.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.     Following a year of breathless expectations, negotiations between North Korea and the United States have stagnated due to many reasons. Pundits skeptical of North Korea’s genuine intentions to denuclearize believe that Kim Jong Un is still developing technologies for nuclear warheads and long-range missiles despite the moratorium on nuclear and missile tests. North Korea, as shown in the recent announcements made by several officials, has criticized the United States for failing to implement corresponding measures such as a partial lift of sanctions from the American side. There is a growing expectation that early next year, there will be a second breakthrough summit between North Korea and the United States, but the nature of the North Korean nuclear problem is changing against the background of the Northeast Asian international situation, especially the extensive clash between Washington and Beijing. American unipolarity, which lasted for about two decades after the end of the Cold War, seriously threatened the prospects of survival of so-called “rogue states.” As one of these rogue states, North Korea sought the ultimate weapon to gain recognition as a political entity worth surviving after its socialist comrades had all fallen. To prove itself powerful enough to pose a threat to the American unipole was somehow effective to draw attention and concessions from Washington, and the state thereby found leverage to fight for diplomatic normalization with the United States and for economic development. However, the lack of trust between North Korea and the United States, and North Korea’s fear of being structurally absorbed by South Korea after reform and opening made Kim Jong Il hesitate over the strategic decision to denuclearize. Under the new US-China rivalry, North Korea has suddenly found itself in a far more difficult position. Amidst growing geopolitical and geoeconomic competition, the two giants are eager to avoid the relative losses that promise to follow after the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem. The complete denuclearization of North Korea will bring about not only a denuclearized North Korea, but also a Korean Peninsula under a peace treaty. What becomes of North Korea after a peace treaty is signed will be the focus of attention as it has the potential to change the geostrategic balance of power in Northeast Asia between the United States and China. Will North Korea transform itself into a pro-American country after diplomatic normalization? Will North Korea remain a staunch ally of China and fight against the US policy of counterbalancing China? Will North Korea try to maintain a policy of equidistance between the United States and China to maximize its own strategic and economic interests? It is completely uncertain what kind of diplomatic strategy North Korea will follow after it denuclearizes, and this is what lies behind the strategic hesitation of both Washington and Beijing to jump into the phase of peace treaty. It seems likely that Kim Jong Un will strive to pursue a self-reliant diplomatic strategy to maximize the interests of the North Korean regime in a practical way. However, North Korea’s nuclear weapons are not so powerful as to make it possible for the country to evade falling victim to the diplomatic dilemma that the rivalry between the United States and China is inflicting on every other East Asian country. Without a well-devised diplomatic strategy, North Korea will face the same strategic dilemma as everyone else, and its nuclear weapons will not save Kim Jong Un. Even with a nuclear arsenal, Kim lacks products to sell that might prove North Korea’s value as a regional player. It follows that President Trump and President Xi Jinping will not be willing to take the geostrategic risk necessary to conclude a peace treaty that may harm their future geopolitical interests, and thus we may deduce that both are hoping to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula while eliminating the immediate security threat posed by North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. As President Trump concentrates on dealing with the rising tensions between America and China, he may be satisfied with the absence of direct nuclear threat from North Korea. At the same time, China prefers for its neighbors to be stuck in the midst of stalled negotiations rather than having to address a denuclearized North Korea with close economic and strategic relations with South Korea and the United States. In 2019, negotiations to denuclearize North Korea will face recurring difficulties unless the United States is able to identify more positive interests that may result from the negotiations, and China becomes confident that it can depend on North Korea to take its side in the competition with the United States and that it will have a better chance to pursue its own strategic interests after a peace treaty is concluded. The combination of a denuclearized North Korea and a post-peace treaty Korean Peninsula will change the status quo in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, the South Korean government, which continues to pin its hopes on achieving denuclearization and a peace treaty, needs to ponder the strategic interests of the two giants. South Korea’s roadmap for the future should depict a peaceful Peninsula that plays a beneficial role in its relations with both the United States and China, and a more positive role for South Korea overall to achieve a better harmonization of interests between the two.     ■ Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the International Relations Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. He also serves as a professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.     Following the June 12th North Korea-US Summit in Singapore, expectations that the process of denuclearization of North Korea would be accomplished in a short period were high. However, the negotiations between the two parties has since stagnated. As discussions progress over the detailed steps that must be taken to achieve denuclearization and establish a peace system, underlying mistrust and conflicts of interest have also grown. North Korea has argued that a renewed relationship with the United States is a prerequisite for denuclearization, while the United States has stood firm that irreversible steps towards denuclearization must be made before an end-of-war declaration or partial sanctions relief can be entertained. The fundamental cause for this stalemate stems from the differences in understanding and intentions regarding the summit between North Korea and the United States. The main takeaways from the June 12th North Korea-US Summit in Singapore are that both parties need to work to build a new permanent and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and that North Korea must work to completely denuclearize the Korean Peninsula by reconfirming the Panmunjom Declaration. Following the summit, optimists argued that the North Korean nuclear issue would be fully resolved and a peace regime established on the Peninsula in due time. Pessimists, however, felt that the agreement lacked specific roadmaps and a timeline for denuclearization. In other words, the agreement reached remains at the basic step of merely emphasizing the importance of the principle of establishing a peace regime. This discord between the two views has produced conflicting interpretations of the meaning of the summit as well as the future prospects for North Korea’s complete denuclearization. What is absolutely necessary at this point is to move beyond the simple dichotomy of optimistic or pessimistic views and to critically analyze and explore the chances of actually solving the problem, beginning with a review of the North Korea-US summit. The key point of the summit was whether or not North Korea would agree to the U.S. demand for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and related capabilities. Prior to the summit, serious negotiations augmented the prospect of resolution. Basically, the two leaders reaffirmed the April 27th Panmunjom Declaration to denuclearize the Peninsula using the expression “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The US was not able to reach a consensus with North Korea to use the term CVID in the agreement, nor were they able to establish a specific roadmap for completing North Korea’s denuclearization. The US did not have a chance to declare the termination of the Korean War and offer concrete measures to guarantee the security of North Korea’s regime. The summit did not result in any tangible progress on denuclearization, as the joint statement used the same language as the Panmunjom Declaration rather than offering a new agreement on denuclearization. North Korea’s genuine strategic intentions and its approach to the negotiation with the U.S. are critical at this point. On April 20th, during the Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, North Korea declared that “the historic tasks under the strategic line of simultaneously developing the two fronts set forth at the March 2013 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Party have been successfully carried out.” North Korea also announced a “new strategic line on channeling all efforts into the economy.” It is critical to note that the new strategic line is neither the past Byungjin strategy of pursuing economic development with nuclear development, nor the most desirable strategy that puts the economy first and includes the total dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Rather, North Korea will reduce its nuclear arsenal to a minimum level of deterrence and, at the same time, devote major resources to the pursuit of economic development. It is also important to note that North Korea is not ready to accept the verification process that the US is pushing for. If North Korea accepts CVID or FFVD (Final, Fully Verified Denuclearization) as proposed by the US, then it must give up all of the nuclear weapons that it has produced thus far to guarantee a minimum level of nuclear deterrence. North Korea will adopt a nuclear-free, economically focused strategy when it is confident that the so-called U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea has completely disappeared. This means that North Korea must be convinced that US-North Korea relations are as strong as US-South Korea relations. Despite the initial agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, North Korea will stick to its own version of denuclearization that is both reciprocal and staged, responding to the US to establish a peace regime, normalize relations and lift economic sanctions. North Korea confirmed the aforementioned recognition through its official comment on the summit, which stated, “We had a mutual understanding that it is important for both parties to simultaneously follow the principle of concerted action in the process of achieving the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the denuclearization of the Peninsula.” Since the summit, it has been demonstrated that even if North Korea itself understands the inevitability of inspections and verification measures, the regime wants to maintain extreme caution in accepting the outside inspections and verification desired by the US. North Korea is currently pushing for a certain form of self-verification as the first step towards denuclearization. Self-verification is a bid to evade the US demand of having outside inspectors and permitting intrusive inspection measures. Rather than accepting an international inspection team composed of American or third country-led specialists, North Korea prefers to advance denuclearization after completing their own voluntary reporting and inspections. No matter how much the US pressures North Korea with economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, North Korea will want to keep the military option of using its nuclear weapons. This is because giving up the last resort of minimum nuclear deterrence and agreeing to complete denuclearization is a life or death decision for the regime. While it is likely that North Korea will unilaterally rapidly implement the first step of confidence-building measures towards arms reduction, as was done in Punggye-ri and Dongchang-ri, the second step of the denuclearization process, which touches on minimum nuclear deterrence capability, will proceed very slowly and cautiously. Moreover, if North Korea is going to complete the final third step of complete, irreversible, and verifiable denuclearization confirmed by outside inspectors to the satisfaction of the international community, Kim Jong Un will require a new strategic determination by North Korea in addition to the one made on April 20th. As the new strategic line adopted by North Korea on April 20th was a conditional decision to pursue step-by-step, mutual nuclear arms reduction in response to the wishes of the international community, particularly the US, North Korea will have to confront once again the choice to pursue a new version of the Byungjin line of economic development based on reform and opening, with genuine, complete denuclearization. It still remains questionable as to whether the US will be able to offer concrete measures that conform to North Korea’s demand for a complete guarantee for its regime. According to the Rodong Sinmun, Chairman Kim Jong Un stated that the deep-seated mistrust and animosity between the two sides has resulted in numerous issues over the years, and put forth that in order to achieve real peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the two sides must promise mutual understanding and not regard one another as the enemy. He also called for the implementation of legal and institutional measures in order to ensure security. Furthermore, he said that establishing a permanent peace regime on the Peninsula would be a very meaningful security guarantee, and that the two sides must cease taking hostile and provocative military actions towards one another. The Tasks Ahead The DPRK took the first step of confidence building by declaring a moratorium on the future development of nuclear weapons and ICBM-related capacity as well as dismantling parts of nuclear and missile engine sites. It is the second step where the problems arise. The second step requires complete denuclearization, including the dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons for minimum deterrence, but North Korea will be extremely cautious and move slowly. The last step should be to make