Dong Ryul Lee is a professor of Chinese studies at Dongduk Women’s University and currently the Chair of the EAI’s China Research Panel. Professor Lee received his Ph.D in Political Science from the Department of International Politics, Peking University, China.         The Significance of Kim Jong-il’s Visits to China   Only nine months after the visits in May and August of 2010, Kim Jong-il yet again made an unofficial visit to China on May 20, 2011. Although it is uncommon for three visits to take place within the span of a year, there exists some precedent for this within the history of China-North Korea relations. Before and after the Korean War in 1950, Kim Il-sung visited China three times consecutively. In 1964 as the Sino-Soviet split was intensifying, it is said that five meetings took place in both Beijing and Pyongyang. Both times were strategically critical moments within China-North Korea relations.   It is generally assumed that Kim Jong-il has been motivated by urgent concerns to make such consecutive visits to China that from a distance look hasty. The issues that North Korea and China currently share can be categorized into three areas: economic aid and cooperation, the leadership succession process in North Korea, and resumption of the Six-Party Talks. These issues are not so different from the agenda that was set during Kim’s previous two visits to China in 2010. In fact, economic aid and the Six-Party Talks has been a regular feature of China-North Korea meetings since the Second Nuclear Crisis broke out in 2002. The speculation that Kim Jong-il visited China three times in order to obtain the Chinese leadership’s support for the succession process is unbalanced. Neither side would want the appearance of China intervening in North Korea’s domestic affairs. For Beijing, such actions would contradict its own policy of non-intervention as well as weaken its position on Taiwan. North Korea, for its part, would not wish to appear to be publicly seeking China’s support that would question the legitimacy of its own Juche ideology that emphasizes independence from great powers.   There is a need to focus on the fact that all these three different issues actually resulted in maintaining and stabilizing the North Korean regime. Compared to his previous visits to China, Kim Jong-il’s latest visit in 2011 would appear to be no different. However, during this visit there was stronger public emphasis on the “DPRK-Chinese friendship and traditional alliance.” Notably, upon his arrival in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-il held an unprecedented welcoming party and highlighted the successful results of the visit. Kim even heralded China-North Korea relations by declaring it as the “immortal long march.”   Despite this rhetoric, there was a subtle difference between the two countries in the way that they emphasized the strengthening of China-North Korea relations. With the pressure of meeting its declared objective of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012, Kim Jong-il appears to have judged that the only alternative in resolving the problem of increasing regime instability is through China. In other words, with this visit to China, North Korea sought to mutually reconfirm the reinforcement of China-North Korea relations7and at the same time, it tried to actively display this friendship. In contrast, China is taking precautions against the possibility that other countries will overestimate China-North Korea relations. For example, the Chinese government made the very unusual gesture of briefing South Korea and other related countries on the contents of the China-DPRK summit immediately following Kim’s visit to China. Furthermore, at the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, China’s Minister of National Defense General Liang Guanglie emphasized that "We have been advising North Korea, via different channels, not to take the risk." While both North Korea and China are greatly concerned about the reaction of other countries, the message the two countries are trying to send are slightly, but clearly different. Such a difference reflects the complicated and delicate nature of China-North Korea relations.   The Significance of the Summit Talks in China-North Korea Relations   The summit talks are certainly a strong indicator for the distinctiveness of DPRK-Chinese relations. The historical background that created this special tradition of diplomatic visits between China and North Korea is actually a paradox because the relationship is the result of implicit mutual distrust. In 1956, Kim Il-sung purged the country of his main rivals including the pro-Chinese Yeonan faction. With the loss of its main human channel in North Korea, China as an alternative suggested holding regular summit talks through mutual visits and in such a way tried to secure its leverage over North Korea. As a result, summit talks through mutual visits have become one of the most important indicators on the state of relations between the two countries.   Leadership visits between the two countries, which began with Kim Il-sung’s unofficial visit to China in May 1950, had been almost an annual event until the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China. There were though several periods where China-North Korea relations were suspended, around the time of the purges of the Yeonan faction in 1956 (1954-1958), during the Cultural Revolution of the mid 1960s (1964-1969), and around the time of Mao Zedong’s death (1976-77). These were each periods when China-North Korea relations were strained. However, with the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China in 1992, the tradition of China-DPRK summit talks were greatly damaged. After 1992, summit talks were virtually suspended until Kim Young-nam, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, visited China in June 1999. Leadership visits then resumed after Kim Jong-il’s visits to China in 2000 and 2001, and Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s return visit in 2001, but they ultimately failed in restoring the tradition of holding annual summits.   Although China-North Korea relations have recovered somewhat in the 2000s, the fact that there are no regular summit meetings that resemble past practices of mutual state visits suggests that the current bilateral relationship is no longer as special as it once was. The content of recent summits has been more like a tug-of-war based on different interests than a relationship that is based on solid mutual trust, worthy of being defined as an “undefeatable friendship.” Indeed, North Korea has been exploiting its bilateral summit meetings with China as a channel to gain economic aid since the Second Nuclear Crisis began in 2002. For China, however, such aid was considered as an inducement for North Korea’s participation in the Six-Party Talks. In particular, Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pyongyang in 2009 marked a revitalization of China-North Korea relations focused on active communication and management of North Korea. In a sense, China has been expanding its influence over North Korea to manage the unstable regime by actively intervening in the bilateral relationship. Since Kim’s May 2010 visit, President Hu Jintao has proposed that bilateral relations be focused on five agenda topics, which are “communication between the experiences in domestic governance, critical diplomatic issues, international and regional affairs, and party-state rule.”   Yet as mentioned above, within China-North Korea relations there has been a private tug-of-war based on different intentions. Kim Jong-il’s seemingly explicit dependence on Beijing implies that North Korea has much to ask from China such as economic aid which can be viewed as a symbol of support for the regime. Pyongyang needs this kind of support in the process of its leadership succession. On the other hand, the Chinese leadership wants to manage the situation in North Korea in order to prevent any signs of instability and expects a transition toward Chinese-style reforms and opening in the long run. Thus, instead of continuing an exhaustive aid-oriented approach, Beijing is now seeking for a way to nurture a compatible economic model in North Korea and eventually a pro-Chinese regime.   Prospects for Change in China-North Korea Relations   Predicting the course of future relations between China and North Korea will require a closer examination of the previous flows over the past few years. After a prolonged period of lukewarm relations since the Second Nuclear Crisis, China-North Korea relations have improved rapidly since Premier Wen’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2009 as part of the sixtieth anniversary celebration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Interestingly, the increased tension between North and South Korea following the sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island brought about closer and stronger ties between North Korea and China. Some voices even called for a restoration of the ‘blood alliance’ between Beijing and Pyongyang, which signifies their inclinations toward traditional affinities. Kim Jong-il’s recent visit to China has also been carried out under this general trend of seeking to revive stronger bilateral links.   North Korea is facing a dilemma between its goals of carrying out its leadership succession process and opening the door to a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012 under the limits of international sanctions and extreme economic difficulties. In order to resolve this problem, Kim Jong-il expressed his intention to maintain a close relationship with China during his visit as well as gain economic and political support from the Chinese leadership. Likewise, despite the strategic burden, Beijing has also accepted such gestures as regime stability in Pyongyang seems to be necessary for China’s rise and its own power transition in 2012. Such interlocking strategic interests resulted in consecutive summit meetings and allowed for North Korea to use China as a lever to sustain its hard line stance against South Korea.   Recently, China and North Korea have clearly been sharing a common interest in regime stability and have therefore been actively promoting the notion of “China-DPRK friendship.” Yet there are differing interests that cannot be easily alleviated between the two states while new developments that can change the characteristics of future bilateral relations are also occurring.   It is likely that future relations between China and North Korea will increasingly resemble an asymmetric dependence structure. As recent China-DPRK summit meetings have so far only occurred through Kim Jong-il’s visits instead of mutual visitation, an unbalanced pattern of North Korean dependence upon China is emerging. Such outright dependence can be seen as a convenient opportunity for the Chinese leadership to expand their influence over the issues related to the Korean Peninsula at the expense of any South Korean leverage over North Korea. Accordingly, a significant change in China’s approach toward the North Korean nuclear issue might also be probable. If Beijing decides that they can manage the security challenges emanating from North Korea more effectively through direct relations with Pyongyang, then their original position toward the Six-Party Talks could also change.   The possibility for a Chinese-led bilateral relationship with North Korea may increase. Unlike Kim Jong-il’s regressive tendencies as seen with the current visits, the Chinese have been pushing for the establishment of a new, future-oriented relationship as they wield a leading role in bilateral relations between China and North Korea. Since Kim’s visit in May 2010, President Hu Jintao has proposed for new relational norms such as “a shared experience in party-state rule and strengthened strategic communication” for the two states. Premier Wen took another step by openly inducing North Korea toward openness and reform and suggesting the regime should transform. A visible attribute of this difference can be seen in North Korea’s main focus on economic aid and China’s contrasting interest in pushing forward with economic cooperation. From 2005, China has proposed the so-called “three principles of economic cooperation,” as an effort to change the pattern of economic support toward North Korea. The swift progress following the summit meetings in the development of economic cooperation projects between North Korea and China such as the economic zones on Hwanggumpyong Island and in Rason is suggestive of this transition.   Northeast Asia after Kim Jong-il's Visit and Strategy for South Korea   Since the summit meetings between China and North Korea, new developments have occurred in the Northeast Asia region that are worthy of attention. Following Kim Jong-il’s visit to China, North Korea declared a total secession of ties with the Lee Myung-bak administration on May 30, 2011. Subsequently Pyongyang disclosed information about recent secret inter-Korean meetings. The North Koreans argued that despite their continued efforts toward inter-Korean dialogue, the “anti-national and the anti-reunification” policies of the South Korean government forced them to turn toward an offensive posture. In emphasizing their efforts toward improved inter-Korean relations, North Korea blamed South Korea for blocking the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. The fact that the North Korean regime has not yet expressed any critical remarks of the United States is suggestive of its future tactics.   At the same time, China is simultaneously sending two different messages to North Korea whereby stating that it will not allow any provocations that may affect its economic development while it also intends to maintain a certain level of continued economic cooperation.   As mentioned earlier, through the remarks by defense minister General Liang Guanglie during the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Chinese argued that they are keeping the North Koreans in check while initiating groundbreaking ceremonies for the economic trading zones on Hwanggumpyong Island and in the Rason area as forms of active engagement in economic cooperation. Also, there has been the first strategic dialogue between the Worker’s Party of Korea and the Chinese Communist Party as well.   For the United States, although there have been some signals of change such as U.S. Special Envoy Robert King’s visit to Pyongyang, there has been no overall change in its policy of “strategic patience.” In order to bring about a fundamental change in U.S.-DPRK relations, there needs to be some sign of a resolution on the nuclear issue. The Obama administration will start to improve economic and diplomatic relations with North Korea only after the regime provides visible willingness to adhere to the February 13, 2007 agreement of the Six-Party Talks by following the three-phased approach of “disablement, declaration and verification, and denuclearization,” and work to improve inter-Korean relations. Realistically this would mean that North Korea would have to effectively abandon its military-first politics, which would be extremely difficult unless a new type of a political leadership emerges. Under the premise that the United States is conducting a hostile policy to North Korea including nuclear threats, the North Korean regime will continue to argue for a need to sign a peace treaty and to hold nuclear arms reductions talks. During his visit to South Korea on June 10, 2011, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell reconfirmed the U.S. position by stressing the need to improve inter-Korean relations as a means to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, and urged caution on economic relations between Beijing and Pyongyang by emphasizing the importance of transparency and deliberation in economic cooperation with North Korea.   In such a changing and complex environment, South Korea needs to face up to the reality that being caught up in its own principles can easily lead to a constriction of its position in resolving the problems on the Korean Peninsula. As China’s influence over North Korea grows even stronger, the United States can no longer turn a blind eye to North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities without having a breakthrough via engagement. Therefore, South Korea must seize the opportunity to pursue an active role by accurately interpreting the changing flow of China-North Korea relations before it is too late. First, it would be necessary to find a long term intervening strategy toward North Korea that can bring about a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, while preparing adequately against any possible North Korean provocations. There also needs to be a long-term North Korea policy that can bring about a strategic change in the North Korean regime, along with continued efforts to remind both China and the United States on the importance of improving inter-Korean relations. Currently, China recognizes the fact that the North Korea card by itself cannot bring about both stability on the Korean Peninsula and increased Chinese influence. Therefore it would be important to develop a practical and active diplomacy toward China so that Beijing understands that a strengthened relationship with Seoul would be more effective for the Chinese leadership to realize its policy goals on the Korean Peninsula.■           Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. The East Asia institute, an Asia Security Initiative core institution, acknowledges the MacArthur Foundation for its generous grant and continued support. This commentary has been translated from the original on June 16, 2011. This commentary is produced with help of Yang Gyu Kim, Yaeseul Park, Stephen Ranger, and Jaesung Ryu. The EAI would like to extend our gratitude to professors Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University) and Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) for their useful remarks and critique on this article.

