The year 2010 has been a contentious period for ROK-China relations, mainly as a result of the Cheonan incident which created tension between the two over North Korea. China’s refusal to accept the findings of a South Korean-led Joint International Investigation that North Korea was responsible for sinking the Cheonan led to strains within China-ROK ties. Beijing’s close relationships with Pyongyang have evidently caused problems with both Seoul and Washington. Moreover, the way in which the Cheonan incident went from being an inter-Korean affair to a U.S.-China dispute placed ROK-China relations in a difficult situation. Since establishing formal diplomatic relations, economic interdependence has been a primary factor in developing closer ties, yet security issues remain as a problem for South Korea and China.   On November 21-22, 2010, the EAI and Peking University’s Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) held their annual Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NASD) forum at Peking University. As with previous years, there was both an experts’ panel and a students’ forum. The experts’ panel brought together scholars from both China and South Korea to discuss the major issues between the two countries. In the first session, the topic was “The Korean Peninsula Post-Cheonan: Power Succession, Peace and Denuclearization in North Korea,” for the second session the topic was “New Security Dynamics in East Asia and Global Governance.”   The following is a summary of the main policy recommendations arising from the discussion among the participants.   U.S-China Relations   U.S.-China relations are expected to be manageable in the future, but China-Japan relations will be of central concern. In 2010 the key differences have been manifesting themselves in the U.S.-China relationship. This has been mainly on sensitive matters such as Taiwan, currency disputes, North Korea, and maritime issues which have all come to the fore. Some view that China has become increasingly assertive over its “core interests” when dealing with the United States. Others argue that the United States and its allies are overly engaging with China’s effort for peaceful rise. While most of these issues have revealed great differences, none have so far jeopardized this important bilateral relationship. It was generally accepted by the NASD panel that the United States and China can manage their differences. Both states can escape negative materialization of a security dilemma in the phase of possible power transition by understanding the nature of East Asian strategy of each state, and also changing nature of power fields in the 21th century defined not just by hard power but also by soft and network power.   The path of China-Japan relations, however, stands in contrast and is more difficult to predict. China has already surpassed Japan as the second largest economy and with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; there exists a flashpoint between the two countries. 2010 witnessed many difficulties that China-Japan relations are going through. In September, the dispute over Japan’s detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands threatened to seriously damage bilateral ties. This case was said to foretell the dangers ahead of how foreign policy in both countries can be manipulated by a domestic audience, but it remains to be seen if this is a current trend or a longer term challenge. What is important in this regard is to recognize that both sides made mistakes during this episode. To avoid such confrontations in the future, Beijing and Tokyo should seek measures to manage the relationship between them.   China needs to develop a sophisticated regional approach to avert feelings of being contained by the United States. The Obama administration’s reengagement with the Asia region has brought about fears in Beijing that Washington is trying to contain a rising China. After almost ten years of distorted focus on the Middle East to combat terrorism, the United States is turning its focus back to Asia.   Maritime security issues became a major issue as some had interpreted that China’s statements claimed the South China Sea to be one of its “core issues” equating it with other such sensitive issues as Tibet and Taiwan. For Beijing, there can be no compromise on its “core interests.” The diplomatic jousting during the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi in July 2010 seemed to epitomize the difficulties in U.S.-China relations. As Washington builds up its contacts in the region by reaffirming alliances with South Korea and Japan and seeking new partnerships with India and Indonesia, Beijing feels encircled. One of the difficulties is the kind of relationships that China has with its neighbors when compared to the United States. In some respects, there are advantages that China holds due to volume of trade that it has with countries in the region. But this has not translated into regional security relations where countries still prefer the United States. The disparity between China’s economic relations and its security contacts is one that should be addressed but in a way that takes into consideration its neighbors’ concern.   The Future of North Korea   As inter-Korean tensions mount, the Six-Party Talks will need a more creative approach. As North Korea goes through it succession process, the situation on the Korean Peninsula have been very confrontational. The sinking of Cheonan in March 2010 set back the previous diplomatic efforts by China to restart the Six-Party Talks. In the aftermath of the incident, South Korea declared that it would not restart talks unless North Korea apologized for its attack. For much of 2010, the Six-Party Talks have been in deadlock despite the continued diplomatic push by China. As the succession issue becomes more stable, there will be a new opportunity to restart talks. However, this chance can be lost if the approach is not effective in bringing together all parties. The step-by-step process that was the hallmark of the Six-Party Talks was effective in reaching some agreements, but future talks will need to utilize a more comprehensive solution. Time is also a major factor, it is critical to restart talks before North Korea weaponizes its nuclear material which would then make it far more difficult to denuclearize.   North Korea can only be stable if it pursues economic reforms and opening, but disagreement remains over how much influence Beijing can exert on Pyongyang. The current policy guiding North Korea is the songun or “military-first politics” which commits the state toward devoting all its meager resources to the military. This distorted policy will continue to plunge the country into a desperate state with no hope of overcoming its basic shortages. The North Korean regime needs to recognize that it can no longer guarantee its survival by adhering to the “military-first politics” indefinitely. What it must do is switch to new policies that can embrace economic reforms and opening and that can guarantee its survival yet not create the dangers and instabilities that come with “military-first” politics. There was a general agreement in the NASD forum about the need for North Korea to adopt reforms and opening that China has been pushing the North on for some time.   Furthermore, the notion that all states must cooperate and develop the policy of engaging with North Korea, and evolve with North Korea in its reform efforts or a policy of “coevolution” is also favored. However, there remains disagreement among the Korean and Chinese participants of the forum about the degree to which Beijing can pressure Pyongyang to change.   The Future of ROK-China Relations   ROK-China relations have been influenced by U.S.-China rivalries, but Seoul and Beijing must work to strengthen their ties and institutionalize the way they solve their differences. The way in which the Cheonan incident went from an inter-Korean issue to a U.S.-China dispute shows the fragility of relations in the region. This placed South Korea in a very difficult situation and one that Seoul fears above all else, whether to side with the United States, its main ally, or China, its largest trading partner. For the most part, Seoul has been able to avoid the difficulties in U.S.-China relations, such as Taiwan or Tibet but the Cheonan incident directly affected the Korean Peninsula and its own security. In spite of the difficulties and tough choices that came with the Cheonan incident, Beijing and Seoul must continue to strengthen ties and develop mechanisms to avoid misunderstandings, by developing more concrete measures to develop their “strategic cooperative partnership relations.”   The recent disputes in Northeast Asia can be resolved as bigger issues drive relations. The importance of enhanced cooperation between South Korea and China is that it can overcome some of the recent disputes and issues in the so-called “Post-Cheonan period.” Suggestions for a Trilateral FTA, for example, between South Korea, Japan, and China could be a way to balance or bridge the interests of each country. Still, despite the economic dependence, imbalances continue to exist among the countries that will have to be properly addressed for the future. South Korea and China needs to develop a more persuasive blueprint for the future regional architecture to manage the process of regional power shift and guarantee peace and coprosperity.■         Korean Participants Chaesung Chun Chong Wook Chung Young-Sun Ha Sukhee Han Dongho Jo Sook-Jong Lee Seong-Yeol Oh   Chinese Participants Dong Wang Jisi Wang Bojiang Yang Tuosheng Zhang Feng Zhu

The East Asia Institute (EAI) hosted Dr. John S. Park, senior research associate at the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Center for Conflict Analysis & Prevention, on August 6, 2010 for a Smart Talk on China’s evolving North Korea policy. He examined the implications of deepening Communist Party of China (CPC)-Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) ties for Seoul and Washington. Leading experts in South Korea participated in the discussion and exchanged their views on China-North Korea relations, China-U.S. relations, post-Cheonan measures, and the future prospects for the Six-Party Talks. The following is a summary of Dr. Park’s presentation.   Xiaokang and China’s Foreign Policy   Xiaokang, China’s development policy of bringing the majority of the population into the middle class by 2020, has been the core objective of the CPC since it was introduced by Deng Xiaoping. Chinese leaders have tailored traditional foreign policy principles in order to further Xiaokang goals. They have placed specific emphasis on two essential factors to strengthen Xiaokang goals – a stable external environment on China’s borders and stable relations with the United States. From this perspective, North Korea has constituted a major instability factor for China in Northeast Asia. At key moments since the early 1990s, North Korean instability – either due to massive natural disasters, ineffective economic policies, or acts of brinkmanship – has posed a major challenge to the secure environment required to achieve Xiaokang goals. To address this North Korean instability factor, Beijing tailored its two primary foreign policy principles – non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states and cooperation in multilateral institutions – to develop the “Four Sentences” that comprise its DPRK policy. The first is non-proliferation in Asia, a message directed to North Korea.  The second is peaceful settlement through dialogue, a message directed to the United States. The third is peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, a message directed to all parties. The fourth is the need to give necessary consideration to North Korea’s security concerns, a message directed to the United States. Although the Four Sentences comprise Beijing’s long-term approach to the Korean Peninsula and remain unaltered, the means for achieving these objectives have changed since the early 2000s. Beijing has become more proactive and entrepreneurial in its handling of the ongoing North Korean nuclear imbroglio. This trend culminated in the start of Beijing’s chairmanship of the newly launched Six-Party Talks in August 2003. Rather than a discreet behind-the-scenes approach that characterized its diplomatic activities during the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, Beijing adopted an overt posture and assumed significant political risk by chairing the Six-Party Talks process.   