a strategic decision to embrace complete denuclearization and economic opening to satisfy all members of the international community. South Korea and other countries in the region must push for a co-evolutionary policy towards North Korea at each stage of the process to accompany North Korea’s efforts towards internal transformation. In the first step, there must be concrete and systematic support for North Korea’s security and prosperity and a blueprint for North Korea to stand on its own two feet. There must also be continued pressure so that if trust-building measures prove insufficient and the situation begins to look dim, North Korea does not backslide as it has in the past. South Korea and the US, as well as other neighboring countries such as China and Japan must participate to the fullest extent possible until denuclearization is achieved, forming a strong cooperative partnership to apply pressure until this occurs. Second, if North Korea’s demand for a complete regime security guarantee is to be satisfied, it is imperative that a long period of confidence building between the US and DPRK come first. A peace regime requires a complex of political, legal, institutional, and military confidence-building measures. The US-DPRK summit was the first step towards political confidence building using dialogue and cooperation instead of military measures to resolve issues. Ultimately, this type of effort can lead to the creation of US-DPRK diplomatic ties. The focus of institutional and legal confidence building is the declaration of the end of the Korean War and the conclusion of a peace treaty. As there exists a historical precedent of North Korea pushing these measures as a unification strategy to realize the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula, mutual efforts to reduce mistrust are critical. North Korea also needs various types of support to secure its international position. However, as military strength continues to be an important policy tool, it is always possible that such promises may turn out to be no more than “a pile of paper” in the realm of international politics. Thus, military confidence building is also an extremely critical part of this process. As North Korea denuclearizes, the US needs to fulfill its pledge to eliminate its nuclear threat. Meanwhile, North and South Korea have been successful during the subsequent inter-Korean summit meetings in engaging in simultaneous arms reduction and other military confidence-building measures in order to drive the process forward. As the USFK copes not just with North Korea’s nuclear weapons but also with conventional threats, the US and the ROK should cooperate closely to discuss the future role and scale of USFK through multiple levels of military talks with North Korea. In order to offer a comprehensive security guarantee, there should be a global cooperation plan to offer economic support and support North Korea’s internal transformation. Third, in order for North Korea to completely denuclearize, there must be a new push for a North Korean-style opening and reform policy to overcome the limitations of the new strategy line declared on April 20th. In order to further develop North Korea’s reform and opening measures, which are more desirable and realistic than the present strategic line, the surrounding countries must also cooperate to create a co-evolutionary North Korea policy that goes hand in hand with North Korea’s efforts to affect changes from within. Fourth, the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization and security guarantee is not limited to creating a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula; it involves creating a peace regime throughout the whole Asia-Pacific region. North Korea’s nuclearization poses an insurmountable threat to the Asia-Pacific region as it has the potential to escalate an arms race. The instability of the North Korean regime has a significant influence on both the US and China, whose aim is to form an Asia-Pacific architecture favorable to their own interests. Thus, if we are to successfully achieve the total denuclearization of North Korea, we must work together to build not only a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, but also a peace regime in the Asia-Pacific. North Korea’s complete denuclearization will require both international sanctions and international economic support. Furthermore, a complete security guarantee for North Korea should be done at combined levels including the bilateral level with the US, China, and South Korea; the multilateral level with the members of the Six-Party Talks; and the global level with the United Nations.      ■ Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington. ■ Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the International Relations Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. He also serves as a professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.     It is no secret that America today is deeply divided between red America and blue America under President Trump. When it comes to foreign policy, American allies and friends often find themselves in difficult positions between these two Americas. But the true division that they face is not between red and blue, but between the President and the rest of his team. Mr. Trump is impulsive, transactional, and seems to have no concern for traditional American values. Others in his policy circle represent the more familiar, principled American approach: deliberate, rational, calculating, and driven by an underlying respect and desire to maintain America’s global leadership. This division often creates interesting dynamics in America’s dealings with major foreign policy issues like trade, alliance relations, and nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea. Trump’s ego and pride in being the “king of the deal” often clash with conventional wisdom in diplomacy leaving everyone, including his own staff, guessing as to his real intention. Trump, like a master gambler, enjoys being unpredictable and keeping his counterparts off balance with reckless bluffing and surprising offers. North Korea is one of the prime examples of Trump’s high rolling diplomacy. Trump’s first year in office was largely spent making war-like threats against the North Korean regime, defined by anger and hostility against Pyongyang’s ongoing missile and nuclear tests in 2017. However, the combative rhetoric promising “fire and fury,” warning that the US was “locked and loaded,” and ready to deliver “total destruction” to North Korea suddenly transformed as Trump proclaimed his “great respect,” and “honor” for the North Korean leader when Kim Jong-un, through South Korean interlocutors, proposed a summit early this year. To everyone’s surprise, Trump accepted Kim’s offer and proceeded without much deliberation or a denuclearization action plan. American hawks, led by NSC advisor John Bolton, maintain a deep mistrust towards North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization. They were deeply concerned when Trump emerged from the June Singapore summit without any tangible measures to take on Kim’s nuclear program. They view the first Trump-Kim summit as a substantial US concession which rewarded Kim for doing essentially nothing. This sentiment is widely shared throughout both liberal and conservative policy and intelligence circles in Washington. They advocate pushing for “complete, verifiable, irreversible, denuclearization” (CVID) or, as Secretary Pompeo has dubbed it, “final, fully verified denuclearization” (FFVD). American hawks also view Trump’s maximum pressure approach to Pyongyang as the best opportunity to force the defiant Pyongyang regime to come clean regarding the true extent of its decade-old nuclear program once and for all. Trump’s aids are determined to prevent their boss from being tricked by the North Korean charm offensive a second time. They want hard evidence of Pyongyang’s denuclearization commitment accompanied by concrete measures before Trump heads for a second summit. Meanwhile, South Korea’s administration has pushed for more peaceful and stable engagement with North Korea. Moon Jae-in made it clear that his first priority is peace on the Korean Peninsula. While echoing the goal of CVID, Moon tried his best to connect Kim and Trump so that they might engage in dialogue, not war. Moon met with Kim three times over the past six months, each time emphasizing the importance of denuclearization in order to further the peace process between Washington and Pyongyang. The problem is that CVID is not easy. Dr. Sig Hecker, a nuclear expert at Stanford University, says it will take up to ten years to achieve under the best circumstances with North Korea’s full cooperation. Many experts suspect it will be difficult for Kim to give up the regime’s “treasure sword,” which offers a powerful deterrence against the mighty US-ROK alliance. As Moon pushes for the second Trump-Kim summit as the next step for replacing the Korean War armistice with a peace treaty, which would mark a tectonic shift in inter-Korean relations, the key issue to be addressed is to what extent a deal on the nuclear front must be finalized for Trump to meet Kim again. At the moment, prospects do not appear bright as Washington and Pyongyang seem engaged in a serious tug of war over the denuclearization issue. Bolton and Pompeo are reportedly pushing for more concrete measures including a nuclear list, inspections, and a time line as prerequisites to a summit, while the North Koreans are threatening to resume their halted nuclear program. As before, Moon finds himself boxed in between American demands for more pressure on North Korea and Pyongyang’s call for more help from Seoul to ease the pain of economic sanctions. And once again, there is only one person who can help him- Trump. For all the controversy and recklessness that have characterized Trump’s foreign policy management, it was indeed Trump’s unorthodox approach that opened the door for the Moon’s engagement efforts with North Korea. The good news is, with the US midterm elections over, Trump can now direct his appetite for another glamorous foreign policy moment towards North Korea. The bad news is that, having been stung by the Democrats in the House elections, Trump may lash out with new anger towards Kim for his nuclear defiance. Which Trump will show up remains to be seen.     ■ Seong-Ho Sheen is a professor at Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. He is also a member of Policy Advisory Board of Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf. ■ This commentary has been translated from the Korean version. The Korean version can be found here.     Unlike the past, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un gave his 2019 New Year's speech sitting comfortably on a sofa overlooked by a large portrait of his grandfather Kim Il Sung and his father Kim Jong Il. The New Year’s Address defined 2018 as “a historic year, in which remarkable changes took place in the internal and external situations and our socialist construction entered a new stage thanks to our Party’s line of independence and strategic decision.” On April 20, 2018, North Korea declared its victory in the simultaneous pursuit of strengthening the economy and its nuclear capabilities (the Byungjin line), and proposed a new strategic line focusing the country’s efforts entirely on socialist economic construction. However, the 2019 New Year’s Address clearly stated that this new strategic line will not pursue denuclearization and economic construction, but rather offer an important opportunity to continue to elevate the socialist revolution and speed up the advancement of socialism using the success of the Byungjin policy as a foundation. North Korea proposed a new slogan for the coming year: “Let us open a new road of advance for socialist construction under the uplifted banner of self-reliance.” This slogan aims to achieve the “task of expanding the country’s capability of independent development to open up bright prospects for taking a step forward towards socialist construction.” Accordingly, the regime emphasized that the strengthening of the self-reliant, socialist economy must be prioritized, the country’s socialist political capacity must be enhanced, the nation must push ahead with the construction of a socialist civilization, national defense has to be bolstered, and lastly, revolutionary workers must continue to struggle. However, in order for the regime to effectively strengthen these capacities, it is essential to heighten its international capability to improve the North Korea-US relationship, and to increase the capability of the two Koreas to further develop the inter-Korean relationship. Kim Jong Un’s assessment of the developing inter-Korean relationship was highly positive, as he stated “Last year was a stirring year which witnessed a dramatic change unprecedented in the history of national division spanning over 70 years.” According to his speech, the three inter-Korean summits clearly show that inter-Korean relations have entered a new stage; furthermore, the Panmunjom Declaration, the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration, and the inter-Korean military agreement all represent a virtual nonaggression declaration and as such were important achievements. Kim also expressed his satisfaction with the first step towards active civilian inter-Korean exchanges of athletes and artists, as well as cooperation in various other fields including railway and road construction. But it should be noted that North Korea is making two important demands with regard to the security guarantee of its regime and the lifting of sanctions. First of all, Kim said “Given that North and South committed themselves to advancing along the road of peace and prosperity, we maintain that the joint military exercises with foreign forces, which constitute the source of aggravating the situation on the Korean Peninsula, should no longer be permitted and the introduction of war equipment including strategic assets from outside should completely be suspended.” He continued “It is also needed to actively promote multi-party negotiations for replacing the current ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula with a peace mechanism in close contact with the signatories to the armistice agreement so as to lay a lasting and substantial peace-keeping foundation.” Kim stated that he is willing to re-open Kaesong Industrial Park and allow tourism at Mt. Kumgang, and proclaimed that if South and North Korea present a united front, no external sanctions or pressure will be able to hinder the two Koreas in their efforts to forge a broad avenue to national prosperity. However, if North Korea hopes to make these proposals the subject of full-fledged negotiations, the regime must demonstrate a true willingness to accept and implement the demands of the international community for complete denuclearization of North Korea. Furthermore, the reduction of military tensions in inter-Korean relations should be further implemented following the implementation of full-fledged operational and structural arms control, which is the next step after the initial stage of confidence building. At the same time, the Northeast Asian community must co-evolve its policy to facilitate this change.  