North Korea is now at the crossroads. It needs to make a strategic decision on whether to defend its nuclear program and “military-first politics” against the pressure of increasing international sanctions or to denuclearize and pursue “economy-first politics.” Depending on which decision Kim Jong-il makes, his successor will face either the path of opportunity or the path of peril. Currently, Kim faces the challenge of ensuring a smooth transition of power to his successor. At the same time, he must negotiate with an international community that is trying to induce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program by simultaneously imposing sanctions on it while offering a comprehensive negotiation package. In this situation, the surrounding countries must construct an international environment that is favorable to convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and join the international community. Furthermore, the neighboring countries need to actively support and develop a clear formula for establishing a lasting peace framework on the Korean Peninsula.   Since the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, Kim Jong-il has faithfully followed the will of his father, who stated that North Korea will denuclearize if and only if the United States withdraws its hostile policy and nuclear threat toward Pyongyang. Amidst the backdrop of its increasing international isolation in the post-Cold War era, the North Korean regime made the decision to develop nuclear weapons as to safeguard its survival. However, this decision brought it into sharp conflict with the United States, who strongly opposed Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The United States could not allow a nuclear-armed North Korea that would destabilize the East Asian region. Subsequently, its strategic decision to pursue the nuclear military-first politics has led North Korea to become a “weak and vulnerable nation” rather than a “strong and prosperous nation,” enduring hardships along the “arduous march.”   Compared to circumstances in 1994 and 2003, the current situation confronting Kim Jong-il is far more complex and difficult. Not only must he revive a shattered economy but he must also adroitly manage the sensitive process of leadership succession that is still ongoing. If Kim fails to take the initiative to give up his nuclear program and allows the nuclear military-first politics to dominate the succeeding regime, it will become even more difficult for North Korea to make the transition toward a non-nuclear economy-first politics. Given the fact that external pressure from the international community for denuclearization and internal pressure of attenuating stability will only continue to increase, the succeeding regime will be in a position where giving up the card that guarantees its survival is impossible. Moreover, it would be political suicide for the new regime to abandon the nuclear military-first politics. As the son of Kim Il-sung who is the embodiment of Chuche ideology, Kim Jong-il needs to make the critical decision to abandon North Korea’s nuclear program. There is no other method for resolving the tense situation without denuclearization. Nuclear weapons might be a shot of morphine to ease the pain temporarily, but it cannot be the remedy to cure a dying patient.   This new road of “strong and prosperous nation” in the 21st century for North Korea, which can be only taken by Kim Jong-il himself, would be to abandon its nuclear arsenal and to adopt the economy-first politics. Kim can set this road by creating an internal and international foundation for the economy first politics so that his successor inherits the transition. For the North Korean leadership, denuclearization implies a de facto regime transition. Therefore, unless Kim Jong-il himself undertakes the risk of giving up the nuclear weapons, his successor will lack the ability to maneuver out of the ongoing nuclear crisis. That is not to say that giving up nuclear weapons is an easy strategic decision to make. Nevertheless, North Korea should strive to secure its regime through bilateral and multilateral cooperation with its neighbors and pursue a path of economic prosperity. It would be almost impossible for the succeeding regime to drive the transition toward a non-nuclear economy-first politics independently. A more realistic option is for Kim to build a political environment that will allow those who support the military-first politics to accept this transition, even after his death. Without this firm decision by Kim and the strategic cooperation of the surrounding countries, it is unlikely that North Korea will choose to embark upon the path of non-nuclear economy-first politics. There will be much to gain if Kim makes this strategic decision. It will lead to diverse discussions on not only how to unravel the North Korean nuclear issue but also how to establish a lasting and peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula for the 21st century.   To resolve the nuclear crisis, North Korea must step forward first. However, the North Korean regime has long stated that a prerequisite to any denuclearization is the United States abandoning its “hostile policy and nuclear threat” towards Pyongyang; in essence, the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea, the severance of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and open disarmament talks on issues such as the reduction and relocation of U.S. nuclear forces in the Asia-Pacific region. These demands are not only unrealistic, but they will not secure the North Korean regime. Even if Washington were to meet its demands, North Korea would still be in range of the United States’ intercontinental ballistic missiles and would therefore never be secure from American retaliation. The key issue here is how to guarantee the North Korean regime’s survival and its national security through comprehensive political agreements. Pyongyang should realize that in order to build a more desirable international environment for the survival and prosperity of the regime, it needs to move forward first.   Solving the nuclear issue requires not only monumental effort by North Korea but also bold moves by the surrounding countries. The unilateral efforts of one party will not be enough to solve all the problems; rather, it will require the concerted effort of all the members of the Six-Party Talks. For the comprehensive, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea to take place, Pyongyang’s fears in regards to abandoning its nuclear arsenal must be addressed. Once its sense of insecurity is mitigated, the North Korean leadership will view itself at the crossroads between life and death, rather than a slow death and a quick death. That will make the leadership more induced to take the strategic decision for denuclearization. If Pyongyang begins to earnestly pursue the process of denuclearization, the other parties must ensure that North Korea does not fall out of step. These parties need to develop and share the vision and plans for North Korea’s future so that Pyongyang can assure itself that denuclearization will not be a futile effort that throws away its card for survival; instead, denuclearization will be the solution that secures its own survival and prosperity.   Working with the United States, South Korea should initiate the first step towards change in North Korea by developing a new comprehensive package. Previous comprehensive alternatives failed to produce any substantial results, largely due to the discord between the two allies, South Korea and the United States. On August 15, 2009, the Lee Myung-bak administration presented the blueprint of a “Korean-style comprehensive package,” mainly consisting of economic aid and the disarmament of conventional forces. But lessons from the “sunshine policy” suggest that economic assistance alone will not be enough to unravel the complicated North Korean nuclear issue. In addition to economic aid, the new package needs to be more comprehensive in political and security issues. The point is whether Seoul and Washington can provide what North Korea’s succeeding regime wants, especially concerning the issue for the normalization of relations and security assurances. South Korea and the United States should develop a concerted vision about what the end point will be with the North Korean nuclear issue. They need to be prepared to start comprehensive negotiations with North Korea as soon as Pyongyang makes the strategic decision to give up its nuclear weapons. China’s role is also critical in this matter. The two allies should not overlook the fact that closer cooperation with China is as important as a strong mutual consensus between South Korea and the United States. For the North Korean leadership, China has the most credibility among all the interested parties. In this respect, China’s active participation is vital for the successful negotiation and implementation of a comprehensive package. However, China’s support is not unconditional. Beijing will support South Korean and American efforts to denuclearize North Korea only when it is confident that Seoul and Washington are not seeking regime change in Pyongyang. International cooperation for North Korea’s denuclearization is required as well. In addition to the participants of the Six-Party Talks, the European Union, the United Nations, and other international organizations need to assist in efforts to make North Korea a stable state, not another failed state. Through these multifaceted efforts, a vision for the future can be presented in which a denuclearized North Korea coexists and coevolves with its neighbors, thereby inducing Pyongyang to choose the road leading to denuclearization and prosperity. ■           Chair Young Sun Ha (Seoul National University)     Panel Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Jihwan Hwang (Myongji University) Sook-Jong Lee (President of the East Asia Institute)   Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this project possible. Under the supervision of Professor Chaesung Chun, this report is produced by Stephen Ranger and Yong-il Moon with help of Eun Hae Choi, Chanil Jung, and Eun Hae Lim.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches.     The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership.     The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region.     The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies.     The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.     First, the two leaders again agreed on their strategic goal of complete, irreversible and verifiable dismantlement (CIVD) of the North Korea nuclear program. During the press conference that followed the meeting, President Obama expressed his flat-out rejection of North Korea’s demand to be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state. The two leaders also expressed a shared view on specific policy ideas to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. President Obama additionally stated that not only the United States and South Korea but also the international community will no longer repeat the pattern of rewarding North Korea’s belligerence. This alteration in the global response calls upon North Korea to change its behavior fundamentally.     Such complete and resolute agreement between Seoul and Washington on policy goals and plans to resolve the nuclear crisis is rather new. But although their united position was spurred on by North Korea’s unprecedentedly provocative actions, in general the two countries’ national interests were already in agreement.     President Obama set forth his bold diplomatic vision in his "World without Nuclear Weapons" speech on April 5th, 2009 in Prague and his exhortations against "violent extremism" in his speech on June 4th in Cairo. Such a “world without nuclear weapons,” for Obama, is threatened by the "violent extremism" of North Korea. President Lee also seeks the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, and he has actively participated in the sanction efforts. In pursuit of this goal he pushed for the effective implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 that imposes further sanctions, and at the same time proposed the idea of a Five-Party Talks that would not include North Korea.     The issue of sanctions presents several questions for the future, concerning not just the nuclear question but the future of North Korea itself. Whether the sanctions against North Korea bring it back to the negotiating table or fail to achieve the desired result, what will be the new starting point in resolving the nuclear issue? Is it possible that North Korea will not yield to this second set of sanctions and will continue its "military-first" politics as it tries to build a "strong and prosperous nation" against the background of its precarious leadership succession? In this regard, what policy alternatives will Seoul and Washington have?     The agreement and cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue that was achieved at the summit in Washington is very well-timed and appropriate. But the process of further resolving the crisis with a degree of flexibility and caution will be a greater challenge. When President Obama stressed "the other path" available to North Korea if it gave up its nuclear program, he did not offer detailed roadmaps. His comments by themselves were not enough to motivate North Korea’s further behavior. If Washington and Seoul fail to assure North Korea of a clear and reliable discussion on the future of its regime and system, North Korea will maintain its own current path of “selling threats.” The importance of asking how to approach North Korea’s nuclearization extends to neighboring countries too. Without a vision going beyond the existing sanctions, countries like China will stall on joining South Korea’s proposed Five-Party Talks. As it stands, the Five-Party Dialogue is even more difficult to implement than the currently deadlocked Six-Party Talks. In order to persuade China, whose main concern is to avoid alienating its ally North Korea, the talks will need to be able to set the stage for discussing ways to help a denuclearized North Korea reintegrate itself into the international community. If South Korea is to play an active role, it needs to be able to map out a new route to clarify the "other path." Whatever is proposed should be based on a national consensus and an international consensus with the cooperating countries.     This process should be spearheaded by the Lee administration rather than by the Obama administration. The United States cannot be expected to make the North Korea problem its top priority ahead of the two major challenges it faces, the unprecedented global financial crisis and the complex war on terrorism.     What needs to be prepared alongside the sanctions is an "exit strategy." Seoul must persuade Pyongyang to independently find a "path" toward denuclearization and prosperity by promoting new policies that engineer North Korean reform. Changes in neighboring countries that contribute to peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula in the twenty-first century should also parallel the transformation of North Korea. Therefore beyond the existing policies, a third policy needs to be implemented, one of "coevolution" between North Korea and its neighbors. The North Korean nuclear issue loomed large over the summit, so much so that the controversial question of troop deployment to Afghanistan did not attract as much attention as it might have. But the Afghanistan situation and its implications for the U.S.-ROK alliance should not be taken lightly. The alliance in the twenty-first century will face many global challenges beyond the North Korean nuclear crisis. What the United States most wishes from the alliance is South Korea’s stronger global role. The recent summit did not call for any expansion of Korea’s overseas military role, but the two governments will have to cautiously come up with a way to cooperate on the two key global security issues of Iraq and Afghanistan that were mentioned in the "Joint Vision." Such a plan can be achieved by carefully assessing the security situation between the North and South, public opinion and the political climate of South Korea and the United States, and the national interests of neighboring countries such as China. Korea and the United States have taken a relatively cautious approach, keeping in mind long-term cooperation plans and understanding each other’s point of view regarding the current situation in Afghanistan. The problem is that no one can foresee the kind of numerous and difficult global issues that will arise in the future.     