The Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute invited Mr. Tanaka Hitoshi for the Smart Q&A where he answered the series of questions on North Korean nuclear issue, the Six-Party Talks, and the Comprehensive Settlement. Mr. Tanaka was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan until August 2005, and now he serves as Chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd. and Senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange.   Smart Q&A is an interview with the presenter of the Smart Talk, a seminar of the East Asia Institute providing opportunities for leading scholars in Korea to meet and engage with prominent figures from around the world. By posing more specific, focused, and policy-oriented questions, Smart Q&A will facilitate a deeper understanding of the issues at hand and generate creative ideas and strategies for dealing with them.   Interviewee Mr. Tanaka Hitoshi (Chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd. / Senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange)   Questions 1. Firstly, we would like to ask how you would evaluate the current situation regarding the North Korean nuclear crisis and the Six-Party Talks.   a) Please give us a brief outline of your concept ‘comprehensive settlement.’   2. You have commented that a two-step approach involving informal bilateral talks before the resumption of the Six-Party Talks is necessary. Yet, the stance of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan cannot be synchronized perfectly, and may cause confusion and even a conflict of interest. In the worst case scenario, these informal talks could jeopardize further negotiations with North Korea. What do you think is the solution for this problem?   a) When the credibility of North Korea has been totally lost, as you pointed out in your article, can we still sit with them at the negotiation table?   b) In conducting informal bilateral talks with North Korea, cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan is vital, particularly on the issue of denuclearization vs nonproliferation. Do you think it is possible to find a common ground among the three?   c) For North Korea, nuclear weapons are indispensable for its survival and are not a card for negotiation. Against this backdrop, how is a breakthrough regarding the four related key elements achieved through the informal bilateral talks?   3. There is no doubt that China’s role in comprehensive settlement is significant. But we also need incentives for China so it can engage more actively in the settlement with North Korea. What strategic measures would you suggest to reel in China?   4. The challenge North Korea poses to the international community is derived from its domestic regime. What are your thoughts on the international efforts to bring changes not just in North Korea’s nuclear strategy but also in its regime or political DNA?

■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   [Editor's Note] North and South Korea had the same traditional culture before they were separated. After their division, each had developed its own culture stemming from the shared tradition. One example of divided cultural elements is “mass games” or “mass gymnastics”, which have similar characteristics but different meanings. In South Korea, mass games had been mainly held during the authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, North Korea still propagates its self-reliance ideology and regime and educates the public through mass gymnastics. Mass gymnastics are composed of various forms of art and sport, and are susceptible to political changes. Both performances were based on collectivism and a strong authoritarian system; one had almost disappeared with such a system, whereas the other continued and evolved into political events. Yet, the author suggests a possibility of change in North Korea’s mass gymnastics if the country undergoes marketization and regime change.     1. A Single Yet Different Culture   While it is possible to say that the cultures of North and South Korea are similar, the two countries have also established independent cultural systems after being separated for a long time. It is appropriate to say the cultures of the two Koreas are a single yet different culture. Cultural differences are often viewed as obstacles to overcome, and each country pursues efforts to homogenize the two cultures by denying or attempting to change the other culture. The two Koreas should acknowledge the cultural achievements of both South and North developed after being divided, while cherishing the common traditional cultural elements. A detailed understanding of the similarities and differences of North and South Korean cultures is needed to achieve a divided yet all-encompassing Korean culture. This paper focuses on the differences and similarities in how the two Koreas understand the concept of cultural elements. There are concepts that have different meanings (the signified) despite being called by the same expression (the signifier) and vice versa. This paper aims to examine the latter by looking through the scope of the concept of “mass games” in South Korea and “mass gymnastics” in North Korea.   2. Mass games in South Korea   Mass games were performed from the 1950s despite being introduced in South Korea during the Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). The first mass game was performed in the 34th Korean National Sports Festival in 1953, and the popularity of mass games peaked during the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Although this foreign word was mispronounced as “[ma:s] games” until the 1980s, the standard form is “[mæs] games.” In the Korean dictionary, it is defined as “free gymnastics or dance routines performed by a large group of people as one, usually at celebration ceremonies or the opening and closing ceremony of athletic meets.”   The characteristics of South Korean mass games are as follows:   1. They are often performed at athletic events.   