Author Kyung-young Chung is Director of the Institute of Foreign & Security Policy on East Asia, and taught national security courses at the Korea National Defense University and the Catholic University of Korea. He graduated from the Korea Military Academy. He received a Master of Science in Systems Management at the University of Southern California and a Master of Military Arts and Science at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, respectively. He received his Ph.D. in International Politics at the University of Maryland College Park.   He was a senior researcher of the Research Institute on National Security Affairs and commanded troops along the Demilitarized Zone. He was a policy practitioner at the Army Chief of Staff Office and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a war planner at ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Dr. Chung joined the Presidential Transitional Team and he was a policy advisor for NSC and the Ministry of National Defense.   The areas of his study and concern are ROK-U.S. military relationship, North Korea’s military strategy, conflict management, and security cooperation.         THAAD Deployment as a Controversial Issue   Pros and Cons debates on the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the Korean theater have already taken place in several venues. Currently, the Republic of Korea (ROK) government is at a crossroad of either cooperating with the U.S. as an ally to deploy THAAD due to national survival considerations in the face of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat, or accepting China’s request to refuse the system due to ROK’s national interest including the economic importance with China.   In consideration of the imminent security situation and controversial political arguments, this paper will conduct a threat assessment of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Then, the paper will address the current reality of the ROK-U.S. combined missile defense system and capabilities of THAAD along with X-band radar. Furthermore, the paper will focus on examining the position of the concerned countries. Finally, the paper will concentrate on analyzing the pros and cons of THAAD in terms of political and diplomatic, military strategic, and economic implications. The paper will make policy recommendations for respective key actors.     Threat Assessment of North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile   The 2014 Defense White Paper published by the ROK Ministry of Nation Defense estimated that North Korea is in a substantial position to obtain ballistic missile capabilities delivering nuclear warheads and develop KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threatening the continental United States. In 2014, North Korea test-fired 111 missile rounds consisting of FROG, SCUD, ER, and Rodong Missiles in order to increase accuracy of their missiles. North Korea conducted surprise and clandestine long-range missile test-firings employing Transportable Erector Launchers (TELs) at medium and high altitudes toward the East Sea crossing inland over North Korea from missile sites in the vicinity of the border between North Korea and China, as well as sites near the Kaesong Industrial Complex. In addition, North Korea test-fired a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) on May 8, 2015.   It is noteworthy that North Korea adopted preemptive nuclear strike as its nuclear doctrine. Since the third nuclear test on Feb 12, 2013, North Korea has pursued a self-defense deterrence strategy in order to prevent opposing forces from attacking by signaling massive retaliation employing nuclear warheads. On March 31, 2013, the North Korean Supreme People’s Congress adopted the constitutional law regarding further strengthening the status as a nuclear state. The moment when North Korea reorganized the Strategic Rocket Command into the Strategic Command in Feb 2014, preemptive nuclear strike became the more significant doctrine.   Especially, Kim Jong-un proclaimed the year 2015 as the time for a great war of unification and approved the ‘Seven Days War Plan’ at the extended Workers Party Central Military Committee on Aug 25, 2012. The War Plan dictates that the Korea People’s Army (KPA) take the initial momentum with asymmetrical weapons systems including nuclear missiles and occupy the Korean peninsula prior to the deployment of U.S. augmentation forces. In 2014, Kim Jong-un paid 73 on-site visits to strategic weapon systems test-firings as well as exercise and training for operational plan implementation. It seems highly likely that North Korea will test-fire a KN-O8 missile as an ICBM in the foreseeable future given that we observed the modified KN-08 missile during the parade for the commemoration of 70th anniversary of the North Korea Workers’ Party foundation on October 10, 2015.   In that context, the Republic of Korea-U.S.’s are committed to preventing attacks with asymmetric assets such as a nuclear warhead delivered by a missile which would inflict a catastrophic number of casualties.     Status of the ROK-U.S. Combined Missile Defense and THAADS   The ROK-U.S alliance has taken synchronized efforts to cope with the North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat through Extended Deterrence Policy Coordination Committee (EDPC) and Counter-missile Capabilities Committee (CMCC) and eventually established the ROK-U.S. Deterrence Strategy Committee in September 2015.   In connection with this strategic environment trend, the ROK forces plan to establish Kill-Chain and Korea Air Missile Defense (KAMD) systems against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. Kill-chain strengthening war fighting capabilities in accordance with the 4D concept (detect, defend, disrupt and destroy) and KAMD consisting of PAC-3 and Long & Medium SAM as ground-to-air missile are scheduled to be fielded around the mid 2020 years.   South Korea is vulnerable because it is insufficiently equipped to defend against the 1,000 missiles of North Korea with only 48 PAC-2 anti-missile missiles. South Korea decided it will develop its own indigenous long range surface-to-air missiles instead of purchasing THAAD. In the meantime, U.S. forces in Korea are equipped with PAC-3 missiles which have a range of 15-40 km with a 24 km altitude limit. The PAC-3 is not sufficient for protecting U.S. forces in Korea since these weapons cover a limited area.   Once THAAD is placed in the field, it has a range of 200km and altitude of 40-150km as an anti-missile weapon system consisting of launchers, missiles, radar, fire control, and communication support equipment. AN/TPY-2 has two mode X-band radars: Forward Based Mode (FBM) with range of detection of 1,800 km and Terminal Based Mode (TBM) of 600km.   Figure 1. Missile Defense on the Korean Peninsula   Source: “S. Korea faces tough decision on THAAD: Experts call on Seoul to make decision strictly based on security interests,” The Korea Herald, Nov. 6, 2014.     Position of Concerned Countries related to Deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces in Korea   The Republic of Korea   The ROK government’s position on the deployment of THAAD to U.S. forces in Korea is based on the three No’s: “no official request from the U.S., no review, no decision.” Strategic ambiguity might be South Korea’s stance, considering China’s protest against THAAD’s deployment, in parallel with the inevitability of the deployment to protect the U.S. soldiers and assets in South Korea against North Korea’s missile threat.   In June, 2014, Former Minister of National Defense Kim Kwan-jin, current Chief of the Office of National Security, made it clear that anti-ballistic missile capabilities for USFK will be enhanced in the event of THAAD deployment along with Patriot surface-to-air missiles. On September 16, 2014, former Minister of National Defense Kim continued to insist, “The MD system primarily aims at defending the Continental U.S. KAMD will protect the Republic of Korea. However, objective, range, and function of KAMD are different from those of the U.S. Missile Defense.” In addition, he clearly mentioned that South Korea did not make any decision to procure nor even consider the acquisition of SM-3 and THAAD. It seems that those statements attempted to interdict the continuing debate on joining the MD systems led by the U.S. if the ROK purchases those weapon systems which consists of boost-up, medium, and terminal stages.   On Oct 7, 2014, Defense Minister Han Min-koo made his position clear relating to the issue of the THAAD deployment to the USFK at the National Assembly audit of the government, saying, “Considering the limited assets against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat, the THAAD deployment will contribute to enhancing the ROK’s security and defense. The immense range of defense by the THAAD will enormously contribute to the defense of the Republic of Korea as well as the USFK.”   Foreign Affair Minister Yun Byung-se provided the official position regarding the THAAD issue, “If the U.S. will officially make a request on the THAAD issue to the ROK, then the National Security Council will make a final decision based on review by the Ministry of National Defense. If necessary, the ROK government will explain it to neighboring countries including China.”   The U.S.   At the forum hosted by the Korea Institute of Defense Analysis (KIDA) in June 2014, USFK Commander Curt Scaparrotti’s mention that the USFK’s request to the U.S. government for the deployment of THAAD created intense debate. In particular, since some public organizations insisted that the deployment of THAAD to Korea is considered to be symbolically joining the Missile Defense system led by the U.S., this issue was a departure from the nature of THAAD and became a political issue...(Continued)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 27   Author Sukhee Han is currently an associate professor of Chinese studies at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. He completed both undergraduate and MA program at the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Yonsei University. He continued his M.A.L.D. and Ph.D. degree programs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. With the completion of his Ph.D. in 1998, he moved to Beijing and accumulated his career as a lecturer at Peking University’s School of Government and as a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing. Professor Han’s area of interest is in Chinese security and foreign policy as well as business practices in China. His recent English publications include “South Korea between the United States and China since the Global Financial Crisis” (2010), “The Evaluation of Beijing Consensus: A Case of China-Angola Relations”(2009), “China’s Pursuit of Peaceful Power Transition: A Case of ICT” (2009), “Public Diplomacy between China and the World: The 2008 Beijing Olympic Torch Relay, A Test Case”(2009), “The Rise of China, Power Transition and South Korea's Soft Hedging”(2009), “Support and Apprehension: Chinese Views on the US Presidential Election”(2009), and “From Engagement to Hedging: South Korea’s New China Policy” (2008).         