Myung-Hae Choi received his Ph.D. in political science from Korea University, and is currently serving as a research fellow at the Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI).          Since the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 was unanimously adopted on March 7, North Korea has continued to increase tension on the Korean Peninsula with threats to “scrap” the armistice and cut off the South-North hot line. The EAI invited Myung-Hae Choi, research fellow at the Samsung Economic Research Institute, to assess the prospective plan and policy that China and South Korea will have to implement in response to Pyongyang’s recent provocations.   Q1: What are the strategic interests of Pyongyang and Beijing regarding the issue of nuclear tests and how do they differ?   A1: “The significant difference lies between the essence of North Korea’s and China’s diplomatic strategy: Nuclear diplomacy vs. Status quo plus. Thus, the North’s advancement in developing nuclear missiles will cause difficulty for China to devise its policy on the North.”   The North Korea-China relationship has always gone back and forth between friendliness and hostility. From 1964 to 1970 when the Sino-Soviet conflict escalated after the Cultural Revolution, Kim Il-Sung never visited China. Moreover, since the South Korea-China diplomatic relations were established in 1992, North Korea had cut all ties with China for almost seven years. Then starting from 2010, Kim Jong-Il paid a visit to China four times in two years, which showed off the strong bond between North Korea and China to the international community. Therefore, the importance lies not in the short-term behavioral pattern between the two countries but in the structural difference between the essence of the North Korean and Chinese national strategy.   The uncertainty in the future of the Korean Peninsula forces China to view issues of the North with a “crisis-managing” point of view. “Crisis-managing” does not simply mean preventing a war but finding the equilibrium point between maximizing “strategic gains” (i.e. maintaining Beijing’s monopolistic influence on the Korean Peninsula) and minimizing “strategic losses” (i.e. sudden collapse of the North Korean regime and unification through the absorption by the South, thus alienating Beijing). As a result, China pursues the “status quo plus” which gradually improves the situation on the Peninsula by maintaining peace and stability in the region while staying in a close relationship with both Seoul and Pyongyang. In order to do so, China pursues the “2(South-North Korea)+2(U.S.-China)” format in dealing with issues over the North Korean problem, with the intention of relaxing the tension on the Peninsula first and then searching for a long-term solution through the bilateral cooperation between the United States and China.   However, China’s “status quo plus” approach may yet reflect a strategic dilemma currently faced by China. China manifests its objective to resolve the North Korean problem insofar as to maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula, but at the same time, to not harm its own strategic and geopolitical interest in retaining its power over the region. Depending on the situation, therefore, Chinese policy on the Korean Peninsula may look ambiguous or even contradictory as China prioritizes “careful management” over the “final settlement” of the problem.   This ambiguous stance of China is well displayed in the issues regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons. During George W. Bush’s second administration, China assumed an active role as a “stakeholder” in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem, only to witness its status over the North Korean problem dramatically decline after North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006. During the negotiation process after the test, Pyongyang directly engaged with Washington, which made the negotiation format “2(North Korea-U.S.)+0,” and excluded China from the discussion. This caused China not to repeat the same mistake; when North Korea attempted its second nuclear test, China chose to maintain its balance over issues on the Peninsula. Although the process took nearly a year to restore the relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing after the first nuclear test, there was less time – four months – to recover bilateral relations after the second nuclear test with Wen Jiabao’s visit to North Korea. Since then, China has emphasized its role as a balancer over the North Korean issue. While it tries to enhance economic cooperation and diplomatic communication with Pyongyang under the banner of “traditional friendship,” Beijing reiterates the value of the Six-party Talk as an effective management system in the region.   For North Korea, however, China’s “status quo plus” format means containment policy towards North Korea. An ideal international political system for Pyongyang consists of heightening its geostrategic value between the United States and China while competing for influence in East Asia. North Korea has tried to disrupt Chinese efforts to establish multilateral arrangements (i.e. three, four, and six-party talks) since 1980, which signifies Pyongyang’s deep suspicion of China’s strategic intent. North Korea has preferred bilateral talks with the United States to multilateral containment based on the belief that establishing strategic relations with the United States through the bilateral talks better serves North Korea’s objectives. In addition, reliance on China has never been among North Korea’s strategic options. Rather, Pyongyang has repeated its “opportunistic” provocations in order to increase its strategic value among the great powers in the region or attempted to secure its independent leverage through developing nuclear weapons.   To boost its bargaining power with the United States, North Korea is likely to make a tremendous effort to develop ready-to-use nuclear weapons. North Korea’s ability to use nuclear weapons enables the North to overcome the unbalanced military power between the North and South, hence creating a ‘political and psychological safe zone’ for its survival. The best scenario for North Korea is to gain the recognition from the United States as a de facto nuclear power status. Thus, Pyongyang will seek to negotiate with Washington under the banner of “nuclear disarmament” rather than “denuclearization.” In order to achieve this, North Korea will try to negotiate with the United States by reducing the number of its long-range missiles; dispelling the U.S. concerns over nuclear proliferation; recognizing U.S. hegemony in Northeast Asia; and even suggesting that the North will join the efforts of the United States to balance China.   As North Korea expands its stance as a nuclear power state, China will have a harder time coining its strategic policy towards the North. China does have a number of various measures to impose sanctions against North Korea. But if China decides to impose such sanctions, not only will China’s influence on North Korea be significantly reduced, but China will also face difficult consequences of regime instability in the North or strains in North Korea-China relations. On the other hand, it is difficult for China to discuss the North Korean issues in terms of unification in the absence of shared vision among the concerned parties on the future of the Korean Peninsula. Strategic maneuverability of China as a “manager” of the Korean Peninsula problems will shrink dramatically if the vicious cycle of North Korea strengthening its nuclear capability, the United States, South Korea, and Japan imposing more strict sanctions against North Korea as a response, and North Korea attempting more serious provocations continues.   