Seung-Yul Oh is a professor of Chinese Studies Division at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.         In the first half of 2011, bilateral trade volume between China and North Korea doubled compared to the same period of the previous year. On August 2, North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Guan concluded his week-long visit to Washington at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Furthermore, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, during his first visit to Russia since 2002, met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at a military base on the outskirts of the eastern Siberian city of Ulan-Ude to talk about bilateral economic cooperation on August 24. Seemingly, North Korea’s hectic diplomatic efforts shed light on the long-stalled Six-Party talks, and it tries to counterweigh its heavy dependency on China. Is North Korea changing its attitude toward the outside world? In order to answer the question, this paper delves into the strategic motivation of the North and China for expanding Korea-China economic relations in terms of China’s strategic shift and North Korea’s open-door to China policy.   Since the global financial crisis, China’s hierarchical status in the world economic order in terms of economic volume and influence improved so fast that even China itself has been facing some difficulties in accommodating the changes in its domestic sociopolitical sphere as well as its external strategies. Premier Wen’s repeated emphasis on the imperativeness of political reform in China is, to some extent, related to the discrepancies in the speed of changes between China’s political institutions and economic power, that is, imbalances in the basis and the superstructure in terms of the political philosophy of Karl Marx. For Marx, the stubborn capitalistic superstructure was a big problem. But in today’s China, the bureaucratic and closed superstructure is in contradiction with its globalized market economy as the world’s workshop. China’s gains from its peaceful rise have not been free from the pains of growth. Such a dilemma might be understood from the example of the contradiction in China’s external political gestures: it categorically argues that it is a member of developing countries when meeting with representatives from those developing countries; nevertheless, at the same time, it deliberately releases news about its achievements in military technologies, for example, those of the J-20 stealth fighter and the super-aircraft carrier. In addition, at the news conference after the closing ceremony of the third China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington in May 2011, the Chinese delegation used the phrase “two leaders” frequently, designating the two giants, China and the United States.   Since China’s embarkation on the economic reform process, its enormous economic success, in large part, has been propelled by market-oriented reforms, inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and, last, but not least, its pragmatic and flexible leadership. But it seems that all these ingredients of China’s success story have been losing their momentum in recent years. The law of diminishing marginal utilities also applies in this context. China’s indigenous effort to marketize its economy in the 1980s and 1990s has lost its creativeness and momentum, and the role and function of FDI within Chinese territory is no longer admired. As well, the pragmatism and flexibility of its leadership is also attenuating in addressing diversified challenges in domestic affairs and international relations. China’s dilemma in accommodating itself to the new challenges with old-fashioned ideology is particularly highlighted in the context of the Korean peninsula issues and China’s strategic shift in dealing with the two Koreas.   With regard to issues related to the Korean peninsula, several factors brought about China’s preference for the status quo and its national-interest maximization strategy. These include: (1) the conservative tendency of the Chinese leadership in dealing with domestic political affairs; (2) China’s over-obsession with the animosity of the United States; (3) the stubbornness of North Korea for developing nuclear weapons; and (4) the uncertainty in that isolated country’s future.   As a result of the implementation of a new strategy designed to separate North Korea’s nuclear development from Chinese-North Korean relations, economic exchanges between the North and China became voluminous, but vulnerable in terms of sustainability. To some extent, strategic cooperation between the two countries is detrimental to exploitation of the possibility of North Korea’s economic reforms, which are indispensible for sustainable peace and stability, as well as prosperity in Northeast Asia. In this regard, some might argue that economic cooperation projects between China and North Korea in the Ra-sun area and Hwang-Geum-Pyeong might be considered as a symbol of the North’s intention for economic reforms. Yet in reality, those programs may be substitutes for the North’s fundamental economic reforms, not complements of or starting points for meaningful system changes.   To some extent, peacefully risen China is experiencing internal contradictions and friction resulting from the duality of harmonizing the logical importance of their relationship with South Korea with their sentimental inertia in dealing with North Korea. Sometimes China’s internal strains due to the imbalance of its economic vitality with its lack of sociopolitical flexibility are reflected in their external relations in the form of aggressive nationalism or undue obsession about confrontation with the source of a potential threat to its national interest. In this regard, the report of the Chinese government that was delivered by Premier Wen at the fourth session of the eleventh National People’s Congress on March 5, 2011, reveals some changes in China’s policies on defense and diplomacy. The report describes the objective of China’s defense strategy as “strengthening national defense and building a powerful people’s army.” In the past, the objective was described with weaker jargon such as “modernization of defense,” not “building a powerful . . . army.” In addition, in the same report, China’s foreign policy identifies what they call major powers with whom China pursues common interests. As well, they define neighboring countries with whom they want to try to build “friendship and partnership.” I would like to interpret the difference as China tries to share the world with major powers to secure its national interest as well as to establish a regional order that is centripetal on China politically. We could understand the expression as a reflection of China’s growing power. On the other hand, such a projection of China’s power on foreign policy implies, at the same time, that China’s strategic shift is subject to ideological constraints. In the press briefing after the third China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Dai Bing Guo, a representative of the Chinese delegation, emphasized that “Asia Pacific is broad enough to accommodate the interests of China and of the United States.” . North Korea’s Discomfort with South Korean-Chinese Relations   North Korea’s military provocation in the Cheonan incident in March 2010 was designed to make South Korea, China, and the United States pay for their reluctance to provide economic aid for the North despite Premier Wen’s Pyongyang visit in October 2009. As well, it was a payback for their ignoring the North’s alleged contact for a South-North summit also in October 2009 and its restraint from moving further in nuclear and missile issues. Indeed, we observed some signs of cleavages and discomfort between South Korea and China, as well as between China and the United States. To some extent, the North’s adventurism was compensated. The South Korean government hastened to investigate the so-called controversial physical evidence of the North’s attack to compensate for its failure to take effective counterattack measures at the scene. It also appealed to its constituency by emotionalizing the incident to win South Korea’s local election in June 2010, rather than to make an effort for a consensus with China on the North’s motivation for the attack and its impact on regional stability. As a result, South Korea and China both suffered from aggravated regional insecurity as well as deteriorated South Korean-Chinese and Chinese-U.S. relations.   Rising conservatism in South Korea and China is another origin for the discomfort between the two countries. Especially in China, I observed a tendency for its leadership to be flexible and reformist in domestic economic affairs and to be conservative in political issues and external affairs. When it comes to the regional issues for which strategic interests of the United States are at stake, China has been obsessed with the United States’ offensive intention against it. In addition, as a rapidly growing transitional economy, China has been inevitably faced with some tensions and frictions in a wide spectrum of its society. The nationalistic patriotism painted with ideological conservatism for foreign affairs might be deemed by its leadership as an effective and cheap way to mitigate its social entropy. In terms of Chinese-North Korean relations, the conservative approach of the Chinese leadership is indirectly reflected in expansion of personal exchanges of high-level party leadership with the Korean Labor Party (KLP) since the second half of 2010.   The current South Korean government’s political stance is basically a conservative one. In addition, uncertainties in North Korea’s future fueled the South Korean government’s intentional rectification of the former government’s sunshine policy or engagement policy with the North. Disappointed by North Korea’s military provocations and lingering nuclear issue, the South Korean people became intolerant of the high cost of this engagement policy for their bad-tempered northern partner. Apparently, for the South Korean people the cost- benefit considerations of the sunshine policy in terms of its contribution to improvement of the inter-Korean relationship and removal of North Korea’s animosity against South Korea were negative. This has driven the South’s government to a hawkish position. Uncertainties in North Korea and security concern of conservative leadership in South Korea have enhanced the South Korean-U.S. strategic alliance, which made China become more obsessed with the United States’ aggressive strategy against it.   Discomfort between South Korea and China functions as a catalyzer for the strategic shifts of China and North Korea in regard to their relations. North Korea, to some extent, takes advantage of the perceptional cleavage between South Korea and China to show that China is on its side in international politics. In addition, restrictive measures of the South Korean government for inter-Korean businesses in May 24, 2010, accelerated North Korea’s pro-China policy implementation. In August 2010, Kim Jong Il visited China just three months after his previous visit in May. China appeared to exploit the situation for its own strategic purpose. North Korea’s open criticism of the South Korean government’s motivation for a secret meeting of officials from both sides in May 2011 is based on such a strategic calculation. The North’s seemingly irrational exposure of secret dealings with South Korea is a well-calculated gesture to show its strategic connection with China by outguessing South Korea’s congenial offensive. China seems to tolerate North Korea’s intentional contiguity with it and accommodate its policies in line with the North’s strategic objective to make South Korea realize the cost of its leaning toward the United States. In other words, South Korea’s strategic importance for China allures China’s leadership, paradoxically, to take the risk of improving its relationship with North Korea as pressure to make South Korea dilute its alliance with the United States.   North Korea’s Open-Door to China Policy   Given that there are some special structural features of trade and investment between China and North Korea, North Korea's seemingly enormous trade deficit with China is not a main constraint for economic exchanges. There exists vast room for political manipulation of the statistics for the strategic interests of both sides, that is, a grey zone. China's strategic concern for the Korean Peninsula and domestic political motivation and North Korea’s manipulation of its external relations are more important factors for the Chinese-North Korean economic relationship. Despite North Korea's reluctance to be seated for the six-party talks and to recognize responsibility for the Cheonan incident, momentum for the Chinese-North Korean economic relationship will be sustained, mainly due to China’s strategic shift and North Korea’s need...(Continued)         Acknowledgement The author appreciates the helpful comments from Chaesung Chun and Dongho Jo.

Dong Sun Lee is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University.         In late 2009, a North Korean warship attacked South Korean naval vessels near Daecheong Island. The following year witnessed a further elevation of North Korean aggression expressed in attacks on the South Korean corvette Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island. These shocking developments have sparked a heated debate in the South, inter alia, on whether and how Seoul’s North Korea policy has increased Pyongyang’s belligerence. This paper aims to critically evaluate key arguments pervading the debate and offer an alternative perspective. (I limit my scope to examining how Seoul’s policy has affected Pyongyang’s recent aggressiveness, instead of offering a more comprehensive account of the provocations or a theory of North Korean behavior.)   I argue that all conventional wisdom (which either denies the significance of North Korea policy or views the level of engagement as mainly shaping Pyongyang’s behavior) has only weak empirical support, but remains salient because it serves parochial political interests in the partisan blame game. In reality, Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang has significantly amplified North Korean belligerence primarily because it has been partisan in nature—not because inter-Korean engagement has been excessive or insufficient. Resolving this problem requires promoting post-partisanship, to which independent scholars and institutions can contribute significantly.   The Debate: Three Contending Perspectives   Three views dominate the current debate regarding the impact of the South’s North Korea policy on the past years’ attacks. A diverse group of elites agree that Seoul’s North Korea policy has little to do with Pyongyang’s recent aggressions. There exist two variants to this argument. One posits that North Korea has acted aggressively for domestic reasons—whether increasing incentives to demonstrate loyalty or loosening civilian control of the military amid an uncertain political succession. The other variant asserts that Pyongyang’s provocations had a primary goal of pressuring the great powers—the United States and/or China—for concessions. According to this “irrelevance” thesis, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was an innocent bystander caught in the middle of an internal power struggle or international bargaining.   Another group holds the view that Seoul’s northern policy did have a significant impact on Pyongyang’s belligerence. The group is divided into two opposing camps, roughly along partisan lines. They disagree on what aspect of the policy provided the stimulus for Pyongyang’s aggressive actions.   The rightist camp within the group argues that the conciliatory tone of Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang had a negative effect. The “appeasement policies”—unconditional engagement—adopted by Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun undermined South Korea’s deterrence posture by reducing military readiness and condoning (or even rewarding) bad behavior. Leaders of the ruling Grand National Party—Kim Moo Sung and Ahn Sang Soo, for example—made remarks along these lines. Those on the farther right go so far as to argue that the Lee Myung-bak administration made similar mistakes, albeit to a lesser degree: it failed to effectively signal a firm commitment to a principled northern policy and made only tepid responses to North Korean provocations. Advocates of this “spoiling sunshine” thesis tend to support a tough policy with diminished assistance to the North.   On the other hand, leftists within the group assert that an insufficient level of engagement is responsible for Pyongyang’s belligerent behaviors. In particular, President Lee Myung-bak’s “confrontational policy”—conditional engagement—forced the Kim Jong-Il regime into a corner and empowered hardliners who called for lashing out militarily. The attacks of 2009–2010, attempts to break out of stifling isolation, were the result. Advocates of this point of view assert that had the sunshine policy continued, there would have been no artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Democratic Party leaders, including Chung Dong Young and Park Jie Won, belong to this group. Those on the far left—for example, the Democratic Labor Party chairperson Lee Jung-Hee—even argue that the ROK government is more responsible for the attacks than North Korea, thereby blaming the victim. The “backfiring wind” thesis naturally leads to demands for a softer policy toward Pyongyang.   Critique: Myth-Making under Fire   All of these views, despite their apparent veracity and wide acceptance, have shaky foundations. Supporting evidence is scarce, and compelling counterevidence is not difficult to find.   It is unconvincing to argue that Pyongyang’s recent aggressions are unrelated to Seoul’s actions. While denying any involvement in the Cheonan incident, North Korea itself has explicitly stated that the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island originated from grievances toward the South. (Of course, this does not mean that those grievances were legitimate.) Pyongyang claimed that the attack was a response to the ROK military exercises on the island and in its surrounding seas. There is no evidence that this statement is wholly rhetorical, merely providing cover for violent acts aimed at shaping domestic politics or great-power relations.   Although Seoul’s North Korea policy indeed matters, the extant accounts for policy failure are not cogent, either. It is difficult to accept the Lee government’s “confrontational policy” as the primary cause of North Korean aggressiveness. Contrary to common perception, the Lee Myung-bak government was not so harsh on Pyongyang before the North’s attacks, even in comparison with the South’s pro-DPRK predecessors. (The ROK sanctions imposed after the attacks cannot be regarded as causing DPRK belligerence since late 2009.) As Figure 1 shows, inter-Korean trade under the Lee presidency (2008–2009) was greater than that during the progressive era (1998–2007), except for one year. In 2009 South Korea accounted for 33 percent of North Korean foreign trade, which attained its highest level since 2000—except for 2007. A similar pattern emerges when only considering imports (which provide revenues for North Korea): the year 2009 witnessed an all-time high (US$934.3 million). For all the armed attacks, inter-Korean commercial exchange has remained substantial. In October 2010, it amounted to US$165.6 million; in January 2008—the last full month of the Roh presidency—the volume was merely US$140.5 million. After all, the Lee government has yet to close down the Gaesong industrial complex, which provides the North annually with US$50 million in workers’ compensation. The ROK government’s assistance also remained significant prior to the attacks despite a conservative presidency: the total amount in 2008 was nearly US$40 million (although this figure constituted a noticeable drop from previous years). All these facts indicate that Seoul is still committed to engagement, albeit to a lesser extent due to the suspension of the Mt. Kumgang tours as well as food and fertilizer supplies since 2008. It is also noteworthy that North Korea made armed provocations near Yeonpyong Island in 1999 and 2002 when South Korea was unconditionally engaged with the North.   Note: Figures represent annual sums of export and import cleared through customs. The 1995 figure excludes a supply to North Korea of rice worth US$237,213,000.   Evidence also suggests that unconditional engagement under previous ROK governments was not a chief cause of North Korean belligerence. Although the policy may have exerted corrosive influences on South Korean defense and deterrence, the fact is that North Korea did not act as aggressively during the period of unconditional engagement (1998-2008). Although the period saw two naval clashes near Yeonpyeong Island (in 1999 and 2002), they were not as serious as the more recent attacks in scale and intensity. The problem with the “spoiling sunshine” argument—as is the case with the “backfiring wind” thesis—is not that it has no veracity at all, but that it fails to do justice to what actual impact Seoul’s policy has had on Pyongyang’s aggressiveness. It captures too small a part of the picture.   