I. Introduction   Traditionally China has emphasized peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as an important strategic interest in its security. As East Asian history demonstrates, China has long perceived the Korean Peninsula as a strategic catalyst for its security and safety, and therefore it has never allowed any other power, other than itself, to exercise control of the peninsula. China has decided to intervene in Korea militarily four times—in 1592, 1627, 1894, and 1950—combating the potential challengers for securing its own suzerainty over the peninsula. Although China’s sphere of influence shrank to the northern half of the peninsula in the wake of the end of the Korean War in 1953, its interest in North Korea as a strategic buffer has remained consistent until the present. Given Pyongyang’s strategic value as a buffer state, Beijing’s primary objective with the North has been the survival of its backward and fragile regime, and peace and stability remain as the necessary prerequisite for its regional security.   However, the recent security environment on the peninsula has never achieved the expectations of China as it has grown. A series of Pyongyang’s arbitrary military provocations, including its sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010, its bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in November of 2010, and its unauthorized launch of a long-range missile in April 2012 have profoundly undermined the security environment around the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the sudden death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 has further aggravated the regional sense of security uncertainty. This unstable security situation per se may be indicative of the term “status quo minus.” Status quo minus implies a situation in which a weak and isolated North Korea raises an imminent security threat by “demonstrating an enhanced capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction and adopting more bellicose rhetoric and behavior.” (Goldstein 2006, 131-136) In this context, economically desperate North Korea tends to implement aggressive provocations on the basis of its belief that Pyongyang’s assertive behavior helps its regime survival. Subsequent U.S. military counteraction against North Korea’s violence will inevitably force China to intervene in the North Korean quagmire.   As a political ally, economic supporter, and diplomatic patron to Pyongyang’s regime, China has exerted whatever diplomatic influence and intervention it can on the North as far as these help maintain peace and stability in the region. Once it intervenes, China’s strategic objective is to shift the security situation on the Korean Peninsula from a status quo minus to a status quo plus. “Status quo plus,” in contrast to status quo minus, indicates a situation in which North Korea stops imposing a serious threat or provocation to neighboring states. In this context, the risk of intense crisis or military confrontation remains “at a modest level,” by the major presence of U.S. military stationed in South Korea. Also, the U.S. security alliance works as a hedge against a deterioration of strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula. To the extent that North Korea’s belligerence can be successfully constrained, security and stability on the peninsula and broadly in the Northeast Asian region may be sustained.   For China, status quo plus seems to be the most preferred security context for the region. China believes that status quo plus shapes North Korea to be kinder, gentler, and more reform-oriented. It also understands status quo plus as “the best way to ensure Pyongyang’s survival,” without any sudden major changes. (Scobell 2004, 16-17) Therefore, China, in pursuit of reaching a status quo plus has to deal with three different North Korean issues: North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, Pyongyang’s economic predicament, and the North’s violent provocations in the region. Despite no immediately satisfactory outcome expected in a short time period, China has consistently implemented its political, economic, and diplomatic influence to shift the regional security situation from status quo minus to status quo plus.   II. The North Korean Threat and Status Quo Minus   The major reason to define the post-2010 security situation on the Korean Peninsula as status quo minus is that North Korea, despite its economic backwardness, diplomatic isolation, and political volatility, poses a variety of security threats to the Northeast Asian region. North Korean threats can be classified into three dimensions. First, Pyongyang’s nuclear threat for about twenty years has continued to undermine Northeast Asian regional stability. Despite the Agreement Framework of 1994 and the eight-year-long Six-Party Talks, North Korea has continued to develope its nuclear devices, and it ultimately tested them twice in 2006 and 2009. Even after the nuclear tests, no specific diplomatic measures have been found to dismantle Pyongyang’s unauthorized nuclear development except the Six-Party Talks. (Nanto and Manyin 2010) Despite the death of his father, however, Kim Jong-un seems to have no intention of giving up his nuclear program and therefore the Six-Party Talks have little chance of meeting their founding goal: North Korea’s nuclear dismantlement. Although China has consistently argued for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, China falls short of convincing the regional powers and in the meantime the North’s nuclear threats are getting more serious for South Korea’s security. (Chanlett-Avery 2012)   Second, North Korea’s military provocations toward the South have caused profound security threats to the entire region. Two cases, including the tragedy of the Cheonan in March 2010 and the North’s bombardment of the South’s Yeonpyong Island in November 2010, have shown that North Korea can provoke security threats to the South at any time without declaration of war. (Thompson 2010; Swaine 2010; 2011) Furthermore, these provocations have also showed that the bilateral confrontation on the Korean Peninsula risk being escalated to a face-off between the regional powers: the United States and China. The cases of the Cheonan and Yeonpyong divided regional security structure into two alliance systems, the U.S.-Korean alliance and the Chinese-North Korean alliance, and the potential confrontation between the two alliance systems creates regional instability. (Michishita 2009, 139-152) To maintain regional security and stability, the vicious cycle that begins from North Korea’s provocations to the South, as a first step, should be controlled. Pyongyang’s provocations, alarming Seoul and prompting it to improve its defense capabilities, forced the implementation of a U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise. And China, suspicious of U.S. military intentions, tends to be at odds with the United States and South Korea, while improving its diplomatic and economic ties with the North. At this stage, the key point is how to stop North Korea’s further provocations toward the South. For regional crisis prevention, China’s diplomatic influence on the North is essential. (Byun 2010)...(Continued)

Author Dongho Jo, Ewha Womans University; East Asia Institute Sung-bae Kim, Institute for National Security Strategy         Abstract The Kim Jong-un regime is, for the short term, considered stable and perceived to be closely imitating the leadership style of his grandfather Kim Il-sung. The Leap Day Deal and the subsequent satellite launch in April 2012 were two contradicting signals that show the regime is still undecided in its foreign relations. For the long term, the regime will likely side with China while at the same time maintaining its equidistant diplomacy regarding bilateral relations between China-U.S., China-Russia, and China-South Korea. Considering the incompatibility of China’s primary focus on economic development with North Korea’s military-first politics, the Kim Jong-un regime will likely experience difficulties in upholding its nuclear politics. Therefore, South Korea and neighboring states need to pursue a strategy of convolution for the long run to facilitate the transition of the Kim Jong-un regime from military-first politics reliant upon nuclear weapons to a denuclearized economy-first politics. South Korea, in particular, needs to plan for a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula in response to the regional mechanism initiated by the China and the United States. Above all, the future policy toward North Korea should included elements of realism, defensive and offensive liberalism, and constructivism which will contribute toward formulating a complex policy.         The full text in Korean is available here  

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 22   Author Shin-wha Lee is a professor in the department of political science and international relations at Korea University. Professor Lee received her B.A. in English language and literature from Ewha Women’s University and received her Ph.D. in government and politics (international relations) from University of Maryland at College and served as Post-Doctoral fellowship at the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. She served as a researcher of Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University, special advisor to the United Nations, ‘Rwandan Independent Inquiry’ appointed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, chair’s advisor of East Asian Vision Group, Korean Coordinator of Trilateral Commission, visiting professor of Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at Singapore Nanyang University, Korean representative of the Korea-China-Japan Future Leaders’ Forum, visiting scholar of East Asian Studies Program at Princeton University, full-time visiting professor of School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, and scholar-in-residence for political affairs of the Republic of Korea Permanent Mission to the United Nations. Now she is a member of editorial board of Journal of East Asian Studies, research director of Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University, member of Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, member of Trilateral Commission, member and executive committee of board of directors of Academic Council for the United Nations System, and division chief of Asiatic Research Center at Korea University Humanity Korea (HK) Project. Her recent English publications include South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia (2008), Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks for the Promotion of Human Security in East-Asia (2004), and Environment Matters: Conflicts, Refugees & International Relations (2001).       