Hun Joon Kim is Assistant Professor of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. He has research interests in international norms and institutions, international human rights and transitional justice, international ethics, and international relations theory. His recent publication includes. The Massacres at Mt Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea (Cornell University Press, 2014) and Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific (Cambridge University Press, 2014).                       Introduction   The 31st Regular Session of the UN Human Rights Council is scheduled to be held from February 29 to March 24, 2006 in Geneva. The Council, composed of 47 elected UN member states, is the most active body within the UN human rights system, promoting and protecting human rights around the world. The most important function of the Council is to discuss and make major decisions on human rights situations around the world in its 10 week regular session. This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Council, which replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights under the Economic and Social Council in 2006.       The purpose of this brief is to introduce important aspects of the Council’s activities, with a particular focus on peace and security in the East Asian region. Human rights issues in the region so far have been understood as an important but secondary issue when considering international relations in East Asia. However, human rights issues are becoming more and more important and thus this briefing will focus on two issues that are highly relevant to us who are living on the Korean peninsula: (1) the human rights situa-tion in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and (2) tensions between China and Western countries over human rights.       Over the last ten years, the Council has initiated new mechanisms to further implement international standards of human rights effectively. Two mechanisms are important in order to understand the current activities of the Council – the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process and the Commissions of Inquiry (CoIs). Since 2006, the Council’s political process is centered on two new mechanisms and the political dynamics and fault line between countries will also be created around these mechanisms at the upcoming 31st Session.       First, since 2006 the Council has followed the UPR process where all the UN member states are obliged to go through the review process of their hu-man rights records. The Council previously had several mechanisms to monitor and promote human rights such as the Special Procedures and self-reports made by the member states and sent to the Treaty Monitoring Bodies. However, these procedures had the critical limitations of being selective because either the Council selectively chose target countries to monitor or special obligations to self-report were se-lectively applied only to the State Parties to specific international human rights conventions. The UPR process is the first human rights mechanism that en-sures every UN member state should be equally repre-sented and scrutinized over its human rights situation every four years. The first cycle of the UPR started in 2008 and ended in 2015 and the second cycle started in 2012 and is scheduled to end in 2016.       Second, the CoIs are another mechanisms that have been actively used by the Council in order to conduct international and impartial inquiries on al-leged human rights violations. So far nine such com-missions were created to investigate serious human rights violations in Darfur (2004), East Timor (2006), Gaza (2009), Libya (2011), Syria (2013), North Korea (2013), Eritrea (2014), and Sri Lanka (2014), and again in Gaza in 2014. The CoIs are an enhanced investigation process when compared to a similar process, the Special Procedure, which is a mechanism designed to address either a specific country’s human rights situation or thematic issues such as freedom of religion or human trafficking. The Council currently has 14 country mandates and 41 thematic mandates under the Special Procedure where investigations are conducted by individual experts called Special Rappor-teurs, or a group of experts called a Working Group. Compared to these measures, the CoIs usually have more personnel and budget, and thus more commit-ment from the Council members.         Human Rights Situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea   In February 2014, the CoI on Human Rights in the DPRK released its 372-page final report after an inves-tigation of about one year under the leadership of Commissioner Michael Kirby. The Commission was the first to be established by a consensus of the Council members in March 2013. The very fact that the commission was created without a vote is a highly sig-nificant indicator of international consensus over the seriousness of the North Korean human rights issue. The Commission confirmed that systemic, widespread, and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by North Korea and further found that the violations of human rights constitutes crimes against humanity. The most controversial issue was the commission’s recommendations which urged the international community to accept its responsibility to protect the people of North Korea and, more specifi-cally, urged the U.N. to hold those responsible for crimes accountable using either a Security Council referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the creation of an ad hoc tribunal like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or Rwanda (ICTR).     In April 2014, the Security Council, albeit with the absence of two veto powers – China and Russia, had an informal and confidential gathering, called an “Arria-Formula” meeting, to hear the Commission’s findings and recommendations. This meeting eventually led to the official briefing of the issue at the Security Council in December 2014. The meeting was the first time the Security Council involved itself in the North Korean human rights issue. Up to that point the Security Council had only concentrated on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and missile activities asserting they are a threat to peace and security. It was the first step towards weaving human rights crimes committed by the North Korean government into peace and security issues. With this first step, human rights in North Korea, which have previously been addressed in the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, are now firmly on the international agenda. Putting the North Korean human rights issue on the international agenda is in and of itself important, regardless of whether the Security Council can eventually refer North Korea to the ICC or create an ad hoc international court.     During the 30th Session the focus and objec-tives of the panel discussion were to raise further awareness and understanding of the human rights situation in North Korea and propose strategies for action, including action on international abductions, disappearances, and other related matters. In response to this panel discussion, the permanent representative of the DPRK to the UN Office at Geneva addressed the President of the Council arguing that the panel discussion is “the attempt of the U.S. and other forces hostile to the DPRK to kick off again an anti-DPRK racket on the UN human rights arena over its non-existent human rights issue.” Furthermore, they regarded the COI report as fabricated and asserted that the testimonies taken from defectors were false and that these defectors were “human scum who deserted after being involved in such crimes as theft, rape of girls under age, abduction of children and flesh traffic.”     Furthermore, North Korea regarded this panelist discussion as a “move to bring down the most advantageous socialist system of the DPRK, the life of its people and the cradle of their happiness” and that North Korea will counter the moves of the United States and other hostile forces. Previously, North Korea even launched a personal and disgraceful attack against Commissioner Michael Kirby. This response from North Korea is a regression from previous cooperative responses immediately before the institution of the CoI. For example, in 2009, North Korea submitted a report to the UPR and the Council issued a report with 167 recommendations, none of which North Korea accepted. However, in the second round of the Universal Periodic Review process in 2013, North Korea made the conciliatory gesture of agreeing to consider 185 out of 268 recommendations forwarded by the Council. The UPR process, separated from the COI process, will be further pursued in the future and it will be interesting to see whether North Korea will maintain its two-track approach, separating their response toward the UPR and against the CoI follow-up process.     In 2016, the human rights situation in North Ko-rea is likely to be a focus of the Council’s discussion for three reasons. First, North Korea became a center of international media focus immediately after its nuclear test, which was alleged to be hydrogen bomb test, in January and long-range missile launch, alleged to be a satellite launch, in February 2016. The United States, Japan, and South Korea are pushing for a stronger Se-curity Council resolution authorizing stronger sanc-tions against North Korea and it is highly likely that these countries will try to link human rights concerns with security issues. It is expected that a stricter resolu-tion drafted by the United States is about to be passed in the Security Council, with a support of China. Inter-national advocacy against North Korea has already gained significant momentum through symbolic events such as the release of the CoI report and the official meeting of the Security Council. It is probable that the current security situation will bring more focus on hu-man rights in North Korea. Importantly, Ambassador Kyong-lim Choi, who has been serving as the Perma-nent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN Office at Geneva was elected as president of the Council for 2016 and this also will enhance the visibility of North Korean issues in the Council. Certainly, there is a complexity in the relationship between North and South mainly because North Korea human rights in South Korea also causes deep division between the conservative and progressive political groups. However, this division, at least in the Council, is not going to be a critical concern since the current Park government is currently determined to pressure North Korea at the UN, even officially questioning the UN membership of North Korea this month.     Second, since the release of the report of the CoI in 2013, there have been ongoing efforts to ratchet up pressure on North Korea and this tendency will con-tinue in 2016. Already two reports on North Korea are on the table for the 31st Session of the Council: (1) Re-port of the Office of the High Commissioner for Hu-man Rights on its role and achievements, including a report on the field-based structure established to strengthen the monitoring and documentation of the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and (2) Report of the Special Rap-porteur on the situation of human rights in the De-mocratic People’s Republic of Korea. In the second report, Special Rapporteur Marzuki Darusman called on the Council to “arrange to have an official commu-nication addressed to the Supreme Leader of the De-mocratic People’s Republic of Korea to advise him and other senior leaders that they may be investigated and, if found to be responsible, held accountable for crimes against humanity committed under their leadership.” Special Rapporteur in February 2016 had a press con-ference and already released his findings so that the issue can be discussed in the 31st Session and can lead to a stronger Council resolution.     Third, new claims of human rights violations were recently raised against North Korea. For decades, workers have been sent abroad to earn foreign cur-rency and live under strict government surveillance. Both male and female workers have been sent to Russia, Myanmar, Cambodia, Fiji, and countries in the Middle East and Africa and most of their wages have been confiscated by the government. Detailed testimony from workers, NGO reports, and news reports have been released in 2015 and private groups and activists have been making claims to the Council on this issue. In October 2015, Special Rapporteur Darusman also expressed deep concern about the issue and made an official announcement on these new types of human rights violations committed by North Korea. Certainly whether the pressure on North Korea with regard to the new types of human rights violation will continue is another question. It is mainly because the current Special Rapporteur Darusman’s tenure will end and the new Special Rapporteur is expected to be appointed by the Council. However, new types of human rights violations are consistently reported and documented by NGOs and the South Korean government, thus it is highly likely that the discussion on human rights situations in North Kora will continue in 2016.           Tension between China and Western Countries over Human Rights   However, the discussion and implementation of hu-man rights in North Korea also depends on the politi-cal situation between major players in world politics. Among many fault lines between Council member states, the most visible divide is between China and western countries over the implementation of human rights. This struggle is often placed in the middle of the UPR process and it was observable through expressed recommendations in the process. For example, in light of the periodic review of the United States in the 30th Session last year, China “highlighted the deep-rooted human rights problems of the United States.” China had several recommendations for United States to carry out. China recommended that United States ratify the International Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.”     Furthermore, China recommended that United States “correctly address the root causes of racial dis-crimination and eliminate the frequently occurred excessive use of force by law enforcement against of African Americans and other ethnic minorities”; “fully disclose the abuse of torture by its Intelligence Agency, ensure the accountability of the persons responsible, and agree to unrestricted visit by the Special Rappor-Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to Guantanamo facilities”; “stop massive surveillance activities both inside and outside its territory to avoid violating the right to privacy of its citizens and those of other countries” and “respect indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities rights and interests; fully consult with them on their land, autonomy, environment, language and other issues; correct the historical injustice and offer compensation.”     Some human rights scholars such as Hopgood as-sert that in the realm of human rights, “great power politics” will return. The current contestation around cultural relativism and the generations of rights can be simultaneously demonstrated by the case of the Chinese government’s recent counterattack to U.S. human rights reports whereby the Chinese issued their version of a human rights report on the U.S. The Chinese government has released annual Human Rights Record of the United States reports since 2005 in response to criticism from the U.S. The Chinese reports state that the U.S. State Department reports are “full of distortions and accusations of the human rights situa-tion in more than 190 countries and regions including China. However, the United States turned a blind eye to its own terrible human rights situation and seldom mentioned it. The Human Rights Record of the United States in 2010 is prepared to urge the United States to face up to its own human rights issues.” In this debate, the fault line is not only between the civil and political rights emphasized by the United States and the economic rights by the Chinese government, but also between how the standards for human rights should be implemented in countries with different cultural traditions.     Since the United States’ membership to the Council expired in 2015, there will be no direct clash between China and the United States in the 31st Ses-sion. However, similar tensions will reappear between China and European Union countries over the UPR process and the discussion of the human rights situa-tion in North Korea. China has already objected to the activity of the CoI arguing that any country-specific investigation is simply another form of criticism and suggested that issues concerning North Korean human rights should be solved “through dialogue on an equal footing.” But the Chinese government will have to go beyond the simple assertion that, “submitting this report to the ICC will not help resolve the human rights situation.” Whether China will come up with a better and more viable alternative is another important issue in the 31st Session of the Council. However, based on how China reacted so far to the North Korean nuclear test and a missile launch, the prospect is not so bright         Conclusion   International human rights as an ideal that humanity has pursued since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted is now at the crossroad with the 10th anniversary of the Council in 2016. Since the creation of the Council, new effective measures – although limited in some ways – have been used for decades. Whether this new mechanisms will be effective against North Korea is an important issue for the 31st Session of the Council. The issue itself is located within highly sensitive international relations between North and South Korea, between North Korea and the U.S., and between North Korea and Japan. Recently, two layers of complexity have been overlaid such as the revived power politics between China and the West and the intensive relations between South Korea and China over the deployment of the U.S. missile defense system. Whether the North Korean human rights issue will be heavily influenced by these power dynamics or the issue will be have its own dynamic and further impact over power politics in return is going to be an important issue in the 31st Session of the Council. ▒                         The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

Soo-Am Kim is Director of Research Management Division and Senior Research Fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), Seoul, Korea. He serves as a member of the Policy Advisory Committee for the Ministry of Unification.          The international community has contributed diverse efforts as the poor situation of human rights in North Korea has been unveiled by North Korean defectors. The United Nations has demanded improvements in the human rights record of North Korea based on monitoring via the Human Rights Council (formerly known as the UN Commission on Human Rights), the UN Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK, and assigning a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK.   As North Korea consistently refuses and denies attempts at monitoring human rights, the international community has had to investigate new approaches to induce a change of attitude. In particular, they have focused on the common practice of ‘impunity’ for human rights violators in North Korea as one of the main reasons why human rights violation continues in North Korea. As a result, in March 2013, UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted the UN resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK. This resolution launched the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea which mandates ‘full accountability.’   The Commission of Inquiry launched a one-year temporary investigation project. The Commission officially submitted the report to UNHRC in February 2014. On the basis of this report, the UN’s North Korean human rights improvement activity shifted from ‘monitoring-oriented’ to ‘accountability-oriented.’ This issue briefing is going to trace the changes of North Korean human rights improvement through the UN Human Rights mechanism. By reflecting on these changes, it attempts to suggest a strategic direction for DPRK’s human rights improvement.     UN Human Rights Mechanisms and the Change in North Korea’s Human Rights Issues   Expansion of Engagement in North Korean Human Rights Issues by UN Human Rights Mechanisms   There have been significant changes to the UN human rights mechanisms for engaging North Korean human rights issues since the investigation from the Commission of Inquiry. UN human rights mechanisms are largely divided into charter-based bodies and treaty-based bodies. While the former consists of state representatives and has strong political characteristics, the latter is a non-political entity composed of experts.   The UN human rights mechanisms are expanding their level of engagement in North Korean human rights issues through the Commission of Inquiry. The following are changes in how UN human rights mechanisms are involved in North Korean human rights issues.   First, the Human Rights Council, one of the representative UN bodies engaged in work on human rights, is involved in North Korean human rights issues. There are four specific mechanisms: General Assembly, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, special procedures, and Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The General Assembly and Sub-Commission are using the resolution method to deal with North Koran human rights issues. The special procedure of UNHRC is concerned with human rights violations in DPRK. First, based on the UN Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK by the Commission on Human Rights, a Special Rapporteur on North Korea’s human rights situation was appointed and has been active since 2004 as part of the country-specific special procedure.   