Fostering Sustainable Stability in Northeast Asia   Xiaokang is a key factor in understanding why stabilizing North Korea constitutes a top policy priority for Beijing. Closely related to Xiaokang is the leadership’s need to promote social stability in China. In practical terms, this means closing the income gap between different regions in China. Among China’s chronically poorest provinces are the three bordering North Korea – Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin. By fostering sustainable stability in Northeast Asia, Beijing is seeking to facilitate sustainable economic development in these provinces. Beijing’s two primary means for doing so have been bolstering DPRK regime stability with Chinese political capital and promoting DPRK resource development for mutual benefit. We should not be surprised by this separate, parallel Sino-DPRK track that has no linkage to progress with DPRK denuclearization. China, like all countries, is seeking to further its national interests. An important distinction is that Beijing conducted these bilateral efforts through its CPC International Department channel with North Korea. This has been part of an ongoing effort by Beijing to rebuild the Sino-DPRK relationship since ties were severed by Pyongyang in response to China’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Seoul in 1992. After a “lost decade” of frozen relations, Chinese overtures began to gain traction in the early 2000s. Vice Premier Wu Yi’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2005 for the 60th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the WPK marked a highpoint. The reason was the inclusion of Commerce Minister Bo Xilai who signed landmark bilateral agreements for the joint development of DPRK mineral resources.   Premier Wen Jiabao’s October 2009 visit to Pyongyang marked a further deepening of the CPC-WPK relationship. While the occasion was the 60th anniversary of founding of diplomatic relations, the significance lay in the comprehensive delegation that Wen headed. Among the Chinese delegation members were the commerce minister, the chief of the National Development and Reform Commission – the main architects and implementers of Chinese economic development – in addition to senior officials from the CPC International Department and PLA.   Economic Engagement with North Korea and Denuclearization   The main message from Wen’s visit was that the CPC would bolster the stability of the WPK through a comprehensive bilateral relationship centered on expanding economic engagement. In practice, seeking to achieve the goals of Xiaokang and securing strong bilateral commercial ties have resulted in the creation of close localized connections between North Korea’s Hamgyong-buk-do and China’s Jilin province. The symbiotic relationship that exists between these two border provinces can be characterized as “Ham-Ji” – a sub-regional area where the border is relatively porous and facilitates coping mechanism-type activities in nascent DPRK markets. Given that China’s economic engagement with North Korea is not directly linked to DPRK denuclearization activities, Pyongyang currently enjoys the benefits of its bilateral economic interactions with China without pressure to meet the immediate obligations of Six-Party Talks agreements. In a sense, Beijing’s North Korea policy has evolved to become a Chinese version of the “Sunshine Policy” initiated by the former ROK president Kim Dae-jung and carried through by his successor Roh Moo-hyun.   The current sanctions regime against North Korea does not actually prohibit much of the commercial activities and economic linkages in which China is engaged. In the unique language of the UN, both Security Council Resolutions 1874 and 1718 do not prohibit member states from engaging in economic development and humanitarian activities in North Korea, which is how Beijing characterizes its economic interactions. In practice, while financial sanctions continue to dominate Washington’s approach to dealing with Pyongyang, PRC state-owned enterprises and private firms have been deepening their interactions with DPRK state trading companies.   Implications for Seoul and Washington   First, China has realized significant progress in the CPC-WPK track and bolstered North Korean stability. Innocuous Sino-DPRK “education, tourism and development” agreements signed by Premier Wen during his October 2009 Pyongyang visit are facilitating a host of follow-up deals. On July 30, PRC Ambassador Liu Hongcai and DPRK Foreign Trade Minister Ri Ryong–nam signed an economic and technical cooperation accord. Soon after, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert Einhorn visited Seoul to seek South Korean cooperation on implementing Iran sanctions and discuss the “new” DPRK sanctions. The intensifying CPC-WPK economic and political relationship raises serious questions about the efficacy of DPRK sanctions.   Second, China’s evolving North Korea policy constitutes one of two pillars in its “balanced Korean Peninsula” approach. It is highly unlikely that China will deviate from this approach and select one Korea over the other — even if there is a future DPRK provocation. The Cheonan Incident sets a dangerous precedent where North Korea evaded a direct military response from South Korea and pressure from Beijing.   Third, the growing CPC-WPK partnership is taking place while Washington implements existing and “new” DPRK financial sanctions.  An unintended consequence of this policy tool is that North Korea is becoming more dependent on China during an accelerated DPRK leadership succession process.■     John S. Park is a Senior Research Associate for United States Institute of Peace. Discussants Jaewoo Choo (Kyunghee University) Sang-Yoon Ma (Catholic University of Korea) Timothy R. Rich (Indiana University doctoral candidate) Seong-Ho Sheen (Seoul National University) Ho Yeol Yoo (Korea University)

The current deadlock in the Six-Party Talks makes the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis a more difficult task. While resuming the Six-Party Talks is a key objective for the participants, restarting U.S. dialogue with North Korea remains the first step. In its first year in office, the Obama administration has faced numerous provocations from Pyongyang as it has struggled to assert a policy toward North Korea. With Stephen Bosworth leading the administration policy toward North Korea and Kurt Campbell overseeing the State Department’s role, understanding what the Obama administration’s North Korea policy is will be critical in addressing the future course of the crisis and its outcome.   The East Asia Institute (EAI) invited prominent Korea expert L. Gordon Flake, executive director of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation on February 23, 2010, to assess Washington’s policy toward North Korea. Together with leading experts from South Korea, he outlined the current approach of the Obama administration and contrasted it with the Bush administration. The missile test and subsequent nuclear test in April and May 2009 respectively, put the Obama administration   in a difficult position from the start. Yet the circumstances were different from previous provocations by Pyongyang. Some have argued that the Obama administration should respond with new deals and comprehensive packages, while others have argued for strong and tougher approaches. What has emerged has been something different from the Bush administration. However, it has yet to achieve any meaningful results. In his presentation, Mr. Flake addresses the many pressing questions surrounding Washington’s policy toward North Korea. How has the Obama administration’s approach differed from the Bush administration? Has the Obama administration been able to effectively coordinate its approaches with regional partners, South Korea and Japan? And correspondingly, how has it worked with China and Russia? What role will the Six-Party Talks play under the Obama administration considering that it is in deadlock? The following is a summary of L. Gordon Flake’s presentation and the discussion that followed.   Presentation   Pursuit of Multilateral Diplomacy toward North Korea   The Obama administration’s foreign policy primarily rests on the core ideas of multilateralism and diplomacy. These principles have been visibly applied by Washington to resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. In contrast to the early period of the Bush administration that explicitly denied direct negotiations with states classified as the “axis of evil” including North Korea, President Obama has explicitly pursued multilateral coordination and tough diplomacy to compel Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. The Obama administration’s political efforts toward close prior consultation and coordination with allies in the North Korean nuclear crisis largely represent this shift in U.S. foreign policy. This can be clearly seen in the diverging strategies of Stephen Bosworth, Special Representative for North Korea Policy under the Obama administration from those of Christopher Hill, Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Bush administration in dealing with the growing nuclear ambitions of Pyongyang. Many experts shared the assessment that Hill pushed for direct negotiations with the North lacking a sufficient level of prior consultation and policy coordination with U.S. allies, whereas Bosworth primarily went through close consultation with its partners before negotiating with the North. Given the Obama administration’s focus on multilateral collaboration toward the goal of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Six-Party Talks are believed to be the most workable as well as desirable policy choice among the parties to the talks, which include China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.   Development of a Northeast Asia Policy rather than a North Korea Policy   In analyzing President Obama’s regional policy in Northeast Asia at a broader level, it can be carefully argued that the Obama administration is pursuing more of a Northeast Asia policy rather than a North Korea policy itself. Mr. Flake shared his assessment that the critical national interests of the United States in the region are not confined to North Korean problems. Rather, peace, stability, and economic progress in the regional as well as bilateral relationships of the United States with China, Russia, and South Korea are more crucial factors in calculating Washington’s strategic interests in Northeast Asia. Accordingly, this pragmatic and realistic assumption of the Obama administration aims to constrain Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions as part of its strategic effort to ensure that the escalating nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula do not damage the promotion of broader U.S. interests in maintaining peace and stability in the region.   Positive Aspects of President Obama’s Policy toward North Korea   Despite the current impasse in the nuclear crisis, Mr. Flake pointed out that the Obama administration has been successful in its handling of the North Korean nuclear issue. Although he termed this “success without progress” in that its primarily manifestations were policy coordination and avoiding worse-case scenarios. Most importantly, the United States has greatly invested its political resources toward trust building with its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. With the unprecedentedly increasing level of communication at the working level with Seoul and Tokyo in recent years, the Obama administration has pursued a coordinated and cooperative approach based on mutual trust. Amid a careful prediction on the possibility of a summit meeting between the two Koreas, policymakers in both Seoul and Washington share a rather optimistic view that an inter-Korean summit can possibly reflect their common interests and mutual trust in peacefully resolving the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula.   Second, Mr. Flake opined that the Obama administration has been more successful at implementing meaningful economic sanctions and coordinated pressure on North Korea in one year than the Bush administration had done in eight years, despite the Bush Administration’s harsh rhetoric. According to Mr. Flake’s review of President Obama’s first year in office, he strongly supported the current administration’s idea that effective economic sanctions against North Korea can only be maximized when the other parties to the talks are convinced that the United States is equally committed to diplomacy rather than the sole use of coercive means. This carefully coordinated emphasis on diplomacy in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will effectively magnify international pressure on North Korea to return to the talks as well as to unilaterally abandon its nuclear arsenal.   Another notable aspect of the Obama administration’s policy toward the North Korean regime is its continuity. In contrast to the policy fluctuations of the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Obama administration has maintained consistency in its handling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program while coping with Pyongyang’s escalating nuclear brinkmanship. Facing the growing emphasis on tougher diplomacy in Washington against the states that seek nuclear acquisition outside the framework of the nonproliferation regime such as North Korea and Iran, Pyongyang appears to lack a coherent policy in pursuing its nuclear ambitions repeating a visible pattern of provocation and compromise under the increasing domestic pressures on regime survival. The consistent policy of tough diplomacy toward North Korea is considered a key to effectively compel Pyongyang to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).   