2. Most mass games, excluding those held at the military, company, and religious events, are usually performed by students.   3. Although mass games are a combination of exercise and dance, there is a tendency to emphasize it as an exercise, as mass games are typically held as a part of athletic events.   In South Korea, mass games were introduced during the Japanese colonial period. They were actively performed after the Korean Peninsula was divided, but are being held less and less often. The mass games quickly became rare after South Korea’s democratization and the influx of individualist culture.   3. Mass Gymnastics in North Korea   Deep-rooted ideology, artistry, and sophisticated physical techniques are combined in North Korea’s mass gymnastics. Comprehensive physical arts, gymnastics, and dance movements comprise the basis of North Korea’s mass gymnastics. By closely intertwining music, art, and various art forms into mass gymnastics, the participants create grand and beautiful images through card stunts, reflecting North Korea’s Juche, or self-reliance ideology.   The detailed characteristics of North Korean mass gymnastics are as follows:   1. The aesthetics of mass gymnastics are in line with Juche realism and focus on the propaganda of their Great Leader.   2. The genre of mass gymnastics is comprehensive sport by combining mass gymnastics and art in the forms of dance and music   3. Mass gymnastics are comprised of a background (card stunt) team and a gymnast team.   4. As a means of educating the public, it contributes to strengthening the regime and has a strong ideological features.   5. The form and content of mass gymnastics continue to evolve, such as its original meaning of a mass gymnastic performance have been complemented with background team and music, completing the three elements of North Korean mass gymnastics: a gymnast team, a background team, and music.   6. North Korean mass gymnastics are easily influenced by changes in not only the political environment but also social changes or changes in the international environment.   4. Mass gymnastics and mass games are alike but different   North Korean mass gymnastics and South Korean mass games came to be called differently due to the differences in linguistic environment after the division of Korea, but they signify a similar concept. There are similarities and differences between mass gymnastics and mass games from the perspective of changing concept. Mass games and mass gymnastics were often performed in both North and South Korea because both Koreas established and maintained a strong authoritarian system. However, the changes in the concept of mass gymnastics in North Korea are especially noticeable. In North Korea, mass gymnastics transformed from a mere athletic event to one that has political meaning and changed its name in 2000 to “Grand Mass Gymnastics and Artistic Performance.” In contrast, as mass games are rarely performed in South Korea, there is a high possibility that the notion will disappear. It is difficult for mass games, based on collectivism, to be performed on an individual or group level in South Korea, which has gone through many social changes from democratization, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and other events.   Although it is not to the extent of South Korea, North Korea is also experiencing marketization and changes in its regime. As individualism and materialism spread, it may be challenging to maintain the traditional form of mass gymnastics. The significance of mass games and mass gymnastics, which were often performed during the initial stage of the nation-building or under a strong authoritarian system, has shrunk or is changing due to democratization in South Korea and regime changes in North Korea.■     ■ Woo-young Lee is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Sociology at Yonsei University and served as an assistant professor at the Graduate School of North Korean Studies at Kyungnam University. He is also an advisor to the Unification Research Group in the National Assembly of South Korea. Prof. Lee has researched on concrete cases of social and cultural exchanges between South and North Korea, including the issues raised during the exchange process and the effects of exchanges. He wrote the parts on group gymnastics and mass games of History of Conceptual Division on the Korean Peninsula consisting of 6 volumes.     ■ Typeset by Yewon HongResearch Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) | [email protected]  

■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   [Editor's Note] Western-style circus performances were first introduced to Korea by Japan. The circus enjoyed its popularity in South Korea until the proliferation of mass media. The short history of circus in South Korea has been buried in oblivion, as it was not included as part of the governmental effort to preserve traditional culture during 1980s. In this special report, Young Sun Jeon, HK Research Professor at the Institute of Humanities for Unification in Konkuk University, claims that the art of circus took a different path in North Korea. The circus was renamed as Kyo-ye and was legitimized by the state as propaganda art and the rightful heir of Korean traditional culture. The author elaborates on how North Korea cunningly uses the art of Kyo-ye and its appreciation of human bodies as part of their ideologies, while condemning its Western counterpart as a frivolous capitalist pursuits.     The Introduction and Division of Circus on the Korean Peninsula   The Western-style modern circus was introduced to the Korean Peninsula through Japan, after which it grew in popularity and became a part of popular culture. However, after the Korean Peninsula was divided, the circus took different paths in the South and North Korea.   In South Korea, circuses were widely popular until the 1960s; however, after the spread of television in the 1980s, the circus lost its popularity. It was subsequently not recognized as a part of traditional culture. The circus bands, which had travelled the country to maintain their slender existence, were quickly pushed out of the public eye.   