This year’s New Year’s Address placed a greater weight than ever before on the importance of North Korea’s relationship with the United States in strengthening the North’s capability in the international realm. This is because an improved North Korea-US relationship is a key precondition to bettering inter-Korean relations. First of all, Kim stated that the North Korea-US summit “brought about a dramatic turn in the bilateral relationship which was the most hostile on the earth and made a great contribution to ensuring peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the region…It is the invariable stand of our Party and the government of our Republic and my firm will to establish a new bilateral relationship that meets the demand of the new era as clarified in the June 12 DPRK-US Joint Statement, build a lasting and durable peace regime and advance towards complete denuclearization.” However, in discussing North Korea’s efforts to denuclearize, he stated that “We declared at home and abroad that we would neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them, and we have taken various practical measures.” This, however, referred only North Korea’s future denuclearization, and not to any efforts of the past. North Korea’s concept of complete denuclearization was fully elaborated in the article published on December 20 of last year by the Chosun Central News Agency, titled “It Would be Better to Search for New Way Rather than Facing Barrier on Old Way” This article corrects the ‘false perception’ of the United States by offering a detailed rundown of the conceptual differences between ‘the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ and ‘denuclearization of North Korea.’ It emphasizes that “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula means removing all elements of nuclear threats from the areas of both the north and south of Korea and also from surrounding areas from where the Korean peninsula is targeted.” The article suggests that in order to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary ‘to completely remove the nuclear threats of the U.S. to the DPRK’ before the elimination of the nuclear deterrence of North Korea. At the same time, it asserts that North Korea agreed to the ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,’ not ‘North Korean denuclearization’ during the Singapore summit. Unless a new strategic line has been adopted in the last ten days, the contents of this review accurately describe the North Korean understanding of ‘complete denuclearization,’ which is what Kim referenced during his New Year’s Address. North Korea is currently pushing for three phases of negotiations at a summit with the United States in order to pursue its concept of denuclearization. In the first phase, North Korea proposed the voluntary destruction of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and missile engine test site for a suspension of the joint ROK-US military exercises. In the second phase, North Korea will want to discuss the principle of “action for action.” This means North Korea will agree to part of what the US demands, a report and inspection of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, in exchange for an end to the US “hostile policy" against North Korea as a security guarantee for the regime and an easing of sanctions. In the third phase, North Korea will try to begin the negotiation of the North Korea’s version of “complete denuclearization in the frame of nuclear disarmament talks of Korean peninsula and surrounding regions. However, North Korea’s vision of a three-step negotiation strategy for the complete denuclearization of North Korea will be impossible to achieve. The United States and North Korea are currently engaged in a final tug-of-war for the second summit. In response to the US call for the reporting and international verification of all past, present and future nuclear facilities as a starting point from which North Korea should demonstrate its sincere willingness to pursue denuclearization, North Korea has countered with an offer to only partially report the past nuclear facilities of Yongbyon and accept IAEA inspections. On the other hand, if North Korea does not accept this demand for complete denuclearization including the past, the United States is only willing to provide very limited guarantee for the North Korean regime and economic sanctions relief. Therefore, even if a second summit is held, neither the North nor the US will be satisfied that their counterparts are approaching the encounter with a true willingness to bargain, which in turn will make it difficult to set the stage for a third summit to achieve complete denuclearization. Chairman Kim Jong Un said “I am ready to meet the US president again anytime, and will make efforts to obtain without fail results which can be welcomed by the international community,” while at the same time stating that North Korea may be compelled to seek a new path if the US misjudges North Korea and continues with its tactics of sanctions and pressure. However, the US will not accept what North Korea is saying unless the gap between North Korea’s concept of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and the US concept of “denuclearization of North Korea” can be closed. Therefore, contrary to our expectations, the current effort to fully denuclearize North Korea will continue to face numerous challenges. The first step towards overcoming these difficulties is to shed subjective optimism and obtain a prudent grasp of the seriousness of the problem. Next, the US and the international community must cooperate with the clear understanding that the current measures of sanctions and deterrence cannot be eased as long as North Korea pushes for the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Furthermore, it should be signaled ,if North Korea does pursue a new strategic line of “denuclearization of North Korea,” our active engagement in ensuring the regime's desired security and easing of sanctions will be simultaneously implemented. Lastly, what is most important is that North Korea itself must undergo internal transformation to accept and acknowledge “denuclearization of North Korea” as its new path for the 21st century instead of the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”     ■ Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

Young-Sun Ha is chairman of the East Asia Institute. He is also professor emeritus at Seoul National University and currently serves as a member of President Park Geun-hye’s civilian National Security Advisory Panel. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Washington.         After ending 2013 with the execution of Jang Sung-taek, Kim Jong-un, the first secretary of the Worker’s Party of North Korea, began the new year by giving his 2014 New Year’s Address. While the people of the North were busy learning and memorizing the message of the Supreme leader, Pyongyang demanded that the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise, “Key Resolve,” be called off. It also officially offered to halt all cross-border slandering and hostilities in order to prevent a nuclear disaster. This, however, created controversy among relevant parties that it was merely a “disguised peace offensive.” Government officials and North Korean experts in South Korea and abroad seem lost inside the labyrinth of North Korea in 2014, divided between a chaotic rift of optimism and pessimism. In order to fully comprehend Kim Jong-un’s 2014 blueprint and prepare appropriate countermeasures, it is of utmost importance to correctly read the New Year’s Address.   North Korea’s New Year’s Addresses are far from mere propaganda statements. Through the speech, Kim attempts to analyze impending difficulties from the present perspective with a heavy influence from the past, as well as try to find solutions in his own way focused on a limited future horizon. In particular, as the address was carefully constructed according to guidelines established after the execution of Jang Sung-taek, a superficial reading or amateur content analysis of the address may be insufficient. Rather, the hermeneutic method called the “fusion of horizons” should be adopted in order to garner an in-depth understanding of the meaning found in between the lines.   The Discourse Structure of North Korea’s New Year’s Address: 1-1-4-1-1   The first step in understanding the 2014 address is determining the discourse structure. North Korea’s New Year’s Addresses have maintained a 1-1-4-1-1 structure for many years. The first 1 is to evaluate the passing year, the second 1 is to provide guidelines for the coming year, and the third 4 is to emphasize the strengthening of domestic hyeongmyeong yeongnyang or “capabilities for revolution” in the four major fronts of political ideology, military, economy, and culture. The fourth 1 stresses the strengthening of South Korean capabilities for revolution in order to move toward the unification of the peninsula. The last 1 discusses the strengthening of international capabilities for revolution to deter American imperialism and antagonistic “hostile policies” toward Pyongyang. Ever since Kim Il-sung laid out a new national political strategy in February 1964 of strengthening the three major capabilities for revolution - replacing the previous national strategy prioritizing the use of military force dating from the Korean War - his legacy has had an overwhelming influence over the perspective of his successors.   The 2014 address maintains the 1-1-4-1-1 structure, reflective of North Korea’s emphasis on the strengthening of the three major capabilities for revolution. The continuation of the discourse structure signifies that the Kim Jong-un regime’s present perspective on domestic, regional (Korean peninsula), and international affairs remains unchanged. In other words, North Korea’s underlying understanding of the world from the perspective of enhancing the three capabilities for revolution has not changed. As the political landscape of the Korean peninsula in 2014 develops, a specific performance by the actor, North Korea, may change according to the particular stage driven by individual events. However, due to the limitations on the actor’s horizon, the general direction for the stage production is already established.   Assessment of 2013: A New Year of pyŏngjin nosŏn   After assessing the discourse structure, it is essential to specifically review the individual items of 1-1-4-1-1. The first 1, the evaluation of the passing year, now holds greater significance compared to last year due to the Jang Sung-taek incident. There still is considerable confusion regarding how to interpret Kim Jong-un’s reasoning behind the purge of Jang. The New Year’s Address, prepared promptly following the merciless killing of North Korea’s second-most powerful man, best demonstrates Kim Jong-un’s perspective on the execution. The address evaluates 2013 by summarizing that “last year was a proud year in which the entire Party, the whole army and all the people waged an all-out offensive in support of the Party’s new line of developing the two fronts simultaneously (pyŏngjin nosŏn) and thus achieved brilliant successes in building a thriving socialist country and defending socialism.” The First Secretary Kim’s evaluation of 2013 as the year of new pyŏngjin nosŏn, a policy to develop the economy and nuclear programs simultaneously, indicates that he was the driving force behind the selection and implementation of this “new line,” and, at the same time, the “new line” will continue to play a key role in 2014. The address also sums up the Jang incident by downplaying its significance vis-à-vis the “new line,” as follows: “In the seething period of the effort for building a thriving country last year we took the resolute measure of removing the factionalists lurking in the Party. As our Party detected and purged the anti-Party, counterrevolutionary factionalists at an opportune time and with a correct decision, the Party and revolutionary ranks were further consolidated and our single-hearted unity was solidified to the maximum.” In other words, the Jang incident can be summarized as an incident in which Kim Jong-un caught the anti-Party, counterrevolutionary factionalists red-handed during the process of executing the pyŏngjin nosŏn in 2013. For Kim Jong-un, the purge was not a consequence of political dissent on the basis of the national strategy. But, rather, it was a consolidation of the political ideology front to strengthen the domestic capabilities for revolution. A thorough understanding of the meaning of the Jang incident leads to an accurate forecast of the future of the Kim Jong-un regime. Although Jang’s execution shocked the North Korean people and the international community, it did not result in any considerable, substantive changes with regard to the regime’s underlying horizon or to the pyŏngjin nosŏn in the short run.   New Year’s Guidelines for State Affairs: The Golden Age of “Songun Korea”   Next, let us decipher the meaning behind the New Year’s guidelines for state affairs as outlined in the second 1 of the discourse structure. There are three gates guarding the labyrinth of North Korea in 2014: songun (military-first politics), pyŏngjin (dual policy line of economic development and nuclear development), and reform and openness. Whichever gate one may choose, the goal of the “advanced Republic” seems inconceivable. The address, however, reveals that Kim’s choice is to pursue the “golden age of Songun Korea.”   