As South Korea plays a role in solving global security challenges, one should not view Korea just as the junior partner of the United States. From Yemen to Somalia, Korea has been directly involved. Its global role is not a choice but a reality. Therefore, alliance strategies parallel to its global commitments should be further promoted. The United States and South Korea have recognized that focusing on international nongovernmental assistance is useful for the division of labor in the alliance with respect to the situation in Afghanistan. Korea can contribute to international peace by, first and foremost, actively participating in PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) in Afghanistan. The Lee administration should form a clear agreement with the Obama administration on how beneficial such efforts can be for the alliance, America’s national interests, and international peace.   Debates on the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance between and within the two countries are inevitable. But they are also needed. The acknowledgment of the difference of opinion over the KORUS FTA and the simultaneous efforts to seek cooperation during the summit meeting are welcome.     During the summit, President Obama expressed the wish to put together an action plan on the FTA issue. The fact that the two countries agreed to continue discussions on the FTA, given the context of the challenging ratification process still ahead, shows the strength of the alliance. This strength is particularly evident when one takes into consideration the high levels of unemployment in the United States and Obama’s presidential election platform, which was critical of the KORUS FTA. Korea should take a broader view. During this global economic crisis it should not slide toward protectionism; instead it should reenergize the world economy by serving as a link between the emerging East Asian economic network and the world’s largest economic power. The KORUS FTA should not be viewed as a means to maximize economic and strategic gains.     South Korea should be ready to hold rational, continuous, and genuine debates over its national interests on the North Korean nuclear program, the U.S.-ROK alliance, and the KORUS FTA, rather than being limited to ideological arguments between liberals and conservatives. The government should also pay attention to these debates and transform them into the foundation of long-term policies. How the situation will unfold in the future will depend on whether the Lee administration succeeds in forming a public consensus on its policies. This can be done through active communication with the people and with opposition parties.■            EAI Security Net   Chair Young Sun Ha (Seoul National University)   Panel Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Sung Ho Kim (Yonsei University) Sook-Jong Lee (President of the East Asia Institute) Yul Sohn (Yonsei University)   Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this project possible. Under the supervision of Professor Chaesung Chun, this report is produced by Stephen Ranger with help of Eun Hae Choi and Yoon-Seon Choi.

Editor's Note In this article, Chung Kyung-young of Hanyang University explores the position of different countries on the presence of US troops if a peace treaty is signed on the Korean Peninsula.      South Korea aims to sign a peace treaty as well as achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the event a peace treaty is signed, the future of US forces in Korea will become an issue between South Korea and the US. At the press conference held just after the South-North Korea summit, US Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis was asked about the possible withdrawal of US troops from Korea. He responded, “That’s part of the issues that we'll be discussing in negotiations with our allies firstly, and of course with North Korea.” Professor Moon Chung-In, special advisor to the president on unification, foreign affairs and security, published an article in the April 30th edition of Foreign Affairs entitled “What will happen to US forces in South Korea if a peace treaty is signed?.” In this article, he stated that it would be difficult to justify the continued presence of US forces in South Korea after the adoption of a peace treaty. However, he also noted that “there will be strong conservative opposition to the reduction and withdrawal of US forces, posing a major political dilemma for President Moon.” US President Donald J. Trump has ordered the Pentagon to prepare options for reducing the number of American troops in South Korea, according to the May 3rd edition of the New York Times. President Trump held a press conference just after signing a joint statement with Chairman Kim Jong-un on June 12th during the Singapore summit, where he said “I want to get our soldiers out. I would like to be able to bring them back home. That’s not part of the equation. At some point, I hope it would be.” The July 5 Asahi Shimbun reported that Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to cooperate strategically on the shared objective of the removal of the 28,500 US soldiers in South Korea. These messages indicate that US troop withdrawal is on table if a solid Korean peace treaty is made. President Moon Jae-in calmed down the sensitive issue, “The US forces in the South are an issue that is solely between South Korea and the US, entirely unrelated to a peace treaty.” He reiterated this position in an interview on July 12th with The Straits Times in Singapore, stating “US troops in Korea are not a subject for discussion in negotiations between the US and North Korea for denuclearization.” The White House denied that a review of the US troop reduction was conducted at all. However, it is likely that US forces in Korea will not be excluded as an issue in the process of building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.  This paper will discuss international law related to the presence of US forces in South Korea and review cases of US troops stationed in foreign countries. It will then explore the position of different countries on the presence of US troops if a peace treaty is signed on the Korean Peninsula. This paper also analyzes the intent behind North Korea’s dual strategy of officially insisting on US troop withdrawal but allowing the continued presence of US forces if US-DPRK relations are normalized. The paper will conduct an in-depth analysis of whether US troops should remain on the Peninsula if a peace treaty is signed by examining domestic politics, economic impact, military security, regional power politics, lessons learned from the Paris Peace Accords, the national strategy of a unified Korea, and regional stability. Finally, the paper will make policy recommendations for the status of US forces and United Nations Command in the event of the conclusion of a peace treaty and transition of wartime operational control. (Continue...)   Author Chung Kyung-young is an adjunct Professor at the Hanyang University Graduate School of International Studies. He received his PhD in international politics from the University of Maryland, College Park. He was a policy practitioner at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ROK-US Combined Forces Command. He was a Professor at the Korea National Defense University and the Catholic of University of Korea. Dr. Chung was a policy advisor to the National Security Council, the Presidential Transitional Team, and the Ministry of National Defense. He has published several books, including Challenge of National Security and Determination toward Unification (2017), Centripetal Foreign and Security Policy of the ROK (2015), and Strategy for Self-reliant Security and a Peace Regime (ed., 2018), and The Obama Administration and ROK-US Strategic Alliance (ed., 2009).    

Editor’s Note Since the turning point of Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year’s Speech, a resolution of the North Korean denuclearization conundrum is proceeding at a breakneck pace, like a rollercoaster of war and peace. Last year’s verbal battle between North Korea and the US, which nearly led to the brink of an actual war, has passed. North Korea’s attendance at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and the exchange of special envoys between South and North Korea has progressed much faster than expected. A North Korea-China summit and visit from the US special envoy to North Korea to meet with Kim Jong Un soon followed. On April 20th, North Korea announced its “new strategic policy line”. This announcement came shortly before the inter-Korean summit due to take place in late April, which will be followed by the North Korea-US summit. All eight attempts during the period between the signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994 and 2017 to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem have met with failure. In order to get off this rollercoaster of war and peace and arrive at the final destination of North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, it is critical to accurately analyze North Korea’s changes in its approach and strategies towards the summit. Furthermore, all related parties, including South Korea, the US, and China, should work together to solve the problem. In order to resolve this historical conundrum successfully, we must first look beyond the simple dichotomy of optimism and pessimism and examine the opportunities and limitations of North Korea’s strategic decision. We must also identify the true objective behind the summit from the complex perspectives of all parties using official documents as a basis. Then we should make efforts to find answers for the denuclearization of and a security guarantee for North Korea to which all parties, including the two Koreas, the US, and China, can agree.     SINCE THE TURNING POINT OF KIM JONG UN’S 2018 NEW Year's speech, a resolution of the North Korean denuclearization conundrum is proceeding at a breakneck pace, like a rollercoaster of war and peace. Last year’s verbal battle between North Korea and the US, which nearly led to the brink of an actual war, has passed. North Korea’s attendance at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and the exchange of special envoys between South and North Korea has progressed much faster than expected. A North Korea-China summit and visit from the US special envoy to North Korea to meet with Kim Jong Un soon followed. On April 20th, North Korea announced its “new strategic policy line.” This announcement came shortly before the inter-Korean summit due to take place in late April, which will be followed by the North Korea-US summit. All eight attempts during the period between the signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994 and 2017 to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem have met with failure. In order to get off this rollercoaster of war and peace and arrive at the final destination of North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, it is critical to accurately analyze North Korea’s changes in its approach and strategies towards the summit. Furthermore, all related parties, including South Korea, the US, and China, should work together to solve the problem.    In order to resolve this historical conundrum successfully, we must first look beyond the simple dichotomy of optimism and pessimism and examine the opportunities and limitations of North Korea’s strategic decision. We must also identify the true objective behind the summit from the complex perspectives of all parties using official documents as a basis. Then we should make efforts to find answers for the denuclearization of and a security guarantee for North Korea to which all parties, including the two Koreas, the US, and China, can agree. North Korea’s New Strategic Policy Line: Change and Continuity It is essential to carefully interpret the two official announcements and the new strategic policy line put forth by North Korea in order to accurately understand what kinds of strategic changes North Korea is pursuing prior to the South-North Korea and North Korea-US summits. After meeting Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang on March 5th, South Korean national security advisor Chung Eui-yong announced the results of his visit to North Korea, including the contents of the six-point agreement. The key to that agreement was the third paragraph, which states that "North Korea says it is willing to denuclearize and has no reason to possess nuclear weapons if the military threat against it is removed and the regime's security guaranteed." Next, during a summit with Xi Jinping on March 26th, Kim Jong Un said “It is our consistent stand to be committed to denuclearization on the Peninsula, in accordance with the will of the late President Kim Il Sung and the late General Secretary Kim Jong Il.” He also said “North Korea is determined to transform inter-Korean ties into a relationship of reconciliation and cooperation and hold a summit between the heads of the two sides.” He further stated “The issue of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula can be resolved, if South Korea and the United States respond to our efforts with goodwill, and create an atmosphere of peace and stability while taking progressive and synchronous measures for the realization of peace.” Taken together, the three statements suggest that the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula can be resolved if South Korea and the US take progressive and synchronous measures to guarantee the survival of the North Korean regime. A newly introduced concept here is the term “progressive and synchronous measures.” In an official statement issued by the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs of on October 17th, 2015, Pyongyang emphasized the “peace treaty first, denuclearization second” principle while criticizing the “denuclearization first, peace treaty second” principle of South Korea and the US as unrealistic, as well as dismissing China’s suggestion of a ‘dual freeze’ and a ‘dual track’ approach of simultaneously discussing denuclearization and peace talks. However, Kim Jong Un’s use of the term “progressive and synchronous measures” is different from North Korea’s conventional position. Rather, it implies the simultaneous pursuit of denuclearization and peace talks, similar to China’s proposal. However, even as North Korea displays flexibility in the ‘procedural’ aspects of the negotiations, it is important to know whether they are also intending to pursue strategic changes in the ‘contents’ of the negotiations, namely denuclearization and a security guarantee. The announcement made on March 5th by the South Korean envoy to the North clearly states that “North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said he is committed to denuclearization.” However, during the North Korea-China summit on March 26th, Kim Jong Un said “It is our consistent stand to be committed to denuclearization on the Peninsula, in accordance with the will of the late President Kim Il Sung and the late General Secretary Kim Jong Il.” The key phrase in this statement is “consistent stand.” The will of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il was not the denuclearization of North Korea, but a denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula. This encompasses not only the denuclearization of North Korea, but also a removal of the existence of nuclear capabilities in South Korea and strategic nuclear weapons surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, if North Korea’s will to denuclearize means denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it indicates the denuclearization of both South and North Korea, not just the North. During the joint press conference after the summit with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Trump said that “…there is a bright path available to