Despite such deficiencies in empirical support, political elites hold on to these views because they serve partisan interests (although unreliable information and ideological bias regarding North Korea also play a role). Leftists use the “backfiring wind” thesis to discredit the conservative Lee administration. On the other hand, supporters of the current government find the “spoiling sunshine” account convenient for deflecting the criticism and shifting blame to the progressive forces that advocate unconditional engagement with Pyongyang. Revealing partisan motives behind the arguments is the conspicuous fact that few stand on the middle ground, claiming a (sequential) combination of both “sunshine” and “wind” to be responsible. Instead, political elites typically cast the argument in black-and-white terms, which compel a choice of one over the other. Its neutral appearance notwithstanding, the “irrelevance” thesis is no less politically charged. Pro-government elites invoke it to avoid being held responsible for the fatal attacks and the resultant strains in inter-Korean relations, and also to deny any need for policy change. Some opposition elites, for their part, utilize the thesis—especially the variant positing that renegade generals initiated the attacks without central authorization—to provide an indulgence to Kim Jong-Il and claim that their presupposition of his trustworthiness (which underpins their pro–North Korea approach) is not misguided.   These myths created by political elites for their parochial interests spread into public opinion; consequently, the architecture of the debate within political society is reproduced in civil society at large. This diffusion process takes several paths. Partisan elites propagandize their preferred views by making public statements and collaborating with friendly media, pundits, and civic organizations. Independent institutions also unwittingly assign privileged positions to the partisan myths. For example, public opinion polls ask respondents to choose among the three views only. The media invite advocates of only these views to discussion panels. These practices have the unintended negative consequence of discouraging the general public from looking beyond the politicized views and forming a more balanced understanding of the issue. Once the partisan views captivate the public perception, politicians who articulate an alternative perspective risk becoming outcasts. The result is consolidation of the highly partisan debate within political society.   An Alternative View: A “Deadly Partisanship” Argument   ROK policy toward North Korea has significantly affected the North’s belligerence, but not in ways that participants of the politicized debate assert. In that case, what is the key factor strengthening the aggressive tendency in North Korean behavior?   The main problem is that Seoul’s northerly policies have been based on partisanship rather than on consensus. In a vibrant democracy, heated debates are natural, and consensus on an important issue is rare. This is all the more true when political forces fall to strong partisanship. South Korea is a case in point. While leftists and rightists hold uncompromising views on numerous issues, the cleavage is particularly wide and deep when it comes to North Korea policy. Unconditional engagement—embodied in President Kim’s “Sunshine Policy” and President Roh’s “Policy of Peace and Prosperity”—is an article of faith for nearly all leftists. Most rightists dislike the soft-line approach and support conditional engagement based on the principle of reciprocity (although some prefer containment). The reproduction mechanisms described above duplicate that cleavage within civil society, with a sizable element wavering on the sidelines. Since this fragmented civil society can produce neither a consensus nor a consistent majority view, the political forces controlling the powerful presidency unilaterally dictate North Korea policy. In this sense, all policies toward Pyongyang have—despite varying shades—had a partisan nature in common.   ROK policies (which have lacked a firm anchor in the popular will) have presented attractive targets for armed coercion. When a campaign aims to change a policy preferred by a small group of partisans rather than by a broad public, the target government expects a low domestic audience cost from accepting the sender’s demand. In addition, it is less challenging for a foreign government to generate popular pressure for policy change in the target country: the civil society contains a partisan group detesting the current policy and a dithering group lacking a strong preference; democratic governments tend to be accountable and receptive to calls for concession made by the intimidated populace. Due to these conditions, Seoul’s North Korea policy is susceptible to external manipulation.   Such susceptibility may have tempted North Korea to engage in military actions against the South. Due to the opaqueness of North Korean decision-making, no direct evidence is available to ascertain that the temptation actually caused the use of force. However, the “deadly partisanship” argument can draw indirect yet significant support from a consistent historical pattern: while partisan policies were in place—whether conditional or unconditional engagement—the Kim Jong-Il regime continually resorted to force. The progressive era of unconditional assistance was not devoid of military provocations, since North Koreans could expect to obtain even greater concessions. The subsequent conservative period has also witnessed the use of force, since its less appeasing policy toward Pyongyang has been potentially reversible.   Also confirming the argument is that North Korea has made repeated efforts to influence the South Korean public to concede to its demands. It seems that Pyongyang is well aware of the shaky popular base for Seoul’s policy. Admittedly, the North Korean efforts were unsuccessful on some occasions and even counterproductive on others. However, these failures do not mean that Seoul’s North Korea policy is not susceptible. Forcing a policy change is not easy, and such force generally has a low success rate. The fact that Pyongyang repeatedly takes up such a tough challenge implies that it probably sees a relatively favorable opportunity presented by Seoul’s partisan politics.   Conclusion: Toward a Post-Partisan Debate   If the partisan character of the South’s North Korea policy is indeed the source of the problem, the solution requires establishing post-partisanship in the debate from which the policy grows. This is a tough challenge: for political actors presently engaged in fierce competition, abandoning an effective instrument of partisanship (if unreciprocated) can amount to unilateral disarmament amid a battle. This move is simply too risky to make, especially when mutual trust is lacking. Considering this obstacle, a post-partisan debate requires a changed atmosphere in which partisan arguments no longer confer advantages on their producers and distributors. Partisan assertions turn into a political liability rather than an asset when the public can clearly understand their untruthful and self-serving nature. No one likes being told lies or half-truths (unless they are well-meaning—e.g. white lies). Therefore, voters will likely punish politicians and their mouthpieces who propagandize myths for selfish purposes, if the populace understands what they are up to. Therefore, debunking myths and promoting truth can discourage myth-making to a significant extent.   This task is cut out for independent scholars who reject partisanship. They can conduct balanced research on policy issues (such as the subject matter of this paper), grounding their conclusions on nothing but logic and fact. Their findings then can be used to verify political claims. It is unfortunate that many nonpartisan experts prefer staying out of policy debates, since they are afraid of coming under politically motivated attacks and being branded as “polifessor”—an invented word pejoratively designating academics whose primary goal is to occupy public office. The participation of truth-seeking scholars in the debate is crucial to breaking the spell of partisanship.   Nonpartisan institutions can play important supporting roles in this endeavor. Foundations can encourage independent analysis by providing funds and other logistical support, while turning away from partisan scholars. Media also can help out by publicizing nonpartisan findings to the broader audience and inviting to interviews and forums independently-minded scholars, rather than simply partisans whose opinions are all too predictable. Polling institutions, for their part, can consult apolitical scholars for questionnaire design, and thereby avoid practically forcing respondents to select among partisan choices. All these efforts can combine to free the public mind from partisan prejudices and build a free “marketplace of ideas,” in which partisan argument finds few customers.   A post-partisan debate would not suffice to produce a consensus. Divergent views can emerge even among nonpartisan scholars, due to their varying scholarly perspectives and methods as well as the irreducible uncertainties surrounding reality. A sizable number of voters and politicians will remain inattentive and therefore ignorant. Others will intentionally avert their eyes from facts and adhere to false arguments, in order to advance nonpolitical interests including economic gain.   Nevertheless, post-partisanship makes a consensus or a lasting majority opinion more likely to emerge. As a result, it becomes less probable that North Korea will see a window of opportunity to extort concessions through violent actions. Given the potential damage that Pyongyang’s belligerence can cause to Seoul, it is worthwhile to pursue post-partisanship no matter how challenging and elusive that goal is. Moreover, once post-partisanship becomes rooted in this public debate, the practice can diffuse to other related debates, improving policymaking in those issue areas as well. Thus expected payoffs clearly justify sustained effort. ■         Acknowledgement The author thanks Chaesung Chun, Dongho Jo, Hyung-Min Joo, Jai Kwan Jung, Sungbae Kim, Kab-Woo Koo, and Seung-Yul Oh for helpful comments.

Kyung-young Chung is a professor of national security studies at the Catholic University of Korea.         The year 2010 saw heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula triggered by North Korea, as shown by the sinking of the Cheonan warship and the artillery attack against Yeonpyeong Island. Some experts, even some within the intelligence community, estimated that through these efforts Kim Jong-eun was attempting to strengthen his power in the succession struggle.   North Korea’s provocative actions, however, while internally motivated, repeatedly force South Korea to pay a ransom to support three generations of succession within the royal Kim family, and create an almost insurmountable problem for the South. Defining the Yeonpyeong Island incident is critical to the national security posture of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Conducting an exercise of artillery fire against a specific target is one thing, but attacking South Korean territory is a different thing altogether. The latter implies an invasive action, a deliberate attack to secure a series of strategic objectives waged by limited warfare.   In the context of North Korea’s provocation, the conflicting, competitive, yet also cooperative relationship between the United States and China had both a direct and an indirect impact on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK's weak, vacillating reaction against the North Korean provocation clearly revealed the ROK military's limitations in countering the North Korean threat. Since dealing with a provocative scenario has a tremendous impact on how the ROK responds, a comprehensive reassessment of the North Korean threat is imperative.   Taking account of the complexity of power politics as well as North Korea's provocations, this briefing will explore a potential provocative scenario, which will be developed on the basis of Pyongyang’s intent, its capability to inflict threat using asymmetric war-fighting assets, and the North Korean perception of South Korea's political, social, economic, and military vulnerability. Finally, the briefing will make policy recommendations in terms of security and defense posture, international cooperation to deter North Korean provocation, and examine how to promptly and effectively deal with future crises in the event of any further military action from the North against the ROK.   North Korea’s Hedging Strategy   (1) Intent   North Korea’s view of war is based on the confluence of the inevitability of class struggle, imperialism, and people’s war perpetuated by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and Mao Zedong, respectively. The Communist Manifesto dictates that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles—society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.” In a similar context, Lenin insists in his work Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, that the war of 1914–1918 was imperialist on both sides, the colonizers and their colonies; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies and spheres of influence of finance capital, and so on. Furthermore, Mao’s military-political strategy of people’s war is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deeply into the interior, where the population will bleed them dry through a mixture of mobile and guerrilla warfare. Influenced by these revolutionary tenets, North Korea’s political and military leadership perceives war as a just war to completely liberate the South Korean people from U.S. imperialism and the bondage of the bourgeoisie.   It is believed that North Korea attempts to conduct warfare simultaneously from the front and the rear through a combination of preemptive strike and people’s democratic revolution. At the initial stage of war, North Korea intends to paralyze the South Korean people by cyber attack, artillery mass fire, and the insertion of special operations forces (SOF), followed by the occupation of the Seoul metropolitan area by conducting blitzkrieg with mechanized forces and the eventual termination of the limited war through negotiation, prior to the deployment of U.S. forces to the Korean Peninsula. However, with the backdrop of a potential aggression, Pyongyang is also undertaking offensive peace actions, which include peace talks with South Korea and consultations on peace agreements with the United States. In other words, North Korea’s political and military approach adopts a Nazism strategy of adventurism while it pursues appeasement at the same time.   (2) Capability   North Korea drew lessons from the Iraq War in March 2003. They learned that Saddam Hussein’s large-scale mechanized forces and fighter aircraft could not resist the coalition forces, particularly the U.S. special operations forces, precision-guided munitions, and electronic warfare. North Korea strengthened its war fighting capability by reinforcing 200,000 SOF, deploying light infantry divisions at each frontal corps and positioning mechanized divisions at each forward corps along the demilitarized zone (DMZ).   The strength of the North Korea’s People Army is 1,190,000, which makes it the fifth largest force in the world. The KPA consists of 1,020,000 army, 60,000 navy and 110,000 air force. North Korea has deployed 1,000 missiles, including Frogs, Scuds, Ro-dong missiles, Musudan intermediate range ballistic missiles, and Daepodong-II missiles, and the completion of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is due within five years. The overwhelming range of these missiles can not only cover the Korean Peninsula but also neutralize airports and naval ports where U.S. forces are deployed. North Korea has 13,600 howitzers, including 5,100 long-range artilleries, composed of 240 multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm guns, which can reach the Seoul metropolitan area. Weapons of mass destruction, including six to eight nuclear weaponized devices as well as 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical munitions can have a tremendous impact on the strategic military balance.   The 820 aircraft of North Korea include 100 leading edge fighters of MiG-23, 25, and Su-25s, which can conduct airstrikes on metropolitan areas within nine minutes. North Korea’s 70 submarines, torpedoes, 130 air-cushion landing vehicles and 420 battleships have also been deployed. Furthermore, North Korea can conduct large-scale cyber terror attacks employing 1,000 technical reconnaissance teams. North Korea will attempt to conduct hybrid warfare, which is a combination of high-speed maneuver, and asymmetric warfare that includes the use of WMD and missile, submarine, SOF, and cyber warfare.   (3) South Korea’s Vulnerability   South Korea has political, social, and military characteristics that make it vulnerable to North Korean provocation. The political and social vulnerability of the South involves ideological confrontation between liberals and conservatives, an inconsistent and disintegrated policy toward North Korea, and the complexity of the decision-making process in dealing with North Korea and neighboring states, due to pro–North Korea and anti-American sentiment. Since the signing of the armistice agreement in 1953, the combined ROK-U.S. defense system has been a crucial instrument in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea has been influenced to believe that the United States has been playing a leading role in defense of the South. In this sense, North Korea assumes that South Korea does not have the political and military will to retaliate against the North’s incessant provocation. The recent two serious incidents reconfirmed for Pyongyang that South Korea’s leadership has a crisis management system with a high level of vulnerability, characterized by excessive sensitivity to the potential escalation of conflict into a war.   The Korean Peninsula’s tumultuous security environment brings about economic vulnerability in the form of the withdrawal of foreign capital.   Any instance of North Korean provocation detrimentally affects the business climate by inducing fear among foreign investors. The impact is even more evident in the Seoul metropolitan area, where the core national infrastructure is closely located near the DMZ. The potential damage to core facilities in the event of North Korean provocation can be predicted to have a severe impact on many industries.   Military vulnerability results from the proximity of Seoul to the DMZ, which makes the metropolitan area’s high-density population more vulnerable to North Korea’s military provocations. Among the total South Korean population of 48 million, 15 million live in or around Seoul.   Thus protecting Seoul should be a priority for the ROK military. Moreover, the ROK military must anticipate the counterstrategies of the enemy. For instance, North Korea might attempt to take 500 South Korean managers and engineers in the Gaesong industrial complex beyond the DMZ as hostages, which would constrain South Korean military actions. Another area of vulnerability is North Korea’s easy access to information through mass media, exposing South Korea’s policy and military actions toward North Korea. North Korea sees the complexity of the ROK-U.S. command structure as one of the most vulnerable areas. Although the ROK Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) exercises peacetime operational control over the military forces, it is worth noting that wartime operational control over the ROK forces is still in the hands of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). However, wartime operation control will be transferred to the ROK JCS from the CFC on December 1, 2015. The ROK’s political and military leadership might hesitate to take prompt action against North Korea’s provocation, as any action is likely to escalate to a war.   The issue of national security, in particular, has not received much attention from past and present administrations. Although national security was deemed more important than democracy by South Korean authoritarian administrations, this position has been hardly apparent in the actions of more current political leaders. The previous liberal administration invested significant effort toward the improvement of the inter-Korean relationship, and this was by focusing less on matters of security. Today, economic issues outweigh national security on the national agenda.   (4) Implications of Outside Interventions   External factors also have an impact on the dynamics of relations between the two Koreas. In the context of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, the conflicting, competitive, yet cooperative relationship between the United States and China had both direct and indirect influence on the Korean Peninsula. The conflict between the two superpowers was attributed to the U.S. involvement in the Cheonan incident and China's demonstration of power and assertive diplomacy by denying the United States access to the West Sea for conducting combined anti-submarine exercises with the ROK navy. The competitive relations between the two superpowers were aggravated by North Korea's artillery attack against Yeonpyeong Island. China inevitably acquiesced in the combined large-scale exercises in which the aircraft carrier, USS George Washington participated. China also struggled to influence the two Koreas by shuttle diplomacy. Presidents Obama and Hu Jintao eventually demonstrated their cooperative relations through the Joint Statement on January 19, 2011, which urged the two Koreas to conduct a sincere, constructive inter-Korean dialogue. The incidents symbolically exemplified the complex nature of U.S.-China relations.   The incidents also showed the dynamics of the two Koreas, which had reverse impacts on the power structure in Northeast Asia. China pays more attention to the overall stability on the Korean Peninsula, not specifically acting on the tension between the two Koreas. It supported North Korea’s position when the Presidential statement to the United Nations Security Council was presented, saying that North Korea was not involved in the Cheonan incident. China’s lack of firm and decisive action over the Cheonan incident induced North Korea to launch another attack by shelling Yeonpyeong Island. Thus, had China showed a stronger attitude toward North Korea, it could have prevented another North Korean attack.   