Q2: What is Xi Jinping’s call on China’s policy on North Korea?   A2: “Before any new policies are established, China’s new government takes into account the policies of the former administrations. The basic principle of separating the North Korean nuclear issue and other North Korean problems will be maintained under the new government. China will also use both sanctions and engagements towards the North to improve its bargaining power vis-à-vis the North and the United States.”   International community has high expectations for the Xi Administration’s new policy on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Chinese public has shown considerable changes in opinions regarding the North Korean issue. Majority of the Chinese public argue that China needs to take a tougher stance with North Korea rather than working as a mere mediator. Many believe that China should urge the North to ‘normalize’ itself by all means necessary. Some even raise voices that Beijing should help topple the Kim Jong-un regime by instigating pro-China factions in Pyongyang or supporting unification through the absorption by Seoul.   However, it is doubtful that those public opinions will lead to a new policy discussion. Rather, the degree of severity in China’s denunciation of the North’s nuclear tests has lessened. China’s official remark on the North’s first nuclear test was that the North has “outrageously and brazenly” (hanran, 悍然) carried out a nuclear test by itself. However, the condemning comments similar to those after the first nuclear test were nowhere to be found when the North carried out its third test. China first “firmly required” the North to comply with the international rule of law after the first and second nuclear tests, but later simply “urged” the North to comply after the third nuclear test. This clearly shows that the Chinese government’s official discourse does not fully reflect the changes in public opinions.   In China, the newly-designated government cooperates with the incumbent and decides future policy directions before a new administration comes into leadership in order to maintain the stability of its government following a leadership-shift. It is known that around July 2009, the fourth and fifth generation of Chinese leadership had met to decide on the future policy direction regarding North Korea. Therefore, regardless of Xi Jinping taking on Chinese leadership, the core essence of China’s policy on the North, which separates the North Korean nuclear issues from the rest of the North Korean problems, will remain mostly unchanged.   The basic principle of China’s North Korea policy is to maintain the long term goal of denuclearization on the Peninsula as the North’s nuclear weapons program threatens stability in the region. However, since the North is unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons, China instead emphasizes the management of the nuclear problem through the Six-party Talks as a realistic solution. North Korea’s geostrategic value is so important that for China, it is crucial to strengthen normal relations with the North.   The Chinese government will comply with most of the United Nations Security Council’s resolution to impose sanctions against the North, especially regarding North Korea’s involvement in illegal transactions. However, there is only a slight chance of China complying with some of the sanctions that could possibly break down the North Korea-China relationship, such as financial sanctions or strict cargo checks on boats and planes. Along with keeping the promise with the United Nations, China will continue on the North Korea-China economic cooperation projects that were exempted from the sanctions and maintain the mid- and long-term engagement stance towards North Korea. Using a good mixture of sanctions and engagements towards the North, China will try to improve its bargaining power vis-à-vis both North Korea and the United States.   Q3: How should South Korea respond?   A3: “Neighboring countries share a high degree of fatigue in dealing with North Korean issues, which makes the role of South Korea very important. Seoul needs to show its willingness to solve the problem and prove its ability to manage this volatile situation by proposing a viable solution.”   Following North Korea’s third nuclear test, neighboring countries in the region share a high degree of fatigue in dealing with North Korean issues. In China, even though the test provoked heated discussion among the public, the government is only maintaining the previous position without showing any sign of pursuing an active role to solve the problem. Thus, it is unlikely that China would make additional efforts on its own regarding the North Korean issues other than complying with the resolutions supported by the international community.   South Korea’s role is crucial in this regard. Seoul needs to show its willingness to solve the problem and prove its ability to manage the volatile situation by proposing a viable solution. Above all, South Korea should understand the strategic calculation behind China’s policy on North Korea and needs to make efforts to engage China by mitigating Beijing’s concerns over instability on the Peninsula. In doing so, South Korea should send a clear message that even though Beijing and Seoul share a common interest in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, this does not preclude all the necessary measures of self-defense in responding to Pyongyang’s premeditated provocation. Therefore, it is necessary for South Korea to continue to assure and persuade China that South Korea needs to secure enough deterrence capability in order to respond to North Korea’s nuclear threat.   China is struggling to come up with alternative options in regard to its North Korea policy. South Korea should take the initiative and constantly assure China that the future dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula would not necessarily have negative effects on China. At the same time, it is important to create momentum in pursuing various types of multilateral cooperation such as South-North-China, South-North-Russia, or South-China-Russia multilateralism. Now is the time when the diplomacy that is based on specific and itemized, rather than generalized, strategies is needed. South Korea needs to search for a step-by-step approach, which focuses on viable measures that could prepare against unpredictability in North Korea’s future and prompt positive changes on the Peninsula.■         Prepared by the Peace and Security Research Unit at the East Asia Institute. The East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this event possible. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. This report was summarized in Korean by Yang Gyu Kim on March 22, 2013 and translated into English by Anna Choi, Yang Gyu Kim, and HyeeJung Suh.