North Korea when it achieves denuclearization in a complete and verifiable, and irreversible way.” In a meeting with executives of domestic media outlets on April 19th, Moon Jae-in again emphasized that “North Korea is expressing a willingness to completely denuclearize.” At the 3rd Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea on April 20th, Kim Jong Un declared a new strategic policy line. According to this new announcement, the following decisions were made: first, North Korea has sequentially and faithfully achieved nuclear weaponization; second, nuclear tests and the intercontinental ballistic missiles tests will be discontinued; third, North Korea will join international efforts to halt nuclear testing altogether; fourth, North Korea will never use nuclear weapons unless there is a nuclear threat or nuclear provocation against the North, and North Korea will never transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear technology; fifth, North Korea will concentrate all of its efforts on building up a strong socialist economy; and sixth, North Korea will intensify solidarity and dialogue with neighboring countries and the international community. Denuclearization as mentioned in the new strategic policy line did not declare complete denuclearization, but instead proposed an incomplete denuclearization where North Korea will continue to possess its existing nuclear weapons for minimal deterrence without conducting further nuclear weapon or intercontinental ballistic missile tests. The implications for the second core concept, the security guarantee, are more comprehensive than those for denuclearization; thus, it is more difficult and controversial to evaluate the change in meaning. The key question that is raised by the statement, “if the military threat against [North Korea] is removed and the regime’s security guaranteed,” released after the South Korean envoy’s visit to Pyongyang on March 5th, is what conditions will prompt North Korea to agree that the military threat against it has been removed and the security of the regime guaranteed. Conditions and measures for the security guarantee as suggested by North Korea in negotiations over the past two decades have stayed the same within the larger framework, despite some minor differences. North Korea has demanded the normalization of North Korea-US relations, the withdrawal of economic sanctions and provision of economic support, and the establishment of a peace treaty for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On July 6th, 2016, North Korea declared the five principles of the “regime guarantee” in a government statement: “First, the release of the US nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea; second, the abolition and verification of all nuclear weapons in South Korea; third, the suspension of the deployment of US nuclear weapons; fourth, a commitment not to use nuclear weapons or pose a nuclear threat to North Korea; fifth, the proclamation of the withdrawal of the United States Forces Korea (USFK).” In the recent working meeting preparing for the US-North Korea summit, it is said that North Korea proposed five measures for the regime guarantee, which include the normalization of the US-North Korea relations, the establishment of a peace treaty, the withdrawal of US nuclear strategic assets from South Korea, the suspension of the deployment of nuclear strategic assets in US-South Korea joint military exercises, and a commitment to not to attack with conventional or nuclear weapons. However, the clause relating to nuclear strategic assets can be interpreted as just another way of saying withdrawal of the USFK and dissolution of the South Korea-US alliance. There are currently both optimistic and pessimistic views of North Korea’s strategic changes ahead of its summit talks. North Korea’s changed position and approach towards denuclearization negotiations made the planned April summit possible. However, a more careful examination is necessary to determine whether there are any notable changes to the actual content of the negotiations. Therefore, it is necessary to once and for all evaluate North Korea’s strategic changes with regards to denuclearization and a security guarantee from the perspective of complete denuclearization, which is the final end goal for both South Korea and the US at the inter-Korean and the North Korea-US summits. In this process, it is important to keep an eye on the position of the Trump administration, which emphasizes the past failures to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The US will stand firm in its “denuclearization first, peace treaty second” principle without accepting North Korea’s “progressive and synchronous” measures of denuclearization unless North Korea’s sincerity and commitment are fully confirmed. North Korea's New Strategic Policy Line and Upcoming Summits It is necessary to accurately understand North Korea's position on the upcoming summit as well as to carefully analyze its strategic change. In his 2018 New Year’s Speech, Kim Jong Un put forth "Let us launch a revolutionary general offensive to achieve fresh victory on all fronts of building a powerful socialist country!" as this year’s rallying cry. All fronts, in the case of North Korea, encompass the domestic, inter-Korean, and global fronts. The domestic fronts can be further divided into military, economic, cultural, and political/ideological aspects. To be clear, the 2018 New Year’s Speech did not officially announce North Korea’s intention to give up its byungjin (parallel) policy of pursuing nuclear security and economic development. Instead, it marked 2017 as the year of completion of North Korea’s nuclear forces and turned its attention to economic development, the other main pillar of North Korea’s parallel policy, as the focus for 2018. However, North Korea faced great difficulties in 2017 due to stronger economic sanctions imposed by the international community and military pressure from the US; therefore, in 2018, North Korea intends to work on reducing obstacles in its path toward becoming a powerful socialist country, including economic sanctions and military pressure, on the domestic, inter-Korean, and global fronts. Because pursuing “a revolutionary general offensive” on the domestic front is currently difficult due to economic sanctions and military pressure imposed from the international front, it appears that North Korea has decided to utilize the inter-Korean front in order to overcome the current challenges. Even though a new administration took office in 2017, the South Korean government has not made any much-needed changes to its North Korea policy, thereby leading to no significant change in inter-Korean relations. However, due to the urgent situation the Korean Peninsula is now facing, North Korea insisted that the two Koreas should “work together to alleviate military tensions and create a peaceful environment,” and the South Korean government must “respond to [North Korea’s] sincere efforts to mitigate tensions rather than aggravate the situation by engaging in the United States’ reckless North Korean nuclear war.” On the other hand, on the international front, North Korea briefly stated that “We will act as a ‘responsible nuclear power’ and only use [nuclear weapons] for minimum deterrence.” The North also said “We will firmly respond to any act destroying the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula.” However, after the 2018 New Year’s Speech, North Korea held a North Korea- China summit and is now preparing for a summit with the US on the international front in order to change the current situation, which has become a stumbling block to the establishment of a powerful socialist country.  North Korea now faces a self-imposed quandary in that its nuclear development has crippled its economy. In order to overcome the biggest obstacle to building a powerful socialist country under the parallel policy of nuclear and economic development, it must first denuclearize. In order to resolve this paradox, North Korea has expressed its willingness to simultaneously pursue incomplete denuclearization and peace talks by displaying flexibility and easing its previously hard stance on “peace treaty first, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula second” during the North Korea-China summit and new strategic policy line. Furthermore, North Korea is also trying to obtain certain achievements and rewards via its progressive and synchronous negotiations. At the outset, it may look like negotiation for the complete denuclearization of North Korea and peace talks will be able to get off the ground. However, the Trump administration will not endure any costs of denuclearization unless North Korea fully demonstrates its sincere intentions to completely denuclearize in the early stages of the negotiations process. Thus, the South Korean government will face the heavy task of coordinating the conflicting positions of North Korea and the US from the beginning of the negotiations, North Korea’s Complete Denuclearization and a Security Guarantee The core agenda of the inter-Korean and the North Korea-US summits is North Korea’s denuclearization and a security guarantee. In order for the summits to be successful, it is necessary to first clarify to what extent the conditions for denuclearization and a security guarantee as understood by South Korea, North Korea and the US coincide and where they differ, and then agree on an agenda. South Korea’s role will be essential during this process. South Korea should be able to translate the different interpretations of denuclearization and a security guarantee between North Korea and the US, and it must act as a navigator towards a new consensus. At the summit, the starting point of the denuclearization discussion will be a nuclear freeze, followed by a verification process including reports and inspections. The important thing is that all parties should agree that the final goal is the complete denuclearization of North Korea. The outcome of the denuclearization discussion, the first item on the agenda at both summits, ultimately depends on whether North Korea and the US can agree on the same conditions for denuclearization. Today’s technical and detailed discussion on freezing, reporting, inspecting, and dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear programs must have a broader and more complex scope than those held during the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework or the 2005 Beijing Joint Statement because North Korea’s nuclear capability has advanced exponentially. It will be difficult for North Korea to accept the US requirement for special inspections of the various facilities unless they make the strategic decision to pursue complete denuclearization. The US will apply extremely detailed and strict standards to North Korea, and the negotiation process will run into serious difficulties if Pyongyang demands that South Korea and the US take measures in tandem with their strict standards. Even if North Korea and other related parties have agreed in principle on the complete denuclearization of North Korea, they need to solve the much more difficult task of guaranteeing the security of a completely denuclearized North Korean regime throughout the actual implementation process. In response, North Korea will most likely demand a reduction of the military threat and a security guarantee, and this requires consensus amongst related parties. Since the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994, the denuclearization of North Korea and the economic, diplomatic and military aspects of a security guarantee, the so-called “Devil’s Quadrangle,” have remained a conundrum that has not been solved easily for the past quarter century. Although the normalization of North Korea-US relations, which works as a security guarantee in terms of diplomacy, might be realized, international coordination is required to set a standard for how and when to lift economic sanctions and provide economic aid to the North during its denuclearization process. But the most important aspect of the security guarantee will be that of the military. If North Korea does not show a significant willingness to bend on its past requirements, such as the withdrawal of the USFK, the dismantling of the ROK-US military alliance, and control of nuclear strategic materials around the Korean Peninsula, it will be difficult for the related parties, including the two Koreas, the US, and China, to reach a consensus about the conditions for a security guarantee. From the standpoint of North Korea, the exchange of complete denuclearization for a security guarantee might seem unfair. Even if the two Koreas declare the termination of the Korean War and related parties including South and North Korea conclude a peace treaty in return for North Korea’s complete denuclearization, it will not be easy for the North to completely trust that this declaration and peace treaty will hold any significant effect or value in the reality of international politics where the transnational judicial order does not function like domestic law. In order to provide an authentic and sincere guarantee of the regime’s survival to North Korea, which already perceives the historical reality of international politics only too well, it is essential to guarantee that a denuclearized North Korea will retain non-nuclear defense capabilities. A complex, ironclad plan that provides greater assurance for North Korea’s security than the security provided by nuclear weapons must be prepared. To achieve this goal, the two Koreas must pave the way for a declaration of the termination of Korean War and create an arms control plan. In addition, peace talks amongst relevant stakeholders, including the two Koreas, the US, and China, need to be held in coordination with multilateral or Asia-Pacific peace systems, such as the Six-party talks. A Complex Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Problem At the inter-Korean and the North Korea-US summits, the related parties must understand that the simultaneous pursuit of a complex solution involving sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and internally driven change within North Korea is necessary in order to successfully resolve the problem of North Korean denuclearization and provide a security guarantee. The nuclear negotiations that have taken place over the past quarter century historically prove that the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be solved via a simple approach of imposing economic sanctions and responding militarily, nor by providing economic support while improving relations. However, until the North ultimately passes the final gate to reach complete denuclearization, the four tools - sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and internally driven change within North Korea - are indispensable, and these four pillars will be needed to support the structure of the complete denuclearization of North Korea. Sanctions and deterrence have made an important contribution to bringing North Korea to the table. However, in order for talks to progress to the next level, there must be an effort to guarantee the survival of the North Korean regime and careful thought regarding the “Devil’s Quadrangle.” Until a certain level of trust has been built and exchanges made regular, denuclearization efforts always have the potential to regress to the pre-negotiation stage. However, this alone is not enough to completely denuclearize North Korea. What we ultimately need to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear conundrum in addition to sanctions, deterrence, and engagement is for North Korea to evolve into the 21st-century. As North Korea’s planned economy begins to reap the benefits of marketization and its closed society and culture adopt the efficiency of informatization, the next inevitable step is the evolution of politics to be able to successfully implement a ‘non-nuclear security and economic dual policy.’ Such changes cannot be enforced externally; they will only arise through North Korea’s internally driven efforts. During this process, the stakeholders surrounding the Korean Peninsula must work to evolve simultaneously as well. ■     Author Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.     

