out weeks before in dissatisfaction with the WHS’s direction, which the NGO described as ‘an incorporation of humanitarian assistance into a broader development and resilience agenda.’ MSF also highlighted its concern that having NGOs and UN agencies make commitments on the same platforms as states unfairly raised the profile and responsibilities of the former, when it is the latter that actually hold both power and responsibility.[11] The title of Ban Ki-moon’s WHS report, ‘One humanity: shared responsibility’ pinpoints exactly the dissent MSF raised – are these truly shared responsibilities? Discussion of ‘ending conflict’ and ‘addressing root causes’ on a global level can flatten the depth and texture of what these platitudes mean in specific contexts. What does it mean to end need, and who has responsibility to act, in a conflict primed but not actively hostile context like the DPRK? As sceptics of aid often point out, humanitarian issues in the DPRK and blockages to aid such as sanctions are borne from the regime’s decision making. Until the regime, as well as international stakeholders such as the United States, Republic of Korea, and China, commit to changes that will adequately address the economic and political root causes, what are humanitarians to do? DuBois presents the idea of ‘humanitarianisation’ as a central flaw in contemporary humanitarian approaches - where contexts and issues that are not humanitarian receive humanitarian responses ‘often resulting in the biased, inappropriate and expansive management of crisis effects rather than causes.’[12] He asserts that humanitarian crises contain two core characteristics: a change from ‘normalcy’ that requires more than available response abilities. Dubois argues that protracted contexts are not humanitarian crises, and humanitarians should stand back in favour of more appropriate actors (e.g. peacebuilding, development, etc.).[13]   The case for supporting humanitarian efforts in the DPRK The danger in interpreting the DPRK as not appropriate for humanitarian response is fourfold. First, while the ‘hermit kingdom’ moniker has largely fallen out of fashion (rightfully so!) and North Korean linkages have many facets, the country still has limited entry points for engagement. Curtailing humanitarian aid would eliminate one pathway for engagement, for learning about the challenges facing North Koreans, and for exposing North Koreans to outside ideas. Studies using humanitarian data[14] show that even with their limitations, there is a rich body of knowledge about the country facilitated by humanitarian interaction. Second, without a clear understanding of what other actors would intervene, their status as state or non-state actors, how they would be funded, and the DPRK’s willingness to work with them, understanding the DPRK as not an emergency and therefore not humanitarian risks leaving an unfilled gap. Alternatively, this approach risks a gap filled by actors whose past behaviour demonstrates minimal interest in North Koreans’ human security such as China. Third, the interwoven nature of acute need and normality do not signal a need to pull humanitarian aid away from the DPRK – instead, it highlights one understanding as to why humanitarian aid would continue to be appropriate. As Hilhorst explains, classical humanitarian paradigms are built on the exceptionality of crisis, while resilience approaches tear down divides between what is normal and what is a departure from normality.[15] The DPRK’s continued humanitarian engagement demonstrates that humanitarian constructs have gone beyond ideas of ‘emergency’ or crisis. Fourth, the resilience paradigm also provides a framing for prepositioning humanitarian relationships – if the DPRK does fall back into large-scale emergency, established humanitarian linkages will likely be beneficial in constructing a larger scale or more urgent response.[16]   Conclusion The responsibility for the well-being and human security of the North Korean people lies primarily with their own government. Humanitarian discussion around responsibility and power to end root causes serves as a reminder of this. This article argues that while concepts of development and humanitarianism highlight the challenges to bringing structural change in the DPRK, the long-term nature of need in the DPRK does not signal an inappropriate match with humanitarian aid. The DPRK’s COVID-19 response has severely impacted humanitarian aid as imports face hurdles and both domestic and international travel are restricted. Some groups have had to wholly pause their work, while others have found new ways of working with their North Korean counterparts to continue projects in some capacity. How the 2021 humanitarian landscape in the DPRK develops remains to be seen, with the potential for monumental challenges. For example, the World Food Programme has noted a ‘significant residual risk’ that lack of food importation will halt their work in 2021.[17] Much of this is dependent on the DPRK’s response to COVID-19. However, humanitarian support — which requires commitments within the control of the international community, such as funding as well as legislation to reduce barriers and unintended effects of sanctions — should continue despite the protracted and structural nature of need. ■     [1] ReliefWeb. 2008. Glossary of Humanitarian Terms. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/reliefweb-glossary-humanitarian-terms-enko. [2] The Aid Worker Security Database (available at https://aidworkersecurity.org/) contains no record of security incidents against humanitarian aid workers in the DPRK. [3] Development Initiatives. 2020. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2020. pp. 22-23. Available at: https://devinit.org/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2020/#downloads. [4] Barnett, Michael. 2011. The Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. [5] Darcy, James and Charles-Antoine Hofmann. 2003. “According to need? Needs assessment and decision-making in the humanitarian sector.” (Humanitarian Policy Group Report 15). London: Overseas Development Institute. P. 13 [6] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2018. “Official development assistance – definition and coverage.” Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm [7] Tandon, Yash. 2008. Ending Aid Dependence. Cape Town: Fahamu. [8] Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [9] Arirang News. 2018. “[ISSUE TALK] TB crisis in North Korea ‘emergency situation’: One-on-one with Stephen Linton.” Video, 16:40. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmfR97EsNcQ [10] BBC. 2005. “North Korea rejects UN food aid.” BBC. 23 September 2005. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4273844.stm. [11] Médecins sans Frontières. 2016. “MSF to pull out of World Humanitarian Summit.” Retrieved from https://www.msf.org/msf-pull-out-world-humanitarian-summit. [12] DuBois, Marc. 2018. “The new humanitarian basics.” (Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper). London: Overseas Development Institute. P. 1. [13] Ibid, p. 8. [14] See, for example: Smith, Hazel. 2015. North Korea: Markets and Military Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Smith, Hazel. 2016. “Nutrition and Health in North Korea: What’s New, What’s Changed and Why It Matters.” North Korean Review 12(1): 7-34. [15] Hilhorst, Dorothea. 2018. “Classical humanitarianism and resilience humanitarianism: making sense of two brands of humanitarian action.” Journal of International Humanitarian Action 3(15). [16] This also emerged as a finding from a study on humanitarian impacts of sanctions. See Zadeh-Cummings, N., and Harris, L. 2020. ‘The Impact of Sanctions Against North Korea on Humanitarian Aid,’ Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, 2(1). [17] World Food Programme. 2020. “Country Strategic Plan Revision.” Available at: https://www.wfp.org/operations/kp02-dprk-interim-country-strategic-plan-2019-2022. P. 3.     Nazanin Zadeh-Cummings is the associate director of research and lecturer in humanitarian studies at the Centre for Humanitarian Leadership at Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia). Her research interests include humanitarianism, the DPRK, humanitarian pedagogy, and civil society.    Acknowledgement Dr Zadeh-Cummings would like to thank Marc Dubois for insightful conversation and exchanges that informed some of the ideas in this article.     Typeset by Kwang-min Pyo Senior Researcher             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note From the construction of open-air theaters to the use of new celebratory mediums in national events and the resumption of the 2020 Youth Day Celebration amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea has experienced a significant transformation in its social and cultural underpinnings over the past year. Seunghee Ha, a research fellow at the Dongguk University DMZ Peace Center, argues that these changes provide important insights into how the North Korean authorities are gradually accommodating new tastes and desires that have emerged among its citizenry. Where such behaviors were once deemed threatening “non-socialist” behaviors, Ha believes that the state’s reactive adaptation highlights the increasing agency of ordinary North Koreans upon the direction of the country’s social preferences. For Ha, this “bottom-up” approach ultimately has the potential to produce a North Korea more socially aligned with the rest of the international community.     This article provides an overview of North Korea’s social and cultural changes in 2020 based on the “people-first principle” that the regime advocates. This article views “the people” as the leading agents of social change in North Korea, and looks at “bottom-up” changes through several key examples. Policies have changed from a “top-down” approach in which the State leads the change. State-led efforts like construction and modernization of infrastructure, mobilization and control of the people, and civilizing efforts are still ongoing. However, the direction and the main agent of policy change are gradually shifting from the State to the people. The North Korean regime has recognized this change among the people and started to reflect such change in its policies. In this article, the process of such change is explained as a “bottom-up” approach. First, a new change is emerging in the new generation of young people. During the 2019 Lunar New Year celebration, a new format of performance began to appear in the form of large-scale outdoor concerts. After this, performances at major events in North Korea gradually moved from indoors to outdoors. The regime has been building a series of youth open-air theaters in accordance with the shift to outdoor performances which began in 2019. Last year alone, active construction took place on Pyongyang Youth Park Open-air Theater in January, Pyongannam-do Youth Open-air Theater in October, Hwangbuk Sariwon Youth Open-air Theater in November, and Sinuiju Youth Open-air Theater in Pyongbuk. That is, the outdoor performance format was adopted In North Korea due to changes in the tastes and cultural consumption patterns of young people, who favor performances like large-scale concerts. It is also noteworthy that while the North Korean regime canceled or downsized most of its planned celebrations as part of a strict response to COVID-19, celebrations of major anniversaries resumed beginning with the August 28 Youth Day celebration. The Youth Day performance, which has been held indoors in the past, was performed on an outdoor stage for the first time. While it is possible that the Youth Day event was held because the spread of COVID-19 had slowed at the time, it is worth noting that on August 28, the day of the Youth Day celebration, the Rodong Sinmun published an article that emphasized the emergency anti-epidemic drive by stressing the importance of “more intensive anti-epidemic measures” and stating that “the emergency anti-epidemic system must be strictly followed.” The Youth Day performance took place while strict anti-virus measures were in place, and all outdoor audience members were required to wear masks. The fact that the event was held despite the virus situation shows how important the Youth Day event is to the North Korean authorities. To celebrate Youth Day on August 28, 2020, the Rodong Sinmun published writings from the participants of the 2nd National Meeting of Young Frontrunners in Noble Traits held in May 2015. The articles emphasized the beautiful stories and achievements of these participants and expressed their gratitude to the Party. The articles depicted a desirable image of the exemplary youths and described the “young frontrunners in noble traits” as “the wonderful young people of our time who have noble moral character and do many good things for society and the group.”