Professor Young-Sun Ha received Ph.D. in international politics from University of Washington. He is currently a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University and a chairman of Global Net 21 at East Asia Institute.         The Need for a Complex Strategy toward North Korea   Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been stepping up efforts in its defense posture and international cooperation. In preparing against any further provocation from the North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on the island, strengthening defense and deterrence capabilities, and drastically increasing its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has also been taking up actions to reexamine the strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, demanding cooperation from China and Russia while maintaining the traditional trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak response to the shelling and preparing to prevent further provocations are undoubtedly important. However, reading the bigger picture and formulating key strategies for the future is a far more critical task. The Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November 2010 conducted two consecutive moves—revealing its uranium enrichment facilities and launching an artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island. Understanding the situation of the whole East Asian region, while at the same time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and taking preemptive actions will be the main challenges ahead for Seoul.   Firstly, it is important to understand the range of North Korea’s strategic options from aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula went through the Korean War in 1950 and following of the ceasefire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’ and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In spite of this global shift, North Korea has been frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the international strategic chessboard. For example, during the Cold War period North Korea provoked the South in a number of cases: Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheonan naval ship and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island ensued. At the same time, Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding for a peace agreement to this day.   The possibility for limited warfare on the Korean Peninsula came dangerously close with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so than the last North Korean provocation, the sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use of this pendulum of peace and war in order to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base.   In spite of the dangers, merely worrying about the possibility of war is not going to help. Rather, we have to understand precisely why the North has raised the bar of aggression from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artillery attack on South Korean territory. It is likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the pendulum. A complex picture emerges when looking back on the recent comments made by top officials from North Korea, the United States, and China. Seoul and Washington have called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for active denuclearization and reengagement in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on the other hand has taken precisely the opposite measures. To read what the North Korean regime has in mind we have to think of the situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea must do more than just respond to North Korea’s actions. Instead it should focus on making strategically preemptive moves. For this, it is necessary to examine why the North Korean regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude and find measures to make the leadership pursue a survival strategy that does not include huddling around nuclear weapons.   As was demonstrated in the Yeonpyeong Incident, Kim Jong-il is passing down exactly what he has learned from his father, Kim Il-sung, to his son, Kim Jong-un. Following the pattern of brinkmanship, Kim Jong-il showed a strong determination for ‘nuclearization’ instead of ‘denuclearization,’ ‘deterioration’ of relations, not ‘improvement.’ Obviously, the next step will be a ‘clinch’ strategy to buy time, such as allowing IAEA inspections or resuming the Six-Party Talks thus the pendulum will swing towards peace. But these are ‘salami tactics’ to successfully establish the Kim Jong-un regime. As of now, neither ‘full-scale war’ nor ‘reform with denuclearization’ is included in the range of North Korea’s strategic options.   On the other hand, South Korea has the problem with its narrow range of options. Compared to North Korea’s pendulum widely swinging from ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ South Korea’s pendulum swings narrowly between the Sunshine Policy and sanctions. For Seoul, a more comprehensive strategy must be utilized against Pyongyang including measures for military, diplomacy, and unification. Most importantly, in order to stop the North increasing its use of belligerence to bring the Korean Peninsula to brink of full-scale war, South Korea needs to work more closely with the United States to devise military capabilities for deterrence, ‘defensive defense,’ and ‘offensive defense.’ Altogether such measures will strip North Korea’s options to use organized provocations.   The issue here is whether or not Kim Jong-un will inherit his father’s will— songun or the military-first politics—to run the next regime. After Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, the consequences of Kim Jong-il’s choice of military-first politics, was to go through an “Arduous March.” If Kim Jong-un chooses to inherit and continue with the military-first politics, a worst fate will befall him. What then can be done to dissuade Kim Jong-un from inheriting the legacy of his father and repeating the path of failure? The answer is complex strategies. First, South Korea needs to make the North realize that the military-first politics focused on nuclear development will only result in total collapse of the regime. The worn out efforts for the Sunshine Policy or sanctions must be put aside and a more effective policy must replace them. In short, a simultaneous approach should be taken: it must prepare for a method to incapacitate North Korea’s belligerence while framing a comprehensive peace system to better response against the North’s peace offensive. The Sunshine Policy can increase limited exchanges, but it cannot bring about fundamental changes in the military-first politics. Taking off the coat is not enough. We need a change in the DNA sequence.   North Korea’s denuclearization is possible if and only if the succeeding regime abandons the old system and pursues a new nuclear-free strategy. This will require political figures to demote military-first politics as the central priority while at the same time it will need comprehensive efforts from South Korea, the United States, and Japan to provide security assurances. For this, a very comprehensive security system is needed to assure North Korea of its future. Furthermore, on top of the efforts to find a way to denuclearize the North, regional and global financial support systems should be established. In a long-run, the North and related states should pursue a strategy of coevolution for the 21st century development of North Korea.   Pursuing a Complex Diplomacy with China   The most important yet the most difficult task in a comprehensive strategy towards North Korea is the policies regarding China. Chinese influence on North Korea is critical. As is well known, China has been unhappy with North Korea in recent years over the lack of basic communication as the North Korean regime pursues its extreme military-first policies without consultations with its sole ally. In spite of this, Beijing has always chosen to back Pyongyang to some extent. Putting its economy as the first priority, China is choosing the lesser of two evils, maintaining the North Korean regime over provoking its possible collapse which would result in a disaster for Northeast China.   Therefore, cooperation with China is as important as trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and Japan for resolving the North Korean problem. Sensing the relative decline of the United States, China with its own rise is taking advantage and has recently made strong comments against the U.S. policies. This stands in contrast to the 1990s when China candidly acknowledged the power gap between them and rather focused on its own economy while delicately making moves in international politics. It is interesting that China maintains the principles of Taoguang Yanghui (Bide our time, build our capacities) and Yousuo Zuowei (Doing some things to make our voice heard in the world) yet has increasingly been taking a more assertive position toward the United States. This is in part related to the fact that China’s confidence grew after the global financial crisis, but what deserves attention at the same time is the influence of domestic politics on its foreign policy. With a leadership succession due in 2012, China is in the midst of a political competition to clarify its global position through its foreign policy. During the power shift, those who clearly express China’s confidence on the world stage will have a more advantageous position in domestic political power competition. This clarification of its global position can be best shown in its strategies against the United States. Hence, domestic politics are invoking China to make critical comments against the U.S. policies.   The question is whether it is appropriate for China to raise its voice against the United States at this time. In 2008, on the 30th anniversary of ‘Reforms and Openness’, Hu Jintao proclaimed that the country will achieve a high level of Xiaokang Shehui (a moderately prosperous society) by 2021, which will mark the 100th anniversary of Chinese Communist Party. As of now, GDP per capita is 4,000 dollars and by 2021, it is likely to break the 10,000 dollars mark. However, Hu Jintao has proclaimed that 2049 as the year that China will truly aim for. That year represents not merely an economic goal but a more fundamental and broader one: showing the world China as a new standard of civilization.   Against this backdrop, both Beijing and Washington are trying to forecast the outcome of the U.S.-China summit which will be held in January, 2011. The talks are unlikely to break down in the middle of the summit but it is expected that sealing a deal will be tough. Although the United States is in relative decline since 2008 with China on the rise, the process of this trend will be slower than expected. When a major historical current flows in a particular direction, self-management can make the decisive difference about the status of the states. The United States belatedly realized the danger of decline and now has been pursuing its own comprehensive strategy in order to adapt to the changing environment.   The future East Asian order will be more complex than China expects, and no clear blueprint has been suggested by policy makers in Beijing. This was well reflected in the recent competition between the United States and China for framework building of the East Asian order for the 21st century.   The U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton gave a speech titled “America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific” in late October, 2010. The speech as basically detailed America’s comprehensive policies in the Asia-Pacific region. Of course the U.S. engagement strategy includes military measures, but it is far more complex. That is, it will not take on the zero-sum perspective like it did during the Cold War. Rather the United States will promote friendly relations with newly rising states such as China, India, and ASEAN states, while also maintaining strengthened ties with five allied states, such as South Korea and Japan in East Asia. The speech also implies Washington’s willingness to engage international organizations in the region. By broadening the scope of engagement, Secretary of State Clinton is framing the U.S. smart power which appropriately combines soft power and hard power in the areas of 3D (diplomacy, development, and defense).   By contrast, China has yet to break away from the old habit of seeing things from a dichotomous view. It is looking at the world through a narrow window of power struggle and balance of power for national interests, which is the core principle in the modern international order. With this narrow view, China cannot catch up with the United States. In the Cold War era, the world was divided into two by the United States and Soviet Union. But the new order of 21st century is much more complicated. It will be harder for China to muster more powers than the United States with this dichotomous world view.   For instance, Chinese politicians, media, and scholars look at the former South Korean administration as pro-China and the current administration as pro-U.S., when in reality there is much more diversity of views in South Korean government. In fact, Seoul is trying to improve its relation with China without loosening its important relationship with the United States and Japan. If China misunderstands these efforts not as Lian Mei Lian Zhong (Being connected to United States and China at the same time) but as Lian Mei Kang Zhong (Being connected to United States to counter China), it is missing the bigger picture of this era. China should no longer apply its dichotomous view in evaluating South Korea and must try to recognize Seoul’s pro-U.S./China policy.   For South Korea, the need for U.S.