I. Introduction   The end of the twentieth century witnessed a change in the nature of armed conflict. Large interstate wars were replaced by violent intrastate conflicts, or “new wars” (Kaldor 1999; 2007), where the vast majority of casualties have been civilians. Overwhelmed by the proliferation of internal conflicts and the resulting humanitarian crises over the past two decades, the international community has increasingly recognized the importance of international mediation or intervention for crisis prevention and response. UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions have been the primary tool for dealing with these problems, with human rights and international responsibility towards civilians trumping potential violations of state sovereignty.   However, international intervention, particularly ones that involve military action, has increased concerns among some states worried about potential infringements on state sovereignty. Since the issue of human rights is commonly regarded as part of the domestic legal affairs of state, external intervention on the grounds of human rights violations is viewed as unjustifiable violation of sovereignty (Lee 2004).   Consequently, the international community remains undecided whether human rights and humanitarian issues should be seen as problems of security. In contrast, issues such as environmental and economic deterioration, and the spread of epidemiological diseases have been defined as security relatively easily. Regardless, it seems to be an irreversible trend within the United Nations (UN) and among other international actors to seek and justify new norms and rules of protection after witnessing obvious failures to prevent mass atrocities and the genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur. In order to address the issues of state sovereignty and individual human rights simultaneously, a change in the normative framework is much needed. The notion of the responsibility to protect (R2P) was developed with this imperative to seek a new international norm and policy guideline on when and how the international community should intervene for the sake of human protection. After the NATO-led military action in Kosovo in 1999 for humanitarian ends brought about serious concerns about the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, the report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) on the R2P attracted global attention and fueled an international debate.   The R2P is a norm or set of principles that redefines sovereignty as a responsibility rather than as a privilege or a means of control. It prescribes that a state has the responsibility to protect its population and if a national government is neither able nor willing to fulfill the responsibility to protect its people, the international community has a secondary responsibility to protect them by force, if necessary, from the “four R2P crimes,” genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (ICISS 2001). The principles of R2P were unanimously adopted by the heads of state and government at the World Summit High-level Plenary Meeting of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2005, and the UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/63/308) on the implementation of R2P was adopted in September 2009.   However, it is very difficult to turn the concept into policy, even if it is unanimously accepted. Originally, the ICISS report recommended that the range of R2P should include situations of state collapse and overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes (ICISS 2001), but this was later narrowed down to the four R2P crimes. This was to prohibit arbitrary use of the R2P concept to justify unbounded international intervention. Yet, it still generated much controversy during the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctioned North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military intervention in Libya in 2011, an intervention based on R2P. Moreover, this limited definition of R2P has led to debates on how it can effectively respond to cases such as North Korea, which face complex emergencies where a combination of natural and man-made disasters adds to the suffering of the people.   Just as in humanitarian intervention, the R2P faces several dilemmas: How serious should humanitarian emergencies be to warrant international intervention? How can the narrowly defined R2P crimes accommodate those suffering in complex humanitarian crises? When should the UNSC approve external military engagement as a justifiable act and when should it not? What generates more danger, forcibly intervening or remaining an onlooker to the humanitarian crisis within a state? What kinds of normative and legal grounds can the R2P provide for outside involvement? Why is the R2P doctrine more than mere humanitarian intervention, and can the R2P overcome the shortcomings of humanitarian intervention? Why did we need intervention in Libya while not in Syria where the situation has been more or less the same as in Libya in terms of the necessity of civilian protection? Is it feasible for the international community to opt for military intervention in North Korea based on the principles of the R2P if a crisis occurs as it did in Libya?   Along the line of these inquiries, this working paper first reviews international responses to complex emergencies, with particular emphasis on multidimensional UN peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. Second, the development of the concept and debates of the R2P will be discussed, which will be followed by the limitations and controversies related to the notions and practices of the R2P. Third, the possibility of the R2P applied to both internationally endorsed R2P crimes and “non-R2P” crimes will be examined with a number of case studies: Cambodia, Darfur, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Libya, and Syria as R2P-delineated crimes; and Myanmar, Somalia, and Zimbabwe as non-R2P cases. Through these case studies, we can evaluate the possibility and validity of expanding the scope of the R2P and find the practical implications for the case of North Korea. It seems unfortunately improbable that the UN member states will apply the R2P to North Korea, not only in its current situation, but even if the people of the country were to face a situation like that of Libya and Syria, because China and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, will veto any military intervention against North Korea.   In brief, the initial assumption of this paper is that considering the difficulty in turning the R2P from words to deeds, it is practical to limit the R2P’s scope to four crimes. However, the narrowly described R2P also limits its potential to prevent, protect, or react to complex humanitarian emergencies, even for cases such as North Korea, where human rights violations and humanitarian challenges are among the most dreadful in the world. Therefore, it is ultimately beneficial to explore ways to expand the scope of the R2P in a way that does not undermine its applicability in the real world.     II. International Intervention in Complex Emergencies   1. Rise of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies   The UN is dedicated to respecting the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of its member states, as well as safeguarding peace through international cooperation and collective security. The founders of the organization envisioned its vital role in preventing conflicts between states. It was believed that defending against external aggression would in turn guarantee the personal security of citizens within the respective states.   The majority of armed conflict today, however, stems from civil wars and communal conflicts within a single recognized state, rather than wars between states. Out of a total of 29 major armed conflicts over the past decade 2001-2010, only 2 were fought between states and the remaining 27 cases have been internal (SIPRI Yearbook 2011). These intrastate conflicts, which have become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War, have been based on ethnic, communal, and religious differences within a state, and often have become intractable when factors, like struggle over political power, territorial issues, and core economic resources have come into play.   The most serious crises that have emerged in the midst of intrastate conflict or state failure have often been defined along humanitarian lines. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), today’s armed conflicts are coupled with the “active and deliberate targeting of civilians, including humanitarian aid workers, widespread human rights violations, the use of rape and other crimes of sexual violence as brutal weapons of war, particularly against women and children, and forced displacement.” The denial of civilian access to basic necessities, such as food, water and shelter, and limited international humanitarian access to crisis zones are also the main causes of widespread human afflictions, not to mention cases of ethnic cleansing or genocide which represent the worst forms of humanitarian crises in conflict areas (Lee 2004)...(Continued)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 20   Author Jin-Ha Kim is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). He was formerly a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS). Dr. Kim received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. His research interests lie in comparative authoritarianism, bureaucratic dictatorship, post-socialist transition, and the North Korean political economy. His recent works on North Korea include “On the Threshold of Power, 2011/12: Pyongyang’s Politics of Transition” (Forthcoming), International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (December 2011); “North Korea’s Leadership Structure and Post-Socialist Transition: Comparing with the Cases of Vietnam and Romania” (in Korean and co-authored with Moon-Hee Song), Unification Policy Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (June 2011); and “Reopening the Six-Party Talks: Prospects and North Korea’s Likely Negotiating Strategies Following the US-China Summit” (in Korean), KDI Review of the North Korean Economy (May 2011).       