Although the two provocative actions by North Korea paralyzed South Korea, the South Korean government took prompt diplomatic action to coordinate with friendly states and the global community with regard to North Korea's brutality. Despite the threatening retaliatory pressure from Pyongyang, the Lee Myung-bak administration also conducted previously planned exercises in the West Sea in the vicinity of the Northern Limit Line. North Korea did not take any military action against these exercises because China influenced North Korea to restrain from responding with any provocative action.   (5) North Korea’s Limited War Scenario   North Korea’s national strategy, entitled “Strong and Prosperous State” focuses on three areas: ideology and politics, the military, and the economy. North Korea’s political leadership is confident that juche, or self-reliant ideology, and military-first politics can firmly control the North Korean people for regime survival. It is estimated that North Korea has become a de facto nuclear state and has been developing its ICBM, which will empower it to deal with U.S. military actions. North Korea’s wishful thinking regarding control of the Seoul metropolitan area, where two-thirds of South Korea’s national wealth is concentrated, might push it to wage a limited war. North Korea’s perception of military provocation is based on the following assumptions. Prior to the Yeongpyeong incident, only 40 percent of the South Korean population showed a high level of security awareness and only 25 percent of the student population were willing to join the army in the event of war.   After the Yeongpyeong attack, there was a drastic change in the level of security awareness among the South Korean public. North Korea’s brutality further reinforced its image as an “enemy” of the South.   North Korea can infiltrate the South by sending 15,000 to 20,000 special operations forces, who could be disguised as South Korean soldiers and police; such a scenario would allow the North Korean military to easily commit atrocities, especially against civilians. Having conducted Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDOS) as cyber terrorism three times in the past, in July 2009 as well as in March and May 2011, North Korea can again gain confidence to neutralize South Korea’s command and control structure. At the height of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong attack, Pyongyang keenly watched to see how vulnerable Seoul was in its crisis management and in the readiness of the ROK’s military force. Keeping track of the recent strike against Libya of the combined forces of the United States and its allies, we can vividly visualize a similar scenario for the Korean Peninsula.   It is estimated that North Korea attempts to employ three options, depending on the situation: offensive diplomacy with a defensive military posture, a limited preemptive strike with a political objective, and more direct offensive military action. The South Korean government perceives the North Korean threat as neither a total war nor a limited war but only as a local provocation, because the North does not have enough logistic capability, energy, and infrastructure to launch a large-scale attack. Significantly, U.S. forces still remain in Korea, so that when the North attacks the South, they will certainly have to deal with a U.S. intervention, which might signal the end of North Korea. The South Korean government assumes that North Korea is only capable of instigating local attacks as in the case of the sinking of the Cheonan, a few fire engagements in the DMZ, infiltrating South Korea by guerrillas, and launching cyber attacks or missile tests and a third nuclear test. In addition, North Korea can attempt to bend the truth by accusing either the ROK or the United States of provocation, such as the ROK military drills or the combined U.S.-ROK military exercises. North Korea’s provocation at the time and place it deems suitable could be used to achieve political goals such as Kim Jung-eun’s propaganda to further establish the legitimacy of his political authority, draw global attention and secure favorable negotiation power, spur internal conflict in South Korea, prevent the North Korean people’s deviation, and enhance North Korea’s military credibility. However, these scenarios are very optimistic. South Korea has to prepare for the worst-case scenarios from North Korea.   South Korea should seriously examine the following scenario. First, a missile attack against critical targets, including Incheon International Airport, the Yongsan military complex area composed of the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces, and Osan Air Base co-located with the U.S. 7th Air and ROK Air Force Operational Command, should be anticipated.   Second, North Korea could attempt to conduct a naval clash to neutralize the Northern Limit Line. North Korea could also occupy the five islands in the West Sea and Daesungdong Village in Panmunjom while simultaneously conducting a large-scale cyber terrorist attack and penetration of the Seoul metropolitan area by Special Operations Forces, spreading harmful chemical materials in the subway, and causing panic through long-range artillery fire with biological and chemical munitions. It is estimated that North Korea would attempt to paralyze Seoul by means of separate individual attacks or simultaneous collective operations. Once having successfully achieved the initial objective of causing chaos in Seoul, then light infantry brigades and mechanized forces of the North Korean People's Army would continue to conduct DMZ breaching operations, envelop Seoul through high-speed maneuver warfare with well-developed road networks in the metropolitan area and supported by underground sympathizers through people’s democratic revolutionary strategy followed by link-up operations between landing amphibious forces in the East and West Sea along the Young-dong Express Highway. Then North Korea will attempt to terminate the limited war early by negotiation, prior to the U.S. main forces’ deployment to the Korean Peninsula. If North Korea can win a limited war, they could eventually achieve a “strong and prosperous state” by seizing two-thirds of South Korea’s economic wealth as the third and final economic objective of North Korea’s national strategy.   The ROK’s Proactive Strategy   Given North Korea’s potential for provocative military action and limited war, the ROK should prepare for any contingent situation. How to establish an ROK security and defense posture to deal with North Korea's provocative actions is one of the most urgent issues.   (1) Integrated Security Posture   The South Korea National Security Council (NSC) needs to be recuperated to develop a national security strategy and to take responsibility for crisis management and policy coordination. Experts and policy practitioners, with a holistic understanding of both theory and practice in the areas of security, defense, and diplomacy, should be assigned to the NSC. High-level diplomatic and security policy makers from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Defense, and Unification and experts from the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, and Korea Institute for National Unification should regularly meet to consult on policy coordination and countermeasures. The crisis management mechanism should be reformed, with institutionalization of crisis management as the control tower. Government officials in diplomacy and security should enhance crisis management capability through pan-governmental levels through periodic political and military games. A responsive communication system should be established in accordance with the spectrum of North Korea’s provocations. However, the special advisor for foreign affairs and security, and the director of the crisis management office should be integrated, because diplomacy and security are inseparable. The disaster security management agency under the control of the Administration and Safety Ministry should be reverted to the Prime Minister’s Office or as an agency under Presidential control as the Emergency Planning Commission. South Korea should achieve a total security posture by enabling its citizens to reach a high level of security awareness about North Korea’s threat and intent, through participating in joint military-government exercises and training in preparation for a possible North Korean provocation.   (2) National Will to Defend Values   Consistent and balanced policy toward North Korea should be pursued. A solid security posture of South Koreans should be maintained and intra-governmental agencies should share useful information with one another. The elusive goal of achieving national consensus brought about by pro–North Korean factions triggers provocation from the North. Thus the subject of modern Korean history and security that specifically tackles North Korea’s provocation cases should be integrated in the curriculum in primary school as well as in junior and senior high school. Liberals should be in a position to emphasize that North Korea’s human rights conditions and political power succession over three generations are below acceptable standards. Since North Koreans usually perceive of South Korean liberals as pro–North Korea, if both the liberals and the opposition party would unite to criticize Pyongyang’s abusive human rights conditions and eventually pass a human rights law in the National Assembly, the North Korean authorities would think that they could no longer control or influence the liberals as well as the opposition party.   (3) Rights to Self-Defense and Rules of Engagement   The morale of the ROK forces should be boosted through empowerment. The ROK forces did not and could not retaliate against North Korea’s violation of the armistice agreement and its terrorist actions. The People’s Army of the DPRK continues to manipulate the South Korean government and military forces. Why is the ROK so feeble against North Korea’s continuing provocations? There is no doubt that ROK national security relies heavily on the ROK-U.S. combined defense system, which has made great contributions to deter war on the Peninsula and facilitate South Korea’s economic miracle. However, the combined defense system has constrained ROK forces from taking prompt action and retaliating against North Korea. The ROK military leadership should be sensitive enough to government directives and the commander’s guidance of the Combined Forces Command or the United Nations Command (UNC). The escalation of the crisis alarms the government and the UNC is likely to pay attention to the rules of engagement to keep the armistice agreement, which agrees to respond proportionally against North Korea’s provocations. As an example, if North Korea fires artillery, South Korea can retaliate against North Korea by artillery fire and addition measures by the approval of the Field Army Commander.   The two North Korean provocations in 2010 vividly showed the powerful impact of both actions on the ROK military leadership. If the ROK government and forces do not exercise proper authority by timely self-defense against future intentional provocation from the North, the reverence of the current administration and forces will be challenged by domestic and foreign actors. The ROK forces should reach an agreement with the UNC on the issues of self-defense authority in the event of North Korea’s provocation. The right of self-defense ensures compliance with the UN Charter Article 7, the Geneva Conventions, and the Hague Treaty. Because North Korea clearly violated Article 2, Item 4, of the UN Charter, Article 8 of the Rome Convention, and committed war-related crimes, it should be punished. Minister of National Defense Kim Kwan-jin took the appropriate action at the commanders’ conference, issuing commanding guidance to all echelon commanders, who should take action and report accordingly; this action clarifies the concept and implementation of self-defense rights.   (4) Superb Military Posture   Mental readiness is an imperative for a strong army. The South Korean people’s trust in their forces, soldiers’ morale, operational discipline, and readiness needs to be firmly established. Vulnerable aspects of war-fighting assets should be resolved. Defense command dedicated to defending the Northwestern islands was activated on June 15, 2011. Intelligence assessment capability, including vigilance and surveillance systems, should be enhanced. Striking assets, including maritime assets, in particular, and counter-fire operation assets to neutralize North Korea’s artillery need to be strongly reinforced. Bolder psychological operations should be conducted, since Pyongyang’s political and military leadership is highly sensitive to North Koreans’ ideological deviation. South Koreans must also help inculcating the truth in North Koreans with regard to the reality of the two Koreas, especially the differences in terms of the economy, human rights conditions, and international status.   (5) Increase in Defense Budget   North Korea’s direct and reinforced threats demand a higher budget for the South’s national defense expenditure. From 2009 to 2011, under the Lee Myung-bak administration, the defense expenditure increased at an annual average of 5.6 percent, which was below 0.8 percent point in terms of the total average expenditure increase of 6.4 percent. In the meantime, from 2005 to 2008, under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the average defense expenditure increased by 8.0 percent, which was 0.6 percent point higher than the average annual increase of 7.4 percent. The current administration should increase the national defense budget for 2012, considering the recent provocative acts of North Korea.   International Cooperation   (1) ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Security Cooperation   The foundation of South Korea’s national security is based on the ROK-U.S. alliance, and in order to respond proactively to Pyongyang’s provocation, a solid ROK-U.S. combined posture is essential. As China continues to provide unilateral support to North Korea, this has to be countered by pursuing trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. We never expect that a military alliance will be established between Seoul and Beijing, because of their conflicting political ideologies, China’s military alliance with North Korea, and their historical experience.   (2) Security Cooperation with China   In the meantime, South Korea should establish security cooperation with China to guide them to play a role as a responsible stakeholder. The Republic of Korea should develop a national strategy that includes not only the United States but also China. Previous and current South Korean administrations and a majority of South Koreans tend to get along well with one, the United States or China, rather than both. The liberal administrations, such as those of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, maintained more favorable relations with China and they exercised an assertive diplomacy toward the United States. The Lee Myung-bak administration, on the other hand, appears to be pro-American and so it seems that it confronts less friction in foreign policy.   This imbalanced perception retains inherent problems. Why can’t South Koreans get along well not only with the United States but also with China? Hwang Joon-hun, the Chinese author of Chosun’s Strategy during the Ching dynasty in the late nineteenth century insisted that the Chosun dynasty should maintain cordial relations with key neighboring states through keeping its friendly relations with China, linking with the United States and also by establishing ties with Japan. He proposed multilateral diplomacy a century ago. A proactive approach is required for South Korea to acquire a deeper understanding of both the United States and China to get along with the two rather than just always favoring the United States. National strategy should thus encompass both the United States and China. The President and his special advisors for foreign affairs and security should consider both states’ importance to the South Korean national interest. Hence, forging networks with both states is vital to demonstrate a more balanced diplomatic and security strategy.   How to establish relations with Beijing is one of Seoul’s primary foreign and security tasks. Programs for reinforcing security cooperation with China should be developed and implemented. Exchange and cooperation initiatives to minimize conflict with China should be explored. These programs should include strategic talks, officer and student exchange program, and the establishment of brotherhood relationships between army, navy and air force units of the two states. Direct communication hotlines between Seoul and Beijing have already been established. An additional treaty for the prevention of dangerous military action should be concluded. Moreover, Track 1.5 conferences between the two states, including the Korea-China Security Forum, the Retired General Officers Association, and the China International Strategy Association should be expanded.   (3) Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Arrangements   The Secretariat office for BESETO (Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo) will be opened in 2011 in accordance with the agreement of the South Korea-China-Japan Summit in 2010, and multilateral response forces of Northeast Asia to deal with natural disasters, including tsunamis, should be established. Seoul, Washington, and Beijing should conduct joint reconnaissance and rescue exercises and counter-piracy exercises, which will make North Korea refrain from hostile actions because it heavily perceives China as a supporter.   Conclusion   The year 2011 is a critical time, just a year before 2012, deemed a vulnerable period for national security due to the following reasons: South Korea and the United States will conduct presidential elections; Chinese President Hu Jintao will turn over presidential authority to Xi Jinping; and North Korea will celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung; the year 2012 also is the target year of North Korea’s vision for a strong and prosperous state. The sinking of the Cheonan and North Korea’s artillery attack against Yeonpyeong Island vividly urged the South Korean people to grasp the North’s real intentions; the incidents awakened the naive populace, thereby highlighting the need to establish a vigilant national security posture. We should be aware that the Yeonpyeong attack did not involve accidental fire but was a brutal invasion to contribute to the North’s strategic objective. Moreover, if North Korea’s political and military leadership decides to seize the opportunity to prove South Korea’s recurring weakness in responding to North Korea’s sequential provocations, they are most likely to launch a limited war to achieve their “strong and prosperous state.” Such a possibility is even more likely if North Korea’s political succession settles down smoothly and South Korea’s vulnerability provides more confidence for the North’s leadership to launch further attacks.   The two pillars of national survival are security and the economy. A prosperous economy cannot be sustained if security is challenged. That explains why security issues cannot be approached through economic solutions. Even though South Korea has a superior advantage over North Korea in terms of national power, economic wealth, and international status, these advantages are futile against the issue of national security and defense posture. The ROK enjoys overwhelmingly superior national power over North Korea. However, if we are vulnerable in our security posture, we are facing a severe security crisis which might lead us to collapse despite our overwhelming advantages except military. We will be able to block North Korea's further provocations through the determination and resolution even to wage war in order to keep peace.   The Republic of Korea, a great model for the Third World’s national development strategy on economic growth and political development, should and is able to build a strong and secure state by strengthening a self-reliant security posture and cooperative security relations with key actors, primarily the United States, China, and the United Nations.   Whether the ROK’s proactive security strategy will succeed or fail depends heavily on two prominent tasks: one is overcoming the stereotype perception of escalation to war in the event of self-defense retaliation. This entails great economic loss, which South Koreans are anxious about because in the event of war, South Korea’s economic achievement might severely suffer. South Koreans are trapped in this kind of mindset, which prevents them from exercising bolder actions in response to North Korea’s continuing provocative actions. Another huge challenge for Seoul is keeping the rules of engagement faithfully, which dictate that it has to abide by the provisions of the armistice agreement; such legalities have constrained South Korea from carrying out a more aggressive strategy toward North Korea. Hence these barriers thwart South Korean determination to face North Korea’s assault. Without a proactive South Korean mindset and strategy with revised rules of aggressive engagement as well as a right to self-defense to respond to any intentional provocation from North Korea, and contributions to deter North Korea’s limited war, achieving peace and security on the Korean Peninsula remains elusive.■         Acknowledgement I appreciate the helpful comments from Kang Choi, Chaesung Chun and Sook-Jong Lee.