-China cooperation is vital. If the United States and China turn their backs on each other, South Korea will be forced to make a difficult decision. While the Cold War still exists on the Korean Peninsula, the global order, even U.S.-China relations are not like that of the Cold War period. Although there are several conflicting elements, mutual cooperation between the two states is inescapable as has been clearly shown through their economic relations. South Korea and China are also too mutually dependent to break away from each other. In terms of economy and investment, China has become the largest partner for South Korea. Therefore, Seoul has to hold friendly relations with both Beijing and Washington. For this, U.S.-China relations should be enhanced. If Chinese leaders pressure South Korea to make a choice between the traditional alliance with United States and the new partnership with China, it will not do much to help China to expand its influence in the world. Currently, the United States is making great efforts to include everyone in its network except a few outlier states such as North Korea and Iran. On the other hand, China’s network is relatively too simple.   Expanding ties with China while strengthening the alliance with the United States is the way South Korea must go. It is woefully difficult for a weaker state to maneuver a stronger state for the former’s benefit, if not impossible. As the famous 18th century Korean scholar, Ji Won Park pointed out in his work Heo Sang Jeon, “Bok Bul” (an expedition to conquer the north which means China) has its limits. Rather he emphasized network diplomacy by using marriage, commerce, and education to the greatest extent. South Korea should follow the advice of Ji Won Park in the 21st century. Through the three steps of ‘expansion,’ ‘intensification’ and ‘trust building,’ South Korea should make China formulate a more comprehensive diplomacy which reflects the interest not only of its own but also of South Korea, the Korean Peninsula, East Asia and the world.   Overcoming the Split in South Korean Public Opinion   The most pressing issue for South Korea in carrying out comprehensive policies towards North Korea is how to overcome the split in public opinion. From the Cheonan incident to the Yeonpyeong Island attack, strong conflicts prevail among South Koreans both in cyberspace and in reality. It is difficult to push for an effective and refined complex strategy in the midst of this tense atmosphere. What is needed at this moment is a future-oriented policy that can draw out a popular agreement regardless of party affiliation. For this, South Korea needs to be equipped with bigger pendulum amplitude than that of the North, and take preemptive actions in an effective way. The current administration’s “Grand Bargain” policy falls short in its persuasiveness amidst popular discord. When South Korea recovers from the wound of the attack on Yeonpyeong Island and when the North reinitiates its peace offensive strategy, popular opinion in South Korea is likely to be bipolarized once again. Therefore, South Korea should not only strengthen its readiness for ‘cold war’ and ‘hot war,’ but also prepare measures for ‘cold peace’ and ‘hot peace.’ In other words, South Korea is required to take a leading role in stopping North Korea from its aggressive diplomacy as well as building a constructive diplomacy for peaceful reunification. Meanwhile, with the precise understanding of where public opinion is going in this internet era, Seoul needs to suggest a persuasive discourse and carry out open discussion concerning its policy towards North Korea both on the internet and in reality.■          Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. The East Asia institute, an Asia Security Initiative core institution, acknowledges the MacArthur Foundation for its generous grant and continued support. This commentary has been translated from the original on December 20, 2010. This commentary is produced with help of Eun Hae Choi, Jina Kim, Yang Gyu Kim, Stephen Ranger, and Hyun Young Yoon.

Since Kim Jong-il’s health deteriorated in the summer of 2008, the question of his succession has drawn attention from all over the world. Finally, on September 28 2010, Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third son, rapidly emerged with his guardianship group made up of the close personnel of the “dear leader” at the Third Meeting of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) Representatives. The future direction of the succession process has generated tremendous interest from all over the world, because it is not only related to internal power transition in North Korea but also directly linked with the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The political and diplomatic decisions of Kim Jong-il’s successor will crucially affect his own future, as well that of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Inter-Korean relations, and the international order of Northeast Asia.   Kim Jong-un was promoted to the rank of daechang, the equivalent of a four-star general, and appointed vice chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission, in essence holding the de facto post of second-in-command. He was named right after the four members of the politburo standing committee by North Korea's official news agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), and his picture was revealed to the public for the first time. This formulated that he became the successor to his father. All in all, he was named as general on the 27th, appointed vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission on the 28th, and his picture released on the 29th, which shows precisely the elaborated staging and even hastiness on the part of the North Korean regime. On October 10, Kim Jong-il effectively declared his heir apparent at home and abroad when he attended a massive military parade with Kim Jong-un, commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. This remarkable event was broadcasted live in North Korea with even foreign correspondents invited to attend. The succession process was a lot faster than expected, particularly when compared to Kim Jong-il, whose succession process only got off the ground six years after he was designated a member of the Politburo in 1974.   It is premature to say which direction Kim Jong-un will go, but it cannot but be seen that his emergence puts more emphasis on ‘continuation’ rather than ‘severance’ or ‘transformation’ from the existing songun or military-first politics. Above all, it is noteworthy that Kim Jong-un took the position of vice chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission rather than positions within its Politburo or Secretariat. This is groundwork to make Kim Jong-un become the “royal” successor of the military-first politics system. Like his father, he will likely exercise the power to interpret the ruling ideology as the sole successor to the “bloodline of Mount Baekdu.” Holding onto the banner of military-first politics, Kim Jong-un will establish it as a “revolutionary” tradition that will form the basis of his succession. Secondly, it is also noticeable that Kim Jong-un’s guardianship group is filled with his father’s people. They were appointed to be heavyweights in the Party and military during the Meeting of Party Representatives. Kim Jong-il’s sister Kim Kyong-hui became a member of the Politburo, her husband Jang Song Thaek became an alternate member of the Politburo, member of the Central Military Commission, and a department director of the Party’s Central Committee, while Vice-Marshal Ri Yong Ho became a Standing Member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. It is hard to find anyone that could be considered as Kim Jong-un’s people, which is to be understood considering his age and inexperience.   There is a dilemma for Kim Jong-un in that he cannot completely rely on the military-first politics. Currently, Kim has not even been officially designated as successor; that will only come when he assumes position as a Standing Member of the Politburo. Such a move can only be possible if he accumulates considerable achievements as he has nothing to his name so far. Presumably, this process needs to be completed before the 7th Party Congress in 2012, leaving Kim Jong-un with little time. Establishing North Korea as an ‘economically strong power,’ one of the three pillars of gangseongdaeguk or strong and prosperous country is something that has yet to be achieved. Pyongyang has already claimed to have achieved the other two pillars of a strong political power and a strong military power. However, as long as the military-first politics is sustained, it is almost impossible for North Korea to pursue the path to economic recovery by itself.   Increased Chinese influence is another structural factor that limits Kim Jong-un’s options. Kim Jong-il visited China twice in March and August, 2010 within three months. Emphasizing a “historical mission to hand over the baton of the traditional friendship of the two countries to the next generation smoothly,” Kim asked for Chinese support in his August visit for the succession process. This is typical behavior more in common with a kingdom in the traditional East Asian regional order where leaders used the tribute-investiture system with China to compensate for the lack of domestic legitimacy. However, increased dependence on China places pressure on North Korea to change its military-first politics and to take on a policy of ‘reform and opening.’ For example, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said China will “support the DPRK for developing economy and improving people' s livelihood and is willing to introduce to the DPRK the experience of China's reform and opening-up” when he met Kim Jong-il in May, 2010. Chinese President Hu Jintao also mentioned in his congratulatory telegram for the September Meeting of Party Representatives that he “sincerely wish General Secretary Kim and the WPK to keep making new and greater achievements in the cause of leading the DPRK people building a strong and prosperous country." Therefore, even though external Chinese support is indispensable for solidifying the succession process, it also presses North Korea internally to change its military-first politics, subsequently forming a conflicting structure. Recent efforts by North Korea to restart family reunions, working-level military talks, and pursue new approaches to South Korea and the United States reflect this situation. Of course, North Korea is trying to secure economic support from South Korea and the United States in order to overcome its current economic difficulties, but those actions can also be seen as an attempt to disperse the pressure for reforms and opening from China.   Kim Jong-un does not have many options left under the structural dilemma in which he has to ‘inherit’ the military-first politics as the 3rd generation of heredity succession, yet also has to embrace ‘change’ in order to revitalize a decaying economy. North Korea naturally favors the option in which it receives economic support from China and South Korea while possessing nuclear weapons and preserves its regime security. However, this move could hardly be accepted by the neighboring countries who will not buy the same horse twice. Considering his dilemma, Kim Jong-un has really only two options. One is to ignore the pressure of change and be bound by the military-first politics that will lead onto the road of another “Arduous March” of famine and economic decline, following his father’s way. While this path may sustain the North Korean regime for some time, it will eventually face a matter of life or death. Without external support, the North Korean economy will only become worse, leaving Kim Jong-un, whose political ground is not firm enough, in a rather vulnerable position.   The other option is to take the path of sunkyung or economy-first politics and embrace a policy of ‘reform and opening’ based on denuclearization and a peace agreement. So long as Kim Jong-un sticks to the military-first politics, it will be hard to see how North Korea can build a favorable international environment that facilitates regime stability and draws in external capital flow to allow for economic growth. Internally, the military-first politics that places a priority on the defense industry not only causes revenue deficiency but also leads to inefficiency in the use of resources. Without any momentum toward economy-first politics of ‘reform and opening,’ North Korea can hardly survive under such distorted priorities. It is understandable that during the transition period it will be hard to take on a new approach; however Kim Jong-un has to consider carefully the right path for the future of North Korea’s advancement.   The first step needs to be taken forward with regard to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. As Kim Jong-il’s succession process finalizes, sooner or later attempts to resume the Six-Party Talks will likely to be actively initiated by China. Pyongyang’s decision on this matter will ultimately be the litmus test for its future. North Korea will no longer be able to obtain external support for its succession process by just simply attending the Talks. Looking back at the final period of Kim Il-sung’s rule where Kim Jong-il took charge of nuclear negotiations, it can be expected that Kim Jong-un too will take on some responsibility in the current nuclear negotiations. North Korea’s nuclear capability is the greatest legacy that Kim Jong-il could leave to his son. The challenge though is how to make the most of it. Kim Jong-un needs to demonstrate his wisdom to resolve both the problems of regime security and economic revival through negotiations. For that, sincerity is required on the negotiating table. Specific plans need to be devised in order to move away from the current deadlock, to revive the progress in nuclear negotiations that has lost its momentum between ‘disablement’ phase and ‘dismantlement’ phase due to the issues of report and verification. Kim Jong-un needs to make a determined strategic choice to pursue a denuclearized comprehensive peace agreement on the basis that nuclear weapons will no longer be the guarantor for the survival of North Korea. The concept of a peace agreement should not be abused as an instrument for short-term interests, but be utilized as a steppingstone to obtain internal backing and external security guarantees. North Korea by itself needs to cast a net that will comprehensively interweave China, South Korea, and the United States. This can be the only way to guarantee the survival of a peaceful North Korea.   