[1] Kim Jong Un emphasized the youth-first principle[2] in an appreciation letter delivered to the Youth League organization during the 2nd National Meeting of Young Frontrunners in Noble Traits in 2015. In the letter, he used varying phrases to praise youths including “a young man who moved on from the past and started anew,” “no men are born bad,” “there is no young man who cannot improve,” and “educate young people who are behind.” Through these statements, we can infer that there were signs of ideological disturbance and North Korean youths distancing themselves from the socialist style at that time. Accordingly, the National Meeting of Young Frontrunners in Noble Traits aimed to reinforce ideology and strengthen unity among the youth in the recognition of their role and importance as the next generation. In addition, it had the purpose of suppressing the current atmosphere of ideological disturbance that was prevalent among the youth by extolling the virtues of the young frontrunners in noble traits and presenting these youths as role models. The youth-first policy advocated by the North Korean authorities indicates that they are well aware of the role and the importance of the country’s youth as their successors. At the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), it was suggested that the name “Youth League” be revised during the upcoming Youth League Congress in accordance with the adoption of the decision to amend the Party rules. It is expected that by recognizing today’s youth and reflecting their changes, North Korea will focus more on the consciousness and problems of the youth who will lead the Party in the future through renovation under a new name. Changes led by the people may also appear alongside the COVID-19 induced quarantine measures. Last year, the aftermath of continued international economic sanctions was aggravated by the outbreak of COVID-19 in North Korea. Despite the Party’s anti-epidemic drive, the public’s adherence to quarantine measures and discipline have weakened. Some people have displayed a “chronic attitude” toward the Party’s anti-epidemic drive and “the false behavior of not wearing mask in public.”[3] The Rodong Sinmun explained that not wearing a mask is "a serious social and political problem of not being able to following one’s basic obligation as a member of society and can be seen as a sin against the state.”[4] The Rodong Sinmun also criticized “a phenomenon [that] arose where some citizens, seeing wearing masks as burdensome, held fast to their opinion against those who require them to abide by the quarantine regulations…Officials of certain units organized worker meetings without wearing masks or some did not appropriately respond to the demands made by members of relevant institutions that are acquainted with the state of the quarantine work”[5] as the product of selfish thinking. The North Korean regime regarded these problems as a failure to recognize the severity of COVID-19, and pointed out “chronological, mechanical, and practical treatment”[6] of the emergency anti-epidemic drive as the biggest problem. They further cautioned that “the greatest enemy in overcoming the existing crisis is laxity,” stating “arbitrary interpretation and undisciplined behaviors in implementing the code of conduct and norms established in relation to pandemic prevention can jeopardize not only individuals but the country as well.”[7] These statements imply that the control of the leadership has decreased since violations of pandemic measures continue despite the State’s emphasis on strict quarantine.[8] Such lack of discipline has been viewed as a “non-socialist” phenomenon. North Korea’s Unabridged Dictionary defines “non-socialism” as “all kinds of unsound things that violate the socialist principle. If non-socialism is promoted, socialism cannot be advocated for, and the superiority of North Korean socialism prioritizing the people cannot be developed.”[9] “Non-socialist” behaviors, which existed in North Korea prior to the pandemic, have increased as COVID-19 persists and have become the target of regime criticism. The non-socialist phenomenon has become an internal problem in North Korea. Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address on January 1, 2018 mentioned the non-socialist phenomenon in the passage “A vigorous struggle should be waged to tighten moral discipline throughout society, establish a socialist way of life, and eliminate all kinds of non-socialist practices so as to ensure that all the people, possessed of ennobling mental and moral traits, lead a revolutionary and cultured life.”[10] On July 20, 2020, the Korean Central News Agency reported that when Kim Jong Un inspected the construction site of Pyongyang General Hospital, he instructed the officers in charge to replace all of the construction directors because they had burdened the people when securing equipment and materials.[11] In the 20th expanded Meeting of the Political Bureau of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK held on November 15, 2020, Kim also criticized the relevant departments of the Party Central Committee, judicial prosecutors, and security agencies as irresponsible, citing their extreme negligence of duties as the reason for the appearance of non-socialist behaviors in educational institutions such as Pyongyang Medical University and society as a whole.[12] Likewise, the prolonged quarantine measures have led people to neglect their duties and fostered a lack of discipline within society. The North Korean regime continues to criticize this behavior and highlight the boundaries of ideological disturbance. COVID-19 has placed the North Korean people under strict quarantine measures and control of the authorities in the context of economic sanctions. The North Korean people experienced increasing disaster fatigue following their mobilization in flood restoration along with the 80-day battle to prepare for the 8th Party Congress. The North Korean authorities responded accordingly. During the commemorative speech at the military parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the WPK, Kim Jong Un said in tears that “our service personnel performed devotedly on the anti-epidemic front and the front of removing the aftereffects of natural disasters which we unexpectedly had to face this year. No one would approach their patriotic and heroic devotion without shedding tears of gratitude…I feel deep regret for them, and I feel pain in my heart as they are not all here on this glorious night with us…I thought over what I would say first at this moment, when we will be looking back upon every page of our Party’s 75-year history filled with glory, I have only one sincere, heartfelt word: thanks.” Kim’s tears and direct expression of gratitude can be interpreted as intending to give the public credit for overcoming difficulties and raise their loyalty by conveying emotional messages. The 75th anniversary of the founding of the WPK