One must be careful in interpreting this guideline, encapsulating ideas of “songun” and the “golden age.” Dubbing the second year of pyŏngjin nosŏn as the “golden age of Songun Korea” illustrates that North Korea will hold fast to the military front of nuclear armament constructed since the Songun era. It also indicates that Kim Jong-un’s regime will usher in the halcyon days by firmly establishing the economic front buttressed by nuclear/military and political ideologicy fronts, consolidated through the purge of Jang Sung-taek. Thus, contextually, “the golden age of Songun Korea” in 2014 embraces both the economy and nuclear program. Nevertheless, the address avoids any direct expression referring to pyŏngjin or the establishment of nuclear armament.   Four Major Fronts: Economy-Culture-Military-Political Ideology   Among the four major fronts in building domestic capabilities for revolution, the New Year’s Address devotes the largest portion to the economic front in realizing the national goal of “golden age of Songun Korea.” The agriculture, construction, science and technology sectors are emphasized as the “torch of innovations,” while impending tasks within the economic front are subsequently directed toward the industries of metallurgical and chemical, electric-power and coal-mining, railroad and transportation, light manufacturing, fishing, and natural resources. The economic front is followed by the cultural front, including education and sports, and the military front emphasizing the buildup of the People’s Army and defense industries. Lastly, the consolidation of the political and ideological front is mentioned.   The four-major-front domestic capability part concludes with the underlining note that “the political and ideological position is a fortress that decides the victory and failure in the battle of defending socialism, and consolidating the revolutionary ranks politically and ideologically is the most important task facing us.” It further states that “in this…year … we should solidify the Party organizationally and ideologically, train all the members of society to be equipped with Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and cement the single-hearted unity of the revolutionary ranks.”   Inter-Korean Relations: Three Principles of Korea Unification, Protection of Peace and Security, and Resolution of South-North Korean Relations   Following the New Year’s Address’ remarks on domestic capability, the prospects outlined for inter-Korean relations triggered incompatible views within the South. Conservatives view it as nothing new - a disguised peace offensive - while the progressives emphasize the necessity to sound out new possibilities for actual change. In order to properly interpret the New Year’s Address, it is necessary to read the Kim Jong-un regime’s perspective hermeneutically, beyond relying on the subjective interpretations of either conservatives or progressives.   The New Year’s Address deals with the unification issue based on three main points. First, the three principles of Korean unification which have been maintained since Kim Il-sung introduced them in the 1970s continue to function as the cornerstone of Pyongyang’s unification policy. The principles include: independence without foreign interference, peaceful means without the use of force, and the great national unity transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and system. “To resolve the reunification issue in keeping with the aspirations and desires of our fellow countrymen, we should reject foreign forces and hold fast to the standpoint of By Our Nation Itself. […] The north and the south should uphold the principle of independence which is one of the three principles for national reunification and has been confirmed in the north-south joint declarations, hold fast to the standpoint of By Our Nation Itself, and respect and implement the declarations with sincerity.”   Second, while the North remarks, “We should make positive efforts to defend national security and peace,” it strongly condemns ROK-U.S. joint military drills. It wrote: “Should another war break out on this land, it will result in a deadly nuclear catastrophe.” Therefore, the North argues that the two Koreas together should forestall and ruin “the maneuvers for war and confrontation by the bellicose forces at home and abroad.”   Third, regarding improved relations between the South and North, it argues that: “A favourable climate should be established for improved relations between the north and the south. It is heartrending to see our nation partitioned by foreign forces, and it is more intolerable to see one side slinging mud at and showing hostility to the other. This will serve merely as an occasion for the forces who are undesirous of seeing one Korea to fish in troubled waters. It is high time to put an end to such slander and calumny that bring no good to both sides, and they should desist from doing anything detrimental to national unity and reconciliation […] We will join hands with anyone who opts to give priority to the nation and wishes for its reunification, regardless of his or her past, and continue to strive for better inter-Korean relations.”   On January 16, the North Korea Defense Commission released an important proposal entitled “Let’s Pave a Wide Avenue for Improving Inter-Korean Relations by the Concerted Efforts of Koreans by the Idea of By Our Nation Itself.” In it, the commission outlined realistic measures to end slander and military hostile behavior and prevent nuclear disasters, which was a more specific version of the inter-Korean relations content found in the New Year’s Address. In response, there is an ongoing “camouflaged peace offensive” debate between the South and North authorities. Among the three provisions of inter-Korean relations suggested in the New Year’s Address, the North prioritizes the third provision over the first and second, while the South emphasizes the first and second provisions. Thus, if North Korea’s intent is not indeed a “camouflaged peace offensive” but rather a new effort, the North should demonstrate a changed perspective toward the existing first and second provisions. Rather than merely responding to the North’s suggestion simply as a “camouflaged peace offensive,” South Korea should specify a “sincere peace suggestion” that enables it to sufficiently reveal the core context of Pyongyang’s suggestion.   International Relations: A Struggle for Anti-Imperialism   The picture of international relations as outlined in the 2014 New Year’s Address shows that the North did not rid itself of the traditional perspective of condemning the hostile policy of the U.S., as demonstrated in the following: “Last year, in the international arena, the imperialists persisted in interference and war moves threatening the independence of other sovereign states and the right of mankind to existence. Especially the Korean peninsula, the hottest spot in the world, was in a hair-trigger situation due to the hostile forces’ manoeuvres for a nuclear war against the DPRK, which posed a serious threat to peace and security in the region and the rest of the world.” Thus, North Korea emphasizes that: “We will defend our country's sovereignty, peace and dignity by relying on our powerful self-defensive strength.” Although North Korea avoids using a direct expression regarding the construction of its nuclear capability, it nonetheless emphasizes the danger of nuclear war, while at the same time indicating its unwillingness to abandon self-defensive strength, namely its nuclear weapons program. The 2014 New Year’s Address does not lead to a bright possibility for a new security perspective without nuclear weapons. To North Korea, its nuclear weapons program still remains a “last resort” for survival.   The Inherent Contradiction of the 2014 New Year’s Address   In the 2014 New Year’s Address, the North clearly reveals an inherent contradiction in its approach toward strengthening its domestic economy for the “Golden Age of Songun Korea” as its foremost priority, while unable to rid itself of the traditional perspective in the discussion of inter-Korean relations and international relations. Based on the three principles of Korean unification, North Korea suggests a struggle for the peace and security of the nation and its people, while at the same time working to improve inter-Korean relations derived from the limited perspective of the North’s “Independence” and “Our Nation.” The South cannot accept such an incompatible approach of threatening and reassuring simultaneously. Thus, the North’s foreign policy toward the South would hardly lead to inter-Korean economic cooperation, which would create a considerable obstacle to Pyongyang’s economic development initiative in 2014.   It is unrealistic for the Kim Jong-un regime in 2014 to demonstrate a limited perspective in confronting the U.S. imperialists’ hostile policy toward the North with nuclear weapons while strengthening the domestic economy at the same time. As long as the North does not demonstrate sincerity in its denuclearization efforts to the international community, it will have to continue its “arduous march” in establishing a stronger economic position without any assistance from the international community.   In regard to strengthening the North’s domestic capability for revolution, the execution of Jang Sung-taek engendered little possibility for the near-future emergence of a potential challenger to Kim Jong-un on the political ideology front. Furthermore, the development of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities has established the foundation of the country’s ability to repel a foreign invasion. Regardless of North Korea’s utmost internal effort to establish the “Golden Age of Songun Korea” through strengthening the economic front, it will fail to achieve an expected outcome without any significant improvement in inter-Korean, as well as international, relations. Kim Jong-un may hope to look back on 2014 as the ‘Golden age of Songun with unwavering pride’ in the 2015 New Year’s Address, but the prospect is rather gloomy.   Finding a Way out of the Labyrinth on the Korean Peninsula   In October 2013, as outlined in the report New North Korea Policy: Beyond Trustpolitik on the Korean Peninsula, the East Asia Institute emphasized the need for the North to evolve from a self-contradicting current two-track strategic line of simultaneous development of its economy and nuclear weapons program to pyŏngjin nosŏn 2.0: the path of non-nuclear weapon security in tandem with economic development. Additionally, a complex strategy toward North Korea encompassing “deterrence-engagement-trust” was suggested to craft a new North Korea policy that effectively prompts such changes in North Korea.   Instead of the two-track line of economic and nuclear weapons program development in 2013, the Kim Jong-un regime cautiously put the “Golden age of Songun Korea” as the official regime guideline. However, the nuclear weapons program undeniably still remains within North Korea’s perspective. If the North is to let in “Golden age of Songun Korea” in a genuine way, it should not only demonstrate sincerity in denuclearization efforts, but also pave a path for “peaceful economic development and improvement of people’s livelihood.” The North Korean model of a “peaceful development” doctrine is needed.   North Korea’s New Year’s Address should be rewritten. In terms of domestic capability strengthening, economic development should be prioritized in tandem with the pyŏngjin nosŏn 2.0 of economic development and non-nuclear-weapon security. North Korea should also establish a denuclearized security system on the military front and reinforce its political ideology that can effectively execute pyŏngjin nosŏn 2.0. With respect to inter-Korean relations, the North should suggest a new South Korea policy that is different from a “camouflaged peace offensive” based on the three principles of Korean unification. In international relations, the North also needs to overcome its perception of the North Korea as in a “state of war” against the U.S. as soon as possible and instead show an upgraded international relations perspective of “autonomous coexistence.”   South Korea’s North Korea policy should focus on facilitating the North toward selecting and pursuing the pyŏngjin nosŏn 2.0 track. On December 30, 2013, President Park Geun-hye set the priorities for future North Korea policy as follows: to “maintain a strong deterrent capability,” “upgrade the trust-building process,” and “seek denuclearization of the North as a means to pursue joint progress on the Korean Peninsula and across Northeast Asia” in her Project Syndicate article entitled “Reinventing the Inter-Korean Relationship.”   In order to escape from and prevent future exacerbation of the instability surrounding the Korean peninsula, it is inevitable that the reinforcement and maintenance of deterrent capability is the South’s No.1 fundamental principle of its North Korea policy. While the North in 2014 will pour all its energy into consolidating the economic front, any significant economic development will be difficult without an improvement in inter-Korean relations or sincere efforts toward denuclearization. Therefore, the only option left for North Korea is pyŏngjin nosŏn 2.0. However, it would be unrealistic to expect that simple trust-building “upgrading measures” - such as humanitarian assistance to the North and efforts to hold reunions of separated families and resolve the issue of prisoners of war and abductees who have been kept in the North - would prompt Kim Jong-un to shift his strategic policy direction from pyŏngjin nosŏn 1.0 to 2.0. The regional architecture of East Asia and the Korean peninsula is necessary for the peace and prosperity of the region in order to guarantee Pyongyang’s survival without turning to nuclear weapons. Strengthening this regional architecture by fully supporting and facilitating a change in the North’s strategic policy direction toward pyŏngjin nosŏn 2.0 should become the No. 2 fundamental principle of South Korea’s North Korea policy. South Korea’s No. 3 principle should be to maintain close international cooperation with related countries, such as the U.S. and China, in order to prepare the ground for the regional architecture for peace and prosperity. Lastly, the No. 4 principle is to establish step-by-step trust-building measures that correspond to every phase in order to facilitate the Korean peninsula’s move beyond the current period of crisis to a transition period that can lead to a negotiation and settlement phase. ■         Prepared by the Peace and Security Research Unit at East Asia Institute. EAI acknowledges the MacArthur Foundation for its generous grant and continued support. This commentary was translated by HyeeJung Suh, Junesoo Lee, and Jun Hyung Yoon; and edited by Kyle Cassily and Yang Gyu Kim.