Along with North Korea’s strategic resolve, South Korea and all parties concerned need to ‘co-evolve’ and try to approach this problem in a different way. The existence of a declining North Korea already obstructs peace, stability, and prosperity in Northeast Asia. But when it descends into a failed state, all of the neighboring states will have to share a tremendous burden. The collapse of the North Korean regime will not meet the strategic interests of any country like South Korea or China, but would only create a ‘structural hole’ in North East Asia and the world. In order for Kim Jong-un to choose the right path, all parties concerned need to evolve their North Korea policies. They should take on the role of a lighthouse-keeper so that Kim Jong-il’s succession process transforms the current emphasis on the military-first politics to a focus on denuclearization and reform. In this regard, the most important thing is to propose a peace plan that allows for alternatives that Kim Jong-un can choose instead of pursuing nuclear weapons. Comprehensive security guarantees will be required, for example, an inter-Korean peace treaty and a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty that are both supported by China. As long as Kim Jong-un feels insecure concerning the survival of the regime and the nation, he will never give up nuclear weapons that he might believe are the last bastion for North Korea.   Neighboring states need to assure Pyongyang that if it pursues peace without nuclear weapons and military threats, not only will North Korea survive, but also it will receive full support and be able to enter the path of reform and development in the long term. When the neighboring states consider North Korea as part of the future of Northeast Asia and show interest in the alternatives that Pyongyang can pursue as a normal state, this will then be taken by the North as a necessary signal for their survival. In the end, it must be made clear to North Korea that it cannot pursue economic development while continuing to possess nuclear weapons and persisting with military-first politics. To this end, comprehensive measures that incorporates both incentive and pressure needs to be developed.   Strategic cooperation between South Korea and China regarding the succession process is also important. The subtle diplomatic competition and tension following the Cheonan Incident should not reappear when dealing with the succession issue. Without a strategic consensus on the future of North Korea, all the contingencies on the North will cause conflict and make collaboration more difficult between the two countries. Additionally, if competition over leverage toward North Korea continues between the two, it would only be exploited by Pyongyang to prolong military-first politics resulting in an undesirable outcome for both Beijing and Seoul. Based on a strategic consensus concerning the desired future for North Korea, South Korea and China must prepare a joint strategy which expedites the internal transformation of North Korea by making the most use of the North’s external demands as soon as possible.■         Chair Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University)   Panel Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Dongho Jo (Ewha Womans University) Sung Bae Kim (Institute for National Security)   Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. The East Asia institute, an Asia Security Initiative core institution, acknowledges the MacArthur Foundation for its generous grant and continued support. This commentary has been translated from the original on October 12, 2010. This commentary is produced with help of Eun Hae Choi, Sun Kim, Tae Hun Kim, Yang Gyu Kim, and Stephen Ranger.

On July 9, 2010, the UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the Cheonan incident was adopted. As expected, a carefully-worded statement was drafted that allowed for different interpretations of the text. Subsequently, there was a second round of disputes over the interpretation of the statement with the ROK-U.S. alliance on the one hand and Beijing and Pyongyang on the other, as well as among different domestic political powers within South Korea.   Although there could be a political signi-ficance in evaluating the success of the Cheo-nan diplomacy, it is completely wasteful in terms of addressing South Korea’s national interests. At this point, an accurate reading of international politics surrounding the Cheonan incident and devising an effective future strategy is much more important than the endless debate over the interpretation of the UN Presidential Statement.   The diplomacy over the Cheonan incident has taken place continuously as a multifaceted complex game. From the great power game between China and the United States at the global level to the triangle game among ROK-DPRK-PRC at the Northeast Asia level and the domestic political game, the levels have intertwined to display great complexity. Thus, the significance of China’s diplomacy at the East Asian and global level was again confirmed, and the United States’ position to resolve current issues through cooperation with China became clear. Furthermore, the strategic partnership between South Korea and China is still fairly weak. Without a discussion or a consensus on the future of North Korea between Seoul and Beijing, issues concerning inter-Korean relations will not be easily solved. There is an unquestionable need for a national strategy that can sensibly deal with current diplomatic issues entangled with domestic politics.   U.S.-China disputes that unfolded at the beginning of 2010 reoccurred again during the Cheonan incident. The outcome was not the victory of one side, but a bilateral compromise. In this regard, conflicts over the ROK-U.S. joint exercise in the West Sea inevitably concluded with the modification of the location to the East Sea away from China.   It is expected that both the United States and China that barely managed to reach a compromise on the Cheonan incident will not afford any more time and effort to this issue. The main stage will swiftly move back toward the denuclearization of North Korea. China has already made its position clear that the Presidential Statement signals an end to the Cheonan incident and therefore the Six-Party Talks need to be resumed. The United States will also be keen to push ahead with the denuclearization of North Korea in order to fulfill President Barack Obama’s vision of a “World without Nuclear Weapons.” If North Korea shows sincerity in this effort, the United States would not feel obliged to oppose the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Washington has already secured strengthened alliances with South Korea and Japan as well as the relative effect of curbing China. As they move on from the Cheonan incident, the United States and China will discuss and map out the specific conditions and methods for resuming the Six-Party Talks.   However, the South Korean government has still maintained that it will not return to the Six-Party Talks without first resolving the Cheonan sinking, a position that served as both a security measure and a strong warning toward North Korea against future attacks. Meanwhile, Pyongyang has been trying to escape from the situation it had created by improving its relations with Beijing through Kim Jong-il’s visit to China, and offering to resume the Six-Party Talks following the release of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the Cheonan incident.   Now that the Security Council Presidential Statement has been adopted, it is in Seoul’s best interest not to pursue a fundamentalist approach by trying to link the Cheonan incident to every other security issue. Its blind focus on the sinking of the Cheonan, regardless of China and the United States’ push towards the Six-Party Talks, is reminiscent of the Koizumi administration’s narrow focus on the abduction issues. South Korea therefore, should at least take up a two-track strategy of resolving the Cheonan sinking while also preparing for the Six-Party Talks at the same time. That is, while it continues its efforts to resolve the incident, Seoul should also demand North Korea’s unconditional return to the Six-Party Talks and its resumption of the denuclearization process as it had agreed. Given that North Korea carried out its second nuclear test in 2009 and then attacked the Cheonan in 2010, Pyongyang’s request to lift the sanctions first should not be accommodated.   Inter-Korean relations are much more complicated. Although normalization is the ultimate goal for improved inter-Korea relations, it should be preceded by the resolution of the Cheonan sinking with North Korea’s formal apology, punishment of the persons responsible, and implementation of preventive measures that President Lee Myung-bak laid out in his statement on May 24. Such resolution however, is unlikely to happen soon. From an objective perspective, it is likely to follow the patterns from past contentious historical events in inter-Korea relations such as the Korean War, the KAL 858 bombing in 1987, and the Rangoon bombing in 1983. The complete and fundamental resolution of the Cheonan incident would only be possible with a change in North Korea’s military-first regime. In this respect, it is necessary to take the incident as an opportunity to push efforts to reshape Kim Jong-il’s military-first policy and inter-Korean relations. South Korea’s approach to inter-Korean relations and policies toward North Korea in the post-Cheonan setting are not completely unprecedented given the Bush administration’s security policy in the post-9/11 period.   Yet, just as important to resolving the Cheonan incident is also preparing for the post-Kim Jong-il era. The formation of the post-Kim Jong-il regime will have a decisive political impact on the Korean Peninsula by determining the fate of North and South Korea. Pyongyang is expected to formalize its political succession issue around 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung as well and declaration of its elevated status as a kangseong taeguk or “strong and prosperous nation.” The upcoming meeting of Party Representatives scheduled for September 2010 will bear more significance than usual. Whether North Korea continues with Kim Jong-il’s military-first policy after his demise or turns to an economy-first policy of reform and openness will determine the future course of inter-Korean relations and the North Korean nuclear issue.   South Korea’s strategy towards North Korea should focus on attracting a post-Kim Jong-il regime toward a desirable direction. Several things need to be considered in order to achieve this result. Firstly, the way hard power is exerted needs special consideration. Seoul should build up a strong defense capability to deal with any contingencies while maintaining sanctions against North Korea. At the same time, South Korea must show prudence on measures that might lead to unnecessary armed conflict, such as installing loudspeakers as part of the Psychological Warfare Operations against North Korea. The unnecessary build-up of military tensions on the Korean Peninsula will only erode South Korean public support for the government’s policies in domestic politics.   Secondly, the importance of soft power is certainly worth the consideration. A new order for North and South relations needs to be presented in order to lead a post-Kim Jong-il regime down the path of denuclearization and economy–first policy in its domestic politics. Under the current situation, where all previous inter-Korean agreements have been abolished, more sophisticated measures will be required to manage North-South relations. It is especially important to lead a ‘denuclearized, economy-first’ post-Kim regime to co-evolve with South Korea’s complex support for the new regime’s prosperity and security.   Lastly, making full use of network power is required. Given the current tensions, opening up all channels of official communication between North and South Korea is unlikely. However, private sector networks can be opened and other networks that affect the North Korean regime’s decision-making should also be developed. This includes North Korea’s diplomatic and alliance networks with China and Russia. In the current situation, the only way to fully resolve the situation is to show initiative in devising a new paradigm and then implementing a new strategy toward North Korea with the strategic support of neighboring countries.■             Chair Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University)   Panel Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Sukhee Han (Yonsei University)   Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this project possible. This commentary has been translated from the original on July 15, 2010. This report is produced by Eun Hae Choi, Jeongu Gim, Do-Hee Jeong, Yang Gyu Kim, Stephen Ranger, and Jill Da Eun Seong.