In contrast, in North Korea, the circus has been recognized as an art form enjoyed by the people. In North Korea, circus was renamed as Kyo-ye. Kyo-ye is an abbreviation for Ki-Kyo-Ye-Sul, which means technical art. The name was changed to show that it is a true art form. North Korea sees the Western circuses as capitalists’ pursuit of curious and stimulating content. On the other hand, Kyo-ye aims to present the beauty of the healthy human body. North Korea argues that when people see a trained body, it inspires them to gain physical strength.   In North Korea, there is a separate specialized curriculum for the circus. Pyongyang Circus School selects talented children and teaches them professionally, and circus performers are highly esteemed by society. There is also the Pyongyang Circus Theater, which is used as a dedicated theater by the National Academy of Arts and Sciences. The theater is capable of showing circus performances in the air, on land, in water, and on ice. There are also professions such as circus critics, directors, and producers. Moreover, there are amateur circus or magic performance groups within factories or corporations that engage in circus acts as a sociocultural activity.   South Korea: Circus, the lost traveling performance   In South Korea, the circus was called “circus,” “performing arts,” or “equestrian feats.” It was a kind of traveling performance that presented magic tricks and animals. When circuses were at the peak of their popularity, circus groups gave not only traditional performances but also sang, told stories, and presented comedic gags. Among various programs, the major entertainment they offered was their emulation of Western-style circus acts. Their initial popularity declined as time went by and mass media began to emerge. The public interest moved from circuses to dramas as radio shows and television become widespread. The government began preserving traditional culture after the 1960s, but the circus was not recognized as a cultural asset that should be protected by the law. Without the government’s protection and support, the circus quickly lost its popularity and became obsolete as other forms of popular culture flourished.   North Korea: Kyo-ye, the representative performing art   On the other hand, North Korea claims that Kyo-ye stemmed from the long history of its people. Unlike the circus which is a performing art introduced from the West, Kyo-ye is acknowledged as a true art form that has originated from its unique traditional art. As it was called “Kyo-ye” instead of “circus,” it became a traditional art that the people enjoyed, and was absorbed into North Korea’s cultural policy that states that Kyo-ye is a modern inheritor of folk art.   Kyo-ye is largely divided into three categories. The first is physical Kyo-ye, which requires physical strength. The second is magic shows which are different from the Western versions that typically show people being stabbed in the head and cut with saws. According to North Koreans, Western magic shows cater to the tastes of the upper class to please them, whereas North Korean magic shows are based on science and use craftsmanship and apparatuses to stimulate the imagination of spectators. The last category is entr’acte, which are short acts usually given while stage settings are being changed. The acts call the audience onto the stage and are comedic.   Kyo-ye could be acknowledged as an art and develop in North Korea on account of it being a physical activity. Kyo-ye is an art that requires performers to use their bodies. Kyo-ye is an art where stamina and physical training are essential while also closely related to art to create an artful physical activity that encompasses various artistic components such as form, rhythm, and nimbleness. Through physical activity, Kyo-ye reflects the experiences, emotions, and tendencies of people to fulfill its role as social culture. In other words, it teaches people to train their bodies and become interested in becoming healthier by improving their physical strength.   In North Korea where Kyo-ye is acknowledged as a traditional art form, there are circus acts specially called “national Kyo-ye or technical art” that use the traditional games of the Korean people. There are acts where performers stand, spin, or shoot arrows from atop a running horse. North Korea claims these acts originate from the traditional games of the ancient Goguryeo Kingdom (B.C. 37 – A.D. 668) called “Masangjae,” or equestrian acrobatics. There are also acts that use neolttwigi, which is a Korean jumping game, or geunettwigi, which is a Korean swing. Performers wear traditional outfits during folk art performances to emphasize that the games are traditional. North Korea propagates that it is thanks to the Great Leader that the traditional games could be developed into and performed as circus acts. According to North Korea, it is because of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il that the traditional games, which are a part of national culture that almost disappeared during the Japanese colonial rule, could be proudly developed into its culture.   Kyo-ye is also important in North Korea because it is used for foreign exchange and to improve North Korea’s national prestige. North Korea has always actively pursued foreign exchange through culture since the beginning of its regime. Kyo-ye is an important means of diplomatic exchange with not only socialist states but also nonaligned nations. Kyo-ye is a nonverbal performance that only uses the body. Unlike music, opera, and other art forms used in North Korea, Kyo-ye has fewer elements that can be considered ideological, making it suitable to be used to interact with various countries, including socialist states. In fact, in June 2000, shortly before the first inter-Korean summit, North Korea’s Pyongyang Circus Troupe performed in Seoul, and North Korean circus performances were included in the Mount Geumgang tourism program.   