Editor’s Note Circumstances surrounding the Korean Peninsula are on the fast track after the PyeongChang 2018 Olympics. With a high-level South Korean delegation’s visit to Pyongyang, inter-Korean summit and North Korea-US summit are each to be held in April and May, respectively. According to Chaesung Chun, agreements to hold dialogues between South and North Korea as well as between North Korea and the US are the result of the understanding that all other options than negotiation are exhausted. The agreement to hold the summits can also be credited to the efforts of the South Korean government to take a cautious approach aimed toward the root of the North Korea issue. However, Chun argues that because North Korea still has the alternative option of advancing its nuclear missile program further, there is a possibility that situations will change especially if sanctions against the North are softened and North Korea-China relations are improved. Chun proposes that it is necessary to shift from a pressure-oriented strategy to the parallel pursuit of pressure and engagement and the international community should be able to provide specific and concrete incentives to North Korea for halting its nuclear development.      There is a high chance that the next three months will mark an important moment in history: a moment that will change the future of the Korean Peninsula. Since the Cold War ended, North Korea has been searching for a way to ensure its survival and sounding out the possibility of negotiations with the US. Throughout the history of the bilateral contact between North Korea and the US, which started with the meeting of Kim Yong Soon and Arnold Kanter in January 1992, there have been several significant moments that came close to settling the tension between North Korea and the US, including North Korean military Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok’s visit to Washington DC and former US Secretary of State Albright’s visit to Pyongyang, both in 2000. After eighteen years of relations at a standstill, a new opportunity for breakthrough has emerged. Agreements to hold dialogues between South and North Korea as well as between North Korea and the US are the result of structural developments among the relevant stakeholders. This reasoning holds that once the exhaustion of all other options than negotiation is understood among the players, the moment of sincere negotiation is bound to happen. The agreement to hold the summit can also be credited to the efforts of the South Korean government to take a cautious approach aimed toward the root of the North Korea issue. North Korea has attempted to obtain various advantages by developing ballistic missile capabilities that enable them to strike the continental US. However, this has only brought about a strengthening of sanctions against the North and diplomatic isolation, significantly reducing the potential for Kim Jong Un’s Byungjin line to succeed. China has been proactively participating in sanctions against the North with close cooperation with the US and the international society. South Korean efforts to impose sanctions on North Korea and strengthen the alliance with the US have been steadfast despite a more liberal administration taking office. It is now certain that the North Korean economy will worsen rapidly in the next year or two. While the US has proposed a military option, North Korea’s military might make it entirely difficult to realize the option and the US cannot but focus on a continuation of sanctions and political isolation vis-à-vis North Korea. This desirable end state of North Korea’s nuclear issue is quite clear: North Korea’s denuclearization with its regime survival guaranteed, and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The more important question has been when and how off-the-table negotiations, which are a necessary precursor to enable on-the-table negotiations among relevant stakeholders to succeed, would end. The nature of the North Korean nuclear problem is such that its resolution has only become clear as circumstances have grown worse and more serious. Now it is up to South Korea to make sure that the cycle of the unresolved North Korean nuclear problem does not end with catastrophic destruction. The Moon Jae-in administration has emphasized peace and evoked the importance of a diplomatic resolution as the circumstances surrounding the Peninsula have worsened. With the current lack of basic trust among the relevant stakeholders, the problem will not resolve itself if left alone. The Moon administration has repeatedly promoted dialogue as a way to gain North Korea’s trust despite skeptical views expressed by the international community, the US, and domestic conservatives. We may interpret Moon Jae-in’s approach as a strategy to increase audience costs by building trust at the expense of political costs. In other words, North Korea only began to believe that South Korea was sincere after observing the Moon administration willingly making political sacrifices to establish trust from domestic and also international audiences. A high-level South Korean delegation to Pyongyang announced a set of six agreements with North Korea. Among these, three (an inter-Korean summit, the creation of a hotline between the leaders, and an exchange of sports and cultural programs) appear to be relatively easy to implement. The remaining three are more challenging: a clear signaling of North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize, a North Korea-US summit, and a halt to future nuclear missile tests by the North. If an immediate stop to additional nuclear missile tests by the North can be agreed upon as a starting point for further negotiations, then the discussion may proceed as to how North Korea can clearly signal its willingness to denuclearize and the specifics of a North Korea-US summit. At the end of last year, North Korea announced the completion of its nuclear missile program and specified its intent to focus on economic development this year. Under the Byungjin line, economic development is to be pursued while maintaining nuclear status. It is extremely difficult to find out once and for all whether or not North Korea has, in the two months since Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address, decided to change its position on maintaining its nuclear status, which is one pillar of the parallel strategy, and instead pursue a new strategy based solely on economic development. It is realistically impossible to determine if North Korea has suddenly decided that it can no longer sustain the costs of maintaining its nuclear missile program due to strengthened economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, and thereby concluded that it should negotiate its nuclear missile program for the highest value and instead concentrate on economic development. North Korea still has the alternative option of advancing its nuclear missile program further. In his New Year’s address, Kim Jong Un mentioned the mass production of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles for operational deployment. If North Korea confirms its ability to hit US territory with a nuclear strike through valid tests, the US will not be able to launch a preemptive strike against the North for fear of nuclear counter-attack on the mainland. Furthermore, if this ability is confirmed, US public opinion will likely favor making a deal, giving North Korea a greater amount of leverage at the negotiating table. Currently, North Korea seems amenable to negotiation because of the difficulties that economic sanctions and maritime interdiction are posing to its development of ICBM re-entry technology. If North Korea can improve its economy and secures technological development beginning in April, it is only logical for North Korea to break off the current talks in order to build additional leverage for future negotiations. The biggest economic obstacle for North Korea is China’s participation in sanctions. If China softens its stance on sanctions against the North and works to strengthen North Korea-China relations as North Korea-US talks progress, the need for North Korea to conclude negotiations in the current round will be reduced. In sum, if sanctions are lessened, the blockade of port traffic, and maritime interdiction are lifted, North Korea can continue to develop its nuclear capabilities and will be better off postponing negotiations. US bureaucrats and experts who are well aware of this situation are also wary of the possibility that President Trump might make too many commitments at the planned North Korea-US summit in May. There is a growing concern that the US should not agree to summit talks if substantial action is not taken towards North Korea’s denuclearization as a precondition, and that the potential wins from negotiations will be reduced if practical negotiations fail after the summit. In addition, if North Korea is determined to be untrustworthy following the summit, the US will begin to consider military options more seriously than diplomatic alternatives. The American public may begin to pressure the US government to attack North Korea, especially before North Korea secures the capability to attack the US mainland. The South Korean government’s greatest task now is to ensure that every country recognizes that a failure in the upcoming April negotiations will harm everyone by reducing the possibility of diplomatic compromise. Whether or not North Korea has made strategic decisions to abandon its nuclear weapons in favor of economic development is surely an important issue, but policy should not be established solely based on North Korea’s intentions. These intentions will shift in line with their capabilities, and a change in the situation may prompt them to make a different decision. Even if North Korea is only agreeing to negotiations in the hope of earning some time and profit, we must try to change and form the intention of Kim Jong Un. Hoon Suh, Director of the National Intelligence Service, said in an interview with the Chosun Ilbo during the recent visit to the US that, “When you negotiate, you do not make judgments according to your opponent’s will or intention. It is more important to draw meaning from their words and make them put this into practice.” This comment clearly demonstrates the nature of the negotiation process very well in that the most important thing in the negotiation process is to form and change the opponent’s intention. Director Suh also mentioned that North Korea has not specified what it will require in return for denuclearizing, and this is an area in which future negotiations have to make progress. Even if North Korea is still looking for opportunities to develop nuclear missiles, if the benefits of nuclear abandonment outweigh the costs, their intentions may change and new prospects emerge during the negotiation process. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to shift from a pressure-oriented strategy to the parallel pursuit of pressure and engagement. The international community has followed the US in pursuing maximum pressure and engagement, but the engagement in this policy has ended in seeking only a basic diplomatic solution. The international community has vaguely explained that Pyongyang will face a bright future if it abandons its nuclear weapons program, but failed to provide specific and concrete incentives for halting nuclear development from North Korea’s point of view. In the September 19 Joint Statement, Russia, Japan, the US, South Korea, and China suggested supplying energy, providing economic cooperation, and discussing a peace regime in separate forums, but a detailed plan for engagement with North Korea did not materialize. South Korea’s Kim Dae Jung administration pursued the Sunshine Policy, but North Korea’s take away from this was that removing its metaphorical clothing under South Korea’s ‘sunshine’ would lead to North Korean regime collapse. The key point to any discussion of an exit strategy for North Korea in terms of denuclearization is the type of future that will await the regime on the other side of the door. Kim Jong Un will work toward a scenario in which North Korea is treated as a normal member of the international community, given a concrete blueprint for economic development, and he is able to keep his domestic political foundation intact even without the nuclear weapons. In fact, Kim Jong Un’s maintenance of power and North Korea’s growth will not necessarily be complementary, as economic development will inevitably lead to social change within North Korea and domestic criticism of the regime will intensify. The abandonment of nuclear weapons will mean that Kim Jong Un must manage not only external, but also internal threats. South Korea and its neighboring countries need to understand these concerns of North Korea and clearly spell out the extent to which they can provide North Korea with incentives. Since the North Korean nuclear issue has remained ongoing for the past 20 years, North Korea may already be well aware of the content and trustworthiness of any guarantees that South Korea and its neighbors can