On May 20, 2010, the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group, which included twenty-four foreign experts from the United States, Britain, Australia, and Sweden announced its results on the Cheonan incident. The South Korean government presented the group’s conclusion that the Cheonan sank due to an attack by a North Korean torpedo. Twenty-two countries including the United States announced that they are in complete agreement with and support the South Korean government. Contrary to Seoul’s expectations though, China displayed a reserved attitude. As soon as the Group began its investigation on the incident, China stressed the need to obtain “scientific” and “objective” results, and continues to make such broad remarks instead of specifically criticizing the South Korean government’s findings.   Since the outbreak of the Cheonan incident, China’s official position is focused on “being a responsible great power” and “striving to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula.” With its own definition of “a responsible great power”, China highlights the compatibility between being a responsible power and maintaining the China-North Korea alliance. Moreover, China has put political emphasis on the need to prevent further tension and uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. The idea of a “responsible great power” and “peace and stability maintenance in the Korean Peninsula” defines well Beijing’s political interests regarding the Cheonan incident.   The reason why China is reluctant to comment about the results from the South Korean government’s investigation results is because analyzing the findings both “objectively” and “scientifically” will inevitably force the Chinese government to acknowledge North Korea’s responsibility for the Cheonan incident. If Beijing admits that North Korea was behind the sinking, it will have to make decisions about issuing statements condemning the attack, and even imposing sanctions at the United Nations Security Council. Conversely, to deny North Korea’s role in the attack, it would then have to debate on the scientific validity and objectivity of the investigation results with those countries including United States who blame North Korea for the incident. This is why China is reluctant to issue any form of assessment.   No matter what the reality is regarding the incident, China has not shown any initiative in acknowledging North Korea’s responsibility for the Cheonan incident. Beijing has taken this cautious approach because it sees the current situation in Pyongyang as not very stable. Due to the increasing isolation from the international community, the worsening economic situation since the failed currency reform of late 2009, the declining health of Kim Jong-il and uncertainty over leadership succession, North Korea is confronting severe difficulties both at home and abroad. Therefore, China seems to have concluded that too much external pressure upon Pyongyang may threaten the regime’s stability.   The difficulties for ROK-China cooperation over the Cheonan incident lie in that the two countries’ strategic visions for the long-term future of the North Korean regime are not accordant. Beijing is concerned whether in the future Pyongyang will be in favor of China’s own national interests, if it agrees with South Korea’s sanctions against North Korea. In light of this, if South Korea fails to prove that its current tough policy will lead onto the path for improved inter-Korean relations and stability on the Korean Peninsula then Beijing will pursue a policy toward North Korea based on its own national interests.   China is not supporting North Korea unconditionally. It has also been exerting pressure on Pyongyang to prevent further provocations and instability. As demonstrated in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s five proposals mentioned during the China-DPRK Summit, China made demands for enhanced strategic communication between the two countries. Primarily, this carries an important message that Pyongyang should hold close consultations with Beijing on North Korea’s major domestic and diplomatic issues. This statement is extremely contradictory with China’s traditional foreign policy that has been rooted in nonintervention. Through this strategic enhancement in bilateral communications, Beijing wants to prevent any surprises coming from North Korea that could threaten Northeast Asia’s peace and security. Mainly because these threats negatively affect one of China’s top-priority goals, economic development.   Despite the difficulties arising from China’s passivity, South Korea is working step by step to draw up stronger diplomatic countermeasures against Pyongyang from the international community. In actual fact, South Korea, just like China, does not wish to propose another UN resolution against the North Korean regime. Drafting another resolution for sanctions would be meaningless, especially considering that North Korea is already under strict sanctions from previous UN Security Council Resolutions. Instead, the South Korean government is pushing for a UN Security Council Presidential Statement so that it can lead the voice of the international community without having to impose de facto sanctions against North Korea. Still, it is unlikely that China will agree to a presidential statement being issued. As long as North Korea continues to strongly deny being behind the Cheonan incident, China will most likely refrain from condemning North Korea.   Still, it would be a considerable diplomatic burden for China to oppose a UN Security Council Presidential Statement. Irrespective of the Cheonan incident, China has underscored the need to resume the stalled Six-Party Talks, differing from South Korea, which insists on “resolving Cheonan incident first, resuming Six-Party Talks after”. In order to overcome such differences, both China and South Korea need to pass the UN Security Council Presidential Statement, through which the Cheonan issue can be finally resolved and focus can then be redirected to resuming the Six-Party Talks. However, the real problem lies in the decision whether to implicate North Korea as the culprit of the Cheonan incident in the Presidential Statement or not. While mentioning North Korea in the statement appears fair from South Korea’s perspective, China has expressed difficulties in doing so.   If the UN Security Council Presidential Statement is adopted, the South Korean government will work to resume the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has asked for the alleviation or termination at best of the UN-imposed sanctions in exchange for resuming the Six-Party Talks. The South Korean government will have to push North Korea for more willing participation, while at the same time working to resume the Six-Party Talks with support from China and the United States. If the Presidential Statement is not issued, there is a high possibility that China will face considerable difficulties in exercising its leadership to resume the talks. Thus, the Cheonan incident is an important opportunity for China to construct its future leadership in the international community.   Ever since the establishment of ROK-PRC diplomatic ties in 1992, South Korea has believed that it needs to maintain a cordial relationship with China so that the Chinese leadership would direct North Korea in a manner which Seoul desires. This has been mainly because of Beijing’s considerable political, economic, military, and diplomatic leverage upon Pyongyang. Hence, Seoul has focused more on retaining an easygoing relationship with China instead of pursuing its national interests. Regardless of South Korea’s position toward China, Beijing has always pursued China-DPRK relations based on its own national interests. If Seoul wants to affect North Korea with the help of China’s leverage, South Korea needs to make China’s national interests coincide more with its own national interests toward the region, or at least regarding the Korean Peninsula. In this way, Seoul needs to draw Beijing’s attention to the changes in the current international environment.   The ROK-U.S. joint naval exercise, currently being considered in response to the recent Cheonan incident, has many implications for Beijing. In the process of assessing the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, China responded in a sensitive way as it considers the entrance of a U.S. aircraft carrier into the Yellow Sea as a considerable threat to its own security. Lacking any feasible means for restricting the U.S-ROK joint military exercise, the only practical option for Beijing is to express its opposition through diplomatic means. China will realize that the ROK-US partnership, in case of the Cheonan incident or any future contingency related to the Korean Peninsula may not always be in line with its own policies toward the Northeast Asia region. Beijing should recognize that it needs to collaborate with Seoul and Washington to discuss about and develop a vision for future contingencies related to North Korea. The current response to the participation of the USS George Washington in the ROK-US joint naval exercise could be a signal for China to recognize that North Korea-related contingencies in the future may significantly change the balance of power in Northeast Asia.   China itself needs further strategic cooperation with South Korea and the United States to secure peace and maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula, because Beijing’s leverage to control North Korea is fairly limited. In order to resolve the ‘North Korean issue’, there is a need to develop various ‘mini-multilateral’ cooperation forums depending on issues, in addition to the Six-Party Talks, in which related parties can efficiently discuss the issues. South Korea, China, and other related nations can confront various regional security problems including North Korea’s regime stability and future uncertainty, nuclear threats, and defectors. The way in which these different forums could cooperate on different issues could be South Korea-China-United States cooperating on the future of the North Korean regime, while South Korea-China-Mongolia and even Japan could discuss on issues related to defectors, and finally South Korea-China-United States can work together on the nuclear crisis.   Along with the rise of China, the importance of PRC-ROK relations is progressively increasing more than ever before. The relationship between the two countries is no longer just bilateral, but is the key to the fate of the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century. Unfortunately, considering the two countries’ geopolitical positions and the differences in national power, South Korea’s actual leverage on China is limited. Understanding the goals of China’s policies in foreign affairs is the first and most important step for South Korea. In addition, Seoul should strengthen its efforts to correlate its own strategic interests with those of Beijing in a phased fashion. As seen with the Cheonan incident, smooth cooperation between China and South Korea can hardly be expected, unless there is active strategic communication upon the future of North Korean regime and the Korean Peninsula. Seeking a clue for further ROK-China strategic cooperation for North Korean nuclear issue, the Six-Party Talks, regime instability, and the succession issue in Pyongyang is really needed.   As well as to reinforce capabilities and secure the balance of power, South Korea should seek to enhance its ‘network power’ in global society. The Cheonan incident has revealed that Seoul should deal more earnestly with the complexities surrounding the Korean Peninsula. If it fails to map out the whole network for problem solving, a mis-connected node will lead to a total failure. In order to do so, South Korea needs to develop the existing ROK-U.S. alliance into a 21st century comprehensive alliance, and to enhance ‘new-era’ cooperation with Japan.   The expansion of a diplomacy network must occur and influence the involved parties so that strategic cooperation between China and South Korea can be further developed. South Korea’s diplomatic alliances and relationships with the United States, Japan, and China are no longer a question of choice, but a problem that must be dealt with according to the dynamics of power at the time of concern.■     Chair Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University)   Panel Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Sukhee Han (Yonsei University)   Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this project possible. This commentary has been translated from the original authored by Sukhee Han on June 25, 2010.

