Author Sung-han Kim , Professor Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) Seoul, ROK     I. U.S. Approach to Non-Proliferation and North Korean Nukes Preventing WMD Terrorism The Bush administration’s nonproliferation objectives were spelled out in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. Specifically, that strategy has three main pillars: • Counterproliferation to combat WMD use including active measures: (1) to prevent the threat from occurring via effective interdiction of WMD systems, materials, technology, and expertise being transferred to hostile states and terrorist organizations, (2) to seek to deter the threat if materializes, and (3) to defend against the threat if it is employed against the U.S., its allies, and friends. • Strengthened nonproliferation efforts involving active diplomacy, multilateral and bilateral regimes, nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation, controls on nuclear materials, export controls, and nonproliferation sanctions. • Consequence management to respond to WMD use. President Bush has stressed repeatedly that the greatest threat before human dignity is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or nuclear weapons. The Bush administration is thus poised to channel all its energies into removing even the remotest possibility of “WMD terrorism.” The Bush administration considers the three gravest threats of nuclear terrorism to be 1) lax control over and the consequent leakage of nuclear materials from the former Soviet republics, where 90 percent of the world’s total nuclear elements are stored; 2) the possible sale of nuclear-related materials by rogue states such as North Korea and Iran; and 3) terrorist organizations’ persistent attempts to procure nuclear materials.1 In this light, the U.S. policy toward the North Korean nuclear problem is aimed at neutralizing North Korea’s attempts to become a nuclear state while preventing North Korea from transferring nuclear weapons or materials, if any, to other states or terrorists.   Hawk Engagement   The Bush administration hopes that North Korea’s Kim Jong-il regime will “voluntarily” make a strategic decision to dismantle its nuclear development programs as Libya’s Qadhafi regime did. Washington’s preference for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in the Libyan way was expressed positively by Rice during her visit to South Korea in July 2004. Rice, then national security advisor, stated, “The time has come for North Korea to make a strategic choice at the six-party talks in the direction of nuclear disarmament... I wish [National Defense Commission Chairman] Kim Jong Il would talk to [Libyan leader] Qadhafi, and he will know what I mean.” Confronted with a rocky post-war reconstruction process in Iraq, however, the United States is of the mind that it can “manage” the North Korean nuclear issue limitedly as long as North Korea does not cross the “redline,” or Washington’s ultimate patience, by conducting nuclear tests or transferring nuclear materials outside the country. U.S. approach to the North Korean nuclear problem is based upon the idea of “hawk engagement.” Victor Cha, currently director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), claimed that the crux of the “hawk engagement” policy was “based on the idea that engagement lays the groundwork for punitive action [in case the other party rejects or abuses engagement afterwards].” Only when countries concerned, excepting North Korea, reach the consensus that “the failure of enhanced diplomacy should be demonstrably attributable to Pyongyang”—as the “Armitage Report” contends—will it be possible to form a coalition to execute a pressure policy on North Korea.   “Hawk engagement” failed to play a proper role during Bush’s first four years in office for two reasons. First, the Bush administration proclaimed the preemptive attack doctrine at home and abroad in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) following the September 11 attacks, thereby giving the impression that it was a new doctrine Bush formulated for the first time and that his administration was seriously considering a preemptive attack to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Consequently, Pyongyang seized on Washington’s renewed preemptive attack pronouncements as a golden opportunity to launch a “propaganda campaign” peddling that hostile U.S. policies compelled it to develop nuclear weapons.   North Korea’s obstinate strategy of “muddling through” that resists showing a real progress in the nuclear six-party talks will slowly exhaust the “patience” of the other five countries concerned, which in turn will provide the grounds for the United States to gradually tighten the screws on North Korea. One cannot rule out the possibility, then, of North Korea’s provocative actions in response. It had been reported at the very end of 2002 that the Bush administration would prepare a “tailored containment” policy to put maximum economic and political pressure on North Korea so that it would abandon its efforts to make nuclear weapons. If North Korea refuses to forgo its nukes, the United States would impose economic sanctions through the UNSC, and the U.S. military might intercept missile shipments to prevent North Korea from proliferating the transportation vehicle of WMDs to other regions. The plan also calls for the United States to encourage North Korea’s neighbors, i.e., China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to limit or even sever economic ties with North Korea.   Tailored containment is different from simple containment in that the former is more systematic and proactive than the latter that means the waiting for the enemy’s collapse. George Kennan’s containment policy of half a century ago called for the political isolation of the Communist countries by means of a slow strangulation through the development of political and military alliances. The Bush administration appears to be considering a more sophisticated policy by which the United States would withdraw or reduce “goodies” on which North Korea is dependent, i.e., food and energy. The United States would “tailor” its containment policy to maximize North Korea’s political and economic vulnerabilities to the surrounding countries. For this policy to be successful, however, it is necessary to form a regional consensus that efforts to resolve the nuclear problem in a peaceful manner have been exhausted. Without this consensus, the containment of North Korea’s Kim Jong-il regime is unworkable. Against this backdrop, it is less likely that the United States will replace the current Six Party Talks with the bilateral talks with North Korea. The United States will just allow the bilateral talks within the context of the Six Party Talks. Should the United States enter into bilateral talks while the North claims the Six Party Talks useless, North Korea might then drag on the talks for a matter of months, thus potentially riding out what could be the worst period of international reaction to its nuclear declarations and ambitions. By the time such bilateral talks end or collapse, the focus would likely be upon the mutual recriminations as to who was responsible for the breakdown of the talks, rather than the acceptability of North Korea’s withdrawal from NPT and its declaration of its nuclear status...(Continued)    