Shortly after the intense military face-off surrounding the Korean Peninsula came to an end last April, the East Asian region once again entered another series of diplomatic war. The confrontation started with Japan’s Cabinet Secretariat Adviser Isao Iijima’s visit to North Korea, and was soon followed by a series of events beginning with Choe Ryong-hae’s visit to China as special envoy of First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang’s proposal for the inter-Korean dialogue, the U.S.-China Summit, the North’s proposal for the US-DPRK high-level discussions, and First Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK, Kim Gye Gwan’s visit to China. South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s visit to China this week is expected to bring a conclusion to the first chapter of this war. In preparation for another round of diplomatic war, which is expected to begin this July, there have already been efforts to arrange strategic collaborative meetings including the meeting of Six-party Talks delegates from South Korea, the United States, and Japan as well as the meeting between the delegates from South Korea and China. North Korea also made strategic move through the DPRK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Shin Sun-ho’s press conference on June 21.   Since the Summit meeting between President Obama and President Xi, the North seemed to have turned away from its original intention of utilizing the inter-Korean dialogue and its friendly relation with China as a stepping stone in order to promote the U.S.-DPRK dialogue. As the U.S.-China’s joint commitment to dismiss the DPRK’s “new strategic line of simultaneously developing economy and defense,” and to confirm resolution to denuclearize North Korea has become clear, North Korea decided to focus on resuming the U.S.-DPRK talks and the Six-party Talks rather than to waste its political energy for inter-Korean dialogue as its temporary measure. Although China did agree to the big picture of the North’s denuclearization, China maintains its priority that goes to unconditional and early resumption of peaceful dialogue and consultation for North Korean nuclear problem rather than the dialogue based on the premise of denuclearization. China focuses to serve as a mediator for facilitating the process to restart this dialogue. The stance of China makes it crucial that South Korea takes the initiative in dealing with the North Korean issues, especially in the upcoming South Korea-China Summit.   Recently, the DPRK’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Sin Sun-ho demanded dismantlement of the UN Forces Command. It was announced five days after the North had proposed the U.S.-DPRK high-level discussions and ten days after the inter-Korean dialogue had foundered. Referring to the UN Command as “a tool for a war against the North, pursuant to its [America’s] own defense strategy,” the North strongly appealed that if the U.S. continues to maintain the UN Command, and its “hostile policy” and nuclear threats against the North, then it would not renounce its nuclear deterrence. Even when Pyongyang suggested the high-level discussion to Washington, it reiterated its position to the denuclearization of “the Peninsula”, rather than “North Korea.” Thus, the North’s gesture appears to be its first strategic step towards the next diplomatic war to lower relevant parties’ expectations in order to yield higher-level support upon its subsequent agreement on other demands.   The United States, under the presidential administrative order, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act responded to the North’s request by defining the North as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the country and extending sanctions against the North by one year. Meanwhile, during her meeting with the former State Councilor of China Tang Jia Xuan on June 14, South Korean President Park Geun-hye asked China to convince the North into having an “authentic dialogue” with the South, and revealed that the cooperation between China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) regarding the North Korean crisis would be the primary agenda for the summit meeting between President Park and President Xi.   The upcoming ROK-China summit would be the first time for both President Park Geun-hye and President Xi Jinping to greet each other as summits. Where and how these new actors should drive their discussions on the recent crisis surrounding the Korean Peninsula may need a careful recap of the past one month of diplomatic history.   The U.S.-China Summit and the New Pattern of Relationship between the Great Powers   The U.S.-China relations is undoubtedly a crucial factor in determining the future direction of Northeast Asia. Therefore, the recent U.S.-China summit on June 7th and 8th during which President Obama and President Xi exchanged eight hours-long conversation deserves thorough evaluation. Especially the comments made by both countries on the latest meeting during the press conference as an unprecedentedly unique and intimate dialogue in the forty year-long history of the U.S.-China relations add the significance to this particular event.   The summit consisted of two official conferences, one working dinner, and one informal dialogue between the presidents during their walks. Details of the three conferences, excluding the informal dialogue, were publicly announced via U.S. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon’s briefing and Foreign Minister of the China Yang Jiechi’s press conference.   During the first official conference, two summits expounded upon their countries’ grand strategies and their visions for developing the bilateral relations. Although neither side brought up new information, the conference served to clarify two countries’ consensus on pursuing new strategic relations underlined since 2012, and thus enhanced mutual understanding and strategic trust.   President Xi Jinping focused on the idea of “Chinese Dream” and “the new pattern of relationship between the great powers.” Summarizing Chinese Dream as “economic prosperity, national renewal and people’s well-being,” President Xi revealed his plan to “adhere to the road of peaceful development, continuously deepen reform and open up the country.” At the same time, he emphasized that China would contribute to promoting peaceful and stable regional and international environments necessary to achieve Chinese Dream. President Xi referred to what he had called “the new pattern of relationship between the great powers” during his visit to America last year as a Vice-President as shifting away from traditional hostile relations between great powers, and turning toward friendly relations which pursue “mutual respect, cooperation and win-win results.” He pointed to this new pattern as an ideal destination for the U.S.-China relations.   President Obama stressed America’s rebalancing strategy with four major focuses: strengthening cooperation between allies, establishing partnership with the rising great powers, especially China, reinforcing regional institutions such as the East Asia Summit, and constructing regional economic architecture for shared prosperity. During the talks, President Obama made clear that the rebalancing strategy is far from being containment policy toward China, and that the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) is always open to China’s participation. He also raised no objection toward President Xi’s idea of the new pattern of relationship between the U.S. and China, and supported the two being in a “healthy competition” rather than being “strategic rival.”   During the second conference, two summits discussed diverse issues, most of which had previously been discussed, including economy, climate change, and human rights. What is significant about the second round is that under the idea of intellectual property rights, the issue of cyber security was newly raised, and as a part of the efforts to reduce hydrofluorocarbon production and consumption, the U.S.-China joint statement was adopted.   The most notable outcome of the latest U.S.-China Summit is that two countries have made an official consensus on promoting the new pattern of major power relations. This implies that the two have started to uphold the spirit of so-called “seeking common ground while reserving differences,” and this cooperative momentum is likely to persist for awhile.   The U.S.-China Summit and North Korean Crisis   Under the big picture of pursuing the U.S.-China cooperative relations and adhering to the major goal of regional peace and stability, North Korean crisis was discussed during the working dinner on the first day of the summit.   The U.S. reported through the briefing by National Security Advisor Donilon that the U.S. and China have come to an agreement that North Korea issue stands as a vital factor in enhancing the U.S.-China cooperation, and that the North cannot be accepted as a nuclear power and denuclearization of North Korea is the ultimate policy goal. According to the briefing, the U.S. and China have come to “full agreement” on carrying out all sanctions against the North including the UN Security Council Resolution in an intimately cooperative manner. It is noteworthy that the U.S. explicitly expressed that “pursuit of nuclear weapons is incompatible with its [North Korea’s] economic development goals”; revealed its firm opposition to the North’s new strategic line of achieving both economic development and nuclear capability; and announced that China has come to the same conclusion.   However, China’s report via briefing by State Councilor Yang Jiechi after the summit displayed a different nuance from its counterpart’s report. First of all, President Xi reaffirmed that China has been consistent with its three principles – “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, safeguarding of peace and stability in the Korean peninsula, and solving of the North Korea nuclear issue and the peninsula issue through dialogue and negotiation” – in dealing with North Korea, and the position will be maintained. China added that two parties have come to an agreement on the principles mentioned above and overall objectives in resolving North Korean crisis, and expressed that China is willing to promote the close U.S.-China cooperation to resume dialogue with the North as soon as possible. Unlike the U.S., China has made no comment whatsoever after the summit on imposing multilateral sanctions against the North, nor has it mentioned about its objection toward the North’s new strategic line. Additionally, it is important to bear in mind that China has put its emphasis on the mechanisms of conversation and negotiations to achieve denuclearization rather than denuclearization as a precondition for the dialogue. This indicates that China has shown no shift away from its three principles, but certain level of reorienting the degree to which it is committed to each principle.   Overall, the U.S. has pointed to denuclearization of North Korea rather than the entire Korean peninsula as its policy goal, expressed its full commitment to protect its allies from any threats imposed by North Korea, and made clear its intention to open up channels for conversation with the North only after the North has shown convincing moves to prove its volition to have “authentic” and “credible” dialogue with other relevant parties. China, in this sense, has shown a considerable difference. Furthermore, Chinese official position is far from the U.S. report that both countries had confirmed shared “threat analysis” on the implication of North Korean nuclear weapons to the Northeast Asian region.   What the U.S. and China have come to an agreement regarding the policy toward North Korea is merely the basic principles and the final goal of denuclearizing North Korea. They still show clear differences over the road map to achieve this end. The U.S. firmly opposes to North Korea’s new line of realizing both economic prosperity and nuclear power status, supports severer punitive measures against the North, and believes that the North should initiate moves that could convince the U.S. of its willingness to make a meaningful change in order to have the US-DPRK talks. On the other hand, China maintains the view that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a long-term project, perceives the importance of resuming dialogue between the North and relevant parties as soon as possible when North Korea makes gestures to reveal its willingness toward a dialogue. China still argues that managing stability on the Korean peninsula should be the number one priority rather than denuclearizing North Korea.   Choe Ryong-hae’s Visit to China and Pyongyang’s New Strategic Line   It was after special envoy Choe Ryong-hae’s visit to China on May 24th when China became more assertive in emphasizing the need to recover the channels for dialogue with North Korea.   According to China’s reporting, President Xi explained the mentioned above three principles China abides by regarding the Korean peninsula during his meeting with special envoy Choe Ryong-hae. In response, Choe Ryong-hae stated that North Korea wishes to “develop its economy, improve people’s livelihoods, and create peaceful external environment,” and is willing to “work with the parties concerned to properly solve relevant issues through the six-party talks and other dialogues and consultation of various forms, so as to safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” During his meeting with member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, Lin Yunshan which took place a day before his meeting with President Xi, special envoy Choe Ryong-hae expressed his appreciation toward China’s attempts to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and efforts to achieve the aim through peaceful dialogues and negotiations. China reported that Choe Ryong-hae reconfirmed the Pyongyang’s willingness to “accept” China’s request and resume dialogue with relevant parties to Lin Yunshan, as well.   What is interesting about China-DPRK dialogue is starkly different ways China and the DPRK summarized the outcome of the conference. North Korea’s report simply stated that “both sides exchanged views on the situation of the Korean Peninsula and issues of mutual concern.” Such difference is a clear revelation of two parties’ diverging views and understanding.   Strictly adhering to its three principles previously mentioned, China has urged North Korea to focus on economic development and improvement of people’s livelihoods rather than to build nuclear capability, and to return to the Six-party Talks. North Korea, however, has shown selective consent only to the second and the third principles of China, and made clear its intention of retaining its nuclear power. As long as North Korea holds onto its new policy line of simultaneously constructing economy and bolstering up nuclear capabilities, it would not accept the relevant parties’ demand for denuclearization. However, in order for the North to achieve another end of reinforcing its economy, it is inevitable that the North show certain level of efforts to direct its policy toward denuclearization in exchange for economic support from the international community.   