EAI Issue Briefing on Public Opinion No. 92   Introduction   In 2010 there were two major North Korean provocations against South Korea as tensions mounted on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region. Following both the sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan and the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, there has been a process within South Korean society to clarify where the responsibility lies and to find an appropriate direction for coping with a more aggressive North Korea. The way that politicians and the media have analyzed the situation has mostly been based upon a dichotomy of ‘war vs. peace.’ Public opinion on the other hand has displayed ambivalent attitudes toward war or peace, preferring to allow for both concepts to exist rather than choosing one over the other.   The South Korean public does not support either appeasement policies that hold back from retaliation or hard line policies that could lead to a full-scale war. In the short term, the public shows mixed views toward improving inter-Korean relations. For the long term, however, the majority of the public favors that the government redirects its tough stance against North Korea toward more dialogue and cooperation. However, it should be noted that there is a growing opinion for maintaining hard-line policies against North Korea even for the long term.   The EAI and Hankook Research, as part of its monthly Public Opinion Barometer, surveyed eight hundred people from around South Korea on November 27, 2010, four days after the attack on Yeonpyeong Island. The results of the November Public Opinion Barometer survey formed the basis of the EAI Issue Briefing on Public Opinion entitled “The Impact of North Korea’s Artillery Strike on Public Opinion in South Korea” which summed up the characteristics of public opinion after the incident . This Issue Briefing will use the results from that survey to provide analysis of the shifting public perceptions on policies toward North Korea.   Issues Regarding Public Opinion on the Yeonpyeong Attack   In the aftermath of the artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island, there have been many discussions among political and civilian sectors of society. The major issues related to the attack include: (1) cause and responsibility, (2) evaluation of Seoul’s response, (3) levels of possible military retaliation, and (4) future policy toward North Korea.   Table 1 Issues Regarding Public Opinion on the Yeonpyeong Attack     1. Cause and Responsibility of the Incident   The main difference between North Korea’s provocations in 2010 is in its admission of culpability. Whereas Pyongyang strenuously denied any involvement in the sinking of the Choenan, it openly and publically admitted that its artillery forces attacked Yeonpyeong Island. Thus, for the Yeonpyeong attack there have been no different views on the direct cause as was seen in the aftermath of the Cheonan sinking. Still, responsibility in preventing the deadly artillery attack shows a divide among public opinion. According to the EAI/Hankook Research November Opinion Barometer survey, a majority believes that the policies of the current Lee Myung-bak administration are responsible for provoking the Yeonpyeong attack. But when asked on the North Korean nuclear crisis, most place responsibility on the previous Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administrations.   In the November Public Opinion Barometer survey, when asked which administration’s policy resulted in the Yeonpyeong attack, 39.4% of respondents blamed the Sunshine Policy of the former administrations while 51.3% blamed the current administration’s hard-line policy against North Korea. The majority of the younger generation, well-educated groups, and progressives criticized the current administration while most of the older generation, low-income groups, and conservatives accused the previous administrations.   In another survey conducted on the same day by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and Research & Research, the results showed a different perception on the North Korean nuclear crisis. 43.3% of respondents blamed the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations’ Sunshine Policy while 35.5% accused the current administration’s hard-line policies.   What lies behind the two different perceptions concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis and the attack on Yeonpyeong Island? It would be obvious to point out that this is simply because the two events occurred under the watch of each respective administration. However, tracking back to the root of this issue there is a critical perception by the public on the government’s inability to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons during the ten years of the Sunshine Policy. At the same time, there is deep unhappiness with the current administration’s reluctance to engage the North, which has caused strains in inter-Korean relations.   Figure 1 Where the Responsibility Lies for Yeonpyeong Attack and North Korean Nuclear Crisis   Who is responsible for Yeonpyeong Attack?   Who is responsible for North Korean Nuclear Crisis? Problem?   2. Evaluation of Seoul’s Response to the Attack on Yeonpyeong Island   According to the November Public Opinion Barometer survey, the majority of South Korean citizens have a high level of distrust in their government. As was already presented in “The Impact of North Korea’s Artillery Strike on Public Opinion in South Korea,” only 24.7% of respondents believed that the government responded well while 72.0% believed that the government did wrong. Likewise, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies/Research & Research survey reveals that only 25.9% of respondents had a positive view on the government’s response while 65.7% held a negative view.   On the subject of what the government did wrong, the results of the November Public Opinion Barometer survey shows that supporters of the Grand National Party (GNP) which is the current ruling party, Liberty Forward Party and other conservatives felt that it was the government’s limited retaliation compared to the level of damage sustained on Yeonpyeong Island. On the other hand, the opposition party and progressives pointed out that the government failed in its handling of the crisis.   Overall, the largest number of respondents (36.5%) placed blame on the government’s lack of an effective crisis management system, while 23.8% stated that the military response was too weak. Other responses included, 13.1% who thought that the direction of response was confused, 11.4% who thought that there was confusion in official statements made by the government, and 6.9% answered that the absence of diplomacy with China was wrong.   Figure 2 Different Reasons for Criticism by Ideological Background   3. Levels of Possible Military Measures   The biggest change in the public perception towards North Korea after the Yeonpyeong attack is the acceptance of the military option to counter North Korea’s actions. 68.6% of respondents answered that a military option was an appropriate countermeasure against North Korea’s attack on Yeonpyeong Island while only 23.9% were against this. This number (68.6%) has more than doubled when compared to the number in the May Public Opinion Barometer survey conducted following the sinking of the Cheonan which was a mere 28.2%.   South Korean public opinion is beginning to form a common perception that the government’s military response was weak. According to the data from the Asan Institute for Policy Studies survey, 80.3% of respondents agreed that the South Korean military should have taken stronger action against North Korea during the Yeonpyeong attack.   However, according to the results of the EAI/Hankook Research survey, the public felt that it would have been too dangerous to have used close air support to attack North Korean artillery positions during the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Such measures could have brought the situation to the brink of all-out war. On these issues, respondents were asked if “South Korea should have launched air strikes on North Korean artillery positions” or whether “South Korea should have refrained from using air power in order to prevent escalation.” 39.3% supported the use of air power while 56.6% answered that refraining from launching air strikes was appropriate. This clearly shows that while more people prefer to take up hard-line policies toward North Korea following the Yeonpyeong attack, the majority does not favor any actions that might lead to a full-scale war with North Korea.   Figure 3 Pros & Cons Concerning the Use of Air Strikes during the Yeonpyeong Attack   4. Future Policy towards North Korea   Calls within South Korea to minimize or even cut off aid to North Korea are becoming more vocal. According to the Public Opinion Barometer conducted in January 2010, 67.6% of respondents felt that it was necessary to increase or maintain current levels of aid to North Korea with only 31.6% believing it should be minimized or abolished. However, the number of respondents who believe that aid to North Korea should be maintained or even increased is decreasing. The Public Opinion Barometer surveys conducted by the EAI and Korea Research following both the Cheonan incident (May 2010) and the attack on Yeonpyeong Island (November 2010) showed those in support of aid at 41.8% and 40.5% respectively. On the other hand, the number of those who agreed to minimize or cut off aid are in the majority, going from 51.2% (May, 2010) to 56.9% (November, 2010).   Although short term public support for aid policies to North Korea has decreased, in terms of long term policies there is still strong support for reconciliation and cooperation rather than maintaining hard-line policies. In the May Public Opinion Barometer, only 37.1% felt that South Korea should pursue hard-line policies toward North Korea in the long run. This number increased slightly to 42.7% following the Yeonpyeong Island attack. By contrast, the percentage of people who supported reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea in May 2010 was 61.5% and only decreased by 6.3% points (55.2%) in November, 2010. While it is true that more people are beginning to favor hard-line policies even for the long term, a far larger percentage still prefers engagement policies with North Korea.   Figure 4 Public Opinion on Aid to North Korea & Long Term Policies toward North Korea                                       Aid to North Korea                                                  Long Term Policy toward North Korea   Conclusion   There has been a fundamental change in public opinion on policies toward North Korea after the sinking of the Cheonan and the artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island. These two incidents have broken the societal consensus on the policies of reconciliation and cooperation, which was mainly focused on providing aid to North Korea. The military option, which was unthinkable in the past, is now seriously considered as a reasonable response by the majority of the public. South Korean public opinion which favored patience for the future in the face of past provocations now supports military countermeasures. There are also more voices blaming the Sunshine Policy under the previous administrations for allowing North Korea to develop nuclear weapons.   However, this does not mean that the public has turned their back completely on engagement policies in favor of tougher policies against North Korea. The public remain concerned that a hard-line approach might escalate the situation and lead to an all-out war. For this reason there is still support for reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea in the long run. That is to say, even though the public’s center of gravity might edge toward tougher policies, contradicting attitudes will continue to exist within public perceptions.   In devising new policies toward North Korea, a flexible approach should be considered that does not select either a hard-line approach or engagement. Such a hybrid policy will gain more public support in the near future.■

EAI Issue Briefing on Public Opinion No. 91   [The Peterson Institute for International Economics] North Korea: Witness to Transformation  Direct to Quote         1. The Level of Security Concern Peaked at its Highest Number Since 2000   From Engagement to Crisis   On November 23, 2010, North Korea launched a deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island; a South Korean island situated 12km off the North Korean coastline. Although ROK Marines returned fire, two Marines and two civilians were killed in the attack by the North. There have been several incidents since the Armistice Agreement that brought an end to the Korean War was signed on July 27, 1953, but this has been the first time a military attack has killed civilians.   The EAI/Han-Kook Research November Public Opinion Barometer, which was conducted after the North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island, reveals that 81.5% of respondents feel they are “concerned” about insecurity (34.9% “very concerned”+ 46.6% “slightly concerned”). This is the highest number since the survey first began in 2000.   Figure 1 Percentage of South Koreans’ concerns of insecurity (including very concerned and slightly concerned) since 2000     After the inter-Korean summit in 2000, only 18.9% of respondents felt “concerned” about insecurity on the Korean Peninsula. However, this number started to rise as former President George W. Bush took office and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis began. In November 2003, it hit 54.8% following Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty. As the Six-Party Talks were initiated to manage the nuclear crisis in 2004, the public’s feelings of insecurity came down to 43.0%. In October 2006, North Korea’s first nuclear test pushed up the number to 63.8%, a year later it drops down to 31.9% with the second inter-Korean summit in October 2007.   Feelings of Insecurity Reach at Their Peak   In the research conducted in March, 2009, only 29.5% of respondents expressed “concern” about insecurity on the Korean Peninsula. But as Pyongyang’s anti-South Korea and anti-United States hard-line policies started to gain momentum so too did the levels of insecurity. The missile launch on April 5, 2009 and the second nuclear test on May 25 in the same year pushed up this “concern” to 32.8% and 48.4% respectively. Furthermore, with increased levels of international sanctions against North Korea such as South Korea’s participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the number goes up higher to 59.2%.   In August 2009, North Korea released the two female reporters who were arrested the previous March and the CEO of Hyundai Group visited Pyongyang, which helped to reduce the levels of insecurity temporarily.   Figure 2 Percentage of South Koreans’ concerns of insecurity (including very concerned and slightly concerned) during the Lee Myung-bak administration 2007-2010   After the Cheonan Incident on March 26, 2010, the “concern” among respondents rose to 66.8%. The number increased to 75.4% when the South Korean administration officially announced that the incident was caused by North Korea. Following the ROK-U.S. combined military exercise and more cooperation between the two states, the level went down to 59.6% until the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island pushed the number up to 81.5%, the highest since 2000.   Of the most concern with this incident is that it was the first time North Korea used artillery to directly attack South Korean territory and civilians. Adding to the rising worries, this attack was a violation of the “principle of distinction,” which thus far prohibited raids on civilians and civilian property.   Chances for War on the Korean Peninsula is Considered Slim   The public’s feelings of insecurity on the Korean Peninsula did not mean respondents felt that there was a chance for total war following the attack. For the survey question “Do you think there is going to be a war?” only 26.8% said yes whereas 71.4% said no.   Public opinion did vary depending on gender and age. Only 18.0% of males answered that they think there is going to be a war while 35.4% of females believed so. For the age groups, younger people tended to have more worries about war breaking out: 35.7% of people in their 20s said yes to the same question; 32.5% of those in their 30s, 25.1% of those in their 40s, and 19.6% of those in their 50s or older said yes. Support among respondents for the current administration in South Korea also had an impact on the results. Only 22.2% of respondents who support the administration expressed concerns for total war, while 30.9% of respondents who oppose the current administration are concerned about the outbreak of war. Education, occupation, and region did not yield any noticeable difference.   Figure 3 Assessment of Chances for War by Different Groups (“A war on the Korean Peninsula is likely to break out” (%))   2. Evaluation of Seoul’s Response to the Attack on Yeonpyeong Island   Progressives and Conservatives both Critical   Reflecting the shock and anger of the South Korean people, Figure 4 shows the public’s cold attitude to the government’s response to the attack on Yeonpyeong Island. Whereas 24.7% of respondents answered that the government reacted well (including respondents who answered ‘excellently’ 1.9% and ‘well’ 22.8%), 72% believed that the response was poor (includes ‘poor’ 46.0%, ‘very poor’ 26.0%).   It deserves attention that not only supporters of the opposition Democratic Party (DP) but also the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) showed negative views regarding the reaction of the government. 63.4% of GNP supporters and 72.8% of conservatives said that the government’s reaction was not enough. This reveals that the government does not even receive support from pro-government circles. Even the majority of the respondents (58.8%) who responded that President Lee has conducted state affairs well said that the administration’s reaction to the North Korean attack was inadequate.   Reflecting this public mood, the Blue House is faced with a wide range of criticism from politicians, the media, and civil society. Some have criticized that Seoul should have punished North Korea militarily even at the risk of escalating tensions. Others blame the hard line policy of the Lee administration toward North Korea in provoking the attack. Another group raised criticism on the confusion among different government agencies in the initial countermeasures to the attack and the failure to convey its message to the public. Finally there were those who raised concerns about the aging military facilities and the emergency management system on Yeonpyeong Island. In order to use this incident as a chance to review and enhance the government’s crisis management system, a meticulous and systematic analysis of public opinion following the attack is required.   