Author Sung-han Kim , Professor Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) Seoul, ROK     I. U.S. Approach to Non-Proliferation and North Korean Nukes Preventing WMD Terrorism The Bush administration’s nonproliferation objectives were spelled out in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002. Specifically, that strategy has three main pillars: • Counterproliferation to combat WMD use including active measures: (1) to prevent the threat from occurring via effective interdiction of WMD systems, materials, technology, and expertise being transferred to hostile states and terrorist organizations, (2) to seek to deter the threat if materializes, and (3) to defend against the threat if it is employed against the U.S., its allies, and friends. • Strengthened nonproliferation efforts involving active diplomacy, multilateral and bilateral regimes, nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation, controls on nuclear materials, export controls, and nonproliferation sanctions. • Consequence management to respond to WMD use. President Bush has stressed repeatedly that the greatest threat before human dignity is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or nuclear weapons. The Bush administration is thus poised to channel all its energies into removing even the remotest possibility of “WMD terrorism.” The Bush administration considers the three gravest threats of nuclear terrorism to be 1) lax control over and the consequent leakage of nuclear materials from the former Soviet republics, where 90 percent of the world’s total nuclear elements are stored; 2) the possible sale of nuclear-related materials by rogue states such as North Korea and Iran; and 3) terrorist organizations’ persistent attempts to procure nuclear materials.1 In this light, the U.S. policy toward the North Korean nuclear problem is aimed at neutralizing North Korea’s attempts to become a nuclear state while preventing North Korea from transferring nuclear weapons or materials, if any, to other states or terrorists.   Hawk Engagement   The Bush administration hopes that North Korea’s Kim Jong-il regime will “voluntarily” make a strategic decision to dismantle its nuclear development programs as Libya’s Qadhafi regime did. Washington’s preference for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in the Libyan way was expressed positively by Rice during her visit to South Korea in July 2004. Rice, then national security advisor, stated, “The time has come for North Korea to make a strategic choice at the six-party talks in the direction of nuclear disarmament... I wish [National Defense Commission Chairman] Kim Jong Il would talk to [Libyan leader] Qadhafi, and he will know what I mean.” Confronted with a rocky post-war reconstruction process in Iraq, however, the United States is of the mind that it can “manage” the North Korean nuclear issue limitedly as long as North Korea does not cross the “redline,” or Washington’s ultimate patience, by conducting nuclear tests or transferring nuclear materials outside the country. U.S. approach to the North Korean nuclear problem is based upon the idea of “hawk engagement.” Victor Cha, currently director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), claimed that the crux of the “hawk engagement” policy was “based on the idea that engagement lays the groundwork for punitive action [in case the other party rejects or abuses engagement afterwards].” Only when countries concerned, excepting North Korea, reach the consensus that “the failure of enhanced diplomacy should be demonstrably attributable to Pyongyang”—as the “Armitage Report” contends—will it be possible to form a coalition to execute a pressure policy on North Korea.   “Hawk engagement” failed to play a proper role during Bush’s first four years in office for two reasons. First, the Bush administration proclaimed the preemptive attack doctrine at home and abroad in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) following the September 11 attacks, thereby giving the impression that it was a new doctrine Bush formulated for the first time and that his administration was seriously considering a preemptive attack to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Consequently, Pyongyang seized on Washington’s renewed preemptive attack pronouncements as a golden opportunity to launch a “propaganda campaign” peddling that hostile U.S. policies compelled it to develop nuclear weapons.   North Korea’s obstinate strategy of “muddling through” that resists showing a real progress in the nuclear six-party talks will slowly exhaust the “patience” of the other five countries concerned, which in turn will provide the grounds for the United States to gradually tighten the screws on North Korea. One cannot rule out the possibility, then, of North Korea’s provocative actions in response. It had been reported at the very end of 2002 that the Bush administration would prepare a “tailored containment” policy to put maximum economic and political pressure on North Korea so that it would abandon its efforts to make nuclear weapons. If North Korea refuses to forgo its nukes, the United States would impose economic sanctions through the UNSC, and the U.S. military might intercept missile shipments to prevent North Korea from proliferating the transportation vehicle of WMDs to other regions. The plan also calls for the United States to encourage North Korea’s neighbors, i.e., China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to limit or even sever economic ties with North Korea.   Tailored containment is different from simple containment in that the former is more systematic and proactive than the latter that means the waiting for the enemy’s collapse. George Kennan’s containment policy of half a century ago called for the political isolation of the Communist countries by means of a slow strangulation through the development of political and military alliances. The Bush administration appears to be considering a more sophisticated policy by which the United States would withdraw or reduce “goodies” on which North Korea is dependent, i.e., food and energy. The United States would “tailor” its containment policy to maximize North Korea’s political and economic vulnerabilities to the surrounding countries. For this policy to be successful, however, it is necessary to form a regional consensus that efforts to resolve the nuclear problem in a peaceful manner have been exhausted. Without this consensus, the containment of North Korea’s Kim Jong-il regime is unworkable. Against this backdrop, it is less likely that the United States will replace the current Six Party Talks with the bilateral talks with North Korea. The United States will just allow the bilateral talks within the context of the Six Party Talks. Should the United States enter into bilateral talks while the North claims the Six Party Talks useless, North Korea might then drag on the talks for a matter of months, thus potentially riding out what could be the worst period of international reaction to its nuclear declarations and ambitions. By the time such bilateral talks end or collapse, the focus would likely be upon the mutual recriminations as to who was responsible for the breakdown of the talks, rather than the acceptability of North Korea’s withdrawal from NPT and its declaration of its nuclear status...(Continued)    