was celebrated with new types of events. These events included a “lighting festival” using light, a “military parade music concert” held by the State Council’s performance group, and a comedy performance show, “Our House Full of Laughter.” “Our House Full of Laughter” was performed at the Youth Park Open-air Theater from October 7th to 16th. The performance consisted of narration props, gags, animal performances, sand paintings, and fantasy magic. Previously, North Korea established the National Comedy Company in 1994 under the direction of Kim Jong Il in order to overcome the Arduous March. The Company was disbanded at the end of the famine as its role was finished. The exceptional comedy performance included in the celebration of the 75th founding anniversary of the Party had a similar purpose to the National Comedy Company established by Kim Jong Il to overcome the Arduous March in 1994 of defeating difficulties through laughter. North Korea used laughter to overcome the Arduous March in 1994, and similarly, “Our House Full of Laughter” is intended to console the exhausted public that has suffered the continuing hardships of sanctions, COVID-19, and natural disasters with laughter. In other words, we can infer from the way that a comedy performance group was established to appease public sentiment using laughter that North Korea’s current situation is comparable to the suffering of the Arduous March. In sum, North Korea is reacting passively in order to satisfy people’s tastes and desires as “bottom-up” changes transform the new generation’s consciousness. People are now directly expressing their opinions on the external environment and domestic issues. In the Kim Jong Un period, new national symbols have been redefined overall, and the old factors that were in line with the previous globalization standards are undergoing a process of reorganization with the current globalization standards. This can be seen as a process of making a “universal state” comparable to the international community. The “people-first principle” stipulated as a basic political means at the 8th Party Congress suggests that the power that has been concentrated in the state has begun to shift to the people as a result of the system changes made in response to the environment of the times. The “people-first principle” exists as a slogan of strategic governance for loyalty to the State and patriotism for the people. Nevertheless, it can be interpreted that the reason behind the emergence of such strategic slogans is that it is impossible for the State to exist solely with authority without appealing to the people. We can learn more about North Korea and its current transition by focusing on the people-led social and cultural changes. ■     [1] “Shall be a pioneer of the technological breakthrough,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, August 29, 2020. [2] North Korea’s Joseonmal Daesajeon(Unabridged Dictionary) defines Youth-first as “Valuing the status and roles of the youth who are the leading players in national defense and socialist construction”, and Youth-first politics as “Politics of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) that has firm belief in the youth in revolution and construction from the most accurate understanding of the status and role of young people and implement things based on their strength.” [3] “Let’s prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus, by tightening-up quarantine measures,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, February 16, 2020. [4] “Everyone must wear masks completely”, “Never slow down the tightening-up,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, February 22, 2020. [5] Sung-min Kim, “Great national project for the People's security,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, March 9, 2020. [6] “Infinite responsibility, loyalty, and dedication must be accompanied in making the decision in the Party Central Committee's emergency enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau,”「Rodong Sinmun」, July 30, 2020. [7] “Top-class alert and strict compliance required under the maximum emergency system,” 「Rodong Sinmun」, August 4, 2020. [8] Seungjun Oh and Seunghee Ha, “North Korea’s Response to COVID-19: Focusing on the Rodong Sinmun,” 『NORTH KOREAN STUDIES REVIEW』, 24.2(2020): p. 33. [9] North Korea’s Joseonmal Daesajeon(Unabridged Dictionary) [10] “New Year’s Address,” 『Rodong Sinmun』, January 1, 2018. [11] Korean Central News Agency, July 20, 2020. [12] “The 7th Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) held the 20th enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau,” 『Rodong Sinmun』, November 16, 2020.     Seunghee Ha is a researcher of North Korean society and culture who has previously served as a Fellow at the Institute of North Korean Studies at Dongguk University. Dr. Ha received her PhD in North Korean Studies from the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, Korea. Her main research interests include North Korean society and culture, North Korean music, and North Korean media. Her recent publications include “North Korea’s Response to COVID-19: Focus on the Rodong Sinmun” (2020), “North Korea’s Use of YouTube Propaganda Media” (2020), and “The Utilization of Electronic Music Bands in North Korea-Japan Relations” (2020).   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director, Research Department             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]    

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note The 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), which was held over a period of 8 days, ended on January 12, 2021. In this commentary, Young-Sun Ha, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University, analyzes Kim Jong Un’s report given during the 8th WPK and uses it to predict what comes next for North Korea. Professor Ha criticizes North Korea’s limitations in reviewing its own achievements during the past five years, arguing that the regime is viewing the future through the eyes of the past. Professor Ha argues that North Korea’s five-year economic development plan will suffer from continued economic sanctions and limited capacity for self-reliance. The constant strengthening of national defense, including nuclear weapons, will end up driving an arms race, paradoxically weakening the regime’s power. Professor Ha also anticipates difficulties for the regime with the new Biden administration, highlighting North Korea’s demands for sanctions relief and a security guarantee and the US expectation of a nuclear freeze including comprehensive reporting and verification. In order for North Korea to successfully deal with the triple crises of continued sanctions, the pandemic, and natural disasters over the next five years, Professor Ha asserts that North Korea must leave behind its Cold War mindset and seek a new strategy of denuclearization and coevolution suited for the 21st century.     