I. Introduction   At the third Delegates’ Conference of the North Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), held on September 28, 2010, the third-generation hereditary succession of Kim Jong-Un, Kim Jong-Il’s third son, was officially declared. This news reignited the perennial debate between the collapsists (Noland 2004, 12-19; Litwak 2007) and the resilientists regarding whether the Kimist (Buzo 1999) autocracy will survive the presumably conflict-ridden process of leadership transition. Collapsists call attention to the structural vulnerabilities of the personalist regime. One scholar argues that as power succession struggles intensify, the “regime tends to crack along the lines of personal loyalties and ‘estate inheritance’” (Mansourov 2007, 51). On the other hand, refuting the predictions of serious disruption, resilientists emphasize the regime’s durability, buttressed by persistent ruling and coercive institutions (Kihl 2007, 3-33). As Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind (2010) note, the autocratic iron cage has been vigilantly guarded, with many effective “tools of authoritarian control.” It is thus expected that “despite all of the obstacles Kim Jong-Un must overcome as he ascends the throne,” the regime will nevertheless manage to maintain stability (Lind 2010). Another resilientist even believes that “the succession seems to be going smoothly” (Chinoy 2011).   The resilientists’ arguments are apparently supported by the earlier experience of the Kimist regime’s survival in the initial hereditary succession process after Kim Il-Sung’s death in 1994. However, before assessing the potential effects of the impending third-generation succession on North Korea, we first need to solve the puzzle of why no modern republic-style autocracy has ever completed a leadership transfer to a third-generation hereditary autocrat (Brownlee 2007b). As Jason Brownlee shows, of the hundreds of potential candidates, only a few autocracies have cleared the thorny hurdle of the first succession to second-generation offspring. Even those few that have proved their persistence by passing the initial test failed to survive long enough to complete the next succession to a third-generation dictatorship.   What makes hereditary succession so rare? What prevents second-generation autocrats from handing down their thrones to their offspring as their fathers did? The first suffocates the next. The succession from father to son makes infeasible the next hereditary succession of the grandson. The reason seems to be that the initial succession over-consolidates personalist regimes to such an extent that the continuation of hereditary succession is no longer feasible.   Hereditary succession is a counterstrategy employed preemptively to cope with a fatal crisis of leadership transition in newly founded autocracies. This succession is feasible only when two conditions are met concurrently. The first condition is that coherently organized ruling institutions should be present. Effective institutions enforce hereditary succession. Mobilizing mass support, a competent ruling party consolidates the elites and constituencies to promote the attainment of the collective action needed for the smooth transfer of power. This process also organizationally produces reassuring effects for the security of elites after the succession. On the other hand, cohesive military and state coercive agencies repress the opposition within and without (Foran 1993, 3-27; Slater 2003, 81-101; Bellin 2005, 21-41). The second condition is that power must be concentrated in the predecessor to such a degree that he monopolizes decision-making authority and mobilizes ruling organizations. Only a few extraordinarily powerful autocrats have been able to satisfy both conditions at the same time, wielding “the power to make decisions” and “to enforce” them simultaneously (Slater 2010, 138). Therefore hereditary autocracy is rare.   In implementing hereditary succession, a regime’s tendency toward personalization is exacerbated. The successor’s survival strategy accelerates the predecessor’s patrimonial drive to minimize institutional autonomy so that, while the retinues’ vulnerability to his discretion is maximized, the rise of rivals entrenched in ruling institutions is prevented. This process inevitably deinstitutionalizes the regime to such an extent that the latter can survive only with the presence of a dictator who personally acts out the functions of institutions. Absentee dictatorship becomes impossible. When a personalist program succeeds, institutions decay. When it fails, rivals prevail. Whether it succeeds or not, it is thus least likely that the given autocracy concurrently meets the aforementioned two feasibility conditions of hereditary succession, especially when the incumbent dictator is debilitated. In that case, no hereditary succession is feasible.   In order to test the explaining power of the proposed “Second-Time-Unlucky” hypothesis based upon an auto-destructive logic of autocratic hereditary succession, this paper mainly surveys nine cross-national cases of hereditary autocracies: the Trujillos of the Dominican Republic (r. 1930-61), the Duvaliers of Haiti (r. 1957-86), the Somozas of Nicaragua (r. 1936-79), the Chiangs of Taiwan (r. 1949-88, the Kims of North Korea (r. 1948-present), the Assads of Syria (r. 1971- ), the Lees of Singapore (r. 1965- ), the Aliyevs of Azerbaijan (r. 1993- ), and the Gnassingbés of Togo (r. 1967- ). In the last four cases, the incumbent second-generation hereditary rulers are currently in power. Of them, Kim Jong-Il alone has formally set in motion a third-generation succession plan. A review of the past trajectories of these regimes can also explore the explanatory validity of the hypothesis.   The cross-national selection and examination of the cases allow us to examine potential alternative explanations for the rise and demise of hereditary succession. The cases are selected naturally. Of “258 post-World War II autocrats who ruled for at least three years” (Brownlee 2007b, 597), only nine of them managed to hand down the throne to a hereditary successor. The selected nine hereditary autocracies had diverse cultural, religious, and historical (and colonial) legacies. They can be conspicuously differentiated by economic fragility, ideological orientation, and human development. Even if the lack of a strong civil society characterizes the nine cases, most nonhereditary postwar autocracies have weak civil societies, signifying that all the enumerated factors are not decisive in explaining the rise and fall of hereditary autocracies. Contrastingly, as proposed in the second-time-unlucky hypothesis, the nine hereditary autocracies started with a powerful dictator and an effective party with robust coercive institutions, concurrently meeting the aforementioned two feasible conditions of hereditary succession. Before their final dissolution, four of them had degenerated into “sultanistic regimes” (Chehabi and Linz 1998a, 3-25), with decayed institutions. The remnant five regimes currently ruled by the founders’ sons also display identifiable tendencies of institutional de-routinization or debilitated dictatorship, providing grounds for future testing. All suggest the relatively stronger explanatory, predictive, and falsifiable potentialities of the second-time-unlucky hypothesis.   The synoptic survey of the cases is then supported by a focused investigation of the case of the North Korean regime. Reinforced by an application of a structured contingency approach, which highlights reciprocal interactions between the institutional precedents and agential actors, we can map North Korea’s trajectories into and out of personal dictatorship, tracking the past transition from a Stalinist single-party system to “sultanistic dictatorship” (Huntington 1991, 112), which was triggered by the hereditary succession to Kim Jong-Il. Beyond the debate about regime collapse, it allows us to anticipate that, in the current context of “post-totalitarian” (McEachern 2010) decay, the impending third-generation succession could precipitate another transition. Analyzing the Kim Jong-Un ascension plan with balanced titrations of such factors as the patrimonial legacies and the distribution of power among major actors and agencies, more plausible transition routes can be discerned. Whether by negotiation or by violence, the next transition is likely to invite either a single-party-based oligarchy or a military regime, neither of which is likely to produce stability due to the country’s institutional lack of binding precedents and commitments...(Continued)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 19   Author Chun, Chaesung is a Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations in Seoul National University. He is now a visiting professor at Keio University in Tokyo. He is also a director of Asian Security Initiative of East Asian Institute. He is a member of Advisory Committee for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Ministry of Reunification. He received his MA degree from the Seoul National University, and Ph.D degree from Northwestern University in the field of International Relations Theory. Major fields include international relations theory, security studies, South Korean Foreign policy, East Asian security relations. Major articles include “A Study on the Forma-tion of European Modern States System,” “Critique of constructivism from the perspective of postmodernism and realism,” “The Rise of New Powers and the Responding Strategies of Other Countries.”       I. Introduction   After the Cold War ended and the former Soviet bloc broke down, North Korea’s rival, South Korea, established diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Union and China, which put North Korea on a difficult journey for survival. Witnessing long-standing communist regimes that had worked alongside Pyongyang to construct socialism helplessly collapse or change over from communism under external pressure or pressure by the people, North Korea found itself in a desperately dangerous situation in which it had to sustain its socialist system and regime, and worry about not just a transition but an absorbed unification by the South.   With the fall of the socialist bloc, the U.S.-led liberal democratic bloc’s development accelerated even further. In the post–Cold War environment, not only the new structure of power but also the development of the massive trends of globalization, information proliferation, and democratization confirmed socialism to be a system lacking the open, democratic, and creative qualities it needed to cope with these changes. In addition, liberal democracy developed in tandem with a market economy. At the same time, as the United States, who was the longtime adversary of North Korea, built an unrivaled hegemony with unprecedented qualities of leadership, North Korea felt ever more threatened.   The Kim Il-sung regime, which was searching for a survival strategy throughout 1991 and 1992, stirred up the first nuclear crisis in 1993, and the Kim Jong-il regime that followed in 1994 tried to escape its post–Cold War crisis by freezing its nuclear program but firmly promoting military-first politics. In the process, North Korea focused on aligning its internal system and strove to provide an opportunity for economic development, on the one hand, while concentrating on creating a diplomatic environment in which North Korea could survive on a long-term basis, on the other. On the basis of its bilateral diplomatic relationship with the United States that was arranged after the first North Korean nuclear crisis, North Korea tried to put an end to the so-called “United States’ hostile policy toward North Korea” while it sought to strengthen its self-defense capacity based on military power that revolved around military-first politics. In regards to South Korea, Pyongyang, while keeping itself from an absorbed unification, utilized Seoul’s engagement policy to secure practical interests for the sake of future regime development.   