Figure 4 Assessment of the Government’s Response to the Attack by Different Groups (“The government’s response following the attack on Yeonpyeong was poor” (%))   Poor Response Amplified the Feeling of Insecurity   The percentage of respondents who felt a sense of insecurity was 85.6% among those who criticized the government’s reaction. This number is 15% points higher than those who believe the government’s reaction was proper, which accounts for 71.6%. The negative perception of the government’s reaction amplified the citizens’ feeling of insecurity more than anything else. Regardless of whether the government’s reaction was effective or not, it is obvious that the artillery strike on South Korean territory and civilian infrastructure greatly increased the feeling of insecurity especially as this was the first use of artillery across the border since the Korean War.   Furthermore, this difference becomes magnified when the degree of insecurity is considered. Among those who support the government’s reaction, only 18.2% responded that they felt “very concerned” about the levels of insecurity. At the other end, 53.5% felt “slightly concerned” about the levels of insecurity. This shows that if the government’s reaction was considered to be appropriate, people would feel a low level of insecurity. However, among those who criticized the government’s reaction, as much as 41.3% felt “very concerned” about insecurity, while 44.3% felt “slightly concerned.” If the percentage of those that felt “very concerned” is compared, there was 33.1% difference.   Figure 5 Feeling of Insecurity in Groups with Different Assessment for the Government’s Response to the Attack   Detailed Evaluation of the Government’s Response: Merits and Demerits   Reflecting the strong criticism, the largest number of respondents (26.1%) answered that the government did nothing well. The second largest group of people (21.8%) stated that preventing the escalation of a wider conflict was correct. There was though a dispute on whether President Lee was within his capacity to give direct tactical orders on the initial response during the attack as the commander-in-chief. Support for maintaining a strengthened ROK-U.S. alliance (16.5%) came in next, followed by smaller numbers for a positive evaluation of the government’s military response (9.5%), managing citizens’ feeling of insecurity (9.4%) and economic risk management (6.4%).   Concerning what the government did wrong, the largest group of respondents, 36.5% of them pointed out the lack of a crisis management system. It is followed by 23.8% of the respondents who believed that the military response was too weak, 13.1% thought that confusion in the direction of the response to North Korea, and 11.4% who stated that confusion in the government’s official statement was wrong. Others answered that a lack of diplomatic influence towards Beijing (6.9%) was at fault while only 1.4% believed that there was nothing wrong.   The majority of respondents pointed out that the lack of a crisis management system and confusion in the government’s reaction rather than a weak military response was the problem. This indicates that not only changing the rules of engagement to modify the levels of response to military provocations, but also diagnosing the systemic problems in the government’s response are important. Specifically, confusion among different agencies and public statements during this crisis was a major concern for the public.   Figure 6: Detailed Evaluation of the Government’s Response to the Attack     Progressives and Conservatives are Critical for Different Reasons   As mentioned before, not only the progressives but also conservatives did not perceive the government’s response to the attack on Yeonpyeong Island positively. Upon careful observation, however, they criticized the government for different reasons. According to Figure 7, 42.3% of the progressives and 41.5% of moderates answered that the lack of a system for dealing with a crisis was the government’s main failing. They are followed by confusion in the government’s official statements and confusion in how to respond to North Korea’s attack which both highlights the government’s inconsistency accounting for 23.9% and 25.0% respectively. 20.9% of progressives and 19.7% of moderates also indicated that a weak military response is a problem.   On the other hand, the largest numbers of conservatives (32.2%) pointed out the weak military response as a problem. It is followed by 27.8% of conservatives who concerned about the lack of a crisis management system. 25.7% identified the government’s inconsistency such as confusion in the government’s official statements and confusion in how to respond to North Korea’s attack as problems.   Criticisms prevail on the administration’s initial handling of the problem, for it focused on preventing escalation and managing domestic matters rather than countermeasures against the North. This acidic public opinion seems to mushroom with conservatives at the core. Amongst liberal and conservative voters, many denounced the administration’s lack of crisis managing system and political confusion. Though the administration’s positively-evaluated handlings are not being discussed at present—within the political community, the media, or the civil society—we would do better to pay more attention to them as well.   3. Changes in North Korea Policy Preferences: Comparing Public Opinion on the Cheonan Incident and the Attack on Yeonpyeong Island   Comparison of the Two Incidents   The biggest difference between the two incidents is that the Cheonan incident, in which a North Korean submarine infiltrated South Korean waters and sank a ROK Navy corvette in a torpedo attack, occurred within the guidelines of the “principle of distinction.” This prohibits any attack on civilians or civilian facilities, something that was not adhered to during the Yeonpyeong Island attack.   Figure 7: Different Reasons for Criticism by Ideological Background   In the case of the Cheonan incident, it took two months for the South Korean government to officially confirm that North Korea was behind the sinking since Pyongyang denied any responsibility. On the other hand, Pyongyang officially admitted its involvement in the attack of Yeonpyeong Island only three days after the attack. Therefore, the two cases differ on responsibility and certainty of the cause.   The reactions of the neighboring states also show a clear contrast. For the Cheonan incident, there was divided international opinion on the cause of the sinking. The United States and Japan believed North Korea was responsible while China and Russia refused to state who or what was responsible for the incident.   For the Yeonpyeong Island attack, Moscow immediately stated that North Korea was responsible for their actions. Beijing at first focused on the fact that the incident took place right after the ROK military exercises, but they began to show a change in their position when the ROK-U.S. combined military exercises including the aircraft carrier USS George Washington took place in the Yellow Sea on November 28. Since the attack, Beijing has been trying to restrain North Korea from further provocations by trying to initiate talks with North Korean delegates.   The South Korean government’s response has also been different. Immediately following the sinking of the Cheonan, the Blue House stated that they were not certain that it was related to North Korea. In an effort to find the cause, the Cheonan was salvaged and an international joint investigation was launched. On May 20, 2010, the Joint Investigation Committee officially announced that it was a North Korean submarine that had sunk the Cheonan and on May 24, President Lee Myung-bak announced his measures for responding to future North Korean provocations during a televised address to the people. In these measures, Lee made it clear that Seoul will punish Pyongyang militarily, sever North-South relations, and refer the issue to the UN Security Council. Interestingly, this came before the June local elections which meant that 67.2% of respondents in a survey conducted on May 30 expressed doubt, believing that the ruling party was trying to use this incident for political purposes.   After the Yeonpyeong Island incident, doubts arose as the Blue House’s statements contradicted with the defense minister’s comments to the National Assembly. Some have argued that the ROK Marines’ counter-battery fire was ineffective and that the government had not prepared for any attack despite some signals, such as North Korea’s movement of artillery to the coastline. A few days after the attack, Defense Minister Kim Tae-Young resigned as he tried to placate the uproar.   Table 1 Summary of Cheonan / Yeonpyeong Incidents     Comparison of Public Opinion on the Two Incidents   It is evident that the evaluation of the response to the attack on Yeonpyeong Island is far more negative than that of the Cheonan Incident. On April 24, 2010, before the official announcement by the South Korean government on the sinking of the Cheonan, less than half of the respondents (41.2%) believed that the administration’s reaction was good. However, on May 28, following President Lee’s televised address 57.6% of respondents had a positive view on how the administration was dealing with the crisis. Although it is too early to have a full picture, the current support rate for the administration’s handling of the Yeonpyeong Island attack is much lower (24.7%).   As Table 2 indicates, the evaluation of how the administration handled the Cheonan Incident is very much polarized. Progressives, Democratic Party supporters, and opponents of the current administration showed a negative attitude, while conservatives, GNP supporters, and supporters of the current administration expressed positive views. By contrast, the survey shows that not only the opponents of the administration but its supporters and conservatives have all expressed strong criticism toward the way the government has dealt with this latest incident, particularly in regard to its response.   Significant Changes in Opinion Regarding the Use of Retaliatory Measures   Until the Yeonpyeong incident, public opinion preferred the use of international cooperation or financial sanctions in times of crisis. People expressed mixed opinions on severing the relationship with the North, and most people disliked the idea of using force as a counter measure.   As Table 2 shows, policy options favored against North Korea following the Cheonan Incident were in support of approaching the UN Security Council (75.0%), with slightly tougher measures next, economic sanctions (58.5%) and severing relations (45.2%), while limited military retaliation (28.2%) figured less. After the attack on Yeonpyeong Island, however, 68.6% of respondents favored the option for limited military retaliation. This was the only dramatic change as the percentages on other categories did not alter significantly between the two incidents.   It is a clear sign that even moderates and liberals now believe that limited military action is needed in response to evident North Korean provocations. The fact that it was a direct attack on South Korean territory and that civilians were targeted seems to have had a significant impact.   Deepening of the “Ambivalent Attitude”: Accepting the military measures is going to be the turning point of the view on North Korea   The possibility for military action against the North has long been treated as a taboo in South Korea, but the recent incident seems to be a turning point. It would seem that a military response is now a priority as a final measure to deal with North Korea.   Yet, it does not look like the preference of the public has completely shifted over to harsh measures against the North. Table 2 shows that respondents who look favorably toward cutting off all relations with North Korea including tourism and economic activities stand at 42.5%, but those who oppose more hawkish measures outweigh them at 53.9%.   As shown in Figure 8, 42.7% of respondents said the Lee administration should “deal with North Korea harshly” while 55.2% said it should try to “engage and cooperate.” The number for hard line policies is up from 37.1% and the number for engagement policies is down from 61.5%. This is from June 5th, the last time the poll was taken. Despite this decrease, the majority of people still favor friendly and lenient policies.   Nevertheless, fear of total war is deeply rooted in the minds of the Korean people so that the growing percentage of respondents prefer a limited military response is only possible with the assumption that war is not going to occur. It can mainly be interpreted as the result of mixed emotional feelings at seeing the loss of civilians and damage of homes. This is a typical case of the “ambivalent attitude,” which is the coexistence of conflicting values, demanding a tougher response yet not willing to abandon engagement with North Korea.   ROK-U.S. Alliance, the Lever of Security for South Korea   During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, especially after the tragic deaths of two middle school girls by a U.S. armored vehicle in 2002, public opinion showed a tendency to improve the asymmetrical relationship between South Korea and the United States and transform the security policy dependent upon the ROK-U.S. alliance. Going through moments of crises such as North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile tests, the Cheonan incident, and now the attack on Yeonpyeong Island, there has been a large increase in support for the ROK-U.S. alliance.   In January 2010, there was a political balance concerning the desirable relations between South Korea and United States (30.8% of respondents supported an independent foreign policy from the United States, 33.6% supported the status quo, while 34.7% supported strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance). By July 2010, several months after the Cheonan incident, however, the percentage of respondents who supported an independent foreign policy had dropped to 23.7%. Supporters of the status quo dropped a little to 30.4%. But those who supported strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance increased by 8.5% points to 43.2%.   After four months, this support has strengthened with the recent attack on Yeonpyeong Island. Supporters for an independent foreign policy have decreased further 12.7% points since January 2010 and now stand at 18.1%. Respondents who took the middle course and supported the status quo have not shown much difference, remaining steady at 30.5%. Those who believe that the ROK-U.S. alliance needs to be strengthened, however, have jumped to 48.6% which is an increase of 13.9% points. It can be seen that as inter-Korean relations become more strained and Seoul’s countermeasures towards North Korea are viewed as ineffective, public trust and expectation toward the ROK-U.S. alliance has strengthened.■   Figure 8: The Future Direction of ROK-U.S. Alliance and North Korea Policy   Table 2: Public Opinion Comparison between Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents    

Jaewoo Choo is Chair and Associate Professor of Chinese foreign policy in the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyung Hee University, Korea. Prior to his teaching at Kyung Hee, Professor Choo worked as a researcher at a number of think tanks in Korea.         At least for the time being, China’s foreign policy goals are focused on the preservation of the status quo in its peripheries, including the Korean Peninsula. China sees its long absence of war or military conflict as evidence of the well-preserved peace and stability of its security environment. Conversely, it conceives that this status quo has been conducive to achieving its foremost national goal, economic modernization. It continues to strive to improve its security environment within the equilibrium.   There seems to be one growing exception, however, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, however. China’s support for the replacement of the Korean War Armistice with a peace agreement and a peace regime is in stark contrast to its status quo policy. Given China’s long advocacy as a peace-loving nation, it seems only logical that putting an end to Korea’s current technically-at-war status would make sense. Beijing has its own reasoning and logic behind its supportive call for a new peace arrangement on the peninsula. A confrontational international structure around the peninsula, for instance, can only be overcome by a peace agreement, a precondition necessitated by the Armistice. Hence, a peace agreement before normalization of this structure is perceived to be path-dependent.   However, serious challenges arise if a call for a peace agreement and regime is put forth without much thinking regarding the strategic implications. Chinese scholars and experts tend to overlook this factor in their appraisal. On the surface, theirs is a just and righteous call that a peace agreement must replace the Armistice. It is critical to the installment of “perpetual peace” on the peninsula. It is also logical that such peace can be guaranteed by forging a peace regime, an assurance mechanism that will supplement the “peace” endowed by the agreement.   If Chinese claims are correct, why are they not embraced by others? There must be something wrong in what the Chinese widely believe. Although their analysis of the imperatives for a peace agreement and regime is undeniable, as we shall see, their call for a peace agreement and regime still remains contradictory to the status quo orientation of their mother country’s foreign policy. Moreover, their work seems to lack insight regarding the strategic and structural implications of the full implementation of such a peace arrangement. Furthermore, Chinese pundits must define the meaning of a new peace in a more articulated way in the context of a new regional order to effectively defend their nation’s support for a peace agreement and regime.   Chinese Reading of a Peace Agreement and Peace Regime   The Chinese government and analysts highly value the idea of replacing the Armistice with a peace agreement and forging a peace regime as an operational framework for such an arrangement. China sees these two steps as an alternative choice to so-called cross-recognition of the two Koreas by their neighboring states. Since the latter has not materialized, China sees the call for a peace agreement and regime as a resultant development. A peace agreement and regime are viewed as a better alternative to North Korea and those who do not have formal ties to it, namely the United States and Japan. Chinese experts argue that a peace agreement between the United States and North Korea, for instance, would be a critical prerequisite to the normalization of their relationship and the further consolidation of peace and stability on the peninsula.   Chinese scholars and analysts (“Chinese” hereafter) are highly appreciative of their government’s longtime support for the ideas of replacing the Armistice with a peace agreement and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. China’s support can be traced as far back as 1973, when the two Koreas first mentioned a “peace agreement” in their joint statement, also known as the “July 4 Joint Statement.” Since then, the Chinese further highlight that regardless of who has initiated the discussions on a peace agreement and regime, the Chinese government has consistently conveyed strong support both in action and in words. During the first discourse of formal negotiations prompted by the so-called Four-Party Talks from 1997 to 1999, the Chinese further elaborate, China declared its desire to play a proactive role and make constructive contributions. As evidence of its stance, for instance, it delivered five principles for the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and four points for the establishment of a peace regime at the fourth plenary session of the Four-Party Talks in January 1999.   Most Chinese defend their government’s position on the basis of the following four imperatives.   1. A new trend in history   The Chinese claim that historical imperatives imply the need to overcome the prevalence of “Cold War thinking” held by the major powers and the two Koreas, which is still very much perpetuated by the Armistice. In other words, such thinking must transform into something more fit and suitable to the current phase of development in world history, that is, the “post–Cold War” world. In the post–Cold War era, the Chinese believe that economic security overrides traditional security on the priority list of the foreign policy agenda; prosperity and development are the key concerns of nations; sustainable development is the theme of the twenty-first century; and dialogue and cooperation, rather than confrontation and alliance, are the preferred means to solving international conflicts. In sum, new thinking is needed to serve the interests of the people and nations living in a new century.   The last time the Chinese government publicly expressed its concern over the remnants of Cold War thinking was in May 2008 during South Korean president Lee Myong-bak’s visit to Beijing. The spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when asked about the Korea-U.S. alliance, depicted it as “a product of a bygone era.” He further elaborated the reasoning behind his statement as based on a premise that the situation in Northeast Asia has changed and the regional issues should not be viewed through a Cold War lens. From Beijing’s perspective, Cold War thinking is strongly embedded in the South Korea-U.S. alliance.   Chinese scholars and experts hold a similar view on the issue. They are explicit in their argument in relating the South Korea–U.S. alliance as a factor in those allies’ Cold War way of handling North Korea and security on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese still see the South Korea–U.S. alliance as a dominating factor in shaping the perception of the North in Washington and Seoul. In the Chinese assessment, Cold War thinking is one of the major obstacles to the realization of “perpetual peace” on the Korean Peninsula.   To substantiate their argument, the Chinese highlight those issues underscored by America’s outdated and outmoded strategic calculus and behavior. Although the Clinton administration once adopted an “engagement policy” toward the North, a “containment policy” eclipsed it. Strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance was vigorously pursued beginning in 1997 by expanding the scope and range of the Japanese military forces’ maneuverability to support U.S. military activities within their vicinity. Moreover, the U.S. push of Japan and South Korea to host the so-called Theatre Missile Defense system, the Chinese argue, is another controversial aspect of the U.S. engagement policy. The Chinese interpret it as American unwillingness to offer security assurance to the North and the adversarial perception upheld by the United States regarding the North.   The Chinese find a similar trait in measures adopted for the South Korea–U.S. alliance in 2003. While the United States justified its military presence for the sake of the “peace and stability” of the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese counterargue that the U.S. decision at the fifth U.S.-ROK Future Alliance Policy Planning meeting to transform the forces into one with greater flexibility and much greater forward deployment capability is a salient example of America’s Cold War thinking. To the Chinese, the U.S. factor is the critical variable for the realization of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.   Furthermore, the Chinese argue that the United States did not fare any better with a leadership change thereafter, as the new administration shifted its policy orientation on North Korea to containment. The Chinese find the cause of America’s refusal to continue the agreed framework with the North in the United States’ ever worsening perception of the North, once dubbed part of an “axis of evil” and a rogue state. In the eyes of the Chinese, the United States wanted to seek “peace and stability” in a rather hard fashion. The fact that the possibility of subverting the regime in Pyongyang received full consideration in Washington validates the Chinese argument. They further proclaim that America’s inconsistent, even contradictory, policy toward North Korea is a significant risk factor for the stability and peace supposedly guaranteed by the current Armistice.   2. Changes on diplomatic fronts   Observing the changes on the diplomatic fronts of North Korea, Chinese analysts attribute the obsoleteness of the Armistice to this factor. Although North Korea adamantly remained a hermit kingdom throughout much of the 1990s despite the demise of the bipolar system, it decided to come out of its isolation in diplomatic terms at the dawn of a new century. The Chinese argue that the changes on both North Korea’s diplomatic fronts and posture function as a requisite international condition to replace the Armistice by a peace agreement. Hence, such a peace agreement will be feasible because a peace mechanism will be effectively at work as a result of the North’s improved relations with the West.   Beginning in 2000, North Korea normalized relations with Italy, Australia, and Great Britain. It also joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that year. In the first half of the following year, it established diplomatic relations with the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Germany, Luxembourg, Greece, Brazil, New Zealand, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Turkey. As of today, the North has diplomatic relationships with twenty-five of twenty-seven EU nations, and is also formally recognized by the European Union. North Korea’s successive normalization with the western European states is significant because most of them once fought against the North in the Korean War.   In addition, North Korea was also given a chance to normalize its relationship with the United States if it abided by all the requirements provided in the so-called 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework (the “Framework” hereafter). However, the North’s desire to improve relations with the United States failed to witness any progress other than symbolic, yet historic, visits by North Korean general Cho Myong-rok to New York in 1999 and then secretary Madeline Albright to Pyongyang in 2000...(Continued)

On June 22, 2010 the East Asia Institute hosted a press briefing on the recent Cheonan incident. The conference comprised of a presentation by Professor Sukhee Han (Yonsei University), which was also released as an EAI Commentary “China's Dilemma regarding the Cheonan Incident and the Future of ROK-China Relations.” There were also further presentations by Seong Ji Woo (Kyung Hee University) and Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University). Following the presentations, a Q&A session took place with foreign representatives from Press TV, Legal Daily, Economic Daily, the Associated Press (AP) and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.   The press briefing was a great opportunity to present and address specific questions on the effects of the Cheonan incident on current and future East Asian political dynamics. More specifically, the presentations focused on the international environment for North Korea, North Korean politics and economy, and South Korea’s response after the Cheonan incident. The following is a summary of the press briefing and the subsequent Q&A.   Presentations   Sukhee Han: The International Environment for North Korea after the Cheonan Incident   China’s response to the Cheonan incident is a manifestation of its attempt to mix two seemingly incompatible entities: the desire to rise as a “responsible global power” while maintaining its alliance with North Korea. As defined by Chinese leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, a responsible power should create stability while promoting justice by maintaining neutrality. To achieve both ends, China’s stance during the Cheonan incident has been to protect North Korea in order to maintain stability and peace on the Korea Peninsula and to achieve the greater goal of regional stability.   China’s Dilemma in Punishing North Korea   China’s actions following the sinking of the Cheonan seems to suggest a strengthening of the alliance between China and North Korea. Highlighting this, Kim Jong-il visited China in May, 2010 to discuss the future of China-DPRK relations. In contrast to South Korea’s expectations, China did not support the results of South Korea’s investigation into the Cheonan incident nor did it commit to South Korea’s efforts in the United Nations to condemn North Korea. In fact, throughout the entire incident China has been deflecting international criticism as it has protected North Korea.   China’s protective stance toward North Korea cannot be explained simply as a genuine effort to protect Pyongyang. Rather it should be seen as a calculated move to preserve regional stability, part of China’s self-defined role as a responsible global power. Because of the fragility of the situation, any small impact from foreign actors may undermine North Korea’s stability and therefore ultimately regional peace and security. If China were to support South Korea’s results from the investigation and agree to condemn North Korea at the United Nations, it would isolate North Korea triggering a potential backlash and further provocations in the region. A further difficulty for China is that it cannot outright veto the resolution, which would risk damaging its diplomatic relationships with other important member states. Considering these choices, China’s only viable option would be to abstain from the vote at the UN Security Council and to maintain neutrality.   The meeting between the China and the DPRK in May shows Beijing’s attempt to preserve regional stability. However, China was unsuccessful at promoting strategic dialogue with the North Korea leadership and failed to exert influence or receive enhanced information on North Korea’s intentions that would help prevent future provocations. Soon after the meeting, Pyongyang continued to make new announcements of its nuclear capability and two Chinese civilians were shot along Yalu River. Furthermore, China was also unable to gain Kim Jong-il’s promise to participate in the Six-Party Talks, while on the other side North Korea was unable to secure substantial aid from China.   Throughout the incident, China has maintained its neutral position, although it seems to be bolstering North Korea’s stance. As a newly emerging leader, China is walking a fine line between preserving its alliance with North Korea and maintaining regional stability.   Implications on South Korea’s Relations with China and the United States   China’s response to the Cheonan incident has led to a low point in China-ROK relations. Beijing’s response seems to suggest that the China-DPRK alliance is more important than the China-ROK partnership. This has created disappointment and provoked efforts to reassess the bilateral relationship with China in South Korea.   In contrast to China-ROK relations, the alliance with the United States is strengthening, as displayed by the upcoming joint military exercise in the Yellow Sea. With the participation of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington for the exercise, it has triggered an emotional response from China which has no realistic measures to stop the joint exercises. With only diplomatic channels to voice against the ROK-U.S. military exercise, it might be an opportunity for China to make meaningful changes in its foreign policy.   Future: Importance of Network Diplomacy   As seen from the Cheonan incident, South Korea, China and the United States are inextricably intertwined. Without a multilateral approach, China cannot single-handedly deal with North Korea to preserve peace and security in the region. Although China’s relationship with South Korea and the United States has deteriorated recently with the incident, it will be essential for all three actors to promote network diplomacy. South Korea must develop its relationship and strengthen its cooperation with China, the United States and other related countries to more effectively work towards regional stability.   Seong Ji Woo: North Korea’s Politics and Economy after the Cheonan Incident   The Supreme People’s Assembly   In 2010, North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) has so far been held twice, its scheduled meeting in April and another extra session in June. Holding a second session within such a short time frame is a particularly precarious act by Pyongyang. The three main reasons for holding the June session seems to be the need to deal with the unsuccessful currency reform of late 2009, follow-up on Kim Jong-il’s visit to China, and importantly to address the Cheonan incident.   For the June session, the SPA appointed a new Premier and Deputy Premier, signaling a shift in focus toward improving the failing North Korean economy. Additionally, Jang Song-Taek, brother-in-law of Kim Jong-il and a member of the National Defense Commission (NDC) since April, 2009, was promoted to Deputy Chairman of the NDC. This promotion sends two messages that the NDC will be the head organization spearheading the succession from Kim Jong-il to his son Kim Jong-eun, and that Jang will be an important figure during this process. Jang is also the director of the Administration Department of the Korean Workers’ Party that controls the state security apparatus such as the State Security Department and the Ministry of Public Security.   Power Succession   The power succession from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-eun is already in progress. Kim Jong-eun was believed to have been selected as successor in January, 2009, becoming the effective “number two” man in both the party and military. Kim Jong-eun currently controls the Organization and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers’ Party. There are also reports that he is heading the State Security Department. Within the Korean Worker’s Party, the Propaganda and Agitation Department is campaigning to idolize Kim Jong-eun and he is also rumored to be behind the 100-Day and 150-Day Battle campaign to improve the economic lives of the people.   Economy and Governance   The North Korean economy is in a desperate situation with no sign of a recovery. In fact, over the past few months North Korea has faced a worsening economic situation due to the failure of the currency reform, and a reduction in trade and economic cooperation with South Korea because of the Cheonan incident. With food shortages already spreading to the cities and the countryside, the Korean Workers’ Party issued instructions on May 26, 2010 proclaiming that the state is no longer capable of providing food to the people for the short-term.   In addition to the failing economy, there is less effective governance in North Korea. The state has issued an order for authorities to not interfere with market activities, signaling its weakening control. Simultaneously, the North Korean people are increasingly becoming cynical of their government system, and as they have more access to international news there seems to be some hope for change in North Korea. Overall, North Korea can be termed as a failing state. The government is no longer able to provide enough food and resources to its people, although the state still effectively wields power and control. While the regime is fragile, it still has enough force to intimidate its own people and external actors. Increasingly though, ordinary people in North Korea are feeling the fatigue from Kim Jong-il’s military-first politics.   Cheonan Incident: Using the Past as a Guide   All countries involved with the Cheonan incident are struggling to find an exit strategy. With the G-20 Summit in Seoul coming up in November, 2010 and efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks, there is strong pressure on the South Korean government to find an exit strategy. The 1987 bombing of KAL Flight 858 can give us some insight into a solution for South Korea’s current tragedy. During the incident, a Korean Air flight exploded in midair after a bomb was planted onboard by North Korean agents. In spite of the major difficulties with such a major provocation, within nine to ten months the South Korean government under President Roh Tae Woo came up with a dramatic proposal to expand political and economic cooperation with North Korea to rebuild ties. This past experience may serve as a useful example for South Korea to find an exit strategy from the Cheonan incident.   