Limitations of President Obama’s Policy toward North Korea   It has been widely agreed that there is no immediate solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis that has been a source of instability and uncertainty in the region. The international nonproliferation regime is perceived to lack any effective or even workable action plans that might result in Pyongyang’s complete and verifiable abandonment of its nuclear weapons. In other words, the United States and the regional powers have merely managed the nuclear crisis in the absence of any ultimate solution. The question of how parties to the talks, namely China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, can have success without a resolution appears to be more applicable and realistic under the current circumstances. Mr. Flake reemphasized that the Obama administration’s key objective in dealing with North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is largely two-fold–containing problems arising from the crisis and preventing the North from becoming a source of conflict between the United States and its allies in the region.   Mr. Flake lastly pointed out that huge political investment does not necessarily lead to successful and targeted policy outcomes. This argument is manifested in the experience of Christopher Hill in negotiating with North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong-il. Despite two years of his persistent efforts and enormous political investment put into the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, Hill was unable to reverse Pyongyang’s nuclear behavior mainly due to his reluctance to actively engage with allies during the course of negotiations with the North. With the lessons learned from Hill’s experience serving as somewhat of inoculation for anyone who might have been inclined to be overly proactive in approaching Pyongyang, policymakers under the Obama administration have adopted a path which diverges from the strategy of the Bush administration. As outlined above, a Northeast Asia Policy is a better description of Obama’s policy toward North Korea. The U.S. strategic interests of maintaining the stability in Northeast Asia prevail over Pyongyang’s nuclear issue itself in the region.   Discussion   Success without Resolutions   Several South Korean discussants pointed out that it can be argued that the United States has been developing a policy of containment in managing the nuclear crisis as an alternative to pushing for a breakthrough for immediate political and security gains in the region. With the underlying assumption that North Korea is increasingly unlikely to abandon its nuclear weapons through dialogue alone in the short term, the United States now focuses on a long-term approach to constrain Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities through collaborative efforts within the international nonproliferation regime. Some policymakers in the United States might push for an immediate breakthrough in nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula as this could serve their political interests as well as represent a tangible achievement for the upcoming 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. However, the Obama administration has warned against the possibility that Pyongyang might use the NPT Review Conference as a window of opportunity to win short-term economic and political gains using the mounting time pressure on the policymakers in the region. The Obama administration’s careful emphasis on a long-term approach requires closer collaboration with regional powers, particularly China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, to collectively deal with North Korea’s nuclear behavior, particularly in times of escalating crisis.   However, one of the South Korean discussants gave a skeptical assessment of U.S. policy toward North Korea, which seemingly focuses on managing the crisis rather than resolving the issues. The level of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities will be a key determinant of whether or not the U.S. management of the nuclear crisis can actually yield considerable results. Although it is easier to reach a consensus on imposing sanctions against North Korea after its nuclear provocations, China and Russia are somewhat reluctant to fully support sanctions against Pyongyang’s missile tests. Accordingly, North Korea’s military capabilities, particularly in missile technology, are likely to continue to increase given the relatively limited pressure on Pyongyang arising from sanctions targeted to constrain Pyongyang’s missile capabilities. If this is the case, the Obama administration’s strategy of containing Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities will be difficult to sustain given the subtle reluctance of the Chinese and Russian governments to expand sanctions against the North.   Resumption of the Six-Party Talks   Some participants noted that increasing domestic instability is more likely to compel the North to bolster its attempt to hold onto nuclear weapons to ensure regime survival. Given the symbolic functions of nuclear weapons that serve to undergird Kim Jong-il’s strict control over all sectors of society, particularly the military, the strengthening of its nuclear weapons program is closely linked to regime survival as well as legitimacy of his leadership. This can consequently lead to the North’s explicit or implicit reluctance to return to the Six-Party Talks that were primarily established for verifiable and irreversible disarmament of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Considering the mounting domestic uncertainty in North Korea in recent months, it will be difficult for the Kim Jong-il regime to unilaterally abandon its nuclear arsenal as well as to return to the talks without preconditions in the immediate future. Accordingly, the increasing domestic instability in North Korea is likely to reduce its strategic incentives to return to multilateral negotiations making the resumption of the Six-Party Talk even more unlikely.   By contrast, an opposite view was carefully voiced among the other discussants from South Korea concerning the link between domestic instability and Pyongyang’s willingness to return to the talks. These discussants mentioned that the increasing uncertainty in domestic politics tend to trigger North Korea to make concessions in order to alleviate deteriorating domestic conditions. The abandonment of nuclear weapons in exchange for economic and diplomatic rewards can be an attractive option, albeit in the short term, when faced with imminent signs of regime collapse in the North. The concept of a curved relationship is more applicable in this case to explain the interplay of Kim Jong-il’s hold on power and the possibility of North Korea’s return to the Six-Party Talks. The effects of the deteriorating domestic problems of North Korea that is on the brink of collapse are more likely to cause a reversal of its nuclear behavior in order to secure regime survival. In this respect, Mr. Flake pointed out that it is somewhat unrealistic for the Kim Jong-il regime to resort to the Six-Party Talks as a primary means to resolve the ongoing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has explicitly maintained a skeptical stance toward the talks having demanded a formal peace treaty with the United States for the past two years. Given the lack of a new pressure point that would trigger fundamental change in North Korea’s nuclear behavior, particularly from China, the existing equilibrium is likely to be maintained in the near future. Pyongyang’s continuing demand for a peace treaty outside the framework of multilateral negotiations will hardly make any meaningful progress in inter-Korean relations as well as international efforts to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. In this regard, Mr. Flake cautiously added that North Korea’s bilateral demand for a peace treaty would be unacceptable for the United States considering the Obama administration’s strategic focus on the multilateral framework of the Six-Party Talks as a key mechanism   Comprehensive Approach toward North Korea   Much attention was devoted to discussing strategic differences between the Lee administration and the Obama administration toward the North Korean regime. One of the discussants pointed out that the Obama administration pursues a gradual and comprehensive approach in dealing with Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons. This approach does not require strategic decisions from Pyongyang to fundamentally reverse its nuclear behavior as a precondition to resume the Six-Party Talks. Rather, it aims to resolve the nuclear crisis in several phases in the course of the multilateral negotiations, which ultimately leads to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the North as a result. As the United States is seeking to obtain Pyongyang’s strategic decision to give up its nuclear weapons as talks proceed, they are likely to reach a consensus in the initial phase of talks, whereas it is somewhat difficult to obtain a reliable and meaningful response from the North as the unilateral abandonment of its nuclear weapons is considered unacceptable to Pyongyang’s strategic interests.   On the other hand, some discussants continued to differentiate the U.S. comprehensive approach from the Lee administration’s idea of a “grand bargain”. One of the most noticeable differences is that the Lee government is pushing the North to make serious steps to stop its illicit transfer of nuclear technology and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons as a precondition for resuming any kind of negotiations. This South Korean approach, however, can possibly lower the chances of persuading North Korea to make a strategic decision to unilaterally give up its nuclear weapons in the first place without any visible security and economic gains. The complete abandonment of nuclear weapons is simply unacceptable to North Korea in the initial phase of negotiations without the guarantee of regime survival and subsequent economic and diplomatic awards. Although the grand bargain policy has a relatively low possibility of reaching an agreement between North Korea and participants of the Six-Party Talks in the initial phase of resolving the nuclear crisis, it is more likely to yield considerable outcomes once North Korea makes an irreversible strategic decision to change its nuclear behavior.   Given the slightly diverging assumptions of Seoul and Washington in dealing with the Kim Jong-il regime, Mr. Flake noted that these two approaches toward North Korea are not fundamentally different. Although the Obama administration does not have a clear definition of the Lee government’s idea of a “grand bargain,” both approaches share a common goal of creating conditions that would compel North Korea to make the strategic decision to halt its development of nuclear weapons and return to the Six-Party Talks. Mr. Flake reiterated that what is more important is the strategic coordination among the participants of the talks based on their shared interests in promoting the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula■         Presenter L. Gordon Flake   Moderator Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University)   Discussants Seongwhun Cheon (Korea Institute for National Unification) Kang Choi (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security) Jihwan Hwang (Myongji University) 