Prospects for the North Korean Nuclear Crisis after the Missile Test     North Korean Nuclear Problem after the Missile Test   The current North Korean nuclear crisis is in deadlock. Although there was some progress made during the second term of the Bush Administration, there is little reason to feel optimistic about the future. The current impasse is centered on making progress towards the third phase as set out in the Feb. 13th agreement reached through the Six-Party Talks. In the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19th September, 2005, the principle “action for action” was outlined as the format for implementing the agreed phased actions.    This process includes three main phases to resolve the crisis. To date, the First and Second Phases of the agreement are being finalized, going through the stage of the “dismantlement with full report and verification” of its nuclear program. This is what was agreed to in the Six-Party Talks’ “Initial Actions Agreement” on 13 February, 2007. But even if progress was made in completing the Second Phase of “complete and correct” declaration, the Third Phase will be the main challenge to fully resolving the crisis. While the first two phases puts the breaks on North Korea’s nuclear program, the Third Phase requires full denuclearization in a “verifiable and complete manner”.      With North Korea stalling on this part of the agreement and the U.S. insisting on denuclearization, it will be hard to see this resolved. Based upon the “action for action” principle, one side can’t move without the other’s satisfactory reciprocal action. This makes it difficult to make a strategic decision on the delicate and sensitive Third Phase, especially for North Korea desperately in need of regime security.    In resolving this stalemate, it had been expected that with the election of President Obama and the new administration, there would be a fundamental renewal and improvement in U.S.-North Korean relations. Certainly this was North Korea’s initial hope. But upon examination of statements and comments by the new administration, we wonder if there will be any change from the Bush administration’s policies towards North Korea. Although the Obama administration is currently reviewing its North Korea policy, we can expect that they will be working from the foundations laid by former Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill during the Bush administration’s second term. Ambassador Stephen J. Bosworth, the newly appointed Special Representative for North Korea Policy, mentioned that in regard to North Korea “the fundamental goal of the United States remains unchanged.”     Consequences of the North Korean Missile Test for South Korea   With the launch of the long-range missile which North Korea claimed was the “launch of a satellite” on April, 5, attention now should focus on the reaction of major powers, international society and the United Nations to this provocation.    What options are there for South Korea? If we go back to the last major incident which was the nuclear test and the failed launch of a Taepodong II missile in 2006, South Korea’s response was more of a formality than actual criticism. It failed to take any lead in that crisis.    The reaction the American, Chinese, Japanese and North Korean sides gave over the missile test was expected. So South Korea should strongly consider the kind of policy response it will pursue, which should not just be a formality like the last time. South Korea needs to seriously think about what kind of role it can play in this crisis. It will be vital that it shows some kind of initiative or it faces the genuine prospect of being marginalized in its efforts to resolve the crisis.   Looking ahead, South Korea should consider the following scenarios and determine what kind of influential and meaningful position it will take.   Scenarios Following the Missile Test   Scenario 1_ Negotiations Breakdown  The U.S. position on the missile test was strong. It vehemently opposed the testing of any missile. Therefore, we can see that this will make continued negotiations difficult. In this scenario, we will see some breakdown in talks between the two sides. In such a case, it will be difficult if not impossible to move on into the Third Phase.   Scenario 2_ Negotiations Eventually Resume  If we look back to the first nuclear crisis in 1993-94, we saw how the situation deteriorated but eventually stabilized allowing for bilateral and multilateral negotiations to resume. Following this current crisis, we can expect that the U.S. will over time grudgingly resume negotiations once the situation has eased.   Upon the resumption of negotiations, we can then expect the U.S. to exert more pressure on North Korea and raise the level of results expected. Through its actions, North Korea is trying to increase the pressure and is hoping to acquire the ultimate “package deal” from the U.S. in exchange for full denuclearization. In this situation, North-South Korean relations can improve in resolving the crisis and it will be vital that policy makers take up this opportunity.     Scenario 3_ No Impact on Negotiations  By launching its missile and raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, as seen recently by the threats to civilian airliners, North Korea is hoping to gain a stronger position in its negotiations. However the result it expects may not come about. Its actions have not had an impact on U.S.-ROK relations in the way that it had hoped and the U.S. is not likely to respond to North Korea’s gestures. In such a case, North Korea has seriously misjudged the U.S. This thinking is based on the fact that the U.S. tends to follow its own logic in dealing with North Korea. If it wishes to negotiate, it will; if not, it will pull away from the table but its decisions will not be influenced by North Korea’s actions. This is a strong characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. As a matter of fact, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton mentioned that "it is important to recognize that the North Koreans entered into obligations regarding denuclearization that we intend to try to hold them to, and that is something we're going to do regardless of what ... they may or may not launch in the future." The issue, then, is whether there will be another, more effective provocation that North Korea can adopt to draw the US to the negotiation table.   