The Future of North Korea   Lastly, with an ailing Kim Jong-il, political succession is the main issue in North Korea. Power succession based on blood-line is the rational and preferable method for North Korean elites who want to prevent the risk of a destructive power competition by breaking the status quo and introducing a completely new candidate. The succession will likely to be successful on three grounds: firstly, there is no alternative among the North Korean elites; secondly, there is no effective organized resistance, and thirdly, little external interference. Given the current circumstances, political succession will most likely be successful.   After the next leader has come to power, this leader will then probably be succeeded by a collective leadership. It is predicted that the new leader and a new generation of elites will in the future be more favorable towards opening North Korea and undergoing reforms when compared to the existing leadership.   Chaesung Chun: Lessons from the Cheonan Incident and South Korea’s Response   Although the Cheonan incident currently draws great attention, it will probably fade away within a couple of months. Policy makers in South Korea are at the moment greatly focused on producing a Presidential Statement at the United Nations which will condemn North Korea for the Cheonan sinking. But soon, the South Korean government will have to shift its attention to more pressing and difficult issues.   South Korea has to prepare for the G-20 Summit that it will be hosting this fall. It also has to develop strategies to restart the Six-Party Talks, which will involve coordinated moves with the United States, China, and Japan to compel North Korea to participate. Policymakers need to reassess engagement policies that will promote long-term relations with North Korea especially when taking into account the regime changes that will be brought about by the ascension of its third leader, Kim Jong-eun. South Korea will have to create a comprehensive strategy with China in order to address and embrace these changes in North Korea. As inter-Korean relations are not just localized to the Korean Peninsula, dealing with these issues will necessitate the need for enhanced strategic cooperation between South Korea and China.   Domestically there will be a need for new approaches in dealing with inter-Korean relations. There is rising opposition to the Lee Myung-bak administration in terms of its North Korea policy, and in the buildup to the next Presidential elections in 2012, competition between different candidates will heat up. Without a broad focus on a diverse set of issues, South Korean policymakers will have to face difficult times in the remaining two years of the Lee administration.   As a result, in a couple of months, South Korea’s situation will be quite different as new issues, such as the G-20 Summit become more prominent. Seoul will not be able to devote all its focus on the Cheonan attack and continue to maintain pressure on North Korea, since it will have to broaden its focus and gain multilateral cooperation to achieve its interests.   Q & A Session   Since North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan, China’s voting power as a permanent member of the UN, has caught everybody’s attention. Would China abstain from voting in the UN? If it does, would North Korea still be mentioned in any statement?   Professor Sukhee Han: China does not seem to be comfortable with taking the Cheonan issue to the United Nations, which could cause grave consequences for North Korea. Yet Beijing wants to become a “responsible great power,” it knows what this means and what it should do to achieve such a position. Therefore, China is certainly in a dilemma with this issue. If it abstains from voting in the UN, then I think it means that China may allow for the passage of a UN Presidential Statement on North Korea. However, I cannot guarantee whether China will specifically allow for North Korea to be named.   The planned ROK-U.S. joint anti-submarine naval exercises including the participation of the USS George Washington in the Yellow Sea has brought about severe antagonism from China. Could there be a correlation between these military exercises that goes against China’s wishes, and China’s vote in the UN Security Council? Is the United States involved?   Professor Sukhee Han: The joint military exercises, particularly with the participation of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington has brought about repercussions in China. It would seem that the South Korean government had not expected that Beijing would react in this way. Following the incident, Seoul wanted to make a show of force and draw attention to the fact that many lives were lost. Therefore some measures had to be taken and the joint military exercise was one of the possible options. Now that China has criticized the exercise, the introduction of the USS George Washington will bring some effective consequences. On the other hand, Beijing’s abstention at the UN is not a related issue. China has seldom been cooperative over this issue, while South Korea expected it to exert some indirect influences over North Korea. The Chinese leadership has always made their own diplomatic decisions based on national interests, and will this time as well.   Professor Chaesung Chun: I think this is a very interesting question. If this is a test case for a possible future scenario for intervention into North Korea by the United States and South Korea, then I think the behind-the-scenes conversations about future contingency planning over North Korea may be interrupted. Hence in any future contingency, if there is no conclusion at the UN level, there will then be state-level military intervention. If there is no agreement between the United States and China, that will be a very difficult situation for South Korea, diplomatically speaking. The issue must be dealt with very wisely and all parties must act accordingly. If not, there will be unexpected tension within the ROK-U.S. alliance, which will cause serious consequences.   South Korea would like to have a “full package” from the UN Security Council. However, with China and possibly Russia against this, it does not seem very promising. How would the South Korean government react, if it does not get a positive vote from China and perhaps even Russia?   Professor Chaesung Chun: China wants to keep its alliance with North Korea, yet certainly Beijing does not want a repeat of the Cheonan incident. When the two leaders met in early May, Hu Jintao wanted to make sure that Kim Jong-il would not provoke any further threats to the regional stability. China possibly thinks that Seoul misunderstands its pursuit of peace and stability in East Asia, and maybe that it is too conservative with its North Korea policy. If China and South Korea cannot agree with each other, it is possible that Beijing would oppose any UN effort proposed by Seoul. If China implicitly agrees that South Korea is just and fair, then China might abstain from voting in the UN at best. However, even that sounds too hopeful at this point.   Although President Lee claimed to promote a resolute policy toward North Korea, his administration should seek an exit strategy from this point on. Even if China and Russia oppose having a UN Presidential Statement on North Korea, the South Korean government should respond in a lukewarm manner. Inaction at the UN would serve as a good excuse for South Korea to move on to the next stage, as we expect many other political events coming up later this year.   Professor Sukhee Han: China also wants to move on and focus on the Six-Party Talks. Beijing has long wanted to close this case as soon as possible and move on. In order to do so, the Cheonan incident must come, to a certain degree, to some conclusion. That would be with a UN Presidential Statement. Unless North Korea admits to the attack, China won’t be able to vote in the UN, instead, it will prefer abstention.   Professor Seong Ji Woo: I personally do not think that China wants to be a “responsible great power.” Rather, it wants to remain as a “responsible regional power.” In this case, China has a primary interest in maintaining stability within the region, and keeping its alliance with North Korea. Between these two interests, China is not torn apart. Rather, it is acting in one co-interest of the East Asian community. There could very well be a connection between the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise and China’s diplomatic reaction at the UN. Politically, nations always send signals back and forth. The United States might be playing in this game as well; it might be sending China a message about what should be done in the UN Security Council.   It seems paradoxical that while China wants to maintain its alliance with North Korea, its actual relationship with North Korea is not congenial, as witnessed when the two leaders met. How can DPRK-China relations be interpreted at the current stage?   Professor Sukhee Han: Maintaining the alliance does not mean China favors North Korea. It is more of a “need.” Surely, China did not want the Cheonan incident to happen. Even though Hu Jintao demanded that North Korea should follow the five conditions discussed during the meeting, what Kim Jong-il did in the North was against China’s will: continued nuclear development, and the shooting of two Chinese people near the Yalu River. Over this, the Chinese media are issuing harsh remarks, which the government cannot simply ignore. Nonetheless, I think the China-DPRK alliance will remain.   Joongang Daily published a report that Kim Jong-eun is already censoring reports for Kim Jong-il about the current situation in North Korea. Is there any credence to this?   Professor Seong Ji Woo: It’s possible that Kim Jong-eun is filtering the reports sent to Kim Jong-il, who is now old and frail. It was common in the past for Kim Jong-il to do the same for his father, Kim Il-Sung. Currently, Kim Jong-il himself might not even have total control of the regime. Kim Jong-eun seems to be expanding his influence, there has been a report that he is in control of the State Security Department. Currently, the state branches of the government are under control of Jang Song-Taek. The military remains under the control of Kim Jong-il and will be the last institution to be handed over. All this indicates that the succession process is under way.   Is South Korea adequately prepared for a possibly” more open” North Korean regime in the future? Would it allow exchanges with the North at all?   Professor Seong Ji Woo: The next regime in North Korea will be relatively more open to the outside world, compared to the current regime. Yet the next leader will have to find some legitimacy, and he will find his rationale from improving the poor economic conditions. Now, there are two options for that: opening up and internal reforms. For the North Korean regime, opening up will be easier than internal reforms. With this the South Korean government will be working with different options. If North Korea does not go with the best option from Seoul’s point of view, then the South will take some time before it embraces and engages with the North. I encourage engagement, but only on the condition that we need to be more strategic, on guard, and be able to push the North harder.■         Presenters Chaesung Chun, Chair of Asia Security Initiative Research Center, East Asia Institute Sukhee Han, Yonsei University Seong Ji Woo, Kyung Hee University

Seong-Ho Sheen is an assistant professor at Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. He is also a member of Policy Advisory Board of Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea.         The Cheonan Incident and Succession in North Korea   While on a routine patrol along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a South Korean Navy corvette, Cheonan was hit by an external explosion and rapidly sunk at 9:22pm on March 26, 2010. Of the one hundred and four South Korean crew members on board, forty six were found dead or remain missing (Cha 2010). After weeks of a scientific investigation supported by an international team of twenty four American, British, Australian, and Swedish experts, the South Korean government announced on May 20, that the ship was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean midget submarine.   The South Korean government and the public are now weighing the various measures in how to respond to this major North Korean provocation. Experts, on the other hand, are trying to understand what might have been the cause of such a bold aggression by the North Korean regime. While some have suggested a combination of various reasons for the alleged attack, a prominent North Korean insider has argued that the Cheonan incident may have to do with the North Korean leadership succession issue. Cho Myung-chul, a former professor at Kim Il-sung University, has suggested that the Cheonan incident was the work of the emerging leadership surrounding the young and unknown Kim Jong-eun, the son of Kim Jong-il and possible future successor. The motivation then would be for Kim Jong-eun and his supporters to prove themselves to Kim Jong-il and North Korean people.   Leadership succession in a dictatorship tends to create a lot of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion for its governance and the state apparatus. There will be competition and rivalry among different groups and factions for survival and to take a lead in the power transition. In that process, hard liners tend to command a stronger voice. Given the mounting pressures of a deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation since the famine of 1995-98, sinking a South Korean warship could score an important political victory domestically, inducing the North Korean people to be proud of its regime and new leadership. At the same time, it could teach a lesson to the Lee Myung-bak government which has insisted on linking the nuclear issue with North-South exchanges. Indeed, North Korea issued a series of warnings to South Korea after criticizing the Lee administration for refusing to restart the Mount Kumkang Tours that had been canceled after a South Korean tourist had been shot by a North Korean guard on July 11, 2008. Pyongyang was further upset by alleged contingency planning for a sudden collapse of the regime and the hosting of military exercises with the United States. In particular, just a couple of weeks before the Cheonan incident, the Korean People’s Army issued a statement that it would no longer remain bound by the Korean War Armistice or the 1992 North-South Non-Aggression Agreement, therefore it “will legitimately exercise their force for self defense, unhindered, just as they had determined to do.”   The worry now is that such provocations may eventually be aimed at the Obama administration which has hardened its position toward North Korea since the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. While not completely excluding the possibility for bilateral dialogue, the United States has insisted that Pyongyang must return to the multilateral Six-Party Talks by implementing its obligations under previous agreements. North Korean demands for nuclear arms control and a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization has only strengthened Washington’s deep mistrust of Pyongyang’s true intentions. Considering that the Obama administration has adopted a policy of wait and see, or what it calls “strategic patience,” the North Korean leadership might have concluded that there is not much to gain from making a deal with Washington for now. Furthermore, President Obama’s designation of North Korea along with Iran as an outlier in his drive for a “World Without Nuclear Weapons” and a possible target of U.S. nuclear weapons in the recently published 2010 Nuclear Posture Review can only have made Pyongyang’s conviction even more pessimistic.   The problem is that the sinking of the Cheonan may not be an isolated incident. North Korea may become more desperate and brazen as they face increasingly harsher measures from South Korea and the international community, particularly the United States. The race for completing succession by 2012 may further strengthen the voice of hardliners who wish to heighten tensions with South Korea and the United States. More importantly, the Cheonan incident could be a sign of increasing instability in North Korea. The regime there faces the critical question of Kim Jong-il’s health and the issue of succession amidst a deepening economic crisis and international isolation. The Cheonan incident not only presents the immediate challenge of crisis management but also poses a medium to long-term question about the regime’s future.   Kim Jong-il and Regime Survival   Since reports surfaced of Kim Jong-il suffering a stroke in the summer of 2008, there has been a flurry of interest and discussion on the possible collapse of North Korea. Indeed, the topic of North Korea’s collapse is nothing new. As the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe fell with the collapse of the Soviet Empire in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, many speculated the same fate for the more impoverished North Korea. The possibility became even more plausible with the sudden death of its supreme leader, Kim Il-sung in 1994, amidst confrontation with the United States over the North’s nuclear program. Yet, North Korea under the “dear leader” Kim Jong-il and his regime showed remarkable tenacity and persistency to survive large-scale famine, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation for the next sixteen years. In fact, North Korea under Kim Jong-il has not only managed to survive but has also become a de facto nuclear state despite intense international pressure led by the United States.   Meanwhile, there have been a lot of questions about Kim Jong-il’s personal health since he suffered a serious stroke in the summer of 2008. Now that North Korea is reportedly preparing for regime succession to his young and unknown son, Kim Jong-eun, the question of regime survival is revisited by some observers again (Stares and Wit 2009). Having seen the remarkable resilience of Pyongyang’s leadership and its people, this time few dare to predict imminent collapse of a post-Kim Jong-il regime. Instead, many expect North Korea to muddle through its uncertain succession process and continue to survive at least several additional years if not decades.   