This is how the dilemma of the North’s new strategic line begins. As North Korea has to secure two goals of ensuring political and military security as well as economic development, Pyongyang would hardly focus only on nuclear test or missile launch. Under the same logic, the North cannot zero in on projects such as normalizing Kaesong Industrial Complex, resuming tourism on Mt. Geumgang, and promoting reunion of separated families that could stir up its economic growth, because it cannot dismiss the importance of enforcing political and military strength. Therefore, Pyongyang has no choice but to disperse its focus on the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration and the July 15th North-South Armistice Agreement to create a proper balance between its economic and political/security concerns.   The recent remark made by the DPRK’s Permanent Representative to the UN which emphasized “the road of pushing forward the building of a socialist economic power and improving the people’s standard of living through the line of simultaneously achieving economic development and nuclear power building” reaffirmed North Korea’s logic of necessitating nuclear power development to become an economic power. Lapsed in this dilemma, it is unrealistic to expect North Korea to show an “authentic” gesture that the U.S. and South Korea have strongly demanded to resume dialogue with the North. In other words, unless the Kim Jong-un administration devises a new strategic line that ceases to adhere to nuclear power development, even if China pushes ahead with its three principles, the Six-party Talks that goes beyond sham diplomacy seems unlikely to happen.   South Korea’s Policy Doctrine toward North Korea: the “Four Principles of Coevoultionary Strategy”   Then what should be President Park Geun-hye’s manner in discussing the crisis surrounding the Korean peninsula during her meeting with President Xi Jinping?   Most urgent task left for South Korea is to come up with a clear and coherent policy doctrine toward the DPRK. Throughout the U.S.-China summit, President Obama and President Xi presented in a definitive manner the principles for their countries’ grand strategies and specific matters including North Korean crisis, and stayed consistent with their positions. Likewise, as President Xi would once again state “Chinese Dream” and three principles China abides by during the ROK-China summit, President Park Geun-hye should also pronounce Korean Dream and the principles the country observes in order to draw a clearer picture of what South Korea’s new strategy of the inter-Korean trust-building process. Nonetheless, there seems to be an intrinsic problem in this new strategy of trust-building process. The simple idea of building the inter-Korean trust by first providing low-level humanitarian assistance to the North, and then phasing in higher-level economic cooperation when the North shows a favorable response underestimates the complexity of the recent crisis. Therefore, this commentary suggests the four principles of Coevoultionary Strategy that gives a more detailed picture of what the new strategy of South Korea should look like.   The first principle of the doctrine toward the North has to be denuclearization of North Korea. The former Lee Myung-bak administration’s “Denuclearization, Openness, 3000” Plan took a hard-line stance that the North should take considerable de facto efforts toward denuclearization in order to receive any response from relevant parties. The Obama administration takes a comparatively moderated stand that dialogues require the North to recall the 2.29 Agreement which pertained to authentic and definite measures such as the freezing of the uranium enrichment program and the moratorium on nuclear and missile development. China supports the most alleviated position out of the three that any signs of North Korea’s willingness to have dialogues should call upon immediate response from the international community. As a new administration, President Park Geun-hye should decide upon what and how much South Korea wants from the North regarding denuclearization, and seek for active cooperation from the U.S. and China. For now, it is important that while the South keeps pace with the U.S., it should also come up with the standards to which China could consent. At the same time, the standards should go beyond freezing the status quo as did the 2.29 Agreement, and call upon more sincere and practical efforts toward denuclearization of North Korea.   The second principle is that South Korea should shift the Pyongyang’s attention away from the current line of developing both economy and nuclear capability, and toward a modified version or the new Line 2.0. It is a stated fact that strict regulations imposed by the international non-proliferation regime make it implausible for North Korea to achieve both economic development and nuclear deterrence. However, as the Kim Jong-un administration has already adopted the policy as a “ro-seon” or “line,” the international community’s reckless opposition to the new line, condemning that its failure is inevitable, would only raise tensions on the Korean peninsula without inducing any desirable response from the North. Instead, there needs to be refined efforts to convince the Kim Jong-un administration of the possible future of ensured peace and security without nuclear deterrence by conducting talks on establishing peace system and providing blue print for the future Korean peninsula. At the same time, South Korea should clearly reveal its intention of assisting North Korea in developing its economy, improving livelihoods of the people, and creating peaceful external environment, and proactively lead the international cooperation for Pyongyang to carry out the Line 2.0 that promotes economic development and military reinforcement without developing nuclear capability.   The third principle suggests international co-evolution that is responsive to North Korea’s policy of pursuing economic growth and nuclear-independent self-defense development, the Line 2.0. Current Park administration’s Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative maintains relatively ingenuous position that first working on issues which easily incur regional cooperation would have “spill-over” effect and lead to gradual expansion of cooperation and ultimately, resolving the “Asia Paradox.” Nevertheless, the idea of expecting non-military cooperation to eventually lead to military cooperation overlooks the gravity of the current security crisis in the region. Envisioning a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism that correlates North Korea’s Line 2.0, regional community should set the basis for long-term regional cooperation on both economy and security. In this way, mutual trust based on interactive policy changes and extensive cooperation between North Korea and the relevant parties could be established.   The fourth principle draws a detailed picture of co-evolution on the Peninsula. If the trust-building process is bound to specific time and issue areas, like current South Korean government suggests, the third principle mentioned above which encourages efforts to facilitate comprehensive cooperation is hard to realize. This does mean that the Park Geun-hye administration should follow the form of previous administration’s “grand bargaining” which included every issue area. Rather, it is important to have in mind the the inter-Korean trust building measure would better serve its aim if it includes various aspects such as military, politics, economy, and personal exchanges.   In addition to the four principles, President Park Geun-hye should focus on establishing a new pattern of the ROK-China relations in the 21st century in correlation to the new pattern of the U.S.-China relations discussed during the preceding summit between President Obama and President Xi. At the same time, President Park should appeal to President Xi that East Asia has entered the era different from the traditional Cold War era, and thus is in the need to construct a new regional economic and security order. Under the “Asia Paradox” which stresses rising political and historical tensions between Asian countries in spite of strengthening economic ties, it is especially important that Beijing and Seoul bring attentions of Asia Pacific countries to multilateral approach to peacefully settle recent conflicts.   In fact, South Korea’s repetitive request for China to play a special role in dealing with North Korea each summit is not conducive to conceiving new strategic direction for the future ROK-China partnership. At the current stage, it is of foremost importance that two parties construct stronger trust toward each other in order to devise and carry out effective policy cooperation.   In 1972, the Era of Détente began, but the inter-Korean reconciliation foundered. To avoid the repetition of this painful history, the Park administration should foster a broad understanding in constructing international, regional, and inter-Korean strategies, and maintain consistent manner throughout the upcoming series of diplomatic war. ■           Chair Young-Sun Ha, East Asia Institute         Panel Chaesung Chun, Seoul National University Yang Gyu Kim, East Asia Institute Dong Ryul Lee, Dongduk Women’s University

Sang-hyun Lee received his doctoral degree from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is currently the Director-General for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.         On March 26-27, 2012, South Korea successfully held the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. This was the largest diplomatic gathering ever held in South Korea with fifty-three countries and four international non-governmental organizations participating. Alongside the summit, President Lee Myung-bak held twenty-seven bilateral talks which helped to elevate South Korea’s international role.   The Seoul Summit has been judged to have produced a more concrete outcome that has strongly supported the achievements made at the Washington Summit in 2010. The result is the Seoul Communiqué, which states that nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are the shared goals of humanity while also reconfirming the commitment to seeking a safer world for all and sharing the objective of nuclear security.   Moreover, the communiqué stresses the fundamental responsibility of all countries, consistent with their respective national and international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which includes nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities under their control, as well as to prevent non-state actors from acquiring such materials and from obtaining information or technology required to use them for malicious purposes. The communiqué further reaffirms that measures to strengthen nuclear security will not hamper the rights of states to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.   With North Korea’s nuclear threat still overshadowing the Korean Peninsula, the summit had some meaningful implications. South Korea will have undoubtedly enhanced its national image from passive recipient to an active rule-maker in international norms.   In preparing for the summit, the South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) focused on comprehensive and action-oriented measures under the belief that by only transforming political commitments from the Washington Summit into action would guarantee the success of the summit. As a result, the Seoul Summit has demonstrated that the promises from the 2010 Washington Summit have now advanced to fruitful outcomes. The seventy-two commitments from that summit have now been almost realized with only a few still to be finalized. In addition, the Seoul Summit has proven itself to be the transition point for global nuclear security moving from political declaration to concrete implementation. The summit itself has also widened its agenda including nuclear safety, the safe use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials, therefore able to address some of the key issues raised following the Fukushima accident.   Despite the achievements, some limitations are evident when looking at the preparations for the summit and its aftermath. In the build-up to the summit in South Korea, there were problems in communication between state and people. While the summit is dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism, some questioned why South Korea was hosting a summit that did not address issues closer to home such as the North Korean nuclear issue or the U.S.-Korea nuclear energy agreement controversy. Such criticism required strong justification of why South Korea was hosting the summit. Another area of difficulty was that nuclear security itself actually lacks a clear definition even among experts. To cope with such questions, MOFAT sought for advice and creative ideas by hosting advisory board meetings during the preparation for the summit.   One of the most important future tasks is how the Nuclear Security Summit will become a sustainable nonproliferation mechanism rather than an occasional diplomatic showcase. The next Nuclear Security Summit will be held in the Netherlands in 2014, but as yet no further plans have been detailed. Thus it is critical to think about how to make the current summit into an international regime. From a variety of viable options on the table, two are worth considering in this regard. The first is to make the best use of the already existing G8 Global Partnership so as to continue the achievements of the past two nuclear security summits. The G8 Global Partnership was launched at the G8 Summit in 2002 for with currently twenty-three members have raised 21 billion dollars. The Global Partnership was intended only to operate for a limited period of twenty years, but its timeline was recently extended at the 2011 G8 summit in France. An extension of the U.S. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, the Global Partnership is a multilateral initiative that aims to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since 2005, South Korea has participated and contributed 5.5 million dollars to the Global Partnership. The agendas of Global Partnership and CTR are also safe maintenance and disposal of nuclear materials and nuclear prevention, consistent with the cause of the Seoul Summit. Therefore, there is the possibility of linking these arrangements. Another is to include the agendas of nonproliferation in the already existing G20 regime South Korea hosted in late 2010. The G20 member states make up for 90 percent of nuclear weapons around the world, 70 percent of global GDP, and 80 percent of the world population. Although originally focused on international economics and global governance, the G20 regime is also well suited to take on nuclear security issues if the member states jointly emphasize a shared vision that nuclear security is the key to global governance.   Finally, we should think about how the non-binding Seoul Communiqué, the inherent limitation of the summit, can develop into international norms. The successful removal and disposal of nuclear materials depends upon the will of the member states to take action. At the Seoul Summit, it was agreed to activate entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material by 2014 and encourage a voluntary use of highly enriched uranium at a minimum level. However, the feasibility of these efforts has been questioned due to the lack of binding enforcement. Much then will depend upon how leaders across the globe may direct attention to the importance of nuclear security issue.■         Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. The East Asia institute, an Asia Security Initiative core institution, acknowledges the MacArthur Foundation for its generous grant and continued support. This commentary has been edited and translated from the original on March 28, 2012. This commentary is produced with help of Yang Gyu Kim, Stephen Ranger, and Siyoung Choi.