Sang-Hyun Lee received his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is currently a Director of the Security Studies Program at the Sejong Institute. He served as a research fellow at the Korean Insti-tute for International Studies and the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis.         The NPR 2010 and the Nuclear Security Summit   When President Barack Obama set out his new initiative toward a “world without nuclear weapons” in his Prague speech on April 5, 2009, there was a great deal of speculation about what his official nuclear policy would be. A year later, questions were answered when the Obama administration finally released its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on April 6, 2010. This document conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense sets out the nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities, and force posture for the next five to ten years. Since the end of the Cold War, every incoming administration has been required to release an NPR as part of the wider “Strategic Defense Reviews,” which also includes “The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),” “The Space Posture Review (SPR),” and “The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR).” In general the NPR 2010 contains five main objectives for the United States regarding its nuclear forces and the approach to nuclear proliferation.   Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism. The NPR 2010 makes a strong emphasis on the need to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism. For the first time, the NPR gives top priority to discouraging other countries from pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons as well as preventing nuclear terrorism. To meet its objectives in this regard, the Obama administration spoke on the need to strengthen international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to enhance global cooperation for securing nuclear materials and impeding illicit nuclear trade. As well as international organization and global cooperation, arms control treaties will also receive renewed focus, including a New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with Russia, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and reinforcing the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.   Reduced Role of Nuclear Weapons. The Obama administration will be looking to reduce the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in both national security and military strategy. This will look to reducing the reliance of the United States on nuclear weapons as policy options and also to reduce their numbers as well. To emphasize this change in policy, the NPR 2010 formalizes a “negative security assurance” which means no use or threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This contrasts starkly with the policy of the previous Bush administration, which stated in its NPR 2002, the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attacks or even against terrorist bases inside caves or bunkers. Despite this change, the NPR 2010 has one caveat to its “negative security assurance,” that the United States still reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against states that have withdrawn or are in violation of the NPT, for example North Korea.   Maintaining Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels. Strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels is a key objective for the United States in the NPR 2010. To achieve this, Washington will seek to establish stable relations with Russia and China in order to maintain strategic deterrence, reinforce stability, and importantly prevent accidental nuclear war through mutual misunderstandings. Immediately upon the release of the NPR 2010, President Obama signed a New START agreement with Russia in Prague on April 8, 2010. The New START limits the number of deployable strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 and the number of launch vehicles, missiles, submarines, and bombers, to 800. The nuclear triad of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and nuclear-capable bombers will be preserved. However, all missiles will be “de-MIRVed” (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle) that is each missile will have only one single warhead.   Strengthening Extended Deterrence. The NPR 2010 commits the United States to extended deterrence to its allies and partners against nuclear attack. Despite this commitment, non-nuclear capabilities will take on a larger share of extended deterrence as the role of nuclear weapons is increasingly reduced in the national security strategy of the United States. It is clear though that extended deterrence will not diminish.   Sustaining Provision of Nuclear Weapons. The United States promises to maintain its nuclear weapons safely, securely, and effectively. Committed to not conducting any nuclear tests or the development of new nuclear warheads, Washington will maintain its nuclear weapons by using only components based on previously tested designs. This will include investment in its Life Extension Programs for nuclear weapons, more support for its research facilities, and the related workforce.   Shortly after the release of the NPR 2010, the United States hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington D.C. April 12-13, 2010. This summit was part of the agenda set out by President Obama in his Prague speech that envisioned “world without nuclear weapons.” This remarkable summit brought together not only the five nuclear weapon states, but also three international organizations, which are the United Nations, the European Union, and the IAEA, and 42 other countries including states possessing nuclear weapons outside of the NPT such as India, Pakistan, and Israel. For two days, the major challenges toward the security of nuclear material and weapons were discussed. These major issues included enhancing nuclear security, restraining terrorist groups’ access to nuclear materials, and securing the non-proliferation regime. The summit also discussed those states that have withdrawn or are in violation of the NPT, including North Korea and Iran.   The NPR, NSS, and NPT Review Conference   In order to fully understand the nuclear strategy of the United States, a careful analysis is required of the NPR, the NSS, and also the NPT Review Conference which was held at the UN Headquarters in New York from May 3-28, 2010. Since the release of the NPR, there has been rapid progress in efforts for denuclearization, signing of the New START in Prague, the NSS in Washington, and finally the NPT Review Conference in New York. With the NPT Review Conference, Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, crowned the conference as the final step in a so-called “nuclear spring.”   The NPR 2010 is not that different from President Obama’s speech on March 5, 2010, to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the NPT. In this speech, he spoke of reducing the number of nuclear warheads as well as limiting the role of nuclear weapons while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, he added that disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are the three central pillars to his vision for a world without nuclear weapons. The NPR 2010 presents a flexible approach in responding to threats through the application of all weapon systems across the board including conventional options and missile defense. Such a new strategy is reminiscent of the Kennedy Administration’s Flexible Response policy, responding to threats with conventional forces as well as nuclear ones.   It remains unclear whether the new nuclear policy of the United States will achieve a “world without nuclear weapons” as President Obama hopes. Despite the NPR 2010 focus on disarmament and a reduced role for U.S. nuclear forces, the Obama administration still recognizes the need for nuclear weapons to deter a potential enemy’s attack as well as to reassure allies and partners. This new strategy will pursue the antinomic goal of reducing the role of nuclear arms while at the same time strengthening nuclear deterrence. Within the United States, there is a large degree of agreement with the fundamental principle of reducing nuclear weapons. However, this should not come at the expense of weakening national security in any way. The United States must continue to maintain its “calculated ambiguity” with regards to its nuclear policy and always leave open the option for the use of nuclear weapons.   The NPR 2010 and the Korean Peninsula   This new nuclear strategy by the United States is likely to have some impact on its allies, including South Korea. Allies of the United States, particularly those that have experienced major threats to their sovereignty in the past like East European countries are concerned about the implications the NPR 2010 has toward the nuclear umbrella. If the United States does not exercise a strong commitment to its nuclear umbrella, then some allies like Japan or Turkey may consider developing their own nuclear programs.   In order to understand the security implications of the NPR 2010 for the Korea Peninsula, an overall analysis of the strategic defense strategy of the United States is needed, including the relationship between the major defense reports, such as the QDR and the BMDR. To some extent, this will enable us to anticipate future security influences on the Korean Peninsula. The QDR mentions the changes for U.S Forces in Korea by making the force posture more “adaptive and flexible,” which will increase its strategic flexibility. Reduction of the role and the number of nuclear weapons emphasized in the NPR 2010 implies that the U.S. nuclear umbrella might be attenuated regardless of Washington’s intention. As part of the new nuclear strategy of the United States, the Department of Defense announced that it will retire TLAM/N (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear), reassuring that the extended deterrence to allies like South Korea and Japan will stand firm. However, South Korea still should make strong efforts to develop its own deterrence against the North Korean nuclear threat, while securing U.S. extended deterrence through strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance.   The main challenge for the Korean Peninsula is the North Korean nuclear crisis. North Korea has already shown opposition to the NPR. A few days after its release, on April 9, 2010, Pyongyang announced that it will increase and modernize its nuclear weapons as long as the United States poses a nuclear threat. The DPRK Foreign Ministry also strongly criticized the NPR 2010 for being no different from the Bush administration’s earlier policies, as the NPR excludes states like Iran and North Korea from its negative security pledge. Furthermore, this criticism was followed up by the release of North Korea’s own official “Memorandum on the Nuclear Issue” on April 21, 2010. In this statement, the Foreign Ministry asserted that North Korea will make efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the world, regardless of whether the Six-Party Talks resume or not. The memorandum also stated that the DPRK will continue to produce nuclear weapons but will refrain from any kind of arms race and will participate in international disarmament efforts only as an equal with other nuclear states. Since its first nuclear test in October 2006, North Korea has continued to claim its status as a nuclear weapon state and called for disarmament negotiations. It continues to call itself a nuclear weapon state regardless of any international recognition. Pyongyang is seemingly raising its leverage for future talks.   The timing of North Korea’s recent claim for its nuclear status is interesting. While the claim itself is nothing new, it is noticeable that it came shortly after March 26, 2010, sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan, which halted efforts to start the Six-Party Talks. It would appear that Pyongyang was trying to divert attention away from that incident while at the same time seeking to gain the upper hand with South Korea and the United States. At the same time, North Korea is also seeking to gain economic support from China by offering to resume the Six-Party Talks, which helps explain Kim Jong-il’s surprise trip to China on May 3, 2010. Even if North Korea returns to the Six-Party Talks, it will work to make its status as nuclear weapon state a fait accompli and gain as many benefits as possible from negotiations, by prolonging the talks for as long as possible. But Pyongyang should realize that that would make it to be a common enemy against a “world without nuclear weapons.” The North Korean regime needs to think seriously about why the Obama administration dubs it as an “outlier,” a state not covered by the negative security assurance. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s recent remarks on nuclear nonproliferation at the University of Louisville that North Korea has five to six nuclear weapons was not an acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status but rather a call for its denuclearization. North Korea will not succeed to be recognized as a nuclear weapon state and therefore should return to the Six-Party Talks.   President Lee Myung-bak introduced Seoul’s efforts for non-proliferation at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, as well publicized South Korea’s cutting-edge nuclear plant operation systems, and announced that Seoul will host the 2nd nuclear summit in 2012. Nuclear power in South Korea accounts for as much as 40 percent of its electricity, yet the South Korean nuclear industry’s reputation is at a disadvantage because of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Hosting the 2nd nuclear security summit will be a good opportunity to show South Korea’s efforts to work for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula as well as expanding the right for peaceful use of nuclear energy as guaranteed under the NPT.   The NPR 2010 of the Obama administration is the first step toward a “world without nuclear weapons.” While we may never know what kind of obstacles lie ahead, Obama’s nuclear policy is an ambitious vision and an earnest appeal for the world that mankind needs to cooperate to face security threats of the world today. It remains to be seen how ideals and the reality will converge, and how the international community will respond to this appeal.■         Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this project possible. This commentary has been translated from the original authored by Sang-hyeon Lee in Korean on May 10, 2010.