The Special Rapporteur monitors the situation of human rights in the DPRK and then submits the report to UNHRC and General Assembly annually. The thematic special procedures are also involved in the North Korean human rights issue according to their mandate.   UPR, a newly founded human rights mechanism from the UN Human Rights Council founded in 2006 to replace the former institution of UN Human Rights Commission, is also concerned with North Korean human rights. North Korea submitted its first state report in 2009 and its second report in 2014. It also dispatched delegations to engage in mutual dialogue with member states.   Second, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is trying to promote technical cooperation in the area of human rights with North Korea. In return for offering technical support through the DPRK permanent representative to UN Office at Geneva, OHCHR is requesting Pyongyang’s cooperation.   Third, the UN General Assembly is also concerned about North Korean human rights. According to the UN Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK passed by the UN Human Rights Commission in 2005, the UN General Assembly is to handle North Korean human rights issues if North Korea does not adopt a positive and future-oriented attitude. Following this suggestion, the Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK has been passed consistently beginning in 2005 to 2014.   Fourth, implementation of the Commission of Inquiry was critical in changing UN Human Rights mechanisms. UN human rights mechanisms are expanding beyond the results of temporary activity-based involvement from the Commission of Inquiry. In a report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council, the Commission of Inquiry urged the UN Security Council to refer the situation of human rights in the DPRK to the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, China and Russia, permanent members of the UN Security Council, oppose the referral to the ICC, thereby prohibiting this from being accomplished. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council is participating in the North Korean human rights issue through different methods: the UN Security Council used an Arria-formula meeting to unofficially discuss human rights in the DPRK on April 17, 2014, and then selected the North Korean human rights issue on the official agenda on December 22, 2014.   Following the Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in March 2014, UN Human Rights Office in Seoul, a field-based structure of the OHCHR, was set up in Seoul on June 23, 2015. By opening the independent field office, the human rights mechanism concerned with North Korean human rights has expanded its involvement. UN Human Rights Office in Seoul has the following four missions: First, strengthen the monitoring and documentation of the situation of human rights in the DPRK; Second, secure accountability;   Third, enhance engagement and capacity building with the Governments of All states, civil society, and other stakeholders;   Fourth, maintain the visibility of the situation of the human rights in DPRK including through sustainable communication, advocacy, and outreach activities. Not only charter-bodies but also treaty-bodies are involved in human right issues in North Korea. North Korea is a member state of Human Rights Committee (CCPR), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). But these treaty-based bodies are able to get involved only when North Korea observes the treaty obligation by submitting the state report and dispatching the delegation. North Korea submitted a second report to CCPR in 2000, a second report to CESCR in 2002, an initial report to CEDAW in 2002, and third and fourth combined reports to CRC in 2007. Because North Korea has not submitted any state report since 2007, treaty-based bodies has not been able to address the human rights issue in North Korea.   Figure 1: Engagement in North Korean Human Rights Issues through UN Human Rights Mechanisms     Transformation of Engagement in the North Korean Human Rights   There has been a fundamental change in UN’s approach to North Korean human rights after the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry. The UN basically has applied a ‘two-track approach’ of ‘pressure’ and ‘engagement’ to enhance the North Korean human rights situation. In particular, in order to prevent, protect, and promote the human rights of the North Korean people, the UN has been attempting to induce— through the two-track policy—changes in Pyongyang’s perception and policy in relation to human rights, institutional changes, and capacity-building.   UN’s strategy of using pressure to improve the situation of North Korean human rights is accomplished through monitoring and accountability. Before the Commission of Inquiry was enacted, resolutions and monitoring through the special procedure were the basic forms of pressure. The UN’s strategy of using pressure has shifted its orientation from monitoring to accountability after the Commission of Inquiry was launched.   Together with the strategy of using pressure, UN has used a strategy of engagement by combining treaty-based bodies, UPR, and technical cooperation from OHCHR to resolve North Korean human rights issue.   Figure 2: UN’s Strategy to Improve North Korean     Changing North Korean Responses   North Korea is responding to the UN’s involvement in the North Korean human rights issues by linking the human rights with the security, national image, and identity. Therefore, it is possible that the whole situation of the North Korean human rights is not fully understood if one looks only at the “human rights aspect.” The UN’s decision to change its method of putting pressure on North Korean human rights issues after the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry acts as the key factor in influencing Pyongyang’s response.   In the 2000s, North Korea responded to the UN’s request for improving its domestic human rights situation by stating that this was a violation of its national sovereignty from the perspective of North Korea’s national security. In accordance with its national security interests, Pyongyang has been adopting a ‘denial strategy’ when it comes to responding to UN pressure. Furthermore, North Korea explicitly stated that it would reject any UN’s attempts at engagement should the UN keep on pressing North Korea on the human rights issue. For instance, although North Korea welcomes the mere idea of technical cooperation with OHCHR, it will not proceed to work with OHCHR because the cooperation is predicated on the North Korean Human Rights Resolution. Because North Korea is using an approach of linking pressure and engagement, the UN’s two-track strategy of pressure and engagement has not yielded any apparent outcomes.   With the shift in the UN’s pressure strategy toward being accountability-oriented, North Korea’s method of linking human rights with security and with national identity is also changing. North Korea defines this accountability-based pressure strategy as targeting their highest leader, to whom they refer as ‘Supreme Dignity.’ While monitoring-based pressure such as the Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK targets a state, accountability-based pressure is targeted at an ‘individual.’ This perception leads North Korea to shift its human rights-security linkage toward “defending and safeguarding the great leader” while maintaining the comprehensive position that human rights fall under the state sovereignty. In other words, although a practice of defining the human rights in terms of regime security continues in North Korea, individual security for the “Supreme Dignity” has been added so that the linkage between the human rights and national security has been strengthened.   Figure 3: North Korea’s Response to the Two-track Strategy by UN   Changes in the linkage between human rights and national security is a key factor in influencing North Korea’s reaction toward the UN’s two-track strategy to improve the situation of North Korean human rights. Linking human rights with the state sovereignty was a loosely-woven linkage, which induced North Korea to respond with a denial strategy. However, with “defending and safeguarding the great leader” being established as the core objective in responding to the North Korean human rights issues, organizations and elites within the DPRK are desperately struggling for their survival in a competition for greater loyalty.   In 2014, North Korea adopted a diplomatic strategy with the perspective of “defending and safeguarding the great leader” in order to prevent the inclusion of a suggestion for the UN Security Council to refer the situation of North Korean human rights to ICC in the UN Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in DPRK. To better advance the North Korean position, its Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong attended the UN General Assembly for the first time in 15 years, and Kang Sok-ju, Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party, visited Europe. Also, North Korea agreed to several measures such as allowing the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK to enter North Korea, accepting OHCHR’s technical cooperation, and human rights dialogue in the process. They even expressed tactical acceptance’ to accommodate the UN’s engagement strategy previously rejected by North Korea if the suggestion to refer the issue to the ICC, which was perceived to target the “Supreme Dignity,” was dropped from the North Korea Human Rights Resolution. Even though North Korea undertook a desperate measure to defend and safeguard the great leader, the Resolution including the suggestion to refer the North Korean human rights issues to the ICC was adopted in UN General Assembly as planned. Consequently, North Korea not only returned to its strategy of denial, but it went further by applying a strong counteroffensive strategy toward international society by mobilizing various extra-governmental organizations.   Figure 4: North Korea’s Method of Linking Human Rights and Security     Based on its perception of the U.S. “hostile policy,” North Korea is responding by linking human rights with national security. North Korea also claims that the UN and other countries’ pressure on North Korea with regards to the human rights issue are due to the U.S. sponsored “hostile policy” and “policy of smothering the DPRK.” Furthermore, North Korea criticizes South Korea as being subordinate to the U.S. and argues that South Korea merely acts in a manner the U.S. would prefer. The involvement of the UN and other countries in the North Korean human rights problem is branded as the United States’ efforts at mobilizing “Instigation and Followership” and the involvement of South Korea in North Korea’s human rights is criticized by Pyongyang that South Korea is a ”Subordinate and Follower” of the U.S.   The UN’s accountability-based pressure strategy, combined with the establishment of the Office of Human Rights in Seoul, is exerting influence on inter-Korean relations. North Korea heavily criticized that the establishment of the Office of Human Rights in Seoul is regarded as “a public proclamation of confrontation” and “an excuse for instigating a war to realize the delusion of unification through absorption,” and that “there will be severe and merciless punishment” in the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea’s Secretariat Report No.1094 on May 29, 2015. North Korea went beyond mere criticism and took measures such as not participating in the Gwangju Summer Universiade on June 19, 2015 and sentencing two South Korean detainees to an indefinite period of hard labor.     U.S. Linking Sanctions and Security with the North Korean Human Rights Issues   There appear to be changes in how the United States responds to the North Korean human rights issue in relation to other issues due to the action of UN Commission of Inquiry. In the absence of measures to resolve the long-delayed North Korean nuclear issue, the U.S. is strengthening pressure on North Korea with regards to human rights violations. Previously, the U.S. listed North Korea’s denuclearization and suppression of military provocations as the priority and was comparably less interested in the human rights issues. However, the U.S is now strengthening the linkage strategy between North Korea’s nuclear problem and human rights as one of its strategies to deter North Korean nuclear development in order to induce North Korea to improve its human rights situation.   Three delegates from countries involved in the Six-Party Talks have officially begun to discuss the North Korean human rights issue. On May 27, 2015, the Chief delegates of Korea, the U.S., and Japan. Delegates are as follows: Hwang Joon-kook, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs; Sung Kim, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Korea and Japan; and Ihara Junichi, Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. They held a meeting about North Korea’s human rights problems and discussed multiple measures for maintaining the international community’s momentum. The delegates from South Korea, the U.S., and Japan did not explicitly announce the idea of adding North Korea’s human rights problems to the agenda of the six-party talks, but they emphasized the strengthening of pressure on North Korea through the human rights issue.   Furthermore, there is a trend toward strengthening of the U.S.-centered ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation on the North Korean human rights issues. At the U.N. General Assembly in September 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry led a high-level meeting on North Korea’s human rights situation with South Korean and Japanese foreign ministers. On July 8, 2015, the Heritage Foundation hosted the United States-Republic of Korea-Japan Ambassadors’ Dialogue where they discussed cooperation measures for resolving North Korea’s human rights problems.   Lately, there are increased movements in the U.S. to link North Korea’s human rights problems and sanctions. At the United States-Republic of Korea-Japan Ambassadors’ Dialogue mentioned above, Sung Kim stated that the evidence and information related to possible sanctions against the people in charge of activities which violate human rights within North Korea are under review.   On January 2, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13687, which imposed additional sanctions with respect to North Korea. In this order, the United States defines the Sony Pictures hacking incident not as a simple hacking incident but as a violation of human rights which attempted to suppress the artists’ and individuals’ freedom of expression. In accordance with this executive order, the basis has been set for sanctions against individuals and organizations in North Korea that commit human rights violations. There are ongoing efforts in the U.S. Congress to link the North Korean human rights and sanctions. For example, the United States House of Representatives sponsored the ‘North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2015 (H.R. 757).’ On February 27, 2015 the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a Markup Session and the act is currently being revised. In this act, a broad definition of human rights violation such as what is happening in a political prison camp across North Korea is also regarded as a basis for sanctions.     Recommendations for South Korea   The targets of policy for improving North Korea’s human rights can be classified into two types: the North Korean authorities and the people. The character of North Korea’s human rights problem has been changing with the activities of the UN Commission of Inquiry. South Korea’s strategy in response should be established in view of changes in the nature of North Korea’s human rights problems. This paper suggests a series of recommendations for South Korea in dealing with the North under three distinguishable policy environments.   First, the international community’s strategy is essentially shifting from monitoring to full accountability. There is also a strengthening trend toward full-accountability-based pressure rather than engagement.   Second, international community’s pressure based on the full accountability seems to leave little room for North Korea to be flexible and forthcoming in its responses.   Third, as North Korea’s method of linking human rights, security, and national identity changes, there are increased trends toward linking human rights issues with nuclear development and sanctions, particularly in the U.S. Furthermore, ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation regarding North Korea’s human rights problem is strengthened.   With the UN Commission of Inquiry in action, North Korean human rights issues display a strongly political aspect as human rights are more and more linked with other issues. There is a limit on how much progress can be made in North Korea human rights issues by focusing on the human rights issue alone. Therefore, South Korea’s strategy should be established having taken into account the political links between human rights on one hand, and security and sanctions on the other.   First, when considering the human rights issue, South Korea needs to consistently pursue a two-track strategy that contains both elements of pressure and engagement. As South Korea aims for the unification, it would be difficult to approach the North Korean human rights issues merely by applying pressure. In light of North Korea’s strong resistance against the full accountability-based strategy, South Korea needs to create more positive conditions for pursuing a North Korea policy that is more conducive to the unification of the Korean peninsula by pursuing a two-track strategy. Therefore, South Korea’s strategy should be established with a two-track approach of combining engagement against the external policy environment where accountability-based pressure is being strengthened.   However, South Korea’s establishment of the North Korean human rights strategy based on the two-track strategy of pressure and engagement faces two different policy challenges. First, pressure is growing in the international community for full accountability regarding North Korea’s human rights problems. Second, North Korea has used international pressure as a pretext to deny engagement with the international community. Because North Korea responds by linking pressure and engagement, it is not easy to achieve results by pushing ahead with a two-track approach of pressure and engagement.   In connection with the first policy obstacle, first of all, South Korea must effectively coordinate between its strategy oriented toward unification and the international cooperation focused on full accountability. In South Korea’s position, it cannot help but abide by the changes in the UN’s approach which features accountability-based pressure on North Korea. However, North Korea is responding with desperate measures to the UN’s approach from the perspective of “Supreme Dignity” argument. In this dilemma, South Korea needs to consistently maintain its traditional position that South Korea has always supported the UN’s approach. At the same time, even if human rights issues are not explicitly mentioned, South Korea needs to seek various methods to improve human rights condition in North Korea through the revitalization of inter-Korean relations. Until now, this kind of perception has rarely been seen in the inter-Korean relations. UN Commission of Inquiry recommends the United Nations to adopt the Rights-up Front strategy. South Korea should also induce an appropriate ministry to take the Rights-up Front strategy into consideration when setting up the inter-Korean cooperation strategy. In this regard, the human rights-based approach which is actively being discussed in the UN needs to be applied in correlation with South Korea’s situation. In particular, South Korea needs to establish its North Korea policy by taking into account the participation and empowerment of the North Koreans during the inter-Korean exchange and cooperation process.   The report by the Commission of Inquiry highlights the revitalization of the inter-Korean exchange and cooperation for improving the North Korean human rights situation. Therefore, South Korea needs to actively promote its position between aiming to improve the human rights situation through the inter-Korean exchange and supporting the international community.   In connection with the second policy environment, first of all, South Korea should try to create conditions for the activation of the UN human rights engagement mechanism so as to alleviate North Korea’s counter-strategy of linking pressure and engagement in the short run. More specifically, South Korea needs to increase diplomatic efforts to make conditions for the UN human rights mechanisms focused on engagement with regard to the UPR, technical cooperation with the OHCHR, and treaty-based bodies to expand their roles and responsibilities.   In particular, there is a need to actively utilize the UN human rights mechanism of engagement based on the countries’ obligations. Regarding treaty-based bodies to be relatively weak in political character, North Korea has tended to be cooperative with the treaty-based bodies until 2007. Therefore, South Korea needs to create conditions conducive for the activation of engaging North Korea to participate in the international community by emphasizing North Korea’s tendency to abide by and cooperate with treaty-based bodies.   North Korea has negatively responded to adopting a resolution for the sake of objectivity or selectivity targeting a specific country. However, UPR is free from criticism of double standards or selectivity in terms of targeting the entire United Nations Member States. Thus, there is a clear need to strengthen and expand the engagement strategy vis-à-vis North Korea by utilizing UPR. More specifically, South Korea can expand its engagement strategy vis-à-vis North Korea by focusing on the proposed resolutions on which North Korea expressed explicit acceptance.   