  John S. Park is Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at MIT. His research focuses on the effectiveness of financial sanctions as a counterproliferation policy tool in the North Korean case. During 2007-2012, he directed Northeast Asia Track 1.5 projects at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). He advises Northeast Asia policy-focused officials at the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; National Security Council; and Congressional committees. Park previously worked at Goldman Sachs, where he specialized in U.S. military privatization financing projects. Prior to that, he was the project leader of the North Korea Analysis Group at the Harvard Kennedy School. He also worked in Goldman Sachs’ M&A Advisory Group in Hong Kong and The Boston Consulting Group’s Financial Services Practice in Seoul.         Following North Korea’s third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, the international community is considering how it should impose sanctions against the country. Even with four UN security resolutions imposed against it, Pyongyang has shown a remarkable resilience in avoiding sanctions and carrying out nuclear and rocket tests. EAI invited Dr. John S. Park, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at MIT, to talk about the sanctions effort against North Korea and the ways in which it has managed to work around them. The following is a summary of the main policy recommendations from this interview.   Q1: Currently the UN is debating on how to respond to North Korea’s third nuclear test. Given that many sanctions are already in place following Pyongyang’s previous provocations and have had limited impact, what more can be done in terms of further sanctions?   A1: “The fact that they [North Korea] are doing more of that activity inside China means that financial sanctions by definition are more difficult.”   • It is important that the international community keeps an eye on the changes in how North Korea conducts its commercial activities. As the regime has lived under many sanctions, it has been learning and adapting to these measures. Currently, much of its commercial activities take place in China which makes imposing tougher sanctions a difficult challenge. The Banco Delta Asia in 2005 example of financial sanctions has been cited recently as a possible policy measure, but similar action today would unlikely to be as effective due to Pyongyang’s changing behavior.   Q2. Outside of the UN, is there anything that the United States, South Korea, or Japan could do to impose sanctions against North Korea? It would seem that these countries have very limited options without the cooperation of China or incurring high costs.   A2: “Many of the countries have exhausted in many respects both international as well as national means of sanctioning North Korea.”   • There are limited options for the three counties in imposing other sanctions. The problem lies in the way that Pyongyang relies upon its state trading companies. These companies mostly operate in China and in partnership with Chinese firms who then do the sales and procurement on their behalf. These kinds of transactions are beyond government-to-government functions and reflect a more private nature of business.   • North Korea is able to procure what its needs from the Chinese market. As a globalizing economy, foreign companies have set up factories in the country to produce goods direct for the Chinese market. This makes it easy for North Korean state trading companies to procure dual-use equipment in China through their Chinese partners. From the perspective of these foreign companies, they are making sales to what they believe are Chinese companies.   Q3: One of the major concerns with North Korea’s recent successful nuclear test is the proliferation of this technology to Iran. As we know, in September 2012 the two countries signed an agreement to enhance further cooperation in science and technology. Could you tell us about the importance of this DPRK-Iran nexus and North Korea’s progress in its missile and nuclear technology?   A3: “The Iran-North Korea relationship is a critical enabler for both countries and I think that this is the point that is often overlooked.”   • The Iran-North Korea relationship is a critical enabler for both countries. Outside observers have tended to look at these ties as benefiting one country or the other. Historically this has been true where there have been periods in which one country has benefited, for example when North Korea provided Iran missiles during the Iran-Iraq War. However, these ties have now evolved into an important relationship that is mutually beneficial.   • A crucial example in this relationship is how North Korea received Russian expertise through Iran. In 2005, Iran was suffering setbacks with its own missile program and turned to Russian companies for assistance. This helped them to overcome their initial difficulties and in 2009, Iran successfully launched its Omid satellite into orbit. With the recent success of the Unha-3 launch in December 2012, it is becoming evident that North Korea has had access by using the technology and advice that Iran received from Russian companies.   Q4: Are there any measures the international community can take to restrict the spread of nuclear and missile technology from North Korea to other places such as Iran or vice versa?   A4: “It is important, first of all, to understand the nature of their commercial networks. A large part of the logistics, movements, procurement is done through commercial means.”   • It is important to understand the nature of the commercial networks between Iran and North Korea. The linkages tend not to be direct cooperation, but rather conducted through intermediaries, such as Chinese companies. Furthermore, these transfers are becoming less reliant upon traceable transactions such as wire transfers. Instead, we are seeing cash settlements and the use of trusted financial institutions in China. By understanding how these deals flow, their structure, and the ways in which cash settlements are made, the international community can see how the two countries are avoiding sanctions.   • One way to disrupt these networks would be to look at the role of private Chinese companies and how they operate on behalf of the North Korean state trading companies. While much of this activity takes places in China, they do have operations in Southeast Asian ports which would be easier for the international community to target.   Q5: The United States had recently signaled that it might sanction Chinese companies under the Iran, DPRK and Syria Nonproliferation Act, which naturally brought about strong criticism from China. How will this impact upon U.S-China cooperation to deal with the North Korea problem?   A5: “The efforts to deal with problems like North Korea are a priority for both countries, but the differences lay in where the means are discussed.”   • U.S.-China relations are fragile and evolving. There is still mistrust on both sides and there is a growing need for confidence-building measures. North Korea remains a priority for both sides, but differences exist in the threat perception.   • China’s priority is to promote stability on the Korean Peninsula and encourage economic development and reform in North Korea that moves it away from its nuclear program. This runs counter to the United States which is more concerned about nuclear terrorism. The more Pyongyang’s nuclear program advances, the more the threat increases for proliferation.   • Overall both sides have similar interest in the overall goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but differ when it comes to implementing efforts to achieve this. U.S. designation of Chinese companies will be a key point in this regard. Even if they are targeted, Chinese companies have a very sophisticated structure given their past experience of operating under sanctions and will be able to avoid any new efforts. There will be political ramifications, but the disruption of actual business dealings will likely to be low. ■          Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this event possible. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. This report was summarized by Stephen Ranger.