This week, North Korea held the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), which provides vital insight into what to expect from the regime over the next five years until the 9th Congress. Over the course of nine hours, Kim Jong Un reviewed the main domestic and international challenges that have prevented North Korea from progressing in the past five years since the 7th Congress, and laid out the North’s projects and strategies for overall innovation of the current Party and national tasks to ensure the next step of the victory of North Korean socialism. However, the limitations of Kim Jong Un’s report were clear as he looked into the future through the eyes of the past, following the basic framework and language of the revolutionary line that has maintained its influence in the regime since it emerged in the mid-1960s and replaced the war line. Kim Jong Un’s report mainly dealt with four things: First, a review of the Party’s work since the 7th Congress, second, the advancement toward building domestic socialist power, third, the progress of independent reunification and external relations, and fourth, the strengthening of the Party programs. The 8th WPK Congress report began by summarizing the difficulties and achievements of North Korea’s political, economic, military, and diplomatic positions over the past five years. The “People-First” Principle was emphasized as the core of Yeongdo ideology. Kim Jong Un then stated that “although the strategic goals in economic construction were not reached,” a valuable foundation for sustainable economic development had been laid. The report gave a detailed review of the military’s achievements in strengthening North Korea’s nuclear war deterrence and self-defense capabilities, and particularly emphasized the effort to modernize nuclear weapons. This section of the report concluded by saying, “North Korea has emerged as a strong nuclear and military power in the world, and the era of trying to bargain for our own interests with superpowers has ended.” This clearly shows how difficult it will be for North Korea to accept complete denuclearization, contrary to our hopeful expectations. Kim Jong Un assessed the country’s recent diplomacy efforts as “a series of the worst of the worst unprecedented crises in the external environment due to the desperate attacks of the United States and the pressures of the economic sanctions implemented by its followers.” The Central Committee of the Party added to this by stating, “With a bold path change and aggressive strategy, North Korea has contributed to the creation of an atmosphere for peace and dialogue in which international society can sympathize with us, as well as the organization of active external activities to raise our international status.” That is, the report assesses DPRK-China, DPRK-Russia, and DPRK-US relations from the perspective of strengthening international revolutionary capabilities within the Three Fronts strategy. The next section of the report reviewed the tasks ahead to achieve the next leap in the construction of North Korean socialism, covering the fields of the economy, defense, science technology, and culture in that order. It began with an examination of the economic difficulties of the past five years before discussing the new five-year economic plan starting in 2021. Specifically, Kim Jong Un highlighted “the worst-ever sanction policies of the United States and other hostile forces,” “severe natural disasters,” and “the prolonged global health crisis” as external challenges, while recognizing the weakness of the previous five-year economic development plan, the old system, and old methods of business as internal problems. The report highlighted the aim of the new five-year economic development plan to achieve sustainable economic growth free from external influences, and to significantly improve the quality of life for the people by reorganizing the economic business system and restoring the foundations of self-reliance. However, the report failed to suggest any appropriate solutions, as international economic sanctions, global health crises, and natural disasters cannot be overcome by self-reliance and will persist throughout the next five-year economic development plan period as well. The next part of the report emphasized the strengthening of national defense. Kim Jong Un referenced the miniaturization of nuclear weapons, the development of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, the possession of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and nuclear submarines as a delivery system, and the research and development of advanced weapons and military satellites, stating “As long as imperialism remains on Earth and the threat of war by hostile forces against our country continues, the historical mission of our revolutionary armed forces will never change, and our national defense must be constantly strengthened along the path of new development.” He indicated that the strengthening of national defense will continue until the military build-up of the US and other hostile forces ceases and the threats and blackmail against North Korea come to an end. However, the continued strengthening of the regime’s national defense will end up increasing the defenses of its counterparts, paradoxically leading to the weakening of regime security over time. Similarly, excessive efforts to strengthen military power, including nuclear capabilities, will only prolong international economic sanctions and increase inefficient investment, resulting in a weakening of North Korea’s overall domestic capabilities. Kim Jong Un stressed that it will be possible for North Korea to demonstrate the superiority and the power of North Korean socialism despite the current difficult circumstances. He predicated this on the condition that the country succeeds in reinforcing the core economy and military power, promoting science and technology to construct socialism, and creating a Joseon-style civilization as a new enlightenment of socialist culture while developing corresponding national and social systems. The report next moves on to discuss independent reunification and the development of North Korea’s external relations. Although Kim stated that “The two Koreas are now standing at a critical juncture. They