Going Forward: The Obama Administration’s North Korea Policy   The Obama administration seems to be currently reviewing its policy on North Korea, but it has to hit the ground running. North Korea is not allowing the new administration time to consider what will be the best option. We can expect that the Obama administration will be pursuing all channels of dialogue and negotiation with North Korea; single channel, bilateral, multilateral to achieve the desired goal of denuclearization. This is in line with much of the new administration’s broad foreign policy in using all tools available to the task. One notable shift that we have seen with regard to its North Korea policy is the change in language. The language used is often a strong indicator of the direction that a new administration will go in its foreign policy. The Obama administration’s initial stance of “direct and tough” approach has now become just a “tough” approach as State Secretary Clinton has shown in her recent Asian visit.■    

In the second session of the Global NK Conference held on May 10 with security experts from Korea, U.S., and China, the speakers presented on the future areas of cooperation among Seoul-Washington-Beijing on pressing issues including nonproliferation and nuclear safety. Furthermore, considering the acute disagreement between the U.S. and Chinese experts on who is causing the nuclear arms race in East Asia, the panelists called for an urgent need to address this conflict in perception in order to secure stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.   ■ Time: May 10, 2023 (Wednesday), 11:10-12:20 ■ Location: Orchid Room, The Westin Josun Seoul ■ Panelists (in alphabetical order): CHUN, Chaesung (Chair, EAI National Security Research Center; Professor, Seoul National University); GIOVANNINI, Francesca (Executive Director, Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center); JIA, Qingguo (Professor, Peking University); KIM, Tae-Hyung (Professor, Soongsil University); OUYANG, Wei (Vice-Chairman, Grandview Institution); SOHN, Yul (President, EAI; Professor, Yonsei University); TOBEY, William (Director, Office of National Security and International Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory)     ■ Presenter: TOBEY, William (Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory) “A Path Forward on Nuclear Nonproliferation” • Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a stable regime and a solid asset for international peace and security. While the death of NPT has been predicted many times, these predictions have been proven wrong. Yet this time may be different. • Attack on the NPT regime will have a far-reaching impact on the Korean Peninsula. Since the 2000s, diplomacy to reverse the DPRK nuclear threat has stalled. • The world changed in February 2022 when Russia violated and vandalized the international order. Russia and China, both members of the NPT and permanent members of the UN Security Council, are evidently rethinking or already directly attacking the NPT. • In response, however, further proliferation cannot be the answer. Like-minded countries supporting the NPT and shared values must act together. They must prepare an active defense of norms, values, and laws, and achieve more tangible defense. • Extended deterrence has been the most successful nonproliferation policy in the course of history. The best evidence is shown by the difference between Poland and Ukraine. Fortunately, ROK is part of the U.S. treaty alliance and a beneficiary of U.S. extended deterrence. More work is needed bilaterally and multilaterally to fight against the threat to nonproliferation.   ■ Presenter: OUYANG, Wei (Vice-Chairman, Grandview Institution) “Seeking Cooperation Amid Strategic Dilemma” • China-U.S. competition is intensifying while DPRK continues its weapon development, and ROK’s DPRK policy is becoming more hardline under the Yoon administration. However, basis and principles for cooperation among the relevant countries in the Korean Peninsula still exist. • Regional order on the Korean Peninsula is less likely to turn into a “new Cold War,” since relevant countries still share the common interest of nuclear safety, security, and stability. • Countries, therefore, still have a space to seek cooperation. Great power competition does not mean confrontation in all fields. Nuclear safety, security, avoiding nuclear war, regional stability, and nuclear-related environmental issues are some shared interests and potential areas of China-U.S.-ROK cooperation. • Multilateral approaches like the Six-Party Talks have often been suspended, but the basic rules and principles are not outdated. Any possible bilateral or multilateral dialogues to promote denuclearization, security, and stability can be meaningful.   ■ Presenter: CHUN, Chaesung (Chair, EAI National Security Research Center; Professor, Seoul National University) “Navigating Future Security Challenges in the Korean Peninsula: Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Engagement” • U.S.-China relations may be adversarial on the surface, but this is based on strategic mistrust and misperception that can be resolved. U.S. thinks that China’s drive for economic development is revisionist in nature, and China believes that the U.S. is containing China unjustly by challenging its territorial sovereignty and integrity over Taiwan. • After the Bali Summit in November 2022, there have been some signs of positive changes. Cautious optimism was observed from the Chinese side, and the U.S. tried to present a vision for ultimate goal of its China strategy. • Yet to improve its position and enhance the credibility of such commitment, the U.S. should present a more explicit strategic framework implying that it wishes to manage the competition in a reasonable manner. In order to achieve mature relations, it is important to engage in continuous dialogue, diplomacy, and rules-based competition. • For Korea, the U.S.-China arms race is increasingly more threatening. ROK should try to find a “strategic space” to enhance cooperation with the two countries. • Washington Declaration was more focused on confirming reassurance for ROK. But this has provoked DPRK in some sense. We need communication with the adversary counterpart and send a signal to the DPRK that extended deterrence is inherently defensive, not offensive.   ■ Discussion 1: JIA, Qingguo • As Professor William Tobey mentioned, the fact that the NPT is under threat is a matter of great concern. The NPT faces numerous challenges. The U.S. itself challenges the regime by deploying nuclear submarines to Australia, and Washington actively discusses deploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea and Japan. • Nuclear safety is a shared interest in the region, and pragmatic steps are required to ensure this. In this front, both the U.S. and China want stability and have in fact voiced strong commitment. However, the reality is much more complicated. Nevertheless, U.S. and China should have benign competition and compete to be better.   ■ Discussion 2: GIOVANNINI, Francesca • It is true that future East Asian order will be predominantly shaped by competition and cooperation between U.S. and China. This order will further shape the general international order as well. • U.S. and China relations can be defined as “complex interdependence.” The competition cannot be understood in a merely “security dynamic” perspective. While the two states are engaged in competition, there exists a need for cooperation. • DPRK can offer a valuable opportunity for U.S. and China to show the world that great power cooperation can work. China is a major player, a responsible actor in dealing with the Korean Peninsula. In this context, China should recognize and come to the table as it did during the Six-Party Talks. • China and ROK-U.S. have different perspectives toward the DPRK, but this is due to a “sequencing dilemma.” China argues that economic cooperation must be realized first in order to reduce the DPRK insecurity, while ROK-U.S. believes that security guarantee must be achieved before any economic cooperation is realized. So in the long term, all parties must commit to dialogue to close this gap.   ■ Discussion 3: KIM, Tae-Hyung • Future of NPT is grim. U.S. already faces critical challenges, such as providing reassurance and efficient arms control to its allies. In current international politics, NPT is being increasingly threatened and the U.S., Russia, and China are all modernizing their nuclear forces. • If ominous forecasts realize, great powers (especially the U.S.) will face immense pressure in terms of preserving the NPT and providing effective extended deterrence to allies. Therefore, it is urgent and imperative for concerned parties to proceed with nuclear arms control talks, which have been proven useful for quite some time. • Today, significant level of technological advancement is helping some countries build better counterforce capability to nuclear powers. Consequently, some nuclear powers will have less confidence in their survival, which could lead to an arms race to develop more weapons. This trend is happening globally and has a negative impact on arms control as well as the NPT. • Extended deterrence is important because it alleviates ROK’s threat perception toward DPRK. However, too much emphasis is given to nuclear weapons. This could give a wrong impression that maintenance of the ROK-U.S. alliance and deterrence against the DPRK nuclear threat is only achieved with nuclear weapons. • It is true that common interests exist among relevant stakeholders in the Peninsula, but each country prefers to prioritize its own national interest. Every country is blaming each other for the DPRK stalemate.   ■ Discussion 4: TOBEY, William • Two clarifications must be highlighted: Australia firmly agreed to the legal and physical steps ensuring that fuels for the nuclear submarines will not be used for weapons, and no U.S. executive officials are considering the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Japan and ROK. • Reemergence of great power competition is a great challenge, and this issue is larger than nonproliferation. EU, Japan, ROK, U.S., and other like-minded countries should bond not just for nuclear weapons, but for global security. These countries, when working together, will be extremely powerful.   ■ Discussion 5: OUYANG, Wei • It is important to note that “nuclear safety” and “nuclear security” are two different concepts. The former also applies to non-traditional security issues. • Since China and ROK are neighbors, they already have channels for dialogue. The U.S. does as well, since there are hotlines. So opportunities for restarting bilateral dialogues exist, perhaps through means like a 1.5 track.   ■ Discussion 6: CHUN, Chaesung • To address Chinese concern toward ROK’s potential change in its Taiwan policy, ROK’s official policy on Taiwan remains the same—it supports peace, prosperity, and stability in the Taiwan Strait. While ROK respects the One China Policy, Taiwan Strait is considered important since it is directly related to ROK’s trade and military stability. • However, Chinese question about ROK’s potential change in policy is understandable, because ROK President and Foreign Minister recently have been echoing U.S. rhetoric of opposing a unilateral change to the status quo. Seoul needs to do more work to clarify what opposing change to the status quo means for ROK. • ROK is critically affected by and vulnerable to the growing U.S.-China competition. In this context, ROK hopes it can participate in a multilateral conversation to figure out where and how ROK can raise its voice.     ■ CHUN, Chaesung is the Chair of National Security Center of the EAI and a Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul Nation University. ■ GIOVANNINI, Francesca is the Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. ■ JIA, Qingguo is a professor at Peking University. ■ KIM, Tae-Hyung is a Professor at Department of Political Science and International Relations at Soongsil University. ■ OUYANG, Wei is the Vice Chairman of Academic Committee of Grandview Institution. ■ SOHN, Yul is the President of the EAI and Professor of the Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College at Yonsei University. ■ TOBEY, William is the Director of the Office of National Security and International Studies at the Lost Alamos National Laboratory and a Senior Fellow with the Avoiding Great Power Wars at the Belfer Center.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]