provide. Thus, careful and precise preparation is required. If a concrete and authentic engagement policy is clearly conveyed to North Korea, it is likely that North Korea will shift its intentions to participate in denuclearization negotiations. The inter-Korean summit will be a place to discuss bilateral issues, but it will also confirm South Korea’s capacity and position as leader of the international community’s strategy, especially that of the US. It will be impossible to agree on specific programs to mitigate sanctions on North Korea and improving inter-Korean exchange and cooperation before the North Korea-US summit. Therefore, it is more important to communicate with North Korea about the concrete engagement strategy that will be led by South Korea and the future that North Korea will face after denuclearizing. As most of the preparatory contact between North Korea and the US will be achieved during the preparation for the inter-Korean summit, South Korea should closely discuss this future program with the United States at this time. The United States-North Korea summit will be a starting point for the denuclearization of North Korea and the normalization of the United States-North Korea relationship. During the summit, there will be a basic agreement proposed for the complete denuclearization of North Korea that guarantees the North Korean regime’s safety. The roadmap for denuclearization has been discussed since the beginning of the North Korean nuclear problem. The real issue is that the United States is not ready to provide a clear roadmap to guarantee the safety of the North Korean regime. In fact, it is unclear exactly what a ‘safety guarantee’ will entail. It may mean a simple prohibition of US military activities against North Korea; a full transition from the armistice agreement to a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; a separate system to maintain a peace regime; a guarantee to normalize North Korea as a member of the international community and support their economic development; or support for Kim Jong Un’s continued dictatorship. Without knowing exactly what they will ask for, it is impossible to guess at the US response. It is also difficult to guess what President Trump’s individual goals and methods of negotiation will be. President Trump prioritizes the interests of the United States, but he also would like to achieve a complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through negotiation in order to have a visible political win. It is difficult to say what price he is willing to pay for denuclearization. South Korea is worried about President Trump’s “North Korea card” in addition to the long-standing obstacles of how to balance the sequence of denuclearization-regime safety guarantee and economic support and the “words for words” and “action for action” problem. With the majority of American post-Cold War policy in a state of radical flux, including the US-centered alliance-based global security system, the liberal international economic order supporting the long-term interests of the United States, ideological diplomacy emphasizing human rights and the expansion of democracy, and careful coexistence with other major powers, it is hard to predict President Trump’s policy on the North Korean nuclear issue. The most important issue with regards to North Korea is, from the perspective of the interests of the United States, to eliminate the nuclear missile threat to the US mainland. It is hard to guess exactly what demands the United States will accept in exchange for eliminating such a threat. The worst case scenario would be a guarantee of North Korea’s military regime in exchange for a weakening of the ROK-US alliance and elimination of the North Korean nuclear threat to the United States. This would amplify the security anxiety of both South Korea and Japan. If the United States places great emphasis on the security of its allies and is committed to continuing to support South Korea and Japan in the future East Asian security framework, it will consider ways to guarantee North Korea’s regime safety that do not weaken the existing ROK-US and US-Japan alliances. The topics discussed during the previous Four-Party Talks: how the international community can guarantee a peace regime, the normalization of US-DPRK relations, and peace on the Korean Peninsula, will be also discussed at the summit, and China’s strategy will be a very significant variable. It is very likely that the Six-Party Talks will be used as the main forum for discussion, and the geopolitical cooperation of the four neighboring powers will be necessary in order to effectively establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s immediate desire is to solve the North Korean nuclear issue and guarantee a peace regime. Ultimately, however, South Korea wishes to establish a sustainable peace regime, improve inter-Korean exchanges, and achieve reunification. To do this, from a security perspective, the establishment of a peace regime as well as the future direction of North Korean development are both essential. The conditions for unification will be established when North Korea maintains political stability for a certain period and gradually develops an open system as a member of the international community. South Korea’s main task is to integrate the current denuclearization dialogue into a long-term roadmap. When South Korea cooperates with the United States, South Korea must first thoroughly discuss this roadmap as a joint proposal to be shared during the working-level talks after the United States-North Korea summit. South Korea must communicate closely with the United States so that the United States develops a response to North Korea’s denuclearization that also protects South Korea’s security interests. Second, it is necessary to be prepared for the possibility that negotiations may halt or run into difficulties as in the past due to the difference of opinion between the United States and North Korea. The possibility of a diplomatic solution must be maximized so that mutual trust and the agreement on basic principle do not collapse regardless of what happens. In particular, South Korea must lay the foundation for continued cooperation with China. Third, South Korea must create multiple opportunities to persuade the United States, especially President Trump, of the need for a long-term solution that goes beyond denuclearization or a short-term guarantee of safety for the North Korean regime. The division of the Korean Peninsula is very difficult to resolve within the current geopolitical structure, but a route to unification must be made clear in consideration of South Korea’s national interest. Lastly, even if denuclearization is achieved, South Korea’s diplomatic difficulties will remain the same owing to the competition between the United States and China. In the process of denuclearization, South Korea’s regional strategy must be linked to the Korean Peninsula strategy as a whole so that denuclearization becomes a successful case of strategic cooperation between the United States and China. In that way, the mechanism of the United States-China cooperation and South Korea’s intervention capabilities will extend to other security issues in East Asia.■      Author Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the International Relations Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. He also serves as a professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University.      The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors    

Editor’s Note Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year address has been dissected and analyzed numerous times by North Korean experts. In this paper, Jong Hee Park of Seoul National University uses various tools of text analysis to decipher hidden patterns in the 2018 address and then interprets these patterns by comparing this year’s address with previous New Year addresses. In explaining why the vocabulary chosen in the 2017-18 New Year address is very different from the previous ones, Park looks at the facts that Kim Jong Un sees the year 2017 as a turning point from many perspectives.      Introduction   Every New Year’s Day since 1946, North Korean  leaders have issued a New Year address. The address typically contains various messages regarding the internal and external issues facing North Korea, and is usually full of congratulatory remarks for the North Korean people and socialist propaganda against external threats. However, North Korean leaders face different challenges every year and cannot recite the same messages over and over. North Korea has maintained a unique one-man-rule dictatorship in which the Kim dynasty, also known as the Mount Baekdu bloodline, controls the Party, the army and the North Korean people. In the process of legitimizing the ruling by the Kim dynasty after the first generation of Kim Il Sung, North Korea has developed a cult of the supreme leader whose authority and influence far exceeds what modern revolutionary dictators such as Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, or Fidel Castro envisioned. What makes North Korea unique among existing authoritarian regimes is this cult of the supreme leader.  The North Korea’s New Year address is a statement made directly by the supreme leader. The address contains clear policy goals and slogans that symbolize what North Korean people should achieve during the upcoming year. North Korean people are expected to memorize and recite the supreme leader’s address every year. This makes it one of the most important political texts that show the direction in which North Korea intends to take and this is why North Korean experts make an annual practice of dissecting and re-assembling the wordings in each New Year address. In this report, I will take a mixed approach to the interpretation of the 2018 address. First, I will use various tools of text analysis to decipher hidden patterns in the 2018 address. Next, I will interpret these patterns by comparing this year’s address with previous New Year addresses.  In this report, I would like to highlight six distinct features of the 2018 address that policy makers and experts should pay attention to. I delimit my discussion into these points in order not to reiterate what others have already said such as the length of the address, the peaceful stance toward South Korea, and the proclamation of the completion of the nuclear project although I may revisit some of these issues from a different angle. 1. How Unique is the 2018 Address?           There are many ways to compare the 2018 address with previous New Year addresses. In this report, we employ a simple, intuitive method of comparing unigram words that appear in this year’s address to those from all past New Year addresses beginning in 1946. Then, we use a clustering method to classify each address based on the vocabulary used.  Figure 1 visualizes the clustering of New Year addresses from 1946 to 2018. The second cluster from the left shows the post-1994 cluster covering the Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un periods. We can find that the 2017 and 2018 addresses consist of a distinct sub-cluster within the post-1994 cluster. In other words, the vocabulary chosen in the 2017-8 New Year addresses is very different from Kim Jung Un’s pre-2017 addresses (2013-2016) and those by Kim Jung Il. Then, what makes this shift in the vocabulary structure? What constitutes the distinct vocabulary structure of the 2017-8 New Year addresses? We will discuss them in details shortly. 2. A Critical Turn in Military Power In New Year addresses, North Korean leaders usually praise the achievements they made in the previous year using various excessive adjectives. Thus, the summary statement of the previous year is not something analysts usually pay much attention to. However, when North Korean leaders think that the previous year was particularly important, they do not hesitate to enhance their use of superlatives to emphasize their victories. In that regard, the 2017-8 New Year addresses stand out with regard to their emphasis on the previous year’s achievements.  