Predicting North Korea’s future after Kim Jong-il is anyone’s guess. Given its isolation and lack of transparency, no outsider dares to predict what will happen. For one thing, Kim Jong-eun has not been revealed to the North Korean public, having remained in complete secrecy. Yet, there are a couple of things that we know about North Korea that may provide a better judgment about the possibility of regime collapse. This comes from the often-misunderstood comparison between North Korea and East Germany. Despite a much more oppressive regime and a weaker economy than East Germany was at the end of the 1980s, North Korea’s regime survival has been sustained by two factors; a solid basis of popular domestic support and unquestioned backing from its key ally in Beijing.   As we know, Germany was unified when the situation in East Germany came to a near collapse of the communist regime. Among the complicated factors and chain of events that led to the East German regime’s implosion, one could point to two factors, one is domestic and the other is external. Both were critical in the final collapse of the regime. First, the East German government never enjoyed true loyal support from its own people. In other words, from the very beginning the East German regime was not the creation of its own people’s choice. Instead, it was created as a result of the outcome of the allied forces’ decision to divide Germany into two. One of which was put under the practical control of the Soviet Union. It was the fear of ruthless suppression and control of its population that kept the Eastern German communist government in power throughout the Cold War. Once the passage to the West was readily available after Hungary’s decision to open its border to Austria, East German authorities could not keep its people from simply deserting the regime and heading to its Western neighbor in massive numbers.   Second, due to the lack of legitimacy with its own people, the Eastern German regime was heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union for support. Moscow shored up its communist ally in Berlin with a heavy military presence and a will to intervene against any anti-communist movements as it had done in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968 respectively. But by the late 1980s, Moscow was under its own severe strains and had no will or strength to shore up its neighbors. Instead the reforming Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev declared a new doctrine of non-intervention, which undermined the East German regime’s power to control its own destiny (Zelikow and Rice, 1997, Ch.1,2, and 3).   In contrast, Kim Il-sung and his regime have enjoyed broad public support among North Koreans since the beginning (Oberdorfer 1997, Ch.1). Even though Kim was brought in by Joseph Stalin’s Red Army after the Pacific War, he soon established himself as the one and only legitimate ruler of North Korea using his charm, charisma, and background as an independence fighter against Japanese colonial rule.   Indeed, it was Kim who manipulated Stalin and Mao Zedong into his ambition to unify Korea by military force in 1950. The failure of the Korean War only strengthened Kim’s domestic position as he mobilized his country for rebuilding the country and a perpetual struggle against American imperialism. After decades of indoctrination, North Koreans have come to revere Kim Il-sung as almost a deity. Kim’s son and successor, Kim Jong-il knew that maintaining his father’s legacy was the key to his political success. He showed his utmost respect for the so-called “great leader” by not inheriting his father’s official title, the president of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Instead, he rules the country as the Chairman of National Defense Committee with his songun or military-first policy. North Koreans returned their appreciation of Kim Jong-il by calling him the “dear leader.”   Despite decades of misrule and a deteriorating economy under Kim Jong-il, his regime enjoys broad support from their own people who see America and its South Korean puppet regime as the source of all trouble. From this perspective, North Koreans view Kim Jong-il’s weakening health with great sympathy, as they consider it to be as a result of his relentless hard work to protect his people against Western imperialism. Viewed in this way, it is not taken as a cue for a revolt. There have been reports of unrest and public protest in North Korea recently. However, such incidents tend to be isolated and limited to marginal segments of North Korean society in remote areas. Large segments of the population, particularly in Pyongyang, are believed to be loyal to the regime under the tight control of military, police, and state apparatus.   Even when the public expresses their displeasure on specific matters like the recent currency reform and government efforts to control the burgeoning black market or more broadly on the deteriorating economy, it never reaches to the level of a large-scale public revolt against the regime itself. For their misery during the so-called “arduous march,” the majority of North Koreans blame it on the hostile policy of the United States and its southern neighbor. North Korea demands normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States and replacing the Korean War Armistice with a permanent peace treaty as a precondition for their denuclearization. Meanwhile, for Kim Jong-il and his successor, growing tension and crisis with Seoul and Washington serves important domestic political objectives of shoring up popular support especially in this critical time of domestic power transition.   China’s Increasing Stake and Leverage   As Kim Jong-il faces the double challenge of managing regime succession under increasing economic and international political isolation, he needs outside help. And China figures prominently in this. For one thing, China today is not like the former Soviet Union abrogating its leadership and commitment to communist allies in Eastern Europe under Gorbachev. Today, China’s influence and clout is increasingly felt by its neighbors and the rest of the world with its fast growing economy. China has been an important supporter of the North Korean regime both politically and economically. Since the 1990s, China has provided North Korea with up to 90 percent of its fuel, 80 percent of its daily consumer goods, and 40 percent of its food supply (Eberstadt 1998). For all its diplomatic and economic isolation, North Korea has become increasingly dependent on China’s life support. Beijing has shown a strong interest in maintaining stability of North Korea. From this, the North Korean regime may well calculate that they can survive as long as they manage to keep a positive relationship with China.   The China-DPRK relationship seemed to go through a tough period when Beijing joined the international sanctions effort against Pyongyang each time North Korea tested a nuclear device in 2006 and 2009. Relations were further strained each time North Korea in turn rejected to return back to the Six-Party Talks hosted by China. These difficulties, though, were offset in October last year when Premier Wen Zabao led a large delegation of Chinese officials to celebrate the 60th anniversary of China-DPRK diplomatic relations in Pyongyang. The Chinese delegation included all major communist party and government officials as well as local officials engaged in border trade and joint ventures with North Korea. The visit exhibited a comprehensive and deepening engagement with the North. Despite tightening international economic sanctions with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1784, bilateral trade between China and North Korea reached $ 2.8 billion in 2008, up 41.3 percent from 2007 (Bajoria 2009).   Yet, the most dramatic show of China’s unwavering support occurred when President Hu Jintao welcomed Kim Jong-il to Beijing on May 5, 2010, in the wake of the Cheonan incident. The surprise meeting came less than a week after South Korean President Lee Myung-bak paid a visit to President Hu at the Shanghai Expo for China to support South Korea’s findings in its investigation of the Cheonan incident. During their dinner at a state house, President Hu said “China always handles, maintains and pushes forward the relations with the DPRK in a strategic and long-term perspective.” He went on to further suggest five specific measures to strengthen bilateral relations. What is interesting and surprisingly candid from Hu was that he called for reinforcing strategic coordination through the exchange of views on major “domestic and diplomatic” issues in a regular and timely manner. The statement almost sounded interventionist, a direct violation of China’s long standing principle of non-intervention in other countries’ domestic and foreign affairs. As Hu added his willingness to share China’s governance experience, the statement clearly indicated Beijing’s strong interest in the political situation and more specifically the succession issue after Kim Jong-il. After the meeting, North Korea issued a statement saying “the DPRK-China friendship will steadily grow strong generation after generation as it…stood all sorts of tests and trials of history.” The Kim-Hu meeting clearly showed Beijing’s priority in North Korea’s regime survival and stability over denuclearization. As much as Kim Jong-il needs China’s help, Beijing enjoys increased leverage over Seoul and Washington as well as Pyongyang. What is more, Pyongyang may try to further up the ante of its hard line policy toward Seoul and Washington as long as it can rely upon China’s support.   In April 2010, the North Korean regime terminated its partnership with Hyundai Asan after months of negotiations over reopening the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region since the shooting of the South Korean tourist. After it had terminated the contract, North Korea declared a new partnership with a Chinese company. As for the Cheonan incident, the Chinese government did not respond to South Korea’s invitation for a fact finding mission of the joint investigation results. Instead, Premier Wen emphasized peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and reiterated China’s pledge to take an “impartial” stand. He urged all parties to remain calm and show restraint during his meeting with President Lee Myung-bak.   It has been well known that Beijing has a keen interest in keeping the North Korean regime stable (Glaser et al. 2008). China has tried to keep a delicate balance between exercising pressure against North Korea’s nuclear defiance and providing a life support for Pyongyang’s crumbling economy. Kim Jong-il may feel getting Chinese support for his successor is critical for the regime’s ultimate survival after his own departure. At the same time, Beijing faces an increasing dilemma between shoring up the North Korean regime and alienating South Korea and the United States (Snyder 2009, Ch.6). If indeed, Kim Jong-il has made a strategic decision to up the ante against Seoul and Washington, Beijing will be in difficult position to protect an unruly Kim Jong-il at the risk of damaging important partnerships with the two countries. It would also drive Seoul into a closer alliance with Washington.   Policy Considerations   It is always difficult for a democratic country to deal with a totalitarian regime like Kim Jong-il’s North Korea. It is even more dangerous and uncertain to deal with absolute leadership in domestic power transition. If indeed, North Korea is preparing for Kim Jong-il’s demise, having Chinese cooperation in managing North Korea and its succession process will be even more critical for South Korea and the United States. This does not mean that their interests vis-à-vis North Korea will always remain the same. Seoul and Washington will have to work hard to define common ground and finding mutual interest in managing the North Korean situation with China (Glaser and Snyder 2010).   The first order of business is keeping close cooperation and a united front on both North Korea and China. Seoul and Washington should demonstrate their unity and resolve to both Pyongyang and Beijing. As a U.S. government official mentioned, U.S.-ROK relations have never been better before. This is the time for two allies to translate good relations into concrete action through close consultation. It was constructive to see the Obama administration fully support the South Korean position in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident.   Now that the almost two month’s long investigation concluded that North Korea was the culprit, the two countries should show strong resolve to demand responsibility from the North Korean side. In June 2010, South Korea brought its evidence from the investigation and presented it to the UN Security Council. At the same time, the two allies are considering various bilateral measures such as joint naval exercises, strengthening anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and numerous unilateral measures such as Seoul reactivating psychological warfare operations against the Kim Jong-il regime and tightening existing sanctions and introducing new ones, in the broad context of the current UN Security Council resolutions against North Korea.   Second, the two allies need to work with, not against, China in dealing with North Korea. Rather than waging a mini-Cold War against the Beijing-Pyongyang axis, they need to identify common interests with China and work on it as a platform for a united front against any future North Korean provocations. Indeed, the U.S.-ROK alliance shares common interests with China including peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, economic reform and opening, and denuclearization. As much as China wants to increase its influence and leverage over North Korea, it has a strong interest in maintaining stability and peace in the region. Pyongyang’s unruly behavior and provocations against South Korea and the United States can only make things more unstable. It is not in Beijing’s best interests to have a situation where things get out of control due to Pyongyang’s provocations. In that respect, China shares a common interest in checking North Korea’s dangerous behavior. Ultimately, China wants to see a more moderate North Korean regime embracing economic reforms and opening up. Indeed, during Kim Jong-il’s Beijing visit, Premier Wen Jiabao publicly pushed for economic reform and opening-up, a sensitive topic for Kim, while reiterating China’s support for developing the North Korean economy and improving its people’s livelihood.   In the long run, China still wants to see denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Otherwise, China would not have agreed to UN sanctions against North Korea not once, but twice. While resumption of the Six-Party Talks for Beijing remains the mechanism for solving the nuclear crisis, the Chinese leadership should understand that a resolution of Cheonan incident one way or another must precede resumption of the talks. The resolution should first come from Pyongyang. China should persuade Kim Jong-il to find a way to come clean about the incident so that it can not only ease the mounting sanctions against North Korea, but also broker dialogue with Seoul and Washington.   Third, they have to get to the bottom of the problem; North Korea. Yes, the two allies need to stand firm against North Korean provocation, and yes, they need to be prepared for any sudden contingency in North Korea. Yet, Seoul and Washington have to find a way to reengage Pyongyang in a creative way. In other words, the two allies should strike a balance between not rewarding or punishing North Korea’s bad behavior and inducing dialogue and engagement. They also need to strike a balance between close alliance management and a division of labor in dealing with North Korea. This double task need not be a zero-sum game if managed in a comprehensive manner. Under the past administrations in South Korea and the United States, achieving either objective led to friction between the two countries. President Bush’s harsh rhetoric collided with the rational of the Sunshine Policy by both the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. South Korea’s continuing engagement efforts in spite of North Korea’s provocations led to tension between Seoul and Washington. During this time, Pyongyang continued to drive a wedge between the two allies with its charm offensive to either side at the expense of the other. After President Roh, the Lee administration’s principled approach to North Korea’s nuclear program coupled with its drive for an upgraded strategic alliance with the United States contributed to a new close alliance partnership between Seoul and Washington. But, it came at the price of stalled, if not confrontational, inter-Korean relations.   Pyongyang’s second nuclear test in May 2009, following the long-range rocket launch in April, challenged President Obama’s early initiative for active diplomacy and froze the Six-Party Talks as the United States led tougher new international sanctions against North Korea. The result was yet more provocations from the North. And as a desperate Pyongyang seeks shelter from its ally in Beijing, China enjoys increasing leverage over South Korea and the United States as well as over North Korea. To break the cycle of non engagement and worsening behavior, Seoul and Washington need to adopt a flexible combination of pressure and dialogue. On the one hand, they need to stand firm together on North Korea’s provocations. At the same time, they have to be flexible enough to reengage with North Korea to prevent further provocations and establish their own leverage.   After its failed currency reform last fall, the North Korean economy is facing an even greater difficulty with a growing food crisis. This might be the reason why the North Korean leadership has become more desperate and aggressive. Yet, is also presents an opportunity for Seoul and Washington to negotiate a settlement over the Cheonan incident and other broader issues with Pyongyang. While demanding acknowledgement and a certain resolution of the Cheonan incident, they should deliver a clear message that they are ready to address Pyongyang’s pressing concerns of its economic situation. They may also suggest finding a way to prevent further conflicts at sea, particularly over the NLL issue. The purpose of this engagement should be preventing further escalation of the current crisis as well as isolating the hardliners within the North Korean leadership. This could lead to the resumption of dialogue for denuclearization and a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. According to the latest poll, 50.6 percent of South Koreans oppose the complete shutdown of inter-Korean exchanges as a measure to punish North Korea over its possible involvement in the Cheonan incident. As Winston Churchill said, “it is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war.”■