Kyo-ye plays a big role in enhancing North Korea’s status in the international community. There are few competitors when it comes to circuses. North Korea’s Kyo-ye is able to maintain its world-class position not only because North Korea systematically trains performers and has facilities where performances can be held but also because there are not many countries that support circuses on a national level. The Rodong Shinmun and other North Korean media outlets never fail to report when North Korean performers are successful in circus championships.■     ■ Young Sun Jeon is HK Research Professor at the Institute of Humanities for Unification in Konkuk University. His main research areas include North Korean literature, culture and daily lives of North Korean people.     ■ Typeset by Yewon Hong Research Associate    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 206) | [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note In an effort to illustrate the bifurcation of "peace" on the Korean Peninsula, Young-sun Ha analyzes the evolution of reunification discourses following the Korean War. In particular, his paper focuses on the three concepts--"reunification through war", "reunification through revolution" and "peaceful reunification"—that emphasize differences in the two Koreas’ respective interpretations of peace. Such conceptual bifurcation, accompanied by existing political and economic differences, makes it increasingly more difficult for the two Koreas to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula.     Quotes from the paper  The Korean War and the Concept of Peace After separate governments were established in the North and the South in 1948, North Korea chose reunification through war as its primary principle, complemented by reunification through revolution with peaceful reunification as the facade.   National Modernization and the Concept of Peace In spite of domestic and international difficulties, North Korea quickly finished postwar reconstruction under the Three-Year Plan for Economic Revival (1954-1956) and the First Five-Year Plan for Economic Development (1957-1961). In the 1960s, the Soviets and the Chinese withdrew their support for reunification through war. In the meantime, South Korea remained politically unstable, and was enduring greater difficulty recovering from the war than North Korea. Accordingly, North Korea began to emphasize reunification through revolution over reunification through war. Kim Il Sung called for reunification through strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities in February 1964. South Korea’s approach of "first construction, next reunification" and the North’s strategy of "strengthen the three revolutionary capabilities" competed against one another. But in 1968, the inter-Korean relationship sharply deteriorated owing to a series of incidents including the Blue House Raid (January 21), the USS Pueblo Incident (January 23), and the Uljin-Samcheok Landing (October 23). After this, the South Korean government switched to a strategy of "parallel advancement of defense and construction".   Détente and the July 4 Joint Statement While Park Chung-hee was pursuing a three-fold survival strategy that included an improved relationship with North Korea, Kim Il Sung sought reunification through a strengthening of the three revolutionary capabilities. Although the two Koreas shook hands, they did so with totally different perspectives and inner hostility towards one another. As a result, the handshake did not lead to a hug but rather regressed to a state of confrontation.   The Post-Cold War Era and the Concept of Peace The arms reduction proposals by North and South Korea have some commonalities but are structurally in conflict, with discrepancies arising from their totally different approaches to "peace" in Korea. On the one hand, South Korea has pointed out that a relaxation of military tensions on the Peninsula is practically impossible as long as the North, based on the lasting ideology of the national liberation and people’s democratic revolution formed in the 1960s, 1) urges withdrawal of the USFK, 2) denies the legitimacy of the South Korean regime and seeks to instigate communist revolutions in the South, and 3) still displays the potential for a surprise attack. On the other hand, North Korea argues that the main obstacles to the relaxation of military tensions are large-scale military exercises such as Team Spirit as well as the presence of US forces and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the South, which must be removed first and foremost to achieve the peaceful reunification of Korea.   Conclusion  Modern concepts of "peace" in South and North Korea have developed in a bifurcated fashion throughout four phases: the Korean War (1950s), national modernization (1960s), the détente (1970s), and the post-Cold War era (1990s). Within the divided Peninsula, the concept of "peace" has been intricately entwined with the three options of reunification through war, reunification through revolution, and peaceful reunification, and has over time come to have totally different meanings in the North and the South. [To] achieve a true resolution to the Korean peace problem in the 21st century, sociopolitical forces inside and outside the Korean Peninsula must exert co-evolutionary efforts to develop and practice a new, shared concept of "peace".     Author’s Biography Young-Sun Ha is Chairman of the Board of Trustees at the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha serves as a member of senior advisory group for the inter-Korean summit talks preparation committee(2018-). He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington. His recent books and edited volumes include: U.S.-China Competition in the Architecture of a Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific (2017), International Politics of Tributary Envoys: The Analysis of Cho’chonnok and Yonhaengnok 16C-19C (2016), and Korean Peninsula among Big Powers 1972 vs 2014 (2015).    