The issue of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis is one of the most protracted and difficult issues facing the Obama administration with no clear end in sight. Negotiations whether bilateral or multilateral, have both been frustrated at different stages and levels. Looking toward the future and taking in a long-term perspective, how the North Korean nuclear crisis will be resolved is one of the key challenges for the United States and the countries in the region when negotiating with Pyongyang.   In order to formulate discussion on the policies for the future of North Korea, Joel Wit (Weatherhead East Asia Institute, Columbia University) was invited to the 5th Smart Talk to present on “Four Scenarios for a Nuclear North Korea.” These scenarios range from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic outlooks. In presenting these scenarios, a number of questions set out the Talk on the future perspective for the nuclear crisis. What are the major issues affecting dialogue with North Korea? Would the United States opt for containment policies over direct engagement? What would be the process for containment or engagement? Finally, what is the current political environment in Washington toward Pyongyang?   The 5th Smart Talk brought together Joel Wit with a number of prominent scholars from South Korea and abroad to develop ideas on these issues and address policy recommendations on dealing with North Korea. After Wit presented his four scenarios, the panel moderated by Professor Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University) debated the issues raised. The following is a summary of the main presentation followed by the discussion.   Presentation   The following four scenarios present the future paths for nuclear North Korea and possible policy responses by the United States, its allies, and other countries in the region.   Scenario I: Denuclearization Agreement Reached   This is the most optimistic outcome of the current deadlock. In this scenario, the international community lives with a nuclear North Korea but there is a successful dialogue process and outcome. At the end of this process, Pyongyang will denuclearize as agreed through negotiations. Of all the probable scenarios, this is the best outcome. A sudden or a rapid denuclearization is unlikely to happen. Key to this scenario is a durable agreement that follows phases of engagement. Part of this process also involves a transformational approach rather than a transactional one. This transformational approach is about a change in the political relations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and United States dealing with sensitive issues such as survival of the regime and recognizing the sovereignty of the DPRK. Economic incentives will play some role but it will not be the prominent one that some expect, thus a transactional process is not expected to work for a successful resolution of the crisis.   The issue of extended deterrence will be a major factor in achieving success. It has long been North Korea’s position to oppose extended deterrence and this is unlikely to change. However, the United States will not give up its extended deterrence for its two main allies South Korea and Japan. Therefore, in what ways could an agreement be found? If North Korea were to denuclearize, a peace agreement was achieved on the Korean Peninsula, and Pyongyang’s relations with other countries, particularly Japan, were improved then it would create a positive environment. In this environment, the United States could look at redefining extended deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea.   The other sticking point between the United States and North Korea is the stationing of troops in South Korea. It is clear the United States would never consider it acceptable to withdraw its forces completely. One possible solution would be to change the role of U.S Forces in Korea to emphasize other duties. During negotiations in the 1990s, North Korea was willing to accept the presence of U.S. Forces in Korea and these negotiations looked at what role these forces could play in the future on the Korean Peninsula.   Scenario II: Negotiations Drag On Without Final Agreement   This scenario reflects the current situation. Negotiations will take a step forward and a step back. There will be achievements without full realization as well as periodic setbacks. Because of the difficulties in achieving any breakthrough, limited agreements will be reached to keep the momentum going. In this kind of situation, it will always be hard to say where progress has been made.   All countries involved will pursue “hedging strategies” in the event that talks will collapse. While North Korea will conduct nuclear activities, the “hedging strategies” of the other countries will mainly consist of diplomatic maneuvers. The United States diplomatic strategy will be more trilateral cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea while it will also develop closer ties with China and work more through the United Nations. South Korea will put pressure on North Korea through inter-Korean relations where it will increasingly tie progress in denuclearization to economic assistance. Limited progress in negotiations would push Japan to focus more on the issue of the Japanese abductees in North Korea with Pyongyang. China would do all it can to prevent talks from collapsing which would include resolving any stalemates in negotiations. Beijing would also work closely with other countries in the region, like South Korea   Scenario III: Negotiations Collapse   This is not the sudden collapse of negotiations but rather a long drawn-out process of talks fading out. Scenario III could be the outcome of the second scenario where the United States is unwilling to continue on with talks indefinitely. It is also possible that in this scenario the two sides withdraw from negotiations in order to bolster their positions before resuming talks.   In the event of negotiations collapsing, the United States will seek to contain North Korea and Pyongyang will seek to build up its nuclear arsenal. There will be containment “hedging strategies” by all sides. However, these strategies will be different depending on the country. The United States will likely bolster extended deterrence through redeploying tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific theatre and the acceleration of non-nuclear activities such as missile defense. Additionally, it will also look at contingencies for air strike capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Pyongyang will restart activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility and enhance its nuclear and missile capabilities. Both South Korea and Japan will look at improving their own strike capabilities such as deploying cruise missiles and possibly utilizing missile defense systems. China, on the other hand, will seek diplomatic strategies as they try to keep negotiations going and avoid instability on the Korean Peninsula.   There are many problems to this scenario. Firstly, it is impossible to determine what each country’s intentions will be. Secondly, it is difficult to see how long this kind of scenario can be maintained. Coupled with that is the fragile situation of how to reconcile the differences in patience toward Pyongyang in Beijing and Washington.   Contrary to some expectations, this scenario will not lead to the pursuit of nuclear weapons by countries in the region. However, in this scenario, the national debates in countries like Japan on restraint of nuclear weapons development will be hampered. There will be a general negative impact from the collapse of negotiations on the region. With the United States, Japan, and South Korea pursuing containment “hedging strategies,” China itself will feel increasingly threatened by this buildup. This in turn will disrupt future dialogue with Beijing that will be important in solving global challenges. Regardless of the outcome in this scenario, the United States will not be resigned to accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapon state.   Scenario IV: Nuclear North Korea Collapses   This is the worst outcome. The greatest threat from this scenario where a nuclear-armed North Korea collapses is the capability of countries like the United States to secure Pyongyang’s stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). While there are many operation plans and scenarios for this outcome, lessons from Iraq show the difficulty in knowing exactly where WMDs are stored. In this kind of end-scenario, prior operation plans are usually found out to be the least successful. Planning policies based on an expected collapse of North Korea are unlikely to succeed.   This worst case scenario requires hedging against collapse and the development of “beachheads” of cooperation. This involves building up prior cooperation with Pyongyang in the event of future contingencies. Such cooperation will allow for the United States and other countries to be in a better position were North Korea to collapse.   Discussion   Seeking a Policy Response: Containment or dialogue?   The four scenarios presented by Joel Wit offer different perspectives on how the United States and other countries could approach nuclear North Korea. Scenario I shows the positive results from active engagement and dialogue resulting in an agreement to denuclearize. By contrast, Scenario III shows the use of containment to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. In presenting these two approaches, Kang Choi wanted to know about Wit’s policy recommendation in handling the current crisis. In particular, he wanted to know if containment would be a policy option.   Wit was strongly against containment as a solution to the nuclear crisis. While he accepted that sanctions against North Korea following the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 were necessary and welcomed, containment is a different story. He believed that the effects of containment on North Korea would be very limited. Containment will not reverse the development of its nuclear arsenal, nor will it prevent proliferation. The few cases of shipments being seized does not bode well for an active counter-proliferation effort and represents only the tip of the iceberg of North Korea’s proliferation activities. Wit also pointed out that there has been a great deal of discussion arguing that sanctions were having an economic impact on Pyongyang, but he disagreed with these views. Going by assessments of long-time visitors to North Korea who know the country well, there does not appear to be a major impact from sanctions. This would appear to tell the story that Pyongyang will not respond to economic incentives or that somehow North Korea could be “bought off.”   Responding to other suggestions by Kang Choi on different forms of engagement like “hawk engagement” or a hybrid form of containment and engagement, Wit disagreed with such ideas as being something new. He referred back to during the first nuclear crisis in 1994 and suggested it was no different than what had been attempted before. The simultaneous engagement while making preparations to launch an air strike on the Yongbyon nuclear facility under the Clinton administration is an example of a policy using both containment and engagement. Wit supports a policy of engagement, dialogue, and positive barriers to bad behavior. He believed that a step-by-step process with a meaningful approach can lead to a successful outcome. This would not take the form of a unilateral concession but rather unilateral confidence building measures (CBM). Some of these CBM steps could include loosening of visa regulations for DPRK citizens entering the United States for a North Korean moratorium on nuclear testing.   Stability of the North Korean Regime   Paramount to any resolution of the nuclear issue and the future of North Korea is the stability of the regime. Wit explained that in any scenario, the looming threat of the collapse of North Korea is a major concern that has to be prepared for. However, Kang Choi disagreed with the perception that collapse can happen in the first scenario because of the role of China and other regional powers in any resolution. This would mean that in scenarios II, III, and IV preparations are needed for the possible collapse of North Korea and how it should be dealt with is the critical question.   Central to the foundations of the stability of the regime is the question of succession. This factor can affect the outcome of any negotiation. Wit put forward the explanation that a new leader in North Korea will begin with a tough approach and will likely be more inward-focused. Kim Jong-il’s successor will likely be constrained by many domestic forces including the military. Such a leader will not have the freedom to make dramatic changes or reforms. Instead, the new leader will have to become more hard-line in order to build up a stronger credibility. Therefore, negotiating with Kim Jong-il now is more likely to bring about a resolution than waiting for succession and a new leadership.   The Impact of United States’ Domestic Politics   An important yet highly complex factor for each scenario is the domestic political situation. The domestic politics in Washington can affect the outcome of engagement and negotiations. While the current administration is going through many difficulties with the health care bill, the underlying worry for Democrats is criticism from the Republicans on foreign policy.   Wit put across four points he believed were political factors influencing the United States: 1) Slap in the face: There is a strong feeling in the Obama administration that when they came to power and offered talks, North Korea slapped them in the face with its actions in Spring, 2009. Many officials in the Obama administration took that very personally and this sentiment has influenced their thinking to North Korea. 2) No winning argument: Currently the domestic debate on engagement to North Korea is hampered by pessimism, exacerbation, and a general lack of enthusiasm toward Pyongyang. It is difficult to present a winning argument on positive engagement with the North Korean regime. 