Also, by improving relations with neighboring states such as China, Russia, and Japan, North Korea attempted to maximize economic and diplomatic support from them. At the same time, it established diplomatic relations with non-Asian states, including those in Europe, and pursued a practical diplomatic doctrine that could have economic and diplomatic benefits, even if only partially.   However, facing a more conservative U.S. foreign policy and the anti-terrorism campaign after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, North Korea found itself in a much more unfavorable diplomatic situation. Eventually, in October 2002, the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis signaled that North Korea was reverting back to the rigid nuclear military-first diplomacy centered on its nuclear program and nuclear weapons. Within the framework of the Six-Party Talks, sporadic attempts to discuss North Korean abandonment of its nuclear program with accompanying economic aid continued, but North Korea did not have the strategic option of abandoning its nuclear program. Its neighbor states’ security guarantees failed to satisfy its insecurities, and thus the North Korean problem based on the nuclear weapons issue is still going in circles without much progress.   The North Korean nuclear program is not a nuclear weapons issue but a question of the survival of North Korea as a political entity. North Korean nuclear weapons diplomacy is also not about nuclear weapons but about its survival and the overall political system based on military-first priorities. As long as North Korea’s nuclear military-first diplomacy and military-first political system interact reciprocally, the individual evolution of North Korean diplomacy is impossible. And if North Korea’s politics, economy, military, society, and other areas do not evolve in tandem, neither will its diplomacy.   Furthermore, North Korea’s evolution without outside support cannot fulfill the goals that are desired. Neighboring states’ foreign policy toward Pyongyang must also evolve at the same time to support and strengthen North Korea’s domestic forces that advocate for such advancement. North Korea and its neighboring countries’ coevolution will alleviate North Korea’s political concerns and, in the long run, create diplomatic agreements on and action plans for North Korea’s role in Northeast Asia.   This working paper predicts that if North Korea pursues nuclear military-first diplomacy in order to support its “strong and prosperous state” policy, it cannot survive as a normal and developed state in the international community. North Korea must make a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear program and revive as a truly developed state, meeting twenty-first-century global standards. In order to achieve this status, the evolution of both North Korea’s political system and its diplomacy must work simultaneously. Moreover, North Korea’s evolution should be supported by the evolution of neighboring states’ North Korea policy. I first examine the development of North Korean diplomacy, and analyze why North Korea’s military-first diplomacy will inevitably fail. Then, I introduce the three steps of diplomatic evolution for North Korea, and through a discussion of the coevolution process of it and its neighboring states, explore the possibility of whether its overall system can lead to a normal and developed future.   II. Components and Evaluation of Diplomatic Strategy in the Military-First Era   1. Components of Diplomatic Strategy   Diplomacy in the military-first era has the strategic goal of serving the strategic purpose of military-first politics. Military-first politics, which has made the military the most important pillar of the regime while it promoted the militarization of the overall society, is a method to maintain and further strengthen the survival capacity of the North Korean socialist regime after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, diplomacy in the military-first era, or, in other words, military-first diplomacy, aims to guarantee the survival of North Korea’s “Great Leader”–centered socialist regime and focuses on creating a diplomatic environment in which North Korea can eventually become a “strong and prosperous state.” As the authority and power of the military have been reinforced, the status and influence of the military in the decision-making process of foreign policy have only increased. Pyongyang, in deciding on its method of enforcing foreign policy, has frequently resorted to military action. Its decision to develop nuclear weapons to use them as an important diplomatic tool can also be understood as one product of the military-first political system.   This argument about North Korea’s military-first politics is closely related to its evaluation of the situation of the international community and the direction of future foreign policy. In other words, this discussion analyzes the environment of military-first politics while finding the “fundamental questions arising in today’s world” from the international political environment. North Korea proclaims the goal of its foreign policy as “protecting and adhering to Juche [Self-reliant] socialism, the bastion of global socialism, from the allied forces of imperialism, and completing Juche achievements.” (Kang 2002, 7-8) Additional explanations of this statement read “as long as imperialism exists on the face of the Earth and the schemes of aggression by imperialists continue, we cannot submit to such forces. The ultimate triumph of Juche achievements can only be accomplished by unrelenting fights. Also, the fundamental spirit of military-first ideology is to fully invoke military, political and economic power to fight to the end against the imperialists who try to crush Juche ideology. Through this process, we shall independently build a new peaceful society based on the dynamic spirit of military-first ideology.” (Kang 2002, 15) Such statements show the direction of North Korea’s diplomatic strategy.   Military-first diplomacy more specifically comprises (1) securing a survival environment through strengthening military deterrence and negotiations with the United States, (2) practical diplomacy for acquiring economic resources, and (3) diplomacy with South Korea in which North Korea, in the name of unification strategy, acquires the necessary diplomatic resources to secure economic aid and an environment in which it can survive. On this survival environment, North Korea asserts that “only a strong military response to the hostile imperialist forces, that only pursue wars of aggression, can lead to peace.” It also states that “it is military-first politics that will provide the peaceful environment necessary for our nation’s unification.” (Kang 2002, 268) Moreover, on acquiring economic aid, it explains that “when our republic suffered an unprecedented food crisis and energy shortage that damaged our overall economy because of U.S. economic sanctions and their schemes using military pressure, military-first politics was the force that drove the military to be the primary actor that vitalized the overall economy.” It also explains that there is a need to “make the military the main force and mightily construct overarching socialism.” (Chun 2004, 32) On its strategy toward South Korea, it argues that “military-first politics is the strongest measure of unification our generation can use to realize our nation’s long-cherished wish for unification.” It further states that “military-first politics finds its meaning in that it hinders the United States’ attempts at wars of aggression and thus provides the fundamental setting for a peaceful environment for our nation’s unification.” It asserts that “this is all because military-first politics is a political method that provides deterrence [in] preventing war on the Korean Peninsula.”   Such military-first politics is also implied in the revised constitution of North Korea. In the Eighth Constitution revised on September 5, 1998, the expression “Marxism-Leninism” in Article 4 of the Seventh Revised Constitution was deleted. The phrase “repel foreign powers on a national scale” of Article 5 was deleted as well. Moreover, in the Eighth Revised Constitution, Article 17, “autonomy, peace, amity” were set as the goals of foreign policy and at the same time, the diplomatic stance was based on “our own version of socialism and strengthening of international solidarity based on autonomy.” The fundamental direction of North Korean diplomacy has thus shifted from (1) revolutionary diplomacy to practical diplomacy, (2) from diplomacy focused on “liberating the South” to a protectionist diplomacy to maintain the North Korean socialist regime, (3) from encampment diplomacy to nonalignment diplomacy in the short run and to open diplomacy in the long run, and (4) from a self-reliant diplomacy between China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War to inducement diplomacy due to Sino-Soviet détente.   Such fundamental diplomatic orientations of Pyongyang clearly differ from its diplomatic strategies during the Cold War period. The Korean Workers’ Party code and the former socialist constitution stipulate that “the immediate purpose of [the] Korean Workers’ Party is to achieve complete socialist victory in the Northern part of the Republic and [finish] national liberation and the historic task of the people’s democracy revolution on a national scale. The ultimate goal is to penetrate Juche ideology across the entire society and [construct] a communist society” (Preamble of the code). For this goal, North Korea adopted a platform to strengthen the three main revolution capabilities and increase diplomatic relations within the socialist bloc and the Third World through strong ties to the Soviet Union. The one continuity is that amid the lack of evidence that North Korea has given up on communist unification, it has not given up the political intention to put the entire Korean Peninsula under its influence by measures other than war. As Hak Soon Paik has pointed out, “In the historical, psychological, and substantial space of the ‘Korean Peninsula,’ the essence of North Korea’s strategy, to win the competition between the two Koreas and secure a monopolized authority over the entire peninsula to build a unified nation, has not changed.” (Paik 2003, 150)   The core goal of military-first diplomacy was diplomatic relations with the United States. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, North Korea focused on negotiating with the United States, and between December 1988 and December 1992, it pushed forward advisor-level diplomatic contacts in Beijing twenty-eight times (Kim 2002, 149-151). However, as North Korea realized that the required factors for its survival were increasingly lacking, it decided on walking the path of military-first diplomacy and then launched the first nuclear crisis in March 1993. Afterward, by agreeing to freeze its nuclear program in the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korea tried to make diplomatic room for its survival for the time being. After going through the first nuclear crisis and signing the Agreed Framework, the bilateral relationship between the United States and North Korea began, and until the DPRK-U.S. Joint Communiqué under the Clinton administration in 2000, desperate efforts to improve U.S.-DPRK relations, known as the “Geneva Agreed Framework system,” continued for eight years. This relationship then experienced a year-long lull after the Bush administration came into office. In 2002, with the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis, this bilateral relationship entered the era of the Six-Party Talks, but without an effective breakthrough, it stagnated.   North Korea, based on its nuclear program, proceeded with its military-first diplomacy while trying to sign a peace treaty with the United States and to create the military and diplomatic environment necessary for its survival. After the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, U.S.-DPRK relations showed partial progress. On January 12, 1995, the U.S. State Department announced that it would ease the sanctions on North Korea, allow business and travel between the United States and the DPRK, grant permission to North Koreans to use U.S. finance institutions, and engage in the importation of magnesite from North Korea. During this process, North Korea continually emphasized the signing of a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty. While demanding the conclusion of a peace treaty, North Korea took measures such as expelling the delegation of the Czech Republic in 1993, establishing Panmunjom representatives of the Korean People's Army in 1994, and pulling out North Korean representatives from the Panmunjom Military Armistice Commission, to jeopardize the armistice system. The Four-Party Talks were held in March 1997, but after six talks ending in June 1998, the Four-Party Talks ceased due to North Korea’s refusal to participate. This was the result of North Korea’s repeated argument that the U.S.-DPRK peace treaty must be signed first...(Continued)  

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 18   Author Kim, Sungbae is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). In that position, he provides advice to government and contributes to development of policy on North Korea and Korean Peninsula issues. Prior to this position, he served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Minister of National Unification (2006). Before taking up that position, Dr. Kim served as Senior Director and Director (2003-2006) of the Strategic Planning Bureau, National Security Council (NSC) of Korea. Dr. Kim earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at Seoul National University.       I. What Made North Korea's Nuclear Threat “Underbalanced”?   The balance of power principle has prevailed on the Korean Peninsula since the Cold War began. The Korean War can be understood from this point of view. The military buildup has increased continuously between the two Koreas even since the signing of the armistice, and both big and small military conflicts keep occurring. These circumstances have resulted in a kind of strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula. However, a decisive factor that might change the inter-Korean strategic balance arose in the early 1990s: North Korea’s nuclear development.   North Korea's nuclear development was first detected in its initial stages in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was never effectively stopped, and the North is now considered to be at a nuclear arsenal stage with an accumulation of nuclear materials and two nuclear tests. Notably, in November 2010, North Korea's uranium enrichment program was revealed in addition to its existing plutonium-based nuclear program, which made the North Korean nuclear issue of greater concern. North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 marked a critical stage, making North Korea a de facto nuclear state. But South Korea’s response was unexpectedly restrained. There were no strong sanctions against North Korea nor a corresponding attempt at nuclear armament. What made this happen?   Why was North Korea's nuclear armament not stopped? According to realist theory, the logic of the security dilemma should have called for a balancing behavior, but the actual responses were limited and even resembled a de facto appeasement policy. The U.S. option might have been restricted by the geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula and the U.S.-ROK alliance. Any sanctions against North Korea, military or economic, could not be imposed if opposed by South Korea, the United States’ ally. What were South Korea's responses? North Korea's nuclear armament decisively changed the military strategic balance in inter-Korean relations. Although South Korea ought to have responded more proactively to the North Korean threat, it did not, from the standpoint of realism. Even without a preemptive military strike, strong sanctions against North Korea ought to have been imposed, given that security concerns were the highest priority in the South Korean decision-making process. Yet the Roh Moo-Hyun administration largely continued to draw on existing inter-Korean relations and only joined the sanctions against North Korea imposed by the UN Security Council following the first nuclear test, the most critical phase in the North Korean nuclear program. Was this action a policy failure or an exceptional case? If we just want to evaluate South Korean policy then we could stop here, but if we want to carefully analyze it then a much more complex analysis will be required.   Neoclassical realists call a threatened country’s behavior “underbalancing” when it has failed to recognize a clear and present danger, has simply not reacted to it or has responded in a paltry and imprudent way (Schweller 2004, pp. 159–160). It is debatable whether we can call the Roh administration’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear threat “underbalancing.” Liberalists as well as realists might not consent to this argument. From a liberalist perspective, the Roh administration's response was a rational choice that reflected the progress of inter-Korean relations, because excessive military measures or strong sanctions against North Korea might have caused unnecessary military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and compromised the entire inter-Korean relationship. Strict realists may not regard the Roh administration’s behavior as “underbalancing,” either. In their view, any balancing act was not needed at that time, because an aggregate strategic balance was already working on the Korean Peninsula since the U.S.-ROK alliance was in place. Rather, they might have viewed the Roh administration’s response as over-engaging behavior, which was too sensitive to North Korea’s reaction. However, defining balancing behavior as a militarily meaningful measure is a too narrow and military-centric approach. Even the concept of “soft balancing” was developed to describe limited and indirect balancing strategies through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining, contrasted with “hard balancing” such as military buildup and alliance formation (Paul 2005, p.58). The Roh administration’s response to North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 was even below its own threatened level, let alone the level that the conservatives and the United States demanded. There are enough grounds for taking the Roh administration’s behavior as “underbalancing,” for it neglected even “soft balancing” It was, however, “underbalancing” on a specific issue rather than in an aggregate power structure.   Nevertheless, this paper is not based on the neoclassical realist approach. The Roh administration’s response is difficult to explain using neoclassical realist theory even if there was some kind of “underbalancing” phenomenon. Neoclassical realism notes the role of domestic politics. The distortion in foreign policy by domestic politics is fully considered in foreign policy studies. The problem is that as shown by the complete differences in the policy toward North Korea of the Roh and Lee administrations, South Korean domestic politics can be an “overbalancing” factor as well as an “underbalancing” one. How can we explain such differences in policy preferences? We need a more complex approach than comparative foreign policy theory. In the case of South Korea, it is impossible to generalize about how domestic politics is reflected in foreign policy with several domestic variables. In South Korea, inter-Korean relations are deeply linked to domestic politics, because policy toward North Korea includes cultural elements such as identity and norms.   This discussion will analyze how the domestic politics of South Korea are reflected in the North Korean nuclear issue, the highest national security concern when North Korea conducted its nuclear test in 2006. Especially, it will show how cultural elements such as norms and identity shaped the South Korean government’s response to North Korea's nuclear threat in term of constructivism. Yet the global cultural environment on which constructivism focuses will not be dealt with in depth here. Constructivism tends to note the effect of the domestic cultural environment in addition to the international one. But the global cultural environment such as the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and non-proliferation norms have had a relatively insignificant impact on the South Korean government's policy decisions. I will therefore review the relevance of various alternative approaches that can be used to explain South Korea's underbalancing behavior in response to North Korea's nuclear threat.   II. How to Explain South Korea’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: A Brief Theoretical Review   1. Neoclassical Realist Approach   The nuclear issue is the most typical military security issue in the international political arena and can be expected to be strongly explained by realist international political theory that stresses high politics. According to traditional realism, all nations pursue their national interests, defined as power. Yet there is an inevitable limitation to national power; the balance of power is a major factor that determines the behavior of nations (Morgenthau 1985). And the most explicit form of power is the military and nuclear weapons that are the most destructive means.   