To get a sense of what the summary sentence usually looks like, we tabulate summary sentences from the six most recent New Year addresses made between 2013 and 2018 in Table 1. Kim Jong Un has issued the regime’s New Year address since 2013. New Year addresses may be put forth by the supreme leader in different forms, including an editorial in the Rodong Sinmum, a co-editorial by three major newspapers (로동신문 Rodong Sinmun, 조선인민군 Joson Inmingun, 청년전위 Cheongnyeonjeonwi), a congratulatory statement, or a speech. All six addresses given between 2013 and 2018 took the form of speech delivered directly by Kim Jong Un. We summarize the key phrases of the summary sentences for the previous years in bold in Table 1. In order to understand the key phrase of the 2018 address, we need to take one step back and look at the 2017 address. The 2017 address defined 2016 as “a year of revolutionary event, a year of great change.” What constitutes this dramatic shift is North Korea’s transformation into a “nuclear strong state” and a “military strong state.” Specifically, Kim Jong Un mentioned the first hydrogen-to-nuclear test and nuclear warhead explosion tests. Most importantly, Kim claimed that the intercontinental ballistic rocket test launch project had reached the “closing stage.” This year’s address declared that the dramatic shift in the military defense system had been “completed.” Kim proclaimed that the completion of this shift “set the immortal milestone” in their history toward becoming a socialist strong state. In that sense, the year 2017 was “a year of heroic struggle and great victory, a year when we set up an indestructible milestone” for North Korea. Kim told his people that the long journey of building a socialist strong state had finally passed an “indestructible milestone” by proving the success of his intercontinental ballistic rocket launch test as he promised one year ago. What this all means is that Kim thinks that in 2017, North Korea passed an important turning point in its journey to becoming a strong socialist nuclear power. 3. Nuclear, Nuclear, Nuclear The second distinct feature of the 2018 address is the frequency of nuclear-related words. Figure 2 shows the frequency of nuclear-related words in recent addresses made by post-Kim Il Sung regimes. The 2018 address stands out for the frequency with which nuclear-related words appear. The high frequency of nuclear-related words in the 2018 address reflects North Korea’s confidence gained following several successful nuclear weapon and ballistic missile systems tests, which culminated in the test of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) on November 29, 2017. Table 2 shows nuclear-related words that appeared in the 2017 and 2018 addresses. A notable difference, besides the increased frequency, is the variety of nuclear-related words, which include such phrases as “nuclear bombardment range” and “nuclear counterattack operation posture.” The diversity of nuclear-related words employed clearly demonstrates the maturity of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development project, as well as the regime’s scope of intention on when and how to use these weapons. Of particular note is the fact that, for the first time, Kim detailed a kind of nuclear doctrine at the end of the 2018 address as follows: As a responsible, peace-loving nuclear power, our country will neither have recourse to nuclear weapons unless hostile forces of aggression violate its sovereignty and interests nor threaten any other country or region by means of nuclear weapons. However, it will resolutely respond to acts of wrecking peace and security on the Korean peninsula. According to this statement, the goal of North Korea’s nuclear project is deterrence, and the regime possesses no offensive ambitions regarding their nuclear weapons system, including their ICBMs. Nonetheless, Kim also stated that their decision to develop a nuclear weapons system proved to be the right one given the changes in international politics in 2017, a reference to the advent of the Trump administration.  However, Kim also acknowledged that the current stage of North Korea’s nuclear program is limited in terms of the number of warheads and actual deployment capabilities, saying that “In the nuclear weapons research and rocket industries, we must accelerate the mass production and deployment of nuclear warheads and ballistic rockets, which have already secured their strength and reliability.”   4. “I am the Supreme Leader!”  The New Year address is a statement from the supreme leader, not the Party. In North Korea’s personalistic (family-controlled) regime, the supreme leader is above the Party and people. In his 2018 address, Kim clearly shows how North Korea is different from other non-personalist autocracies in two instances.  The first instance is his mention of the “nuclear button.” Kim said “the nuclear button is on my office desk all the time.” This statement indicates that Kim alone has unchecked power over the use of nuclear weapons. The second instance is the statement “The United States can never come to war against me and our country.” Kim distinguishes himself from his country for the first time in his New Year addresses since 2013. Considering the fact that the content of a New Year address is carefully prepared and thoroughly edited by his aides, this distinction should be not read as a slip of the tongue. Then, what does “war against me” mean? First, this could indicate a secret operation targeting Kim’s removal such as a decapitation strike by US special forces. Second, it could mean any secret operation or campaign targeting regime change in North Korea by the US, China, or South Korea. By distinguishing himself from North Korea as a country, Kim inadvertently admits that the security of his regime is one thing and that of his country is another.   5. Now, it’s the Economy, People.  Behind the fanfare of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program lies North Korea’s devastated economy and increasing pressure from UN sanctions. If North Korea keeps its promise to limit its use of nuclear weapons to defensive purposes, the North Korean people will never see the utility of nuclear weapons. As Colin Powell said, “nuclear weapons are useless.” Kim probably knows this dilemma very well. He has concentrated the lion’s share of North Korea’s resources into the development and tests of the nuclear weapons system, which has not only diverted resources from other more useful purposes but also invited the implementation of harsh sanctions against North Korea by the international community, including China. As time goes on, the North Korean people will face the bitter consequences of this trade-off, a trade-off that they never approved and never had the chance to approve, in the form of food and oil shortages.  For that reason, Kim repeatedly emphasizes that North Korea needs to make a breakthrough in its economic development in this year’s address. Kim emphasized the goal of making the North Korean economy “independent and self-reliant.” The first step in achieving this goal is to bolster the electric power industry, followed by the metal industry, the chemical industry, the mechanical industry, mining, railroads, and light industry. The priority of this goal indicates Kim’s concerns regarding the recently imposed UN sanctions. However, what makes the current UN sanctions particularly painful to North Korea is China’s compliance. We may infer that the real goal is to make the North Korean economy independent of China.   6. Thank God the Winter Olympics are Coming!  The last thing we cannot miss in this year’s address is the gesture of reconciliation toward South Korea. Figure 3 shows the frequency of the term “South Korea” (Namjoseon) as it appears in New Year addresses since 1995. The 1999 address shows that the term “South Korea” was used ten times, but its use largely indicated the South Korean people, not the government. The term was used then as a form of socialist propaganda encouraging internal struggle against anti-North Korean institutions and laws. In contrast, Kim uses the term “South Korea” eight times in the 2018 address: four times to praise South Korean people’s successful impeachment of President Park Geun-hye and four times to reference the new South Korean government. Most impressively, every use of the term “South Korea” in the 2018 address is either positive or neutral. This degree of positivity towards South Korea is, to my knowledge, unprecedented. The intention behind this positive posture is complicated and highly strategic, as many commentators have already pointed out. However, considering the political importance of the New Year address as a form of instruction from the supreme leader, such a conciliatory posture should not be taken lightly.  The principle North Korea has used for the engagement with South Korea is “among our race 우리민족끼리”(uriminzzokkiri). For that matter, the regime change in South Korea and the upcoming Pyeongchang Winter Olympics provide an ideal opportunity for North Korea to change its stance while saving face. Kim closes his remarks on South Korea by saying “I sincerely hope that everything is going well in the North and South this year.”   Conclusion  Although North Korea already defined the year 2016 as “a year of great revolution, a year of revolutionary turn” in the 2017 address, we should consider the year 2017 as a turning point from many perspectives. First, in 2017 North Korea claimed that they had “completed” the nuclear weapons development project that they consider an “all-purpose sword” for deterrence. It remains to be seen whether this stated confidence is a strategic bluff to buy more time for the actual completion of the project, or a tough warning against any possible provocations intended to test North Korea’s nuclear resolve. However, North Korea has also admitted that their nuclear system is very limited in terms of the number of warheads and deployment capabilities.  Second, the 2018 address clearly demonstrates that North Korea is facing an entirely new type of security challenge now that the Trump administration has come to power in the US, as Trump continues to mull over military options for regime change or destruction of North Korea’s nuclear weapon system. Because of this, North Korea’s rhetoric toward the US has been extremely aggressive, even threatening, stating that now the entire US territory is within North Korea’s nuclear missile range.  Third, despite all of these issues, North Korea has clearly declared what can be considered a North Korean nuclear doctrine, stating it is a “responsible nuclear power who loves peace, and will not threaten any country or region with nuclear weapons.” The two purposes of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, according to Kim, are (1) for use against “threatening hostile forces that violate the sovereignty and interests of our nation” and (2) for use in a counterattack in response to “the act of destroying the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula.” Kim intends two things by this statement. The first goal is to send a clear signal to the US that any type of military option taken against North Korea will be countered with nuclear weapons. The second goal is to ask the international community (and the US in particular) to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power like India, Israel, and Pakistan. However, North Korea must be well aware that no county has been recognized as a nuclear power while threatening the US with their nuclear weapons. The second goal is nothing but far-fetched, wishful thinking. The true message of the statement is to drive home the first point: nuclear counterattack against any type of aggression.  The launch of Hwasong-16 convinced the CIA that North Korea’s ICBMs have nearly reached the completion stage. Recently, CIA Director Mike Pompeo advised the US President that the US has a  three-month window during which to preempt North Korea’s ICBM plans. North Korea’s hasty declaration of its nuclear success (originally made on November 29, 2017) and nuclear doctrine (on January 1, 2018) is a signal to the US that there is no window for a preemptive strike and any strike will be countered by military actions, possibly with nuclear warheads. In 1998, the International Olympic Committee revived an ancient Greek tradition of the “Olympic Truce,” or “Ekecheiria,” that calls upon all nations to observe the Truce. It is a historical irony that an Olympic Truce has been called for between the US and North Korea, who signed the armistice agreement that halted the Korean War in 1953, for the upcoming Pyeongchang Olympics. The Vice President of the US and the Chief of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea will visit Pyeongchang as the delegate heads of each country. So far, there are no signs of direct talks and negotiations between the two sides. It appears that the situation has reached a stalemate, and this stalemate in turn appears precarious because of the US’s (actually, the CIA’s) self-imposed deadline of a “March window.” This stalemate should be broken before any party chooses the irreversible option of punching the other in the face first – either via North Korea’s bombing of Guam or the US’s “bloody nose” operation - in order to avoid a catastrophic outcome that could kill millions of innocent lives in the Korean Peninsula and derail the improving global economy. The situation calls for someone to play the role of “honest broker.” It could be South Korea, China, Russia, EU, the United Nations, or any individual that can effectively deliver truthful information to both sides and convince top decision makers in both countries to choose the best available option that ensures mutual safety and benefits. There is no doubt that South Korean President Moon has the highest stake in solving this stalemate. ■     Author Jong Hee Park is currently employed as Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. His research interests include political methodology and international political economy. He received his Ph.D. from Washington University in St. Louis.    