After 20 years: North Korea in 2032   2012 is a critical time for North Korea as it has proclaimed that from this year it will achieve the status of a “strong and prosperous nation.” With Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, this immense task now falls upon the shoulders of Kim Jong-un. For the past seventeen years under Kim Jong-il’s rule, North Korea has tried to seek a way to ensure its regime’s survival and guarantee its national security through Songun or military-first politics and the possession of nuclear weapons. Yet, this has actually resulted in international isolation, economic hardships, and an overdependence on China. For North Korea, it was “lost two decades”. It is natural to wonder about what kind of impact Kim Jong-il’s sudden death will have on North Korea in the short run. However, it is more important now to think carefully about what lies ahead for North Korea over the next 20 years under Kim Jong-un’s rule. Upon such a consideration it is also critical to prepare necessary measures in terms of this long-term perspective.   The most urgent priority for the newly established Kim Jong-un regime is domestic stability, which means that the regime will have to pursue the legacy of Kim Jong-il’s rule. In this respect, it will continue to possess nuclear weapons, seek economic gains from negotiations over its nuclear program, and attempt to accelerate its economic development under the banner of a “strong and prosperous nation” to gain political legitimacy. So long as Kim Jong-un sticks to “rule by his deceased father’s will,” then North Korea will face the inevitable dilemma it has faced for the last seventeen years. Pursuing regime security by huddling onto nuclear weapons will only continue to ensure Pyongyang’s international isolation. This isolation in turn brings about economic hardship, which consequently has a negative effect on the stability of the Kim Jong-un regime as its legitimacy is still rather weak. These interlinked problems of domestic politics, diplomacy, and economics can be easily locked in a vicious circle.   The Kim Jong-un regime must deal with these pending issues in line with a long-term strategy that will guarantee its survival and help North Korea pursue reforms to meet the norms of the twenty-first century civilization. The first stage of this long-term strategy is to seek a policy shift. At some point in the future, Kim Jong-un has to make the strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons and switch from the current military-first politics to economy-first politics. Of course, such a shift is an extremely difficult decision to make, but it would be a good chance to prove the strength of Kim Jong-un’s leadership internally and externally. The second stage is transition and reform. With this step, North Korea will finally take measures toward peaceful development under the basis of a more enlightened Suryong or Great Leader Direct Rule system. Those measures include overcoming the demands for excessive security, moving forward to establish a security system without nuclear weapons, and plan for a North Korean-way of reforms and opening. In order to achieve these goals, North Korea will truly require support from South Korea and the international community. The third stage is the transformation of North Korea to meet the international standard of advancement. In this stage, it is crucial to find a way to encourage North Korea to transform into a nation that seeks moderate security capabilities as well as a new momentum for economic development, democracy, and normal diplomacy. If it succeeds, North Korea could then become a model country which serves for peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula and contribute toward development and stability in Northeast Asia.   During this delicate period, it is an imperative to get over single-minded approaches to focus only on the collapse of North Korea or to call for the one-sided effort of either North Korea or the international community to resolve all the issues. Furthermore, it is time to understand the broad range of problems of North Korea and seek a path of coevolution which takes in a bigger picture of peace and stability for not only the Korean Peninsula but also East Asia.   The Short-Term Stability of the Kim Jong-un Regime   It is clear that the North Korean leadership has made preparations for this power transition. The 2012 Joint New Year Editorial stated, “Glorify this year 2012 as a year of proud victory, a year when an era of prosperity is unfolding, true to the instructions of the great General Kim Jong Il.” This shows that, as expected, the Kim Jong-un regime will attempt to deal with domestic and foreign issues based on Kim Jong-il’s military first politics.   The Kim Jong-un regime will likely show solid stability in the short term, indicative that it has a stronger political power base than some people had expected. During the mourning period for Kim Jong-il’s death, Kim Jong-un was proclaimed the supreme commander of both the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and Korean People's Army (KPA). He leads the WPK with the support of Jang Song Thaek (65, Administration Department Director), Kim Kyong Hui (65, Member of the Political Bureau), Choe Ryong Hae (62, Member of the Central Military Commission), Kim Ki Nam (85, Secretariat), and Choe Thae Bok (81, Secretariat). As supreme commander, he will lead the KPA through Ri Yong Ho (69, Vice-Chairmen of Central Military Commission), Kim Jong Gak (70, Senior Deputy Director of Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) General Political Department), Kim Yong Chun (76, Minister of the MPAF), and U Tong Chuk (69, Senior Deputy of State Security Department). During the National Memorial Service for Kim Jong-il on December 29, 2011, Kim Jong-un was referred to in the official media as “the dear respected Kim Jong Un, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the WPK and supreme leader of the WPK state and army.” And at the Political Bureau meeting of the WPK’s Central Committee held on December 30, 2011, Kim Jong-un assumed supreme commandership of the KPA at the “behest of leader Kim Jong-il on October 8, 2011.” Also during the memorial address, Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, proclaimed the next leadership and its core policy by saying “We will accomplish the cause of the Songun revolutionary cause, the cause of building a thriving socialist nation, holding Kim Jong Un in high esteem as another General and supreme leader.”   The Kim Jong-un regime has to focus on consolidating its power base through utilizing the slogan at the “behest of Kim Jong-il” as its most valuable political asset. Kim Jong-il did exactly the same when he came to power after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. As the third generation of leadership succession from father to son, the Kim Jong-un regime has serious limits in creating its legitimacy. Therefore, the regime has to rely on and begin its rule with the slogan of at the “behest of Kim Jong-il,” as well as continue with Kim Jong-il’s military-first politics. The Kim Jong-un regime still lacks the political strength that could help it to manage any possible instability caused if it makes a sudden shift in North Korea’s political and economic future.   Moreover, Kim Jong-un has to embrace the existing military and political elites who tend to favor hard-line policies toward South Korea. Even if he genuinely has a will to carry out reforms and opening of the economy, it would be unthinkable to implement those polices if he lacks the political strength to make his own decisions in terms of domestic politics. This means that he needs to be viewed as the legitimate ruler of North Korea in the eyes of the people as well as the political elites. The importance of this legitimacy was reflected in the 2012 Joint New Year Editorial which emphasized, “Let us do many more things for the benefit of the people!” and “Officials should be deeply aware that they exist for the sake of the people, have the steadfast standpoint of launching all undertakings in keeping with the will and interests of the people.” Related to this effort to gain legitimacy, Kim Jong-un has been taking up hawkish measures toward South Korea. This reminds us of the situation following Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 when inter-Korean relations became strained as both sides pursued hard-line policies toward each other. On December 25, 2011, North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland released a statement manifesting that North Korea will decide its policy toward South Korea based upon Seoul’s stance on allowing condolence visits to Pyongyang. This point also came up in the Joint New Year Editorial where North Korea lashed out against “conservative ruling forces in south Korea” for “hindering in every possible way the offering of condolence.” However, it is a little bit premature to conclude from this that the Kim Jong-un regime will attempt military provocations or raise tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China, the sole patron for North Korea’s stability, has been strongly and openly opposed to North Korea “taking any risks” since late 2010. In any case, North Korea itself needs a stable international environment in order to focus on domestic events such as the 70th anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s birth on February 16, 2012, and the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth on April 15, 2012.   The key concern is how the Kim Jong-un regime will make its next move after it has managed to establish legitimacy and stability in the short run. Kim Il-sung’s political assets and “will” were only effective in a limited way during the seventeen years of Kim Jong-il’s rule. It is then questionable whether Kim Jong-il’s legacy will be effective during the Kim Jong-un era. Would Kim Jong-un be able to make the strategic decision to carry out his own model of long-term survival based on a thorough understanding of North Korea’s current situation? The critical moment for this would be around 2015, which will be the 70th anniversary of the WPK and when Kim Jong-un may officially bring to an end the “rule by his deceased father’s will.” In this case, will North Korea be able to evolve?   The Long-Term Dilemma of the Military-First Politics   As long as the Kim Jong-un regime sticks to Kim Jong-il’s system of military-first politics, there will be no way to solve North Korea’s long-standing triple dilemma. The “unholy trinity” among securing legitimacy in domestic politics, stabilizing the international environment by resolving the nuclear crisis, and alleviating the economic hardships is all interlinked in mutually contradicting ways. What Kim Jong-il’s rule clearly showed is that it is impossible to sustain the totalitarian Suryong system with nuclear weapons while also attempting to resolve chronic economic difficulties. Kim Jong-il believed that he could only maintain the Suryong system by possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons though only intensified a worsening economic crisis at home. However, after seventeen years of military-first politics, it has now become difficult to sustain the Suryong system without the possession of nuclear weapons. This pursuit of excessive security has also led to a failure in resource distribution. As it stands now, giving up nuclear weapons in order to make an advance in economic development will jeopardize the whole Suryong system.   In 2012, Kim Jong-un’s attempt to gain political legitimacy through inheriting military-first politics will only achieve short-term results. Kim Jong-un will face tremendous pressure to make changes in the near future on account of the following three reasons. First, international pressure over the nuclear program will grow. Up until now, Pyongyang has managed to walk a thin line between possessing nuclear weapons and negotiations that requires giving them up. North Korea hasn’t been able to give up a security guaranteed by nuclear weapons nor gain economic support from the international community. But this situation cannot go on indefinitely. The regime will face weaker political legitimacy and a devastating outcome caused by ongoing economic difficulties. Due to various factors, including North Korea’s domestic challenges and the requests of Beijing seeking stability on the Korean Peninsula, Pyongyang has no choice but to come forward to the negotiating table in the near future. Although the international community including the United States is now prioritizing a stable power transition to Kim Jong-un, they will eventually pressure North Korea to follow up on its commitments to denuclearize.   Second, the ongoing economic difficulties will eventually become a threatening factor for regime stability. It is very likely that North Korea will never be able to accomplish its goal of becoming a “strong and prosperous nation.” Without large scale support from the outside world, not even a moderate level of economic development would be possible, which could be used by Kim Jong-un to consolidate his legitimacy. The regime’s stability will continue to be challenged by popular involvement in the unofficial markets which emerged following the collapse of the public distribution system during the great famine of the 1990s. In this context, possessing nuclear weapons and sustaining military-first politics would only aggravate dissatisfaction among the people and increase the possibility that a certain group could gain enough momentum to eventually challenge the regime.   