Abstract   The purpose of this research paper is to evaluate the desirability and feasibility of the re-deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea as an additional effective option to deter a North Korean nuclear attack on South Korea. The necessity of discussing this option has increased since North Korea succeeded in developing ICBMs and a hydrogen bomb. Many South Koreans, including the largest opposition party, the Liberty Korea Party, demand re-deployment out of fear of a North Korean miscalculation. The U.S. Trump Administration has begun to review this option in the wake of North Korea’s hydrogen bomb test in September 2017.   We need to admit that the U.S. may need to make difficult decisions regarding the execution of its extended deterrence promise to South Korea, because North Korea is rapidly becoming capable of credibly threatening to attack cities in the U.S. mainland with hydrogen bomb missiles. In this sense, South Korea and the U.S. may need to seriously consider the re-deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to prevent a possible North Korean attack. The re-deployment could strengthen the ROK-U.S. combined deterrence posture, correct the nuclear imbalance with North Korea, expedite de-nuclearization negotiations with North Korea, and dissuade South Koreans from making their own nuclear weapons. Although there are a few risks surrounding deployment, the rapid strengthening of North Korean nuclear threat may not allow South Korea and the U.S. to worry about them.   Considering the potential for anti-U.S. movements in South Korea and South Korea’s proximity to North Korea, we may need to expand the scope of nuclear sharing from between South Korea and the U.S. to include Japan. It would be easier and safer for the U.S. to deploy its nuclear weapons to Japan than South Korea. South Korea could enjoy similar deterrent effects if nuclear weapons were deployed to Japan. South Korea, the U.S. and Japan could strengthen their NCND policy on the locations of the nuclear weapons to maximize the deterrent effect and minimize opposition.   Quotes from the Paper   “Despite intensive and continuous international diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons, the prospect of denuclearizing North Korea is growing dimmer. Now is the time for South Korea and the international community to discuss more effective options for protecting the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, the United States (U.S.), and the world as a whole from a North Korean nuclear attack.”   “A comparison of the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear threat to South Korean preparedness reveals that South Korea’s ability to protect its populace is very limited. The country depends on U.S. extended deterrence, but there is no guarantee that this extended deterrence will be executed in the event of a real attack.”   “The gravity of the North Korean nuclear threat should compel South Korea to employ all possible options regardless of the downsides. Among these options, the re-deployment of U.S. tactical weapons to South Korea stands out.”   “South Korea in particular faces a serious security threat from North Korea’s nuclear weapons. It does not have any reliable deterrence or defense preparedness for a nuclear war except for the U.S. extended deterrence…South Korea should come up with more effective measures than now to ensure the reliability of U.S. extended deterrence. In this sense, South Korea may need to ask the U.S. to re-deploy tactical nuclear weapons, and the U.S. should seriously consider the request.”         Author Doctor Park Hwee-rhak is Dean of the Graduate School of Politics and Leadership at Kookmin University, Seoul and has been teaching on Nuclear Strategy, Contemporary Military Issues and Defense Reform. He has written several articles on the North Korean nuclear and missile threat, defense reform, contemporary war-fighting concepts, and other military issues. He graduated from the South Korea Military Academy in 1978 and retired as Colonel in 2009. He earned his Masters of International Relations at Yonsei University in 1983, and acquired a second Master’s Degree at the U.S. National War College in 1999. He achieved a PhD in Political Science at Kyunggi University, Seoul, South Korea, in 2008. He has published several professional books in Korean including The North Korean Nuclear Threat and National Security (2016); Conditions for South Korean Defense in the Era of the North Korean Nuclear Threat (2014); South Korean Defense Posture against the North Korean Nuclear Threat (2013); Peace and National Defense (2012), and others. He has also written more than eighty articles during the last ten years in registered journals to the National Research Foundation of Korea on nuclear issues and military affairs including the following English articles: “South Korean Preparedness for the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Few Steps Behind,” The Korean Journal of Security Affairs, Vol . 29, No. 2 (2017); “The Expectation and Reality Gap in South Korea’s Relations with China,” Asian International Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2017); “An Analysis and Lessons on South Korea’s Attempt and Postponement of the OPCON Transition from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command,” The Korean Journal of Security Affairs, Vol . 27. No.3 (2015); “South Korea’s Defense Posture against the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Dangerous Reluctance,” International Studies Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (June 2015); “Time to Balance Deterrence, Offense, and Defense? Rethinking South Korea's Strategy against the North Korean Nuclear Threat,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 2012), etc.      