Thus the balance of power is the most effective tool for analysis to explain a nuclear issue. Structural realism, pioneered by Waltz, emphasizes the concept of the balance of power in a different context. Under an anarchical international system without global government, nations have the same functional property as units in that they have to put the top priority on their survival and safety rather than on cooperation with other nations. Therefore, the most significant element in international politics is the distribution of power; in this context the balance of power is the core factor that can explain and predict the behavior of all nations (Waltz 1979). Nuclear armament, in particular, is a critical factor that can change the strategic balance among nations in a fundamental way. North Korea's nuclear development can be interpreted from a realist point of view. There are various interpretations of the nuclear negotiating strategy of North Korea. Yet it cannot be disputed that North Korea developed its nuclear weapons program in order to secure its survival and safety. It is generally understood that the strategic factors for North Korea's nuclear weapons are the increased security vulnerability with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc; the fear of U.S. attack, which intensified following the Iraq War; the diverging gap in South-North Korea national capabilities; and the burden from the conventional arms race with South Korea due to the North’s own economic difficulties. Whatever the factors might be, nuclear armaments can be perceived as the most effective tool to guarantee the survival of the North Korean regime in a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment.   The problem is whether realism can explain South Korea’s response to North Korea's nuclear threat. Traditional realism regards a state as a unit pursuing power as a human being does. And structural realism sees the international anarchic structure as defining the behavior of an individual state. Either way, realism takes a state as a rational unitary actor. A state naturally shows balancing behavior toward external threats, but this has not been the case on many occasions, such as the response to North Korea's nuclear threat in 2006. South Korea did not take any meaningful military measures at that time. In this regard, we might take note of the geopolitical risk that the South Korean government faces. The possibility of full-scale war, as experienced in the Korean War, limits options in North Korean policies. But overemphasizing the geopolitical risk might lead to ignorance of the fact that there are various levels of sanctions and diverse types of military sanctions, such as military exercises and deterrence measures. In any sense, the Roh administration’s response is difficult to explain from a realist point of view.   Even within realism, international politics theory based on a positivist hypothesis of rationality has been questioned. Neoclassical realists note the process and interaction of agents and acknowledge that the response of a state to an external threat can be influenced by domestic circumstances. The closer the policymaking process and actual state's society relations to a unitary actor, the more accurate realism's prediction is. Conversely, when states are divided at the society level, they are less likely to behave in accordance with balance-of-power predictions. According to Schweller, a neoclassical realist, we can explain an actor's choices by two reasons, the first being an actor's preferences, that is, willingness, and the second being the ability of the actor to balance, given the political and material hurdles that must be overcome to do so. Schweller posits four variables that are comprehensive enough to explain state responses to threats: elite consensus, government or regime vulnerability, social cohesion, and elite cohesion. He insists that incoherent and fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats, because elites view the domestic risks as too high and are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society (Schweller 2004, pp. 168–170).   A neoclassical realist approach indeed has some implications concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. It is true that the North Korean nuclear issue has deteriorated over the past twenty years since the early 1990s despite some progress. North Korea was suspected of developing its nuclear program in the early 1990s and is supposed to be a de facto nuclear state today. From a neoclassical realist viewpoint, this situation is the result of a lack of proper responses to explicit external threats and a typical “underbalancing” phenomenon. In Schweller's framework, it is the result of South Korea's specific domestic politics. It is true that the South Korean state-society was fragmented during the same period. Particularly after the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, the entire society as well as the political elites was rendered almost dichotomous over inter-Korean relations and the policy toward North Korea. But it is not enough to explain South Korea's response to North Korea’s nuclear threat only by reference to the cohesion of society. Schweller's framework, based on the British and French experiences during the interwar period, cannot be applied to South Korea, which has a different historical background. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to explain the Lee administration's response to the North Korean nuclear issue, which is the very opposite to the Roh administration’s, while societal fragmentation and cohesion have not changed. It does not make sense to explain that South Korea's response has changed completely after only two years, with a change of actor's preferences due to adjustments in domestic political circumstances. Rather, it would be more plausible to say that the policy preferences of the two administrations were different socio-psychologically. It is true that domestic politics are relevant in balancing external threats. But in the South Korean case, cultural elements such as norms and identity are much more influential than political and economic interests.   2. Liberalist Explanation   Liberalists have much to say about South Korea's response to North Korea’s nuclear threat. They would resent the concept of “underbalancing.” “Underbalancing,” which is very value-oriented, is a concept based on the assumption that a proactive balancing action has to be taken. But liberalists would not consider the Roh administration's response to be “underbalancing.” To them, it was the appropriate response to prevent tensions from accelerating on the Korean Peninsula. In their view, a kind of under-engaging has happened under the Lee administration, to the extent that the North Korean nuclear issue has deteriorated to a much greater extent. The motivation behind North Korea’s nuclear threat has been to prompt the United States to negotiate the lifting of financial sanctions against North Korea rather than to create a substantial and immediate threat to cause a strategic imbalance between the two Koreas. Taking excessive military measures is overbalancing that might cause military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In the liberalist view, the Roh administration's choice reflected the progress of inter-Korean relations. Based on a cost-benefit analysis, it was a rational choice to maintain inter-Korean relations through a measured response rather than through sacrificing the entire relationship by strong sanctions against North Korea. This means that the so-called spill-over effect” worked, as liberalism and functionalism would say. Liberalist approaches are based on the hypothesis that the state is basically a rational actor. But if we understand that the Roh administration's choice was not the best but was inevitable and rational, it, at least, comes from the fact that the actor (the Roh administration) had a liberalist's view. The Lee administration showed another choice in sacrificing its inter-Korean relationship in order to protect its security interests. Still, the liberalist approach also cannot effectively explain why the two South Korean administrations under almost the same state-society structure made opposite political choices.   3. Constructivist Alternative   The constructivist approach is relevant in analyzing the Roh administration’s response to the North Korean nuclear issue in that it emphasizes cultural elements such as norms and identity. South Korean domestic politics became more diversified as the country went through rapid industrialization and democratization over the past half century, and the influence of domestic variables in the decision-making process has greatly increased. Thus, we can explain South Korean behavior by analyzing public opinion on specific foreign policy issues or bureaucratic interests. We can also simply use ways of analysis such as cognitive consistency, group thinking, and psychological stress.   However, the Roh administration's response to North Korea's first nuclear test that I analyze here seems to have been more affected by discourse politics and cultural elements than by political interests, being much more relevant than the personal level cognitive and psychological elements of political elites.   Constructivism focuses more on the cultural-institutional elements of a state's environment and identity than on the physical environment surrounding it, shaping the national security interests or the security policies of a state. Katzenstein defines norms as collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. The former is called "constitutive effects" that specify what actions will make the relevant others recognize a particular identity, and the latter is called "regulative effects" that specify the standards for proper behavior (Katzenstein 1996, p. 5). Taken together, norms establish expectations about who the actor will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave (Katzenstein 1996, p. 54). Norms influence policy decision-makers to prefer or avoid particular polices on the grounds of norms, and the public or experts present or support specific norms to affect policymaking...(Continued)

EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 17   Author Hwang, Jihwan is an assistant professor of the University of Seoul, Korea. Professor Hwang was an assistant professor of North Korean Studies at Myongji University, and a research fellow at the Institute for Unification Studies of Seoul National University. His research interests include East Asian international relations and security studies, focusing on the North Korean nuclear crisis. His main concern is how to explain North Korea’s foreign policy in terms of international relations theories. He published numerous articles, and his recent publications include “International Relations Theory and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” “Offensive Realism, Weaker States, and Windows of Opportunity: The Soviet Union and North Korea in Comparative Perspective,” “The Second Nuclear Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy,” and “Rethinking the East Asian Balance of Power.” Professor Hwang received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Colorado at Boulder.       I. Introduction   Ever since Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, the military-first policy has been maintained as Kim Jong-il’s principal strategy for governance and survival in North Korea. The policy’s effectiveness as a force in domestic politics and political propaganda is debatable, but its critical flaw is that it creates doubts as to whether it will be effective enough to ensure North Korea’s security and powerful state building in a rapidly changing world order.   The military-first policy is designed to enable North Korea to become a strong and prosperous state by 2012, but in fact it is restricting the development of nonmilitary sectors. Running the state through the army and focusing almost all of state capacity on the military disrupts the effective distribution of resources and aggravates the problem of an overweening military and an excessive emphasis on security. Thus despite its designers’ intentions, the military-first policy will inevitably fail as a national strategy.   Kim Jong-il initially adopted this strategy in order to facilitate the maintenance of his regime. There is a possibility that despite Kim Jong-il’s being aware of the policy’s its imminent failure, a lack of alternatives is forcing him to hold on to it. Insistence on this strategy will foster not the construction of a strong and prosperous state, but both external and internal ineffectiveness, weakening both the regime and the state, and eventually bring them down. On the other hand, if the current strategy is abandoned and North Korea makes new strategic decisions, its chances of survival will be greater and it will certainly be able to become a normal state in the international community.   This paper points out the structural problems that North Korea’s military-first policy entails, and proposes a new direction for development in a so-called coevolution strategy. Pyongyang could adopt it by modifying the military sector, aiming to transform North Korea from both the inside and the outside. The North Korean issue is not one which can be solved simply by changing the international community or the South Korean government’s North Korea policy. The problem with President Lee Myung-bak’s Grand Bargain or the Obama administration’s “Comprehensive Package” is that they lack programs that would transform the North Korean state itself. Meanwhile, due to the current domestic situation and the political environment on the Korean Peninsula, the possibility of the problem’s being successfully resolved by North Korea’s leadership by promoting a different autonomous reform program in the Chinese or Vietnamese style is rather low. In the beginning stages of reform there would be heightened socioeconomic instability due to the loosened grip on internal politics, and the leaders would feel increasingly threatened by their relative weakness compared to their strong South Korean neighbor. Therefore for the successful survival of North Korea, there must be a coevolution strategy consisting of giving up its nuclear weapons and promoting an autonomous reform program, while its neighboring states simultaneously ensure and support its safety.   The strategy proposed in this paper is not a completely new concept. Despite certain defects, former President Kim Dae-jung’s ”Sunshine Policy” and President Lee Myung-bak’s ”Denuclearization-Openness-3,000 Initiative” both aim for internal change in North Korea and simultaneous support from the international community. The discussions on the Korean Peninsula’s peace system during the Six-Party Talks follow the same context, aiming to shape North Korea’s strategy by changing the security environment of the Peninsula. However with the absence of mutual trust, such an approach is bound to take on a limited form, and a more fundamental strategy that satisfies both sides is required.   Advocating both guaranteeing the system and the giving up nuclear weapons may seem reckless and unrealistic, but the current environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula is actually quite favorable for resolving the North Korean issue. This situation becomes clearer if we understand that North Korea is facing a three-fold problem of nuclear weapons, economic crisis, and the succession of its leader. It also requires a fundamental reform in all other sectors, including politics, international relations, the economy, and the socio-cultural realm (Chun 2009). In order to achieve fundamental reform, the military-first policy must be abandoned and a new strategy needs to be devised. But given North Korea’s political situation, unless change in the political structure comes first, there is a very low chance that nuclear weapons will be given up and economic reforms will be carried out. In this context, a coevolution strategy aims to make North Korea decide its strategy regarding nuclear weapons and economic reforms during its process of achieving a stable succession. Such a strategy aims for an eventual shift from a “military-first policy” to an “economy-first policy.”   Coevolution strategy in the military sector aims to resolve the problem of “‘excess security” and excess caused by the military-first policy, the essence of which is giving up nuclear weapons. Just as in other sectors, it is composed of three stages. The first stage consists of North Korea declaring the shutdown of its nuclear weapons program in the process of the succession while the international community ensures external and internal security. The second stage is North Korea actually carrying out what it has promised and shaking off the security dilemma by moving from a “military-first policy” to an “economy-first policy.” The final stage results in the reduction of armaments of both South and North Korea, the latter participating in East Asian multilateral security cooperation after having adopted an entirely new approach to becoming a strong and prosperous state.   II. Understanding and Evaluating Military Strategy in the Military-First Era   1. Military Strategy in the Military-First Era   Kim Jong-il’s military-first policy can be interpreted as having succeeded and developed Kim Il-sung’s idea of prioritizing the military and applying this to national strategy during the era of armed struggle (Kang 2002, 17). Kim Jong-il said that “safeguarding and persisting in our socialism and completing the great achievement of revolution by using force is our Party’s unwavering will and conviction.” He added that he was not willing to pursue any changes, emphasizing that he had “reached a firm decision to overcome any hardship by relying on the strength of the gun.” (Jeon 2004, 15-16) However, it is said that Kim Jong-il’s policy is different from Kim Il-sung’s strategy to a certain extent, because there was formerly no party, state, or formal military during the process of nation-building and Kim Il-sung was mostly dependent on the proletariat class when conducting warfare against the Japanese. On the other hand, in a situation in which both a party and a state exist, Kim Jong-il’s military-first strategy insists on relying on strong military power represented by the North Korean People’s Army to protect socialism and face the international community’s hostile policies (Jeon 2004, 16-17).   This aspect is made evident in the “military before labor (先軍後勞)” terminology emphasized by the“military-first policy.” It is based on the notion that in the fulfillment of socialism the proletariat force can carry out its role only with the support of strong military power because even the proletariat force, which is the spearhead of the struggle for socialism, cannot escape the fate of getting enslaved if there is no strong military (Kang 2002, 22-30). Thus this perspective places more importance on the revolutionary spirit of the military rather than on that of the proletariat class, and regards the military not as a means but as the leading force of politics. This reflects how, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of socialism, North Korea’s internal and external security dilemma has intensified and the proportion that the military sector takes in national strategy has increased accordingly.   In the end, there are two types of military-first policies: the “political strategy placing the military as the top priority of national affairs” and the “political strategy having the military as the core and main force.” (Jeon 2004, 19; Kang 2002, 19-22; Eom and Yun 2006, 150-151) In the perspective of military strategy, the former is for foreign security and the latter for internal stability of the regime.   (1) Military Strategy of the Military-First Era Aiming for External Security   North Korea claims that military-first policy is the “political strategy placing the military as the top priority in national affairs.” (Jeon 2004, 20-26) Because, it says, the international community, including the United, States, is menacing its right to exist, it is inevitable that the North Korean military sector be treated as of the utmost importance in order to be able to defend the state’s other duties in areas such as politics, economics, and culture. The existing traditional socialist theory was perceived to be based on a materialist view of history aiming to construct socialism with improvements in the economic sector such as in production, followed by the strengthening of the military sector. In other words, the military was thought to be reliant on the economic sector. North Korea asserts that a military-first policy works based on creative principles that differ from traditional socialist theory because it proposes first and foremost the strengthening of the military based on juche ideology (Jeon 2004, 21-23).   Because the military is perceived as the most important factor, the military-first policy devotes itself primarily to strengthening national defense. For this purpose, it is especially important to focus on developing the industrial sector of national defense because it is essential for establishing a defense system entirely for the people and the state, which would thus increase national defense capabilities. In addition North Korea emphasizes that unlike imperialism and an arms race, this type of politics aims to contain war and attain peace, and not to threaten the other states. Its goal is to become an invincible military power that is able to secure the state’s and nation’s rights to life and sovereignty, and guarantee the construction of a strong and prosperous state (Eom and Yun 2006, 156-167)...(Continued)