Dong Ryul Lee is a professor at Dongduk Women’s University and Chair of China Research Panel at East Asia Institute. Professor Lee received his PhD in Political Science from the Department of International Politics, Peking University.         Background and Significance of Kim Jong-il’s China Visit   The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il embarked on a secretive trip to China on May 3, 2010. The five day visit was his first to China in four years and his fifth so far. Kim’s recent visit to China does not seem to be that much different from previous summit meetings between North Korea and China. Although North Korea’s nuclear test in 2009 did not provoke a longer than normal suspension in bilateral exchanges, in essence, progress has been made since the resumption of bilateral diplomatic visits in 2000. The key agenda of the recent summit has been consistent with the principle in which China provides economic assistance in exchange for North Korea’s return to the Six-Party Talks. This principle has been the backbone of Beijing’s North Korea policy, which has been in place since the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 2003. Furthermore, this secretive trip to China looks very similar to Kim Jong-il’s last four visits to China, where he toured the industrial regions that have benefited from China’s economic reform and opening.   There has been a lot of controversy and diverse assumptions on the reason for Kim’s visit to China. This is particularly attributable to the complicated and delicate nature of inter-Korean relations even though this China-DPRK summit shares many similarities with those of the past. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the political and security environment of the Korean Peninsula in which Kim Jong-il decided to make such a critical strategic decision to travel to China.   The visit and the resulting bilateral summit were a successful conclusion to the longest gap in China-DPRK relations since the revival of bilateral ties at the beginning of 2000. Similarly, this summit carries special meaning considering the current deadlock of the Six-Party Talks that has gone on for the past eighteen months. What is more significant is the fact that Kim Jong-il’s trip immediately followed South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s official visit to China on April 30, amid the escalating tensions in inter-Korean relations over the North Korean torpedo attack on the Cheonan. Moreover, North Korea is facing dire domestic circumstances primarily caused by the health problems of Kim Jong-il, the succession issue, instability following the disastrous currency reform of late 2009, and its failing economy struggling under United Nations sanctions.   The fact that the China-DPRK summit took place in such a complex environment indicates that a wide range of current issues were involved and it would have a greater impact for stability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s actions immediately following the bilateral summit with China should be closely examined as it could help South Korea predict how the Cheonan incident will develop. There were no official reports or any specific details of the conversation available for the public due to the opaque nature of the talk. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize as well as analyze any subtle moves by both countries that might reflect any possible major agreements between the two sides. There are three major questions that need to be answered when evaluating this recent summit in China. First, what is the significance of the summit regarding China-DPRK relations and Beijing’s policy toward North Korea? Second, did North Korea and China agree on the North’s return to the Six-Party Talks in exchange for Chinese support for its regime? If so, what is the prospect for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks? Third, what impact will this summit have on ROK-China relations in light of the fact that the summit meeting took place while the South Korean-led international investigation into the cause of the Cheonan sinking was in progress?   China’s Policy toward North Korea and the Bilateral Relationship   Kim Jong-il’s secretive trip to China in the immediate aftermath of the Cheonan incident has intensified the debate over the current status of China-DPRK relations. On the surface, China-DPRK relations have recently appeared to be weakening and adrift. After North Korea’s nuclear test in 2009, China took up an unusually hard-line against Pyongyang by supporting the United Nations resolutions condemning the North. In response, the North Korean regime criticized strongly these resolutions as a “scheme of the United States and its blind followers”, which included China.   However, China did not carry out strict sanctions against Pyongyang directly. In fact, quite the opposite, China has increased its economic exchange with North Korea. In 2008, North Korea’s trade dependency on China reached the seventy percent mark. In addition, these two countries further strengthened economic cooperation as traditional allies, manifested recently by Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to North Korea in 2009 and now by Kim Jong-il’s trip to China.   The hidden side to the paradoxical China-DPRK relations lies in the strategic disparity between China’s short-term strategy toward the North Korean nuclear issue and its long-term strategy for the overall problems of North Korea. Considering China’s foreign policy strategy toward North Korea, its main interest is upon maintaining a stable pro-China regime without nuclear weapons in Pyongyang. The underlying assumption of this strategy holds that North Korea’s nuclear problem should not adversely affect the rise of China. Beijing is concerned that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons as well as the regime’s instability might create major impediments to China’s peaceful rise as a global power. Accordingly, China is attempting to use the Six-Party Talks to prevent the North Korean crisis from worsening the security environment in East Asia in the medium to long term. As China views the North Korean nuclear crisis as fundamentally a bilateral issue between North Korea and the United States, the Chinese government believes that its role in resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is somewhat limited.   On the other hand, Beijing is continuing bilateral economic exchanges and cooperation with North Korea in order to pursue its fundamental interests and long-term strategy. This is instead of pushing Pyongyang to adopt the Chinese model of economic reform. Through this strategy, China is hoping to counterbalance its weakened influence over Pyongyang in case of the normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations as well as to maintain the stability of the North Korean regime as a pro-China policy in Pyongyang. As seen in the previous four visits of Kim Jong-il to China, this visit also focused on the successful experience of economic reform in Dalian, Tianjin, and Zhongguancun. During the visit, Premier Wen Jiabao explicitly pointed out that China will continue its full support for North Korea’s economic development and hopes to introduce China’s experience in economic development and reform. In order to pursue these long-term strategies, China needs to continue its economic cooperation with Pyongyang despite the ongoing tensions of the nuclear crisis.   China might have allowed this visit mainly due to its security burdens arising from the instability of the North Korean regime in the immediate aftermath of the Cheonan sinking. Although North Korea is currently perceived as a strategic burden to China, it will be difficult for Beijing to completely discard the North Korea card which has the potential to turn into a strategic asset in the long term. Consequently, China is attempting to manage any security burdens that North Korea might create in the short and medium term while maximizing the value of North Korea by stabilizing the reclusive regime to be more pro-China. Moreover, this carefully calculated strategy by China adequately addresses any possible changes in regional security relations in the event North Korea makes the decision to denuclearize.   Prospects for the Six-Party Talks after the China-DPRK Summit   Kim Jong-il might have expected to make substantial gains from China during the visit such as economic assistance and cooperation, support for the regime and Pyongyang’s succession plan, and possibly a chance to provide explanations on the Cheonan incident from the North Korean perspective. In contrast, China did not expect much from Pyongyang during the summit meeting with Kim Jong-il. North Korea’s return to the talks seems sufficient enough for China’s national interests as indicated during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pyongyang in 2009. Accordingly, the question of whether the two leaders were able to reach a bilateral consensus that reflects their interests remains the focus. If this is the case, the participants of the Six-Party Talks will soon begin their diplomatic efforts to resume the Talks at the working level. Overall, China-DPRK relations are expected to be stable in the foreseeable future.   This recent visit did not see any significant progress on the Six-Party Talks when compared to the discussions during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Pyongyang in 2009. During Kim Jong-il’s visit in May, the two leaders merely reconfirmed their shared effort toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula within the framework of the September 2005 Joint Statement. In contrast to the previous summit meetings, China did not clearly specify its economic assistance in response to North Korea’s return to the Six-Party Talks. Although it has been widely believed that China’s President Hu Jintao and Kim Jong-il agreed on economic cooperation in five areas including economic reform, it still lacked substantive details. Specific plans and the scale of Chinese economic assistance have not been made public following this summit in May. Considering the fact that this recent visit was the first in four years, the outcomes are unexpectedly vague. Despite the persistent Chinese efforts to persuade the North to return to multilateral talks since 2003, Pyongyang has remained resistant to China’s persuasion. This clearly shows the difficulty in resuming the Six-Party Talks through bilateral negotiations between Beijing and Pyongyang. Yet, it is still too early to conclude that the prospects for the Six-Party Talks are dim. There are many factors that can help restart the Talks.   Although the Cheonan incident placed China in a dilemma on how to respond, its consistent support for the resumption of the talks remains unchanged. The Obama administration has also explicitly expressed support for the talks under his initiative for a nuclear-free world and implicitly encouraged China to play a role in the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. In this regard, Beijing has long been a traditional mediator between Pyongyang and Washington to successfully resume the Talks. On April 29, shortly before the China-DPRK summit meeting, State Councilor Dai Bingguo and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shared a telephone conversation on the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.   With the results of the China-DPRK summit, it is now time to invite China and the United States to move forward to resume the Talks. The Strategic Economic Dialogue 2010 on May 24 between China and the United States serves as a good indicator of the prospects for the Six-Party Talks. Similarly, there is a high possibility that the leaders of China and North Korea would discuss preconditions for the North’s return to the Talks. Kim Jong-il specifically mentioned that he hoped regional powers would create a favorable environment that might lead to the resumption of the Talks. This is indicative of Pyongyang’s willingness to participate in the Talks with Chinese help as a mediator after the difficulties surrounding the Cheonan incident have concluded.   The Cheonan incident is undoubtedly an important variable for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. China does not want the tensions over the warship incident to escalate, which might cause regional instability. However, China will be somewhat compelled to support the United Nations Security Council sanctions against Pyongyang given the definitive and undisputable forensic evidence accusing Pyongyang that has been widely accepted at the international level.   Implications for ROK-China Relations   Kim Jong-il’s visit to China surprisingly created some ripples in ROK-China relations. With this, the Lee Myung-bak government now faces an important, yet unexpected, diplomatic test. The series of events following the Cheonan sinking with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to China followed by Kim Jong-il’s visit, created the unusual perception that the two Koreas were in a diplomatic competition over China. This diplomatic competition looked even more abnormal considering the fact that ROK-China relations and China-DPRK relations can no longer be defined as a zero-sum game. South Korea and China have cooperated in an array of policy issues since 2003 after acknowledging that North Korea’s nuclear program posed a serious threat to both countries. In fact, this shared threat perception against Pyongyang’s nuclear program contributed toward strengthening bilateral ties between Seoul and Beijing.   After South Korean President Lee Myung-bak took office in 2008, South Korea and China elevated bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership. Despite improving relations, the two governments have displayed diverging interests on key strategic issues including the North Korean nuclear crisis and Cheonan sinking. In the wake of warship incident and the China-DPRK summit, South Korea should reevaluate the “China factor” on the Korean Peninsula and examine how to manage Chinese variables in the multifaceted and complex dynamics of international relations in the East Asia region.   Above all, the Lee Myung-bak government needs to review its eighteen year history of ROK-China relations. Although the two countries have shown drastic developments in the bilateral relationship over the past eighteen years, beneath its blooming façade is the need for greater mutual understanding and trust. This has mainly generated some of the current diplomatic problems between Seoul and Beijing. Therefore, mutual understanding between the two countries should come first. In this regard, the South Korean government needs to assess China’s North Korea policy and China-DPRK relations from the rational and objective perspectives rather than through wishful thinking.   In addition, South Korea needs to make an effort to take the lead in the North Korean nuclear crisis. Despite a series of diplomatic mishaps between Seoul and Beijing, there is an increasing need for both countries to cooperate more closely on North Korea issues. However, South Korea should abandon its wishful thinking that it can make more use of China’s knowledge and leverage on North Korea for its own interests. Instead, Seoul needs to secure its own set of information, diplomatic channels, and leverage on North Korea, preferably superior to those of China. With such tools, South Korea should seek a more active role when it comes to persuading participants of the Six-Party Talks over the resumption of dialogue or sanctions against Pyongyang. The North Korean nuclear crisis has resulted in the increased influence of China on the Korean Peninsula, which conversely has decreased South Korea’s role as inter-Korean relations deteriorated. Another zero-sum game between Seoul and Pyongyang vying for China will only exacerbate South Korea’s already declining foothold, particularly in pursuing its long-term goal of unification on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea should focus on diplomacy to ensure its own strategic values and status in possible future power struggles between China and the United States.■     Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this project possible. This commentary has been translated from the original authored by Dong Ryul Lee in Korean on May 13, 2010.