Abstract   China’s Sino-centrism and expansionism, the U.S. America First policy, Russia’s Neo-Eastern policy and North Korea’s incessant adventurism pose ongoing security challenges to the Northeast Asian region. Within this turbulent global and regional strategic environment, ROK-Japan security cooperation is essential to the stability and peace in the Western Pacific, the Korean Peninsula, and the world as a whole. But there is still an onslaught of issues complicating security cooperation between the two countries, including historical legacies such as the comfort women issue, territorial disputes, mutual distrust, ambivalent national interests, and distorted political and social relations. Despite these difficulties, ROK-Japan can improve military-military cooperation by the professionalism of each national defense. This paper aims to examine the current realities of security and military cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan in the ever-changing turbulent strategic environment of the 21st century. It also works to explore potential strategies and policies so as to enhance cooperative security relations between the two countries.       Quotes from the Paper   “It is imperative for Japan and the ROK to jointly face the North Korean threats of nuclear tests and missile launches, the possible sudden collapse of North Korea, reunification, the East and South China Sea disputes, the Taiwan Strait, cyber security, terrorism, natural disasters, and others.”   “We, both sides, have our challenges in improving and bolstering security cooperation between our two countries, and it will likely take time. However, in reality, we may be nearly out of time, and therefore we should make better security cooperation a priority. The authors believe that the ROK and Japan can improve military-military cooperation with the professionalism of the national defense sector of each country.”   “We recommend ongoing security cooperation ranging from high-level defense cooperation to lower-level military exchanges be established and institutionalized so as to be shielded from the political situation…In particular, political and social relations between Japan and Korea should not impact military security cooperation and exchanges. The effectiveness of such cooperation should be periodically reviewed and re-evaluated so that areas for improvement can be identified and cooperation deepened.”             Author Dr. Chung is Adjunct Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland. Dr. Chung graduated from the Korea Military Academy. He also received Master in Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College. He taught international security at the Korea National Defense University and the Catholic University of Korea. Dr. Chung was a policy practitioner at the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Forces Command as well as troop commander along the Demilitarized Zone, and a Policy Advisor for the National Security Council and the Ministry of National Defense. He published Security Challenge and Determination toward a Unified Korea (2017), Korean Centripetal Foreign and Security Policy (2014) and “Realities and Strategies in Managing North Korea’s Nuclear Challenge,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol.2, No.4 (Winter 2016). Areas of his research are ROK-U.S. military relations, North Korea military strategy, multilateral security and conflict management.     Lt Gen (Ret.) Izumi is Independent Scholar in Japan. He received his Master in National and International Security in National War College/the U.S. National Defense University. He graduated from Japan National Defense Academy. He also graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the same year of Dr. Chung. After his having retired from the service, he was once an advisor of TOYOTA Motor Corporation. Lt Gen (Ret.) Izumi was Vice Chief of Japan Joint Staff and Director of J3 Operations/Joint Staff as well as Field Army, Division and troop commanders all over Japan, and a supporting officer in Japan’s Embassy in Cambodia for Japan’s Engineer Contingent and UNMOs of UNTAC, which is Japan’s first UN PKO deployment. He presented his paper entitled “In searching of Building a North-South Korean Community through security and economic linkage strategy and international cooperation from Japanese perspective” at the international seminar (Oct. 2013). He has also proactively participated in finalizing Power Politics and Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula: Reflections and Architecture as Dr. Chung’s co-author in the one and half year. Areas of his research are Japan-U.S. defense relations, international defense strategy, multilateral security and conflict management.  

Abstract   With the year 2014 marking the 70th anniversary of Korean Independence and the division of Korea, a plethora of socio-economic and political discourses on the unification of the two Koreas have been on the table. Water issues are among the imminent issues to be dealt with on the path to unification of the Korean Peninsula. Shared water resources are a potential source of conflict between the two Koreas and their neighboring countries, China and Russia. Therefore, it is timely to delve into the myriad of issues involved in water resources management in preparation for unification. This paper aims to analyze the challenges and opportunities for water resources management of the shared rivers between South and North Korea, namely the Imjin and the North Han Rivers, and the rivers that will become transboundary after unification, such as the Yalu and the Tumen Rivers.   Quotes from the Paper   “The relationship between the two Korean governments regarding the Imjin River and the North Han River has been bumpy, and it seems unlikely that there will be close cooperation between them in the future without significant changes to the status quo. The incident on the Imjin River in 2009 indicates the typical behavior of an uncooperative upstream country (North Korea).”   “Cooperation on the shared rivers has been highly susceptible to the political atmosphere between the two Koreas over the last several decades, and mistrust between the parties still prevails. More time and patience will be required for the two Koreas to return to the negotiating table and discuss important issues that impact the local population that lives along the border areas.”   “The reunification of the two Koreas may come in the future. In the course of socio-economic and political transformation, the unified government of Korea should ensure equal access to clean water and proper sanitation services alongside adequate water-related disaster prevention…At the international level, unified Korea should encourage trust building with its neighboring countries, especially China, Japan, Russia, and Mongolia.”           AuthorSeungho Lee is Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University, Seoul, Korea. Professor Lee previously worked as Lecturer (Assistant Professor) for the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Nottingham (2004-2008) after completing his postdoctoral research at the Korea Institute of Construction Technology (KICT). As specialist in water policy with reference to China, Korea and Europe, Professor Lee has published a number of research and working papers on water issues of China, Korea, and Europe, both in English and Korean. His research interests are transboundary water management, private sector participation in the water sector, water policy, and water governance. His major publications include ‘Benefit sharing in the Mekong River Basin,’ Water International (2015), ‘Wastewater Treatment Transfer-Operate-Transfer Project in China,’ KSCE Journal of Civil Engineering (2015), and ‘Development of Public Private Partnership Projects in the Chinese Water Sector,’ Water Resources Management (2010). He is the author of book, Water and Development in China (New Jersey, World Scientific, 2006). Professor Lee holds BA Asian History from Korea University, MA Chinese Area Studies and MA Environment and Development from SOAS, University of London. He completed his PhD in Geography from SOAS, University of London focusing on China’s Water Policy.        