[Editor’s Note] In Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year’s Speech on January 1, North Korea showed a firm commitment to strengthening its nuclear program while expressing its willingness to participate in the PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games and paving the way for further diplomacy. As the South Korean government responded positively to this move, anticipation is heightening at the prospect of improving inter-Korean relations. However, in this article, Young-Sun Ha points out that the two Koreas must overcome the distinct perception gap between them regarding the meaning of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games to continue the mood of reconciliation. While North Korea is using the Olympics to bolster their three revolutionary capabilities, South Korea understands it as a part of their new survival strategy and hopes it will be the first step on the path to reconciliation. Ha emphasizes that this difference of understanding will eventually be made clear after the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, when the ROK conducts a joint military exercise with the US and North Korea resumes its nuclear tests. A true path to improved inter-Korean relations will only be possible if North Korea seeks a new, twenty-first century strategy of coexistence.         KIM JONG UN’S 2018 NEW YEAR’S SPEECH HAS SPARKED BOTH anticipation and concern over a potential thaw in inter-Korean relations. The two Koreas became viciously hostile towards one another during the Korean War in the early 1950s, and the tough road from the July 4th South and North Joint Statement in 1972 to the Inter-Korean Summit in 2007 was paved with six instances of hope for reconciliation that ended in frustration over failure. Today’s hope for another chance must not follow the tragic pattern of the past, so it is critical to establish an understanding of the true meaning of Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Speech of January 1, 2018.   Conducting a content or big-data analysis of this speech will not provide an adequate understanding of the meaning that lies hidden beneath the text. This article introduces an Asian method of hermeneutics known as yi yi ni zhi (以意逆志), which can be translated as “using textual comprehension to trace the author’s intent.” This hermeneutical methodology requires readers to hear the speaker’s inner voice (意) and examine their world so that they might place themselves in the mind of the speaker to better understand what that person is trying to pursue (志). It is our goal to forecast North Korea’s trajectory for 2018 by aligning our perspective with that of Kim Jong Un and subsequently analyzing his speech from this point of view.   Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Speech of 2018 did not differ greatly from those of the past. It began with a summary of the successes of the prior year and proposed a blueprint for the upcoming year with the ‘three revolutionary capabilities,’ a concept employed since the mid-1960s, as its framework. Kim Jong Un began his address by extending sincere greetings to “all the people and service personnel, the compatriots in the South and abroad, and the progressive peoples and other friends across the world.” He then stated that the country achieved an “indestructible milestone in the history of building a powerful socialist country” in 2017 even though “the moves of the United States and its vassal forces to isolate and stifle our country went to extremes.” He emphasized “the accomplishment of the great, historic cause of perfecting the national nuclear forces” as “an outstanding success” of 2017, and then boasted of the “notable headway in carrying out the five-year strategy for national economic development” and “successes…made on the scientific and cultural fronts.” triumph of the Juche-oriented revolutionary line of the Workers’ Party of Korea” despite “the sanctions-and-blockade moves the United States and its vassal forces perpetrated more viciously than ever before to stamp out the rights to sovereignty, existence and development of the DPRK.”   However, North Korea’s counterintuitive effort to overcome the existing danger posed by nuclear weapons by developing additional nuclear technology is only worsening the security situation. Despite this, Kim Jong Un put forth the rallying cry, “Let us launch a revolutionary general offensive to achieve fresh victory on all fronts of building a powerful socialist country!” as if the achievement of building nuclear weapons in order to strengthen North Korea’s domestic capacity would prove to be the key factor in overcoming the current crisis. On the first front, he emphasizes that North Korea should “enhance the independence and Juche character of the national economy and improve the people’s standard of living” for “the socialist economic construction.” As “a shortcut to developing the self-sufficient economy” he gives “precedence to science and technology” and requests “innovations in economic planning and guidance.” On the second front, he proposes a comprehensive development of socialist culture.   On the third front, Kim Jong Un pushes for further consolidation of the country’s self-reliant defense capabilities, stating “the nuclear weapons research sector and the rocket industry should mass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, the power and reliability of which have already been proved to the full, to give a spur to the efforts for deploying them for action.” The fourth front addresses “political and ideological might,” stating: “All Party organizations should never tolerate all shades of heterogeneous ideas and double standards of discipline that run counter to the Party’s ideology, but strengthen the single-hearted unity of the whole Party centered on its Central Committee in every way possible.”   Next, Kim Jong Un underscores the strengthening of the nation’s unification capacity as a tool for North Korea’s continued survival in the face of numerous existential threats. North Korea’s unification capacity depends upon its domestic capacity, and Kim Jong Un elaborates the steps necessary to strengthen them both as follows. First, “a peaceful environment on the Korean peninsula” should be created by easing “the acute military tension between the North and the South.” Second, North Korea is willing to open its “doors to anyone from South Korea, including the ruling party and opposition parties, organizations and individual personages of all backgrounds, for dialogue, contact and travel.” Third, “the authorities of the North and the South should raise the banner of national independence higher than ever before” and “they will resolve all the issues arising in bilateral relations on the principle of By Our Nation Itself.” And fourth, North Korea is “willing to dispatch our delegation” to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games, and “with regard to this matter, the authorities of the North and the South may meet together soon.”   Lastly, North Korea’s effort to strengthen its international power is limited by increasing international sanctions and deterrence in response to its continuing development of nuclear and missile technology. Nevertheless, Kim Jong Un asserted in his New Year’s Address that North Korea will stand against “the imperialist forces of aggression” as a “nuclear power,” while stating it will also continue to “develop good-neighborly and friendly relations with all the countries that respect our national sovereignty and are friendly to us.”   Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Address clearly outlines the three facets of North Korea’s survival strategy for 2018. With this in mind, the South Korean government should implement the following policies in collaboration with the international community in order to successfully resolve the situation on the Peninsula and build a lasting peace.   First, it should be recognized that there is a distinct gap between the two Koreas as far as their perspective on the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games. We can hope that North Korea’s participation in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics will act as a stepping stone for further dialogue to better the inter-Korean relationship, but whether it does or not will depend on how the Koreas manage this perception gap. North Korea’s decision to dispatch a delegation does not mean that the country intends to change its position on the three revolutionary capabilities. Rather, it is another way of bolstering these capabilities. Meanwhile, South Korea is hoping that North Korea’s participation in the Olympics will be an opportunity to better the inter-Korean relationship, a goal that North Korea’s 2018 survival strategy explicitly states as well. The impact of this meeting between the two Koreas will be made clear after the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, when the ROK conducts a joint military exercise with the US and North Korea resumes its nuclear test. A true path to improved inter-Korean relations will unfurl only if North Korea seeks a new, twenty-first century strategy of coexistence that goes beyond its historical focus on strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities.   North Korea continues to mass produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles and conduct test launches under the assumption that this strategy will ensure their survival. However, North Korea must recognize on its own that the crisis on the Peninsula has been created by these very acts, and find a new way to combat perceived threats against itself, its counterpart, and the world. As long as North Korea continues to develop nuclear technology, it will never be free of the international sanctions imposed by the US, China, and other stakeholders. A strong deterrence system should be constructed rapidly in order to neutralize the North Korean nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region. North Korea is facing increased economic hardship and reduced political capacity as its efforts to become a nuclear state result in international isolation. However, South Korea and other neighboring states should not hesitate to suggest a new framework of a complex peace and prosperity system, which will guarantee the survival and prosperity of a denuclearized North Korea.   Lastly, as the three revolutionary capabilities are changing, North Korea must consider pursuing a new twenty-first century survival strategy. While outside pressure can be an important incentive, efforts to change internally will be the most critical element in this shift. North Korea is already undergoing economic marketization and informatization via high technology in the socio-cultural sphere. During this historical transition, the South Korean government must also make a long-term push so that North Korea can adopt a new Byungjin (parallel) policy of pursuing non-nuclear security and economic development that aligns with political and ideological values of the twenty-first century. ■         Author Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.   Young-Hwan Shin is Director of the Research Planning Department at the East Asia Institute.