Since the tragic sinking of the ROK Navy corvette, the Cheonan, on March 26 2010, there has been an unprecedented level of unconfirmed suspicion, speculation, and criticism over the incident. Not only has this focused on the cause of the sinking but also on the Lee Myung-bak administration’s handling of the incident and its response in the immediate aftermath. The major challenge ahead is to build a domestic consensus on how to perceive and characterize the Cheonan incident and muster global support to punish North Korea. Pyongyang’s sinking of the South Korean warship has raised fundamental questions in the five most critical areas of the state; the military, diplomacy, economy, politics, and intelligence. Rather than narrowly focusing on one single area within which to muster a response, the Lee administration needs to take a comprehensive approach across all five areas and prevent further provocations from threatening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.   1. Military   The North Korean torpedo attack on the Cheonan shows all too clearly the security environment in which Koreans have lived since the end of the Korean War. More seriously, it has also revealed the loopholes in South Korea’s defense policy during a time of crisis. Immediately following the sinking of the Cheonan, concerns were raised criticizing the initial reporting system in the military and the insufficient levels of cooperation between the civilian government and the military. This together with the lack of effective communication to the public led to unconfirmed speculation dominating subsequent discussions even among policymakers including the military. The shortcomings of the government’s crisis-management capacity only served to aggravate South Koreans’ anxiety and threat perceptions of North Korea.   For the South Korean government, what is urgently required is a comprehensive review of its defense strategy. Particularly, this relates to the development of feasible options to strengthen the ROK’s defense capability against unexpected provocative actions. To prevent further attacks against South Korea, a careful analysis regarding the underlying causes of the threats to its security is needed. The Cheonan incident hit the Lee Myung-bak administration at a time when it had yet to devise an effective defense strategy and was also in the midst of reconsidering the defense reforms left over from the previous administrations. In light of the incident, voices are growing for the reclassification of the North Korean regime as the main enemy of South Korea, a delay in the transfer of wartime operational control, and an increase in defense spending. This all demands that the government urgently needs to conduct a long-term and comprehensive strategic review of its national security policy.   The primary focus of Seoul’s reaction to this tragedy is centered on the prevention of further provocations against South Korea, particularly future clashes in the Yellow Sea. President Lee Myung-bak should send a clear message that the international community as well as his government will not tolerate any kind of attack that threatens peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea should enhance its defense capability and the ROK-U.S. alliance needs to be further strengthened in ways that make a future joint military response more effective. Any military response, however, should come together with diplomatic, economic, and political measures in a comprehensive manner. South Korea’s effective use of various diplomatic channels at the global level can further maximize the effects of a military response.   There are limits to South Korea initializing a military response in the future. Considering the Lee Myung-bak administration’s global initiative to emerge as a benign middle power, it will be difficult for him to blindly pursue military retaliation that can deepen tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the rapidly changing security environment in East Asia. If a military response is the only option available for Seoul, it will also fail to reflect the interests of regional powers, particularly China and the United States, that seek to establish themselves as stabilizers in the region. Given South Korea’s numerous foreign policy initiatives including the G20 summit meeting in November in Seoul, future military countermeasures to the North’s provocations should be carefully calculated in ways that do not escalate unnecessary tensions on the Korean Peninsula.   2. Diplomacy   On the diplomatic front, the Cheonan incident has already reached a new level. South Korea should make its diplomatic effort consistent to prevent future provocations on the Korean Peninsula. This effort should include sending a clear signal that any country or organization that leads or supports any violent provocations will suffer punitive political, economic, and diplomatic consequences.   The regional powers have shown a great deal of attention to how the Cheonan incident will develop and its possible implications for their national interests. In the midst of the rapidly changing international politics in East Asia, the United States has pursued both a strategic partnership with a rising China and a multilateral foreign policy in the region. Yet Washington’s traditional alliances with Japan and South Korea remain its priority. Given the recent friction between the Obama administration and the Hatoyama government in their bilateral ties, the ROK-U.S. alliance is gaining more strength in the region. The Obama administration has expressed continued support for South Korea’s handling of the Cheonan incident by indicating its willingness to suspend efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks until the warship sinking has been fully resolved. However, the Obama administration’s initiative for a nuclear-free world remains its overall objective which would suggest a consistent strategic interest in denuclearizing the North. Taking this into account, the Lee administration should send a clear and strong signal about its own North Korea policy. Considering the complexities involved in the Cheonan incident, Seoul must outline clearly how it will attempt to respond in order to successfully maximize the cooperation between South Korea and the United States.   China is also in a difficult position regarding the Cheonan sinking. Beijing continues to support the North Korean regime out of a fear for instability on its border. At the same time, China is now seeking to secure its status as a responsible global power at the international level. The Chinese government has recently showed its commitment toward resolving the Cheonan incident by initiating talks with both the South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il respectively and acknowledging that the South Korean-led multinational investigation is scientific and objective. During Kim Jong-il’s recent visit to China, the North was strongly pressed to increase strategic dialogue on both Pyongyang’s domestic and external affairs with Beijing in exchange for the continued Chinese political and economic support. The Cheonan incident presents a serious test for China as both a global power and a North Korean ally. Whether China will be fully cooperative on sanctions against Pyongyang will largely depend on the two strategic goals of China. These two goals are the promotion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the peaceful rise of China as a global power. As Chinese support is crucial for South Korea, the Lee Myung-bak government should devise a long-term and well-calculated strategy to gain adequate support from Beijing to punish Pyongyang.   South Korea’s diplomatic response could serve as a good example in the international community if similar provocations arise. With the rising status of South Korea at the global level in hosting the G20 summit meeting and high-level meetings on a variety of transnational issues, the South Korean government needs to meet global standards and norms when responding to the Cheonan sinking. South Korea has to show its effective use of all possible diplomatic means that engage multilateral bodies including the United Nations.   3. Economy   South Korea’s open market-based economy has been highly influenced by the security perceptions of other countries during times of escalating crises on the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean government should deal with the security concerns effectively and secure an international support base by strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance if the country is to continue to prosper. Given the fact that the guarantee of national security leads to sustained economic development in South Korea, it is important to maintain a stable security environment by securing sufficient military funds that are relatively free from economic constraints. However, the sinking of the Cheonan increasingly raised the public’s awareness of the fundamental problems in the navy as well as the military as a whole, particularly poor working conditions and outdated facilities and weapons systems. The global economic crisis has resulted in a decrease in defense spending and investment for defense reform that was pushed through by the previous Roh Moo-hyun administration. This recent incident has awakened South Korea to realize the important lesson that a defense policy has to take into account not only economic conditions but the threat perception as well.   With North Korea held responsible for this tragic incident, South Korea’s economic leverage against Pyongyang will serve as a useful tool. Economic sanctions will certainly prove to be useful, albeit with some limitations, while other economic leverages seem equally important to promote stability on the Korean Peninsula and improve inter-Korean relations. North Korea is becoming highly dependent on China’s economic assistance as inter-Korean relations have deteriorated. As the most important ally of the Kim Jong-il regime, China seeks to maintain its dominant influence over Pyongyang while adjusting the level of economic cooperation to within the boundaries of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions instituted after North Korea’s nuclear tests. South Korea has to decide on whether to actively engage the North which would also secure economic leverage in inter-Korean issues or to isolate Pyongyang with economic sanctions when necessary. It is important that Seoul both maintain economic leverage against the North Korean regime in order to achieve the strategic upper hand in inter-Korean relations and intensify the impact of sanctions against its deadly provocations.   4. Politics   The Cheonan incident has clearly revealed the government’s failing crisis-management capacity and exposed the limitations of political leaders in dealing with national security threats. The government’s crisis management fell short of a prompt and accurate analysis and an array of governmental bodies also failed to provide a coherent picture of the tragic incident. The lack of a cohesive and coordinated response from the government has generated public distrust of official reports on the incident, which ultimately leads to public disapproval of subsequent measures from the government. Considering the persistent threats arising from the rapidly changing security environment in Northeast Asia and the North Korean regime, the South Korean government needs to take the Cheonan incident as a warning to reinforce its crisis management system for the future.   In times of crisis, political leaders should transcend their partisan interests to pursue a shared public goal in national security. As responsible leaders in society, politicians need to place a priority on ensuring national security even though this might entail political losses. It is an important time now for political leaders to reach a bipartisan consensus on the Cheonan incident with the enduring question of what makes a good leader in difficult times.   Other actors in society, such as the press and non-governmental organizations, should participate responsibly with shared security concerns. In the aftermath of the sinking of the warship, unconfirmed information and biased opinions were reported competitively as well as irresponsibly by the mass media and other various organizations with eye-catching headlines. A mature democracy should demonstrate responsible participation of citizens in the production and distribution of information.   5. Intelligence   The Cheonan incident is a clear example of an intelligence failure. The South Korean government appears to have failed to obtain any relevant information prior to the North Korean torpedo attack against the navy corvette that regularly patrols the Yellow Sea, revealing the limitations of South Korea’s intelligence capability. This also confirms the difficulty of acquiring intelligence on asymmetrical security threats on the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, the South Korean government should prove how it can improve its intelligence capabilities. The government is not the only one to blame for this intelligence failure. Other institutions at the national level have also exposed their limitations when investigating the possible cause of the sinking. Many experts and scholars failed to reach a consensus even after rounds of discussions. The sinking of the warship reiterates the importance of building an intelligence network at the national level to cope with the flood of information during a crisis.   South Korea’s response to the North Korean torpedo attack should be long-term and multifaceted addressing the five critical areas discussed above. In this way, the Cheonan incident will be remembered as a painful yet valuable lesson for strengthening South Korea’s security. This tragic event in the Yellow Sea is inevitably linked with rapidly changing inter-Korean relations as well as Pyongyang’s nuclear program and its future. Therefore, South Korea should take all these factors into consideration when dealing with the Cheonan incident as its answers will determine the course of the strategic and diplomatic response against North Korea’s deadly attack that killed forty-six South Korean sailors.■             Chair Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University)   Panel Du-Hyeogn Cha (Korea Institute for Defence Analyses) Jung-hyun Cho (The Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security) Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Sook-Jong Lee (President of the East Asia Institute)   Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges the grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this project possible. Under the supervision of Professor Chaesung Chun, this report is produced with help of Eun-Hae Choi, Jeongu Gim, Yewon Ji, and Stephen Ranger.