must choose whether to take the path of peace and reunification by resolving the serious deadlock in North-South relations, or whether continue to suffer division amid the vicious circle of confrontation and the danger of war,” he also took a principled stand in saying, “In North-South relations, it is critical to be willing to solve the essential problems first. We must stop hostile actions toward each other, and be sincere in how we handle the North-South Declaration.” Kim declared that a new path for inter-Korean relations based on trust and reconciliation will open up if South Korea stops focusing on cooperation on peripheral problems such as COVID-19 prevention, humanitarian issues, and tourism, and instead starts to work on the essential problems of peace on the Korean Peninsula, such as suspending the import of advanced military equipment and the joint ROK-US military exercises. These arguments clearly show how North Korea remains limited owing to self-contradiction. The regime claims that it has no choice but to strengthen its defense capabilities as long as hostile forces continue to pose a threat. However, South Korea and the United States feel that there is no alternative but to strengthen their defense capabilities as long as North Korea poses a nuclear threat. Several basic principles taken from the historical lessons of international politics should be followed in order to resolve this dilemma. First, the issues that North Korea considered peripheral or non-essential are in fact a very important first step toward solving the essential problem of the current stage wherein the two Koreas even distrust “building trust to build trust.” The essential issues of peace on Korean Peninsula must be achieved by true consensus on the complete denuclearization of North Korea and a guarantee for North Korea’s regime security. A minimum level of mutual deterrence system should be maintained in order to break this vicious cycle in the process of seeking new inter-Korean relations, and there must be mutual efforts to engage in economic cooperation and preparation for future-oriented survival strategies. In the regime’s discussion of the development of external relations, Kim Jong Un delineated his strategy of “consistently confronting hostile forces and superpowers as a powerful Party,” and then explained some key principles. First, North Korea will firmly adhere to the principle of self-reliance in order to protect its national interest. Second, it will offensively pursue diplomatic war in order to keep its right to sovereignty and development. Third, the regime will focus its external political activities to suppress the United States, which is the biggest obstacle to revolution and North Korea’s biggest enemy. Fourth, no matter who is in office in the United States, US policy towards North Korea will not change. Therefore, North Korea will establish a shrewd strategy toward the United States and continue to expand its self-reliant capabilities and anti-imperialist alliance. Policy toward the United States, which lies at the core of North Korea's diplomacy, will have a decisive impact on North Korea in the next five years. President-elect Joe Biden has signaled that he will take a more cautious approach, criticizing President Trump's policy toward North Korea. It is expected that Biden will place somewhat of an emphasis on bottom-up diplomacy unlike Trump’s unilateral top-down diplomacy that resembled a TV show, with splashy events like the US-DPRK Summit. Biden, who emphasizes American leadership in sharp contrast to Trump’s America First policy, will place value on multilateral negotiation tactics with the relevant states, like the Six-Party Talks, to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The United States will first begin with a nuclear freeze negotiation, even though the ultimate goal is complete denuclearization. Although a nuclear freeze can be regarded as an intermediate stepping stone, the US will not negotiate a nuclear freeze if it lacks trust in the ability to eventually achieve the final goal of complete denuclearization. That is, the United States will proceed to nuclear freeze negotiations only after receiving a comprehensive report of all nuclear facilities and nuclear capabilities to guarantee that North Korea has truly made a strategic decision to pursue complete denuclearization. As seen at the US-DPRK Hanoi Summit, Kim Jong Un’s regime is open to negotiations for partial denuclearization. However, North Korea has never made the strategic decision to give up its ability to hold the minimum nuclear weapons required to secure the regime, and will not give up its nuclear weapons easily in the future either. The United States seems willing to accept comprehensive reporting and verification as a first step towards complete denuclearization. Negotiations over the North Korean demand to lift economic sanctions and guarantee regime security and the US request for a nuclear freeze and complete reporting and verification will inevitably be fierce. The Biden administration, which emphasizes democracy, holds the view that North Korea needs to choose denuclearization as a measure of self-preservation. Since information on the rapidly changing world is key to North Korea coming around to the viewpoint that denuclearization is a means of self-preservation, free communication of information in North Korea will no doubt be raised as a crucial issue. If North Korea responds to the Biden administration’s North Korea policy in line with the basic principles it has laid out for its external policies going forward, it will realistically be impossible to resume negotiations on lifting economic sanctions and guaranteeing regime security, both of which North Korea desperately needs. North Korea is expected to face the triple disaster of economic sanctions, a health crisis, and natural disasters in the next five years. It must devise a forward-looking survival and developmental strategy that is appropriate for the 21st century, going beyond its past view of strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities. The Asia-Pacific, where the Korean Peninsula is located, is entering a period of change in the political order under the dual influence of the global COVID-19 pandemic and strategic competition between the US and China. In order to go beyond 19th century self-reliance and achieve 21st century coexistence, North Korea should also emerge as a rising power in the new Asia-Pacific order by developing a new blueprint that includes a commitment to denuclearization in the name of self-preservation and coevolution with nearby states.