Editor’s Note U.S. President Donald Trump successfully finished his first tour of Asia since his inauguration in January 2017. While many had high hopes that the U.S.’s Asia strategy might be unraveled during the tour, it ended up with an unclear picture of the regional strategy. According to Chaesung Chun, it is noteworthy that Trump administration put forth “free and open Indo-Pacific” regional strategy as an alternative to the Obama administration’s Rebalancing strategy. However, Trump’s current Asian regional policy focuses heavily on the economics and does not provide clear pictures on the future direction of the U.S.-China relations, implications of regional alliances, and multilateral economic cooperation, thereby making it difficult to see Trump’s Asian regional policy as an intricately woven concept.         President Trump’s tour of Asia drew a great deal of attention as the world expected it to indicate the type of Asian strategy the Trump Administration will pursue. President Trump did not lay out a clear Asian strategy during his campaign as domestic agendas, particularly economic issues, dominated the last U.S. presidential election. The tour, which consisted of three formal state visits and three key regional summits, wrapped up on November 15. On the final day of the trip, President Trump articulated the three core goals of the tour: first, to unite the world in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue; second, to create a free and open Indo-Pacific; and third, to establish fair and reciprocal trade rules.   President Trump stated that his goal is to unite the world against the North Korean threat, not to find the “solution to the issue.” He argued that the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program has been steadily growing and now requires urgent attention. The term “free and open Indo-Pacific” was used by key cabinet members, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, even before the tour. President Trump stressed that America’s greater goal is to strengthen its alliances and economic partnerships in a free and open Indo-Pacific comprised of thriving, independent nations that are respectful of other countries and their own citizens and safe from foreign domination and economic servitude. He also insisted on the realization of fair and reciprocal trade for the United States, which has an almost $800-billion annual trade deficit with other nations. All countries that seek to do business with the United States must follow the rules. President Trump delivered a clear message that the United States seeks to protect the values and security of the United States through fair competition in Asia.   Although it is still abstract, the major focus continues to be the United States’ comprehensive Asian strategy. The term “free and open Indo-Pacific” can be regarded as an alternative to the Obama administration’s “Rebalance to Asia” policy. With the region emerging as a key focal point for U.S. security and economic strategy under the greater goal of retrenchment, the Obama administration placed relatively strong emphasis on Asia and invested a greater amount of policy resources there.   President Trump is presenting a concept of U.S. interest promotion that redefines the security and economic architecture of the Indo-Pacific region while emphasizing the security and economic situation in Europe and the Middle East.   proposed in 2007 by Gurpreet Khurana, a former Indian naval captain and current executive director of the Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, India. Following several months of strategic dialogue between India and Japan, Prime Minister Abe used this concept in his address to the Parliament of India in 2007. Prime Minister Abe emphasized the Indian and the Pacific Oceans as the oceans of freedom and prosperity during his visit to India. The United States government began to use the term around 2010. Hillary Clinton, who was Secretary of State at the time, emphasized cooperation with the Indian Navy in the Pacific Ocean and with the Indo-Pacific region for global trade and commerce. Australia’s defense white paper of 2013 used the term “Indo-Pacific” to indicate its emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region for economic and military strategy. It is only natural that China understood this series of actions as part of a China containment policy. Accordingly, China has exhibited a vigilant attitude with regards to the formation of a containment network across the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.   China, as a rising global power, is now pursuing “Two Ocean” strategy across the Indian and the Pacific Oceans along with the “One Belt One Road” initiative. India, which has the third largest economy in Asia and the seventh largest economy in the world, has also turned its attention to Asia. It has shifted from the Look East Policy to the Act East Policy and has strengthened its economic and security relations with Asia. Japan is also strengthening its ties with Southeast Asian states while pursuing a security and economic strategy that draws it closer to India and Australia. In this context, the notion of the free and open Indo-Pacific region promoted by top U.S. officials warrants serious attention.   Secretary of State Tillerson mentioned the Indo-Pacific region during his visit to India, expressing his view that the Indian and the Pacific Oceans are inseparable in terms of security and economy. While the key element of the concept of the Indo-Pacific region lies in the connection of both oceans, it also involves the perception that India must inevitably become a part of the Asian security and economic architecture. Yet, there is a long road ahead if India is to be incorporated into the Asian security arrangement, not least because the country is neither a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) nor the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is also far from certain whether and how India, a conventionally nonconformist country in the international arena, would toe the line as part of a U.S.-led Asia strategy. These doubts are not unwarranted given that India, confident in its strength, wants to follow its own path in the competition between the U.S. and China.   It is yet to be understood what the content of Trump’s “free and open Indo-Pacific region” will be, or what strategy he will pursue specifically. In the joint statement given by Japan and the U.S. following the summit talks on November 6, Japanese Prime Minister Abe referenced the Indo-Pacific region, welcoming countries that want to join the initiative. The general impression undoubtedly is that the U.S. is playing a supporting role in Japan’s regional strategy. Still, it is difficult to imagine that Japan’s top priority in its regional initiative is to encircle China and keep the country in check. While President Trump said during the press conference that China was an excellent friend, it appears that Japan will be keeping a close eye on U.S.-China relations, and more specifically the Trump-Xi partnership. At the moment, President Trump is stressing cooperation with China on bilateral economic relations and the North Korean nuclear issue. Trump would not want an Indo-Pacific regional initiative to arouse anti-Chinese sentiment under these circumstances. Japan is also hinting at building a better relationship with President Xi, who is more actively seeking “a new type of international relations” as well as regional partnerships in the wake of the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress.   As for now, President Trump’s vision of an Indo-Pacific region is largely economic. This was clearly spelled out in his remarks at the CEO summit in Danang, Vietnam on November 10, which was held on the sidelines of the APEC summit meetings. He said that a free and open Indo-Pacific region is where independent, sovereign states share diverse cultures and visions while dreaming about development in peace, freedom and prosperity. In a way, this “Indo-Pacific Dream” may become a U.S. alternative to the China Dream. Emphasizing at length America’s historical bond with Asia, President Trump highlighted the U.S. relationship with India and Southeast Asia as well as Northeast Asia. He was generous in his praise while congratulating India on the 70th anniversary of its independence, noting its status as the biggest democracy in the world with astonishing economic growth. Of particular focus here are economic issues. That is, at the core of prosperity and security for the U.S. and Indo-Pacific nations is the principle of equity and reciprocity. Denouncing the deficiencies of the World Trade Organization (WTO), President Trump pointed to the damage they did to U.S. interests. He stated that the U.S. would put its interests first as all other countries do. In the end, the U.S. vision of the Indo-Pacific reflects first and foremost the reasoning that the U.S. will share its prosperity only with the countries that agree to uphold rules that promote U.S. interests.   Upon observing the abovementioned points, one can summarize Trump’s notion of a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” into four points. First, his emphasis on the phrase “free and open” cannot be seen as spontaneous and ephemeral; rather, it is likely to be maintained. This regional notion is not only shared among the United States, Japan, and India. European countries must also consider it important to link the Indian and Pacific Oceans as the trade volume between Europe and China expands and China pursues its “Two Ocean” strategy and “One Belt One Road” initiative. Furthermore, more countries are now recognizing the importance of maritime security issues, freedom of the seas, and maritime transport.   Second, due to the particular nature of the Trump administration, it is difficult to interpret the notion of a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” as a concept that has been intricately woven in terms of regional strategy. President Trump is currently facing domestic political challenges, such as allegations of collusion in the Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and needs to gain ground at home by bringing about economic recovery and job creation. Because the situation is too urgent for Trump to be able to ensure a successful presidency through the pursuit of a global and regional security strategy, he should at least seek short-term economic gains. Moreover, Trump’s personality is too different from those of previous presidents for him to give serious thought to the long-term linkage between geopolitics and geoeconomics and the very foundations of U.S. hegemony. The notion of an “Indo-Pacific region” has been suggested as the key concept behind a revival of the U.S. economy. It is more likely to be connected to bilateral economic negotiations with countries that are in agreement with President Trump on his trade principles. Under the current system in which multilateral economic architectures such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are nearly collapsing, it remains to be seen how the United States will shape its policy on the Asian regional economy without multilateral cooperation.   Third, the U.S. has postponed, or rather, avoided, situating China in its discussion of devising a comprehensive future strategy. While President Trump emphasized the North Korean nuclear problem and U.S.-China economic relations during the press conference after his visit to China, he failed to mention anything about the important regional security issues surrounding the South China Sea and East China Sea. It is unclear whether an awareness of the possibility of strategic competition and clash between the United States and China, as illustrated in Thucydides’ trap, has been factored in at all. Because Trump is primarily concerned with ensuring the promotion of U.S. interests among other tasks facing the country, the key issue at hand is to promote U.S.-China trade and investment agreements, currently valued at $250 billion, and free trade with China. As of right now, it is difficult to foresee how the Trump administration is drawing a strategic blueprint regarding the future direction of the U.S.-China relations.   Fourth, it is difficult to gauge the importance of alliance in the context of the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific regional strategy. The Obama administration’s Rebalancing strategy was based on the key principles of alliance, strategic partnership with major countries such as China, the market economy, and democracy. The concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” is generally not specific regarding the strategic resources on which the concept is based, and it is even less clear on the role of alliance. President Trump mentioned that countries that abide by the rules suggested by the U.S. will remain economic partners while those that do not will not. It is true that the old-fashioned sense of alliance in terms of collectively responding to common traditional security threats has faded as issues such as intellectual property protection, the prevention of unfair government subsidies, the eradication of cybercrime, and the amelioration of unfair competition are of utmost importance. While it should be noted that President Trump did acknowledge past alliances and emphasize their importance during his visits to South Korea and Japan, he did not outline a vision of a future alliance or the crucial role it will play in the U.S. relations with Asia. President Trump does not seem to have a clear conception of the essence of security threats. For example, he mentioned that it is not right to closely link economic security with national security, and then clearly stated that “economic security IS national security.”   South Korea’s main concern is how Trump’s extensive tour of Asia will influence the future direction of the North Korean nuclear issue. Trump’s five-nation Asia tour leaves the following points to consider regarding the North Korean nuclear problem. First, it is apparent that President Trump views the North Korean nuclear problem as urgent and serious as it now has the potential to directly affect the U.S. mainland. However, he does not fully recognize that North Korea’s nuclear development is the geopolitical issue surrounding the Korean Peninsula and international politics in East Asia, which in turn are closely related to the future status of Korean Peninsula and North Korea’s strategic position in the region. The North Korean nuclear problem is also not connected to the Indo-Pacific regional strategy. Trump seems to be focusing on isolating North Korea, maximizing pressure and sanctions on the North, and reiterating the end goal of denuclearization. In so doing, it has become apparent that Trump is more concerned about protecting the U.S. mainland from a North Korean nuclear missile attack rather than taking into account historical and strategic calculations regarding the division of the Korean Peninsula or the North Korean nuclear problem.   Second, the Trump administration has proposed a North Korea policy of maximum pressure and engagement. While he emphasized maximum pressure during his visits to Asia, he did not provide a concrete strategic blueprint for engagement with the North. Engagement is a concept that embraces various policy considerations including the future strategic position of North Korea, conditions for long-term peace with North Korea, and diplomacy toward denuclearization. Even though Trump’s tour of Asia was a great opportunity for him to signal to Asian countries how the U.S. will develop its long-term strategic relationship with North Korea, he unfortunately failed to do so. However, it does seem that the conditions for dialogue with North Korea have somewhat improved. Although Trump did state that all options were on the table, he did not say it often. Furthermore, sanctions and pressure were emphasized as the main policy options while the military option was barely mentioned. As the date of departure for President Trump’s tour of Asia neared, key cabinet members including the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense continuously highlighted the importance of dialogue with North Korea. This may also imply that the U.S. has more thoroughly and carefully evaluated the possible damages that the military option would inflict upon South Korea and Japan.   Fourth, Trump criticized the dictatorship and mentioned the current human rights situation in North Korea during his speech to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. Introducing the concept of the “thin line of civilization,” Trump excluded the North from its sphere. This phrase may cause difficulties once official dialogue with North Korea begins in earnest. While sanctions for human rights violations are possible, future negotiation with North Korea based on cool-headed calculation of strategic interests is necessary. On the other hand, it is a positive sign that Trump’s criticism against North Korea’s political regime did not lead to a discussion of the possibility of using the military option.   Fifth, it remains to be seen how the U.S.-China dialogues set up to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue will translate into actual policy. Controversy over the ‘freeze-for-freeze’ initiative between the U.S. and China is already brewing, and China recently dispatched Special Envoy Song Tao to Pyongyang. Despite President Trump’s visit to Beijing, the U.S. and China still have different positions on the North Korean nuclear problem. The gap between these positions is a challenge that will need a longer period of time be resolved.   It is naïve to believe that Trump’s recent tour of Asia signals the approach of a decisive moment for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem. The U.S. approach to the issue does not display a full understanding or consideration of South Korea’s concerns or China’s strategic position. President Trump himself emphasized coalition and cooperation among relevant stakeholders rather than the resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea should closely monitor how the U.S.’s Asian regional strategy pans out and analyze its effects on South Korean national interests. On the other hand, the North Korean nuclear program should be considered part of the strategic problem surrounding the Korean Peninsula and North Korea in general. Furthermore, South Korea should be prepared to respond to future developments under a complex policy toward North Korea consisting of pressure, sanction, deterrence, engagement and North Korea’s normalization. ■           AuthorChaesung Chun is the Chair of the Center for International Relations Studies at the East Asia Institute, and also a professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. His main research interests include international relations, security studies, South Korean foreign policy, and East Asian security relations. Dr. Chun received his Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University.