    Abstract   The following is a summary of a report (which can be found here) published on February 26, 2016 by EAI in Korean entitled “New Solutions for the DPRK Nuclear Crisis.” The report was a product of a roundtable discussion on “North Korea Policy after the Fourth Nuclear Test” hosted by Dr. Young-Sun Ha (EAI) and Dr. Chaesung Chun (EAI & Seoul National University). The following experts attended the roundtable and contributed to this report: Dr. Byung-Yeon Kim (Seoul National University), Mr. Sung-lac Wi (Seoul National University), and Dr. Hee Ok Lee (Sungkyunkwan University).     Introduction  On January 6, 2016, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) carried out its fourth nuclear test. The DPRK has continued to develop its nuclear and missile technology in the face of sanctions and criticism from the international community. Furthermore, the possibility of the DPRK developing a hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has taken the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula to a whole new level.   In light of DPRK's increasingly threatening behavior, an investigation into why past sanction regimes have been ineffective is necessary to devise new policies. In that process, however, one must also keep in mind that the situation is much more complex now – any simple approach toward sanctions or engagement will not suffice if we are to prevent another turn in the vicious cycle of DPRK's nuclear and missile provocations.   This task is not an easy one, but we believe such new policies should at least be comprised of the following: making sanctions stronger and more efficient, a new security approach toward the DPRK without considering the nuclear option, developing a new diplomatic strategy for denuclearizing the DPRK along with a long-term engagement plan for peace on the Korean Peninsula, and devising a catalyst which can lead to the DPRK’s self-denuclearization as well as normalization through economic development.     Making Sanctions Stronger and More Efficient   Cooperation among the countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula is a requisite condition for the sanctions against the DPRK to be efficient. To do so, China’s role has been and will continue to be important.   Here, the Republic of Korea (ROK) must do all it can to keep issues related to the Korean Peninsula, including the denuclearization of the DPRK, from becoming linked to the strategic competition between China and the U.S. A key here is to clearly show China that ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation is not a threat. The ROK also needs to make it clear that it seeks peaceful coexistence with a non-nuclear DPRK and that it wants to pursue gradual and peaceful unification.   Accordingly, preventing a spark from igniting in U.S.-China relations over the Korean Peninsula is critical. In order to do this, it is necessary to continue improving relations and building trust with China. A China that shares aligned interests with the ROK pertaining to the denuclearization of the DPRK and actively participates in the sanctions against the DPRK is going to be the key to effectively implementing the new UN Security Council resolution.   Constructing a New Security Approach toward the DPRK   The ROK government should calmly respond to the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons by considering longer term alternatives. Independently developing nuclear weapons is ineffective and unrealistic, and redeploying American tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula is not feasible.   Rather, the ROK must quickly build up its deterrence and defense systems, and work to strengthen its missile defense systems and extended deterrence in cooperation with the U.S. Without running the risk of causing further instability in the region, the ROK government should ramp up its non-nuclear efforts to discourage the DPRK from developing nuclear weapons, eventually leading the Kim Jong Un regime to seek a new alternative.   At the same time, the ROK must actively strengthen its cooperation with the U.S. regarding extended deterrence. In order to respond quickly and effectively to the DPRK’s rapidly increasing nuclear threat, defense spending must guarantee such efforts are completed faster than previously scheduled.     Developing a New Diplomatic Strategy toward the DPRK  The DPRK has continued to repeat its demand for concluding a peace treaty with the U.S. since the early years of the nuclear crisis, and as the cycle of the nuclear crisis continues to roll on, there have been calls for such a peace treaty. On February 17th, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi suggested pursuing a parallel track approach of simultaneously realizing denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and negotiating a peace treaty. In order to deal with the instability on the Korean Peninsula that has been caused by the nuclear crisis, a shift to a new diplomatic strategy is needed.   The ROK government’s new policy design should not only include a demand for sincere DPRK denuclearization, but also a guarantee for the survival of the DPRK regime if it denuclearizes, trust building measures in security affairs, and finally guidelines for arms control. This kind of policy can clearly expresses to the DPRK that there is no desire to see it collapse but rather the ROK seeks to coexist with a non-nuclear DPRK. In doing so, the ROK will need to gain China's trust on its policy toward the DPRK, and subsequently utilize the strategic cooperation between the U.S. and China during the process of negotiating a system of peace on the Korean Peninsula. That being said, effort must be made to prepare a framework for negotiating these issues as quickly as possible.     