Secondly, South Korea should weaken North Korea’s linkage strategy in which a response to the pressure-based strategy defines its response to the engagement-based strategy over the mid to long-term. In order to change North Korea’s action, which responds with both pressure and engagement, South Korea needs to use the North’s approach reversely. Because North Korea responds to accountability-based pressure by equating that as targeting the “Supreme Dignity,” relevant agencies in Pyongyang feel a lot of pressure. South Korea needs to establish a strategy for using it reversely. In this regard, it is important to induce North Korea to realize that the international actions for the accountability-based pressure will not be temporary.   South Korea should strengthen and maintain the visibility of North Korea’s human rights problem to make North Korea realize that the international efforts to hold human rights violators accountable will continue. Therefore, South Korea needs to play a leading role in maintaining the visibility of the North Korean human rights problem through communication, advocacy, and promotion in mid to long-term. For this role, South Korean government should play a leading role in establishing a complex, multifaceted cooperation network with international organizations, individual nations, internal and external NGOs. Taking into account North Korea’s response and the fact that the NGO’s role is strengthening in human rights field, South Korean government should reinforce public-private cooperation and provide support in building international solidarity with NGOs instead of directly getting involved.   If the pressure of full accountability continues in mid to long-term, it will become increasingly difficult for North Korea to reject all of United Nations human rights mechanisms. As part of its measures to alleviate pressure from international society in the mid to long term, it is possible that North Korea will adopt tactical acceptance, whereby North Korea accepts involvement of the United Nations’ human rights mechanisms. North Korea may also take positive actions, such as conditional permission for the UN personnel including the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in the DPRK to visit North Korea, acceptance of technical cooperation with OHCHR, agreement to abide by the international human rights treaties, and partial implementation of the proposed recommendations by the UPR.   Lastly, South Korea needs to devise its own strategy to improve human rights after taking into account the political factors behind linking human rights issues with national security and sanctions. Under the current situation where the accountability-based pressure on the North Korean human rights problem continues, a simple human rights-based approach would be difficult to effectively deal with the linkage between human rights and national security. In order for South Korea to carry out engagement strategy against the backdrop of pressure strategy on the North Korean human rights issues, South Korea needs to take a strategic approach to weaken North Korea’s the linkage strategy between human rights and national security. Above all, in order to resolve the North Korean human rights problem, human rights strategy toward North Korea should be established to create a favorable condition in which linkage between human rights and national security can be weakened. North Korea is linking human rights with national security in response to the U.S. “hostile policy” toward North Korea. The U.S., in turn, is strengthening its human rights linkage in order to create a policy environment for the resolution of the North’s nuclear weapons program. North Korea and United States are both linking human rights with national security for the different purposes; however, the key chain in this linkage architecture is North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In order to for South Korea’s strategy to produce tangible outcomes toward resolving the North Korean human rights problem through a two-track approach of engagement and pressure, human rights strategy toward North Korea must also take into account the North’s nuclear weapons problem. In this process, South Korea needs to find coevolutionary strategy to alleviate the North’s security concerns. ■         The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean gov-ernment. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

Kyung-young Chung is the director of the Institute of International Strategy on East Asia, and taught national security courses at the Korea National Defense University and the Catholic University of Korea.         The transition of wartime operation control (OPCON) from Combined Forces Command (CFC) to the Republic of Korea (ROK) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will be an epochal turning point for the evolution of the ROK-U.S. alliance. In early June 2013, the ROK government requested a review of the transition of wartime OPCON by December 1, 2015. The reasons for the ROK government proposal were the increased threat level caused by North Korea's third nuclear test, which was reinforced by long-range missile fire, the possibility of miscalculation, and the unpreparedness of the Republic of Korea military.   North Korea’s third nuclear test and further development of long-range missiles have had a tremendous impact on the Park Geun-hye Administration’s policy-making process regarding another delay in the OPCON transition due to changing threat perceptions. Assuming that the transition of wartime OPCON will be implemented on December 1, 2015, North Korea could miscalculate in waging a war if South Korea will not be fully prepared at that time. Therefore, the Park administration is sensitive to any potential terrible tragedy during her tenure as president in the event of another Korean war.   The role of national defense is to protect the sovereignty and territory of the state and defend the lives and property of its citizens. To retain the national self-esteem of the ROK is both noble and valuable, and if South Korea continues to delegate the leading role of defense of the ROK to the U.S., then the ROK's dependence is undesirable.   That the Park Geun-hye administration again requested the U.S. to take a leadership position in the defense of the ROK is not consistent with South Korea’s status as the 15th-largest economic power in the world, its international prestige, and its enhanced sense of national security as a result of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the South Korean people’s strenuous efforts. The ROK should defend the country and be able to stand on its own for its national security. Another delay in the transition of wartime OPCON should not meet one of the commitments in the ROK-U.S. mutual agreement. How will the international community, as well as North Korea, perceive South Korea’s lack of confidence in defending its country?   This paper will first provide a historical review of OPCON. It will then discuss the background of the Park Administration’s request, and the factors for U.S. consideration. Next, it will address the reasons why the year 2015 was chosen for the transition of wartime OPCON. Finally, this paper will make policy recommendations.   A Historical Review of Operational Control   North Korea launched a large-scale invasion along the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. It took three days for the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) to occupy Seoul. The U.S. Truman Administration took prompt and decisive action to participate in the Korean War. In early July 1950, Task Force Smith deployed to the Korean theater. On July 14, President Syngman Rhee sent an official letter to General Douglas McArthur, commander of UN forces, which delegated the command authority of the Korean armed forces to the UNC for as long as the then-present state of North Korean hostility remained. The UNC could prevent communist expansionism through unity of command. However, after the armistice agreement, the operational control was supposed to revert back to the ROK government.   The South Korean government had to insure that the U.S. government could protect South Korea by signing the ROK-U.S. mutual defense treaty on Oct 1, 1953. Considering painful lessons learned during the Korean War, the South Korean government attempted to retract OPCON authority from the UNC. The U.S. reached an agreement with the ROK on the Agreed Minutes relating to continued cooperation in economic and military matters on November 17, 1954 which stated that as long the UNC continues to defend South Korea, the UNC will exercise operational control over ROK forces. Since the establishment of the CFC on November 7, 1978, operational control has shifted from the UNC to CFC. In particular, after the former Soviet Union dissolved in 1990, the U.S. developed the East Asia Security Initiative (EASI), which included changing the role of USFK and the Koreanization of South Korean defense. South Korean President Roh Tae-woo promised to transition operational control after considering the political requirements of the South Korean people after democratization.   Peacetime operational control shifted from the CFC to the ROK JCS on December 1, 1994. But after the first North Korean nuclear crisis, both governments could not implement a wartime operational control transition.   Changes in the international security environment in the 21st century accelerated the wartime operational control transition. After 9/11, in order to handle China’s potential threat as well as international terrorism, the U.S. examined its oversea bases by conducting its Global Posture Review. The U.S. developed a policy and system in which the South Korean military leads and U.S. Forces provide support, which included the relocation of U.S. forces in Korea and USFK strategic flexibility. In addition, President Roh Moo-hyun requested a more mature and equal relationship with U.S. by seeking wartime operational control. In 2006, the two allies reached an agreement on the transition of wartime operational control by April 17, 2012. Due to North Korea’s second nuclear test on May 25, 2009 and the sinking of the Cheonan on March 26, 2010, the ROK and U.S. governments reached an agreement on the postponement of the transition of wartime OPCON to December 1, 2015.   Background of the Park Administration Request and U.S Consideration Factors   It is estimated that the Park administration requested to review the wartime OPCON based on the following reasons. First, it wanted to reevaluate the security environments between the time when the allies agreed to the OPCON transition and the time after the North launched a long-range missile on December 12, 2012 and conducted a third nuclear test on February 12, 2013. Secondly, the administration was concerned about Korea’s capability to respond to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. Lastly, it wanted to review Korea’s military capabilities to exercise wartime operational control.   Proponents of another delay in the transition of wartime OPCON insist that it should be postponed until North Korean threats and the nuclear crisis disappear and peace settles upon the Korean peninsula. The insistence of this group implies that South Korea will never exercise the transition of wartime OPCON over to its own forces. North Korea will never abandon its nuclear arsenal since they continuously attempt to use nuclear devices for regime survival and ransom to drag down South Korea. Additionally, North Korea attempts to employ nuclear devices as negotiation leverage with the U.S. North Korea also wants to prevent China’s intervention and attempt to communize the Korean peninsula through nuclear war or the threat of nuclear war. This means that South Korea will never implement operational control over its own forces.   In the meantime, the U.S. has responded negatively by releasing remarks by key military personnel about the ROK government’s review of the transition of wartime OPCON. In written testimony submitted by Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his reconfirmation hearing at the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on July 18, 2013, Dempsey said, “I support transitioning wartime OPCON to Korea according to plan. From a military point of view, the timing of the transition is appropriate.” In addition, General Curtis Scaparrotti, who has been nominated as the next commander of U.S. forces in Korea, met with Yonhap News reporters on July 30.   Scaparrotti said, “I approve of plans to transition OPCON in 2015, I think it’s a good plan. And I think we should move forward accordingly.” Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin responded during a meeting with reporters after talks with U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on August 28, 2013, “It is not just a military issue, but something that requires in-depth discussions that should involve political, diplomatic and comprehensive considerations.”   It is expected that the U.S. may seriously consider South Korea’s public opinion regarding the transition of wartime OPCON and its impact on national self-esteem, the level of trust in the alliance, USFK strategic flexibility, the rebalancing strategy to East Asia, and U.S. financial pressure as its defense budget faces a reduction of $487 billion in the upcoming ten years. The U.S. military is already planning to go from about 570,000 soldiers to 490,000 by 2017. The current plan to reduce the size of the Marine Corps to 182,000 from 205,000 could also be changed. The substantial reduction of U.S. troops will have a serious impact on U.S. deployment to the Korean theater in the event of war on the peninsula. The re-postponement will have a bad impact on the U.S. strategically and financially.   In the meantime, the U.S., which assesses the ROK-U.S. alliance as the linchpin of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, will still take the lead in defending the ROK regardless of its success with economic growth and political development. Does it make sense? If the U.S. again accepts the ROK’s proposal, is it eventually helpful for the ROK to be considered as a reliable ally?   Reasons for the Year 2015 for the Transition of Wartime OPCON   1. The Rationale for the Transition of Wartime OPCON   Why should the Republic of Korea exercise wartime operational control over its forces? First, the transition of wartime operational control is a requirement in pushing for a unification strategy in wartime, as well as peacetime, on a national, strategic level. North Korea should also consider South Korea an equal counterpart with whom to negotiate military confidence-building measures and a peace regime on the peninsula, because South Korea retains its wartime operational control. In the event of war, if South Korea’s forces take the lead in conducting military operations, South Korea will be able to play a leading role in accomplishing unification by making China less likely to intervene in the war on the peninsula – rather than if the U.S. takes the lead in conducting counter-offensive operations towards China along the international border.   Second, wartime operational control signifies that, by exercising autonomy in the employment of military power, South Korea is building a system that is able to manage North Korean threats and to take measures to retaliate against North Korean military provocations. North Korea would not dare to further provoke the South since it realizes that South Korea now has full authority over its forces in responding to any provocations. The ROK military’s mission in preventing any further North Korea military provocations could make contributions that lead North Korea to establish a normal relationship with the South.   Third, wartime operational control implies military sovereignty should be exercised by South Korea. For example, when a driver drives a car, he is in charge and responsible for the safety and security of himself, as well as the passenger. The passenger, however, does not have any sense of responsibility in case of an emergency. This concept is applicable to the defense of South Korea. Hence, South Korea has the authority to defend and protect its own country.   Fourth, each sovereign state should exercise operational control over its own forces during both wartime and peacetime. During the Korean War, the delegation of operational control authority to the UNC was acceptable because of the national crisis; however, it has still remained under the leading role of the U.S., which is an unusual case. Wartime operational control should revert back to the ROK government, because it is a normal state with economic power, as well as international prestige regarding its forces.   Finally, the transition of wartime operational control to South Korea will not only support inter-Korean policies, but also be an opportunity to expand South Korea’s diplomatic prospects by exercising extensive autonomy in activities with the international community.   2. The Constraints in Coping with North Korea’s Military Provocations   The second reason for the transition of wartime control is to enable the ROK military to proactively cope with North Korea’s military provocations. The U.S. has been sensitive to a potential escalation of war if South Korea retaliates massively and decisively against North Korea’s military provocations. The U.S. believed it should contain South Korea’s ability to retaliate by exercising operational control over its forces as a control tool. The combined command structure could then deter war on the peninsula. In this sense, South Korea could achieve successful economic development. However, consequently South Korean forces have become cowardly. North Korea has violated the armistice agreement with 2,953 incidents since it was signed.   Because of the armistice UNC rules of engagement and the duality of command structure between peace and war time, the South Korean government and its forces could not respond in a timely manner against North Korean provocations and terrorism with more powerful weapon systems. The war environment on the Korean Peninsula is a unique situation that can progress at an alarming rate from peacetime to crisis and crisis to wartime. The armistice and its UNC rules of engagement dictate that South Korean forces should respond proportionally against North Korea provocations and in accordance with lethality of the weapon system employed by the KPA. In addition the chairman of the ROK JCS exercises operational control over ROK forces during peace time. However, if the crisis becomes worse, operational control over Korean forces should be shifted to the commander, CFC.   The complexity of the UNC rules of engagement dictated by the armistice and the combined command structure constrain ROK forces to be able to timely respond to North Korean provocation. This has led North Korea to perceive South Korean forces as a paper tiger. North Korea has continuously exploited the vulnerability of the command structure and rules of engagement. South Korea could not massively and promptly retaliate against North Korean hostilities, including the sinking of the Cheonan. Even though North Korea has trampled South Korean territory, including the Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the South Korean government and its forces have not been able to exercise self-defense rights against North Korean brutality. It is ironic and unacceptable that South Korean cannot defend its national sovereignty and territory, as well as protect its people. This is abnormal and unusual. South Korea should be able to exercise its right to self-defense.   These painful lessons from past incidents led the ROK-U.S. alliance to collectively cope with North Korea’s local provocations. The ROK military has made strenuous efforts to effectively institutionalize military-readiness posture to prevent North Korea provocations by taking the initiative in employing the combined assets. On March 22, 2013, the signing of the ROK-US Combined Counter-Provocation Plan by General Chung Sung-jo, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General James D. Thurman, commander of USFK, had significant implications concerning the transition of wartime OPCON. The Combined Counter-Provocation Plan allows South Korean forces to exercise its self-defense right against any further North Korean provocations by prompt and decisive retaliation. It also allows USFK to jointly fight by deploying U.S. assets in Korea, and even U.S. assets from Japan and the continental United States in order to prevent further escalation. The concept of the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan could be applicable to a wartime setting where the ROK takes the lead and the U.S. supports it.   During a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on March 21, President Obama stated that all countries have independent rights when it comes to making decisions to carry out a military action - a significant message for South Korea. “I also appreciate the fact that the president has reaffirmed more than any other president Israel’s right and duty to defend itself, by itself, for itself. That sums up our common view,” Netanyahu said.   Also, in early 2011, military operations were launched in Libya to eliminate a Kaddafi regime that had lost the responsibility to protect its own people. As a result, the UN Security Council passed a resolution to place military sanctions on the regime. The operations were led by NATO forces, along with the U.S. The U.S. delegated operational control authority to NATO member states, such as Italy, France and the U.K., because they better understood and were familiarized with the region, even though the U.S. provided much of the weapon systems and equipment. This exemplifies a cooperative strategy by the Obama Administration which respects the other party as an equal partner.   