■     Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department             For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 209)  |  [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note The US and North Korea seemed to be making progress before the Hanoi Summit took place. However, after the Hanoi talks fell apart, negotiations sputtered and then stalled. The situation now is arguably worse than it was three years ago. Professor Kyungyon Moon from Jeonbuk National University states that the US, rather than seeing North Korea as an equal negotiating partner, has instead sought to implement punishing tactics as though the regime is a “rogue boy” in need of discipline. This attitude on the part of the US has resulted in an unwillingness in Washington to consider further negotiations or compensatory measures. Professor Moon argues that while South Korea should be playing the role of active mediator between the two countries, it has not been able to keep North Korea and the US at the negotiation table. South Korea must do its part and actively mediate between North Korea and the US by convincing the US to provide a compensation mechanism to North Korea, which will open the path to resumed negotiations.     North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and its fifth in September of the same year proved that its nuclear weapons capability has reached the final stages. It also demonstrated the regime’s ability to strike the mainland United States through a series of ballistic missile launches. This prompted the international community, especially the United States, to take practical action on the North Korean nuclear issue and throw strategic patience aside. The United States and the international community have imposed strong and practical economic sanctions against North Korea beyond formal sanctions. It has banned all overseas worker projects and exports of coal and other mineral resources to China, which were the main sources of income for the North Korean economy and the military. It also banned all exports of strategic materials, oil, and chemicals to North Korea. Above all, China and Russia judged that North Korea was ignoring their warnings against upgrading its nuclear capabilities. Thus, China and Russia joined the US and the international community's economic blockade against North Korea, and economic sanctions against the North began to take effect. The situation on the Korean Peninsula has escalated into a state of war as North Korea protested against these strong sanctions. In particular, President Trump's unilateral foreign policy and unpredictable leadership have raised concerns that military operations against North Korea may be possible. This has forced the Korean government and civil society into a state of tension exceeding any that have come before it. In May 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration, which aims to build trust with North Korea, was inaugurated. Moon’s administration began its charm offensive by initiating sports diplomacy, inviting North Korea to attend the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics held in February. Moon quickly followed this with an invitation to the dialogue table to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Following North Korea's decision to participate in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, the Korean Peninsula was more peaceful than ever. The first inter-Korean summit was held in May 2018, and progress seemed tenable until the second round of US-North Korea talks broke down in February 2019. Hopes abounded that the half-century-long dispute and confrontation between the two Koreas might be resolved. At the same time, the Trump administration was soaked in "selfish expectations" that it would be able to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue where former US presidents had failed. During the same period, North Korea conveyed the results of the series of inter-Korean summits and the first-ever US-North Korea summit to its people through propaganda media. The North Korean government called on its people to remain patient for just a bit longer, sending the message that it would be able to end its confrontation with the international community and focus on economic development. North Koreans endured the pain of economic hardship caused by tighter internal controls and the US economic blockade in the hopes that US-North Korea negotiations meant that the young leader Kim Jong Un would catch the two rabbits of regime security and economic development that Kim Jong Il had failed to achieve. Indeed, the US sanctions imposed on North Korea after the fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016 were enough to inflict pain not only on the Kim Jong Un regime but also on the North Korean people. The ban on exports of oil, chemical, and fertilizer products to energy-poor North Korea has dealt a direct blow to its economy, especially agricultural production. Oil and fertilizer aid, which had been provided by China, an ally regardless of sanctions, was suspended. The US has taken a so-called “smart sanction” approach by sanctioning agencies and people involved in nuclear development, saying it minimizes the humanitarian damage that could be caused by economic sanctions, but it has not in fact been “smart” at all. In the midst of this, the South Korean government and NGOs were unable to provide virtually any aid, even with sanctions exceptions granted by the US and UN. This seems to be due to the US calculation that any aid will weaken US leverage in the process of denuclearization negotiations. North Korea's current economic hardship is believed to be the worst since the early 2000s, when 300,000 died of starvation. In July 2020, North Korea finally began to criticize the US and South Korea. The regime’s criticism centered on how the US, South Korea, and the international community rewarded North Korea, which participated in the denuclearization negotiations in a serious and unprecedented manner to pursue peace on the Korean Peninsula starting with its attendance at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. The failure to come up with a proper compensation mechanism for North Korea, which actually participated in the negotiations, has impacted the situation in a number of ways. As discussed above, the unprecedented strong US sanctions against North Korea during the negotiations have left North Koreans more impoverished, greatly dampening Kim Jong Un's grip. Kim Jong Un's foreign policy of pursuing a conciliatory policy of dialogue and negotiations ended in failure, and Kim Jong Un