A Catalyst for Self-Denuclearization and Change  The ROK government must prepare a way for the DPRK to seek on its own a path for denuclearization. The DPRK’s byeongjin policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development is neither realistic nor desirable. Simply put, economic and nuclear weapons development are not complementary but rather contradictory.   In order to help the DPRK to realize this, the ROK and the international community must make a joint effort to encourage the DPRK to forgo the current byeongjin policy by showing how it is incurring significant security costs, and push the DPRK toward a new alternative that can be characterized by a new byeongjin policy of pursuing non-nuclear security and economic development.   Secondly, there needs to be active support for reform and opening up of a DPRK that makes strides in denuclearization. At first this will include humanitarian assistance and low levels of economic cooperation, but ultimately there will need to be a focus on the growth of the DPRK’s markets and the soft landing of its economic transition.     Policy Recommendations  1. Following the strengthening of sanctions which are a result of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests, the ROK government should clearly signal its intentions associated with its policies and make a strong effort to prepare a complete roadmap considering negotiations and engagement.A new complex solution comprised of making sanctions stronger and more efficient, constructing a new non-nuclear security approach toward the DPRK, developing a new diplomatic strategy for denuclearizing the DPRK, and devising a catalyst which can lead to the DPRK’s self-denuclearization should be prepared.   2. The ROK government should encourage China to participate in the implementation of the sanctions against the DPRK. Also, the ROK needs to understand China’s national interests and accept the need for strategic cooperation with China on issues related to the DPRK in the long run. The foreign policy goals of the ROK and China’s core national interests are not necessarily at odds with each other, and during strategic ROK-China dialogues it should be confirmed that they can actually harmoniously co-evolve together.   3. The ROK government should understand that developing its own nuclear weapons is costly and unrealistic. Conventional deterrence systems, without considering the nuclear option, should be pursued stronger. Given the increasing nuclear and missile threat of the DPRK, the ROK should conduct a complete review of its security systems.   4. Once sanctions against the DPRK take effect, the ROK should make it clear that the DPRK’s current approach towards a peace treaty with the U.S. is not realistic. At the same time, it would be important for the ROK to propose a new and convincing plan to all of the countries involved. This new ROK plan for peace should not only include a demand for sincere DPRK denuclearization, but also a guarantee for the DPRK regime’s survival if it denuclearizes, trust building measures in security affairs, and guidelines for arms control.   5. For the survival and prosperity of the DPRK in the twenty-first century, rather than the current byeongjin policy which incurs excessive security costs, the ROK and the international community should make a joint effort to propose a new byeongjin policy of pursuing non-nuclear security and economic development. The ROK needs to actively support reform and opening up of a DPRK that makes strides in denuclearization, and also prepare an appropriate sanctions regime which can ensure that the DPRK’s economic development does not translate into more nuclear weapons and missiles. The ROK should also control the direction and pace of improving relations. During this process, the ROK government should put forward a mid and long-term roadmap for co-evolution which will not only lead to the DPRK adopting the new byeongjin policy of non-nuclear security and economic development, but also seeks fundamental internal changes in the DPRK so that it becomes a more effective unification partner. ■           About the Authors    Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the board of trustees at EAI. He is also Professor Emeritus of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Currently, Dr. Ha is serving as chair of the Diplomacy & Security sub-committee at the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation.     Chaesung Chun is the Chairman of the Center for International Relations Studies at EAI. He is also a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun is currently serving as an expert member for the Diplomacy & Security sub-committee at the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation.     Byung-Yeon Kim is a professor in the Department of Economics at Seoul National University. He is also the Deputy Director of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, a university research institute. Dr. Kim is currently serving as an expert member for the Economics sub-committee at the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation.     Sung-lac Wi is a visiting professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Previously, Ambassador Wi served as a long time career diplomat in the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During his service, Ambassador Wi was Republic of Korea's chief negotiator at the Six-Party Talks, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security, and Ambassador to Russia.     Hee Ok Lee is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University. Dr. Lee is also the Director of Sungkyun Institute of China Studies and visiting professor at China's Capital Normal University, Jilin University, and Fudan University, among others.