Executive Summary   A strong majority of South Koreans agree on the need to engage North Korea but there is no consensus on the most effective means. As the debate over how to deal with the northern brother intensifies, deep fissures are forming among the public. Significant generational and political shifts have transformed views in ways that could undermine U.S. policy in the region unless Washington develops a better understanding of the situation in Seoul. The generation that lived through the Korean War is being supplanted by the generation that led the fight for democratisation in the 1980s. Younger South Koreans are less easily swayed by appeals to anti-communism and less reflexively pro-American. They are more accustomed to prosperity and less fearful of North Korea, and thus more willing to shake up their country's system in the name of economic and social justice. They are more progressive and nationalistic in their views, although few are true followers of Pyongyang's ideology. This generation, now in its 30s and 40s, will dominate South Korean politics for years to come. As a result of this generational shift, there has been a change in both the style and substance of South Korea's approach to North Korea. While the vast majority still view the North as a threat, confrontation has been replaced by an emphasis on cooperation and reconciliation. The removal of government restrictions on inter-Korean exchanges has led to an explosion of contacts, helping to demystify the North in South Koreans' eyes. Moreover, students are no longer being taught to fear Pyongyang as their parents were. A majority of citizens now see North Korea more as an object for dialogue and assistance. While engagement of North Korea remains controversial, there is an emerging consensus that: ???? North-South economic cooperation can be mutually beneficial; ???? gradual reunification is preferable to sudden collapse and absorption; ???? war on the Korean Peninsula is unthinkable; ???? North Korea's nuclear program is undesirable and should be negotiated away if possible, but it is not directed at South Korea and is not in itself reason to end engagement; and ???? it is necessary to help the people of North Korea overcome their economic hardships. At the same time, there is a growing divergence about: ???? the capacity of the Kim Jong-il regime to change; ???? the desirability of dealing directly with the North Korean government; ???? the proper way to approach North Korean human rights problems; ???? whether to reduce legal restrictions on information about and contact with North Korea; and ???? the degree of reciprocity that should be demanded from North Korea.     The changes in South Korea's perceptions of North Korea intensify the debate about the future of the alliance with the U.S. A clear majority of South Koreans still regard North Korea as a potential threat, even though they consider an invasion unlikely. Most do not want U.S. troops to leave the peninsula, although some seem to regard the alliance as necessary, as much to restrain Washington as to deter Pyongyang. A clear majority is uneasy with what it sees as the Bush administration's hard-line stance toward the North. Few support regime change. Most instead favour gradual reconciliation and reunification. This split is exacerbated by the lack of close ties between South Korea's new political leadership and the ascendant Republicans in Washington. Two separate U.S.-South Korean dialogues are taking place: the people out of power in Seoul are talking to the people in power in Washington, and vice versa.   It is not true, as alarmists on the right sometimes claim that South Korea is being taken down the path of socialism. Today's young people have a dual mindset about North Korea: they are more accepting of dialogue with the regime but do not embrace the system. However, as moderates are being drowned out by the more vocal extremes, these subtle distinctions are being lost. In a country and culture that has never been adept at accommodating diversity of opinion, the crucial question is whether it will be possible to overcome the "South-South conflict" (nam-nam galdeung) and develop a coherent approach to the North Korean problem. Seoul/Brussels, 14 December 2004 Crisis Group Asia Report N°89 14 December 2004 Author Peter Beck is the North East Asia Project Director of International Crisis Group. This paper was submitted to "EAI Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia" supported by the Henry Luce Foundation based in New York. All papers are available only through the online database.      While the Korean Peninsula is at times called the last bastion of the Cold War, profound changes have taken place over the last twenty years. The end of the superpower confrontation had vastly different effects on the two Koreas. In the North, the end of Soviet subsidies led to almost complete economic collapse, but with little discernible change in internal or external politics. During the same period, the South moved from dictatorship to democracy, and from a developing country to the world's twelfth largest trading nation. As a result, there is a newer generation of South Korean leaders with very different ideas than their elders about how to deal with their northern sibling. While North Korea's attempts to open to the outside world have had some impact on attitudes, domestic political and social changes in South Korea play a much greater role in explaining the shift in perspective.   Traditionally, the two Koreas have been locked in a struggle for legitimacy, with each claiming to represent the true government of the peninsula. North Korea based its legitimacy on anti-imperialistic nationalism and a peculiar form of socialism known as juche (self-reliance). In South Korea, nationalism was more problematic, given the high percentage of the ruling class that had collaborated with Japanese colonial rule and the country's dependence on its military alliance with the United States. Thus, military dictators -- Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987) -- used economic growth and anti-communism as the pillars to justify their rule. Left-wing nationalism, advocating reunification on North Korean terms, or questioning the U.S. military presence, were strictly forbidden under the National Security Law of this period. The transition to a democratic form of government in 1987 ushered in an era of greater freedom of speech and assembly, allowing new civil movements to blossom. One result was questioning about whether the life-or-death confrontation with North Korea should be abandoned in favour of a more cooperative relationship. This re-evaluation was prompted by the thawing of the Cold War. When all the world's communist countries except Cuba refused to honour North Korea's call to boycott the Seoul Olympics in 1988, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo -- the first democratically elected leader since Park's 1961 military coup -- seized on the opening to pursue détente with the Communist Bloc. Roh launched a series of moves collectively known as "Nordpolitik". By the end of his term, he had established diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and China, achieved joint admission for both Koreas into the United Nations, and signed the first-ever direct agreement between North and South Korea in 1992, although its terms have never been implemented. The cumulative effect was to make "peaceful coexistence" with the North politically acceptable within South Korea for the first time. Roh's successor, Kim Young-sam, assumed the presidency in 1993 as revelations of North Korea's nuclear ambitions were coming to the fore. An unprecedented flurry of negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. ensued, in which South Korea pushed hard to be included. Kim agreed to hold a summit with North Korean President Kim Il-sung, but it was cancelled due to the latter's sudden death. He did succeed in bringing about the four-party talks between North Korea, South Korea, the U.S. and China. While they achieved little of substance, they did establish the process of regular dialogue between the two Koreas. In 1995, North Korea revealed that it was suffering from severe food shortages, and the government of South Korea responded with food aid. Non-governmental contacts, however, remained largely restricted. By the 1997 presidential election, the foundation had been laid for a restructuring of Seoul's approach to its long-time enemy in Pyongyang. The election gave a narrow victory to Kim Dae-jung, the septuagenarian opposition leader who was running for the fourth time. Throughout his years as a democracy campaigner, Kim had consistently advocated a more open policy toward the North, a stance that during the 1970s and 1980s had him labelled as a communist and made him the target for arrest and assassination attempts by South Korean governments. In power, he set about implementing his long-held dream in hopes of securing a legacy as the man who put Korea on the road to reconciliation and reunification. In doing so, he fundamentally transformed the way South Koreans view their northern counterparts...(Continued)    

EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No. 8   Author Jacques E. C. Hymans is Assistant Professor of Government at Smith College in Massachusetts, USA. He is the author of The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2006) and articles in the European Journal of International Relations, the Journal of East Asian Studies, Security Studies, and other publications. Hymans received his Ph.D. from the Harvard University Department of Government in 2001. This paper was submitted to "EAI Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia" supported by the Henry Luce Foundation based in New York. All papers are available only through the online database.     What are the strategic intentions and technical capacities of the nuclear program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea? Notwithstanding the strident debates over how to deal with the DPRK nuclear issue, in fact no one can claim to know the answers to these basic questions. Indeed, even to the extent rough mainstream consensus answers have emerged, the evidence supporting them is very thin. But the cloud of ignorance that hangs over the DPRK nuclear debate contains a silver lining. The absence of solid information about the case actually can free us to focus on the theoretical assumptions that usually remain implicit in proliferation threat assessments. The result of this exercise is an alternative assessment of the DPRK case that defies the standard formulae. Moreover, the return to theoretical basics promises to improve our understanding not only of this case, but of other current cases of proliferation concern as well. For the sad truth is that even for countries on which plentiful information has been available, the record of strategic threat assessment is abysmal.     The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature on DPRK strategic intentions and capacities. It finds that even the best, most theoretically self-conscious work on the case suffers from questionable assumptions about the general dynamics of nuclear proliferation. In particular, first, the typical assumption that the DPRK’s nuclear intentions can be viewed as a rational response to the unfriendly post-Cold War external environment can be called into question—not on the grounds that the DPRK is uniquely irrational, but instead because the basic choice to go or not to go nuclear is a revolutionary one that rarely if ever lends itself to rational, cost-benefit analysis. Bomb desires are better understood as the product of non-rational emotions, and in particular, of the fear and pride that grips “oppositional nationalists.” The paper provides evidence that the DPRK leadership is and has always been oppositional nationalist, and preliminary evidence that its desire for the bomb dates back many decades. Second, the typical assumption that the technical challenges of building the bomb are mere nuisances for heavily (albeit inefficiently) industrialized states like the DPRK can also be called into question—not on the grounds that it may not yet have acquired certain key pieces of technology, but instead because its regime type is prone to extreme organizational and managerial ineptitude. The DPRK fits snugly into a class of regimes that from a neo-Weberian perspective can be labeled “neo-patrimonial” or “sultanistic.” The comparative politics literature indicates that even when such regimes gain access to the latest technology, their management pathologies are so pronounced that their “big science” projects routinely run aground. The paper provides preliminary evidence that the DPRK may indeed not be up to the nuclear research and development challenge. Finally, the conclusion of the paper briefly tackles the question of how the United States should handle this very different DPRK than the one usually portrayed...(Continued)    

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note In an effort to illustrate the bifurcation of "peace" on the Korean Peninsula, Young-sun Ha analyzes the evolution of reunification discourses following the Korean War. In particular, his paper focuses on the three concepts--"reunification through war", "reunification through revolution" and "peaceful reunification"—that emphasize differences in the two Koreas’ respective interpretations of peace. Such conceptual bifurcation, accompanied by existing political and economic differences, makes it increasingly more difficult for the two Koreas to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula.     Quotes from the paper  The Korean War and the Concept of Peace After separate governments were established in the North and the South in 1948, North Korea chose reunification through war as its primary principle, complemented by reunification through revolution with peaceful reunification as the facade.   National Modernization and the Concept of Peace In spite of domestic and international difficulties, North Korea quickly finished postwar reconstruction under the Three-Year Plan for Economic Revival (1954-1956) and the First Five-Year Plan for Economic Development (1957-1961). In the 1960s, the Soviets and the Chinese withdrew their support for reunification through war. In the meantime, South Korea remained politically unstable, and was enduring greater difficulty recovering from the war than North Korea. Accordingly, North Korea began to emphasize reunification through revolution over reunification through war. Kim Il Sung called for reunification through strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities in February 1964. South Korea’s approach of "first construction, next reunification" and the North’s strategy of "strengthen the three revolutionary capabilities" competed against one another. But in 1968, the inter-Korean relationship sharply deteriorated owing to a series of incidents including the Blue House Raid (January 21), the USS Pueblo Incident (January 23), and the Uljin-Samcheok Landing (October 23). After this, the South Korean government switched to a strategy of "parallel advancement of defense and construction".   Détente and the July 4 Joint Statement While Park Chung-hee was pursuing a three-fold survival strategy that included an improved relationship with North Korea, Kim Il Sung sought reunification through a strengthening of the three revolutionary capabilities. Although the two Koreas shook hands, they did so with totally different perspectives and inner hostility towards one another. As a result, the handshake did not lead to a hug but rather regressed to a state of confrontation.   The Post-Cold War Era and the Concept of Peace The arms reduction proposals by North and South Korea have some commonalities but are structurally in conflict, with discrepancies arising from their totally different approaches to "peace" in Korea. On the one hand, South Korea has pointed out that a relaxation of military tensions on the Peninsula is practically impossible as long as the North, based on the lasting ideology of the national liberation and people’s democratic revolution formed in the 1960s, 1) urges withdrawal of the USFK, 2) denies the legitimacy of the South Korean regime and seeks to instigate communist revolutions in the South, and 3) still displays the potential for a surprise attack. On the other hand, North Korea argues that the main obstacles to the relaxation of military tensions are large-scale military exercises such as Team Spirit as well as the presence of US forces and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the South, which must be removed first and foremost to achieve the peaceful reunification of Korea.   Conclusion  Modern concepts of "peace" in South and North Korea have developed in a bifurcated fashion throughout four phases: the Korean War (1950s), national modernization (1960s), the détente (1970s), and the post-Cold War era (1990s). Within the divided Peninsula, the concept of "peace" has been intricately entwined with the three options of reunification through war, reunification through revolution, and peaceful reunification, and has over time come to have totally different meanings in the North and the South. [To] achieve a true resolution to the Korean peace problem in the 21st century, sociopolitical forces inside and outside the Korean Peninsula must exert co-evolutionary efforts to develop and practice a new, shared concept of "peace".     Author’s Biography Young-Sun Ha is Chairman of the Board of Trustees at the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha serves as a member of senior advisory group for the inter-Korean summit talks preparation committee(2018-). He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington. His recent books and edited volumes include: U.S.-China Competition in the Architecture of a Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific (2017), International Politics of Tributary Envoys: The Analysis of Cho’chonnok and Yonhaengnok 16C-19C (2016), and Korean Peninsula among Big Powers 1972 vs 2014 (2015).    

EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No. 8   Author Jacques E. C. Hymans is Assistant Professor of Government at Smith College in Massachusetts, USA. He is the author of The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2006) and articles in the European Journal of International Relations, the Journal of East Asian Studies, Security Studies, and other publications. Hymans received his Ph.D. from the Harvard University Department of Government in 2001. This paper was submitted to "EAI Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia" supported by the Henry Luce Foundation based in New York. All papers are available only through the online database.     What are the strategic intentions and technical capacities of the nuclear program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea? Notwithstanding the strident debates over how to deal with the DPRK nuclear issue, in fact no one can claim to know the answers to these basic questions. Indeed, even to the extent rough mainstream consensus answers have emerged, the evidence supporting them is very thin. But the cloud of ignorance that hangs over the DPRK nuclear debate contains a silver lining. The absence of solid information about the case actually can free us to focus on the theoretical assumptions that usually remain implicit in proliferation threat assessments. The result of this exercise is an alternative assessment of the DPRK case that defies the standard formulae. Moreover, the return to theoretical basics promises to improve our understanding not only of this case, but of other current cases of proliferation concern as well. For the sad truth is that even for countries on which plentiful information has been available, the record of strategic threat assessment is abysmal.     The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature on DPRK strategic intentions and capacities. It finds that even the best, most theoretically self-conscious work on the case suffers from questionable assumptions about the general dynamics of nuclear proliferation. In particular, first, the typical assumption that the DPRK’s nuclear intentions can be viewed as a rational response to the unfriendly post-Cold War external environment can be called into question—not on the grounds that the DPRK is uniquely irrational, but instead because the basic choice to go or not to go nuclear is a revolutionary one that rarely if ever lends itself to rational, cost-benefit analysis. Bomb desires are better understood as the product of non-rational emotions, and in particular, of the fear and pride that grips “oppositional nationalists.” The paper provides evidence that the DPRK leadership is and has always been oppositional nationalist, and preliminary evidence that its desire for the bomb dates back many decades. Second, the typical assumption that the technical challenges of building the bomb are mere nuisances for heavily (albeit inefficiently) industrialized states like the DPRK can also be called into question—not on the grounds that it may not yet have acquired certain key pieces of technology, but instead because its regime type is prone to extreme organizational and managerial ineptitude. The DPRK fits snugly into a class of regimes that from a neo-Weberian perspective can be labeled “neo-patrimonial” or “sultanistic.” The comparative politics literature indicates that even when such regimes gain access to the latest technology, their management pathologies are so pronounced that their “big science” projects routinely run aground. The paper provides preliminary evidence that the DPRK may indeed not be up to the nuclear research and development challenge. Finally, the conclusion of the paper briefly tackles the question of how the United States should handle this very different DPRK than the one usually portrayed...(Continued)    

Key Updates   1) North Korea’s launch of the ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on July 12th, with an unprecedented 74-minute flight time, drew condemnation from the US, South Korea, and Japan, as discussions were ongoing at a NATO summit.   2) North Korea marked its 70th War Victory Day with a grand ceremony attended by Chinese and Russian officials, including a military parade showcasing their armed forces and strategic weapons, such as the ICBM Hwasongpho-18.   North Korea Launches Longest Ever Flight of ICBM   North Korea carried out the firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasongpho-18 from its eastern coast on July 12th, sparking condemnation from the United States, South Korea, and Japan. The incident occurred amid discussions at a NATO summit, where leaders of South Korea and Japan expressed their concerns (MOFA 2023a). The missile’s flight trajectory extended over a remarkable 74-minute duration, attaining an altitude of 6,000 km and covering a distance of 1,000 km. According to Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hirokazu Matsuno, this represents the lengthiest observed flight time for a North Korean missile (PMOJ 2023). This launch comes in the wake of a series of recent grievances raised by North Korea. Among these is the allegation of U.S. reconnaissance planes violating their designated economic zone, expressing discontent over the presence of an American nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine in South Korea, and making a commitment to take responsive measures (KCNA 2023a; 2023b).   Following the event, on July 14th, in a trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting attended by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Japan’s Foreign Minister, and South Korea’s Foreign Minister, the leaders have jointly condemned the launch of an ICBM by North Korea (DOS 2023a; MOFA 2023b; MOFA Japan 2023a). The three countries reaffirmed their commitment to collaborate with the UN and the global community, aiming to ensure the comprehensive implementation of sanctions as outlined in UN Security Council resolutions against North Korea. Moreover, they expressed their determination to heighten efforts to prevent North Korea from generating illicit revenue through activities such as overseas labor and cyber operations, which fund its banned weapons programs. The United States underscored its resolute dedication to safeguarding South Korea and Japan using a full range of capabilities, including nuclear capabilities. To bolster security measures, the three countries will further enhance their trilateral cooperation by actively sharing real-time missile warning data, conducting defense exercises, engaging in anti-submarine activities, and participating in maritime interdiction exercises, all designed to effectively counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. The G7 foreign ministers and the European Union also released a joint statement strongly criticizing the recent ICBM launch by North Korea, along with the earlier launches on May 31 and June 15, 2023 (DOS 2023b).   Moreover, on July 20th, a trilateral meeting involving the United States, South Korea, and Japan regarding North Korea-related matters took place in Karuizawa, Nagano Prefecture, Japan (DOS 2023c; 2023d). U.S. Special Representative for the DPRK, Ambassador Sung Kim, joined Japanese MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General, Funakoshi Takehiro, and South Korean Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, Kim Gunn, in attendance. During the meeting, the officials engaged in discussions on how to address mutual concerns and shared interests with North Korea. They also deliberated on strategies aimed at enhancing trilateral security cooperation and emphasized the escalating risks associated with North Korea’s cyber activities.   However, on 19th and 24th, North Korea subsequently launched ballistic missiles into the East Sea during the early morning hours, prompting the Japanese Prime Minister to issue directives (PMOJ 2023b; 2023c). During a press statement concerning the 2023 Preparatory Committee Meeting (PrepCom) convened in Vienna alongside other NPT States Parties, Matthew Miller, spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, emphasized North Korea as a representative country presenting a significant nuclear threat, along with Russia and China. Miller noted North Korea’s active development of its nuclear arsenal and the use of intimidating rhetoric regarding its potential deployment (DOS 2023e).   