3. The U.S. Solid Commitment to Defend South Korea even after the Transition of Wartime OPCON   The argument that the transition of wartime operational control would cause the U.S.-ROK alliance to weaken, eventually leading to the withdrawal of USFK, is not appropriate. The ROK and U.S. governments agreed to the following four points in the event of the transition of wartime OPCON. First, the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty is still effective, even after the transition. Second, the strategic mechanisms between the two allies, including the Security Consultative Meeting and Military Committee Meeting, are also effective. Third, the U.S. will continue to provide bridging capabilities for vulnerable areas within ROK forces, even after the transition. Finally, the U.S. will deploy augmented forces to the Korean theater in the event of war.   The U.S. commitment to defend South Korea is solid and clear. The U.S. would not withdraw its troops from Korea, especially considering that the relocation of U.S. forces to Camp Humphrey, which is currently under construction, will be four times larger than the previous camp. In particular, the U.S. will continue to evaluate the Korean peninsula as a critical strategic point to contain Chinese influence in the region. The U.S. considers South Korea a power hub for coping with contingency situations in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. forces in Korea have been partially re-deployed in the past to Thailand to conduct the Cobra Gold exercise, and also to the Philippines for the Balikatan exercise. That is why the U.S. government adopted an accompany-dependant policy recently from a non-command responsible assignment policy in Korea, which led U.S. soldiers’ assignment to Korea to become psychologically more stable.   The primary reason for reviewing the time period for the transition of wartime OPCON requested by the South Korean government and its military forces is the nuclear and missile threats. North Korean strategic weapon systems, such as its nuclear arsenal and missiles, threaten the U.S., as well as South Korean national security, and are a challenge to its national survival. South Korean and U.S. forces should prepare against any nuclear war. This past spring, the U.S. demonstrated its ability to use extended deterrence through power projection by flying strategic bombers, including the B-52, B-2, F-22 and planes from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Nimitz, over the peninsula in a move against future North Korea provocations and threats. The weapon systems flew from varied places such as U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, and even from the continental U.S. The U.S. has exemplified its determination to cope with any contingency caused by nuclear and missile threats. In this sense, the U.S. retains a solid and powerful resolution.   South Korean forces also have made tremendous efforts to develop kill-chain systems and to develop a Korean missile defense system to deal with the North Korean missile threat. The South Korean military has already allocated in its defense budget to purchase weapon systems such as surveillance and reconnaissance and deep-strike assets.   4. To Implement a Trust-building Process and Seoul Process Requires the Transition of Wartime OPCON   As long as the Park administration does not have confidence in national security and will not exercise operational control over its forces, it might not be able to implement a trust-building process on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asian peace and cooperation initiatives. The end goal of a trust-building process is to normalize the relationship between the two Koreas. The instable armistice structure could be shifted to a permanent peace structure. If South Korea will not exercise operational control over its forces, it will not be in a position to achieve arms control, as well as security and military confidence-building measures.   North Korea will attempt to directly negotiate with the U.S. without considering South Korea as the key party at the negotiation table. The Park Administration should take a closer look at North Korean behavior, which has always been to stick to bilateral negotiations with the U.S. - in particular over military and nuclear issues. Hence, the transition of wartime OPCON will be the most critical variable for the South Korean government to deal with the North.   In the meantime, to implement the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, it is necessary for South Korea to take the lead in institutionalizing multi-lateral security cooperation for events such as natural disasters and atomic plant safety problems. The basic prerequisite for the Seoul process is for South Korea to exercise operational control over its own forces. This indicates that South Korea should have also autonomy over its forces in order to be considered as a key and equal player in the region. Therefore, President Park should take the lead in regional security cooperation. Particularly, the Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo trilateral cooperation secretariat, which was established in 2011, will be a backbone of the Northeast Asia Peace Cooperation Initiative.   Policy Recommendations   1. The ROK-U.S. alliance should be a role model for world alliances in terms of successful industrialization, democratization, and eventual security autonomy.   The alliance’s eventual objective is to help the weaker party to become self-reliant toward its own defense. The ROK-U.S. alliance is a great example of this concept, whereby the ROK has been able to advance greatly during its alliance with the U.S. Economic growth, political development, and security autonomy have risen dramatically due to the alliance. However, if the transition of wartime OPCON is not implemented, the two allies can no longer be considered a benchmark for third-world countries, because security autonomy has not yet been fully established.   2. Be Careful Not to Overestimate North Korean Forces and Do Not Underestimate South Korean Forces.   It is important to correctly assess North Korean forces. However, we don’t need to overestimate North Korean forces. If we underestimate South Korean forces, it will have a severe impact on South Korean troop morale and a negative impact on South Korean war-fighting capabilities.   More than 40 years have passed since President Park Chung-hee launched a self-reliance defense policy in the early 1970s, which helped South Korea to pass North Korea in terms of economic power. The 2009 Military Balance published by IISS indicates that South Korea’s defense budget is $22.5 billion, which is five times larger than that of North Korea’s $4.38 billion. In particular, the KPA has severe shortages in oil, food and the essential components of weapon systems. The North’s seaports, airports, and other infrastructure are in bad condition. Those factors have negatively impacted the war sustainability of the North. In the meantime, South Korean forces have continued to strengthen their war-fighting capability by purchasing sophisticated weapon systems. In particular, South Korea’s overwhelming industrial capacity is superior to that of the North. In that context, South Korea can take the lead in defeating the KPA in the event of a war supported by the U.S.   South Korean forces have demonstrated their war and operational fighting capabilities in the past. During the Vietnam War, the commander of South Korean forces in Vietnam exercised operational control over his own forces and showed excellence in military operations. Also, South Korea deployed its Zaytun Division to the Iraq War. The stabilization operation conducted by the Zaytun Division was benchmarked by all the other coalition forces, including the U.S. In addition, South Korea’s Naval Special Forces conducted a marvelous counter-piracy operation using highly-sophisticated weapon systems during Operation Twilight Aden Bay in January 2011. The South Korean JCS commanded and controlled the counter-piracy operation by employing GPS and satellites from Seoul. All these exemplify the war-fighting capability of South Korea done in close operation with the U.S. Also, since the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, volunteer rates for the Marine Corps and Special Forces Command have doubled, which demand both physical and mental toughness. These imply the fact that South Korean forces should and will be able to take the lead in waging war by exercising their own operational control.   3. Strategies for Neutralizing North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal and the Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Warheads to South Korea Should Be Developed and Implemented for Convincing the South Korean Government to Seriously Reconsider the Request to Postpone the Transition Again.   The primary reason for reviewing the timeline of the transition of wartime OPCON requested by the South Korean government and military forces is the nuclear and missile threat. North Korean strategic weapon systems, such as its nuclear arsenal and missiles, threaten the U.S. and South Korea’s national security and challenge South Korea’s national survival. South Korean and U.S. forces should prepare against nuclear war.   It is necessary for the U.S. to proactively re-deploy tactical warheads to the Korean peninsula. The U.S. Department of Defense is now reviewing the re-deployment of tactical nuclear warheads to the Asian-Pacific region. This option seems to be inconsistent with the Obama administration policy of a nuclear-free world. However, the re-entry of tactical nuclear devices into the Korean theater would serve to neutralize North Korean nuclear employment and to prevent a domino effect of nuclear proliferation in the region.   In particular, if the Obama administration makes a decision regarding the re-entry of tactical nuclear warheads to the Korean theater, it is intended to persuade the South Korean government to implement the transition of wartime OPCON as planned. The return of tactical warheads by the U.S., which seems to show the U.S. perceived South Korea’s request as a preliminary action, would lead China to play a more active role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and also to help the South Korean people eliminate feelings of psychological instability.   If North Korea abandons its nuclear arsenal, then the U.S. government would withdraw tactical warheads from Korea to the U.S. These strategies and the re-entry of tactical warheads would enable South Korea to cope with the nuclear crisis of the North. In the meantime, South Korean forces can take the lead in protecting sovereignty, territory, and defending the lives and property of the Korean people by exercising wartime operational control.   The South Korean people are supposed to defend their nation. Even though Korea has been invaded more than a hundred times, their ancestors have protected the country through bloody battles. The South Korean people should protect their country against any external invasions. In addition, considering the size of South Korean forces, 3.8 million soldiers consisting of 600,000 active troops and 3.2 million mobilized personnel, and approximately 200,000 U.S. forces which could be deployed to the Korean peninsula theater in the event of war with 28,500 soldiers present in Korea, it does not make sense for South Korean forces to follow U.S. troops in the event of war. In particular, if South Korean forces take the lead in waging a war against the North, it seems less likely that China will intervene in another Korean war. Moreover, it should be noted that the objectives of war between two allies are not consistent. This was observed during the Korean War when the U.S. attempted to terminate the war through armistice negotiation, whereas the South Korean government attempted to continuously conduct military operations by withdrawing the operational control authority from the UNC.   4. The Defense Budget Should Be Increased to Reinforce the Essential Combat Assets for South Korea’s War-fighting Capability.   It is inevitable for South Korea to purchase C4I surveillance and reconnaissance assets, such as the Global Hawk system. South Korea should develop 800-km range ballistic missiles, which cover the entire area of North Korea, in order to improve the striking capability of South Korean forces. The South Korean government should allocate a greater share of funds to the defense budget in order to reinforce military operational capability. Unlike the Roh Moo-hyun Administration, which retained a 7.8% average annual defense budget increase, the Lee Myung-bak Administration only allocated a 6.4% average annual defense budget increase. President Park Geun-hye’s promise to increase the annual defense budget, which supersedes the increase of the annual financial budget, should be implemented.   5. Mid- and Long-term Strategies for National Security and Sustainable Economic Growth Should Be Developed.   The South Korean government should consider the defense industry, as well as defense-burden sharing, to form linkages between security and the economy. The South Korean government negotiates with the U.S. about the extent of its defense-burden sharing, which is currently about 42 percent of the U.S. troops present cost. The U.S. side has requested an increase to more than 1 trillion won from the current 869.5 billion won defense-burden sharing. Considering USFK strategic flexibility, does it make sense to pay the U.S.-requested additional cost?   In addition, if the U.S. continues to exercise wartime operational control over ROK forces, then dependency will grow deeper through the purchase of more U.S.-made weapon systems. Also, South Korea’s defense industry will not be able to develop. Besides, military-industry joint investment will be limited. As a result, a linkage strategy between security and the economy should be developed. This also means that South Korea should consider developing a national strategy from a mid and long-term perspective, and not necessarily continue to rely heavily on the U.S. To achieve self-sufficient defense and develop a defense industry, South Korea will enhance national interests by stimulating sustainable economic growth. These strategies should be pursued by the Park Administration.   6. Preparation for the Transition of Wartime OPCON Should be Initiated by the President.   The President, as commander-in-chief of ROK forces, should be in charge of the preparation of the transition of wartime OPCON issue. This issue is not a purely military issue, but a national security issue. Thus, the president should take full responsibility. As President Park Chung-hee strongly pursued a self-reliant defense during his leadership, President Park Geun-hye should initiate a quarterly ‘Transition of Wartime Operation Control Status Conference’ until December 1, 2015.   President Park should take appropriate actions with related ministries to implement the transition of wartime OPCON and coordinate with the National Assembly and South Korean citizens to mentally prepare for the transition. The year 2015 will be a historical year for South Korean national security and national self-esteem. It will proactively enable South Korea to successfully implement the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiatives, as well as the trust-building process on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, the ROK-U.S. alliance would then serve as a global role model for other alliances to imitate due to the strength of its security autonomy, as well as the successful industrialization and democratization that accompanied it. The ROK-U.S. alliance will play a crucial role in demonstrating a global partnership to achieve international security missions for peace, human rights, and development and making great contributions to civilization. ■         Acknowledgement The author appreciates Chaesung Chun and Young-ho Kim for helpful comments.

Chang-Hyun Jung is an adjunct professor in the Department of General Education at Kookmin University.         Abstract   The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.   The new stage of North Korea’s leadership succession began with the rise to power of the third generation leader Kim Jong-un. On 15 April 2012, the newly-appointed First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong-un made his first public speech during a military parade to commemorate Kim Il-sung’s centenary. It was the official announcement of the opening of the Kim Jong-un regime toward the world. A series of political events from the Meeting of Party Representatives to the Kim Il-sung centenary celebrations clearly show that the third generation of leadership is emerging as a new core power group backed by the second generation. This move means more than just a generational shift in North Korea’s power structure. It indicative of possible changes in policy lines on its internal and external affairs.   Kim Jong-un conducted political reshuffles before and after the Meeting of Party Representatives in April 2012, as part of actions to implement a moderate shift in generation and to firmly secure his control over the military. Since smoothly establishing the hereditary succession process, Kim Jong-un not only moved toward assuming political leadership but also swiftly acquired a firm grip on the power elites in the party, government, and military by reorganizing and uniting power elites. It would seem Kim Jong-un’s rule is stable, at least in terms of power structure.   The power structure of the Kim Jong-un regime has turned out to be a single leadership where the country is ruled by one strong man rather than a collective leadership. Instead of having “specific figures” as a regent or a guardian through a decentralization of power, North Korea seems to prefer to support the new supreme leader through “collective consultation.”   The policies designed and implemented during the last three years of Kim Jong-il’s rule were in fact intended as a policy transformation process to prepare preparation for Kim Jong-un’s rule. These policy directions have been maintained since Kim Jong-un came to power. His first public speech on 15 April can be translated as an announcement on limited changes for a “knowledge-based economy.” This established a new period while inheriting the values of Jaju or independence from the Kim Il-sung era and Songun or military first politics from the Kim Jong-il era. In particular, Kim Jong-un emphasized the significance of “peace,” by stating in the speech, “for our party and the Republic’s government that consider powerful state construction and people’s livelihood improvement to be their general goal, peace cannot be more valuable.” Under Kim Jong-un’s rule with the keyword of “knowledge-based economy,” North Korea is expected to place priorities on improving people’s livelihood and will take on more flexible policy decisions from 2013 when the next administrations in South Korea and the United States will be established. As such it is an inevitable option for North Korea to rebuild its economy and attract foreign investment. Against this backdrop, the administrations in South Korea and the United States should not pressure North Korea but rather wait and respond calmly until the policy lines of the Kim Jong-un regime on economic change and openness are clearer. Above all the first priority should be placed on stable management of North Korean issues, given that many of the participants of the Six-Party Talks will enter into power transition process at the end of 2012.   First, the U.S. administration needs to resume contacts with North Korea in order to implement the Leap Day Deal in which Pyongyang would place a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests, as well as freeze its nuclear programs. If the diplomatic pressure from the international community successfully leads North Korea to give up its nuclear activities and ease tensions, it would create the right environment for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.   Second, it will be worthwhile establishing contact through high-level channels to develop a clearer picture of what are Kim Jong-un’s intention regarding North Korea’s nuclear activities. In providing new opportunities for the North Korean leadership, a policy shift by Pyongyang may take place.   Third, it is important that the Lee Myung-bak administration reopens channels for inter-Korean talks even at low-level so as to not leave too much of a burden for the next administration. Offering to hold inter-Korean family reunions for the second half of the year 2012 would be a good start.   Fourth, the next administration in South Korea should be committed to establishing a more sustainable North Korean policy that can maintain consistency regardless of any power shift by comprehensively reflecting public opinion during a time when conflict among South Koreans on approaches toward North Korea is becoming worse.   Whoever comes into power in South Korea after the presidential election, the main agenda of inter-Korean relations will be on the next inter-Korean Summit. Kim Jong-un has already expressed his willingness to talk, stating “(we) will go hand in hand with anyone who truly desires the country’s reunification and peaceful prosperity.” If the third inter-Korean Summit can be held in 2013, it would be a significant breakthrough in building confidence between two Koreas and solving the North Korean nuclear crisis as well as making progress toward peaceful coexistence. ■         Acknowledgement The author appreciates Chaesung Chun and Jung Chul Lee for helpful comments.  