During the first session of the May 10 Global NK Conference titled "Nuclear Competition and Escalation Pathways in East Asia: ROK, US, and PRC Perspectives on Cooperation for the Future of the Korean Peninsula," the speakers each presented on the lingering DPRK nuclear threat, the future of deterrence, and overall assessment of the U.S.-China relationship. While all participants recognized the shortcoming of both U.S. and Chinese effort to seek meaningful communication, the U.S. and the Chinese side exchanged heated debate on defining the “strategic competition” between the two states. The panelists urged for U.S., China, ROK, and other critical stakeholders to actively take advantage of shared interest in the Korean Peninsula to seek for effective cooperation.   ■ Time: May 10, 2023 (Wednesday), 09:30-11:10 ■ Location: Orchid Room, The Westin Josun Seoul ■ Panelists (in alphabetical order): BUNN, Matthew (Professor, Harvard Kennedy School); HA, Young-Sun (Chairman, EAI); JIA, Qingguo (Professor, Peking University); KIM, Inhan(Professor, Ewha Womans University); PARK, John (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center); PARK, Won Gon (Chair, EAI Center for North Korea Studies; Professor, Ewha Womans University); ZHANG, Tuosheng (Chairman, Grandview Institution)     ■ Presenter: BUNN, Matthew (Professor, Harvard Kennedy School) “Deterring Without Provoking” • Whenever a state makes its key decision, its security implication to the adversary and the adversary’s potential response must be considered. In this context, in order to maximize security, the state must assess both the defense-deterrent value and provocation risks. • What the ROK and U.S. see as deterrent and defensive may be seen as an offensive threat to the DPRK. In crisis, therefore, North Korean misperceptions of ROK-US actions could provoke unwanted escalation. • Escalation risks link deterrence of large-scale war and smaller provocations. “Core” deterrence, or stopping a full-scale war “out of the blue” is likely to be strong, but deterrence of smaller-scale provocations may fail. Big concern on deterrence lies on the inadvertent steps that could lead to war when small conflicts get out of control. • In planning responses to provocations, combined ROK-U.S. forces need to consider both the effect on deterring further outrages and the risk of provoking DPRK. • “Deterring Without Provoking” Policy Dilemma #1: ROK-U.S. want conventional superiority for defense and deterrence, but history suggests that side facing conventional inferiority is more likely to use nuclear weapons. • “Deterring Without Provoking” Policy Dilemma #2: ROK and U.S. want to improve their ability to target DPRK nuclear forces, thereby exacerbating DPRK fear of such targeting. This increases incentive to build more weapons or even pre-delegate nuclear use authority. • So how do we mitigate these dilemmas? Reduce the temperature, strategically include provocation risk in planning, apply confidence-building measures, and employ nuclear restraints.   ■ Presenter: JIA, Qingguo (Professor, Peking University) “The Imposed Strategic Competition: China’s Response and Its Position on the North Korean Nuclear Program” • The term “strategic competition” is “imposed” on China by the U.S., and China has never accepted this term. China believes that this term does not adequately capture the complicated bilateral relationship. Outright “public” competition is untraditional for Chinese—instead, Chinese tend to compete under the table. • United States’ determination to engage in a “strategic competition” has resulted in a distinct pattern of behavior that makes the relationship more difficult and confrontational. Trump and Biden have both been pursuing high-tech decoupling, supply chain redirection, and military preparation in places of China’s interest. • Of all U.S. actions, China is most concerned about U.S. challenge against the territorial sovereignty and integrity over Taiwan. Under this circumstance, China is rethinking its national strategy. • Since Biden came into office, U.S. policy toward China has become less volatile and outright provocative. Yet Congress poses the problem—it has become increasingly proactive over Taiwan, passing bills and resolutions unfavorable to China. • While U.S. “containment” policy against China aims to take away China’s stake in the international order, China must be stronger and more capable to “wreck the [U.S.-led] order” if it finds interest in doing so. Against this background, China rethinks its nuclear policy. • China’s nuclear policy has been based on three pillars: (1) minimum in number, (2) no first use, and (3) nonproliferation. With growing U.S. threat, there is growing voices in China calling for a stronger stance. • In short, U.S. should stop meddling with Taiwan and engage with China. It is never too late to stop confrontation and seek cooperation.   ■ Presenter: PARK, Won Gon (Chair, EAI Center for North Korea Studies; Professor, Ewha Womans University) “North Korea’s Nuclear Maneuverings: Signaling the Demise of Longstanding Pursuit for Complete Denuclearization?” • Since 2019 until today, DPRK continues provoking, developing nuclear weapons, and pursuing its “Frontal Breakthrough” policy. “Frontal Breakthrough” constitutes four principles: (1) self-reliance, (2) ideological indoctrination, (3) confrontational policy toward ROK and U.S., and (4) nuclear development “in the most sophisticated way.” • Clearly, DPRK’s ultimate goal is to be recognized by the world, U.S. in particular, as a de facto nuclear state. In this context, complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) and complete denuclearization are rather unrealistic. • While North Korea continues provocations, there are clear differences in its behavior that have serious implications. Pyongyang explicitly states that the provocations target ROK and U.S., conducts tests during ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, deploys missiles for tangible warfare, diversifies platforms to launch the missiles, and broadcasts its provocations to its own people. • While the international community must not holistically disregard the possibility of a seventh nuclear test, DPRK is facing some critical difficulties. Strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan ties and advancement of the high-tech sector are burdensome to the DPRK. While Kim Jong Un declared that DPRK will achieve 1.4-fold increase in GDP by 2026, this is virtually impossible partially due to its self-imposed border closure. • For effective economic development, North Korea must inevitably come to the negotiating table and take meaningful steps for denuclearization. Without such actions, there remains no chance for sanctions relief. • Partial denuclearization without a clear and comprehensive goal of complete denuclearization could provide space for DPRK to find ways to retain its nuclear arsenal indefinitely.   ■ Discussion 1: PARK, John (Director, Korea Project, Belfer Center) • In a perception vs. reality perspective, we are currently seeing an important dynamic of perception being greater than reality. In fact, contrary to this perspective, historical reality shows that the U.S. is resilient and adaptive to changing order. It also suggests that the U.S. is not in an irreversible decline. • If the strategic competition between U.S. and China is “imposed” by the U.S., as Professor Jia Qingguo suggests, this perception reflects that there is a clear difference in how the two countries are defining or the term.   ■ Discussion 2: ZHANG, Tuosheng (Chairman, Grandview Institution) • Kim Jong Un’s claim that North Korea made a “significant nuclear achievement” is “not totally groundless, but overstated.” The international community is concerned about DPRK’s potential nuclear test, but it seems unnecessary for them to conduct it. DPRK already has sufficient capability to deter U.S., ROK, and Japan. • Yet nuclear conflict due to miscalculation could be possible. In an event of a serious military confrontation between ROK-U.S. and DPRK, North Korea may strike first or the U.S. may strike preemptively. • Some Chinese experts believe that DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons reduced the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This, however, increased the risk of nuclear proliferation, potentially creating a domino effect in the region. North Korea’s development of weapons could provide U.S. an excuse to deploy strategic asset to ROK or Japan, thereby posing immense security threat to China.   ■ Discussion 3: KIM, Inhan (Professor, Ewha Womans University) • Professor Bunn mentioned that ROK-U.S. should avoid provocation and provide reassurance to secure deterrence. Yet this begs an important question about South Korea’s security concerns from the lack of its capability to deter DPRK’s “nuclear” attack. ROK-U.S. must find a balance between keeping a strong alliance and alleviating DPRK’s security concern. • Regarding Professor Bunn’s call for the need to “reduce the temperature,” the international community should keep in mind that various approaches like the Sunshine Policy and Six-Party Talks have been taken, but were ineffective. • On Professor Jia Qingguo’s presentation on the “imposed” competition, one should remember that ROK and U.S. never shut China out of the table. China should fulfill its duty by raising its voice against DPRK provocation because this is also a China problem.   ■ Discussion 4: BUNN, Matthew • One important aspect in deterring Kim Jong Un from using nuclear weapons is convincing him that the U.S. will not threaten regime survival as long as he doesn’t attack (the U.S. or its allies in the region). • China has done just as much as the U.S. to “impose” the strategic competition. • Given that Secretary Blinken officially said that he hopes to schedule his trip to China, hopefully U.S. and China will get back to conversation. There are many world challenges like climate change, future pandemic, and nuclear war, for which U.S.-China cooperation is required.   ■ Discussion 5: JIA, Qingguo • China has its own share of responsibility for deteriorating bilateral relationship. China could have handled better in some respect. • At the moment, U.S. and China both face opportunities and shared interest in stabilization and even improvement of bilateral relationship. Biden has flexibility to handle the relationship with China, and China needs to restore economic growth.   ■ Discussion 6: PARK, Won Gon • DPRK emphasizes its right to survival, which includes permanently halting joint military exercises and deployment of strategic assets, and withdrawal of the USFK. At the same time, DPRK knows that ROK and the U.S. will not attack them first. • Nevertheless, both the ROK and U.S. governments need to work on signaling the possibility of dialogue with North Korea. Biden administration’s “calibrated and practical approach” still remains elusive. • Meanwhile, it is critical for ROK to enhance its own deterrence capability with the help of the U.S. and Japan. As South Korea needs to pursue integrated deterrence with the U.S., it has no choice but to further strengthen the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation.     ■ BUNN, Matthew is the James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. ■ HA, Young-Sun is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees at the East Asia Institute and the Professor Emeritus of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. ■ JIA, Qingguo is a professor at Peking University. ■ KIM, Inhan is an Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science at Ewha Womans University. ■ PARK, John is the Director of the Korea Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. ■ PARK, Won Gon is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor in the Department of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. ■ ZHANG, Tuosheng is the Chairman of Academic Committee of the Grandview Institution and a Senior Fellow at the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]    

Young-sun Ha, Chairman of the East Asia Institute (Emeritus Professor at Seoul National University), discusses South Korea's options in responding to the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula as North Korea adopted an aggressive nuclear doctrine and law declaring itself to be a nuclear weapons state, and demonstrated its ability to carry out strikes with tactical nuclear weapons. Chairman Ha claims that South Korea's nuclear weapons acquisition or deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons would not bring the expected outcomes while only weakening the legitimacy of pursuing North Korea's denuclearization. In this regard, combining South Korea's Three-Axis Defense System with the United States' integrated deterrence system would be a realistic and effective approach for South Korean security and stability on the Korean Peninsula.     Responding to North Korea’s Nuclear Threat Part 1. South Korean Nuclear Armament 04:04 Part 2. Redeployment of the US Tactical Nukes 11:06 Part 3. Combining US Extended Deterrence with South Korea’s Three Axis Defense System16:13     ■ Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the board of trustees at the East Asia Institute(EAI) and Professor Emeritus of the Seoul National University. Dr. Ha served as a member of senior advisory group for the inter-Korean summit talks preparation committee and a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group(2008-2016). He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington. He was Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University (1980-2012), He was a research fellow at the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His recent books and edited volumes include: World Politics of Love: War and Peace (2019), A New Perspective on the Diplomatic History of Korea: Tradition and Modernity (2019), U.S.-China Competition in the Architecture of a Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific (2017).     ■ Typeset by Junghoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | [email protected]  