3) Anything but Bush/Hill: It is the view of the Obama administration that the past administration’s efforts on North Korea amounted to little. Particularly with Christopher Hill, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, there is the view that he handled the situation wrongly. Many believe that Hill neglected allies in the region while responding too much to North Korean demands. The Obama administration’s Special Representative on North Korea Policy, Stephen Bosworth, is taking a very different approach from Hill. 4) Consensus in decision making: It is wrong to believe that North Korea is low down on the list of priorities for the Obama administration. Rather, current efforts reflect the slow process of how the administration reaches decisions. This process requires a general consensus before approaches are made to North Korea.   Combined together, these factors present an administration that is fed up with North Korea and is seeking to develop a different approach from the Bush administration. With this difficulty in the domestic politics in the United States, Wit was keen to emphasize the need for a durable approach in developing a policy. This durable approach should also include all areas toward North Korea, such as missiles, peace agreement, human rights, and proliferation. Wit did remain optimistic about the chances of success for the current administration, which has now a possible eight-year window of opportunity to achieve results.   Conclusion   The approach to North Korea should be a positive engagement that evolves from a durable process. This effort should not wait to deal with a new leadership in Pyongyang after Kim Jong-il. Wit stated that the new leadership will not be reform-minded and this will make any resolution of the crisis more difficult. Therefore it will be more effective and easier to conclude a deal now with Kim Jong-il. Wit’s recommendations on approaches to North Korea highlight some of the difficulties ahead but the opportunities are there, particularly with a new administration in Washington. In presenting his four scenarios on the long-term prospects for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, Wit was seeking to stir debate and thought about future efforts rather than current ones. Two key factors will shape the resolution of the nuclear issue. The first is the stability of the regime in North Korea and the second is the political situation in the United States. Both are hard to determine and identify as to which direction they are heading. To cope with these difficulties, Wit suggested that any engagement with North Korea must be supported by a strong underlying political base that is durable and concluded before leadership succession in Pyongyang complicates reaching an agreement. Above all, this approach will require innovative thinking on devising new negotiating strategies, particularly on the tough and sensitive issues like proliferation and human rights. In this way, solutions to the North Korean nuclear crisis can be found and result in a more optimistic future.■         Moderator Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University)   Discussants Kang Choi (Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security) Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Brendan Howe (Ewha Womans University) Jihwan Hwang (Myongji University) Sook-Jong Lee (East Asia Institute, Sung- kyunkwan University) Hyeong-Jung Park (Korea Institute for National Unification)  

Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the Asia Security Initiative at the East Asia Institute and an associate professor in the Department of International Relations at Seoul National University.          The Final Deal with Kim Jong-il?   Sanctions against North Korea will realize the policy objectives of South Korea and other nations only when combined with feasible post-sanction plans for the next round of negotiations. International economic and diplomatic sanctions after North Korea’s second nuclear test, which occurred on May 25, 2009, have been successful enough to make Kim Jong-il send gestures indicating a willingness to reengage in dialogue, mainly with Washington and partly with other participants in the Six-Party Talks, including Seoul. Issues are: How should the coming round of talks differ from the past ones? Should the Five Parties (that is, all those except North Korea) prepare a totally different package from the last one under the Six-Party Talks framework? Are there structural differences that will force Kim Jong-il to come to the negotiating table with new goals? Further, how comprehensive should the deal with North Korea really be? What kind of preparations will aid negotiators in finding the leverage to make progress on the problem posed by North Korea’s nuclear program and to avoid a repetition of the past problem of rewarding the North’s brinkmanship?   The so-called “grand bargain” of South Korea and the “comprehensive package deal” of the United States seem to emphasize the need to broaden the agenda of the negotiations in order to solve problems in a fundamental way. Eisenhower’s maxim, “Whenever I run into a problem I can’t solve, I always make it bigger” may apply here, but the problem is what is meant by “comprehensive,” given the failures of the Agreed Framework in 1994, the September 19th statement in 2005, and the February 14th action-for-action approach in 2007.   If we think of Kim Jong-il’s intentions as the essential determinant, the North Korean nuclear problem is inherently a political question. Kim has attempted to create an international environment in which North Korea’s current regime can survive with all its former socialist brethren fallen away. North Korea’s repeated statements that it has developed nuclear weapons because of the United States’ “anti-North Korea policy and aggressive nuclear strategy against the North” reflect Kim’s political and international dilemma. Defining North Korea’s nuclear problem as one of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will not help solve the issue in any fundamental way. At issue is not just North Korean nuclear development but also North Korea itself or,   more specifically, the problem of Kim Jong-il himself (Chun 2009). After the so-called “redirecting” of South Korea’s North Korea policy by the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration, and with the advent of the more “balanced” Obama administration, Kim Jong-il’s gestures indicating a willingness to resume dialogue seem to have produced a new momentum. The coming dialogue will be a significant indication of Kim Jong-il’s current situation.   The 2009 Negotiations Will Be Different   First, time has become an increasingly important factor in determining how the story of North Korea’s nuclear game will end. Kim Jong-il’s health problems, despite his improved appearance of late, make obvious the clear limits to his period of governance. This limit constitutes the first difference in the coming stage of negotiations from previous ones. Kim Jong-il has also declared that by 2012, North Korea will begin to establish itself as a “strong and prosperous country.” Since then he has pressed the North Korean people to exert more effort to make this prediction come true, if only to counter his people’s judgment about the legitimacy of his rule and to put aside growing discontent about the aggravated economic situation. Kim’s repeated statements about North Korea’s optimistic future could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, but they could also be a self-destructing prophesy if Kim cannot fulfill North Koreans’ desire for a better life.   The succession process within the North Korean leadership, or at least the preparations for the succession, will determine not only the possibility of realizing a “strong and prosperous” North Korea but also the future of the Six-Party Talks. With no clear guarantee of the next leader’s ability to deal with tremendous domestic and diplomatic problems, Kim Jong-il may not want to pass on the highly difficult nuclear question. Kim’s decision will be a function of his evaluation of the next leader’s political and diplomatic ability, his predictions regarding North Korea’s economic situation and his people’s political attitude, and the content of the “grand” or “comprehensive” deal that will be suggested by neighboring countries. Whatever agreement is reached in 2009 will be highly affected by Kim Jong-il’s thinking about his ever more desperate domestic and personal situation.   Second, China’s importance in any dealings with North Korea has been repeatedly pointed out. Because of its own national interests, China has provided indispensible economic and diplomatic support to its neighbor. North Korea is China’s ally, valuable geographic buffer, and example that shows China’s loyalty and care for a neighboring country to the international community. However, China’s position may change: North Korea, with all its brinkmanship behavior, defies China’s range of protection; China, as a would-be global power, needs to establish itself as a norm-conforming state, which makes the alliance with the North increasingly untenable; and in the future China will be faced with additional serious North Korean problems such as the North’s next leadership and its economic difficulties. China seems to be at a crossroads where it must decide whether North Korea is a buffer or a burden. More important is that North Korea is sure to know that China’s strategic attitude toward it is changing, and that this change is likely to be structural and long-lasting rather than event-based. Beijing seems not to have fundamentally altered its position toward Pyongyang so far. Yet the possibility is growing that China will undertake a serious reconsideration of its policy toward North Korea, and may reorient its approach as a result.   Third, Kim Jong-il’s change of attitude from around June 2009 reflects the success of international sanctions. The United Nations (UN) has provided an effective venue for coherent international sanctions with broad participation of its member states; China and Russia have actively participated in the sanctions effort since North Korea’s nuclear tests; continuity from UN resolution 1718 has been demonstrated in the new resolution 1874; and sanctions have been effectively implemented in the financial area and in the case of North Korea’s suspect ship the Kang Nam in June. At this point international sanctions against WMD-related economic transactions with North Korea will continue for a long time, which will put insurmountable pressure on Pyongyang.   Fourth, the Obama administration has been and will be maintaining a tough and resolute stance in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Past experience in negotiating with North Korea in 1994 and 2005 set a basis against which future relations will be evaluated. Although major figures in the Obama administration have stated that North Korea’s decision to completely dismantle its nuclear programs will bring about U.S. economic assistance, diplomatic normalization, and peaceful policies toward the North, there are strong prerequisites that North Korea will have to meet before these developments will be possible. A particular difficulty lies in the fact that both the United States and North Korea will need to resume the Six-Party Talks where the last round stalled, surrounding the issue of reporting and verification of the North’s nuclear program. As we approach the moment of truth, when no more postponing based on incremental salami tactics is permitted, the tough position of Washington will continue. The domestic political situation of the Obama administration might be another factor as well. Decreasing approval ratings for the President will make the North Korean issue an area where any policy failure is not permissible and any strategic change can only be considered very cautiously.   The above four factors work to make the coming negotiations with North Korea all the more critical. However, there is also a fifth element that increases the situation’s complexity. Conflicting national interests of countries that surround North Korea, especially China and Russia, may exist between the imperative to conform to the international norm of nonproliferation and the more realistic regional interest in maintaining good relations with North Korea. If the desire for positive relations wins out, then the commitment to international sanctions may weaken on the part of some of the North’s neighbors. Because resolution 1874 concerns economic transactions regarding specific items such as weapons of mass destruction, debates may take place over the issue of whether a country’s economic relations with North Korea violate resolution 1874.   All these factors—North Korea’s domestic situation, international sanctions, and each country’s changing strategy—make the coming negotiations different from the last ones, and these factors are structural rather than subject to short-term change. It is not certain which road Kim Jong-il will take in the future. But all involved need to bear these new factors in mind in pursuing a comprehensive deal...(Continued)  