Andrei Lankov is an Associate Professor in the Social Science Department at Kookmin University.         Few people would doubt that the continuing rise of China is the single most influential factor in the evolving geostrategic position of Korea. Over the last 35 years, China has experienced a period of rapid economic growth which is probably without parallel in world economic history, and this period is not over. While China is still far from being in a position to challenge global US hegemony, it is quite possible that it will play a dominant role in East Asia, especially if ongoing changes in the world economy press the US into reducing military spending and downsizing its global role.   Indeed, in the last few years China loomed increasingly large in issues of the North Korean politics. Some of the most controversial political problems of present-day Korea are clearly related to China’s rise. The fate of the Jeju naval base, whichever is officially stated, largely depends on whether Korea will eventually chose to balance against or bandwagon with rising China. The problem of the forced deportation of the North Korean refugees attracted much attention of the Korean public to the issues of human rights in China – perhaps, first time when such issues are discussed widely.   It seems that the rise of China will present Korea with many a difficult decision. In some cases, confrontation is likely to develop, but usually some kind of compromise is, probably, the best option. Like it or not, most problems in East Asia cannot be effectively solved without cooperation with (or at least the passive support of) China. This is the case with the major long-term issue of Korean politics, that is, the issue of Korean unification.   Some (speculative) thoughts about North Korea’s future   In recent years, it has been a general rule of diplomatic protocol and political correctness to profess belief that the eventual unification of Korea should be achieved gradually, through negotiation between the two Korean governments. Unfortunately, this is wishful thinking. While negotiated and gradual unification is highly desirable, it is all but impossible as well.   The major stumbling block is the huge – and growing – gap in living standards between North and South. Even according to the most optimistic estimates, the per capita income gap is as high as 1:15, whilst more pessimistic estimates put this gap closer to 1:40. This remains largely unknown to a majority of the North Korean population thanks to a combination of harsh policies of self-imposed information isolation, domestic surveillance and ruthless persecution of dissent. For decades, the North Korean government has gone to exceptional lengths to hide the level of South Korea’s economic affluence from the average North Korean.   Indeed, the increasing income gap makes the North Korea regime extremely vulnerable politically. Once the North Korean populace learn about the prosperity enjoyed by their Southern brethren, they are quite likely to see their government as the force responsible for the current economic backwardness and destitution of the North. Hypothetical negotiations about unification will inevitably bring about much closer interaction between the South and North. Sincere steps towards negotiated and gradual unification will mean increasing contacts through economic interaction, personal exchanges and the like. If this is to happen, the North Korean people are bound to learn about the gap between the two Koreas and they are yet again likely to blame their own government for this gap. Improved contacts with the South are highly destabilising for the North Korean regime in its present shape, and the regime is perfectly aware of this.   Therefore the only realistic route to unification is a radical change in the North Korean regime – and such changes seems to be a question of time since in its present form the regime cannot be sustained indefinitely. Such a change may result from a popular revolt, power clash within the elite, or even attempted reforms (due to the above mentioned reasons, Chinese-style reforms are extremely dangerous for regime stability in the North). Some combination of the three may happen as well. Domestic crisis in North Korea is likely to trigger a popular movement whose major demand will be unification with the affluent South – essentially the adoption of the seemingly super-efficient and highly attractive economic system of South Korea. In other words, we are talking about the Korean version of what happened in Germany in 1989-91.   However, in the peculiar case of North Korea such a domestic crisis and the resulting outbreak of a popular pro-unification movement is likely to develop into a violent confrontation. The North Korean political elite, including its middle and even lower strata, have good reason to believe that in the case of unification-by-absorption, they will lose everything. These people are therefore likely to fight – to take the most recent example, Gaddafi’s loyalists in Libya did. These potential Kim loyalists clearly constitute a minority, albeit a significant one (one or at most two million, perhaps), but they are better organised and better trained than the average North Korean. In the case of a domestic crisis, these Kim loyalists will see themselves as cornered and therefore will fight with determination.   If a future domestic crisis in North Korea were to become violent, this will create great temptation for China to get involved. The result of Chinese unilateral intervention is likely to be the emergence of a pro-Chinese satellite state in the northern half of the Korean peninsula. Such a turn of events would perpetuate the division of Korea more or less indefinitely. It will also endanger peace and stability in Korea because it means that the Korean peninsula will remain the focal point of great power rivalries.   Therefore, to the best of our knowledge we can anticipate that North Korea’s mid to long-term future is likely to follow one of the following three scenarios:   1. North Korea remains basically unchanged. The scenario entails that the regime avoids all real reform, keeps its people as docile and terrified as it can whilst manipulating outside powers in order to obtain aid. This is not a recipe for indefinite systemic survival, but it may ensure elite continuity for a decade or two, if not longer.   2. A domestic crisis brings about unification by absorption. In this scenario, disintegration of law and order, whatever the cause, will bring about the outbreak of a pro-unification movement whose demand will be unification with the South.   3. A domestic crisis brings about Chinese intervention and the creation of a pro-Chinese regime. In this scenario, the state that emerges north of the 38th parallel is likely to start economic reforms – it will be able to afford this, being backed by Chinese armed divisions and Chinese capital. But politically, the state that emerges will be more or less controlled by Beijing.   Of the above mentioned scenarios, unification-by-absorption seems to be the most desirable or, to be frank, the least undesirable from both the ROK’s and US’ perspectives. Unification by absorption is likely to be socially troublesome and economically ruinous, but all other realistic alternatives are, at the end of the day, significantly less desirable (while the oft-lauded “gradual and negotiated unification” should not even be considered by a serious analyst, because, unfortunately, it is a pipe dream, pure and simple).   Therefore the major goal of South Korea’s diplomacy should be the creation of conditions which will make unification the most likely outcome. The major problem is the position of China, whose actions or lack thereof seem to be the only outside factor which might decisively influence the outcome of a future crisis in North Korea. Therefore, it is extremely important to find mutually acceptable compromise with China, to make sure that China will not be too active in its efforts to keep the North Korean regime afloat and will not choose to use the eventual North Korean crisis to establish a pro-Chinese state in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula.   What interests does China have on the Korean Peninsula?   In order to create an effective policy in dealing with China in this matter, one has to ascertain what the major goals of China’s policy towards North Korea are, and more broadly, the Korean peninsula. It seems that such goals and concerns are relatively easy to outline and, fortunately, these concerns are quite legitimate, rational and are remarkably free from any ideological considerations.   China is sometimes described as “North Korea’s ally,” but this is not really the case. The author’s contacts with Chinese diplomats and academics makes him suspect that the Chinese attitude towards the North is generally similar to the attitude the Soviet Union took towards North Korea in the 1970s. Under the thin veneer of fraternal rhetoric, there is a great deal of hostility, suspicion and plain contempt. For the Chinese, North Korea is a bizarre and almost comical place – it is to them a caricature of China in the early 1970s, the embodiment of all that was wrong with China back then.   From my talks in Beijing, it appears that a significant majority of China’s Pyongyangologists quietly assume that in the long run the North Korean regime is doomed to collapse. They also assume that the eventual outcome of such a collapse is likely to be the unification of Korea under the auspices of the Seoul government. The Wikileaks cables scandal of last year confirmed that such expectations are indeed widespread among Chinese officials.   Talking privately at an international seminar a year ago, an influential Chinese academic/official said frankly: “North Korea is a strategic asset for China, but the actual value of this asset is not particularly high and diminishes as time goes by. We are willing to help North Korea as long as it remains relatively cheap, but we are not going to bail the Pyongyang government out of serious trouble.”   Nonetheless, currently China persists with supporting North Korea – largely because it sees unification as mildly detrimental to its long-term strategic interests. Both its willingness to provide Beijing with aid, and its unwillingness to allow a free passage of the North Korean refugees to the South are driven by this fear of regime collapse followed by an outbreak of instability. This support is devoid of ideology, rather it is driven by geopolitical and strategic considerations which are listed below.   • First of all, China needs stability near its borders. China has become a status quo power, since the Chinese government believes that international and domestic stability is vital in order to maintain rapid economic growth. China will not necessarily remain a status quo power forever: sooner or later, it might challenge the existent world order which is dominated by the US. But, at least for the time being, the Chinese elite believes that time is on their side. As time passes, Chinese economic power and military might increases, making China a potentially more significant player in the international system. Therefore, the Chinese government does not want disruptions which might deflect valuable resources away from all important economic aims, and even if a particular crisis is unavoidable, it makes sense to postpone it for a brief while.   Therefore, China would prefer stability on the Korean peninsula. It would accept (admittedly with varying degrees of enthusiasm) almost any outcome on the Korean peninsula, so long as final stability is guaranteed. Even possible involvement of China in a future North Korean crisis might be largely determined not by hegemonic designs or geostrategic worries but rather by the need to reign in potential chaos in a nearby region.   • Second, China worries about US political and especially military presence in its vicinity. Therefore, it would prefer to keep the Korean peninsula divided, with North Korea playing the role of a buffer zone between China and US forces in Korea.   While the strategic rivalry between the PRC and the US is not nearly as intense as the Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR, it is significant nonetheless and is likely to intensify in the coming years. Therefore, North Korea is perceived as a natural buffer zone and this might be the reason why China might intervene there in future. This is also the reason behind the current willingness of China to provide North Korea with relatively generous and unconditional aid.   • Third, China has some economic interests in North Korea. These interests should not be overestimated, of course. Contrary to what is often stated in South Korea, economic interests are secondary in Chinese decision making in regard to North Korea. Loud talk of a Chinese ‘economic takeover of North Korea’ should not obscure the fact that the volume of trade between the North and China is a paltry $3.5 billion while the volume of trade between South Korea and China is $207.1 billion – an impressive sixtyfold difference. To put things in a more global perspective, China’s trade with Chile is roughly seven times larger than its trade with North Korea, even though Chile has a smaller population and needless to say, is far more distant both politically and geographically. Nonetheless, such economic interests are clearly present.   First of all, China is interested in the mineral deposits of North Korea. While these deposits are not particularly large by international standards, they still are sufficiently attractive for resource-hungry China, especially for the enterprises of the Chinese North-East region. This is the reason behind the acquisition of mining rights and joint mining ventures which have widely reported in recent years.   The second economic consideration for China is an interest in transportation infrastructure. The Chinese North-East is landlocked, therefore the industrial enterprises of the area would benefit from the right to use the ports of Korea’s East Coast, especially if access to these ports becomes essentially hassle-free. Currently, the major focus of such interest is Rason, but other ports in the area might also attract Chinese attention as well.   Yet another factor is the remarkable cheapness of North Korean labour. North Korean workers can work efficiently and diligently for $15-20 a month. This is well below the current rate for unskilled and semi-skilled labour in China. Currently, this factor is not particularly important, but as Chinese labour becomes significantly more expensive, some Chinese companies might find investment and/or outsourcing to North Korea extremely attractive.   • Fourth, China worries about the possible impact that the unification of Korea will have on China’s domestic situation. Of special importance is the position of the Korean ethnic minority in China. So far, the 2 million strong, Sino-Korean community has remained remarkably loyal to Beijing. But from interaction with Chinese officials one can easily feel their concerns about post-unification developments in the area. The Chinese central government is quite cautious when it comes to the ethnic minority issue.   These fears are further exacerbated by territorial claims that might be made by the post-unification of the Korean state. It is widely known that some Korean nationalist groups have already made rather extravagant claims on Chinese territory in ‘Manchuria’. Worse still, when tensions do arise between Seoul and Beijing, a number of Korean politicians, including members of the National Assembly, have explicitly supported these claims. For example, in 2004 up to a dozen ROK National Assembly members established a group, solely dedicated to the promotion of the “Kando” claims. None of these developments have remained unnoticed in China. And naturally, these developments make Beijing more reluctant to accept unification as the eventual solution to a North Korean domestic crisis.   What will China risk if it gets too much involved with a North Korean crisis?   The above-listed factors are the reasons which make China to subsidize North Korea now, and will probably prompt it to get involved with a domestic crisis there. However the potential for China to get involved in a future North Korean crisis is not without serious drawbacks.   • First, Chinese intervention in North Korean domestic crisis will inflame national sentiments both in the South and, eventually, in the North. China will trigger an outrage and will then probably be perceived as a serious, existential threat by Korean nationalists. Even inside North Korea, the new pro-Chinese North Korean regime will not necessary be popular. It is likely to revive the economy and greatly improve living standards, but the average North Korean will not be too impressed by these improvements: for him/her, South Korean affluence will become and remain the benchmark. In other words, the leaders of this new regime will not be seen as great statesmen, presiding over remarkable economic growth. Rather they will be seen by the majority of their subjects as a bunch of opportunistic Chinese puppets, preventing the North Korean populace from enjoying the living standards of their Southern brethren.   • Second, an open intervention in North Korea will deliver a serious blow to the myth of the ‘peaceful rise of China’ which plays such a pivotal role in Chinese diplomacy and public relations efforts. Many of China’s neighbours will worry that one day they may face the same fate as North Korea. This will make them more cautious in their dealings with China, more pro-American and harsher on their internal opposition, especially of the pro-Chinese variety.   • Third, a direct intervention in North Korea, as well as the subsequent efforts to restore now moribund state economy is certain to cost Chinese budget a lot. For China this amount may not be ruinous, but it will be onerous nonetheless. Needless to say, China needs these funds domestically to ensure the continuation of economic growth but also to ameliorate the socio-economic side effects of said growth. Last but not least, spending this money on the economic revival of North Korea will not be popular with the Chinese public who believe that there are much better uses for this money.   Therefore China has valid reasons to reconsider direct involvement in a North Korean crisis, but also equally valid reason to avoid direct involvement unless absolutely necessary. So, it is likely to remain indecisive until the last moment, and skillful South Korean diplomacy can help to tip the balance.     What is to be done about Chinese worries   As we have mentioned above, the major goal of Korea’s diplomacy is to minimize the probability of a unilateral Chinese intervention, thus increasing the likelihood of Korea’s eventual unification. Fortunately for Korea, the above listed Chinese worries are legitimate, rational and relatively easily to address. Of course, Korea will have to be ready to compromise in order to make a workable deal, but the likely cost of such a compromise is not prohibitively high.   • The first issue is, of course, stability. In this regard, it is vital to demonstrate that the South Korean government (acting alone, or with its US ally) will be willing and capable of maintaining stability in the post-unification Korea.   In practice, this might hinge on Seoul’s willingness to despatch forces to strife-ridden North Korea in order to stabilise the situation, secure nuclear facilities and provide basic economic security for the population.   Taking into consideration the gradual, but seemingly unstoppable changes in Seoul, one cannot help but doubt whether such a decisive and costly intervention will be politically feasible. The South Korean public and younger South Koreans in particular, are increasingly sceptical about unification. They are remarkably reluctant to pay for it, let alone risk their lives and security for it. Therefore the idea of sending military forces to North Korea in case of a crisis is likely to be very unpopular in the South. That said, South Korea’s indecisiveness might essentially provoke Chinese action in the area. If Beijing sees how the situation in the North is deteriorating and getting out of control, while Seoul procrastinating, the decision to get actively involved in the crisis as natural and clearly a lesser evil.   Therefore, the political will of South Korea may become the decisive factor. If Seoul shows decisively and unequivocally its willingness to take control of the uneasy situation, as well as to lead and support the future stable development of North Korea, China is far less likely to intervene.   • Chinese worries about the US presence can be ameliorated through a tripartite compromise. China will be more willing to accept the unification of Korea, if it believes that it will not lead to an increase in the US military presence in the area.   Therefore, it will make South Korea and the US jointly promise that after unification there will be no increase in US forces on the Korean peninsula (partial or even complete withdrawal of US forces might be considered as well). Additionally, it may help if no US units or military installations were to be stationed or built in the northern part of post-unification Korea (“no US troops to the North of the present DMZ, even after unification”).   Such a compromise is likely to be acceptable to Washington, since it will not threat US strategic interests in the region. It should concurrently be welcomed by the US military establishment, since it will be helpful in fostering long-term cordial relations with Korea. After all, the emergence of a unified, democratic and nationalist Korean state on the Chinese borders will be good news for the US government anyway.   • Worries about China’s current economic interests are perhaps the easiest to deal with. It will probably suffice for the South Korean government to explicitly promise that all economic agreements between China and North Korea will be honoured after the unification. This might sound like a significant concession since many of these agreements are grossly unequal, but this is still an acceptable price to pay for achieving Korea’s unity.   • Fourth, the utmost care should be taken by the Korean side in dealing with potential territorial issues. China should not be provoked. It would be helpful if the Korean government explicitly and unequivocally recognises the existing border between China and North Korea as the future border between China and unified Korea. Such a stance would clearly be criticised by Korean nationalists, but regardless of the factual nature (or otherwise) of these territorial claims, their realisation is all but importable and the continued threat of claims pertaining to the ‘Kando issue’, will clearly be seen as hostile activity by Beijing. There is no need to persist with activities of this sort that could directly impede unification.   What is to be done, in the short run   The measures described above are largely aimed at placating China’s future worries, when unification becomes part of the practical political agenda. While such a time will eventually come (maybe sooner than we expect) it might be quite far away and this leaves us with the question of what should be done in dealing with China now.   It has been suggested a number of times that South Korea should restart aid and generally increase its interaction with Pyongyang, in order to counteract the growing influence of Beijing in the North. While restarting aid programs is a welcome suggestion, one should not believe that the revival of South Korea’s aid programs related to the North will seriously change the ‘balance of power’ in Pyongyang. The revival of South Korean aid is what North Korea has hoped for considerable number of years. Historically, North Korean diplomats have always tried to maintain two great power sponsors, preferably whose relations were tense and hostile. In the years 1960-90 they were China and the Soviet Union, while in subsequent years until recently they were the US along with South Korea and China. The current reliance on China is worrisome for China. As experience testifies, in the peculiar case of North Korea, economic leverage does not necessarily lead to political influence. Even when Pyongyang was completely dependent on Soviet economic assistance, it could ignore Soviet pressure and undertake actions which clearly contradicted Soviet interests (the seizure of the USS Pueblo and support for Pol Pot’s regime in Kampuchea are two among many examples). Therefore, China does not have much say over political decision making in Pyongyang. That said, however, excessive and growing dependence on China puts North Korean decision makers into a potentially unstable and perilous political position. This means that they want South Korean aid back, in order that they could then play Beijing and Seoul off against one another.   Paradoxically, the more efforts China and Korea will put into showering North Korea with aid, the less control over the North Korean decision-making both China and Korea will have.   Nonetheless, the revival of aid to North Korea should be welcomed. This aid is valuable because it serves a number of purposes. Needless to say, in spite of the appropriation of some aid by the elite, it still helps the average North Korean to survive in adverse circumstances. Aid also helps to drive down the likelihood of confrontation or provocation on the DMZ or NLL. However the most politically significant function of aid is the influence it exercises over the values and worldview of average North Koreans. The existence of aid is seldom mentioned by the North Korean media and when aid is mentioned, it is usually explained as a kind of tribute being delivered by the South as a token of gratitude to the North and its current regime. Nonetheless, the average North Korean, as my frequent talks with refugees testify, is aware of the existence of South Korean aid, as well as about the high quality of the products supplied from the South. This reinforces the image of South Korea as an affluent and successful state, a country to envy and emulate. Such an image encourages the development of pro-South Korean sentiment among the North Korean populace and such developments should be welcomed.   Therefore the revival of aid is desirable. It is important though to resist temptation and not to pick fights with China over North Korean issues. Like it or not, China seems to be the only country which have both the will and the means to prevent Korean unification, when the situation will be right for it. Therefore it is advisable not to provoke China and look for all possible ways to work together on North Korean issues.   A few concluding remarks   The rise of China is a fact of life in East Asia. For Korea there is no choice but to accept this fact and to adjust to the new, emerging order in this part of the world. China is not excessively enthusiastic about Korean unification, but its concerns and doubts are not that difficult to overcome through cold and calculated diplomacy. This diplomacy will require some concessions from the South Korean side, but considering the importance of the issues at stake, such concessions are relatively minor and acceptable. ■         Acknowledgement The author appreciates Chaesung Chun for helpful comments.