Global NK Zoom & Connect has met with leading South Korean researchers who study North Korea and listened to their voices to understand current research on North Korea. For this issue, we interviewed Young-Sun Ha (Chairman of the Board of Trustees at the East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University). Based on the public speeches Kim Jong Un made last year, Chairman Ha predicts that improvements in inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. relations are unlikely to occur as long as Pyongyang insists on its principle of the U.S. and South Korea abandoning “double-dealing standards” and “hostile policies.” Chairman Ha points out that although it is highly unlikely for the DPRK to make a strategic decision on complete denuclearization, Kim Jong Un will face fundamental dilemmas if he persists on the current Byungjin line.       ■ Young-sun Ha is Chairman of the board of trustees at the East Asia Institute. He is also Professor Emeritus of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha serves as a member of senior advisory group for the Inter-Korean Summit Talks Preparation Committee (2018-). He also served as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group (2008-2016), the Co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era (2009-2013), the Director of the Center for International Studies and American Studies Institute at Seoul National University, the President of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and a research fellow at the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington

As part of the Global NK Zoom & Connect project, the East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn) held “North Korea in 2022: Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Message and the Korean Peninsula." This webinar analyzed and forecasted North Korea`s strategy in 2022 based on New Years` messages from the plenary meeting of the central committee of North Korean Workers` Party and Kim Jong Un. Experts from the United States and South Korea discussed issues concerning the Korean Peninsula including inter-Korean relations, denuclearization, and prospective North Korea policy to be initiated by the next South Korean government and talked about ways to realize a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula and facilitate successful peace-denuclearization talks.   Time & Date: January 7 (Fri) 10:00 – 11:00 (KST)   Panelists: Leif-Eric Easley (Professor, Ewha Womans University), Evans Revere (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution), Ki-Young Sung (Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Research, INSS)   Moderators: Chaesung Chun (Chair of the National Security Research Center, EAI; Professor, Seoul National University)     I. The 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea   Main Contents of the Plenary Meeting – Economic Recovery According to Dr. Ki-Young Sung, Director of the Department of Foreign Policy Research at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), states that the key priority for this year`s plenary meeting was the revival of the North Korean economy. This comes as no surprise, given that North Korea’s GDP fell by 4.5% in 2020, which is the second largest drop recorded in history.   Dr. Leif-Eric Easley, Professor at Ewha Womans University, notes that worsened economic conditions due to border lockdowns are likely to have especially affected the livelihood of women. Women are reported to have a significant, yet unrecognized role in the North Korean economy; they are known to be actively involved in informal trade, essential to the imports of household and other goods. He views that the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly curtailed women’s opportunities of entrepreneurialism and market activity.   Contrary to assumptions that the regime would introduce bold, dramatic plans to reinvigorate the economy, none of such were suggested. However, Dr. Sung adds that the dire state of the economy is likely to affect the political foundation of leadership in North Korea. For instance, he notes that the leadership has been tackling subpar economic performance with the idolization of the leadership. State media have recently referred to Kim Jong Un as suryong, a term only used for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.   Dr. Easley also notes that the Worker`s Party`s policy ideas were "uninspiring.” He points out that although Kim Jong Un is willing to manifest his ambitions for economic growth, his clampdown on informal markets pursuit of juche self-reliance has failed to distance himself from the failures of his predecessors.   Limited Media Coverage on the Plenary Meeting – Strategic Maneuver? Mr. Evans Revere, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, also deduces that North Korea is suffering economically and agriculturally from the plenum but further notes that "our ability to understand the actual depth of its current crisis … is very limited by the way that the regime reported the Korea Workers’ Party Plenum.” In particular, he notes that while Kim Jong Un’s remarks were referenced in North Korean official media, no actual text of his statement was released. He raises the possibility that much has been left unreported regarding the full extent of North Korea`s difficulties. Furthermore, Mr. Revere claims he finds it “incomprehensible that Kim did not dwell on foreign affairs, relations with the U.S., defense and security matters, including the nuclear and missile programs, North-South relations, and ties with China in his remarks at the plenum.” The absence of reporting should not be interpreted as the absence of content.   II. Prospects for North Korea`s Commitment to Denuclearization   North Korea’s Willingness to Denuclearize Mr. Revere states that while North Korea is aware that renewed nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile testing would anger China and push the U.S. to adopt harsh measures, it has a record of defying what we perceive to be in its best interest. Although North Korea should find ways to alleviate pressures from sanctions and maintain good ties with China, it remains firm in its belief that it can simultaneously own weapons and obtain sanctions relief. Dr. Sung sees that North Korea would be unwilling to resume dialogue with the U.S. unless it renders the resumption of talks with the U.S. or South Korea helpful in achieving domestic stability or consolidating Kim Jong Un`s power. Additionally, the air of uncertainty in South Korea regarding the presidential elections and U.S. midterm elections will keep North Korea in a "wait-and-see” position.   