Charles L. Pritchard is the President of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington. He also served as ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and United States representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization in the administration of President George W. Bush from April 2001 until September 2003.         On April 5, 2009, after months of much publicized preparations, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile, Taepodong-2. Despite the North Korean regime’s claim that it was a rocket carrying satellite, the gambit inevitably provoked the condemnation of global society. With its national goal of becoming a gangseongdaeguk or “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, nonetheless, Pyongyang dared the international denunciation, conducting a nuclear test on May 5, 2009. Why did North Korea undertake such confrontational actions? Did North Korea actually intend to raise the security tension in the Northeast Asian region? Or, was North Korea unexpectedly pressed to escalate the strain of the regional security relations? To discuss such looming issues of the “North Korean Nuclear Threat,” the East Asia Institute held its second Smart Talk on July 1, 2009, inviting Charles L. Pritchard, President of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington D.C. and former special envoy of the United States to North Korea. The Talk, with a number of prominent Korean experts on the issues, sought to identify what was driving North Korea to take such drastic measures. It tried to suggest some feasible policy recommendations in order to mitigate imminent conflict as well. In the Talk, in particular, Pritchard explained how North Korean leaders’ miscalculations have led to the escalation of dissension, illustrating the ways in which vicious action-reaction cycles between Pyongyang and the international community evolved into the second nuclear test. The discussion in the Talk concluded with the policy proposal that it is necessary to develop a more sophisticated approach including “exit strategy” to bring North Korea back to the negotiation table. This report summarizes the presentation of Pritchard and the subsequent discussion with the participants at the Talk.     Presentation   North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test appear to be following a familiar pattern. But what we are witnessing is, in fact, something very different. We have seen a real lack of flexibility and something far more nationalistic in Pyongyang’s move. The health of Kim Jong-il and the leadership succession are the key to understand this unconventional behavior. Primarily, the North Korean regime’s recent provocative actions are geared more toward a domestic audience. The North Korean leadership needed to show off its strength and assure its control over the people. However, when it launched a ballistic missile in April, Pyongyang did not intend nor expect that a highly-tense situation would evolve. Unwittingly the North Korean leadership made a strategic miscalculation on the response from the United States and the international community.      Strategic Miscalculation 1: The United States’  Tough Diplomacy   There has been a strategic miscalculation by North Korea in how it has interpreted the new Obama administration. The North Korean regime might have expected a softer and more liberal response from the Obama administration on its missile launch. But what Pyongyang faced was a far more conservative and tougher response than would have been expected from a Democratic president. Although the Obama administration has been forced to act without having fully prepared itself, one thing was clear in its policy to North Korea. There was a strong feeling within the administration of being fed up with North Korea’s provocative actions. The administration did not want to revive the exhaustive negotiating process of the Clinton administration nor to continue with the policies of the Bush administration’s second term. Later it would blame the Bush administration for causing the current North Korean nuclear crisis by not implementing any substantial sanctions or offering any alternatives. The Bush administration only used rhetoric as it urged North Korea to abandon the nuclear program. By contrast, the Obama administration wants to be firm on the denuclearization of North Korea while being open to direct negotiations. Secretary Hillary Clinton was another critical factor which led the United States reaction to be far more conservative. When North Korea launched its missile in April, Washington was not ready to deal with the North Korean threat. The Obama administration had not fully formed its North Korea team. Therefore, its policy responses have been mainly from the instincts of Secretary Clinton herself. She has proven to be far more conservative than Pyongyang would had ever expected.   Strategic Miscalculation 2: Strong International Condemnation   When North Korea launched its Taepodong-1 intermediate-range ballistic missile on August 31, 1998, it was confronted with strong criticism from global society. But the criticism was largely caused by the fact that Pyongyang had not given any official notice before the launch. The missile test then was not so much an issue of whether it was right or wrong but an issue of whether it violated appropriate protocols. If the North Korean regime had followed the appropriate procedures, it would have not needed to face such strong criticism. The same thing happened again when the North Korean leadership launched a Taepodong-2 missile in 2006 for the first time. Again, North Korea was criticized for not making the proper notification before the missile test.      What followed with the missile launch in April 2009 was something new for North Korea. Before the launch, the North Korean regime made clear notifications about the test. It did not violate anything in the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation or the Missile Technology Control Regime. So, from the North Korean perspective, it did nothing wrong with its “peaceful satellite launch.” Considering also the limited international criticism of Iran’s launching of a satellite in February 2009, Pyongyang did not expect any severe international condemnation.    However, it would transpire that the North Korean leadership had made another strategic miscalculation in regards to the international response. The April missile test brought about strong criticism from the international community as well as the United States. These strong reactions were then formalized when the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a presidential statement on April 13, condemning North Korea’s missile launch and calling for existing sanctions against Pyongyang to be more tightly enforced. It was apparent that there is a great difference in how North Korea perceives what it did and how the world perceives what it did.   North Korea’s Reaction: Nuclear Test   Since North Korea felt it had followed appropriate measures and had done nothing wrong, it was both confused and infuriated at the unanticipated strong criticism from the United States and global society. In response to the international condemnation including the United Nations Security Council’s presidential statement, the North Korean leadership remained defiant and countered with provocative statements. Pyongyang proceeded to expel United Nations inspectors who were monitoring the denuclearization of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. North Korea also declared that it would not to attend the Six-Party Talks and threatened to reactivate its nuclear facilities. Beyond these antagonistic actions, it was not just resentment but also fear that drove Pyongyang’s actions. Watching China and Russia join in the criticism of its missile test, North Korea felt vulnerable. This explains why the North Korea leadership decided to conduct its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. An interview with a high-ranking North Korean diplomat confirmed the concerns beyond the nuclear test. Answering on a question why Pyongyang decided to conduct the test, he explained at first that the anger at the international condemnation triggered the nuclear test. Pressed further he revealed that they felt vulnerable, and thus decided to conduct the nuclear test. In a nutshell, the current North Korean nuclear crisis has been caused by an escalation of actions and reactions. At the first stage, North Korea’s strategic miscalculation of the United States and global society resulted in Pyongyang conducting the missile test. This action provoked severe condemnation from both the new Obama administration and the international community including China and Russia, the two strongest powers among Kim Jong-il’s few friends. The unexpected reaction from the world forced the North Korea regime to provocatively conduct its second nuclear test. This is how the crisis has escalated through an action-reaction process, resulting in a high level of tension in East Asia.      Need for an Exit Strategy   The potential for an escalation in conflict in East Asia remains very strong. The direction and tone of the Obama administration has already been established. It is clear that the Obama administration wants to change the behavior of North Korea, and will pursue tough diplomacy for denuclearization. The administration does not want to revive the exhaustive negotiating history of the last Democratic administration. The international community has agreed to issue United Nations Resolution 1874, strengthening sanctions against North Korea. If Pyongyang were to respond to the resolution in a defiant manner, then sanctions will very likely be toughened. On the Korean Peninsula, the health of Kim Jong-il and the leadership succession issue has left the North Korean regime with little room for flexibility in decision-making. In the meantime, South Korea’s Lee administration is confident with its tougher stance against North Korea and will not change the tone of its policy. A reflection of this is that South Korea’s Defense Minister Lee Sanghee has recently given naval commanders autonomy to make their decisions without having to refer back to Seoul. Thus, over the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the potential for an escalation of not just hostilities but an actual conflict is very strong. For peace and stability in East Asia, the dangers of these potential flashpoints needs to be recognized and another escalation of conflict should be prevented. More importantly, an ‘exit strategy’ to attract Pyongyang back to negotiations must be developed. This is something that would have to be done behind-the-scenes through closer cooperation with other parties. To develop a formal policy to North Korea, the Obama administration will reach an appropriate response within the administration, and consult the decision with its regional allies including South Korea and Japan. Then, it will talk with Beijing and Moscow before making its response formally to North Korea. The United States has always wanted the negotiation process with North Korea to stay alive. It still wants the process to continue. But there has been no “return ramp” to induce North Korea back to negotiations. We should develop an “exit strategy” to convince North Korean regime to realize that there can be another path for its survival by returning to the negotiation table.   Discussion   Cause of the North Korean Nuclear Test   While participants agreed that what has driven North Korea’s provocative behavior came from domestic factors, there was less of a consensus on whether the second nuclear test was the result of an actions and reactions. One discussant indicated that a nuclear test would have taken more than a year for North Korea to prepare, thus the test in May must have been prepared in advance, even before the start of Obama administration. Another discussant noted that it is hard to say the nuclear test was a result of the action-reaction cycle alone. He explained that the combination of North Korea’s tactical miscalculation and its intention together caused an escalation in tensions, and ultimately resulted in the second nuclear test. It is important to understand what was in North Korea’s mind when it decided to conduct the nuclear test. And the best outcome for North Korea now is to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state. Demonstrating those points, the discussant inferred that Pyongyang wants to change the game. It now wants negotiations to focus on arms control issues rather than on the previous process of Complete, Irreversible and Verifiable Dismantlement of its nuclear facilities.      