After 20 years: North Korea in 2032   2012 is a critical time for North Korea as it has proclaimed that from this year it will achieve the status of a “strong and prosperous nation.” With Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, this immense task now falls upon the shoulders of Kim Jong-un. For the past seventeen years under Kim Jong-il’s rule, North Korea has tried to seek a way to ensure its regime’s survival and guarantee its national security through Songun or military-first politics and the possession of nuclear weapons. Yet, this has actually resulted in international isolation, economic hardships, and an overdependence on China. For North Korea, it was “lost two decades”. It is natural to wonder about what kind of impact Kim Jong-il’s sudden death will have on North Korea in the short run. However, it is more important now to think carefully about what lies ahead for North Korea over the next 20 years under Kim Jong-un’s rule. Upon such a consideration it is also critical to prepare necessary measures in terms of this long-term perspective.   The most urgent priority for the newly established Kim Jong-un regime is domestic stability, which means that the regime will have to pursue the legacy of Kim Jong-il’s rule. In this respect, it will continue to possess nuclear weapons, seek economic gains from negotiations over its nuclear program, and attempt to accelerate its economic development under the banner of a “strong and prosperous nation” to gain political legitimacy. So long as Kim Jong-un sticks to “rule by his deceased father’s will,” then North Korea will face the inevitable dilemma it has faced for the last seventeen years. Pursuing regime security by huddling onto nuclear weapons will only continue to ensure Pyongyang’s international isolation. This isolation in turn brings about economic hardship, which consequently has a negative effect on the stability of the Kim Jong-un regime as its legitimacy is still rather weak. These interlinked problems of domestic politics, diplomacy, and economics can be easily locked in a vicious circle.   The Kim Jong-un regime must deal with these pending issues in line with a long-term strategy that will guarantee its survival and help North Korea pursue reforms to meet the norms of the twenty-first century civilization. The first stage of this long-term strategy is to seek a policy shift. At some point in the future, Kim Jong-un has to make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons and switch from the current military-first politics to economy-first politics. Of course, such a shift is an extremely difficult decision to make, but it would be a good chance to prove the strength of Kim Jong-un’s leadership internally and externally. The second stage is transition and reform. With this step, North Korea will finally take measures toward peaceful development under the basis of a more enlightened Suryong or Great Leader Direct Rule system. Those measures include overcoming the demands for excessive security, moving forward to establish a security system without nuclear weapons, and plan for a North Korean-way of reforms and opening. In order to achieve these goals, North Korea will truly require support from South Korea and the international community. The third stage is the transformation of North Korea to meet the international standard of advancement. In this stage, it is crucial to find a way to encourage North Korea to transform into a nation that seeks moderate security capabilities as well as a new momentum for economic development, democracy, and normal diplomacy. If it succeeds, North Korea could then become a model country which serves for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula and contribute toward development and stability in Northeast Asia.   During this delicate period, it is an imperative to get over single-minded approaches to focus only on the collapse of North Korea or to call for the one-sided effort of either North Korea or the international community to resolve all the issues. Furthermore, it is time to understand the broad range of problems of North Korea and seek a path of coevolution which takes in a bigger picture of peace and stability for not only the Korean Peninsula but also East Asia.   The Short-Term Stability of the Kim Jong-un Regime   It is clear that the North Korean leadership has made preparations for this power transition. The 2012 Joint New Year Editorial stated, “Glorify this year 2012 as a year of proud victory, a year when an era of prosperity is unfolding, true to the instructions of the great General Kim Jong Il.” This shows that, as expected, the Kim Jong-un regime will attempt to deal with domestic and foreign issues based on Kim Jong-il’s military first politics.   The Kim Jong-un regime will likely show solid stability in the short term, indicative that it has a stronger political power base than some people had expected. During the mourning period for Kim Jong-il’s death, Kim Jong-un was proclaimed the supreme commander of both the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and Korean People's Army (KPA). He leads the WPK with the support of Jang Song Thaek (65, Administration Department Director), Kim Kyong Hui (65, Member of the Political Bureau), Choe Ryong Hae (62, Member of the Central Military Commission), Kim Ki Nam (85, Secretariat), and Choe Thae Bok (81, Secretariat). As supreme commander, he will lead the KPA through Ri Yong Ho (69, Vice-Chairmen of Central Military Commission), Kim Jong Gak (70, Senior Deputy Director of Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) General Political Department), Kim Yong Chun (76, Minister of the MPAF), and U Tong Chuk (69, Senior Deputy of State Security Department). During the National Memorial Service for Kim Jong-il on December 29, 2011, Kim Jong-un was referred to in the official media as “the dear respected Kim Jong Un, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK and supreme leader of the WPK state and army.” And at the Political Bureau meeting of the WPK’s Central Committee held on December 30, 2011, Kim Jong-un assumed supreme commandership of the KPA at the “behest of leader Kim Jong-il on October 8, 2011.” Also during the memorial address, Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, proclaimed the next leadership and its core policy by saying “We will accomplish the cause of the Songun revolutionary cause, the cause of building a thriving socialist nation, holding Kim Jong Un in high esteem as another General and supreme leader.”   The Kim Jong-un regime has to focus on consolidating its power base through utilizing the slogan at the “behest of Kim Jong-il” as its most valuable political asset. Kim Jong-il did exactly the same when he came to power after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. As the third generation of leadership succession from father to son, the Kim Jong-un regime has serious limits in creating its legitimacy. Therefore, the regime has to rely on and begin its rule with the slogan of at the “behest of Kim Jong-il,” as well as continue with Kim Jong-il’s military-first politics. The Kim Jong-un regime still lacks the political strength that could help it to manage any possible instability caused if it makes a sudden shift in North Korea’s political and economic future.   Moreover, Kim Jong-un has to embrace the existing military and political elites who tend to favor hard-line policies toward South Korea. Even if he genuinely has a will to carry out reforms and opening of the economy, it would be unthinkable to implement those polices if he lacks the political strength to make his own decisions in terms of domestic politics. This means that he needs to be viewed as the legitimate ruler of North Korea in the eyes of the people as well as the political elites. The importance of this legitimacy was reflected in the 2012 Joint New Year Editorial which emphasized, “Let us do many more things for the benefit of the people!” and “Officials should be deeply aware that they exist for the sake of the people, have the steadfast standpoint of launching all undertakings in keeping with the will and interests of the people.” Related to this effort to gain legitimacy, Kim Jong-un has been taking up hawkish measures toward South Korea. This reminds us of the situation following Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 when inter-Korean relations became strained as both sides pursued hard-line policies toward each other. On December 25, 2011, North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland released a statement manifesting that North Korea will decide its policy toward South Korea based upon Seoul’s stance on allowing condolence visits to Pyongyang. This point also came up in the Joint New Year Editorial where North Korea lashed out against “conservative ruling forces in south Korea” for “hindering in every possible way the offering of condolence.” However, it is a little bit premature to conclude from this that the Kim Jong-un regime will attempt military provocations or raise tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China, the sole patron for North Korea’s stability, has been strongly and openly opposed to North Korea “taking any risks” since late 2010. In any case, North Korea itself needs a stable international environment in order to focus on domestic events such as the 70th anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s birth on February 16, 2012, and the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth on April 15, 2012.   The key concern is how the Kim Jong-un regime will make its next move after it has managed to establish legitimacy and stability in the short run. Kim Il-sung’s political assets and “will” were only effective in a limited way during the seventeen years of Kim Jong-il’s rule. It is then questionable whether Kim Jong-il’s legacy will be effective during the Kim Jong-un era. Would Kim Jong-un be able to make the strategic decision to carry out his own model of long-term survival based on a thorough understanding of North Korea’s current situation? The critical moment for this would be around 2015, which will be the 70th anniversary of the WPK and when Kim Jong-un may officially bring to an end the “rule by his deceased father’s will.” In this case, will North Korea be able to evolve?   The Long-Term Dilemma of the Military-First Politics   As long as the Kim Jong-un regime sticks to Kim Jong-il’s system of military-first politics, there will be no way to solve North Korea’s long-standing triple dilemma. The “unholy trinity” among securing legitimacy in domestic politics, stabilizing the international environment by resolving the nuclear crisis, and alleviating the economic hardships is all interlinked in mutually contradicting ways. What Kim Jong-il’s rule clearly showed is that it is impossible to sustain the totalitarian Suryong system with nuclear weapons while also attempting to resolve chronic economic difficulties. Kim Jong-il believed that he could only maintain the Suryong system by possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons though only intensified a worsening economic crisis at home. However, after seventeen years of military-first politics, it has now become difficult to sustain the Suryong system without the possession of nuclear weapons. This pursuit of excessive security has also led to a failure in resource distribution. As it stands now, giving up nuclear weapons in order to make an advance in economic development will jeopardize the whole Suryong system.   In 2012, Kim Jong-un’s attempt to gain political legitimacy through inheriting military-first politics will only achieve short-term results. Kim Jong-un will face tremendous pressure to make changes in the near future on account of the following three reasons. First, international pressure over the nuclear program will grow. Up until now, Pyongyang has managed to walk a thin line between possessing nuclear weapons and negotiations that requires giving them up. North Korea hasn’t been able to give up a security guaranteed by nuclear weapons nor gain economic support from the international community. But this situation cannot go on indefinitely. The regime will face weaker political legitimacy and a devastating outcome caused by ongoing economic difficulties. Due to various factors, including North Korea’s domestic challenges and the requests of Beijing seeking stability on the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang has no choice but to come forward to the negotiating table in the near future. Although the international community including the United States is now prioritizing a stable power transition to Kim Jong-un, they will eventually pressure North Korea to follow up on its commitments to denuclearize.   Second, the ongoing economic difficulties will eventually become a threatening factor for regime stability. It is very likely that North Korea will never be able to accomplish its goal of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation.” Without large scale support from the outside world, not even a moderate level of economic development would be possible, which could be used by Kim Jong-un to consolidate his legitimacy. The regime’s stability will continue to be challenged by popular involvement in the unofficial markets which emerged following the collapse of the public distribution system during the great famine of the 1990s. In this context, possessing nuclear weapons and sustaining military-first politics would only aggravate dissatisfaction among the people and increase the possibility that a certain group could gain enough momentum to eventually challenge the regime.   Third, the long-term stability of the regime is only possible when North Korea embarks upon a path of reform and opening. China has already begun to pressure North Korea to take this path. Politically as well, Kim Jong-un needs to emphasize his own legacy which must be differentiated from his grandfather’s Juche or ideology of self-reliance and his father’s military-first politics. Considering the current situation in North Korea, this should be focused on growth and development. Military first politics needs to be adjusted for the sake of advancing light-industry and improving the people’s standard of living, which have been economic targets emphasized by the regime for years. In order to achieve this reform and opening, however, Pyongyang’s closed and autocratic political system has to be able to cope with pressures from an open society. This means that the Suryong system should be transformed from a totalitarian dictatorship to an enlightened and benevolent supreme leader. In the end, the Kim Jong-un regime will face a crossroads in its strategic decisions. The regime will have to choose whether to take the same path of military-first politics and become a vegetative state or take the prudent path of a North Korean-way of reforms and opening.   South Korea and the Strategy of Coevolution   From 2012, South Korea will need to remain vigilant on leadership transition in North Korea and establish short-term, mid-term, and long-term plans to meet this challenge. The current government in Seoul should refine its policy package to the Kim Jong-un regime under the framework of a long-term strategy which can also serve as a foundation for the next administration due to be inaugurated in early 2013. Candidates for the next presidential election should compete with each other to establish a paradigm of non-partisan North Korea policy. The past dichotomy of either the Sunshine policy or the principled engagement policy is no longer valid in the 2010s thus a third way of policy alternatives needs to be developed. Along with this effort, it is also important to carefully manage public opinion in South Korea so as to avoid conflict within society over polices to North Korea.   The immediate strategic message that Seoul should deliver to Pyongyang is that the strategic decision made by the Kim Jong-un regime will be the key to not only the survival and development of North Korea but also to new models of governance and unification on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it is important to make clear that Seoul will also co-evolve with Pyongyang on a mutual vision for the advancement of North Korea and make genuine efforts to persuade the international community to join this co-evolutionary path. The primary recipient of this message is, of course, key figures in the Kim Jong-un regime, but in the long run, will be aimed at all possible reformist forces in North Korea which have the will to co-evolve with South Korea and international community. For the political elites and people in North Korea who are stuck in the Suryong system and closed socialist system unable to see the path of advancement, South Korea should present specific blueprints for the future of the Korean Peninsula.   For the mid-term, the South Korean government needs to prepare policy alternatives for North Korea which faces in the near future the triple dilemma mentioned before. Above all, measures to resolve the nuclear issue should be prepared. In perceiving the nuclear challenge as a political issue that is related to the Kim Jong-un regime’s survival, Seoul has to devise a way to guarantee the regime’s security while at the same time, present reasonable conditions for Pyongyang to engage in denuclearization. By taking this opportunity of Kim Jong-il’s death, the Six-Party Talks should function as a multilateral framework to deal with the overall North Korean problem, not simply focused on nuclear issues. In this context, the South Korean government could think about an active and forward-looking approach that decouples the Six-Party Talks from the difficult issues in inter-Korean relations, such as South Korea’s demands for an apology for North Korea’s provocations in 2010.   Second, a strategy for building a peace system on the Korean Peninsula is also important. Until now, talks on a peace system have not reached any agreement as Seoul and Pyongyang have approached this issue with different strategic goals. In particular, North Korea has insisted upon the same old measures that include ending the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Asia, withdrawal of United States Forces in Korea, and redrawing the maritime border in the West Sea. However, it is time for North Korea to develop different strategic goals with this peace system issue for the Korean Peninsula. As Pyongyang is faced with the situation that without fundamental change it will not survive in the near future, the peace system should be approached with the perception that it can be a new way to guarantee its own survival.   South Korea also needs to move away from its perception that the peace system issue is only an excuse by North Korea to evade its obligations for denuclearization. Rather, Seoul should approach this issue strategically by using it to encourage the Kim Jong-un regime to change its developmental model from the military-first politics to an economy-first politics. With patience and sincerity, Seoul needs to persuade Pyongyang that nuclear weapons cannot guarantee the regime’s survival. Only under a complex network of security guarantees from the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the United Nations, could the regime finally secure its survival and stability. Also massive economic support from the international community as a reward for giving up its nuclear program could help Pyongyang to finally accomplish the vision of a “strong and prosperous nation” which Kim Jong-il had failed to achieve. In the end, true peace in inter-Korean relations can only come about when a peace system on the Korean Peninsula is established with an agreement between Washington and Beijing on the survival of the North Korean regime and a regional multilateral peace system in Northeast Asia.   When this mid-term goal has been accomplished, it will be possible to pursue the long-term goal of the advancement of North Korea beyond normalization. However, the challenge remains that Pyongyang has never taken such a path before. North Korea should be transformed into a democratic system and meet the standard of a twenty-first-century civilization which is a powerful country of knowledge, culture, environment, and economy rather than just a “strong and prosperous nation.” South Korea and North Korea could then be an equal partner in building a more peaceful Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia once North Korea has reached this level of advancement.   South Korea as the Facilitator for the International Evolution of North Korea Policy   The future of North Korea is linked to the international politics of Northeast Asia. Blueprints for the future of the Korean Peninsula cannot be separated from the future architecture in East Asia. Although South Korea is not a great power and cannot be the main designer of regional architecture, it can be a middle power which takes on the initiative in drawing the future of the Korean Peninsula that will have an impact on the shape of the region. Therefore the advancement of North Korea is important not only for the future of the Korean Peninsula but also for the status of South Korean diplomacy in the region. This is both a test and an opportunity.   U.S.-China relations will be the most critical variable that determines the future of the Korean Peninsula for at least the next 10 years. North Korea, and more broadly the Korean Peninsula, is a stage of competition and conflict between the two countries: a rising China trying to make East Asia as its base for peaceful development and a relatively declining United States which seeks to restore its regional hegemonic influence. The conflict between Washington and Beijing in 2010 settled down following the U.S.-China summit meeting in January 2011. The United States agreed to respect China’s “core interests” and China acknowledged the U.S. policy to reengage the region. Since the summit meeting, the East Asia strategy of the United States has become more specified. It is seeking to strengthen relations with Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, and Myanmar as well as raise its voice on multilateralism in East Asia through the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit. Along with these efforts, Washington has also reinforced its alliance relations with Seoul and Tokyo, and has even emphasized trilateral cooperation among its alliance partners. The United States is redesigning the security-economy architecture of East Asia.   China is closely watching these developments and is trying to check the movements of the United States in the region. It is expected then that North Korea will be the place where Washington and Beijing will clash over its future direction. While both countries prioritize the status quo, they will cautiously respond to changes if North Korea becomes over dependent on one side. Particularly, the Chinese leadership would be very reluctant to allow North Korea’s future to be influenced by South Korea and United States, an outcome that could then be used to check China on its periphery.   Both Washington and Beijing have been taking a wait and see approach by supporting the status quo in North Korea after the death of Kim Jong-il. However, each of side has been carefully considering how to shape their future moves. From the beginning, China has sent a “clear and decisive” message of support to Kim Jong-un. All nine members of China’s ruling Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee made a morning visit to the North Korean Embassy in Beijing and confirmed their strong will to support the Kim Jong-un regime. At the same time, the United States reaffirmed its strong commitment to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the security of its close ally, South Korea, and emphasized a “peaceful and stable transition.” In its following statements, Washington expressed its priority for its North Korea policy as follows: peaceful and stable transition; the commitment of the new leadership to honor North Korea’s agreements on denuclearization; improving relations with its neighbors; respecting the rights of its people.   When there is conflict between the United States and China over the North Korean issue, South Korea should not take an opportunistic approach which would certainly end in failure. Rather, Seoul should be able to persuade both Washington and Beijing by using the North Korea issue to highlight that if both sides insist upon their own blueprint for East Asian architecture, all the countries in the region including them will suffer. South Korea, as a middle power at the heart of the architecture of the great powers, should find its own way to establish a new vision that benefits all stakeholders in the region. In line with this effort, South Korea should also prepare discourse and logic on the future of North Korea and a specific policy package for the coevolution of North Korea and the international community.   In the short-term, the South Korean government will face many questions on its long-term strategy toward North Korea from the United States, Japan, and in particular China as the ROK-China summit meeting is scheduled to take place in late January 2012. What South Korea wants from the future of North Korea has a lot in common with what the United States and China wants: denuclearization, reform and opening, and a normalized and advanced North Korea which contributes to the development of the region. The problem is how to come up with realistic and specific policies to accomplish this transformation of North Korea. Along with this, the capability to adjust the interests of neighboring countries and promote strong international cooperation on North Korea should not be affected by the domestic political situation in each country, is also required.   It is noteworthy that Pyongyang emphasized the importance of its relationship with both Beijing and Moscow in the Joint New Year Editorial of 2012. This shows that the Kim Jong-un regime intends to take advantage of competition between Washington and Beijing over architecture building in East Asia. Were the Six-Party Talks to resume without a compromise in any of the party’s conflicting interests, it would be hard to see how there would be any improvement in the denuclearization of North Korea. In order to limit the influence of great powers in shaping the future of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean government should engage in sincere dialogue with Beijing.   South Korea’s future moves will have a tremendous impact on the future of the Korean Peninsula and the region. By recognizing the significance of this opportunity, Seoul should carry out the specific measures of the strategy of coevolution while harmonizing its efforts to promote a North Korea policy of the international community and endeavor to contribute to a new architecture in East Asia.■         Chair Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University)     Panel Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Dongho Jo (Ewha Womans University) Sung Bae Kim (Institute for National Security Strategy) Sook-Jong Lee (East Asia Institute; Sungkyunkwan University)

Jihwan Hwang is an assistant professor of International Relations at University of Seoul.         Rethinking the Balance of Power on the Korean Peninsula   The global and East Asian orders of power are now represented by China's economic, military, and diplomatic rise and America's decline. The result is often called Chimerica or G2, leading to U.S.-China competition in every aspect of the international agenda. After the Bush administration's foreign policy in the first years of the millennium, when many scholars and policy makers focused on U.S. unipolarity or at least its preponderance of power after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the current state of affairs is a great change. While U.S.-China relations represent a set of the most important variables in world politics, the meaning of China’s rise is much greater in the East Asian regional order. The Korean Peninsula, of course, cannot escape from the influence of its neighbors.   Although the world order of the 1990s saw the unprecedented economic prosperity and overwhelming military power of the United States, the recent order has been characterized by the relative decline of the United States and the fast and strong rise of China. The Chinese economy has grown more than 10 percent per year for the last thirty years and is now the world's second-largest economy.   Although the Chinese GDP is still only one-third that of the United States, as TABLE 1 shows, it is not at all unheard of to say that China may economically catch up with the superpower by 2030. Moreover, China's trade with Northeast Asian countries is much larger than that of the United States. As TABLE 2 shows, China's exports and imports with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are almost twice as large when compared with those of the United States. Given America's economic recession and China's incessant growth, the gap between the two is likely to get much larger. China's increasing economic interdependence with regional powers will have a great effect on the changing balance of power in the region, and will have a much greater effect on the Korean Peninsula.   On the other hand, China has also made every effort to build up its military capability. Supported by its strong economic growth, Chinese military spending has been hugely increased, more than 10 percent per year on average. China spent 40 billion U.S. dollars in 2001, but it spent 119 billion in 2010, an increase of almost three times in ten years. TABLE 3 indicates that Chinese military spending is still less than one sixth compared to the American figure, but one must recognize that while the United States plans to cut its military spending in the next decade due to its budget deficit, China is certain to keep increasing its, unless its economy falls into deep trouble in the near future.   TABLE 1. GDPs in Northeast Asia, 2010 (trillion U.S. Dollars)     TABLE 2. The United States and China's Trade in Northeast Asia, 2010 (billion U.S. dollars)     TABLE 3. Military Spending in Northeast Asia, 2010 (billion U.S. dollars)   Furthermore, the military spending between the two countries cannot be compared just in nominal figures. While U.S. military power has been involved all over the world, including Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, China has focused mainly on East Asia. The military rise of China therefore means a much stronger influence on the Korean Peninsula than the figure shows. The United States has also been recently more concerned about China's military and security developments. With regard to their military and security policies, China has sought to improve its power projection and possess the capability of conducting a range of military operations in Asia well beyond that of Taiwan, as clearly shown in its aircraft carrier program. In contrast, the United States, due to its economic difficulties, appears to be coping with the situation by strengthening its alliances with South Korea and Japan, encouraging its allies to increase their contribution to global and regional security.     The Two Koreas in the Post-Cold War Security Framework   Given the recurring balance of power shift from the U.S. preponderance of power for the last two decades, it is necessary to rethink the security environment in the region. In this vein, South Korea may need to examine the meaning of the rise of China for the Korean Peninsula, especially with regard to the North Korean issue. In reality, China's rise has presented South Korea with a complex and difficult challenge in dealing with North Korea. Most of all, South Korea's approach toward North Korea has so far been based on the post-Cold War regional security framework, which I call America's preponderance of power, given that North Korea has lost its two Cold War patrons, the Soviet Union and China, and has been isolated and surrounded by an unfavorable security environment. The South Korean government has so far made good use of this favorable security environment and has pursued a strong and determined policy toward North Korea.   Since the end of the global Cold War in the early 1990s, every South Korean government has tried to persuade North Korea to change the nature of its regime by either engaging with it or punishing it. The Nordpolitik under the Rho Tae-woo government was the first active effort to bring about the collapse of the Cold War order on the Korean Peninsula and resolve the issues regarding the divided Korea. The Kim Young-sam government had driven North Korea into a corner, hoping to see the collapse of the regime in the mid-1990s and reunify the two Koreas under South Korean leadership, especially after Kim Il-sung's death in 1994. The Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyu governments sought to engage North Korea. This period is often called the Sunshine Policy, but the two were not much different in that they intended to change the nature of the regime by a South Korean initiative. The current Lee Myung-bak government has also pursued a further tough and determined North Korea policy supported by a strong Korea-U.S. alliance and has sought to force the North Korean regime to accept international norms and change its course of action.   On the other hand, North Korean leaders have recognized since the late 1980s that as the global Cold War is over, the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula has been moving against North Korea. Kim Il-sung reassessed North Korea's security environment in the process of the Soviet collapse and China's shift. He could choose to face the changing balance of power, in international relations terms, with internal balancing and bandwagoning. The former involved a domestic arms build-up, while the latter was approaches to Cold War enemies like the United States, Japan, and South Korea. North Korea could not rely on external balancing because it could not find a new ally comparable to its former allies, who were no longer very active in guaranteeing extended deterrence. For internal balancing, North Korea concentrated on the development of a nuclear weapons program because it could not afford to carry out a conventional arms race. For bandwagoning, North Korea made contact with the United States and Japan in the late 1980s and the early 1990s in an effort to get out of its unfavorable post-Cold War security framework by establishing diplomatic relations with its former enemies, but this effort failed due to lack of interest and trust. North Korea also sought to improve relations with South Korea and produced the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991, but they could not guarantee the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.   North Korea's dual approach of pursuing both internal balancing and bandwagoning could not be accepted in international society due to the evident conflict of interest. If North Korea really wanted to get along with the United States and South Korea, it had to give up its nuclear weapons program, but it could not do so because it perceived that its nuclear weapons program was its last resort for regime survival. What North Korea learned from Iraq was that Saddam Hussein could not secure his regime when he gave up his nuclear weapons program. However, the problem remains that if the North Korean regime keeps its nuclear program going, it will have no chance of approaching the United States and South Korea and getting out of the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula. In short, North Korea's mindset and perception after the Cold War has been quite defensive and passive under the unfavorable balance of power on the peninsula.   The Rise of China and North Korea's Growing Dependence   As a result of the rise of China and changes in Chinese-North Korean relations, the North Korean problem can no longer be seen from the post-Cold War framework of the 1990s. Although the recent East Asian security framework is not a new Cold War rivalry with the United States, Japan, and South Korea on the one side, and China, Russia, and North Korea on the other side, North Korea is not an isolated nation any longer. It is now a nation strongly dependent on and supported by a rising China. Of course, China perceives North Korea neither as it did during the Cold War nor as North Korea now wants China to perceive it. Rather, China seeks to take advantage of North Korean issues strategically in facing its challenges, especially its relations with the United States. North Korea also appears to make use of the Chinese position and tries to use it to get out of its internal and external dilemmas.   What embarrasses South Korea most is that as North Korea's dependence on China gets bigger, its dependence on South Korea gets smaller. North Korea's increasing dependence on China is in part a natural result of China’s rise in East Asia, but it is also because North Korea is getting less dependent on South Korea. This situation must mean that while China's influence on North Korea is growing, South Korea's influence is getting weaker. As Keohane and Nye explain, asymmetric interdependence can be the origin of power. It implies that as North Korea's sensitivity and vulnerability to China are getting larger, so is China's influence on North Korea. In order to balance against China's growing influence on North Korea, South Korea should also seek to lead North Korea to depend more on South Korea, but the reality is exactly the opposite.   TABLE 4 and TABLE 5 indicate that North Korea's economic dependence on South Korea has recently been decreasing. While North Korea's trade with South Korea has been increasing overall, the rate of the rise has stagnated since 2008. South Korea's economic aid to North Korea has been recently cut in one tenth for the last three years. These data clearly mean that North Korea has become economically less dependent on South Korea than before, which implies that South Korea's economic influence on North Korea is weakening.   TABLE 4. North Korea's Trade with South Korea (million U.S. dollars)   TABLE 5. South Korea's Economic Aid to North Korea (billion Korean won)     TABLE 6. North Korea's Trade with China (million U.S. dollars)     Conversely, TABLE 6 shows that North Korea's economic dependence on China is growing quickly. North Korea's trade with China has doubled in the last five years , and is likely to be increasing continuously. In reality, North Korea has recently made up for the decrement from South Korea with an increment from China. North Korea is thus now economically much more dependent on China than on South Korea, which will lead to a difference in economic influence on North Korea.   Of course, the growing Chinese influence but weakening South Korean influence on North Korea has not just occurred in the economic area. The Chinese influence is also much stronger in diplomatic and military areas. If South Korea wants to have a strong initiative on the Korean Peninsula in an era of a changing balance of power as it has had for the last two decades, South Korea itself should make every effort to enlarge its influence over North Korea. The security environment favorable to South Korea on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Cold War resulted from the U.S. preponderance of power in East Asia, but the balance of power in the region appears to have become less advantageous for South Korea. Thus, it is high time for South Korea to think again about its North Korea policy. The South Korean government needs to reassess the changing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and seek a new North Korea policy that can increase its influence on North Korea.   South Korea’s Search for a New North Korea Policy   After Kim Jong-il's sudden death in December 2011, North Korea will likely become more dependent on China as the new leadership cannot help but seek China’s support in order to stabilize North Korean society. It is not in the South Korean interest to let North Korea keep increasing its dependence on China and let China keep increasing its influence over North Korea. China's growing influence over North Korea will inevitably lead to its leverage on the whole Korean Peninsula and also affect South Korea-China relations, not only with regard to the North Korean issue but also with regard to South Korea's strategic choice between the United States and China. Thus, if South Korea wants to keep its initiative on the Korean Peninsula in spite of the changing balance of power in East Asia, it needs to balance against China's influence over North Korea. In order to balance against China's influence, South Korea should seek to enlarge its influence over North Korea by encouraging the North to depend more and more on the South Korean side.   However, North Korea will be very reluctant to increase its dependence on South Korea under such a changing balance of power. Because the rise of China and the decline of the United States in East Asia is a less unfavorable security environment for North Korea compared with the post-Cold War framework, it is more likely to avoid the further increase of South Korean and U.S. influence. North Korea, of course, would not want China to have a strong influence on it either, but it will seek to make use of China to confront South Korea and the United States. In short, North Korea will build up its negotiating capability by taking advantage of the new balance of power in East Asia. For example, as shown in the cases of the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, North Korea will try to escalate the tension between the United States and China regarding the issues of the Korean Peninsula. If the Six-Party Talks resume in the future after their long period of suspension since December 2008, North Korea is more likely to insist on its demands and stand firm by highlighting the conflict of positions between the United States and China.   In order to cope with the changing balance of power in East Asia and North Korea's new balancing behavior, South Korea must make every effort to enlarge its common perspective with China. South Korea should be ready to talk with China on the future of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula. It will be significant to plan how to persuade China to share its perceptions and policies with South Korea. If China perceives South Korea to be a more important player than North Korea in East Asia, it will be easier to persuade China to rethink the denuclearization and reunification of the Korean Peninsula, which will serve Chinese interests in the long run. Given the meaning of asymmetric interdependence as a source of power, the South Korean government should seek to upgrade Korean-Chinese relations and lead China to depend more on South Korea not only economically but also strategically, because the Chinese influence on the South as well as on the North will grow if North Korea's dependence on China increases asymmetrically.   On the other hand, it is necessary for South Korea to lead North Korea to depend more on South Korea than on China. If North Korea is getting more dependent on South Korea, South Korea will have more leverage on the issues of the Korean Peninsula and it will be easier to persuade China to agree to South Korean initiatives. Increasing South Korea's influence on North Korea while decreasing China's influence is how South Korea should respond to the rise of China in East Asia.   This is the impact of the changing East Asian balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and on South Korea's North Korea policy. Whoever takes power in the next South Korean presidential election in December 2012, it is the issue of how to respond to the rise of China on the Korean Peninsula that will determine the success or failure of the next South Korean government's North Korea policy. Because the favorable balance of power for the South Korean side is finished, the South Korean government cannot enjoy the initiative any longer on the Korean Peninsula that was provided by the U.S. preponderance of power after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. Although the South Korea-U.S. alliance is still the bottom line of South Korea's North Korea policy, the changing balance of power represents a serious challenge to the South with regard to how to deal with the rise of China on the Korean Peninsula. ■         Acknowledgement The author thanks Chaesung Chun and Seongji Woo for helpful comments.

Seongho Sheen is an associate professor at the Graduate Schools of International Studies, Seoul National University.         No totalitarian regime in history has survived longer than North Korea’s. According to an expert, “North Korea is the world’s longest lasting species of totalitarianism—6 decades so far and counting. Furthermore, it is the only totalitarian regime to survive a leadership transition—the hereditary succession in July 1994 of Kim Jong-il to follow his father Kim Il-sung as dictator.” Established in 1948 by the young and charismatic leader Kim Il-sung, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has distinguished itself with a unique combination of personality cult, juche ideology, a command economy, and military-first policy. The regime survived a war with the United States in the early 1950s, witnessed the fall of the Soviet Empire and Saddam Hussein, suffered the worst famine in an industrial society in the mid-1990s, and continues to develop nuclear weapons. Now Pyongyang’s totalitarian regime is trying to achieve a second hereditary succession from the ailing Kim Jong-il to his youngest son, Kim Jung-un, in his twenties. Many experts still remember the embarrassment of predicting the collapse of the North Korean regime in the aftermath of collapsing communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Yet the specter of an unexpected wave of people’s will to rise up against decades-old authoritarian/totalitarian regimes in the Middle East raises questions about the future of the North Korean regime once again. At the age of sixty-nine, Kim Jong-il and his regime look vulnerable. Amid isolation and worsening economic conditions, Kim’s health is weakening since he suffered a stroke in the summer of 2008. The sudden emergence of the young Kim Jung-un in the fall of 2010 suggests that the regime is preparing for a second hereditary succession. Many speculate that the succession will be more difficult this time, all things considered. Some experts believe the second succession could lead to a final end of the North Korean regime, if not the state. Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables show that the U.S. government, along with China and South Korea, is increasingly concerned about the possible collapse of the North Korean government. According to cables released by WikiLeaks and reported on by several media outlets, top U.S. diplomats have discussed a collapse in the past year with their counterparts from South Korea. The future of the North Korean regime will have important implications for regional and global security as well as inter-Korean relations. Given the widespread pessimism regarding the likelihood of the current Kim Jong-il regime voluntarily giving up its nuclear weapons, regime change would be the only viable option for complete and irreversible denuclearization. Some U.S. experts have suggested that the policy of actively supporting regime change should be held in reserve as a possible course of U.S. action. Whether a regime change or a regime collapse, any change in North Korea will most likely start from a turn of events within Pyongyang’s totalitarian regime. Whether it will be initiated by the North Korean people remains unclear.   Weakening Regime in Pyongyang   There are several characteristics of a totalitarian regime: an absolute dictator and ruling party; a totalist/utopian ideology; all-pervasive terror; a monopoly of coercive apparatus; a centrally planned economy; and a monopoly over mass communications. The Kim Jong-il regime in Pyongyang shares many of these characteristics. North Korea has been ruled by the Kim family under the juche ideology with military and other state apparatus terrorizing the whole population through central control of their economic and social activities. In doing so, the Kim regime has relied on several tools: restrictive social policies; manipulation of ideas and information; use of force; co-optation; manipulation of foreign governments; and institutional coup-proofing. Yet Pyongyang is best described as a failing or eroding totalitarian regime, where exhaustion, loosening of central control, and weakening over the monopoly on information are taking their toll.   There have been signs that the regime’s control over the population is weakening. First, the regime does not have full control of the economic life of the people under communist planning. With the continuing chronic food shortages, the economic situation seems to be getting worse.   The North Korean authorities do not provide a nation-wide food supply anymore except in the capital city of Pyongyang. This circumstance means twenty million North Koreans have had to find their own way to survive. This spring, even the four million Pyongyang residents were told not to expect a supply of rice until the fall harvest. Indeed, the price of rice has increased drastically to 2,100 KRW per kilogram, a hundredfold increase from the failed currency reform in November 2009. Second, unable to provide basic food and goods to its population, the state allowed markets in major cities with partial economic reform in July 2002. Since then both legal and black markets have spread rapidly in Pyongyang and other places. The failed currency reform in November 2009 accelerated privatization of economic life among the North Korean people. The spread of markets is creating a new emerging class of rich people who are engaged in both legal trade and smuggling, using their party and military connections. This in turn is producing a new source of social tension as people openly complain about rampant corruption and illegal activities among government officials and elites. Third, the Kim regime is also losing control of its people’s movement. Its security over the border with China has become so porous, with poor management and corruption among border patrols, that up to 300,000 North Koreans have crossed the Yalu and Tuman rivers to China looking for food since the famine of the 1990s. Among those defectors, more than 20,000 made it to Seoul. Fourth, the regime’s effort to control information is also loosening. Thriving markets provide people with the opportunity to exchange information as well as goods. Various sources report that increasing numbers of North Koreans are enjoying drama, movies, and popular songs from South Korea and other countries. They smuggle these prohibited items through China and circulate them in markets using DVD, CD, USB, and mobile phones. Smuggled radio is an important source of information about the outside world. Listening to Voice of America (VOA), Free Asia Radio (FRA), and other South Korean channels, North Koreans receive news of the people’s revolutions in the Middle East and spread the word to fellow citizens through the markets. And even though mobile phones are still very limited, North Korea is also obtaining them. Since the Egyptian Orascom Telecom introduced the first cell phone service in North Korea in 2008, the number of cell phone subscribers rapidly grew to 660,000 as of 2011. This does not include Chinese cell phones that are widely used along the North Korean border with China. Using smuggled Chinese telephones, many defectors in Seoul and China communicate with their families and relatives inside North Korea who are receiving outside information as well as money transfers.   People’s Revolution, Not Likely Yet   Despite the deteriorating health of Kim Jong-il, uncertainty over Kim Jung-un’s succession, and weakening power of the regime to control its increasingly discontented population, the people’s revolution seen in the streets of Middle Eastern cities is hard to imagine in North Korea in the near future. North Korean society is under very different conditions from its Middle Eastern counterparts. First, there is no political force to unite and drive the average North Korean person to rise up against the regime. Despite the population’s increasing discontent and criticism of the Kim Jong-il regime, most North Koreans seem to remain loyal to the regime out of fear, helplessness, ignorance, brain washing, and having no alternative. North Korean society has no memory of regime change under a different leadership. There is no opposition party or any political dissidents comparable to those that existed prior to the Jasmine Revolution in Middle Eastern countries. Even in Libya, where Gaddafi and his family exercised brutal suppression very similar to that of Kim Jong-il, exercising state terror through the military and police, tribal leadership provided a political force to unite different rebel groups and people against the regime. In Egypt, there were cases of regime change from Nasser and Sadat before Mubarak. In Libya, Gaddafi himself took power through a coup. Meanwhile, North Korea’s founder Kim Il-sung established a system where he, accompanied by his family, became a deity in total isolation and indoctrination of the entire population. In the name of juche ideology, the Kim family has become the sole guardian of the regime so that father and son succession is regarded as a fait accompli. After three years in Pyongyang as the British ambassador, Peter Huge recently told the press that he did not sense active support for family succession by the North Korean public. Yet he did not see the possibility of mass protest in North Korea, either. “North Korea does not have an established civil society. It is difficult to expect a joint activity or protest at the [popular] level due to strong control and suppression by the state,” said ambassador Huge.   Second, North Korean society lacks the tools to mobilize its people against its brutal regime. While the popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were largely powered by SNS, mobile phone, and the Internet, North Korean people have no free flow of information and access to free communication. Their access to outside information is very limited. North Korean people cannot communicate freely among themselves. If SNS played a critical role in civil revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, most North Koreans do not have access to computers or cell phones; the recent surge of 600,000 cell-phone users only represents a very privileged 2.5 percent of its twenty-four million general population. In the cases of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, the number was 171, 106 and 87 percent. A US$900 cell phone is out of reach for most North Koreans, who make less than one dollar per day. Even if one is wealthy enough to afford one, cell phone registration must go through strict reviews by the authorities. Meanwhile, North Korean television and radio have fixed channels set to its propaganda machine. Those who dare to enjoy popular movies, drama, or songs from the outside world risk imprisonment and torture with accusations of national treason.   Third, the country is in complete isolation from the outside world. While every year 8 million tourists visit Tunisia, only roughly 1,500 Western tourists visit Pyongyang each year, making North Korea one of the most secluded places on earth. According to the U.S. State Department travel guidelines, “North Korea limits trade and transportation links with other countries and tightly restricts the circumstances under which foreigners may enter the country and interact with local citizens. Telephone, facsimile, and Internet access are unavailable in many areas of the country, and foreigners can expect their communications to be monitored by North Korean officials . . . Foreign visitors to North Korea may be arrested, detained, or expelled for activities that would not be considered criminal outside the DPRK, including involvement in unsanctioned religious and political activities, engaging in unauthorized travel, or interaction with the local population.” Average North Koreans do not have much chance to see or have contact with the outside world, making them easy targets of state propaganda. The seclusion provides the Pyongyang regime with a useful environment to blame outside pressure and imperialist plots for the economic difficulties and sufferings of the North Korean people.   Fourth, Kim is in full control of his military and secret police. Under the banner of his military-first policy, Kim established a complete monopoly over his military command. Indeed, Kim’s official title is Chairman of the National Defense Commission, which is regarded as the country’s most powerful political institution, even over the communist party. In Egypt and Tunisia, the refusal of the military to follow orders from the regime to suppress the people’s revolt was critical in the final end of the regime. On the other hand, Kim Jong-il has co-opted the military by bestowing on it policy influence, prestige, and economic incentives. The military elites have a vast interest in keeping the regime in power. Any sign of opposition or plot against the regime has been brutally suppressed through mutual surveillance, imprisonment, torture, and public execution. According to Amnesty International, North Korea runs huge political prison camps in which up to 200,000 North Koreans are interned, suffering from malnutrition, disease, beatings, and subject to execution. The scale and size of the camps have been increased since 2001. The regime’s brutal control creates genuine fear among its population. Should the people rise against the regime, Kim Jong-il’s military and security guards will be ready to crush them with brutal force. After all, it was unwavering loyalty of Chinese military to the communist regime that played a critical role in the final days of Tiananmen Square against the freedom movement of the Chinese people a few decades ago.   Fifth, despite its international isolation, Kim Jong-il and his regime enjoy strong support from a longtime ally and a rising hegemonic power, China. Once the people took to the streets demanding freedom and democracy against the troubled tyrannies of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, they received warm support from the international community. The United States, despite its longtime partnership with those dictators in their fight against terrorism, demanded that the regimes step down. In Libya, Gaddafi’s military repression of rebel forces invited major military intervention by the coalition forces of NATO led by France, the UK and the United States. Unfortunately, the international dynamics of the North Korean case will be very different. It is widely known that the Chinese leadership has an unchanging strategic interest in keeping the North Korean regime in opposition to the U.S.-ROK alliance. China places top priority on maintaining the regime over other issues such as denuclearization and human rights in North Korea. The Chinese government reportedly has set up a contingency plan to intervene in case of major instability in North Korea. Premier Hu Jin-tao promised “the DPRK-China friendship will steadily grow strong generation after generation as it . . . [withstands] all sorts of tests and trials of history” during his meeting with Kim Jong-il last year. There are increasing contacts and exchanges among high-ranking officials between the two communist allies. Kim Jong-il has paid eight visits to China since 2000, four of which were made between May 2010 and August 2011.   The people’s revolution in the Middle East has awakened anxiety in Pyongyang. North Korea strongly criticized American military bombing of Gaddafi forces as a typical imperialist interventionist policy. Calling the events in the Middle East the “Color Revolution,” North Korea issued a warning that “a Color revolution is a similar case where former Eastern European countries collapsed after they suffered [from a] propaganda war and ideology-cultural intrusion by the imperialists.” The Foreign Ministry spokesperson criticized the U.S. bombing of Gaddafi’s forces as a “brutal violation of [the] independence of [a] sovereign state and territorial integrity.” North Korean authorities are reportedly strengthening their control over their population. On the one hand, they relaxed the penalties against crimes related to daily economic activities. At the same time, they mobilized new surveillance by communist forces, security police, and the military; strengthened border controls with China; restricted mobile phone use; and sent guidelines for local authorities to watch for any sign of social disruption. As the protests in the Middle East intensified in the spring, North Koreans were told not to have a meal among more than two people nor to have long conversations on the street. In February of this year, China’s police chief, Meng Jianzhu, visited Pyongyang to discuss collaboration and information sharing with his counterpart for blocking the wave of a democracy movement from the Middle East.   Will Kim Jung-un Repeat His Father’s Success?   The Kim Jong-il regime shows signs of weakened central controls and eroding power. Yet its totalitarian nature is largely in place as the military provides Kim Jong-il with the necessary instruments of terror to intimidate its populations. It is premature to expect a regime collapse in North Korea of the sort where a complete evaporation of political power would trigger a reorganization of state power leading to the establishment of a new regime type. Moreover, one needs to distinguish a regime collapse from a state collapse in which a state cannot control its borders and loses authority over large chunks of territory, plagued by chronic internal warfare, violence, lawlessness, and economic collapse. Even if the Kim Jong-il regime collapses, it would not necessarily lead to a collapse of the North Korean state. An expert noted that “there are certainly good reasons to be skeptical about the possibility of fundamental political change in North Korea, certainly through a ‘people-power’ type social movement that has toppled dictatorships elsewhere. The country’s cult-like political system, its relative geographical and political isolation, the absence of any real civil society, and repressive state control all clearly reduce the impetus and opportunities for change from below.”   However, the lack of the North Korean people’s political will does not mean that Pyongyang’s totalitarian regime is secure. The expected second hereditary succession from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jung-un will present the most serious challenge to Pyongyang since the first successful one in 1994. When Kim Jong-il was officially debuted on North Korea’s political scene in 1974, North Korea had strong support from its allies in Moscow and Beijing. South Korea was still poor. And Kim Jong-il had two decades to establish himself as the next leader before he assumed his current leadership position after his father’s sudden death in 1994. To the contrary, the situation in which the current succession is taking place is not so friendly to the North Korean leadership. No one inside or out of North Korea had seen Kim Jung-un’s face before he was first introduced to the North Korean people when he was named as the vice chairman of the Central Military Committee in September 2010. At the age of 28, he was awarded a four-star generalship. Yet the situation he faces is much more daunting. North Korea is very much isolated with numerous international sanctions. The South Korean economy is 25 times bigger and average South Koreans are 15 times wealthier than North Korea. What is worse, Kim Jung-un may not have much time to consolidate his own political base. Many expect that Kim Jong-il’s weakening health will not sustain him much longer and that time is running out. North Korea has declared that it will achieve the mission of building a “strong and prosperous great country (kang-sung dae-guk)” by 2012, the centennial anniversary of its founding father, Kim Il-Sung’s, birth. April 15, the birthday of Kim Il-Sung next year will be an important moment for North Korea’s political calendar, because some expect that the North Korean regime will declare Kim Jung-un to be the official heir of Chairman Kim Jong-il.   The problem is that succession in totalitarian regime involves a lot of anxiety, tensions, and uncertainties for the elites. It often evolves into power struggles between the old guard and the new blood as a new leader tries to consolidate a power base. There is already a sign of an emerging power struggle in Pyongyang. A longtime North Korea observer, Dr. Suh Dae-sook, has expressed strong doubts about the second succession attempt by the Kim family. Recent reshuffling of the most prestigious National Defense Commission, where old generations of generals were replaced with younger generals, indicates that the regime is facing “very serious trouble” with some people at the top opposing the succession. And “the tension will increase,” said Suh. His observation is shared by other experts in Seoul. Dr. Nam Sung-wook, the Director of the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), a think tank funded by the National Intelligence Service (NIS), said that there is strong opposition to Kim Jung-un’s succession behind the political scenes of the North Korean regime. Such tensions were thought to have prompted North Korea’s military provocations in 2010 toward South Korea. Dr. Nam said that the North Korean attack on the ROK navy ship the Cheonan in March and on Yonpyong Island in November last year could be explained as Kim Jong-il’s efforts to consolidate domestic support against emerging criticism of his succession plan. What is important is that Kim Jong-il needs time and energy to prepare a smooth power transition of power to his younger son. It may happen. But if Kim Jong-il passes away suddenly, say, within five years, the North Korean regime could experience serious political turmoil with intensifying power struggle among elites. Such uncertainty may eventually bring about a power vacuum in Pyongyang with possible regime collapse. Still, in the immediate or medium term, the most possible case would be a change within the regime through elite politics rather than a change of regime by the people.   Conclusion   The sudden rise of Kim Jung-un in 2010 signals that Pyongyang’s totalitarian regime is entering an uncharted territory of leadership change. It is during a period of leadership change that totalitarian regimes are most vulnerable to collapse. Yet Pyongyang’s totalitarian regime has proved to be resilient enough to surmount the first challenge in 1994 with hereditary succession that has lasted almost two decades. Whether the Kim family will pull off such a miracle again with a second hereditary succession remains to be seen. All things considered, the second transition will involve many more challenges and much more risk for the regime. No matter how hard Kim Jong-il tries to make the transition smooth, he does not seem to have much time to set up all the mechanisms for his young and inexperienced son. Both domestic conditions and the international environment for North Korea today are much worse than ever. The regime’s power to control its country is weakening in every aspect. And the international pressure to sanction its nuclear defiance has been strengthened. These are enough signs of trouble for the regime’s stability. The process of collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime may have begun. What is deceiving is that “the regime has skillfully managed to stave off collapse, but this has only prolonged the inevitable . . . When collapse occurs, it will almost certainly catch everyone, including Pyongyang’s elites, off guard.” The inevitable, however, would not necessarily involve the North Korean people’s will in the near to medium future. Rather it will be a prolonged process of political struggle at the top between the military and communist party elites. It is difficult to predict whether such a struggle will eventually lead to unification with the collapse of the North Korean state or a continuation of the North Korean state with a different kind of regime. One could expect a change to an authoritarian regime, rigid enough to suppress a people’s revolution, but amenable to certain reforms and outside cooperation. It is imperative that the international community pay close attention to the important changes about to happen in Pyongyang. Yet, one needs to be patient in expecting complete freedom for the North Korean people as they face far more difficult conditions than their Middle Eastern counterparts. At a minimum, whether through group leadership or the rise of a new individual, the change may be near and bring an end to the totalitarian regime in North Korea. That will be a good beginning for the people of North Korea. ■         Acknowledgement The author thanks Chaesung Chun and Seongji Woo for helpful comments.