will have no choice but to support the hardliners in denuclearization negotiations and foreign policy going forward. What created this situation? Did North Korea make too many demands at the US-North Korea talks in Hanoi in February 2019? Were the demands of the US reasonable? What did South Korea do? It may be difficult to find a clear answer, but if we look back on the past three years since the first inter-Korean summit in 2018, it is not difficult to understand the North's choices or the background of Kim Yo-jong’s criticism of the United States and South Korea issued in July of this year. First, the US has treated North Korea as though the regime is a teenager who should be disciplined, not as an equal with which the US must negotiate. The US began negotiations with the North determined not to offer any indications of potential compensation or signs of a conciliatory attitude until the teenager named North Korea reflected on its actions and promised to shape up. The outcome of this approach was foregone. The US would not make any concessions or offer kindness until North Korea first reflected on its attitude and asked for forgiveness, promising that it would never do wrong again. However, a successful negotiation is a process in which the participants in the negotiations recognize each other as partners on equal footing. Both sides can then reach an agreement while upholding mutual respect by making equivalent concessions to find a consensus. This further requires a clear mutual understanding of the needs of the other side. However, the US instead saw North Korea as a rogue boy, not a negotiating partner, and no conciliatory gestures such as compensation were ever considered as the US sought to change the North’s attitude. Second, let's assume that throughout the last three years of US-North Korea denuclearization negotiations, the US has maintained its perception that it is in a superior position rather than a partner in an equal dialogue. Viewed through this lens, the US approach to these negotiations has been one of a father seeking to discipline and correct the attitude of a rogue teenager. Even if this were the case, it takes a harmonious use of both carrots and sticks for a father with the upper hand in terms of power or authority to discipline a child. Children should not be given too much love or overly harsh discipline. For teenagers who have already demonstrated a bad attitude, hardline measures such as sticks will only worsen the situation. You have to expand your mind, and soft, warm gestures are the only way to open the heart of a wounded child. North Korea has been the loner of the international community for the past 30 years since the end of the Cold War, a rogue teenager who does not hesitate to act out to attract attention. Hunger and the past three years of denuclearization negotiations have been tougher than ever due to the US whip of economic sanctions. North Korea came to the negotiation table willing to discuss making changes. But when North Korea said they would turn over a new leaf, how could the US take their word for it? The US instead countered by asking the regime to show their willingness to change by taking action first, insisting on a total surrender and behavior change. Wasn't this demand too harsh for a child who just emerged from a dark tunnel? The father should have shown warm behavior first. In other words, the US should have provided North Korea, which was seriously involved in denuclearization negotiations, with a compensation mechanism. Third, suppose North Korea is a misbehaving child and the United States is the father who wants to correct their behavior. In this analogy, let us assume that South Korea is the mother. What role did the mother play in the father's discipline of his son? What should South Korea's role be? From South Korea’s perspective, the father is blunt and strict because he has a mission to protect his family from the harsh world. Such a father is more likely to use a whip than to engage in warm actions or speak gently to discipline his child. The mother should be an active partner who advises such a father that warm words and actions are a more effective means of discipline than a whip. It is easy to guess what role South Korea should have played as the mother when the US as the father favored taking up the whip over warm words and actions in disciplining his son, North Korea. However, South Korea did not do its part properly. Such a mother is bound to be resentful of North Korea's distorted position as a child. The last three years of denuclearization negotiations are about to collapse. COVID-19 has prompted North Korea to refrain from making the extreme choice of leaving the negotiating table entirely. However, even if the denuclearization negotiations between the US and North Korea resume, absent fundamental changes in Washington's attitude toward Pyongyang, the chances of success appear low. South Korea should also take a more active role. South Korea should hold on to North Korea, which wants to leave the negotiating table, and persuade the US to provide a corresponding compensation mechanism by sitting at the negotiating table. ■     Dr. Kyungyon Moon has been an associate professor at the School of International Studies at Jeonbuk National University, Republic of Korea since 2016. He served as a research fellow at the Research Institute for North Korea Development at the Export-Import Bank of Korea from May 2014 to February 2016, a research professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University from March 2013 to April 2014, and worked as a professional researcher at the Institute for Poverty Alleviation and International Development (IPAID) at Yonsei University in South Korea. He is a civilian member of the South and North Exchange and Cooperation Promotion Council of the South Korean government. He has also served as the Chair of the Research Committee at the Korea Association of International Development and Cooperation and as a member of the Policy Advisory Committee of the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea. Moon received his master’s degree from the University of Oslo, Norway and his doctoral degree from Cranfield University in Britain. His research interests include poverty reduction, aid architecture, famine in North Korea, and civil movement in humanitarian and development assistance, as well as international cooperation with a special focus on food aid.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Director, Research Department             For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 209)  |  [email protected]