Pritchard reemphasized that it was the reactions from the United States and the international community that actually triggered North Korea’s second nuclear test. He admitted that a nuclear test needs a long time to be prepared and that North Korea, hoping that would enhance the regime’s leverage, had been preparing for a second nuclear test since its first nuclear test failed on October 26, 2006. However, he insisted that there was no reason to suggest that North Korea would have conducted a test in May, 2009, unless confronted with the unexpected criticism that it received from the United States and the United Nations regarding its rocket launch. He did though agree with the point that North Korea is trying to change the game, hoping the new talks would be concentrated on arms control, with the United States recognizing it as a nuclear weapons state. Still, he remained firm that the Obama administration cannot and will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.      The Obama Administration’s North Korea Policy   Drawing upon Pritchard’s insight and experience, the participants wanted to know what can be expected from the new North Korea team in the Obama administration. More specifically, some wanted to know what changes can be expected from the new team, considering that the defensive and conservative response during the initial period of the administration was from Secretary Clinton’s instincts. Pritchard began by giving an insightful analysis into those key actors who will be dealing with Pyongyang. Kurt Campbell, recently sworn in as new Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, will not be playing the same role as his predecessor Christopher Hill. Campbell rather will be in line with Jim Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State. They have worked together before and have a close relationship. Stephen Bosworth, Special Representative for North Korea Policy, will play the role Hill used to play. But the problem is that he does not have the same kind of influence or power as Hill had. Phillip Goldberg, former Ambassador to Bolivia, will be the administration’s point man on overseeing sanctions against North Korea. And Jeff Bader, Senior Director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council, and Gary Samore, White House Coordinator for Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction, will also be playing key roles. Attention needs to be paid on Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. He was the architect behind the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) sanctions effort and is one of the few Bush administration officials kept on by President Obama. He will be working to create a similar environment as the BDA case to facilitate negotiations. Then, Pritchard suggested that there will not be a substantial shift in the administration’s policy to North Korea, because the administration has already established its tough diplomacy and upheld its principle toward denuclearization. The conservative characteristics of Secretary Clinton seem to be strengthened, and some of the administration’s key actors including Steinberg agree with the conservative tone. And Pritchard added that, even if the Obama administration wants to take on a softer tone, it cannot give what North Korea wants. For example, even if the administration is willing to recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, international legal obligations prevent it from doing so. United Nations Resolution 1874 clearly objects to recognition of North Korea as nuclear weapons state and refers to past resolutions that echoed this sentiment. Thus, it is clear that the Obama administration cannot and will not meet North Korea’s desires.    China: The Key to Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Threat    All the participants largely recognized that China is the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear threat. Without China’s support, any sanctions against North Korea will not succeed. So, it is important to understand whether China will become involved in the sanctions effort against Pyongyang, and, if so, in what conditions are involved. In the discussion, some believed that China will not abandon North Korea, while others upheld that China will support sanctions if Pyongyang’s actions cross Beijing’s “tipping-point.” Pritchard outlined how China may evolve and adjust its policy on the North Korean regime. He explained that if China thinks the cost for supporting Pyongyang exceeds the potential risk for collapse of the North Korean regime, then it is possible that Beijing will shift its policy away from support for North Korea. He further clarified that the “tipping-point,” for China to allow sanctions against North Korea, would not be one single event. It would be rather a weakening over time of China’s threshold for Pyongyang. However, he added that if certain actions by North Korea would threaten its own economic growth and recovery from the current financial crisis, then we could expect China to accept, or to support at least, specific sanctions to North Korea. For example, with the BDA issue, China felt that the issue was detrimental to its banking system and would thus have negative consequences to its own economy, therefore Beijing did not appeal strongly to the United States. The discussion then turned to the proposed Five-Party Talks. Mentioning the power game between the Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department in China’s diplomacy, Pritchard noted that some Chinese officials have been warm to the idea of a Five-Party Talks. He also implied the possibility of China’s support to the Five-Party Talks by concluding that the importance is in how it would be packaged and presented. Some challenged with Pritchard’s expectation, emphasizing that, based on how China has responded so far, it is clear that China would never accept the Five-Party Talks.   A Strategy Beyond Sanctions   One discussant turned the conversation onto the topic of the post-sanctions strategy. He commented that North Korea will gain some benefit if it is able to hold out against the sanctions with China on its side. This is where the importance of the United States position on the post-sanction stage comes in. He asked what the United States’ plan would be in its aim of bringing North Korea to the negotiating table, in a post-sanctions environment. Prichard replied that the implementation of the sanctions will be a slow process, and it takes time for the impact of sanctions to be felt. For the post-sanctions stage, he noted, the agenda needs to be transformed and broadened. Prichard went on to criticize the current negotiating process. “The Six-Party Talks in the current form is already dead. If the Talks are to be revived, it could be done on a similar form but in a different format.” He noted that, “During the Four-Party Talks that were held from 1997 to 1998, the format could be changed according to what was being discussed. It could be bilateral between the United States and North Korea or it could be multilateral including South Korea.” At some point in the future, he suggested, bilateral talks are inevitable. “They will be a face-saving measure for the North Koreans. However, the United States would only participate in bilateral talks if they would lead on to multilateral talks.” Concluding the discussion on a strategy beyond sanctions, one participant commented that it is clear that the United States will be trying to change the behavior of North Korea, while still using “carrot-and-stick” approaches. As long as North Korea pursues its songun chongchi or “military–first” politics, he emphasized, it will be very difficult for Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons. In this situation, he suggested, it would be better to talk about how we can help North Korea come back into the international community rather than just impose sanctions. Here lies the importance of the “coevolution” strategy as an alternative to sanctions.   Conclusion   The Talk underscored a number of insightful analyses on the North Korean threat, and left at least two questions on the table for further examination. First, while the participants agreed that the North Korean missile launch in April was driven by domestic political issues, there was less of a consensus on what triggered North Korea’s nuclear test in May. Pritchard presented that the escalation caused by action-reaction cycle ended up with the test. But many participants pointed out that Pyongyang’s intention to change the game is a critical reason for the test as well. Second, although the participants largely recognized that China is the key to resolving the North Korean issue, the forum did not achieve a consensus on China’s consent to enforce sanctions. Some doubted the possibility of China’s willingness to abandon the North Korea regime, but others expected that Beijing may support sanctions if Pyongyang’s actions cross the “tipping-point.” Finally, there was considerable agreement that a more sophisticated approach is needed to deal with North Korea. Pritchard concluded that an “exit strategy” should be provided to integrate North Korea back to the international community. Agreeing with Pritchard, the participants suggested that alternatives to sanctions, like “coevolution,” needs to be considered. ■            Discussants Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University) Jihwan Hwang (Myongji University) Byung-Kook Kim (Korea University) Sook-Jong Lee (East Asia Institute) Seongho Sheen (Seoul National University)

Political control is the core interest of the North Korean regime. It will not respond to any economic incentives that could weaken its control by even the slightest measure. This tough picture of North Korea painted by Stephan Haggard has strong ramifications on any negotiating process with North Korea. Drawing upon the work conducted by Haggard and Marcus Noland (Peterson Institute for International Economics) through interviews with a number of North Korean refugees and surveys of Chinese and South Korean companies operating in North Korea, he focused on North Korea’s complex political economy. Haggard emphasized the importance of understanding North Korea’s intentions by analyzing this key area. The state of its trade and investment also tells us much about the degree to which North Korea is opening up. All of this of course can be used to give us some indication of the effectiveness and the impact of current policies to North Korea.   Presentation   The Political Economy of North Korea: Strategic Implications   The North Korean state was unable to cope with the great famine of the mid-1990s. The inability to deal with a disaster of such great magnitude was reflected by the collapse of the Public Distribution System (PDS). In response to this catastrophic state failure, people in North Korea forced to fend for themselves, resorted to engaging in market activities to supplement the loss of goods delivered through the PDS. This began the process of "marketization" in North Korea that would change the way people lived their lives. Data on the surveys of North Korean refugees indicates that there is an increase in securing income through private trading following the famine.   In 2002, the government responded to this "marketization" at a grassroots levels by implementing limited reforms. This shows a somewhat lukewarm attitude to the facts on the ground. But from 2005 the picture changes, it began a process of what Haggard calls "reform in reverse." On the back of increasing harvests and rising aid, the government moved in. It banned private trades in grain, conducted seizures in rural areas, and closed off access to remote areas by relief agencies. These efforts were to regain the control that had been lost with the massive famine. Haggard outlined how this was a shift away from reform to an increasingly control-orientated approach to economic policy. This makes it clear that North Korea will not give up anything that would threaten the control of the leadership, regime, and state. For the North Korean regime, the food economy is a key feature for control. A troubling side effect from this "reform in reverse" has been a rise in corruption. The surveys of the refugees reflect this assessment that corruption, inequality, and general dissatisfaction has increased.   Another area that was examined to show North Korea's intentions was those companies that invest in North Korea. Whether South Korean or Chinese, both have shown mixed results of success as reflected in the surveys conducted by Haggard and Noland. Chinese companies, which have been more successful, have shown a kind of "Chinese engagement model." Whether this is a model that could be applied for South Korean companies is debatable especially given North Korea’s control-oriented approach to inter-Korean relations. Also, Haggard highlighted that most counterparts in North Korea are state-owned enterprises which raise the question of what impact is this kind of investment really having.   Unlike the Chinese companies, South Korean companies investing in North Korea are based less on commercial activities. Much of the inter-Korean trade is heavily state-subsidized. This non-commercial nature makes it difficult to really transform North Korea in the way that was set out with the Sunshine Policy.   