  L. Gordon Flake joined the Mansfield Foundation in February 1999. He was previously a Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Program on Conflict Resolution at The Atlantic Council of the United States and prior to that Director for Research and Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America. He has authored numerous book chapters on policy issues in Asia and is a regular contributor to the U.S. and Asian press. Mr. Flake has traveled to North Korea numerous times. He is a member of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and serves on the Board of the United States Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (USCSCAP) as well as on the Board of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the Advisory Council of the Korea Economic Institute of America.         With its “strategic patience” approach, the Obama administration has had some successes with its policy toward North Korea. But there has also been some criticism about whether it has done enough to manage the nuclear threat. The EAI invited L. Gordon Flake, Executive Director of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, to evaluate the Obama administration’s policy toward North Korea and prospects for the Six-Party Talks as well as the upcoming U.S. presidential election. The following is a summary of the main policy recommendations from this interview.   Q1: As we come up to the end of President Obama’s first term in office, how would you evaluate the administration’s approach to North Korea?   A1: ”I think you could argue that rather than having a North Korea policy, the Obama administration has really had a Northeast Asia policy, and it has been a rather successful one.”   • The Obama administration’s policy toward North Korea is the product of the past twenty years of the ongoing nuclear crisis. When President Barack Obama entered office, he stated that he was willing to use diplomacy with North Korea. However, the events of early 2009 with the missile and nuclear tests had a major impact on the policy choices of the administration. These events really set the tone for the Obama administration’s policy and “strategic patience” emerged out of this.   • “Strategic patience” was a reaction to the two extreme phases of the Bush administration’s policy to North Korea. The first phase came with then Vice-President Dick Cheney’s approach of “you don’t negotiate with evil, you defeat it” and efforts to undermine any dialogue with Pyongyang. The second phase was characterized by Christopher Hill’s efforts where the priorities were wrong, i.e. negotiating with North Korea in secret first and then discussing with the allies last. In reacting to these two excesses, the Obama administration underlined the importance of dialogue while it also set the right priorities, particularly in working with allies first. There has been some success in this regard as Washington’s relations with its allies in the region are now very strong.   • Despite these approaches, it would be wrong to say that the Obama administration has a North Korea policy. Relations with North Korea are not in U.S. national interests, rather Washington’s priorities are in preserving peace and stability in East Asia, strengthening relations with its allies, and maintaining positive ties with China and Russia. The Obama administration has been very careful to make sure that the problem of North Korea does not   threaten or overshadow U.S. strategic, economic, and security interests in the region. It would be more accurate to describe its approach as part of a broader Northeast Asia policy.   • “Strategic patience” is not a policy but rather a descriptive element of where the United States is at. It is a recognition that the United States is unable to move until North Korea shows what President Obama describes as “seriousness of purpose.”   Q2. How would you address some of the criticism toward “strategic patience” that it is not proactive enough in dealing with the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program?   A2: “’Strategic patience’ is not a strategy, it is just a description of the reality. And the reality is that in the current political environment and all the other countries combined, there is not an option of us being more proactive.”   • With the current political environment, it is not possible for the United States to be more proactive and “strategic patience” is a reflection of this fact. There is still no evidence yet that North Korea is willing to move forward or change. If Kim Jong-un were to show that he is a reformer then there might be an opportunity to be more proactive on the issues. But this is not the case. Kim Jong-un appears to be still in a vulnerable position and in fact, he has gone the opposite direction as North Korea has recently enshrined its nuclear status in its constitution.   • What is more likely is that North Korea will continue on the same course of threats and provocations. However, it will always remain as a second or third priority within U.S. policy making circles. That would change though if North Korea were to carry out an unambiguously successful nuclear or missile test. For example, a successful uranium nuclear test would certainly be regarded by the United States as a game-changer.   • It would also be difficult to make any signal toward North Korea in order to induce it to change as there are no more carrots left on the table. For example, U.S. Congress made an amendment to the Farm Bill which outlaws the provision of food aid to North Korea. This limits the kind of inducements that a negotiator could offer to North Korea. The only way to move out of this situation is for Pyongyang to change the environment and make moves that would be seen as a “seriousness of purpose.”   Q3: With the U.S. presidential election coming up in November 2012, what is the current thinking among the two political camps on policy to North Korea?   A3: “The questions of Korea and Korea policy and even North Korea policy have not been particularly partisan issues. I anticipate that the 2012 campaign, at least in regards to Asia, will again be a relatively mature, non-controversial campaign.”   • There are no significant differences between the two political camps in the run-up to the 2012 U.S. presidential election. This was the case in the 2008 election between Obama and McCain. Obama has not politicized Asia policy like Clinton and Bush did during the presidential campaigns in 1993 and 2000 respectively. For the 2012 campaign, domestic and economic issues will be more of a focus. This is also in part because Asia policy has been a strong point for the Obama administration.   Q4: What are the prospects for the future of the Six-Party Talks with leadership changes taking place in most of the countries involved in this process?   A4: “What was anticipated to be a year of tremendous change in 2012 in terms of politics turns out to be one that doesn’t have a lot of change in the status quo, at least with the impact on the Six-Party Talks.”   • There are unlikely to be any major changes in the Six-Party Talks process as the result of leadership changes taking place in 2012. The change of president in South Korea may offer some chance for change, with the next administration likely to reach out to North Korea. However, there are many limits to engagement whether it is under the conservatives or the progressives in South Korea. The sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island of 2010 have placed a limit on such engagement and make the unconditional provision of aid and support unlikely. There are also deeper questions about whether North Korea will respond to any overtures from South Korea as well as the more fundamental challenge that Pyongyang has never been prepared to discuss serious security issues with Seoul. China has not been focused on the Six-Party Talks due to its own leadership succession issues. There are rumors that the next leadership in China views it as a legacy of Hu Jintao’s government and may seek other approaches. Japan and Russia are unlikely to have any impact with their leadership changes.■         Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this event possible. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. This report was summarized by Stephen Ranger.