Third, the long-term stability of the regime is only possible when North Korea embarks upon a path of reform and opening. China has already begun to pressure North Korea to take this path. Politically as well, Kim Jong-un needs to emphasize his own legacy which must be differentiated from his grandfather’s Juche or ideology of self-reliance and his father’s military-first politics. Considering the current situation in North Korea, this should be focused on growth and development. Military first politics needs to be adjusted for the sake of advancing light-industry and improving the people’s standard of living, which have been economic targets emphasized by the regime for years. In order to achieve this reform and opening, however, Pyongyang’s closed and autocratic political system has to be able to cope with pressures from an open society. This means that the Suryong system should be transformed from a totalitarian dictatorship to an enlightened and benevolent supreme leader. In the end, the Kim Jong-un regime will face a crossroads in its strategic decisions. The regime will have to choose whether to take the same path of military-first politics and become a vegetative state or take the prudent path of a North Korean-way of reforms and opening.   South Korea and the Strategy of Coevolution   From 2012, South Korea will need to remain vigilant on leadership transition in North Korea and establish short-term, mid-term, and long-term plans to meet this challenge. The current government in Seoul should refine its policy package to the Kim Jong-un regime under the framework of a long-term strategy which can also serve as a foundation for the next administration due to be inaugurated in early 2013. Candidates for the next presidential election should compete with each other to establish a paradigm of non-partisan North Korea policy. The past dichotomy of either the Sunshine policy or the principled engagement policy is no longer valid in the 2010s thus a third way of policy alternatives needs to be developed. Along with this effort, it is also important to carefully manage public opinion in South Korea so as to avoid conflict within society over polices to North Korea.   The immediate strategic message that Seoul should deliver to Pyongyang is that the strategic decision made by the Kim Jong-un regime will be the key to not only the survival and development of North Korea but also to new models of governance and unification on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, it is important to make clear that Seoul will also co-evolve with Pyongyang on a mutual vision for the advancement of North Korea and make genuine efforts to persuade the international community to join this co-evolutionary path. The primary recipient of this message is, of course, key figures in the Kim Jong-un regime, but in the long run, will be aimed at all possible reformist forces in North Korea which have the will to co-evolve with South Korea and international community. For the political elites and people in North Korea who are stuck in the Suryong system and closed socialist system unable to see the path of advancement, South Korea should present specific blueprints for the future of the Korean Peninsula.   For the mid-term, the South Korean government needs to prepare policy alternatives for North Korea which faces in the near future the triple dilemma mentioned before. Above all, measures to resolve the nuclear issue should be prepared. In perceiving the nuclear challenge as a political issue that is related to the Kim Jong-un regime’s survival, Seoul has to devise a way to guarantee the regime’s security while at the same time, present reasonable conditions for Pyongyang to engage in denuclearization. By taking this opportunity of Kim Jong-il’s death, the Six-Party Talks should function as a multilateral framework to deal with the overall North Korean problem, not simply focused on nuclear issues. In this context, the South Korean government could think about an active and forward-looking approach that decouples the Six-Party Talks from the difficult issues in inter-Korean relations, such as South Korea’s demands for an apology for North Korea’s provocations in 2010.   Second, a strategy for building a peace system on the Korean Peninsula is also important. Until now, talks on a peace system have not reached any agreement as Seoul and Pyongyang have approached this issue with different strategic goals. In particular, North Korea has insisted upon the same old measures that include ending the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Asia, withdrawal of United States Forces in Korea, and redrawing the maritime border in the West Sea. However, it is time for North Korea to develop different strategic goals with this peace system issue for the Korean Peninsula. As Pyongyang is faced with the situation that without fundamental change it will not survive in the near future, the peace system should be approached with the perception that it can be a new way to guarantee its own survival.   South Korea also needs to move away from its perception that the peace system issue is only an excuse by North Korea to evade its obligations for denuclearization. Rather, Seoul should approach this issue strategically by using it to encourage the Kim Jong-un regime to change its developmental model from the military-first politics to an economy-first politics. With patience and sincerity, Seoul needs to persuade Pyongyang that nuclear weapons cannot guarantee the regime’s survival. Only under a complex network of security guarantees from the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the United Nations, could the regime finally secure its survival and stability. Also massive economic support from the international community as a reward for giving up its nuclear program could help Pyongyang to finally accomplish the vision of a “strong and prosperous nation” which Kim Jong-il had failed to achieve. In the end, true peace in inter-Korean relations can only come about when a peace system on the Korean Peninsula is established with an agreement between Washington and Beijing on the survival of the North Korean regime and a regional multilateral peace system in Northeast Asia.   When this mid-term goal has been accomplished, it will be possible to pursue the long-term goal of the advancement of North Korea beyond normalization. However, the challenge remains that Pyongyang has never taken such a path before. North Korea should be transformed into a democratic system and meet the standard of a twenty-first-century civilization which is a powerful country of knowledge, culture, environment, and economy rather than just a “strong and prosperous nation.” South Korea and North Korea could then be an equal partner in building a more peaceful Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia once North Korea has reached this level of advancement.   South Korea as the Facilitator for the International Evolution of North Korea Policy   The future of North Korea is linked to the international politics of Northeast Asia. Blueprints for the future of the Korean Peninsula cannot be separated from the future architecture in East Asia. Although South Korea is not a great power and cannot be the main designer of regional architecture, it can be a middle power which takes on the initiative in drawing the future of the Korean Peninsula that will have an impact on the shape of the region. Therefore the advancement of North Korea is important not only for the future of the Korean Peninsula but also for the status of South Korean diplomacy in the region. This is both a test and an opportunity.   U.S.-China relations will be the most critical variable that determines the future of the Korean Peninsula for at least the next 10 years. North Korea, and more broadly the Korean Peninsula, is a stage of competition and conflict between the two countries: a rising China trying to make East Asia as its base for peaceful development and a relatively declining United States which seeks to restore its regional hegemonic influence. The conflict between Washington and Beijing in 2010 settled down following the U.S.-China summit meeting in January 2011. The United States agreed to respect China’s “core interests” and China acknowledged the U.S. policy to reengage the region. Since the summit meeting, the East Asia strategy of the United States has become more specified. It is seeking to strengthen relations with Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, and Myanmar as well as raise its voice on multilateralism in East Asia through the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit. Along with these efforts, Washington has also reinforced its alliance relations with Seoul and Tokyo, and has even emphasized trilateral cooperation among its alliance partners. The United States is redesigning the security-economy architecture of East Asia.   China is closely watching these developments and is trying to check the movements of the United States in the region. It is expected then that North Korea will be the place where Washington and Beijing will clash over its future direction. While both countries prioritize the status quo, they will cautiously respond to changes if North Korea becomes over dependent on one side. Particularly, the Chinese leadership would be very reluctant to allow North Korea’s future to be influenced by South Korea and United States, an outcome that could then be used to check China on its periphery.   Both Washington and Beijing have been taking a wait and see approach by supporting the status quo in North Korea after the death of Kim Jong-il. However, each of side has been carefully considering how to shape their future moves. From the beginning, China has sent a “clear and decisive” message of support to Kim Jong-un. All nine members of China’s ruling Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee made a morning visit to the North Korean Embassy in Beijing and confirmed their strong will to support the Kim Jong-un regime. At the same time, the United States reaffirmed its strong commitment to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the security of its close ally, South Korea, and emphasized a “peaceful and stable transition.” In its following statements, Washington expressed its priority for its North Korea policy as follows: peaceful and stable transition; the commitment of the new leadership to honor North Korea’s agreements on denuclearization; improving relations with its neighbors; respecting the rights of its people.   When there is conflict between the United States and China over the North Korean issue, South Korea should not take an opportunistic approach which would certainly end in failure. Rather, Seoul should be able to persuade both Washington and Beijing by using the North Korea issue to highlight that if both sides insist upon their own blueprint for East Asian architecture, all the countries in the region including them will suffer. South Korea, as a middle power at the heart of the architecture of the great powers, should find its own way to establish a new vision that benefits all stakeholders in the region. In line with this effort, South Korea should also prepare discourse and logic on the future of North Korea and a specific policy package for the coevolution of North Korea and the international community.   In the short-term, the South Korean government will face many questions on its long-term strategy toward North Korea from the United States, Japan, and in particular China as the ROK-China summit meeting is scheduled to take place in late January 2012. What South Korea wants from the future of North Korea has a lot in common with what the United States and China wants: denuclearization, reform and opening, and a normalized and advanced North Korea which contributes to the development of the region. The problem is how to come up with realistic and specific policies to accomplish this transformation of North Korea. Along with this, the capability to adjust the interests of neighboring countries and promote strong international cooperation on North Korea should not be affected by the domestic political situation in each country, is also required.   It is noteworthy that Pyongyang emphasized the importance of its relationship with both Beijing and Moscow in the Joint New Year Editorial of 2012. This shows that the Kim Jong-un regime intends to take advantage of competition between Washington and Beijing over architecture building in East Asia. Were the Six-Party Talks to resume without a compromise in any of the party’s conflicting interests, it would be hard to see how there would be any improvement in the denuclearization of North Korea. In order to limit the influence of great powers in shaping the future of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean government should engage in sincere dialogue with Beijing.   South Korea’s future moves will have a tremendous impact on the future of the Korean Peninsula and the region. By recognizing the significance of this opportunity, Seoul should carry out the specific measures of the strategy of coevolution while harmonizing its efforts to promote a North Korea policy of the international community and endeavor to contribute to a new architecture in East Asia.■         Chair Young-Sun Ha (Seoul National University)     Panel Chaesung Chun (Seoul National University) Dongho Jo (Ewha Womans University) Sung Bae Kim (Institute for National Security Strategy) Sook-Jong Lee (East Asia Institute; Sungkyunkwan University)