The Role of the U.S and Allies in Accelerating Progress   Dr. Easley views that North Korea is likely to push ahead with its military modernization and resume weapons testing in 2022. Bringing North Korea to denuclearize would not only require a unity of purpose among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, but also a more cooperative China and pressures inside North Korea for political-economic reform. However, the Biden administration does not seem keen to place North Korea on top of its priority list as of now. Mr. Revere points out that given relations with China and Russia, the internal political situation in the U.S., and the pandemic, the Biden administration will remain in a “wait-and-see” posture in the absence of a major provocation by North Korea. While progress on the road toward denuclearization seems limited, Dr. Easley emphasizes that “Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo are capable of managing the North Korea threat by increasing security cooperation for deterrence, reinvigorating international sanctions while granting sanctions for aid and expanding multilateral pressure on both Pyongyang and Beijing.” It should, however, also be noted that North Korea has a tendency to reject UN assistance. Dr. Easley explains that this is due to three reasons. One is concerns over virus transmission – novel viruses pose a serious threat to survival in a country devoid of adequate medical infrastructure. Additionally, North Korea does not appear to be convinced that vaccine rollout would serve as an antidote to the pandemic. Furthermore, North Korea’s concern over regime legitimacy overrides practical concerns for healthcare.   III. North Korea in the Context of U.S.-China Strategic Competition   The Implications of U.S.-China Strategic Competition According to Mr. Revere, the U.S aims to push back against China`s aggressive approach in East Asia, deal with China`s attempts to intimidate its neighbors, and respond to China`s desire to become the dominant actor. While other major international actors are aligning themselves with the U.S., China seems to have accepted, albeit reluctantly, the fact that North Korea is now a nuclear state and shares North Korea`s goal of undermining the U.S.-ROK alliance.China regards North Korea as a “buffer zone” and refers to their relations as “lips and teeth.” Dr. Sung notes China strives to maintain its economic leverage over North Korea and use North Korea’s geostrategic position as a buffer against the U.S. Under such context, it will be difficult to find a breakthrough in the denuclearization negotiation process. Dr. Easley views that the U.S.-China rivalry is not the main obstacle to denuclearization talks; he instead sees that the Kim regime’s own version of “strategic patience” is the biggest stumbling block above all.   Prospects for South Korea Mr. Revere states that high tensions between the U.S. and China have placed South Korea in a very difficult situation. While Seoul believes that it can balance strong security relations with the U.S. and a robust economic relationship with China, he is skeptical that this is possible. He views that the next South Korean administration “will need to make a decision about Korea’s future, keeping in mind the vital importance of its alliance with the U.S., preserving South Korea’s independence, and the need to find a way to coexist with China.” Dr. Easley states that “Seoul should not give in to Chinese pressure, whether in the form of economic coercion against deployments like THAAD, attempts to shift blame onto U.S. alliance defense exercises, or maritime and airspace security challenges caused by China’s fishery and military expansion.” He underscores that South Korea should not use the great power competition as an excuse for the slow progress its North Korea policy has made. Most importantly, he states that the competition should not prevent South Korea from defending its own national interests and sovereignty. ■   IV. Speaker, Discussant, and Moderator Bios   ■ Leif-Eric Easley_ is a Professor at Ewha Womans University where he teaches international security and political economics. He publishes in academic journals regarding U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination on engaging China and North Korea. He has degrees from UCLA and Harvard and is frequently quoted in the New York Times, Washington Post and elsewhere on diplomacy in Asia.   ■ Ki-Young Sung_ is a director of the department of foreign policy strategy research, the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). Dr. Sung’s main research area covers US-DPRK relations, inter-Korean relations and regional coopeartion of Northeast Asia. He received Ph.D. in international studies from University of Warwick (UK), and conducted postdoctoral research at the Korean Studies Institute in University of Southern California. After he had come back to South Korea, he worked for the Yonsei Institute for North Korea, and Korea Institute for National Unification as a research fellow.   ■ Evans J.R. Revere_ is senior advisor with the Albright Stonebridge Group, a leading global strategy firm. He is also nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He is an active participant in international dialogues dealing with U.S. relations with the PRC, the two Koreas, Japan, Taiwan and East Asian regional security issues. His commentary appears frequently in major U.S., Korean, and Japanese newspapers and he has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, CNBC, the BBC, NHK, and other major international news networks.   ■ Chaesung Chun_ is the chair of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and a professor of the department of political science and International relations at Seoul National University. He received his PhD in international relations at Northwestern University in the United States, and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. His main research interests include international political theory, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsular affairs.     ■ Typeset by Seung Yeon Lee Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;}     Introduction In the first episode of [Global Inter-NK-View], (Part 3: Unification of the Korean Peninsula and Security Interests for South Korea), Dr. Young-Sun Ha (Chairman of the Board of Trustees at EAI; Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University) discusses the spatial and temporal significance of the unification issue and 21st century perspectives on unification. As part of the Global North Korea project, EAI has been conducting the ‘Global Inter-NK-View: Expert Views on North Korea’ to provide timely analysis on the North Korean issue through interviews with experts. The content of this interview reflects the interviewee’s opinions and not those of the East Asia Institute. Please make sure to use proper references when citing Global NK.