  Professor Dr. Soo-Am Kim earned his Ph.D degree in Political Science at Seoul National University. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a standing member of the National Unification Advisory Council (NUAC), and an advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.         The political discourse on North Korea’s human rights has become more intense recently in South Korea following the attempted passage of the human rights bill in the National Assembly. This was further compounded by the tragic human story of Oh Kil-nam who fled North Korea and is seeking the repatriation of his family that he left behind. To help understand further these difficult issues, Dr. Soo-Am Kim of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) discussed on the human rights in North Korea and the international community’s response to this situation. The following is a summary of the main policy recommendations regarding North Korean human rights from the interview.   Q1: What is the current situation regarding human rights in North Korea?   A1-1: “Considering the gross infringement of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in North Korea, the human rights issue is of serious concern.”   • Due to the closed nature of North Korean society, the North Korean human rights issue was only exposed to the international community with the surge of defectors who came over in the 1990s. The consistent reports from these defectors helped to reveal the scale of the human rights problems in North Korea. The UN has played a key role as the main standard to judge the gravity of the situation in North Korea. Every year, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) selects a country with the worst human rights conditions and North Korea has always been chosen since 2003. After 2005, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for improved human rights in North Korea.   • One of the key concerns in regards to civil and political rights is the political prison camps. There are six such camps where approximately one hundred and fifty thousand political prisoners are held; Kaechun, Yoduk, Hwasong, Bukchang, Hoeryung, and Chongjin. They are imprisoned under the Ministry of National Security and are deprived of civil rights and forced to work like slaves. The camps are divided into two sections; “total control zone” and “revolutionary zone.” If one is sent to the “total control zone,” he or she is imprisoned for life and will never return to general society. Forced labor and torture not only takes place in the camp but also continues to exist in other state detention facilities. There is no doubt that these camps and facilities violate even the most basic rights. Even the right to life, the most fundamental human right, is seriously infringed upon as public executions regularly take place of those who resist public authority, commit social crimes, expose internal information to the outside world, or smuggle drugs. As criminal law in North Korea also punishes those who neglect or conceal any anti-state activities, whole families are punished through the implicative system. Despite these harsh punishments, it is becoming increasingly common for people to bribe the authorities during an investigation in order to be released or receive a lighter sentence. This naturally then impedes upon the right to be protected by a fair trial. Although the North Korean constitution guarantees the freedom of religion, it adds that it is illegal to practice any religion that draws in foreign influences or disrupts the social order. Under such a loose definition, one can be punished for carrying a bible or holding a religious ceremony in spite of the guaranteed constitutional rights. Furthermore, the discrimination against people based on their ancestry also continues to occur in regards to promotion in the workplace, membership of the party, and college admission. This also goes against the right of national equality.   • Issues regarding health and nutrition are also very serious in addition to violations of economic, social, and cultural rights. As North Korea’s military-first policy fails to equally distribute resources, the civilian population constantly faces a shortage of food. While the ruling class, including the military, is guaranteed food through a highly centralized distribution system, the civilian population must rely upon local markets for food. Senior citizens and children are particularly vulnerable to malnourishment. Although the constitution and laws regarding the health service assures free medical care, the system supporting such legal articles does not work because of national economic difficulties, thus the civilian population is not really protected.   Q2. How has North Korea and the international community responded to these issues?   A2-1: “North Korea claims the human rights issue is being manipulated in order to overthrow the regime.”   • The international community’s requests to improve the human rights situation in North Korea has aroused a backlash of angry feelings from the regime as it believes that they are trying to overthrow its socialist government. Pyongyang further claims that since each country have their own political, economic, social, and cultural conditions, the international community should not intervene in its human rights. According to the North Korean regime, the entire population is united under the Kim family (Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un) who are benevolent, loving, and caring, to form a big happy family where human rights issues do not exist, specifically highlighting its health and education system. In other words, as long as one lives under the system they chose, human rights will naturally be guaranteed. Due to these reasons, North Korea rejected the legitimacy of the UN resolution on North Korean human rights by arguing that it is only a part of the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea. Pyongyang has also further refused the UN’s request to investigate the human rights situation in the country. In firing back at its critics, Pyongyang has attacked capitalist societies for being hypocritical in the way they have criticized North Korea as they too have their own domestic failings.   A2-2: “The United States has provided financial support to improve North Korea’s human rights, appointed a North Korea human rights envoy, and also allowed North Korean defectors to reside in America.”   • The United States has played a key role in response to the human rights situation in North Korea. In October 2004, the United States signed into law the North Korea Human Rights Act which ensures financial support programs to protect     the rights of North Korean civilians and budgets $24 million per year for this effort. Secondly, the United States appointed a North Korean human rights envoy for the government to coordinate efforts on these human rights issues. Lastly, it allows North Korean defectors to move and reside in the United States. Approximately one hundred and thirty North Korean defectors have been living in the United States since 2006.   A2-3: “China maintains its position of non-intervention in domestic affairs”   • China, on the other hand, sticks to its principle of non-intervention. Beijing believes that the defectors are not refugees but illegal economic migrants and therefore arrests and repatriates them back to North Korea. However, exceptions are made in the case where a defector successfully enters extraterritorial areas, such as embassies. The Chinese government has on occasion shown respect for domestic law, international law, and humanitarianism, by allowing for defectors to be sent to a third country.   Q3: What role does the South Korean government play in this regard?   A3-1: “South Korea should avoid an all-or-nothing approach to human rights in North Korea.”   • South Korea possesses few strategic resources with which it can effectively improve the human rights situation in North Korea. As inter-Korean relations are currently strained, Seoul is limited to public rhetoric in order to address human rights concerns. Such an approach though is unlikely to see any improvement in North Korea. Were inter-Korean relations to improve then there would then be more effective opportunities for influencing the human rights situation. This is due to the fact that increased contacts with the North will mean more ways in which to induce change. Despite the obvious challenges, the improvement of human rights in North Korea should not be considered an all-or-nothing case in which progress can only be made through regime change. The complex nature of human rights which not only include civil-political rights but also social-cultural rights allows for South Korea to make indirect efforts to improve the situation in North Korea.   A3-2: “A comprehensive approach remains the best way to address the issues.”   • As mentioned, human rights in North Korea include many dimensions such as economic, social, cultural, civil, and political. Yet, the debate in South Korea regarding the human rights situation exhibits a narrow interpretation of the issue, focusing solely on rights of civil liberty or food. Since human rights include all of these specific cases, taking a comprehensive approach would be the most effective way rather than ranking the needs and focusing on specific problems. In other words, an effort to fundamentally improve the rights of North Korea civilians by changing the related policies in the North and an effort to solve ongoing specific issues must be taken simultaneously.         Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this event possible. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. This report was summarized in Korean by Ha-jeong Kim and Yang Gyu Kim on May 30, 2012 and translated into English by Yang Gyu Kim, Stephen Ranger, and Jung Min Yeo.