North Korea’s 70th War Victory Day Celebrations and China and Russia’s Visit   North Korea annually commemorates July 27, 1953, the date of the armistice that ended the Korean War, as “the victory day in the Fatherland Liberation War.” This year, North Korea celebrated its 70th anniversary with a massive and fervent ceremony, inviting senior officials from China and Russia to Pyongyang. On July 25th, Kim Jong Un visited the Fatherland Liberation War Martyrs Cemetery, accompanied by Minister Kang Sun Nam and prominent officers from the DPRK Ministry of National Defense, as well as service commanders and commanding officers of significant combined units within the Korean People’s Army (KCNA 2023c). A grand military parade was held in Pyongyang, showcasing the achievements of North Korea’s armed forces and commemorating the historic victory (KCNA 2023d). The parade featured various units representing different phases of the war, including infantry, tank divisions, naval and air forces, and missile units. The display included strategic weapons that underscored the country’s readiness to respond to nuclear threats and confrontations. A highlight was the appearance of the ICBM Hwasongpho-18, symbolizing “the might of the strategic force of North Korea.”   During the meeting held to mark this occasion, Sergei Shoigu, Defense Minister of the Russian Federation, and Li Hongzhong, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China participated (KCNA 2023e). At the meeting, Shoigu delivered a congratulatory speech on behalf of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, the President of Russia. In his letter, Putin articulated that North Korea’s “firm support to the special military operation against Ukraine” showcased their “common interests and determination to counter the policy of the Western group which hinders the establishment of the truly multipolarized and just world” (KCNA 2023f). Even before this visit, during a Russian Foreign Ministry briefing on the 26th, spokesperson Maria Zakharova characterized this meeting, commemorating the “70th anniversary of signing the Korean Armistice Agreement” as an opportunity to strengthen “military ties” and enhance cooperation between the two countries (MOFA Russia 2023). The North Korea-Russia bilateral talks between Defense Ministers also centered around fostering cooperative relationships between their respective armed forces, aligned with this objective (KCNA 2023g).   A Chinese party and military delegation, led by Li, also engaged in a meeting with Choe Ryong Hae, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly. However, the specifics of the meeting were not disclosed to the public. In contrast to the talk with Russia, there were no ministerial-level North Korean officials (KCNA 2023h). On the other hand, during a Chinese press conference, spokesperson Mao Ning addressed queries concerning Li’s visit. Reports indicated that Li’s visit encompassed the conveyance of a personal letter from Chinese President Xi Jinping. Nevertheless, any details for the visit were not revealed during the press conference (MOFA China 2023). Additionally, during the same conference, Mao addressed concerns about China’s stance on UN sanctions, considering that Chinese delegations participated in a parade in Pyongyang, where weaponry banned by UN sanctions was displayed. Mao reiterated China’s steadfast position on the Korean Peninsula, stating, “On implementing UN Security Council’s resolutions, China always fulfills its due international obligations.”   Conclusion   After the launch of North Korea’s ICBM Hwasongpho-18, it is becoming increasingly evident that the confrontational divide between the U.S.-South Korea-Japan partnership and the Russia-North Korea-China coalition has further solidified. Both sides are emphasizing military cooperation, indicating that military tensions on the Korean Peninsula are likely to persist for some time. Meanwhile, the distinctive approaches of North Korea’s relationships with Russia and China are particularly notable during the War Victory Day Celebrations. Russia’s explicit recognition of North Korea’s involvement in the Russia-Ukrainian war places North Korea in a precarious position, potentially exposing it to increased international isolation as a state sponsor of warfare. On the other hand, China assumes a more passive stance, abstaining from sending a ministerial-level delegation to Pyongyang. Despite attending the ceremony, which included the display of an ICBM, China reiterates its commitment to international responsibilities as outlined by the UNSC Resolutions. Consequently, the regional security landscape might undergo significant shifts, contingent upon China’s diplomatic relationships and roles. As the South Korean government contemplates China’s potential proactive role in tackling these challenges, it is imperative to articulate shared concerns and security risks that transcend the confines of the two opposing camps.    Reference   Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2023a. “Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK Releases Press Statement.” The Organization of Asia-Pacific News Agencies. June 1. https://oananews.org/content/news/kim-yo-jong-vice-department-director-cc-wpk-releases-press-statement   _________________________________. 2023b. “Kim Son Gyong, Vice Foreign Minister of DPRK, Releases Press Statement.” June 1. https://oananews.org/content/news/kim-son-gyong-vice-foreign-minister-dprk-releases-press-statement   _______________________________. 2023c. “Press Statement of Director General for Int'l Organizations of DPRK Foreign Ministry.” June 2. https://oananews.org/content/news/press-statement-director-general-intl-organizations-dprk-foreign-ministry-0   _______________________________. 2023d. “Press Statement of DPRK Maritime Administration Spokesperson.” June 8. https://oananews.org/content/news/press-statement-dprk-maritime-administration-spokesperson   Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea (MND). 2023a. “North Korea’s space launch is a serious violation of the UN Security Council resolutions.” June 16. https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/boardList.action?command=view&page=1&boardId=O_47261&boardSeq=O_337748&titleId=null&siteId=mndEN&id=mndEN_020100000000&column=null&search=null   ___________________________________________________________. 2023b. “Korea, the United States and Japan to operate a systern to share North Korean missile warning data in real time within this year.” June 16. https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/boardList.action?command=view&page=1&boardId=O_47261&boardSeq=O_337749&titleId=null&siteId=mndEN&id=mndEN_020100000000&column=null&search=null   ___________________________________________________________. 2023c. “Only a strong military can guarantee freedom, peace and prosperity for the Republic of Korea.” June 28. https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/boardList.action?command=view&page=1&boardId=O_47261&boardSeq=O_338387&titleId=null&siteId=mndEN&id=mndEN_020100000000&column=null&search=null   Ministry of Defense of Japan (MOD). 2023a. “United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Meeting (TMM) Joint Press Statement.” June 3. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2023/06/3d261b6bcd4d9b867653a23762afc40f0bb5bf0c.html   __________________________________. 2023b. “United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers’ Meeting (TDMM) 2023 Joint Statement.” June 3. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2023/06/086c9e47a8b8e0a3298a57eba5983b0148ee3000.html   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea (MOFA). 2023a. “Exploring Ways to Expand Global Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific - Vice Minister LEE Dohoon Delivers a Keynote Speech at 18th Jeju Forum.” June 1. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322209&page=3   ___________________________________________________________. 2023b. “ROK Elected as Non-permanent Member of UN Security Council for 2024-25 Term.” June 6. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322213&page=2   ___________________________________________________________. 2023c. “Yoon administration releases its National Security Strategy.” June 8. https://www.mofa.go.kr/us-en/brd/m_4511/view.do?seq=761767   ___________________________________________________________. 2023d. “MOFA Holds First Interministerial Meeting for Implementation of ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy.’” June 29. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322227&page=1   The White House. 2023a. “Notice on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea.” Briefing Room. June 20. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/06/20/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-north-korea-3/   _______________. 2023b. “Message to the Congress on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea.” Briefing Room. June 20. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/06/20/message-to-the-congress-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-north-korea/   U.S. Department of State (DOS). 2023a. “Department Press Briefing – June 15, 2023.” June 15. https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-june-15-2023/#post-454680-NorthKorea   ______________________________. 2023b. “Designation of Two DPRK Individuals Supporting the DPRK’s Unlawful Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs.” June 15. https://www.state.gov/designation-of-two-dprk-individuals-supporting-the-dprks-unlawful-weapons-of-mass-destruction-and-missile-programs/     ■ Minah Kang is a Ph.D. candidate at Johns Hopkins University.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park , Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

Key Updates   1) The recent developments in military cooperation between Russia and North Korea resulted in sanctions on entities that facilitated their arms deals.   2) The South Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit at Camp David laid a strong foundation for continuous and stable trilateral cooperation to address North Korean threats and bolster regional security.   3) North Korea’s second “satellite launch” has raised regional concerns and prompted trilateral action.   Russia-North Korea Military Cooperation   The Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Pyongyang last month in light of North Korea’s 70th War Victory Day celebrations has ignited interest and concern regarding the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea. Matthew Miller, the spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, emphasized the United States’ longstanding concerns about this collaboration, particularly on North Korea’s alleged support for Russia’s involvement in Ukraine (DOS 2023a). Vedant Patel, the Principal Deputy Spokesperson, pointed out that Shoigu’s visit to North Korea was an attempt to persuade North Korea to provide further munitions, thereby aiding Russia’s war efforts (DOS 2023b). He emphasized that such security cooperation or arms deals between North Korea and Russia would unquestionably contravene a series of UN Security Council resolutions.   In response, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced the imposition of sanctions on three entities closely associated with Ashot Mkrtychev, a Slovakian national previously sanctioned by the U.S. for his involvement in facilitating arms deals between North Korea and Russia (DOS 2023c). These sanctions come in the wake of Mkrtychev’s attempts to facilitate the supply of arms to Russia for its involvement in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Mkrtychev has coordinated with North Korean procurement officials and used Versor to conduct negotiations with companies abroad (TREAS 2023). This latest action underscores the U.S. commitment to identify, expose, and penalize individuals and entities from third countries that support Russia’s illegal activities in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the White House emphasizes that Russia, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, bears a heightened responsibility to comply with the numerous UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to North Korea (White House 2023a). Any failure to adhere to these resolutions, particularly those related to ballistic missile defense technology, would constitute a breach of international obligations.   South Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit at Camp David: Key Milestones and Global Reactions   On August 18th, President Yoon Seok Yeol of South Korea, President Biden of the United States, and Prime Minister Kishida of Japan held a landmark 65-minute summit at Camp David in Washington, D.C. (MOFA Japan 2023a). This was the first occasion during President Biden’s tenure in which he extended an invitation to a foreign leaders at Camp David, the presidential retreat. During the summit, they adopted the Camp David Principles, reaffirming their unwavering commitment to a shared vision for their partnership and the broader Indo-Pacific region. Among the significant outcomes of the summit was their resolute and unified stance on North Korea, where they explicitly expressed their dedication to the complete denuclearization of North Korea and opposed “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion [in the Indo-Pacific]” (The White House 2023). In the Spirit of Camp David, the leaders expressed concern over North Korea’s cyber thefts and sanctions evasion, highlighted their commitment to dialogue without preconditions, and urged for respect for human rights. Another noteworthy development was their pledge to share real-time missile warning data on North Korea by the end of 2023, building upon the commitments outlined in the November 2022 Phnom Penh Statement and highlighting their resolve to address regional security challenges. Institutional mechanisms for trilateral cooperation at various levels, including “regular summits, annual government personnel meetings, and a communication channel for swift coordination in times of crisis” were established as well (White House 2023b; PMOJ 2023a).   In his remarks during the Joint Press Conference following the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David, President Yoon emphasized the pressing need for enhanced cooperation in response to North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile threats (MOFA 2023). Stressing the urgency of the situation, he conveyed that the three countries had engaged in substantial discussions on practical methods to strengthen their collective response capabilities. Furthermore, as part of their comprehensive efforts to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the leaders acknowledged the significance of trilateral defense exercises. They committed to establishing annual plans for South Korea-U.S.-Japan drills, reaffirming their dedication to regional security. In a bilateral South Korea-Japan summit held on the same day, the two leaders acknowledged that recent progress in the trilateral partnership enhances coordination between the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the South Korea-U.S. Alliance, elevating trilateral security cooperation to new heights (MOFA Japan 2023c). They also highlighted the potential for more effective cooperation between South Korea and Japan as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council next year.   In response to the recent developments in the trilateral partnership, both China and Russia expressed concerns, raising questions about the implications and the impact on regional security dynamics. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, defined the trilateral initiative as an attempt to form “exclusionary groupings” under the pretext of Korean Peninsula issues. He cautioned against the escalation of regional bloc confrontations and called for a departure from the “Cold War mentality,” emphasizing the need for meaningful dialogues to address each party’s “legitimate concerns” (MOFA China 2023). During the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Head of the Russian Federation’s Delegation highlighted what it perceives as U.S. hypocrisy in accusing DPRK of NPT violations, especially in light of the recent U.S.-ROK agreement on a “joint nuclear planning (MOFA Russia 2023).” The Head expressed apprehension that such actions not only undermine efforts to resolve the Korean Peninsula situation but also erode the systern of UN Security Council resolutions aimed at denuclearization.   North Korea’s Second Satellite Launch and Trilateral Response   On August 24th, North Korea launched a second ‘space launch vehicle’ carrying a military reconnaissance satellite. The missile’s trajectory took it over the airspace between Japan’s main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima island, prompting a swift response from Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary. He stated that this launch employed ballistic missile technology, further escalating the regional security threat (PMOJ 2023b). Additionally, during a recent telephone meeting, the foreign ministers of Japan, the United States, and South Korea strongly condemned such deed and expressed concern over the increasing frequency and evolving methods of North Korea’s missile launches. The three ministers reiterated their commitment to bilateral and trilateral collaboration for the complete denuclearization of North Korea, in line with United Nations Security Council resolutions.   Conclusion   In recent months, the schism between the U.S.-South Korea-Japan partnership and the Russia-North Korea-China coalition has notably deepened. Specifically, the South Korea-U.S.-Japan Summit at Camp David laid the groundwork for formalizing trilateral cooperation to address North Korean challenges and bolster regional security. Criticism from China and Russia concerning this trilateral partnership, coupled with North Korea’s recent satellite launch, has further exacerbated this confrontational scenario. It is worth noting that leaders from South Korea, the United States, and Japan discussed plans for a trilateral defense exercise and aimed to enhance coordination between the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the South Korea-U.S. Alliance, thus elevating trilateral security cooperation to unprecedented levels. On the other hand, with regards to the recent meeting between the leaders of North Korea and Russia on September 13, where Russian President Putin expressed his willingness to support North Korea in its satellite development efforts and emphasized that United Nations sanctions on North Korea would not hinder the future development of relations between Russia and North Korea, it becomes crucial for the Korean government to carefully assess whether Russia’s involvement will lead to shifts in North Korea’s stance or influence its interactions with other regional players, particularly China. As regional security dynamics continue to evolve, maintaining open lines of communication and engagement with all stakeholders will be essential.    Reference   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA Japan). 2023a. “Camp David Principles.” August 18. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100541778.pdf   __________________________. 2023b. “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan.” August 18. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100541827.pdf   __________________________. 2023c. “Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Telephone Meeting.” August 24. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000455.html   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea (MOFA). 2023. “Remarks by President Yoon Suk Yeol in Joint Press Conference following the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David.” August 28. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=320864&page=1   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (MOFA China). 2023. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on August 21, 2023.” August 21. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202308/t20230821_11129753.html   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MOFA Russia). 2023. “Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General debate).” August 1. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1899782/   Prime Minister’s Office of Japan (PMOJ). 2023a. “Joint Press Conference by the Leaders of Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea.” August 18. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202308/18kyodo_kaiken.html   _______________________________. 2023b. “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on North Korea’s Launch Using Ballistic Missile Technology.” August 24. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/decisions/2023/0824_seimei.html   U.S. Department of State (DOS). 2023a. “Department Press Briefing – August 7, 2023.” August 7. https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-7-2023/#post-469040-nkorea   __________________________. 2023b. “Department Press Briefing – August 15, 2023.” August 15. https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-15-2023/   __________________________. 2023c. “Sanctioning Entities Connected to Russia-DPRK Arms Dealer.” August 16. https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-entities-connected-to-russia-dprk-arms-dealer/   U.S. Department of the Treasury (TREAS). 2023. “Treasury Sanctions Entities Tied to Arms Deals Between North Korea and Russia.” August 16. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1697   U.S. White House (White House). 2023a. “Camp David Principles.” August 18. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/camp-david-principles/   __________________________. 2023b. “Press Gaggle by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.” August 18. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/08/18/press-gaggle-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-thurmont-md/   _________________________. 2023b. “Remarks by President Biden, President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea, and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference.” August 18. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/08/18/remarks-by-president-biden-president-yoon-suk-yeol-of-the-republic-of-korea-and-prime-minister-kishida-fumio-of-japan-in-joint-press-conference-camp-david-md/

■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   1. An Evaluation of Hwasong-17’s Test Launch   On March 25th, 2022, North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency released photos and specifications of the new Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a day after its launch on the 24th. It claimed that the Hwasong-17 flew 1,090 kilometers at a top altitude of 6248.5 kilometers for 4,052 seconds. It consequently landed accurately on the high seas of the East Sea. The successful launch came eight days after a failed test launch on March 16th. Compared to Hwasong-15, launched four years and four months ago on November 29th, 2017 and succeeded on its first attempt, Hwasong-17 is evaluated to be reliable by 50%. Nonetheless, some military sources have cast doubts on North Korea’s claims, stating that the imagery may have come from past dates. The success of the re-launch, which comes just eight days after the initial failure, can be attributed to North Korea’s confidence in its technical abilities. However, it is premature to credit the Hwasong-17 as a completed weapon system, as the biggest obstacle in ICBM development lies in the re-entry technology that penetrates the Earth’s atmosphere and strikes a target on the ground at hypersonic speeds of Mach 20 or higher. Developing Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, which directs multiple warheads to separate targets reentering the Earth’s atmosphere, remains a critical task in advancing Hwasong-17.   