In general, Haggard has argued in favor of analyzing the political economy as a way of understanding North Korea's intentions. He pointed out that the significance of the political economy is rather underappreciated. That at some point North Korea has to deal with its fraying socialist system otherwise there would be an extreme limit to what North Korea could do if it is unable to extract the resources from its society.   Discussion   The Difficulties of South Korea’s Engagement   Having understood the intentions of the North Korean regime, its implications for South Korea’s engagement policy are stark. The designated discussion panel agreed with Haggard on the difficulties of South Korea’s engagement policy. Its intentions to open up North Korea, promote more commercial activities, and cultural exchange are hampered by the fact that Pyongyang will not yield any loss of control. Haggard explained that North Korea has always made sure that inter-Korean contacts are state-to-state and conducted in isolated areas so that it can manage and control those contacts. Although Haggard conceded that the Sunshine Policy was a gamble and brought about results in some respects, he pointed out that North Korea would never be happy with South Korean businessmen operating in the country. North Korea is always cautious about commercial engagements with the South. Both Haggard and the panel contended that North Korea views such engagements as a challenge to the regime’s control on all activities in the country.   Recently the difficulties of South Korea's engagement policies have been very vivid. The Kaesong Industrial Region was again cited by Haggard as an example during the discussion. It was a project that intended to initiate reforms in North Korea but has become something of leverage in reverse. With South Korea's deep investment in the project, North Korea is now using the Kaesong project as part of its negotiations and to manage inter-Korea relations. This is completely the opposite of the expected outcome and intention when the project started.   On the other side, the panel pointed out that there has also been difficulties with the reciprocal policy of South Korea such as Lee Myung-bak's official North Korea policy, Vision 3000. Vision 3000 offers North Korea a number of economic incentives and rewards if it is to give up nuclear weapons.   The panel noted three parts that make the goals of Vision 3000 difficult to achieve. The first is that there is a mismatch of parties. Under the plan if North Korea gives up nuclear weapons it will be South Korea that provides North Korea with aid and benefits but North Korea wants to deal with the U.S. in any deal. The second difficulty is that the process has the wrong reward. North Korea wants regime survival not economic development. Lastly the goals of the policy are unrealistic and thus difficult for North Korea to accept. Under the plan were North Korea to give up nuclear weapons the plan promises that they would see their average per capita annual income rise to US$3,000 within ten years. This assumes that current North Korean income levels are at US$1,000 when the estimates are of between US$300 and US$500. Although it is important to have such grand visions, Haggard emphasized the point that there is a basic need to get talks started. It is also worth bearing in mind that North Korea will always seek to control inter-Korean relations, making any policy difficult in achieving success.   The Importance of China   North Korea's trade with China has been increasing and remains strong. In fact, during the presentation Haggard noted that North Korea is in effect living in a Chinese world with almost forty-five percent of its trade taken up by China. So, in this regard, North Korea's economy is opening up. But this is not a true opening up of the economy. Trade with Japan and Europe has almost stopped. The geography now of North Korea’s trade is limited to China and countries in the Middle East who will not be likely to exert pressure or demands on North Korea. The discussion turned to the issue of the importance of China in any sanctions effort and what could be done. Haggard was keen to point out that this would call for more targeted sanctions efforts like the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) case and counter-proliferation efforts like the Proliferation Security Initiative. The BDA case is a good example of targeted sanctions where the U.S. focused on a major bank in Macau suspected of money laundering for North Korea. In that instance, it worked because the U.S. offered talks to get North Korea back to the negotiating table.   Implications for U.S. Policy   Taking into account North Korea's intentions and taking away the picture of a regime that is willing to endure hardships to ensure its survival and political control, the panel wanted to know about what the U.S. could offer to North Korea during any negotiations. Haggard’s assessment was that so far the Obama administration has not really offered much to North Korea. It appears to be that the Obama administration is going back to policies similar to the Bush administration’s first term. Much of this is because of the concerns of North Korea's proliferation to the Middle East. Missile sales to Iran affect Israel's security and thus creating a whole new urgency in dealing with North Korea.   Haggard referred back to the Perry process, the policy of the Clinton administration during its second term, as a format for the U.S. to deal with North Korea. The Perry process offered North Korea two paths but channeled them in the right direction. There are limits in what could be offered to North Korea but Haggard felt that diplomatic recognition could be one element. Recognition as a nuclear weapon state poses many difficulties, the least of which is that it would compromise the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is not appreciated greatly how much the U.S. values the integrity of the NPT. Therefore, recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapon state would have wider implications for its non-proliferation efforts, particularly in regard to Iran's nuclear activities.   Haggard did stress that whatever formula is taken, the important part is to get negotiations started. So far there has been no effort to initiate talks. There needs to be a window open for North Korea to talk.   In general, the panel emphasized that North Korea's actions are being influenced from an internal logic due to the current leadership succession. Taking on the panel’s assessment, Haggard specified that patience is strongly required in such a case. However, patience is a luxury that Washington is finding harder and harder to indulge in.■               Moderator Young-Sun Ha     Presenter Stephan Haggard   Designated Discussants Chaesung Chun Jungwook Hong Geun Lee Byeong Cheol Lim   Free Discussion Panel Sung Kyoo Ahn Jihwan Hwang Heon Joo Jung Thomas Kalinowski Myung-koo Kang Byung-Kook Kim Su-Jeong Kim Whan-yung Kim Dongmin Lee Seung hoon Lee Yong Wook Lee Seongho Sheen Jee-ho Yoo       PresentedSlides_PE_of_DPRK_nucs.pdf      HaggardNoland_PE_of_DPRK_nucs.pdf     

Excerpts from EAI KOREAN PUBLIC OPINION REVIEW (2009 Feb. Survey)   Rising North Korean Threat Perception and Support for Korea-US Alliance   Since 2002, the EAI's Center for Public Opinion Research has been analyzing and assessing the Korean public's opinion on various security issues such as the Korea-U.S. alliance and the North Korean nuclear crisis. In February 2009, within the context of the recent inauguration of the Obama administration as well as the current crisis over North Korean potential missile launch, the Center set out to understand and interpret the Korean public's opinion on these key issues of the Korea-U.S. alliance and the U.S. leadership in the world. The following are important findings.   The leading characteristic in the U.S.-Korea alliance is that as the security situation becomes more uncertain, Koreans' support for the alliance increases. In this respect, as the intensity of the North Korean nuclear crisis increased, the rate of support for the alliance increased. Conversely, when North-South Korean relations went through a period of detente, we see a decrease in the support for the alliance.   Figure1) Concerns on National Security / Public Support for Korea-US Alliance since 2000   Data: Hankyoreh Shinmun (2000), EAI · JoongAngIlbo (2002), EAI · CCFR (2004), BBC · GlobeScan · EAI · Maeil Business Newspaper, Global Issue Monitor international survey(2006-2007), EAI · Hankook Research, Public Opinion Survey in the first Anniversary of Lee's Presidential Inauguration(2009 Feb. 21)   Looking at Figure 1, we can see that after 2002 (at the height of anti-American sentiment after the incident where two Korean schoolgirls were run over and killed by a US Army vehicle) until the peak of the nuclear crisis in 2006, as the responses concerning on national security increased from 18.9% to 63.8%, support for the alliance increased from 32.0% to 48.8%. Concerns on national security was measured by the percentage of respondents who ed 4 to 5 on the 1-5 scale (1 being 'not concerned at all', 5 being 'concerned a great deal', and 3 being neither 'concerned' nor 'not concerned') Alliance support was measured by the percentage of respondents who marked from 6 to 10 on the 0-10 scale (0 being 'strongest support for being independent of the U.S. influence', 10 being 'strongest support for strengthening the Korea-U.S. alliance' while 5 being 'middle of the road'). However, the following year, as the relations with North Korea improved, support for the alliance ped to 34.9%. Currently, as North-South Korean relations are strained over the prospect of North Korea's missile test, there is an increase in the support for the alliance, which stands at 43.7% as of Feb. survey. The results clearly show that as the security threat increases the need for the bilateral alliance is more strongly felt. In this way, it is perceived as the safety valve in deterring the North Korean threat.   Looking at public opinion polls from 2004 to 2006, Koreans' evaluation of American global leadership decreased while its support for the alliance increased as the North Korean nuclear crisis deteriorated. Figure 2 indicates that the percentage of people who believe that the U.S. plays a positive role in the world has declined steadily from 51.9% in 2004, to 44.4% in 2005 and then to 35.3% in 2006. From this we can see that the Korean public did not show much confidence in U.S. leadership. Yet they did offer "conditional support" to the bilateral alliance due to the overwhelming security interests in deterring the North Korean threat.   Figure 2) Korean Public's Positive Evaluation of the U.S. and China's International Role (%)   Data: BBC · GlobeScan · EAI · Maeil Business Newspaper, Global Issue Monitor international survey (2004-2007) EAI · Hankook Research, Public Opinion Survey in the first Anniversary of Lee's Presidential Inauguration (2009 Feb.21)   Since 2007 Koreans have been changing their views on American leadership in the world. Up until 2006, the support for the Korea-U.S. alliance stressed upon "security interests." However we see that the current support is based upon confidence in America's international leadership. Growing confidence in American leadership is a phenomenon that appears not only in Korea but also across the world. It should be noted that during the Bush administration's second term, the previous unilateral policies slowly diminished following immense criticism. Then during the recent presidential campaign, President Obama made pledges to reverse the Bush administration's unilateral diplomatic policies. In Figure 2, starting from 2006, as American leadership recovered public confidence, the positive evaluation of America's international role rose to 49.8% in December 2007 survey. In the February 2009 survey conducted after the inauguration of Obama administration, the positive evaluation of America's international role rose up to 57.4%. From this we can infer that the strengthened support of the U.S.-Korea alliance of today is helped by the Korean public perception of positive leadership in the world.   Questions   Korea-U.S. Alliance "We would like to ask your view on desirable Korea-U.S. relationship. On a scale from 0 to 10, give 0 if you support 'independent from U.S. influence', 10 if you support 'strengthened Korea-U.S. alliance', and 5 if you support 'middle of the road'. You can choose any number from 0 to 10."   Concerns on National Security "How much are you concerned about Korean national security of today? On a scale from 1 to 5, give 1 if you 'aren't concerned at all', 5 if you are 'concerned a great deal,' and 3 if you are 'neither concerned nor not concerned'. You can choose any number from 1 to 5."   Evaluation of the U.S. and China's International Role "Please tell me if you think U.S. [China] is having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world."   Written by Hanwool Jeong and Wonchil Chung at EAI's Center for Public Opinion Research Translated by Eun Hae Choi and Stephen Ranger with help of Jasmine Begin Marchand, Hyong Tak Son, Jayne Jungsun Yoo, and Eunice Kang