  Dr. Sung-bae Kim earned his Ph.D degree in Political Science at Seoul National University. He is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), where he provides advice to the government and contributes to the development of national security strategy and policy on North Korea.             On the eve of North Korea’s official celebrations for the centenary of Kim Il-Sung’s birth on April 15, 2012, Kim Jong-un assumed two important posts; First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. As Kim Jong-un solidifies his leadership, Dr. Sungbae Kim of the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) discussed on the implications of this process and offered prospects for North Korea’s domestic and foreign policies. The following is a summary of the main policy recommendations from the interview.   Q1: What has been the outcome of the recent party and state meetings?   A1: “Kim Jong-un has assumed the position of supreme leader far more quickly than Kim Jong-il did as he has successfully stabilized his power base through a generational shift of key positions and has maintained regime stability.”   • Kim Jong-un, who was only supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), became the supreme leader of the country as he assumed titles of First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (appointed on April 11, at the 4th Party Conference) and the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea (appointed on April 13, at the 5th session at the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly). In order to hold power, he must take over the chain of command, as institutional inertia acts upon any regime. The recent Party Conference and Supreme People's Assembly show that Kim Jong-un has now completed his power succession. In particular, this succession process has been carried out very swiftly when compared to that of his father Kim Jong-il. Although Kim Jong-il exercised power as the General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Chairman of the National Defense Commission following the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, he only became the official head of state after the National Defense Commission chairmanship was declared to be the highest post of the state with the constitutional amendment in 1998. By contrast, Kim Jong-un became the supreme leader three months after Kim Jong-il’s death.   • It seems that the power base of Kim Jong-un and his uncle and key supporter Jang Song Thaek has been strengthened with a generational shift in personnel changes, which took place at the Party Conference and Supreme People’s Assembly. Former Minister of People’s Armed Forces Vice-Marshal Kim Yong-chun, who was among the eight people to walk alongside the hearse at Kim Jong-il’s funeral, was recently replaced by Kim Jong-gak, who   was formerly First Vice-Director of the General Political Bureau of the KPA. Kim Won-hong, formerly head of the Military Security Command was chosen to be Minister of the State Security Department filling the 20-year vacant post and replacing General U Tong Chuk, Senior Deputy Director at the State Security Department. Another important move has been with Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, who is closely linked to Jang Song Thaek. He was appointed to be the Director of the KPA General Political Bureau and was also promoted to serve as Presidium Standing Member of the Politburo, and as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. General Ri Myong Su, who was promoted as Minister of People’s Security and is also known to have close ties to Jang Song Thaek. Such changes in the party and military signify the strengthening of the Jang Song Thaek circle, the guardian group of Kim Jong-un, and ultimately, the reinforcement of Kim Jong-un’s power base.   • As the Kim Jong-un regime has successfully strengthened its power base through the Party Conference and the Supreme People’s Assembly, it is expected to remain stable for the short term, despite the recent satellite launch failure and the growing confrontation with the international community.   Q2: What are the prospects for North Korea’s domestic and foreign policies following these promotions?   A2-1: “North Korea’s domestic policy will follow the military-first ideology in the short term, but will eventually transform into an economy-first policy in the long term.”   • On the domestic front, the Kim Jong-un regime has no choice but to maintain Kim Jong-il’s policies due to the hereditary nature of the political system. Moreover, during this period of power transition it is very difficult to make rapid changes. In the long term, though, change will be inevitable for the following two reasons.   • Firstly, domestic factors in North Korea’s economy have a strong influence. The reason for North Korea’s economic growth during 2003 and 2008 was not a result of the military-first politics’ economic strategy but the economic measures launched on July 1, 2002 and opening of official markets in 2003. The centrally planned economic system and private markets already coexist in North Korea, and the citizens will resist efforts by the regime to further control the markets.   • Secondly, Kim Jong-un must focus on establishing an economic power, as he needs to complete Kim Jong-il’s declaration to establish a “strong and prosperous nation.” Since 2010, North Korea has published New Year Joint Editorials that placed great emphasis on light industries and enhancing living conditions, making a shift from the narrow focus on the military-first politics. In particular, the 2012 New Year Joint Editorial has stressed the importance of knowledge and technology-based economy as it put forth a model for an “Industrial Revolution in the New Century.” For the short-term, the Kim Jong-un regime is expected to follow both the military-first policies as well as the ideas of an “Industrial Revolution in the New Century.” This will gradually change with more emphasis on the economy.   A2-2: “North Korea’s foreign policy will maintain its hard line position now, but will enter negotiations in the long term.”   • In the long term, negotiations will be a greater focus for the Kim Jong-un regime’s foreign policy. From the beginning, the Kim Jong-un regime sent a confused message as it reached the Leap Day Deal with the United States and then attempted to launch a satellite. Such mixed signals indicate that the Kim Jong-un regime has yet to decide on a course for North Korea’s foreign policy. However, the satellite launch was driven by the domestic political factors rather than by its foreign policy. This does not suggest that the Kim Jong-un regime will take a hard line in it foreign relations in the future. The following are the reasons why the Kim Jong-un regime is bound to adopt a negotiation strategy in the future.   • First, it is essential for the Kim Jong-un regime to ensure stability in foreign affairs in order to stabilize its power base at home. In particular, nuclear negotiations involving major powers such as the United States can help provide the new regime with diplomatic recognition.   • Second, the Kim Jong-un regime cannot afford to neglect its relations with China. Until now, Beijing’s focus on peaceful development and Pyongyang’s military-first politics have been incongruous. The unexpected swiftness in China’s approval of the United Nations Security Council’s Presidential Statement following the 2012 satellite launch seems to be a strong warning that it will not always provide aid to North Korea while tolerating such actions in the future, It will become increasingly more difficult for North Korea to defy China as it will place more pressure on the Kim Jong-un regime so as to limit the options in carrying out more provocative actions.   • Third, the Kim Jong-un regime is pursuing the leadership style of Kim Il-sung rather than that of Kim Jong-il. Consequently, it will seek to follow Kim Il-sung’s model of equidistant diplomacy which places emphasis on the concept of juche or “self-reliance” in foreign policy. North Korea needs to overcome its excessive dependence on China and will therefore naturally seek to approach the United States and Russia. Kim Jong-un can use nuclear negotiations as a weapon in his pursuit of equidistant diplomatic relations between the U.S.-China, China-Russia, and China-South Korea.   • Fourth, foreign aid is indispensable for the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime. There needs to be a stable supply of food, energy, and capital investment in order to overcome the severe shortage of resources in North Korea. This will contribute toward developing light industries and improving living conditions. In the interest of fulfilling these goals, North Korea must give up its nuclear program and place a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests in exchange for foreign aid and participating in negotiations.   Q3. What role can the South Korean government play in this regard?   A3: “The strained relations between South Korea and North Korea will continue for the time being. The South Korean government must carefully manage the situation and take this as an opportunity to reinforce policy coordination with its neighbors.”   • Inter-Korea relations will continue to be strained for the time being. The Kim Jong-un regime’s hard line policy toward South Korea will not let up as the new leader cannot appear to be soft on dealing with South Korea. It will also be difficult to resume the Six-Party Talks due to the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement condemning the recent satellite launch.   • The Lee administration in South Korea must work to prevent the current situation from becoming worse rather than fulfill its ambition to develop its relationship with North Korea. Simultaneously, Seoul needs to improve policy coordination with neighboring countries concerning North Korean issues. This is achievable because all neighboring countries, including China and Russia share the same view that North Korea must transform from its military-first politics to an economy-first system through denuclearization. Moreover, when the Six-Party Talks resume, major issues such as a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula, U.S.-DPRK relations, and the normalization of Japan-DPRK relations will all be simultaneously discussed along with the nuclear issue. Therefore, it is crucial for South Korea to coordinate policies on North Korea and the future of the Korean Peninsula with neighboring countries in advance. Now is the perfect opportunity for policy coordination, as the satellite launch has created an atmosphere of international cooperation and shed more light on the need for a collective response.   • In the year 2012, leadership transitions will be taking place simultaneously in Northeast Asia. During this period of transition, countries are likely to experience policy delays. In this respect, it is important for South Korea to work closely with neighboring countries to help transfer policies from the current Lee administration to the next administration and also minimize policy delays or even the emergence of a policy vacuum.■         Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this event possible. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. This report was summarized in Korean by Ha-jeong Kim and Yang Gyu Kim on April 24, 2012 and translated into English by Siyoung Choi, Min Ju Kim, Yang Gyu Kim, and Stephen Ranger.

  Jihwan Hwang is an assistant professor of the University of Seoul, Korea. Professor Hwang was an assistant professor of North Korean Studies at Myongji University, and a research fellow at the Institute for Unification Studies of Seoul National University. His research interests include East Asian international relations and security studies, focusing on the North Korean nuclear crisis.         On March 16, 2012, North Korea announced that it would be launching a satellite into orbit only two weeks after reaching a deal with the United States in which it would be willing to pursue denuclearization and place a moratorium on further missile and nuclear tests. Professor Jihwan Hwang of the University of Seoul discussed on North Korea’s motivations and the impact this will have on China, South Korea, and the United States. The following is a summary of the main policy recommendations from the interview.   Q1: Why is North Korea’s seeking to launch a satellite now?   A1-1: “This is the only way for North Korea to publicize the successful achievement of “strong and prosperous country” ahead of the centenary of Kim Il Sung’s birth.”   • After the third round of high-level talks between the United States and North Korea at the end of February 2012, North Korea seemed to be taking steps toward denuclearization through what was referred to as the Leap Day Deal. This agreement also seemed to open up the possibility for restarting the Six-Party Talks. However, two weeks later Pyongyang announced that it would conduct a rocket launch to put its Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite into orbit. Such actions bring back memories of April 2009 when North Korea launched a rocket to place a satellite into orbit and then responded to the subsequent international sanctions by conducting a nuclear test a month later. North Korea’s actions were quite surprising back then as tensions on the Korean Peninsula had reduced somewhat towards the end of 2008, particularly with the election of President Obama who stated that he was willing to engage in direct talks with North Korea.   • North Korea’s external behavior is a reflection of its internal politics. Pyongyang has clarified via several channels that dialogue with the United States and the launching of its rocket were the decisions of the late Kim Jong-il. Particularly with the centenary of Kim Il-sung’s birth on April 15, 2012, the Kim Jong-un leadership needs to publicize that it has successfully achieved Kim Jong-il’s vision of North Korea becoming a kangsungdaekuk or “strong and prosperous country.”     A1-2: “North Korea is confident that in the end the United States will have to negotiate over its uranium enrichment program.”   • There is a new sense of confidence in North Korea as its uranium enrichment program progresses further. Over the years, the plutonium facilities at Yongbyon have deteriorated to such an extent that they are considered to be more of a long-term threat. However, now with its uranium enrichment facilities coming online, North Korea has a nuclear program that is harder to trace and can produce nuclear weapons more easily. With this program, the international community including the United States now faces a greater challenge and a more urgent threat. North Korea therefore believes that in the long run Washington will have to engage in bilateral talks with Pyongyang despite the negative effects brought on by the satellite launch   A1-3: “As 2012 is an election year for most countries in the region, North Korea will likely discuss nuclear issues again after the second half of the year.”   • 2012 will be characterized by political change. With the member states of the Six-Party Talks facing leadership changes, it will be difficult for these countries to make critical decisions. It would appear then that the North Korean leadership has decided to hold off on discussing denuclearization issues until 2013 when all the new leaders will be in place.   Q2. What will happen in the region after North Korea's satellite launch?   A2: “South Korea’s policy toward North Korea will be the critical variable related to nuclear issues on Korean Peninsula.”   • China continues to believe that stabilization of the North Korean regime will ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider Northeast Asia region. This was evident in the way that China swiftly recognized Kim Jong-un’s leadership immediately after the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011. Accordingly, China will stick to its current position regarding how the nuclear crisis should be managed believing it can only be solved with a stable North Korean leadership. This would go some way toward explaining Beijing’s unenthusiastic attitude toward Pyongyang’s announcement of the rocket launch so soon after reaching an agreement with the United States.   • If President Obama is reelected then it is expected that U.S. policy toward North Korea will not change dramatically. The Obama administration will also likely continue to closely coordinate its policies with South Korea as well as support Seoul’s position on inter-Korean issues as it has been doing.   • The most crucial variable that will affect the future of the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula will be the North Korea policy of the next administration in South Korea. Having experienced the benefits and failures of both the “sunshine policy” under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations and the “principled engagement policy” of the Lee Myung-bak administration, the next administration, regardless of which leadership comes to power, will have to choose a North Korea policy that exists between these two approaches.   Q3: What is the most important area for South Korea to focus on with its policy toward North Korea?   A3: “The next administration in South Korea should develop a domestic political consensus before embarking on bold policies toward North Korea.”   • Every policy requires continuity for it to become effective. It would not be a wise move for the next administration in South Korea to completely discard the policies of its predecessors. Rather the next administration should consider both the approaches of the “sunshine policy” and the “principled engagement policy.”   • Deliberating on policy corresponding to North Korea’s decision to change is necessary, which has been overlooked in Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang. The Kim Jong-un regime has ensured stability by sticking with the system which Kim Jong-il established. Looking to the future though, Kim Jong-un will have to develop his own system if he is to ever distinguish his rule from his father. As part of this process, the North Korea leadership will actively engage in internal discussions about its future national strategy. This would be a critical moment for the South Korean government to fundamentally change North Korean issues.   • Given this situation, some advocate that the South Korean government should launch engagement policies designed to support reformists in North Korea. However, such a bold plan faces limitations since there is still no true consensus in South Korea on the direction of its North Korea policy. The next administration should consider policies that will be able to support North Korea if it makes a transformation from its current “military-first politics” to “economy-first politics.”■         Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this event possible. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. This report was summarized in Korean by Ha-jeong Kim and Yang Gyu Kim on April 06, 2012 and translated into English by Yang Gyu Kim, Young Jin Lee, Josh Power, and Stephen Ranger.

    Smart Q&A is an interview with the presenter of the Smart Talk, a seminar of the East Asia Institute providing opportunities for leading scholars in Korea to meet and engage with prominent figures from around the world. By posing more specific, focused, and policy-oriented questions, Smart Q&A will facilitate a deeper understanding of the issues at hand and generate creative ideas and strategies for dealing with them. The comments in this video reflect the views of the interviewee only and not the positional stance of any institution or organization.       Interviewee Mark E. Manyin, U.S. Congressional Research Service   Questions     1) The Impact of Strategic Patience on North Korea   In 2011 North Korea has changed its tone by offering to return to the Six-Party Talks, asking for humanitarian aid, and holding back from further provocations. To what extent has the Obama and Lee administration’s “strategic patience” had an impact on North Korea’s changing behavior?    2) U.S. Appointment of New Special Envoy to North Korea   Ambassador Stephen Bosworth will leave as the Special Representative for North Korea policy and will be replaced by Glyn Davies, the current ambassador to the IAEA. Ambassador Bosworth worked on a part-time basis which relates to the “strategic patience” approach of the Obama administration. By comparison, Ambassador Davies will be working on a full-time basis; does this mean any change in the Obama administration’s approach?    3) North Korea’s Leadership Transition   North Korea has declared 2012 as the year it will become a “strong and prosperous nation.” It is expected that this will signal Kim Jong-eun’s formal designation as successor or that he will at least play a bigger role. What will be the impact of this period of leadership transition upon the North Korean nuclear crisis?   4) East Asia after 2012   With the simultaneous leadership transition in the main countries of East Asia including the United States, 2012 will be a period of uncertainty. How will the main issues facing the region become more politicized during this period?

  Smart Q&A is an interview with the presenter of the Smart Talk, a seminar of the East Asia Institute providing opportunities for leading scholars in Korea to meet and engage with prominent figures from around the world. By posing more specific, focused, and policy-oriented questions, Smart Q&A will facilitate a deeper understanding of the issues at hand and generate creative ideas and strategies for dealing with them.       Interviewee Stephan Haggard, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor at the University of California, San Diego   Questions     1) Research on North Korean Refugees   Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea, your recent book, focuses on surveys of North Korean refugees in South Korea and China. Could you tell us about some of the crucial findings from the surveys?   2) Overview of China-DPRK Relations   Kim Jong-il recently visited China, an extensive journey that was his third visit in the space of one year. There has been some speculation as to whether the outcome of Kim Jong-il’s visit was as successful as he expected. How would you assess China-DPRK relations?   3) Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations   Inter-Korean relations appear to be at an all-time low as both sides maintain their tough positions. South Korea is demanding an apology for last year’s provocations while North Korea has rebuffed any attempt at dialogue. Is there any chance for a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations?