Editor’s Note The North Korean nuclear problem has presented a new challenge following the North’s sixth nuclear test in an attempt to develop a hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic missile tests of missiles that can strike U.S. territory. As the strong words flew back and forth between North Korea and the U.S., tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula have risen. However, the relevant stakeholders have not been at all successful in their efforts to resolve the North Korean problem. Young-Sun Ha, Chairman of the East Asia Institute, points out several limitations of the previous solutions and suggests that it is time to draw a new roadmap for the denuclearization of North Korea. First, a new roadmap for resolving the North Korean nuclear issues should set its goal as complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization, using a nuclear freeze as a bridge. Furthermore, this roadmap must encompass four aspects-sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and internally driven change in North Korea-as a potential response to the North Korean nuclear issue. Through these efforts, it is of utmost importance to induce North Korea to evolve from the current Byungjin line of nuclear and economic development to a new Byungjin line of non-nuclear security and prosperity.         THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM HAS PRESENTED A NEW challenge following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in an attempt to develop a hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic missile tests of missiles that can strike U.S. territory. U.S. President Donald Trump’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly and the subsequent statement from Kim Jong-un further exacerbated the tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula. In this current situation, the relevant stakeholders have not been at all successful in their efforts to resolve the North Korean problem. In order to resolve this issue, it is crucial to evaluate the limitations of the previous solutions and draw a new roadmap.   Two Major Obstacles in Trump’s North Korea Policy   Upon his inauguration, U.S. President Trump strongly criticized the Obama administration’s North Korea policy of ‘strategic patience’ and announced his own strategy of ‘maximum pressure and engagement.’ This policy entails the following: first, it heavily emphasizes the role of China in the denuclearization of North Korea, and second, it considers the military option as a policy alternative for the purpose of maximum pressure. As expected, Trump’s UN speech did not deviate from this newly adopted strategy. After labeling North Korea a ‘rogue regime,’ Trump emphasized the importance of the military option, stating “The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.”   However, efforts by the U.S. to denuclearize the North are currently up against two major obstacles. To begin with, China will not willingly impose sanctions or pressure on Kim Jong-un to the degree anticipated by the U.S. China opposes North Korea’s nuclear weapon development, which is why it is participating in the international sanctions regime imposed by the UN. But China is not primarily concerned about the Kim Jong-un regime itself with nuclear weapons. Rather, the unpredictable future of the post-Kim Jong-un regime, whether or not it is nuclear, will be the bigger worry. If market democracy is introduced to a post-Kim Jong-un North Korea and negatively influences Northeast China’s security and economy, this has the potential to cause greater damage to China’s core interests than North Korea’s hydrogen bombs. Therefore, although it is dissatisfied with the status quo, China is likely to continue to search for an alternative resolution to the North’s nuclear threats and the Kim Jong-un regime other than denuclearization as the lesser of two evils.   Next, even if the United States aggressively puts a military option on the table, North Korea is unlikely to back down. In his response statement, Kim Jong-un predictably said “His remarks which described the U.S. option through the straightforward expression of his will have convinced me, rather than frightening or stopping me, that the path I chose is correct and that it is the one I have to follow to the last.” Kim Jong-un, who has thus far rather successfully endured the sanctions that have been imposed over the last quarter of a century, demonstrated that he anticipated Trump’s thought sequence well in advance, and therefore he clearly has no intention of being provoked by Trump’s remarks.   Moreover, because North Korean nuclear problem involves the Korean Peninsula where the United States and China are competing for strategic advantage in building the regional architecture, the United States must find a joint solution in close cooperation with South Korea while also taking into account China’s core interests. It is necessary for Trump to continue to make ongoing efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. However, his current approach will prove inadequate in overcoming the dual obstacles outlined above. It is time to look for a new roadmap.   Weaknesses of China’s North Korea Policy   Since March 2017, China has been putting forward the ‘dual freeze’ and ‘dual track’ approach as a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. This entails the temporary suspension of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests in exchange for a halt to South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises and the simultaneous pursuit of peace treaty talks and denuclearization negotiations by reopening the Six-party talks.   However, China’s proposal has several shortcomings. First, it is not sufficient to close the gap between South Korea and the United States and North Korea and China. The ‘dual freeze’ option has its own limitations in terms of commitment and symmetry. When looking back on the history of negotiations, South Korea and the United States have always been wary of the fact that the North Korean nuclear freeze for the sake of simply “freezing” ended up bringing the negotiations back to the starting point following the South’s discovery of the North’s lack of intention to follow through. Because of this, the first step of the new roadmap must include a display by North Korea of their sincere intention to achieve the goal of denuclearization. Additionally, in order to overcome the limitation of asymmetry, a temporary suspension of South Korea-U.S. large-scale joint military exercises needs to include not only a simple nuclear freeze, but also a tangible reduction in the military threats between South and North Korea.   Second, the ‘dual track’ approach has its own two problems. North Korea’s major position on the peace treaty talks has not changed since it was publicly made official in 2000 during the visit of the Envoy to U.S. from North Korea, Jo Myong-rok, to Washington DC. North Korea has remained steadfast in its position that in order to shift North Korea-U.S. relations from hostile to peaceful, three things must occur: the withdrawal of the United States Forces Korea, the dissolution of the military alliance between South Korea and the U.S., and the eradication of nuclear threats from the U.S. Because South Korea and the United States cannot accept these terms, a ‘dual track’ approach is virtually impossible.   At the same time, North Korea is adamantly against the idea of demanding Pyongyang’s denuclearization before peace talks or simultaneously discussing denuclearization and peace talks. North Korea wants peace treaty talks on their terms as a precondition for denuclearization. Therefore, China’s suggestion of a ‘dual freeze’ and a ‘dual track’ approach continually fails to garner a consensus from the relevant stakeholders, making it a difficult starting point for negotiation.   Hidden Hurdles in South Korea’s North Korea Policy   During his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2017, South Korean President Moon Jae-in highlighted the necessity of sanctions, stating “it [the international community] has to strongly and sternly respond until North Korea gives up its nuclear program of its own accord. All nations must thoroughly implement the U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions and seek new measures in case of any further provocations by the North.” Furthermore, he emphasized resolution through peaceful measures by arguing that “Despite North Korea’s flagrant violation of its obligations and commitments under the U.N. Charter, the Korean Government and the international community are making every possible effort with great determination to peacefully solve the North Korean nuclear issue.”   Moon went on to clarify that neither the collapse of North Korea nor unification by absorption is desirable in the path toward a peaceful resolution. As long as North Korea is ready to make the right decision, Moon reiterated South Korea’s utmost willingness to assist the North in partnership with the international community by pursuing multilateral security cooperation and creating a Northeast Asian economic community.   Over the past 20 years, South Korea’s North Korea policy has been entangled in the complex, exhausting web of sanctions and engagement, a web which it is now trying to escape. President Moon Jae-in emphasized the necessity of both economic sanctions and peaceful resolution in his UN General Assembly address. However, in order to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, several hurdles must be overcome, such as North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and the Byungjin line, a strategy focused on the simultaneous development of the North’s economy and nuclear weapons. As long as the Kim Jong-un regime maintains the current Byungjin line as its 21st century survival strategy, bilateral and multilateral negotiations for North Korea’s denuclearization will inexorably circle back to the starting point instead of progressing forward. Thus, the key to a successful negotiation is finding a way to jointly promote potential options for a different regime survival strategy, rather than simply reaching a consensus on preconditions for a future negotiation.   Finding a New Roadmap to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Threat   The first step in finding a new roadmap for the denuclearization of North Korea is the clear setting of goals. As North Korea’s nuclear weapons development continues, this important task is becoming more convoluted. Some have even offered the opinion that because North Korea now possesses nuclear weapons, it would be more realistic to make a nuclear freeze, rather than full denuclearization, the ultimate end goal of a negotiation process. However, this confusion is due to a lack of understanding of the dual nature of the political and military role of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have been used as the most important tool in coercive diplomacy on the political stage, and have brought about similarly revolutionary changes in terms of destructive power on the military stage. As expected, North Korea is using its nuclear weapons not only as a military, but also as a political tool. Therefore, as asymmetry in both political and military relations between South and North Korea cannot be accepted, a new roadmap for resolving the North Korean nuclear issues should set its goal as complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization, using a nuclear freeze as a bridge.   An examination of the historical efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat reveals that the limitations of the dichotomous approach between sanctions and engagement has been reached, and there is a consensus that a simultaneous pursuit of sanctions and engagement is necessary. However, creating a new roadmap is not that simple. First, the further North Korea develops its nuclear weapons program, the more necessary it becomes to prepare a way to deter the regime’s nuclear ambitions. Second, a new peace structure that can absolutely and pragmatically guarantee the well-being and prosperity of a non-nuclear North Korean regime must be built. Third, the creation of a new roadmap towards the denuclearization of North Korea cannot be completed without efforts on the part of the current North Korean regime to evolve from the current Byungjin line of nuclear and economic development to a new Byungjin line of non-nuclear security and prosperity. Therefore, we must explore a new roadmap that encompasses four aspects–sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and internally driven change in North Korea–as a potential response to the North Korean nuclear issue as soon as possible.   1. Sanctions   Since the first round of sanctions were imposed on North Korea in 1993 in response to the country’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and refusal to allow inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has imposed ten rounds of sanctions over the span of ten years. These range from UNSCR 1695 in 2006 to UNSCR 2375, which specifically outlines a full ban on the sale of natural gas condensates and liquids to North Korea, a reduction of the quota for oil sales to North Korea, a full ban on the purchase of North Korean textiles, and limits on visa issuance to North Korean overseas laborers. However, because of China’s limited cooperation and North Korea’s efforts to bypass sanctions, the sanctions have not had the full predicted impact.   As long as North Korea adheres to the Byungjin line of nuclear and economic development, the vicious cycle of continuing missile tests and subsequent strengthening of sanctions will continue. It is unrealistic to expect that the simple imposition of sanctions on North Korea will completely eradicate the North Korean nuclear threat. This is not to say that strengthening sanctions is a completely fruitless action. The imposition of sanctions is undeniably necessary to ultimately induce North Korea to reconsider the costs and benefits of nuclear weapons development.   2. Deterrence   In the era of nuclear weapons, deterrence, rather than defense, is prioritized. This is due to the unthinkable degree of human casualties and material losses that result from the use of nuclear weapons. In order to deter the rapid development of the North Korean nuclear program and strip the North’s ability to use their nuclear weapons as a political and military tool, a balance of terror must be reached. Methods of establishing this balance, including South Korean nuclear development, the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, extended deterrence through deployment of U.S. strategic military assets around the Korean Peninsula, and the strengthening of conventional weapons, are currently the subject of debate both at home and abroad.   However, South Korean nuclear weapons development would not only threaten North Korea, but also risk the economy, technology, and security of the South under the current global regime of nuclear non-proliferation. Furthermore, this has the potential to spur Japan to develop nuclear weapons as well, which could lead to regional nuclearization around the Korean Peninsula and intensify regional tensions and instability.   Even though redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is part of extended deterrence in essence, it would face an even harsher backlash than the deployment of THAAD did. As of right now, strengthening extended deterrence through the deployment of U.S. strategic military assets is even more important in terms of effectiveness and practicality. But it is crucial to remember that the key to the extended deterrence is the enhancement of mutual trust. Lastly, the Kill Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) systems need to be established in advance to counter North Korea. South Korea and the U.S. must use their joint capacity to the fullest to deter North Korea from using its nuclear weapons militarily and politically.   3. Engagement   Proactive engagement that not only increases the costs of nuclearization through strengthened sanctions and deterrence, but also expands the benefits of denuclearization is crucial to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. North Korea needs to believe that survival and nuclearization bring about death and poverty, while denuclearization will lead to and ensure the well-being and prosperity of its people.   Currently, it is more important to pursue a South Korean-style peace mechanism, which is more sincere in tone and approach, than it is to pursue a North Korean-style peace mechanism, which lacks persuasive power. North Korea has always argued that its development of nuclear weapons was a survival strategy in response to the hostile policy of the United States towards Pyongyang. Therefore, it is important to provide North Korea with an alternative that can adequately ensure the survival of its regime without nuclear weapons. In order to do so, it is necessary to construct a complex peace mechanism that can guarantee the survival of a denuclearized North Korean regime. There must be a quadruple assurance system consisting of bilateral security, such as North Korea-U.S., North Korea-China, and South Korea-North Korea; multilateral security such as the Six-party talks; global security such as the UN; and unilateral security such as a non-nuclear defense system. In order for North Korea to thrive on the 21st century global stage under the new survival strategy of a Byungjin line of non-nuclear security and prosperity, complex economic support from South Korea, Asia-Pacific countries, and global organizations must be pursued.   4. Internally Driven Change within North Korea   Even if the relevant stakeholders successfully employ sanctions, deterrence, and engagement to bring about bilateral or multilateral talks for the denuclearization of North Korea, the process will involve multiple steps, just as the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994 and the Joint Statement made at the conclusion of the fourth round of the Six-party talks in 2005 did. This is unavoidable as long as the Kim Jong-un regime fails to commit to a new survival strategy that goes beyond the Byungjin line of simultaneous development of the economy and nuclear weapons. Thus, without internally driven change in North Korea, a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue will not be possible.   Three aspects are critical to evolving North Korea’s current Byungjin line of simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and economy into a new Byungjin line of non-nuclear security and prosperity. First, marketization is of utmost importance. However, under the current regime in North Korea, the political effects of marketization in the country will gradually increase. Second, informatization is crucial. In the current closed society of North Korea, its impact is restricted, but with the introduction of modern information technology, the political effects of informatization will increase rapidly. Lastly, in order to survive in the 21st century, they must organize their political system in such a way to make it suitable for the current era.   In parallel with these efforts, the co-evolution of South Korean and other relevant country policies on North Korea must be simultaneously pursued as the new path toward the denuclearization of North Korea. It is urgent to engage in strengthening these “Three Evolutionary Capabilities” for the 21st century.   Therefore, what is pressing is for the Moon Jae-in administration to have a good understanding of the limitations behind the simple solutions currently being pursued by relevant stakeholders. Next, South Korea should play a guiding role in preparing a complex solution consisting of sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and an emphasis on the potential of a new Byungjin line, and implementing that solution as soon as possible. Unfortunately, time is running out. ■         Author Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.        

(Tactical) Winds of Change?   ALARMED BY NORTH KOREA’S SIXTH NUCLEAR TEST ON September 3rd, South Korean citizens are quickly taking a more aggressive stance towards the regime. This is reflected in rapidly shifting public opinion supporting hardline measures such as the deployment of extra THAAD units and the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. A public poll conducted by Korea Society Opinion Institute (KSOI) several days after the incident found that 68.2% of 1,014 respondents were in favor of deploying tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil to as a response to the North Korean nuclear threat. An earlier opinion poll conducted by the East Asia Institute in June showed that 67.2% of those surveyed agreed to the idea of nuclear weapons in South Korea. These results seem to indicate that animosity among the South Korean population towards the Kim Jong-un regime and its adventuristic maneuvers has been brewing over the past few years.   In line with this trend, the Moon Jae-in administration stepped up security measures in response to the test by approving the deployment of 4 additional THAAD units, albeit temporarily, and working with the U.S. to revise the missile guidelines limiting the range and weight of South Korea’s ballistic missiles. Still, some lawmakers, particularly opposition lawmakers, continue to decry these measures as insufficient and call for consultations with the U.S. on the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear assets on South Korean soil. They advocate this as an effective counter-threat and potential bargaining chip against North Korea.   Tactical nuclear weapons, nearly 950 units of which were in operation in South Korea at the height of the Cold War in the 1960s, were completely withdrawn from the country in December 1991 in line with the Declaration of the Denuclearization announced a month before by President Roh Tae-woo. The withdrawal also paved the way for the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that was signed by the two Koreas the following year. Public debate over redeployment, however, was recently reignited when Yoo Seong-min, the presidential candidate for the conservative Bareun Party during the 19th election, brought up the idea at a nationally televised debate in April.   Figure 1: Which statement about tactical nuclear weapons do you agree with more? Source: KSOI, 1,014 respondents, 2017.9.8 ~ 2017.9.9   Figure 2: Number of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea (unit: unit)   Source: Federation of American Scientists   The Opposition Party Push for Redeployment   Although the topic took a backseat to domestic issues upon President Moon’s arrival in office, it quickly rose to the forefront again as North Korea conducted a new series of nuclear and missile tests demonstrating the apparent acceleration of its nuclear program. Liberty Korea Party has adopted the redeployment of the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal on the Korean Peninsula as its party platform. This is not insignificant, as Liberty Party Korea holds 107 parliamentary seats second only to the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (121 seats).   Party floor leader Jung Woo-taek announced this new policy platform on August 16th, saying that their decision was driven by the need to speak for the more than 64% of the population that recent polls indicated were in favor of redeployment. Elaborating on the decision, the spokesperson stated, “A nuclear balance is the only way that South Korea can defend itself; it's an eye for an eye, a nuclear weapon for a nuclear weapon.” Following the announcement, the party held an open forum to discuss ways to make the idea a reality. At the forum, Chairman Hong Jun-pyo argued that redeployment had become a question of national survival now that the North Korean threat was reaching its final stages. As the leading conservative candidate in the last presidential election, he mentioned the policy as one of his campaign pledges, but the pledge was criticized as unrealistic “baloney” even within his own party at the time.   In the face of continued North Korean provocations, however, the general mood has shifted favorably towards more aggressive measures, including tactical nuclear weapons deployment. Against this backdrop, political observers note that the opposition party's move could serve as a rallying cry for its supporters as well as a timely political offensive against the president and the ruling party, both of which have been enjoying high approval ratings. The issue is so contentious that a rift exists even among President Moon’s.   At the same time, Liberty Korea Party is seeking to form a coalition on this front with other opposition parties. After successfully aligning with the Bareun Party and People’s Party to block the nomination of several new chief Constitutional Court justices on September 11th, Jung Woo-taek made overtures to the two parties, urging them to “make the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons a party platform and seek joint action with us.”   Nuclear Sharing vs. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other   Still, both the People’s Party and the Bareun Party remain on the fence. People’s Party lawmakers are sharply divided on the question and party leader Ahn Cheol-soo has yet to adopt a clear stance. Previously, he supported the denuclearization principle, but recently he has criticized President Moon for not putting all options on the table. The party’s floor leader and members of the National Assembly National Defense Committee have also personally expressed favorable views towards the idea. Regardless, a majority of People’s Party representatives remain either skeptical or negative. Led by Representative Chung Dong-Young, lawmakers against the redeployment argue that the idea is out of tune with the party’s identity. The party leadership decided to bring its lawmakers together at a seminar on September 18th to discuss the party’s position on North Korean nuclear issues, including the tactical nuclear weapons question.   Meanwhile, the Bareun Party is advocating “nuclear sharing” modeled after NATO instead of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. The rationale behind this is that authority over the operation and use of the weapons lies solely in the hands of the U.S. forces in the latter, while the former arrangement allows the hosting country a certain degree of latitude in the use and management of nuclear weapons deployed in its territory. Representative Ha Tae-kyung, a leading proponent of this plan, drew a clear distinction between nuclear sharing and the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, pointing out that nuclear sharing could avoid unnerving China further as it does not necessarily involve the placement of nuclear weapons on South Korean soil. He also condemned Liberty Korea Party’s call for redeployment as “a perilous anti-American populist hype that could undermine the ROK-US alliance.”   Shin Won-sik, a retired three-star general and former vice chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, also recently endorsed the idea of nuclear sharing during an interview with a local newspaper. He argued that such a scheme would provide South Korea with a degree of authority over U.S. nuclear weapons, thus ramping up security without actually acquiring nuclear capabilities. Meanwhile, Professor Park Hwee-rhak, a nuclear strategy expert at Kookmin University, proposed a trilateral nuclear sharing model between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. He argued that in addition to strengthening the ROK-U.S. combined deterrence posture and possibly expediting denuclearization negotiations with North Korea, the scheme would also dispel fears in South Korea and Japan of the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The assurance provided by nuclear sharing would allow them to shelve the idea of developing and possessing their own nuclear arsenal to defend against each other as well as against North Korea.   [Table 2] Party Lines on the Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (as of 2017.9.18)     A critical blind spot of these proposals, however, is that nuclear sharing would only cover the vehicles or platforms of nuclear weapons, i.e. submarines or aircraft. It is only the original owner of the weapons, the U.S., that can actually authorize and activate their use. Research on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe consistently mentions that the weapons remain in full control of U.S. forces while the hosting governments and/or their military authorities do not have any access. Throughout the Cold War era, the U.S. never approved or accepted any mechanism or institution that could undermine its monopoly on the use of its nuclear weapons. NATO’s nuclear sharing scheme is, in this regard, a bizarre compromise of a decades-long tug-of-war between the U.S. and its NATO allies in Europe.   By extension, another weakness of this argument is that it does not logically or practically allay South Korean fears of abandonment by the U.S. Having control over the vehicles that carry tactical nuclear weapons means that a country can stop its ally from hastily using weapons by forbidding use of these vehicles. However, it cannot compel its nuclear power ally to use nuclear weapons since it does not have any say over the weapons themselves.   Last but not least, it is questionable whether the U.S. has any incentive to share authority with South Korea, especially if the weapons are not placed in South Korean territory. In fact, the only thing that the nuclear arsenal NATO member states have been sharing with the U.S. is the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in their territories, meaning that the scheme, unlike what its advocates maintain, is essentially not at all different from the re-introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into South Korean territory.   Experts Warn of Huge Losses for Small Gains while (Unlikely) Advocates Raise Their Voices   Most South Korean security experts frown at the idea of redeployment, noting that it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would welcome the proposal and highlighting that even if it were to agree, redeployment would do more harm than good for East Asian regional security as well as South Korean national security. In an interview last month, former Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok observed that while there is little point in adhering to the virtually obsolete denuclearization principle, deployment would constitute a de-facto recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and muddle up U.S. security strategy in East Asia, not only towards North Korea but also China, Russia, and even its closest ally Japan.   Calls for redeployment, however, have not been confined to the opposition parties. President Moon’s confidant and key strategist of foreign policy and security issues during his campaign has also voiced support. After Kim Jong-un made a blustery declaration in mid-August that his next test would target the U.S. base in Guam, Park Sun-won, the former unification policy secretary for President Roh Moo-hyun, used social media to advocate for a conditional introduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons as a means of re-establishing the power balance on the Peninsula and making Kim Jong-un think twice before pushing ahead with his nuclear ambitions.   Although his views are strictly his own as he does not hold any office at the moment, Park Sun-won’s blog post highlights just how controversial the issue of tactical nuclear weapons as a counter-measure against North Korea is in South Korean political circles as well as the public. Academics and policy experts also joined the debate. The Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), a research arm of the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS), released two papers under the title “A Debate: The Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons” on September 13th, 2017.   Dr. Park Byung-Kwang, Chief of the Northeast Asia Research Department at INSS, argued that the denuclearization principle is essentially null and void and that tactical nuclear weapons could create a balance of terror, reducing the chances of North Korean provocations and aggression and possibly compelling the regime to come to the negotiation table. Rebutting Park’s argument, INSS Research Fellow Lee Soo-hyung contended that tactical nuclear weapons would instead serve as a catalyst for North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and spur a nuclear arms race in East Asia, and that it would eventually perpetuate the division of the two Koreas.   In addition to the hot debate over the political implications of tactical nuclear weapons, another controversy surrounds their pure military value in general as well as in Korea’s geopolitical circumstances in particular. Hwang Il-do, a researcher at the University of North Korean Studies, notes that tactical nuclear weapons have lost most of their military relevance, as strategic nuclear weapons can fully replace tactical nukes in terms of function and mission.   Moreover, he argues that the main targets of tactical nuclear weapons are enemies with expansive territories, i.e., the Soviet Union or China, with a view to localizing a war and limiting the theater to a ‘tactical’ level. In comparison, the Korean Peninsula is geographically small and there is little, if any, point in distinguishing tactical nuclear weapons from strategic nukes in case of war. As one senior U.S. military officer of the European Command reportedly said during the nuclear arsenal management inspection in 2008, tactical nuclear weapons are simply political tools that have effectively no military implications yet cost a “king’s ransom.”   The Blue House Digs in its Heels and the U.S. Remains Steadfast as Debate Continues   Amid the ongoing dispute, the Blue House and the ruling Democratic Party have expressed a firm opposition to the idea. As part of the effort to calm the public, first deputy chief of the National Security Office Lee Sang-chul officially stated in a press briefing at the Blue House on September 12th that the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons would constitute a breach of the principle of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula that was established in 1991. Reiterating the government’s official stance, President Moon Jae-in said in an interview with CNN on September 14th that he was not considering the option at all, emphasizing that a “nuke-for-nuke” attitude would destabilize the Korean Peninsula and could ignite a nuclear arms race across the Northeast Asian region. The statement and the interview suggest a fine-tuning of the Moon administration’s position, as previous comments from the Defense and Foreign Affairs ministers were noncommittal.   Minister of Defense Song Young-moo stated during the September 4th National Defense Committee session at the National Assembly that he was willing to fully examine the option of redeployment, even in the face of clear objection from ruling party lawmakers. He backed down, however, at the National Assembly interpellation on September 12th. When asked if he thought a tactical nuclear arsenal should be brought in for the purpose of creating a “balance of terror,” the minister replied that he was not considering the option at all. He denied claims that he had a serious discussion with U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis on the subject during ministerial talks in late August, and stressed that he had simply touched upon the fact that some quarters of South Korea were calling for redeployment.   U.S. military experts have also expressed skepticism over the possibility of the redeployment. The Washington Post reported on September 4th that a number of experts, including nuclear weapons policymakers of the past administrations, had “almost universally” voiced their concern over the idea, largely due to fears of miscalculation and the potential for heightened tension on the Peninsula. The key national security figures of the current Trump administration are no exception. National security advisor H.R. McMaster said in an interview with MSNBS in early August that “If the non-proliferation regime is broken…a Northeast Asia with a nuclear armed North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia…it’s bad news for everybody.”   Still, those in favor of redeployment point to apparent changes in the atmosphere in the White House in the wake of North Korea’s sixth nuclear test on September 3rd. NBC quoted several sources from the White House as saying, “The administration is not ruling out moving tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea should Seoul request them.” However, the same news report went on to suggest that the option appears too remote and that the remarks were aimed at urging China to put more pressure on North Korea. This view is line with the response of the State Department to the delegation of Liberty Korea Party who recently visited the U.S. to convey South Korea’s public concern over the issue. State Department officials reportedly said that they would seek measures to place more strategic assets, instead of tactical nuclear weapons, on the Peninsula in order to deter North Korean provocations.   Some observers have also cautiously called attention to official statements from the White House and the State Department that conveyed a slightly different tone. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Logan, a Pentagon spokesman, in an interview with Voice of America, firmly declined to comment on the department’s stance on redeployment, saying that it would be “inappropriate” to talk about it in detail at the moment. Instead, he stated that the Pentagon continues to support South Korean and Japanese efforts to strengthen their defense capabilities in response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.   The VOA interpreted this response as rather vague in comparison with the answer to the same question five years ago, when Defense Department spokesperson and Lieutenant Colonel Catherine Wilkinson affirmed that the department did not plan or intend to bring tactical nuclear weapons back into the East Asian theater. Their statement was echoed by Victoria Nuland, the spokesperson of the State Department at the time. The subtle nuances in the more recent statement by Lieutenant Colonel Logan could possibly lend credence to recent reports that the Trump administration has been seriously considering redeployment as one of its options. Although it seems like a remote possibility at the moment, North Korea’s continued and relentless provocations might drastically alter the calculations of President Trump, and for that matter, those of President Moon as well. ■         Authors Jiwon Ra is a research associate at the East Asia Institute. His main fields of interest cover new security issues including hybrid and automated warfare, and the relationship between politico-economic systems and military recruitment. He has been contributing articles on international relations and U.S. foreign policy issues to local newspapers on both sides of the political spectrum. He studied international relations and earned his master’s degree at Seoul National University.                  

[Editor's Note] The North Korean nuclear and missile problem is growing more serious, and its urgency demands a response that is both rapid and carefully calculated. The policies of past South Korean regimes, whether accommodative or sanctions-focused, have proven inadequate in resolving this pressing issue. It is clear that no progress can be made without newly designed approach based on complex diplomacy and co-evolutionary efforts. In this article, Professors Young Sun Ha and Chaesung Chun put forth a bold vision of a North Korea strategy for the new South Korean administration.         The Changing Policy Environment Surrounding the North Korean Nuclear Issue   One of the most difficult problems facing the newly inaugurated South Korean administration is the task of formulating new policy on North Korea and its nuclear program. The North Korea nuclear problem, which at this point has a history of 24 years, has entered a new phase.   First, as North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have increased, it has, of course, become a direct threat to South Korea and other surrounding countries. In addition to the development of transport means for missiles together with nuclear ballistic missile submarines and the mass production of nuclear missiles, the regime’s development has reached the level of large-scale surface-to-air and surface-to-surface interception capable of neutralizing South Korean missile defense systems. Just since the emergence of the new South Korean government, the DPRK has already conducted two successful launches of a Hwasong-12 missile and Pukkuksong-2 missile, and announced that it successfully developed an effective long-range missile as well as atmospheric re-entry technology. North Korea is expected to possess 100 nuclear warheads by 2020, and its odds of successfully developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are increasing. It is extremely urgent that we block, and ultimately completely eliminate, North Korea’s nuclear and missile development.   Second, the development of North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities was a matter of survival for South Korea and the central problem of Northeast Asian international relations. However, North Korea’s development of an ICBM threatens United States territory, and with its acquisition of the ability to threaten Chinese territory with nuclear missiles, it has emerged as a security issue for not only China and the US, but also Japan and Russia. This change offers both an opportunity and a threat to the new South Korean administration. All affected countries, including China and the US, who are facing this urgent North Korean nuclear issue, will jump wholeheartedly into the diplomatic arena to try to resolve the matter. However, owing to the limits of Chinese sanctions towards North Korea and Kim Jong Un’s rigid “dual line” policy of nuclear and economic development, it is challenging for Trump and Xi Jinping’s governments to find an approach to resolving the issue. Within this scenario, if South Korea is to take the lead in finding a solution, it must surpass the simple theories of autonomy and cooperation and push for a more prescient, co-evolutionary approach.   Third, with the strengthening of international sanctions against North Korea in response to its nuclear missile tests, it will be difficult for South Korea to push for North Korean engagement policy on its own. At the same time, as the North Korean regime of Kim Jong Un has already achieved a significant degree of development in its nuclear missile capabilities, North Korea will not easily give up its dual line policy of nuclear and economic development even though the surrounding countries have increased their sanctions. Accordingly, the new administration is currently facing the great challenge of needing to deal with North Korea by commanding a strategy of policy towards the US and Inter-Korean relations that differs concretely from the way that past administrations dealt with the Kim Jong Il regime.   Fourth, the new government is embracing the difficult task of creating policy towards North Korea and its nuclear program that is founded on the cooperation of both the progressives and conservatives. As neither the progressive policy of cooperation nor the conservative policy of sanctions toward North Korea have been able to halt the country’s nuclear missile development and military provocations towards South Korea, the new administration must find a new type of complex North Korea policy that combines both pressure and cooperation. However, the Kim Jong Un regime’s ongoing and consistent development of nuclear missiles and provocations towards the South is narrowing the gap between the progressive and conservative perspectives on the North. This can be seen as an opportunity for the new administration to overcome the trials and errors of the past and map out a fresh, new approach to North Korean policy.   Disentangling the Parallel Dilemmas of Pressure and Engagement   The top priority for the new government is the creation of a set of ‘Complex Principles of Pressure and Engagement’ to facilitate the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue in a manner that allows all stakeholder countries to cooperate. Countries affected by the North Korea nuclear issue agree in principle that denuclearizing the Peninsula requires a combination of pressure and engagement. The Trump administration of the US is proposing a new North Korea policy along these lines, and Xi Jinping’s government is emphasizing a push for a parallel policy of denuclearization and a peace regime through the halting of both North Korea’s nuclear missile development and US-South Korea military exercises. On the other hand, North Korea advocates denuclearization following the establishment of a peace regime. The question is whether denuclearization should come first, occur simultaneously, or happen after the establishment of a peace regime, as well as whether the surrounding countries will be able to cooperate over what denuclearization and a peace regime will actually entail.   The new administration must first be able to synchronize the pressure and sanctions from the international community to maximize the cost the nuclear development incurs. Then it needs to be able to offer the possibility for a denuclearized North Korea to survive and develop while building Inter-Korean trust before finally putting forth a new plan for cooperation over true denuclearization and a peace regime on the Peninsula. At the same time, the new administration must be able to lead the countries surrounding North Korea in order to facilitate cooperation around the realization of this plan. This type of effort must appear to be a more complex and co-evolutionary policy that is distinguished from both the Sunshine and pressure policies.   The international community has adopted a variety of sanctions in order to entice North Korea to give up its nuclear program. These sanctions are not intended to make the regime collapse, but rather to push it into replacing the high-cost nuclear path with the low-cost denuclearization path. However, with North Korea choosing to engage in brinkmanship, this type of pressure will never lead the regime to abandon its nuclear weapons. Because Kim Jong Un thinks that nuclear weapons are the “sword of state” that allows his regime to survive, North Korea must face a reality where the possession of nuclear weapons will not ensure the regime’s survival, but rather endanger it. Only then will they abandon their nuclear weapons. In the end, only when Kim Jong Un reaches a crossroads where the choice is between the continued development of nuclear weapons and the death of the regime will he be forced to choose the abandonment of full-scale nuclear weapons. If he is not presented with this dilemma, the regime will continue in its attempts to receive recognition as a nuclear weapons state, its military threats against its neighbors, and the pursuit of economic development through the dual line policy.   However, it will not be easy to make North Korea reach this particular crossroads. The likelihood that China, which exercises the greatest amount of influence over North Korea, will exert the kind of pressure that the US and South Korea expect, is almost nonexistent. This is because Xi Jinping’s administration still perceives a collapsed North Korea to be a bigger threat than a nuclear North Korea, even though it is not pleased with the North’s ongoing nuclear missile tests. Furthermore, although the Trump administration is capable of placing the military option on the table in its negotiations with North Korea, the actual exercise of this option is not easy. North Korea, well aware of these vulnerabilities in its opposition, continues to employ brinkmanship while hardly ever facing that crossroads. Regardless, maximizing the costs of the nuclear path and minimizing the costs of denuclearization has been identified as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. Thus, the new administration must create international sanctions that are stronger than any before and then carefully examine how it will lead this sanctions strategy in the future.   Building Inter-Korean Trust and Creating a Roadmap for Engagement with the North   As the new administration goes forward with pressure and sanctions against North Korea’s continued nuclearization, it must at the same time propose an extremely careful and step-by-step roadmap for engagement over North Korea’s denuclearization. South Korea must make it clear in a variety of ways to both the Kim Jong Un regime and the North Korean people that what it desires is not unification by absorption, but rather the normalization of a denuclearizing North Korea and the stabilization of Inter-Korean relations. In order to dispel the North’s worries of unification by absorption, South Korea must put forth a formal unification plan that reaffirms a gradual and peaceful three-step process, as well as a 21st century unification plan if needed. In addition, South Korea must make it clear that the plans for North Korea’s denuclearization proposed by both the US and China are unrealistic. China’s proposal that North Korea suspend its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for a suspension of US-ROK military exercises lacks a concrete path to denuclearization and a peace regime. At the same time, the recent strategy put forth by the Trump administration of engagement and pressure overestimates, as usual, the leadership of China in strong sanctions against North Korea and underestimates the degree of pressure needed to bring North Korea to the table for talks. For these reasons, it will be difficult for this plan to succeed.   The South Korean government must first clarify its willingness to stabilize the situation on the Peninsula through an engagement strategy towards North Korea and cooperation on Inter-Korean exchanges. After doing so, they will be able to initiate exchanges and the provision of humanitarian support that cannot be used for military or political purposes, meetings of separated families, and social and cultural exchanges. Following this they will be able to begin the process of economic cooperation first through low-level economic exchanges, followed by full-blown economic exchanges and then complete market integration. Of course, the expansion and deepening of these incremental exchanges will be accompanied simultaneously by denuclearization and negotiations on a peace regime. South Korea must fine-tune the vague roadmap for engagement that is currently in the minds of the US, China, and the international community by taking the leading role and then facilitating engagement with North Korea under the cooperation of the international community.   True cooperation on denuclearization must arise through the step-by-step process of negotiations over a nuclear freeze and a settlement, reporting and inspections along with a return to the NPT, the disabling of existing nuclear facilities, and finally the complete abandonment of the North’s nuclear program. When the irreversible step of nuclear abandonment is reached, a full-scale inter-Korean economic exchange may be initiated. Thus, the first step for the new administration is to prescribe precisely the terms of engagement with North Korea with the cooperation of the international community while continuing to uphold international sanctions against the North. If progress is made on true nuclear freeze negotiations, South Korea and the surrounding stakeholder countries can begin to discuss economic support for North Korea and cooperation on Inter-Korean exchange can get back on track so that eventually denuclearization can take place.   Creating a Complex Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula in the Mid-Long Term   When freeze negotiations for the purpose of denuclearization of the North are initiated, discussions on how to build a true peace regime on the Peninsula must begin at the same time. North Korea and its neighbors have in the past reached and implemented a basic agreement (the Agreed Framework of 1990 in Geneva) on denuclearization and a peace regime. The problem was that North Korea’s neighboring countries have fundamental differences in their political intentions, and the reality is it will be extremely difficult for smooth cooperation to take place when trust has not been built. If coordination surrounding a two-track sequence and individual concrete steps for negotiation cannot be established it will be difficult for negotiations to proceed. At the same time, there must be a co-evolution of conditions outside the negotiating table supporting the negotiations.   The urgent problem of denuclearization talks is placing a condition on North Korea to suspend its ‘development’ of nuclear missiles. A stop on testing only runs the risk of North Korea continuing to engage in the nuclear development activities other than testing. If this occurs and negotiations break down, North Korea will further reinforce its nuclear weapons capabilities in response to this situation. If North Korea halts its tests and wants to demonstrate its sincerity in suspending all of its nuclear development activities, it must report and verify all current nuclear activities, open itself to complete inspections, and take the first practical step in denuclearization. Furthermore, North Korea must also at the same time dismiss all of its personnel involved in nuclear weapons development from the military. Once North Korea shows its sincerity in denuclearizing, it will be able to demonstrate its firm willingness to promote its continued existence and development through a peace regime. Even if South Korea and the US do not stipulate denuclearization from the beginning, there absolutely must be a resolute freeze and halt in order to show their sincerity in denuclearizing. Finally, as a condition of putting a suspension to nuclear tests and negotiations over a nuclear freeze, the US and South Korea should temporarily suspend their military exercises, North Korea announce a stop to its military provocations and chemical weapons, and military trust building should occur, followed by a total denuclearization through a complete halt to North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and facility inspections. This entire proposal must take place under the close cooperation of all neighboring countries, including China.   A plan should be designed at the same time regarding how to respond if negotiations fail during the first stage. After suspending its program, North Korea is going to demand the physical collateral of the withdrawal of US hostile policy towards North Korea before moving on to denuclearization. The US and South Korea must demand a verification system of complete nuclear abandonment following the nuclear freeze, inspections and the restoration of the non-proliferation regime. The problem is that North Korea is going to demand the inclusion of a provision in the DPRK-US peace agreement that includes a withdrawal of US forces in South Korea and a breaking of the military alliance as a precondition for its total denuclearization. However, in the past North Korea has encountered a brick wall in peace regime negotiations when it demanded this kind of comprehensive peace regime under the framework of the Three Revolutionary Capabilities. As trust between the two Koreas is extremely low, there must be a stage where political and military trust are built prior to a reduction of military power in order to have sincere negotiations over a peace regime. The key question is how to create a measure ensuring the survival of the North Korean regime without nuclear weapons that a North Korea on the path of denuclearization can trust.   During these difficult negotiations, there is always the risk that after North Korea develops an ICBM it will think it has the advantage and negotiations will break down. Thus, the surrounding countries, including the US and China, must agree to prepare to return to the issue of North Korea’s missile development in the event that this occurs. This type of decision is not only out of line with international norms, but will have an extremely negative impact on the regional order, peace, and stability. Thus, the affected countries must have a concrete agreement that North Korea will take responsibility for any breakdown in negotiations. Negotiations to denuclearize North Korea must be carried out under a comprehensive, step-by-step agenda, with total preparation for failures in the mid-long term in order to keep negotiations progressing according to plan.   When denuclearization negotiations are fully on track, a complex framework for peaceful coexistence that can be sustained into the mid-long term must be created. This will require active planning on the part of South Korea for peaceful coexistence and the completion of a South Korean-style peace regime that can win the support of the surrounding countries and international community as a whole.   A future peace regime on the Korean peninsula suited for the 21st century must arise from a complex system of South and North Korea, the neighboring countries of the Korean Peninsula, and international organizations. First, an overall peace agreement between the two Koreas based on a denuclearized Peninsula must be created, and the surrounding stakeholder countries must provide a complex guarantee of its effectiveness. The contents of the DPRK-US peace agreement may be included in this process. China’s guarantee is also needed for North Korea’s security. The Korean Peninsula must denuclearize and there must be an agreement to reduce conventional military arms that includes political and legal trust building. As a result, a complex peace regime made up of a variety of actors on the stage must be built. If the surrounding countries are all going to be able to agree on a Korean Peninsula peace regime that includes the DPRK-US peace agreement advocated by North Korea, China’s proposed peace guarantee for North Korean security, and the peace agreement that includes the surrounding countries advocated by South Korea, it is essential that the two Koreas and the surrounding nations put forth a co-evolutionary effort for the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific regional order. ■           Authors Young Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.   Chaesung Chun is chair of the International Relations Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. He is also professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University.   Translator Natalie Grant is Research Associate of the Research Planning Department at the East Asia Institute.         Acknowledgement This article has been originally published as a chapter of Policy Recommendations for the New Government’s Diplomacy and Security (in Korean). Considering that the North Korean issue is important and urgent for regional and international security, EAI has translated and published it to make it available to a global audience.  

Rising Tensions on the Korean Peninsula   ANOTHER CRISIS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA HAS EMERGED following the first summit meeting between the US and China that took place in April 2017. Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to increase cooperation in reining in North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, although he did not offer any new formula for cracking Pyongyang’s defiance during the two-day summit at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida. Xi and Trump both agree that North Korea’s nuclear advances have reached a “very serious stage.” The Trump administration has emphasized that the era of strategic patience is over, and that now is the time to focus on maximum pressure and engagement with North Korea. Beijing has also been fast in responding to Washington’s policy on North Korea, hinting that it can cut off the oil supply to North Korea in the event of further provocations such as a 6th nuclear or ICBM test. Many in Washington and Beijing anticipated a ratcheting up of tensions on the Korean Peninsula will not subside at least until the end of April, as North Korea tends to regard political events such as the 105th anniversary of “The Day of the Sun” on April 15 and the 85th anniversary of the Foundation of the Korean People’s Army as an ideal time to conduct additional nuclear and missile tests.   However, the response from North Korea was not as aggressive in terms of actions as it was in words. The North spoke bluntly of their willingness to engage in an ‘all-out-war’ against the US if Washington uses military means, and also said that North Korea will conduct more missile tests on a weekly, monthly, and yearly basis. The regime released its first official response to the Trump administration’s North Korea policy which consisted of bolstering its nuclear weapons program at maximum speed. These speeches were delivered primarily by diplomats such as North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Han Song-ryol, North Korea’s Deputy Ambassador to the UN Kim In-ryong, and North Korean foreign ministry spokesman.   This series of events seems to indicate that nobody wants a direct confrontation. All players are testing the resolve of their adversaries and hoping to bring about behavioral change that will favor their own coercive policies. North Korea may choose to carry out a low intensity provocation with a new type of ballistic missile test rather than strategic provocation for the time being. Doing so would signal that the regime continues to upgrade its missile capabilities despite pressure from Washington and the failure of all three of its recent missile tests in April. Tillerson is calling for UN members to suspend or downgrade their diplomatic relations with North Korea even as Trump stated he would meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “under the right circumstances.”   This recent so-called ‘April Crisis’ differs from previous crises on the Korean Peninsula in several ways.   First, the US and China are demonstrating their intentions to engage in mutual cooperation and coordinated approaches toward North Korea. Although these two major players are making very different calculations with regards to this issue, Beijing is supporting Washington’s stance on North Korea indirectly by using phrases such as “simultaneous pursuit of denuclearization and peace treaty talks” and “simultaneous freeze of nuclear/missile provocations and US-ROK joint military exercise” much less frequently. China also did not register any strong opposition to the demonstration of US military assets, such as the re-entry of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Carl Vinson to the waters of the Korean Peninsula. This indicates that the two strong powers have reached a consensus on ‘maximum pressure first’ and ‘then possible engagement’ in the face of an imminent 6th nuclear and ICBM test. This is the first time that the US and China have shared the role of pressuring the North. Since 2003, the US has focused on applying military pressure while China remained on the economic side. In 2003, strong pressure coordination between the US and China led North Korea to the multilateral dialogue arena of the six-party talks. China may even reduce the amount of oil it supplies to North Korea, a step it has not considered since the beginning of the six-party talks in 2003. The problem is how long this strong cooperation and coordination between the US and China will last. Historically, North Korea reversed its denuclearization process swiftly and engaged in provocations such as nuclear/missile tests when the cooperation and coordination between the US and China weakened.   Second, both Japan and Russia have an interest in urging North Korea to refrain from further provocations. At the “two-plus-two” meeting between Japanese and Russian foreign and defense ministers in March, both pledged to work closely in reaching out to North Korea and China to achieve a diplomatic solution. However, the national interests of the two countries differ despite the outcome being a common goal. Currently, Russia acts as a buffer between the DPRK and the US. The role of stressing a diplomatic solution in dealing with the DPRK was largely taken on by China in recent years. Now, it is Russia that is trying to turn down the heat and noise. Russia blocked a draft statement in the U.N. Security Council condemning the latest North Korean missile test, opposing the removal of the words “through dialogue.”   Japan’s interest, on the other hand, currently lies in utilizing the rising tensions on the Korean peninsula to distract people’s attention from domestic political scandals, such as corruption allegations and a series of resignations of cabinet members. This also serves Japan’s desire to advocate for loosening restrictions on the military actions of the Self-Defense Forces. Recently, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has been struggling with a delicate political situation with the revelations that placed him at center of a scandal for his connections to a land deal that benefited an ultra-nationalist organization. Other cabinet members, including the Minister for Disaster Reconstruction, the Vice Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Parliamentary Vice Minister for Disaster Reconstruction resigned over separate political scandals. Although the Japanese public is dissatisfied with Abe over a whole range of domestic issues, they remain rather keen on security concerns. After Abe warned of North Korea’s launching missiles containing toxic substances, demand for nuclear bomb shelters and air purifiers increased significantly and some areas even held evacuation drills for the first time.   With the looming threat from North Korea, Japan’s military is testing the limits of pure self-defense within its Constitution, while Japan’s ruling party urges the government to consider taking on more offensive military capabilities. In March 2016, Japan changed its laws to permit the mobilization of their Self-Defense Force to defend allies and other countries when not doing so could jeopardize Japan’s safety and security. The current situation can help boost support for the movement to revise the Constitution, which is a long-cherished goal of Abe. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces conducted joint naval maneuvers with the USS Carl Vinson strike group, sharing information on missile interception and other communications. Conducting a joint drill with a US carrier in adjacent waters is rare for the Marine Self-Defense Force. Faced with a new threat level, Japan may further loosen its self-defense-only posture, justifying the change by claiming a need to possess improved deterrence and response capabilities.   Third, South Korea’s anxiety about being diplomatically isolated from these dynamic changes taking place in neighboring countries has become intense. The interim government in South Korea has had little room to take initiative in dealing with the North. However, the fact that President Trump spoke on the phone with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe before meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and did not speak acting Korean President Hwang Kyo-ahn raised concerns that Korea was not being given as much importance as it should in dealing with security issues on the Korean peninsula. South Korea’s local media even coined the term “Korea passing” to describe Seoul’s diplomatic isolation in the current situation. However, there are facts that run counter to this assertion. After Park Geun-hye was impeached, President Trump communicated with acting president Hwang, stressing that the ROK-US alliance remained strong. There was a telephone conversation in March following North Korea’s four missile tests, which was arranged at the request of the US. Vice President Pence’s trip to Seoul in early April, and Secretary of State Tillerson’s visit in mid-March were also indicative of Washington efforts to show that the allies maintain a united front in dealing with the North. Envoys from South Korea, the US, and Japan held a trilateral dialogue on April 25th to discuss measures to maximize pressure on North Korea. They reportedly agreed to coordinate “all actions” taken with regard to North Korea. The US Navy conducted a maritime exercise with South Korea as a demonstration of their shared commitment to security and stability in the region. South Korea and the United States have been working to secure early operational capability of the THAAD system. The concern of the South Korean public regarding Washington’s disregard of Seoul despite ongoing close coordination between the two allies signifies the level of anxiety that people are feeling due to the escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula. President Trump’s comments that the KORUS FTA should be renegotiated and South Korea should bear the full cost of THAAD further unnerved the South Korean public, increasing their worries that the two countries will struggle to resolve nuclear and alliance issues.   Continuing Challenges from North Korea   The problem is whether the resolve of these five players to drive Pyongyang into changing a course is stronger than Pyongyang’s resolve not to budge. Kim Jong-un will never give up so-called Byungin policy of simultaneous pursuit of economic development and nuclear weapons capabilities, which is very closely tied to the stability of his regime.   During the 2017 New Year’s address, the North declared that it had reached an epic turning point in the strengthening of its military capabilities and that its preparations for the test-firing of an ICBM had reached the final stages. The North is showing that it will continue developing its nuclear and missile capabilities according to its own schedule, regardless of international community’s tough sanctions and pressures. This stance has been backed up by rapid actions. North Korea successfully test fired a solid-fuel IRBM named Pukguksong-2 on February 12 and a simultaneous test-firing of four Scud-ER missiles on March 6. In addition, the regime announced the successful combustion test of new missile engines on March 18 with the apparent aim of hinting at the advancement of its ICBM technology. Kim Jong-un placed great weight on this new rocket engine test, calling it the “March 18 Revolution.” Provocations from the North did not stop in April. Some preparatory activities for another nuclear test, perhaps the largest yet at over 20kt, were observed. Many predicted that a 6th nuclear test would take place sometime in April.   However, instead of another nuclear test or missile provocation, the North displayed strategic weapons, including a new type of ICBM, in a massive military parade to mark the 105th birthday of late Kim Il-sung. They also carried out the largest-ever live-fire drill targeting a US aircraft carrier, the Carl Vinson, and South Korea’s capital on the 85th anniversary of the founding of the KPA.   One has to reconsider the implications of the North’s actions during the ‘April Crisis.’ The North tried to send three signals to the international community during its military parade. First, North Korea intends to show its resolve to achieve victory against any threat from the outside. Pyongyang emphasized their win in the armed struggle against Japanese imperialism, the victory achieved by North Korean military units in the struggle against US forces, and marched the Ryu Kyong-su tank division, which first entered Seoul three days after the beginning of the Korea War, in the parade. Second, the North included strategic weapons in a military parade that it claims are able to target US reinforcements and the US mainland. Three new kinds of ICBMs were introduced. These included a KN-08 ICBM on a 12-wheeled TEL, which in a previous military parade was rolled out on a 16-wheeled TEL, and a new ICBM on a 16-wheeled TEL has never been revealed before. Another ICBM was displayed on a trailer, not a truck. The Pukguksong-2 IRBM and Scud-ER (extended range Scud missiles) were on a tracked TEL instead of a wheeled TEL. More importantly, the Scud-ER that appeared in this parade can be an improved Scud-ER with an attitude control system. This means that the North can target all vessels within a 1,000km range, blocking US military reinforcements. Third, the North unveiled the existence of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Special Forces for the first time during the military parade. These special forces were seen as a counter to the South Korean and US Special Forces ‘beheading’ operation that was supposedly conducted to take out the North’s leadership. To sum up, Kim Jong-un’s policy toward the US is not the brinkmanship strategy of the past that raised the cost of bargaining chips. Rather, it is a policy with ‘real coercive military capability.’ In other words, Kim is determined to show his strong resolve and willingness to respond to any attacks by engaging in an all-out war.   The second implication is that the recent increase in tensions was not caused solely by the actions of the North. The assertive stance taken by the US in responding to possible provocations from North Korea also played a role. The North emphasized its intentions to build up its military strength on the 85th founding anniversary of the KPA. Kim Jong-un called 2017 the ‘year of military training’ and asked all services, branches and special units of the military to make advanced preparations for war. This is why the North staged a large-scale firing drill on April 25. Kim Jong-un introduced the term ‘Juche Weapon’ in 2016 and vowed during his 2017 New Year’s Address to build more kinds of Juche weapons. It is possible that the idea of ‘Juche Weapons’ is closely related to the development of strategic weapons as well as the advancement of conventional weaponry. In developing nuclear weapons, missiles, 300mm multiple rocket launchers, and new rocket engines, North Korea is working to create an arsenal of miniaturized, sophisticated, light, diversified, standardized weapons using its own unmanned smart technology that is suitable for the North’s geographical location and military systems. It is unlikely that the North will halt its provocative actions for the time being. Rather, it will continue to strengthen its weapons system. As long as these efforts continue, the close cooperation and coordination between the US and China cannot be seen as having much effect.   When will the North stop accelerating nuclear and missile development? It is possible that Kim Jong-un will attempt to show off the North’s advanced nuclear and missile technologies as a significant accomplishment in the pursuit of self-reliance and self-defense as a result of one of the “speed battles” that are taking place all around the North. However, without being able to predict the point where the international community will cease to apply maximum pressure, North Korea must decide on its own how far it will go. If international pressure stops following an agreement to another moratorium on North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, the Trump administration may be criticized for giving the North additional time to continue developing nuclear and missile capabilities. If, on the other hand, this pressure is intended to push North Korea until it abolishes all nuclear weapons and mid-to-long-range ballistic missiles, it will be regarded as an unpromising goal. In the meantime, the cycle of provocation from the North Korea will likely continue.   A Silver Lining   Many have raised concerns that the possibility of armed conflict on the Korean peninsula may shortly become a reality. The Trump administration openly stated that it is willing to consider taking kinetic military action, generating a great deal of public speculation. However, it has become much harder to find good military options to deal with the DPRK since its emergence as a nuclear-armed state. The US military has long estimated that war on the Korean Peninsula would cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Then, a viable option becomes “escalation for de-escalation.” President Trump assembled a team of people with military backgrounds to review the situation, and some have raised concerns about the assertiveness of US foreign policy. The upside of this team is that military officers understand the risk of escalation better than others. In theory, expressions of strong resolve and demonstration of overwhelming military force can persuade one’s adversary not to climb up the ladder of escalation.   It should be noted that the US has not taken anything off the table so far. Even the Perry Process during Clinton Administration that sought engagement with the DPRK included a precision strike against the North as one of multiple options. Obama’s Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, also stated that all options were on the table. Dialogue is always on the table and so is a military option. The DPRK also talks about striking the US military in a similar fashion, and the end result is a situation where both sides warn each other not to move first.   The remaining question is how long the cooperation between China and the US will continue. It is not clear whether Washington's idea to outsource the problem will work. China may not go further than making adjustments to its current relations with the DPRK. Avoiding confrontation with the US is China’s interest, but pushing the DPRK to the brink of contingency is not. Considering the fact that China has agreed to items that are generally declining in China-DPRK trade already and made exceptions in order not to hurt regular economic activities in the North so far, it is likely that China will regard pushing the North into total economic and diplomatic isolation only as a last resort. The best option for China is to provide an exit so that the DPRK can escape the situation in a face-saving way.   If North Korea’s aggressiveness remains unchecked despite China’s efforts to rein in the regime, will the US respond with ‘overwhelming military force’ as it has frequently vowed to? There are at least four main points to consider before the US takes military actions against North Korea. These include the threats posed to US vital interests; domestic support, especially from Congress; the cost, and; whether or not all other options have truly been exhausted. Currently, North Korea’s neighbors are counseling against military action. A strike alone cannot neutralize all of the ballistic missiles in the North, and would invite Chinese intervention, a nightmare scenario for the US. It is too early to say that all options are exhausted because the US government will lean on China for a while. The worst scenario for South Korea is that the DPRK continues buying time to advance its nuclear and missile technology. In order to avoid this, the next South Korean government must design a detailed road map for denuclearization to take the initiative in dealing with the issues that directly affect South Korea’s national interests. Considerations should include ensuring denuclearization as the ultimate goal of any negotiation, deciding on a sequence of actions, particularly regarding where talks on peace arrangement should take place during the denuclearization verification process, and building a mechanism to prevent defection from talks in order not to lose momentum. ■           Authors Ho-ryung Lee is a Research Fellow, chief of North Korean Military Studies at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, specializing in two-Korean relations, North Korea military and Northeast Asian security. She studied International Relations and received a Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science & International Relations at Korea University in 2001.   Jina Kim is an Associate Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, specializing in U.S.-North Korea relations, nuclear nonproliferation, and Northeast Asian security. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and teaches “Humanitarian Intervention: Theory and Practice” at Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies.    

Editor’s Note    South Korea’s presidential election is just around the corner. On May 9, 2017, the official election day, South Korean public will vote for their next president after having ousted the former President Park Geun-hye. Tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula are rising: North Korea’s continued nuclear and missile programs, THAAD deployment and China’s retaliation, icy relations with Japan that needs to be amended, and unpredictability of the U.S. administration, just to name a few. When the newly elected president steps into office on May 10, he or she will face unprecedented challenges without the usual transition period and security issues will be on the top priority. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the campaign promises and positions of five major presidential candidates in order to understand policy directions which the new government may adopt. In doing so, this paper aims to shed light on policy options the new government may take by looking at the presidential candidates’ campaign promises in order to address the current insecurity surrounding the region and reassert South Korea’s position.           TODAY, SOUTH KOREA IS FACING A NEW SECURITY GAME OF serious tensions on the peninsula and in the surrounding region. North Korea continues its plan of nuclearization and missile development, threatening South Korea, its allies, and the security of the greater international community. The new U.S. administration has declared Obama’s strategy of “strategic patience” a failure, and has apparently embarked upon a new path of “impatient” action towards North Korea. After the U.S.-China summit at Mar-a-Lago resort, China shifted its position and agreed to apply more coercive sanctions and pressure to North Korea. China warns that North Korea must not worsen the situation by continuing nuclear tests and engaging in threatening behaviors. Telephone calls between Trump and Xi, urgent meetings among the foreign ministers of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, media spats between China and North Korea, U.S. naval deployment, and other activities surrounding the peninsula depict a serious situation indeed.   Even as Northeast Asian politics are rocked by insecurity, South Korea’s diplomatic role remains limited and without true presidential leadership following the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye. Election campaigns for the presidency are underway as South Korea prepares to elect a new president on May 9, 2017. The new president will be confronted by this challenging situation immediately upon stepping into the role, with security at the top of the new administration’s to-do list. Thus, we must analyze the campaign promises and positions of each candidate in order to understand the potential policy alternatives that a new government may adopt. This is not intended to evaluate the policy agendas put forth by each candidate. Rather, we aim to give the reader an overview of the meaningful policy ideas in the electoral campaign so that they might anticipate the diplomacy and security agenda of the next president.   Our analysis will focus primarily on the electoral promises made by the top five presidential candidates: Mr. MOON Jae-in of the Minjoo Party of Korea, Mr. HONG Jun-pyo of the Liberty Korea Party, Mr. AHN Cheol-soo of the People’s Party, Mr. YOO Seong-min of the Bareun Party, and Ms. SIM Sang-jung of the Justice Party. We include the official documents provided by each of the candidates and their parties online. We also referred to each candidate’s book publications, televised presidential debates, newspaper interviews, and addresses made thus far during the campaign period. By examining these materials, we have worked to piece together the diplomacy and security agendas and policy options that a new government under each candidate might entertain.   North Korea’s Nuclear Threat and Korean Unification   South Korea has been unable to make progress on either national unification or the North Korea issue over the last decade. Any attempts at doing so have been thwarted as North Korea continued its nuclear development program and threatened South Korea with missile tests. In response, the South Korean government shut down most channels of dialogue and exchange with the North through the 5.24 Measures in 2010. Following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and long-range rocket launch, Seoul decided to shutter the Kaesong Industrial Complex in February 2016, which had been a symbol of reconciliation and exchange between the two Koreas. For a decade now, inter-Korean relations have remained frozen with no exit. Despite strengthened sanctions, North Korea continues to refuse to give up its nuclear program.   The nuclear issue is quite critical to South Korea’s security. As long as North Korea maintains its nuclear and missile programs, the South Korean government is not able to continue engaging in economic assistance and exchanges with the North. Denuclearization has become Seoul’s precondition to restoring dialogue and exchanges with Pyeongyang. Stuck at this impasse, each Korea has gone its own direction; North Korea forges ahead with its nuclear program with total disregard to international criticism, while South Korea mobilizes any measures it can to impede North Korea’s nuclear progress. North Korea’s persistence in its nuclear development led to a fifth nuclear test in September 2016. However, Seoul was powerless to do anything besides adopt a higher degree of economic sanctions against the North as punishment. By isolating the North, the South Korean government has also narrowed its policy choices, though it wished to discourage North Korea’s asymmetric threats.   Each of the five presidential candidates has proposed policy solutions to resolve this issue. Three of the candidates favor the consideration of peaceful solutions reliant upon dialogue and negotiation. MOON, AHN, and SIM argue that South Korea must restore its diplomatic efforts to mitigate the North Korean nuclear threat by promoting dialogue and negotiation among stakeholders. These candidates propose a resumption of the six-party talks to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program, followed by Four-party Talks to establish a peace regime on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. In other words, their solution is to pursue dialogue and direct diplomacy. SIM promises to lift the 5.24 Measures to encourage exchanges and collaboration between the two Koreas.   On the opposite side, HONG and YOO stress the importance of deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear capability. HONG advocates the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons by the South in order to offset the increasing threat posed by the North. YOO also agrees there is a need for South Korea to deploy tactical nuclear weapons, arguing that the U.S. nuclear umbrella does not provide a sufficient deterrent against the North. MOON and SIM dismiss this notion, arguing that South Korea should preserve the principle of the Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It should to be noted that this is the first time this issue has been discussed during a presidential election campaign.   The candidates also emphasize the importance of deterrence by strengthening South Korea’s defensive power against the North Korean threat. They propose completing the construction of the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), Kill Chain, and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) ahead of schedule. But the biggest issue in terms of South Korea’s defenses has been the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). With the exception of SIM Sang-jung, the candidates generally appear to agree on the necessity of its deployment as a response to the increasing nuclear threat from the North. HONG and YOO argue that THAAD is essential to strengthening South Korea’s deterrence capabilities, and have even argued that the country should expand the existing THAAD further. AHN initially expressed opposition to THAAD, but later walked back on his position, stating that the progress of North Korea’s nuclear and missile technology and increasing threat require THAAD’s deterrence. MOON argues that the issue should be left to the new government, who should investigate and then decide. However, he stated during one of the televised presidential debates that THAAD may be necessary if North Korea continues in its aggressive posture towards the South. Only SIM has maintained her position against the deployment of THAAD, questioning its functionality and utility. The question of THAAD is not limited to deterrence. It is linked to other important security issues, such as the ROK-U.S. alliance, South Korea’s relationship with neighboring countries including China, Russia, and Japan, and the defense strategy of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.   As for unification, MOON, AHN, and SIM champion a peaceful process. They advocate pursuing the final unification of Korean Peninsula through trust-building between the two Koreas via economic and social exchanges, increased communications, mutual understanding, and reciprocal prosperity. MOON suggests putting together a collective effort to promote peace and security in the Northeast Asian region with neighboring countries. He stresses the need for South Korea to improve its relationship with Russia. AHN states that South Korea’s close relationships with both the U.S. and China are compatible and not zero-sum. He also argues that building good relationships with both the U.S. and China is required to promote peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. SIM advocates institutionalizing the irreversibility of the inter-Korean relationship to pursue longstanding efforts for national unification.   Renovating South Korea’s National Defense Capabilities   Except for SIM, the presidential candidates are for increasing the defense budget. MOON criticizes past administrations, pointing out that the rate of increase of the defense budget has dropped over the last ten years, and promotes increasing the defense budget to 3% of GDP. AHN also stresses the need to increase the defense budget to 3% of GDP, stating this is required to be able to incorporate advanced technology into the country’s military capabilities. YOO suggests an increase to reach 3.5% of GDP, which should be spent on strengthening defense capabilities as well as improving conditions for South Korean soldiers. HONG has not clarified his opinion on increasing the defense budget, but he has also stated that an increased portion of the national budget should be allocated to defense.   SIM, however, argues that a defense budget increase will not necessarily guarantee improved national security or powerful defense capabilities. She focuses instead on improving the quality of the South Korean military. She has suggested establishing an “Agency for Core Technology Development,” which will encourage the incorporation of advanced science and technology into defense and weapon systems. In addition, she advocates a revamp of the military to bring it in line with the values and requirements of the coming 4th industrial revolution. AHN also emphasizes the importance of advanced technology in building a capable military and defense system. He argues that the era of the 4th industrial revolution will arrive soon, revolutionizing every aspect of our lives, and that the South Korean military must undergo changes to adapt. YOO proposes building a technology-oriented defense system through the “Korean Offset Strategy,” which offsets North Korea’s physical threat with an advanced defense system.   HONG proposes an organizational reformation of the South Korean military through the creation of a fourth division called the “Marine and Special Forces Command” that integrates the Marine Corps and the Special Forces Command. He insists that national defense policy should be transformed to a more offensive orientation. AHN critically evaluates the existing imbalance of South Korea’s military forces, which boast a strong army but a relatively limited navy and air force. AHN advocates reinforcing South Korea’s air and naval force. MOON suggests shortening the period of mandatory military service from two years to 18 months. He proposes compensating for the decreased number of soldiers by enhancing the quality of troops and weapon systems. SIM proposes a two-track conscription system comprised of specialized soldiers who serve four years and ordinary soldiers who serve for six months. She stresses that a shortened service period is inevitable considering the demographic changes in South Korean society. She also raises the issue of gender equality with regards to the treatment of female soldiers.   The main theme of the election promises candidates are making about South Korea’s defense power is the incorporation of advanced technology into the military. Candidates are proposing defense policy plans that include an increased budget, organizational reform, the rooting out of corruption in defense industry and procurement, recruitment, and improved conditions for soldiers. Most of these promises are centered on the construction of a powerful military force with advanced science and technology, and are in response to the need for self-reliant defense capabilities that can counteract the North Korean nuclear threat and equalize the military strength of the two countries.   ROK-U.S. Alliance: Cost-sharing and Operational Amendments   The ROK-U.S. alliance is essential for South Korea to protect itself from the offensive threat posed by North Korea. Since the armistice agreement of the Korean War, South Korea has been dependent upon its alliance with the U.S. for security, and the presence of U.S. military support has been a strong deterrent against North Korean aggression. All of the presidential candidates acknowledge the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and argue that the alliance system should be further developed and strengthened in consideration of the changing security circumstances around the Korean Peninsula.   Recent indications that the current alliance may be subject to changes, particularly with regard to cost-sharing, came in the form of a request from the U.S when President Donald Trump requested that South Korea pay the cost of THAAD deployment. President Trump also raised the issue of alliance cost-sharing during his campaign. The recent request seems to indicate that the Trump administration is seeking to change the rules of alliance cost-sharing and is pressing its partner allies to pay more for security. Trump’s remark about THAAD gave immediate rise to debates and concerns among South Koreans regarding both security and the alliance. Alliance cost-sharing is not a new issue, and South Korea expects that the U.S. will request that South Korea shoulder more of the financial burden in the future. Nevertheless, the candidates have hesitated to bring up the issue in their campaigns. Only AHN has said that South Korea should prepare to re-negotiate the cost-sharing of the ROK-U.S. alliance. MOON has not made any clear statements regarding the issue, but he argues in his book that South Korea’s position in the alliance should be improved to establish a fair security partnership. He indirectly suggests that the term ‘fair relationship’ implies fair cost-sharing as well.   Following Trump’s remark that South Korea should pay the full cost of THAAD’s deployment, the South Korean government politely pushed back, stating that the U.S. would shoulder the cost according to the initial Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)-based agreement. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. government confirmed that the original cost-sharing agreement over THAAD would be upheld, but hinted that there may be renegotiations in the future. The cost-sharing issue, in combination with the practical pros and cons of THAAD deployment, is making the situation more complex. HONG and YOO asserted that the THAAD deployment cost should be covered by the U.S. as the two allies had previously agreed. YOO added that he had concerns regarding any further negotiation over defense cost-sharing between South Korea and the U.S. AHN said it was unlikely that the U.S. would pass the costs over to South Korea. However, he stated that he anticipates the re-negotiation of the KORUS FTA will be quite tough. MOON and SIM each took advantage of the changing situation to advocate their individual positions on THAAD. MOON took a shot at the former Park Geun-hye administration, saying that South Korea had little leverage on the issue owing to the previous government’s hasty acceptance of its deployment. SIM went further, arguing that THAAD should be withdrawn immediately.   The second ROK-U.S. alliance issue the candidates addressed was the transfer of wartime operation control (OPCON) to South Korea. MOON argues that the South Korean military is adequately prepared and that the transfer process should be completed during the next presidential administration. AHN acknowledges the need for transferring OPCON to South Korea, but he argues that South Korea should be 100% prepared before this occurs. He adds that the ROK-U.S. Combined Defense System needs to be maintained even with a transfer of control. SIM has also asserted the need to transfer OPCON to South Korea soon, and emphasizes the need to revise the SOFA in order to address the current inequality between the two allies. The two conservative candidates disagreed, arguing that South Korea needs to guarantee security support from US forces.   The ROK-U.S. alliance is regarded as the fundamental platform for deterring North Korea’s military threat and guaranteeing South Korea’s security. All candidates acknowledge this. However, SIM goes further in her vision of the future security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. She proposes the institutionalization of a regular dialogue with all of the major players in the Northeast Asian region, including South and North Korea, U.S., Japan, China, and Russia, together with collaboration for regional security.    The core function of the ROK-U.S. alliance has always been to deter North Korea from an attack. However, since the end of the Cold War, a transformation of ROK-U.S. alliance has been discussed as the new security environment places new demands on the traditional alliance system. As the concept of security evolves, the ROK-U.S. alliance is being called upon to address new and challenging issues, not only on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, but globally. MOON has proposed that the ROK-U.S. security partnership evolve beyond deterrence against North Korea to prepare for the variety of global threats we are facing today.   The ROK-U.S. alliance is a basic security mechanism that should be developed in accordance with the changing security environment. With the new U.S administration in office, it seems likely that the allies will soon discuss how to adjust the alliance appropriately. With sharp differences delineating the policy positions of each candidate, these discussions will not be easy, and it is important to understand and be prepared for the variety of scenarios that may play out.   Rekindling Relations between the ROK and China   China will undoubtedly be one of the most important factors in the policy direction of the next South Korean government’s Northeast Asian regional cooperation initiative. Amid the rising tensions fueled by an increasing sense of mutual cooperation and competition between the U.S. and China, South Korea is walking a tightrope as it balances its relationships with the two major regional players. Despite the urgency surrounding the peninsula, South Korea has been left on the sidelines as President Trump arranged calls and meetings with Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe to discuss possible responses in the event of more nuclear tests by North Korea. It is imperative that the new South Korean president reassert South Korea’s position and national interests in any type of regional dialogue among stakeholders as soon as he or she steps into office on May 10, 2017. This necessitates a clear evaluation of how South Korea should pursue its policy vis-à-vis China, and an examination of where the five major presidential candidates actually stand regarding South Korea-China relations.   During the Park Geun-hye administration, the relationship between South Korea and China was at its height. The number of summits and senior-level meetings between the two countries increased significantly as summits and senior-level meetings between North Korea and China halted. The ROK-China FTA was signed in 2014; South Korea took the initiative in bringing China and Japan to a trilateral summit in Seoul in 2015; and South Korea confirmed its intention to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015. However, owing to a series of North Korean nuclear and missile tests, as well as the decision to deploy THAAD on the Korean Peninsula and a deepening rivalry between the U.S. and China, ROK-China relations deteriorated in 2016. This has hindered the further development of the strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries.   The next South Korean government faces the difficult challenge of steering the country along a dual path of managing sensitive issues, such as the deployment of the THAAD or South China Sea territorial disputes, in a strong, stable manner, and closely cooperating on long-term issues, such as the institutionalization of the ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership. In other words, South Korea needs to expand its strategic position on political, economic, and social fronts while acting as a bridge in building a regional network or community.   All five major presidential candidates agree on the importance and urgency of rebuilding ROK-China relations. Based on the basic assumption that military-diplomatic issues should not be linked with economic issues, MOON argues that it is important to substantialize the strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries. On the political side, bilateral strategic dialogues on issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula should be implemented. MOON highlights the role of South Korea in trilateral cooperation between South Korea, China, and Japan. AHN focuses on the importance of pursuing peace diplomacy vis-à-vis the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia, and strengthening the strategic cooperative partnership between South Korea and China based on the underlying ROK-U.S. alliance. SIM emphasizes the need to address the anti-Korean sentiment prevalent in China, which will be challenging to resolve through pure diplomacy if left unaddressed. HONG, on the other hand, tends to be more critical of China. Pointing out that “Korea-China relations is a matter of living, but Korea-U.S. relations is a matter of life and death,” HONG clearly puts ROK-U.S. relations before ROK-China relations.   The most controversial issue in the ROK-China relationship is currently the deployment of THAAD. MOON strongly advocates for an open discussion of the issue with China. While acknowledging that South Korea and China do share an understanding and responsibility regarding the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and that China is in an advantageous position to wield influence over North Korea, MOON favors South Korea taking the lead in the dialogues on North Korea between the U.S. and China. On the other hand, the conservative candidates HONG and YOO view THAAD deployment as a matter of national sovereignty and argue that China should not interfere. While AHN Cheol-soo and MOON Jae-in fundamentally disagree over THAAD’s deployment, AHN’s approach toward how this issue should be handled vis-à-vis China is similar to Moon’s in that both emphasize the need to include China into the dialogue.   Another salient issue awaiting the next South Korean administration is that of China’s economic retaliation. In response to South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD to the Korean Peninsula, China has engaged in full-on economic retaliation, including a boycott of Korean companies, a decrease in the number of Chinese tourists permitted to travel to South Korea, and the cancellation of the concerts of South Korean artists. Considering that China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, one cannot help but wonder how long South Korea’s economy can endure. MOON argues that security issues like THAAD should be discussed between governments while economic issues need to be left in the hands of the private sector. Nonetheless, MOON and AHN emphasize that closer communication with China is necessary to dissuade China from economically retaliatory behaviors. While MOON sees the role of South Korea as a main player in dialogue with China, YOO argues that the U.S. needs to urge China to stop its economic retaliation against South Korea and states that the South Korean government should work toward placing this issue on the agenda of the next U.S.-China summit. HONG goes even further, having previously mentioned the possibility of pulling Korean companies from China if necessary. He has gone so far as to suggest that China shut down oil pipelines from China to North Korea as a counter-measure to pressure North Korea.   Thawing Relations between the ROK and Japan   Under the Park Geun-hye administration, South Korea’s relations with Japan can be described as “chilly” at best. Domestic politics in Japan exacerbated the problems that plagued South Korea-Japan relations during this period. Since Shinzo Abe took office, Japan has been criticized by its neighbors for its rightist and nationalistic tendencies. Despite criticisms and opposition expressed by South Korea and China, Abe visited the Yasukuni shrine and has taken an unrelenting stance on various issues ranging from the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and history textbooks to Japan’s wartime sexual exploitation of Korean women, or “comfort women.” The Park administration’s strategic interest in Japan was also rather low. Even when working with China and Japan on the North Korean problem, including nuclear and missile programs, South Korea focused on China’s role in pressuring North Korea and in turn, Japan’s space to maneuver was limited. Security cooperation between South Korea and Japan has always been linked with historical disputes, which stir negative public sentiment and nationalism in both countries.   Despite the troubles brewing in the relationship between South Korea and Japan during this time, initiatives from the U.S triggered signs of positive development. In January 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill urging the U.S. government to encourage Japan to address the comfort women issue. This was followed by then-U.S. President Obama’s initiative to bring together Park Geun-hye and Shinzo Abe after the Nuclear Security Summit at The Hague in March of 2014 for their first face-to-face talks. This opened a window of opportunity for dialogue and cooperation between the two countries through a series of summits and senior-level meetings. South Korea-Japan relations seemed to have hit a high point when the two countries signed a landmark agreement over the comfort women issue in December 2015. However, the agreement stirred up considerable controversy and debate among the Korean public and was met with strong resistance, making the South Korea-Japan comfort women agreement the most hotly debated and important issue for presidential candidates as they discuss South Korean policy towards Japan. While the previous administration did achieve certain level of success in getting a third party, namely the U.S., to support it in seeking redress over historical issues such as the comfort women, it failed to respond effectively to the changing political dynamics in Japan.   It is true that amidst the deepening rivalry and competition between the U.S. and China, instability and nuclear threats of North Korea, inauguration of Donald Trump, and South Korea’s own presidential corruption scandal, South Korea’s five major presidential candidates have not focused much on promulgating policy regarding Japan. However, once a new president is elected, he or she will need to shape this policy. Regardless of who wins the presidential election in South Korea, any South Korean leader shares an understanding that South Korea, one way or another, needs to work with Japan, ‘quasi-ally’ that shares democratic principles and values with South Korea, toward the common goal of mid- to long-term co-prosperity and development. Past administrations were not able to successfully delink political or diplomatic issues from historical ones, thereby making it harder for the two countries to go forward in pursuit of this goal. The next South Korean administration will need to work on building mutual trust between South Korea and Japan by de-linking historical and political issues. Because of the indelible memories of the history between South Korea and Japan and accompanying strong public sentiment, South Korea must be careful in evaluating whether an issue is for South Korea’s benefit or the country’s historical justification.   As mentioned above, policy towards Japan has not received much of a spotlight in the South Korean election campaigns. However, we will briefly examine two important issues relevant to ROK-Japan relations; the comfort women agreement and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).   All of the presidential candidates agree that the comfort women agreement signed in December 2015 was dishonorable and should be re-negotiated. MOON, however, emphasizes that South Korea needs to enhance its relationship with Japan to achieve a mature, cooperative partnership. SIM argues that future relations between South Korea and Japan should be based on the receipt of an honest apology from Japan and an acknowledgement of its past history. HONG strongly emphasizes that South Korea should not pay much attention to how Japan responds to its actions. YOO suggests delinking the issues; South Korea should work with Japan on further implementing a currency swap or the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), agree to disagree on history issues and territorial disputes, and strongly push for a re-negotiation of the comfort women agreement. AHN also highlights that the agreement in December 2015 is a result of lack of communication and does not reflect the wishes of the victims themselves.   Candidates are divided on GSOMIA. Two of the more liberal candidates, MOON and SIM, are more skeptical of the GSOMIA. While MOON argues that there should be a more comprehensive evaluation and scrutiny of its effectiveness in terms of South Korean national interests, SIM points to a lack of consensus in the National Assembly. On the other hand, HONG, AHN, and YOO agree that the GSOMIA can be useful in receiving essential military information on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. HONG emphasizes that the GSOMIA will benefit both countries, especially in strengthening security cooperation between South Korea and Japan in response to North Korea’s nuclear threats.   Conclusion   Regardless of who wins the presidential election on May 9, 2017, South Korea’s next president will face unprecedented challenges when he or she steps into office on May 10. Not only will the president have to pick up on what has been left hanging by the previous administration, he or she will have to lay out policy agendas without the usual transition period. Security dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula are changing rapidly. This makes it even more important for the presidential candidates to clearly put forth their foreign policy and security agendas early on.   In this paper, five important foreign policy and security agendas were addressed: unification and North Korea, national defense, the ROK-U.S. alliance, ROK-China relations, and ROK-Japan relations. One important item, which is missing in many of the campaign promises of the presidential candidates, is a specific roadmap for regional policy. It is noteworthy that MOON Jae-in envisions a Northeast Asian Responsible Community, in which South Korea will take initiative in promoting the common good and prosperity of the Northeast Asian region. Trilateral cooperation among South Korea, China, and Japan will be enhanced, and multilateral security cooperation will be strengthened through the reestablishment of the six-party talks. This concept of a Northeast Asian Responsible Community will couple multilateral security cooperation with an economic community. Considering that this is not the first time that the idea of creating a regional community has been suggested, it will be interesting to see how MOON’s Northeast Asian Responsible Community will be different.   While the five major South Korean presidential candidates align on certain issues, they remain distinct in their advocacy of differing approaches to many key challenges facing the country. Because of the unusual circumstances, namely the presidential corruption scandal, in which the early presidential election is taking place this year, Korean public is seeking democratic and just governance, consensus, and the elimination of deep-rooted corruption. It remains to be seen how the next South Korean president will try to bring together an ideologically divided public, but now is the time for governance that promotes consensus while acknowledging and embracing differences. ■          Authors  Young Hwan Shin is Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Research Planning Department at the East Asia Institute.   HyeeJung Suh is Senior Research Fellow and Associate Director of the Research Planning Department at the East Asia Institute   Acknowledgement. The authors appreciate Professor Chaesung Chun of Seoul National University for helpful comments.        

Editor’s Note  Under U.S. President Barack Obama’s initiative, the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was launched in Washington, D.C. in 2010 to bring high-level attention to the global threat posed mainly by nuclear terrorism in the extended context of the “war on terror.” To halt further nuclear proliferation, there was an urgent need to cultivate global norms on nuclear security to ensure that unauthorized actors are denied access to nuclear materials, in addition to building international capacity to act against any illicit attempts to access nuclear materials in the most appropriate manner. In this paper, EJR Cho evaluates the four Summits, particularly the fourth and final summit held in 2016 in Washington, D.C. The results of the 2016 NSS were mixed. The most significant achievement of the 2016 NSS was raising collective efforts to ensure Iranian compliance with the recently-concluded nuclear deal. However, Cho highlights the following shortcomings: no meaningful outcome regarding the North Korean nuclear problems was reached and it failed to introduce a system to maintain labels on radiological sources in accordance with the current international framework. Cho concludes by suggesting a future challenge which is sustaining the influence of the NSS and proposes the idea of it being regularized within the framework of the UN.          Introduction   At the urging of U.S. President Barack Obama in his speech on a "nuclear-free world" in Prague in 2009, the Nuclear Security Summit ("the Summit") was launched in Washington, D.C. in 2010 to bring high-level attention to the global threat posed mainly by “nuclear terrorism” in the extended context of the "war on terror," the anti-terrorism policy of the U.S. since 9/11. Such fears were not entirely groundless. For example, it is known that in 1998, when Russia was suffering a deep economic crisis, 18.5 kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium ("HEU") was stolen from Russia's largest nuclear weapons facility. More re-cently, in 2007, two groups of armed men attempted to attack South Africa's Pelindaba Nuclear Research Centre in Pretoria where weapons-grade material for 25 nuclear bombs was stored. Of ongoing concern is intelligence indicating that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda may have obtained a limited amount of nuclear material in the late 2000s; if true, this could pose a significant threat to the entire international commu-nity as well as the U.S. To halt further nuclear prolif-eration, there was an urgent need to cultivate global norms on nuclear security to ensure that unauthorized actors are denied access to nuclear materials, in addi-tion to building international capacity to act against any illicit attempts to access nuclear materials in the most appropriate and timely manner. By sharing common security concerns, the U.S. government and like-minded allies have sought to lay the groundwork for bringing countries up to a higher standard of nu-clear security through summits in Seoul (2012), The Hague (2014), and Washington, D.C. (2016).   Key Agendas at Previous Meetings (2010-2014)   Washington D.C. (April 12-13, 2010)   The first Summit in 2010 was held to discuss more effective ways of fighting nuclear terrorism, against the background of increasing propagation of serious warnings, such as that “the theft of only 0.01% of the world [HEU] stockpile could cause a global catastro-phe.” In fact, with weapons-usable nuclear materials stored in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries under varying security situations, the risk of terrorist groups acquiring bomb-making materials increases.   Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, there have been several reports of the theft of some essential ele-ments in nuclear bomb-making. What is most con-cerning is that while roughly 200 cases of improperly secured nuclear materials are investigated by the In-ternational Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") annually, in reality, no vigorous responses have been made in the international community prior to the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. o prevent nu-clear materials from falling into the hands of unau-thorized actors, the Summit called for the political commitment of the participating 47 states to imple-ment the pledges in the Washington Communiqué on a voluntary basis. These included, for example:     • Ratifying and implementing treaties on nu-clear security and nuclear terrorism;   • Cooperating through the UN to implement and assist each other in connection with Se-curity Council Resolutions;   • Working with the IAEA to update and im-plement security guidance and carry out ad-visory services;   • Reviewing national regulatory and legal re-quirements related to nuclear security and nuclear trafficking;   • Converting HEU used by civilian facilities to non-weapons-usable materials;   • Research on new nuclear fuels, detection methods, and forensics techniques;   • Development of corporate and institutional cultures that prioritize nuclear security;   • Education and training to ensure that coun-tries and facilities have the people they need to protect their materials; and   • Joint exercises among law enforcement and customs officials to enhance nuclear detec-tion approaches.  Seoul (March 26-27, 2012)   During the Seoul Summit—"the largest gathering of world leaders since the creation of the UN in 1945"—despite ongoing nuclear threats posed by the world's two biggest nuclear concerns, North Korea and Iran, neither of them was actually on the official agenda at the summit and neither country was invited to attend. Before the summit, North Korea threatened that if its "nuclear issue is placed on the agenda at the Seoul summit," it would consider this a "provocation" of war. Ultimately, therefore, the success of the Seoul Communiqué relied on Russia and China's commit-ments to the two rogue states in private talks.   Despite these limitations, some progress was made at the summit. It was announced that the participating states would commit themselves to minimizing stockpiles of HEU and plutonium, enhancing nuclear safeguard systems, and preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear-weapon-usable material. Specifically, from 2010 to 2012, the U.S. and Russia have converted a large volume of HEU, sufficient to build 3,000 nuclear warheads, to low enriched uranium ("LEU"), and they agreed in Seoul to reduce a further 68 tons of plu-tonium. Moreover, eight other participant countries have successfully discarded 480kg of HEU, which could build 18 nuclear warheads. In particular, Mexico and Ukraine have eliminated all their weapons-usable material.   In addition, the nuclear industry's safety and se-curity issues were emphasized with the highest gravity in a meeting held a year after the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster in 2011, which is one of the world’s worst nuclear accidents. The nuclear plant melt-down in Fukushima was a serious alert for neighboring countries to Japan, such as South Korea and China, where the nuclear energy industries are still fast-growing, contrary to those in European countries and the U.S. To restore faith in civil nuclear energy, the IAEA released its report reviewing Japan’s revised nu-clear safety assessment processes shortly after the summit in Seoul.   In the Seoul Communiqué, overall, nuclear secu-rity was defined more broadly and comprehensively than in the first summit in Washington, D.C., and consensus was reached on 11 action areas, particularly in terms of materials, governance, smuggling, and cul-ture. In fact, one of the biggest achievements of the Seoul Communiqué was to introduce one common platform for dealing with a variety of contemporary nuclear issues, having been separately dealt under di-vided sub-fields of nuclear governance such as nuclear security, safety, and safeguards (the so called 3 S’s). Nevertheless, at the same time, criticism arose suggest-ing that the summit failed to set an official agenda on the imminent threats posed by rogue states' attempts to develop nuclear weapons; the joint statement remains vague in terms of measurable targets and the only tangible achievement was the inclusion of more extensive nuclear safety procedures after the Fukushima crisis.   The Hague (March 24-25, 2014)   The third Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague was overshadowed by events in the Crimea and the absence of the Russian President, who was supposed to be a central player in international efforts to secure fissile material and combat the threat of nuclear terrorism alongside the U.S. and China. In addition, the international audience was confused by news released immediately before the summit about the U.S. budget cut on non-proliferation programs for the following year, which was widely perceived as the U.S. declaring, "we are in retreat." President Obama requested $114 million less than anticipated for the international ma-terial protection program, aiming to secure and elimi-nate "vulnerable" nuclear weapons and materials, and $108 million less for the global threat reduction initia-tive, bringing total cuts to existing nuclear security programs to $222 million. More significantly, this may have caused problems to diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Russia because, while both na-tions had agreed to each dispose of 34 tons of pluto-nium and to store it at the mixed oxide fuel (MOX) fabrication facility in South Carolina, U.S., this plan would be hampered by the U.S.'s budget cut.   Despite some clear limitations, some progress was reported at the summit. Japan announced that it would release more than 300kg of "highly-bomb-ready" plutonium and 200kg of HEU— allegedly capable of producing 40 and 50 nuclear warheads—to the U.S. for dilution and disposal. Japan's stock of weapons-grade material has been a source of conflict with the two Koreas and China, particularly after right-wing Japanese politicians suggested that it may have value as a deterrent, even though the country unilaterally prohibited developing its own nuclear weapons in 1967. The agreement with Japan was hailed by U.S. officials as the greatest success to date of President Obama's Prague initiative. Likewise, Belgium and Italy agreed to remove surplus fissile material as part of a continuing Washington-led effort to reduce global stockpiles and the number of sites around the world where it is stored.   Washington D.C. (March 31-April 1, 2016)   With suspicion mounting that the terrorist network that hit Paris (November 2015) and Brussels (March 22, 2016) may have been in the planning stages of another terrorist operation, this time targeting a Belgian nuclear facility, the Washington 2016 Communiqué returned focus to issues of nuclear terrorism "more akin to the Washington 2010 Communiqué than the communiqués for the past two summits." Accord-ingly, Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel high-lighted real nuclear terrorist dangers and urged that real steps be taken to improve nuclear security. Re-portedly, since 2014 a number of suspicious and alarming activities have been detected at the nuclear sites in Belgium, resulting in an estimated $100-$200 million in damage. To reflect this development, is-sues of nuclear smuggling and cyber security were discussed in the joint statements (so called "gift bas-kets"). Calls for more vigorous efforts to combat nuclear terrorism in more realistic terms, particularly the issues of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran and among some terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State (IS)—potentially supplied by North Korea—dominated the two day summit.   While almost the entire first day of the summit was dedicated to nuclear threats posed by North Korea, no meaningful outcome was reached from trilateral meetings between the leaders of three nations—South Korea, the U.S., and Japan—as well as bilateral meet-ings between the U.S. and China. In contrast to the North Korean case, however, the summit succeeded in drawing a blue print of how to raise collective efforts to ensure Iranian compliance with the recently-concluded nuclear deal and to stop the spread of nu-clear weapons to some malign groups who have tar-geted urban areas across the globe: that meeting was held by the leaders of the P5+1 (the U.S., the UK, France, China, and Russia (absent) + Germany) and the IAEA. In fact, the summits have built a solid track record of progress on the Iranian case. In 2009, Iran was the most concerning country in terms of contin-ued efforts to develop nuclear weapons, just as North Korea is now. However, under the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) made in July 2015, Iran is supposed to reduce its number of centrifuges from almost 20,000 to 5,060 at the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz, Iran within 10 years and its uranium stockpile by 98% to 300kg in 15 years, keeping its level of enrichment at 3.67%. As part of its efforts towards these targets, by January 2016, Iran had shipped tons of LEU at Natanz and Fordo to Russia. In addition, Iran has agreed to convert the heavy-water nuclear reactor near Arak, the spent fuel of which contains plutonium suitable for building nuclear bombs. To prevent Iran from covertly building any illicit nuclear programs, inspectors from the IAEA will be able to access any site they deem suspicious in Iran according to the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement that Iran signed on December 18, 2003. Thus far, the Iranian case can be considered the biggest achievement of the Summit over the past six years and also a model process for the international non-proliferation mission that has successfully brought a problem country back into the international community through peaceful means, unlike the Iraqi and Libyan cases. To a certain level, obviously know-how that the international community has accumulated in dealing with Iran would be able to provide some useful ideas in tackling increasing nuclear threats posed by North Korea.   Conclusion: Prospects and Limitations   Since the first Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, the agenda and efforts have expanded in order to sustain international interest in nuclear security in a broader term: indeed, such expansion was crucial for further progress. Particularly, faced by the evolving contem-porary security challenges of the new millennium, there was an urgent call for the introduction of en-hanced security frameworks. In response, the Summit has succeeded over the past few years in raising na-tional awareness of nuclear security at the highest level, leading governments to introduce necessary measures to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. To date, within the framework of the existing interna-tional agreements, it has:     • provided a useful platform for ensuring that nuclear material is more secure by integrat-ing sub-fields of nuclear governance such as nuclear security, safety and safeguards;     • enabled nations to draw upon each other’s expertise regarding how they are handling their material; and     • successfully facilitated and coordinated ca-pacity-building and international coopera-tion among participating countries, to pre-vent the world's most dangerous material from falling into the wrong hands.   In the wide spectrum of civilian and military programs, the Summit has enabled participating countries to enhance the security and safety measures that are in place to ensure that countries are handling nuclear materials more responsibly.   To be realistic, however, its fruits are not mature enough to harvest yet; accordingly, its future remains uncertain. First, while the boundary of agendas has been successfully pushed out throughout the four Summits, actually the attention was not paid evenly among the three important agendas of nuclear security, safety and safeguards: despite the significance, issues of nuclear safeguards were sidelined, rather than included in conjunction with the other aspects, in the discussions. From this, the original idea about en-hancing nuclear security more comprehensively by bringing in a variety of nuclear issues was significantly undermined at the end. Moreover, despite the tre-mendous efforts, the visions could not grow out to be institutionalized, either. For example, even after years of discussions at the highest-level, the Summit has failed to date to introduce a system to maintain labels on radiological sources in accordance with the current international framework so that they can to be tracked down to the end of the fuel cycle. Second, the interna-tional security environment is too unsettled to firmly predict possible threats and prepare appropriate pre-emptive actions due to new (or newly perceived) secu-rity challenges, such as natural disasters, cyber terror-ism, bioterrorism, and threats posed by unidentified local militias in association with some religious ex-tremists.   Regardless of the obstacles ahead for the Summit, it is obviously time to discuss how to grow this asset. Particularly when the fifth nuclear test of North Korea is forecasted to follow shortly after the fourth one in January 2016, demands for organizing international and regional efforts is higher than ever. In so doing, it is essential to sustain the influence of the Nuclear Se-curity Summit afterwards. One of viable options would be to regularize it within the framework of the UN (more specifically, the Non-Proliferation Treaty), thereby using it as a useful vehicle to share insight and achievements of the summits with the rest of the world. To be successful, future high-level dialogues should include specific requirements in international conventions, the adoption of a more rigorous form of universal nuclear security/safety standards, and the introduction of some room for regional autonomy that can allow regional actors to bring in their own issues and share their valuable experiences with the international community. ▒      Authors EJR Cho is a research associate in the project on “Complex Organization Principles and Regional Orders in East Asia: The Development of Theory and Policy” (The Social Science Korea Project funded by The National Research Foundation of Korea) at the Center for International Studies (CIS), Seoul National University. For more information, please visit the website of the project: http://www.eastasiair.com/.    

Editor’s Note The world was able to send North Korea a strong message in the wake of its fourth nuclear test in the form of the unanimously passed United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270. Yet a list of sanctions has proven ineffective in stopping North Korea from continuing its nuclear weapon development program. Thus agreeing on the language of the resolution cannot be the end of international cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, and attention must be given to the enforcement of the new stricter sanctions and negotiating a peaceful resolution for the Korean Peninsula if the cycle of nuclear tests followed by sanctions is to be broken. To accomplish this, South Korea will need to strategically employ its middle power diplomacy initiatives in an effort to encourage countries from all over the world to support and participate in the sanctions and emphasize common interests among the various stakeholders in Northeast Asia in order to construct a permanent peace on the Peninsula.             TENSION HAS BEEN GROWING ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA after the fourth nuclear test by North Korea, followed by UNSC Resolution 2270 and by countermeasures by individual nations against North Korea. The two opposing parties, South Korea and international soci-ety on the one hand and North Korea on the other, are volleying reciprocal hostile actions and words back and forth. This string of events is nothing new to those who follow events on the Korean Peninsula and most will recognize this back and forth as indicative of a much broad and “vicious” cycle — North Korean nuclear tests, the resultant sanctions by the United Nations, and negotiations to alleviate the tension — that has thus far continued relatively unabated for over a decade.   South Korea’s role in addressing the nuclear issue of North Korea has been limited, even though it is the core stakeholder most acutely affected by North Korea’s continuing provocations. South Korea needs to contribute to ending the long standing insecurity not only for itself but for all concerned states including North Korea. To do so, first it is necessary to understand why the UN’s previous resolutions and sanctions have failed to achieve their goal — denuclearization of North Korea or at a minimum slowing down its nuclear development — and what should be done in order to make the sanctions regime effective.   First Divide: Collective Efforts of the UN   The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolu-tion 2270 represents one of the strongest responses by the international community to North Korea's contin-ued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic mis-siles. Compared to past resolutions, the proscriptions are more detailed and wide-ranging, and it may well be the strongest sanctions imposed by the council in 20 years. The fact that the new resolution was co-sponsored by a record number of more than 50 coun-tries is definitely an encouraging sign as well. In order to achieve the stated goal of denuclearizing North Korea, however, political pressure must be backed up by the ability to change Pyongyang’s calculus. Keeping in mind past failures to break the vicious cycle mentioned above, the first step is to demonstrate that sanctions regime hinges not on the language of the resolution but the ability to effectively implement each line of it.   Despite the fact that the world has come together in condemnation of North Korea's nuclear tests to pass numerous UNSC resolutions, Pyongyang has contin-ued developing its nuclear and ballistic missile pro-grams. This leads one to conclude that implementa-tion of the sanctions has not been efficient enough to prevent North Korean circumvention. Indeed, the number of countries that submitted their respective implementation reports to the UNSC, as called upon by past resolutions regarding North Korea, remains stagnant at about 50 percent to date (see Table 1). In terms of region, about 98 percent of European coun-tries submitted their implementation reports while only about 11 percent of African countries did so. About 40 to 50 percent of countries in Asia, the Amer-icas, and the Middle East submitted their implementa-tion reports to the UNSC (see Table 2). Of course, submitting these reports alone does not mean sanc-tions are going to be effectively implemented. But we must realize that, in theory, 50 percent of countries pledging to implement UNSC measures could also mean that North Korea can still reach out to at least the other 50 percent of countries in the world, which is an easy environment for its circumvention technique. This suggests there is more to be done if the newest sanctions against North Korea are going to be effective.   Table 1. Implementation Report Submission by UN Member States   Resolutions Count (% of total) Resolution 1718 (2006) 78 (40.6%) Resolution 1874 (2009) 57 (29.7%) Resolution 2094 (2013) 29 (15.1%) Number of member states that submitted a report at least once 101 (52.6%) *As of March, 2016     Table 2. Implementation Report Submission by Region Region Submitted Did not Submit Rate (%) Asia 17 19 47.2 America 15 20 42.9 Europe 53 1 98.1 Middle East Asia 10 10 50.0 Africa 5 41 10.9 Total 101 91 52.6   *As of March, 2016   Implementing the new UNSC resolution for sanc-tioning North Korea requires countries to pay their own costs. While most countries would agree on the gravity of the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, some countries might feel that it is against their best interest to put too much effort into implementing the sanctions while others may simply lack the resources to do so. The latest sanc-tions introduced by the Resolution 2270 are both de-manding as well as dependent on the implementing country’s discretion. Realizing that there is a limit to what the UN body can do in terms of enforcement, that responsibility would ultimately fall under the collective willingness of the international community. In that sense, countries need to be more open for greater col-laboration when it comes to sanctions implementation   There is another reason why we should count on member states’ good will to collaborate against a nuclear threat. Each phrase in the resolution requires interpretation when applied in the real world. How are “luxury” goods defined? Or how are energy resources associated with nuclear development and civilian use categorized? Rules and legal statements cannot perfectly capture all real world possibilities. Therefore, we need to interpret them in the light of the law’s basic aim. However, on the international level, the interpretation is more autonomous, and often dependent upon individual state’s national interests. This makes it even more difficult to implement international regulations according to their original spirit. Therefore, creating a shared vision and will among member states who signed the resolution is crucial and demands collaboration.   Then how can we achieve such collaboration? The most obvious step countries need to take is fulfilling the UNSC requirements, which include submitting the implementation report pursuant to Resolution 2270. Likewise, the Panel of Experts under the UN's North Korea sanctions committee should be able to release more information to the public on what it has found in terms of member states’ violations of the sanctions. In doing so, more interested countries should be able to encourage others to cooperate while offering technical and other forms of assistance should such assistance be necessary. Raising the audience cost of sub-par implementation through increased moni-toring is another important approach to keep the in-ternational community in line. In this regard, leading countries with special interest in WMD and nonpro-liferation should take the initiative to persuade and encourage member states’ participation in the sanction regime, thus overcoming limitations of the UN’s multilateral system. If this can be achieved through delicately organizing a sanction network, the resolu-tion should apply increased pressure on Pyongyang forcing recalculation of its gains and losses obtained through development of nuclear weapons.   Second Divide: Regional Key Actors’ Changing Positions   The sanctions outlined in Resolution 2270 have the strong support of all the key stakeholders in the North Korea denuclearization talks and all agree that the goal of the sanctions is to bring about North Korean com-pliance with international law. The leading role of the key stakeholders is essential not only in effective im-plementation of the international sanctions, but also in bringing peace to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula by breaking out of the vicious cycle. And denuclearization and a permanent peace treaty are the two main issues which key stakeholders must negotiate. While a consensus to realize denuclearization first and then negotiate a peace treaty previously existed, the posi-tions of some states has become more fluid as of late causing concern over the order of which these two important steps should be taken.   The default position of the U.S. and China enter-ing 2016 can be roughly described as adhering to the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks which pre-scribed that peace treaty negotiations would be held in a forum outside of the Six-Party Talks, essentially meaning that denuclearization would take place first followed by a peace treaty. This is reflected in a statement made by a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry on March 6, 2013 following North Korea’s third nuclear test, “a peace mechanism should replace the armistice mechanism on the Peninsula in the long run.” This statement is not far from the lan-guage used by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry during a joint press conference with the Chinese Foreign Minister on February 23, 2016: “[North Korea] can actually ultimately have a peace agreement with the United States of America that resolves the unresolved issues of the Korean Peninsula, if it will come to the table and negotiate denuclearization.   However, the Chinese position on the order of denuclearization and peace talks has shifted over the previous months. The Chinese government is no longer repeating the constant rhetoric of calling for a return to the Six-Party Talks after the February 23rd joint press conference during which Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for “parallel tracks” for achieving denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and a permanent peace treaty. Since then the Chinese government has begun calling for any talks amongst interested parties, likely given the fact that the 2005 Joint Agreement does not reflect their new position. This position of “parallel tracks” was reiterated during talks between Wang and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on March 2, 2016. Wang stressed the parallel approach to achieve denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, and Lavrov responded by saying Russia would continue to coordinate closely with Beijing.   China’s new position may be based on its concern that North Korea may withdraw the nuclear issue from the negotiation table. In 2005, North Korea was willing to exchange nuclear development for security and economic assistance. But, in 2012 it declared its nuclear power status publicly in its constitution, and most recently disclosed pictures and a blueprint of its military plan and miniaturized nuclear warhead. North Korea has remained consistent in its desire to be recognized as a nuclear power. Even though Kim Jong Un showed some desire for a peace treaty in the New Year Address, he also ordered the fourth nuclear test shortly thereafter. Unfortunately, North Korea seems to be separating denuclearization from peace treaty negotiations, and declared its intention to remain a nuclear power.   The U.S. on the other hand continues to officially adhere to the position that it supports the 2005 Joint Statement and insists that the focus is denuclearization with no other subjects being discussed without addressing denuclearization. However, the order of denuclearization and a peace treaty is ambiguous as a report by the Wall Street Journal on February 21, 2016, suggests that when the U.S. was approached by Pyongyang at the end of 2015 regarding peace treaty discussions, the U.S. was willing to take up denucleari-zation talks in conjunction with discussions on a peace treaty, a counteroffer which North Korea rejected. Also, U.S. State Department has not officially ruled out the possibility of its considering a “parallel process.” Yet this wavering may have ceased as at a recent press conference in Seoul on March 11, 2016, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Mark Lippert emphasized that North Korea denuclearization is the U.S. govern-ment’s first priority.   South Korea holds a similar position to the U.S. but has been showing little desire to budge following the most recent nuclear test. An ROK Foreign Ministry spokesperson recently stated that denuclearization is the top priority and that “This is not the time for international society to be discussing means for the resumption of detailed talks with North Korea. Rather an extensive consensus on strengthening pressure on North Korea is forming.” Considering its geograph-ical and strategic position, South Korea has consistent-ly emphasized the priority of denuclearizing North Korea, and it has been notably unenthusiastic about the possibility of a peace treaty between the U.S. and North Korea. Following the UNSC resolution, the South Korean government manifested additional co-ercive measures against the North and held a bilateral dialogue with high level officials from U.S. in order to ensure the effectiveness of the sanctions.   As shown above, South Korea believes that the aim of sanctions is to exert intense pressure on North Korea so that it has no choice but to change its behavior. So while the South Korean government recognizes the importance of international cooperation, especially collaboration with neighboring countries: Japan, China, and Russia, its insistence on creating extreme levels of pressure without considering dialogue with the North has caused a setback in Sino-South Korea relations. If these various positions on the order of peace negotiations and denuclearization cannot be organized into a single voice toward North Korea, it is extremely likely that not only will North Korea use these differences to play one party off against another, but that the implementation of the sanctions will suffer due to a lack of coordination.   Bridging the Divide: South Korea’s Role as a Middle Power   Repetitious crises and limited alleviation has resulted in ever increasing tension on the Korean Peninsula. In order to break out of this vicious cycle, South Korea’s intermediary role is important both in implementing sanctions and in diplomatic negotiations for denucle-arization and a peace settlement on the Peninsula. The South Korean government previously declared its in-tention to act as a middle power in order to contribute to promoting international peace and security both in traditional and emerging areas. One of the core roles of a middle power is to serve as a bridge among big powers and small powers to coordinate different interests and seek common goals. In order to thaw the current icy situation on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea should stick to its middle power diplo-macy initiative in multilateral forums, the UN, and in the mini-lateral table in Northeast Asia.   The UNSC resolution requires that all member states collaborate on implementing the sanctions against North Korea. Considering that member states’ cooperative and active participation in effectively im-plementing the sanctions, diplomatic effort to lead collaboration is required. Therefore, South Korea should demonstrate its active role as a middle power by persuading and encouraging member states to co-operate. South Korea’s diplomacy has been heavily focused on neighboring powers and relatively limited on the multilateral stage. Encouraging all member states to implement the new resolution accordingly should be a core goal of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the UN.   Sanctions themselves are not a goal, and they should be regarded as a means to lead the “target” to change its behavior. Penalizing North Korean behavior is necessary; but new measures for the next step, the negotiation stage, should be simultaneously considered if the cycle is to be broken. South Korea should recognize that positions of big powers, especially the U.S. and China, around the Korean Peninsula are shifting and growing apart from one another, especially related to the ordering of denuclearization and a permanent peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula. Here, the bridging role of a middle power will be necessary. If the U.S. and China disagree over the North Korea nuclear issue and if they cannot compromise, the future of Korean Peninsula will be even darker. South Korea does not want its peninsula to be an arena of competition among big powers. Preventing the neighboring big powers’ interests from diverging and coming into conflict can be accomplished if South Korea remembers one of the core functions of middle power diplomacy and exerts effort to keep the U.S. and China on the same page.   South Korea needs to remember that bridging does not simply mean connecting, but also suggesting new diplomatic alternatives which each actor may accept. Up till now, denuclearization has been sought in exchange for economic assistance including in-vestment, industrial complexes, infrastructure, energy, etc. It should be understood that the pay-off matrix of denuclearization and economic assistance has not suc-ceeded in bringing about the desired outcome. There-fore, a new package of pay-offs needs to be designed which requires creative prudence, an essential virtue for a middle power.   Finally, from previous experience, it is reasonable to expect that North Korea will approach some of the neighboring countries for talks after the news of the sanctions has become stale. During these dialogues South Korea is usually ignored. For example, Pyong-yang took advantage of the “abduction issue” to begin normalization negotiations with Japan, and it invited basketball player Dennis Rodman when it tried to sound out the possibility of talking with the U.S. Both cases were initiated by North Korea, and neither was helpful for improving the security situation on the Korea Peninsula. Even the leading powers can be at-tracted to make use of North Korea for their own politi-cal interest. It is evident that bilateral approaches do little to weaken North Korea’s strategic position and in fact actually strengthen it leading to the continued nu-clear insecurity in the region. Therefore, South Korea’s role in coordinating among interested parties is essen-tial to build a new path toward peace. ■         Authors Benjamin A. Engel is a Research Fellow in the Peace and Security Research Unit of the East Asia Institute. Jaesung Ryu is a Research Fellow in the Peace and Security Research Unit of the East Asia Institute. Young-Hwan Shin is a Senior Research Fellow and the Chief of the Peace and Security Research Unit of the East Asia Institute.     * The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

North Korea and Southeast Asia loomed large in U.S.-China relations in February 2016. Constructing a new sanctions regime which was acceptable to both countries required a couple rounds of diplomacy this month during which other issues consistently popped up creating new tensions or reigniting some that had gone dormant. A historic U.S.-ASEAN summit in Sunnylands, California also ensured that the territorial disputes in the South China Sea would remain at the top of the agenda. Overall the month was marked by significant progress in areas where common interests can be found and heated exchanges on diverging issues, the typical pattern of U.S.-China relations. The following summarizes issues that were highlighted most prominently by the two governments in February 2016.   Negotiating a Response to North Korea   The U.S. and China struggled to conclude negotiations on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution which was to implement harsher sanctions in response to North Korea’s January 2016 nuclear test. To negotiate the new sanctions regime, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met twice in February, once in Beijing and once in Washington. The two countries were eventually able to agree on the language of the resolution and a proposal was submitted to the UNSC for consideration. However, Wang Yi introduced a new Chinese approach to the denuclearization talks by calling for parallel tracks of denuclearizing North Korea while concurrently replacing the armistice with a peace treaty to officially end the Korean War. So while the two were able to devise a new round of sanctions on North Korea, other complications emerged including the contrasting opinions on a peace treaty and China’s dissatisfaction with the U.S. move to independently sanction North Korea outside of the UN resolution.   THAAD Reemerging as a Source of Tension   Another important issue that has come to the forefront in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear test in January is the ongoing debates about the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system to South Korea. Apart from the responses from both sides on the nuclear launch by North Korea in the beginning of the month, China repeatedly emphasized how the THAAD system is an unnecessary measure taken by South Korea, expressing its fear of a potential security imbalance in the region as well as insisting that such measures threatened China’s national security. On the other hand, the U.S stated that it is a defensive anti-missile system needed to deter the increasing nuclear activities of North Korea in light of its obligation as an ally to South Korea.   U.S.-ASEAN Summit Highlights Disagreement in South China Sea   The U.S. held a summit with leaders from all ten member states of ASEAN in California in what was billed as a demonstration of U.S. commitment to its rebalance to Asia strategy. The meeting reaffirmed the progress made during a meeting in November 2015 as the parties agreed to continue deepening their economic cooperation, words that came on the heels of the signing of the TPP, and reaffirmed their commitment to “a regional order where international rules and norms are upheld.” The ASEAN-US summit also served as a platform for exchanges between the U.S. and China where the two sides keep arguing within different scenarios. Whereas China’s argumentation is based on a potential future confirmation of their sovereignty rights, the U.S. still argues within the present situation of uncertainty about who has sovereignty over what. The U.S. emphasized their previous claims that China’s construction activities on various islands in the disputed areas contribute to militarization, and their own military maneuvers are thus necessary to secure the freedom of navigation. China paints a contrary picture stating it is these maneuvers that militarize the conflict which should be solved peacefully and solely between the claiming parties, i.e. without involvement of the US, ASEAN or international arbitration: “The South China Sea issue is an issue between China and some ASEAN countries, rather than [...] China and ASEAN.” However, at the same time, China did not wish to alienate its neighbors to the south and took special care to highlight cooperative projects between China and ASEAN nations as well.   Structural Change and Trade Rules   As the “new normal” continues to grip China, attention is being given to “optimizing economic structure.” In the midst of this restructuring effort, China is taking on criticism from various fronts. The European Commission has accused China of dumping surplus steel into its markets and other elements in Europe suspect the “Belt and Road” initiative of being a means for dispersing Chinese surpluses. The U.S. also continued to call for reforms to increase domestic demand in China. For its part, the Chinese government insists that the restructuring process is underway and that a new development model is being sought. This month also witnessed the signing of the TPP and the U.S. continues to push for domestic ratification. The U.S. is also pushing the TTIP, the Atlantic version of the TTP, while China steps up efforts to conclude negotiations on the RCEP by the end of this year.   Long-term Perspective on Syria Crisis and Chinese Engagement in Africa   Aside from Asia, two other world regions kept the US and China busy. Especially during the Munich Security Conference the ISIL/Syria crisis was intensively discussed, and despite all sides agreeing that bringing back peace and stability to the Middle East will be a long-term process that requires the combined efforts of the international community, Secretary of State Kerry remained optimistic in light of the established ceasefire agreement. Whereas the U.S. was quite forward in demanding more positive contributions, especially from Russia, China emphasized the importance of upholding peace talks and urged all involved actors to find a political solution. Furthermore the U.S. used the African Union Summit to address African issues, something the U.S. has not done much of as of late. This may be in response to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s African tour during which he strengthened Xi Jin Ping’s focus on Africa, as expressed on the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in December 2015. In several meetings with African Ministers he expressed that China regards ‘’developing countries [as] the cornerstone of China's foreign policy, while Africa is the chief cornerstone’’ and coastal states like Mozambique are even considered a ‘’natural extension of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.’’     TIME PERIOD: February 1 ~ 29, 2016   1. U.S. – China Bilateral Relations: U.S. Acknowledges the Co-existence of Cooperation and Conflict in Relations with China ; China States it Does Not Seek to Subplant the U.S. or Current World Order   2. Economic Relations: U.S. Signs TPP with Other Member States and Continues Domestic Push for Ratification; China Shrugs Off Concerns Over Slowing Economic Growth and Argues Structural Reform is Progressing Well   3. Military and Security Relations: U.S. Focuses on Improving Cybersecurity and Preventing Spread of Nuclear Weapons; China Provides Updates on Peacekeeping Missions and Adjustments to Organization of Army Commands   4. Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues: U.S. Continues to Call for Release of Political Prisoners in China; China Seeks to Uphold UN Development Standards while Criticizing UNHCHR Report   5. Climate Change and Environmental Issues: Both Countries Seek to Continue Work on Stopping Climate Change   6. Asia Pacific Issues: U.S. Holds Summit with Leaders of ASEAN; China Also Touts Positive Relations with ASEAN, Grows Quiet on Japan   7. Korean Peninsula: U.S. and China Negotiate the Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test; U.S. and South Korea Discuss Possibility of Deploying THAAD on the Korean Peninsula to which China Objects   8. Middle East and Africa Issues: U.S. Seeks End to Syrian Civil War to Focus on ISIL, Incinuates Russian War Crimes in Syria; China Lends Support to Syrian Peace Talks, Calls Africa the Foundation of its Foreign Policy   9. Sovereignty and Territorial Disputes: U.S. Continues Calls Claimants to Settle Disputes Safely and Urges China Not to Militarize South China Sea; China Criticizes U.S.-ASEAN Summit, Claims Actions in South China Sea Are in Accordance with International Law