2. Prospects and Remaining Tasks for North Korea’s ICBM Development   Through this test launch, North Korea demonstrated its ICBM rapid-fire capabilities, releasing a video of the missile being launched from a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) over a short period of time. However, for ICBMs, a solid-fueled propulsion system is favored over a liquid propellant system as the former enables a faster launch. To this end, North Korea previously unveiled a solid-propelled ICBM model, similar in appearance to China’s DF-31A and Russia’s Topol-M, at the military parade in 2017. Provided with this, it is likely that North Korea will test-launch a solid-propelled ICBM in the near future. Notably, North Korea’s solid-propelled ballistic missiles are generally referred to as Pukguksong. Except for Pukguksong-2, Pukguksong-1, 3, 4, and 5 are submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Once North Korea succeeds in developing a large-diameter long-range SLBM, it would make efforts to convert the missile into ground types. Pukguksong-2 is only a land-based TEL-mounted variation of the Pukguksong-1, which is submarine-launched.   North Korea’s development of solid-propelled ICBMs has been delayed due to the technological challenges in producing nozzles for solid-fueled rockets. High-performance, heat-resistant material technology is required for such missiles, as the increased range of the rocket extends the nozzle’s exposure to high-temperature and high-pressure conditions. In 2017, North Korea demonstrated its determination to develop such technologies through its Chemical Materials Institute, releasing the blueprint of the new facility. However, it would take a long time for Pyongyang to develop such technologies as required substances are classified as strategic materials and are difficult to import. Additionally, its industry is not equipped with the technology necessary to develop such materials. Given that such technology is required to manufacture high-speed re-entry vehicles and warheads, the development of ICBMs remains a daunting task for North Korea.   3. After North Korea’s Development of Strategic Nuclear Weapons   While the development of Hwasong-17 may be the ultimate goal of North Korea’s ICBM pursuits, it does not mean that North Korea’s development of full strategic nuclear weapon capabilities is complete. Nuclear powers that possess ICBMs develop SLBMs and strategic bombers on top of existing weapons due to their effectiveness in implementing nuclear strategies. Although North Korea suffers from dire economic circumstances, it has pursued the parallel development of strategic submarines and SLBMs, and launched military satellites. Such technological capabilities are considered essential to North Korea’s nuclear strategy.   North Korea is not content with the development of the Hwasong-17, which, according to Pyongyang, is capable of striking mainland U.S. Pyongyang is working towards acquiring North Korean-style anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to constrain intervention by the U.S. and other combined forces on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea likely aims to isolate the Korean Peninsula by developing military satellites and missiles such as medium-range cruise missiles and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), that can detect, track, and hit moving targets at sea.   4. The Threat Behind North Korea’s Development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons   North Korea has accelerated its development of nuclear weapons on the premise of using them on the Korean Peninsula. It has advanced strategic nuclear weapons such as the Hwasong-17, capable of striking mainland U.S. with nuclear warheads, in order to deter U.S. intervention in a war on the Korean Peninsula. At the same, Pyongyang has generated tactical nuclear weapons that can offset the inferiority of its conventional forces, hoping to secure military superiority on the Korean Peninsula. At the 8th Party Congress, North Korea announced its aspirations to develop tactical nuclear weapons. Recently, it created a North Korean version of the Iskandar missile also referred to as “new-type tactical guided projectile,” a rail-mobile ballistic missile, a hypersonic missile, a small SLBM, and a short-range cruise missile. Since such missiles have a relatively short range, they are considered as means of transportation for tactical nuclear warheads throughout the entire Korean Peninsula.   In order to achieve various tactical purposes, North Korea continues to push for the miniaturization and weight reduction of nuclear warheads to the extent that they can be mounted on various delivery means, while simultaneously developing neutron warheads with increased human lethality or nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads that can simultaneously cause electromagnetic destruction in a wide area. The development of such tactical nuclear weapons can be made possible simply by adding a specific material around an existing fission warhead to increase the emission of neutrons or gamma rays that occur during nuclear fission. Nonetheless, North Korea may also seek to achieve technological progress through nuclear tests.   5. Ways for South Korea to Deter the North   South Korea has built nuclear deterrence through conventional weapons. Although its nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) response system relies on conventional forces, integrated deterrence, a concept introduced by the U.S., refers to a system of deterrence that mobilizes all capabilities possessed by South Korea and the U.S. on top of South Korea’s conventional weapons. Even if North Korea eventually possesses the ability to strike the U.S. with nuclear weapons and Washington may appear reluctant to retaliate with nuclear weapons, Seoul and Washington can strike the North Korean leadership through their dominant conventional forces, including the U.S.’ tactical nuclear weapons. However, the North Korean leadership has fortified Pyongyang in preparation for nuclear war for a long time, building protective facilities for evacuation. For example, the Pyongyang subway is built more than 100m underground; Seoul is barely equipped with facilities protective against nuclear attacks. Such “asymmetry in protection” causes an “imbalance of fear.” While South Koreans are more alarmed at the prospect of a nuclear attack due to their high vulnerability against such a strike, residents in Pyongyang are relatively less vulnerable against it. Without resolving such imbalance, South Korea will not be able to fully deter North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons. In order to “rebalance fear,” we would either have to reduce our trepidations or place North Korea under greater angst. However, instead of choosing one option over the other, South Korea should prioritize its choices and prepare in advance.        ■ Dr. Sangmin Lee, an active-duty army colonel, is currently the director of the North Korean military research division at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA). He is an expert in North Korea's military field, particularly researching nuclear weapons, missiles, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). His major career includes working as an expert on denuclearization at the Korean Peninsula Peace Negotiation Headquarters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and as a member of the North Korean nuclear issue task force of the Ministry of National Defense (MND). In addition, he has held positions on CBRN and EMP protection at the CBR Defense Research Institute of the Armed Forces CBRN command, and has experience teaching physics at the Korea Military Academy (KMA). He is trying to link policy and technology based on his diverse experience in policy departments, research institutes, and academia, and is working to build a national defense strategy against the threat of WMD. He graduated from the KMA, and obtained his master's and doctoral degrees in material science & engineering from Japan National Defense University and Tohoku University. He served as a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Materials Research(IMR) in Japan, and as a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley, USA.     ■ Typeset by Seung Yeon Lee , Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) |[email protected]