.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note Recent changes and reformations conducted in social and economic spheres under the regime of Kim Jong Un seem to signal that North Korea is working to build a “normal state.” Yet it is still uncertain as to whether North Korea will successfully manage to overcome the “traditional North Korean” dilemmas, as it is beginning to appear that Kim Jong Un’s liberal leadership is surviving solely on its drive towards reforms. Chae-Yeon Kang of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University argues that Kim Jong Un is currently seeking a brand new leadership style in politics, the economy, and culture by fighting the old and bringing in the new. Professor Kang adds, “The premise under which North Korea may become a ‘normal state’ rests on recovering trust and joining international society. It is important for North Korea to keep its promises, recover trust in its relationships with other states, stop its chronic buck-passing, and remain accountable for its actions.”     After 2018, the path Kim Jong Un blazed across Beijing, Panmunjom, Singapore, Hanoi, and Moscow was such that expectations arose that he might become “the leader of a normal state” and that a “new North Korea” might emerge. Kim Jong Un has become more aggressive about the restoration of multi-player economic relations, the strategic partnership between China and North Korea, and the strategic interest between Russia and North Korea than of denuclearization. The improving inter-Korean relations have only served as a means for negotiation on denuclearization between the US and North Korea, and have often put South Korea in a position of embarrassment. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un has been flaunting his position as the leader of a normal state while he seeks a new style of leadership over domestic changes in politics, the economy, and culture. Now, the “normal state” change of North Korea is focused on the inside and outside of the country. As of June 12, 2019, over a period of about eighteen months (January 1, 2018-June 12, 2019), the fifty-four major news media outlets of South Korea have reported 2,175 news stories related to North Korea’s normalization. So, is it possible that North Korea has become a “normal state?”   The Path to the Normalization of the State, and the Other Side There are three recent issues related to Kim Jong Un’s expansive moves in North Korea which have drawn widespread attention. The first is his open leadership and the circumvention of the “mysticism of reception” with regard to political and social aspects. The public was given the impression of “a leader of a normal state” again from the figure cut by Kim Jong Un on the first day of 2019 as he read the New Year’s Address while seated on a sofa in a party building. Kim Jong Un stated, “If we mystify the leader’s revolutionary activities and manners, we will mask the truth” in letters issued to participants of a party convention on March 9, 2019. “Mysticism of reception” is an ideology of the group mobilization system which results in a sense of “absoluteness” and “unconditionality” of the leadership. This statement means that Kim Jong Un is now circumventing the formalism created by the “mysticism of reception.” Further, government organizations highlight that placing the burden on them for social projects actually equates to “anti-human, anti-party” dissent against party policy. These changes indicate an epoch-making historical event in contrast to previous governments. The second is North Korea’s dream of achieving production localization and the globalization of North Korean industry through its “Special District Policy.” North Korea once again approached the topic of production localization at a light industry conference held in March 2013 after a ten-year hiatus since the concept was first discussed in 2003. North Korea is also integrating IT into domestic products in the fields of publicity, marketing, and technical development. This is being hotly discussed on North Korea’s thirteen major websites. With this, North Korean domestic products are gradually replacing Chinese products among North Koreans. In addition, messages embedded in domestic inspections send a warning about the formalism, conservatism, individualism, and rankism of North Korean party cadres. North Korea’s domestic inspections are surpassing military inspections in terms of frequency. General data provided by the Rodong Sinmun on Kim Jong Un’s domestic inspections since 2018 shows that there were six times as many domestic inspections relating to economic enterprises as compared to military inspections over a period of eighteen months. In contrast to previous governments, the current government doesn’t visit pre-designated locations, instead baffling executives with random surprise visits. Further, the current government assessment of North Korea’s mass movements, such as the “Speed Battles” which were held at the tourist district of the Wonsan-Galma coast, as “slipshod” indicates clear fault-finding in the so-called achievements of the previous governments. The “Speed Battles” which were created during the process of Kim Jong Un’s succession to Kim Jong-Il were called “Pyongyang Speed.” The “70s Speed-Creating Campaign,” the “80s Speed-Creating Campaign,” the “90s Speed-Creating Campaign,” and “Heechun Speed” in Kim Jong Il’s period and “Mallima Speed” in Kim Jong Un’s period are the pivot of North Korea’s mass movements. In this way, Kim Jong Un has circumvented the deification of his leadership and other policies of the previous leadership, instead finding North Korea’s social ills rooted in these former policies. In contrast to his father and grandfather, he points out that North Korea needs to concede “the reality of North Korea” and that “business with emotion and heart” should take precedence above all else. It appears that Kim Jong Un’s challenge will be undoing these North Korean social ills. Third, North Korea is focused on making significant economic and social changes to its general education and higher education systems with an eye to globalization. North Korea replaced its compulsory education system initiated in 2003 which required one year of nursery school, four years of elementary school, and six years of middle school with the current system requiring one year of nursery school, five years of elementary school, three years of middle school, and three years of high school, adding new processes and subjects in the reformation. North Korea has also instituted a mixed style of education which includes both multiple choice questions and narrative questions in its testing. North Korea is attempting to imitate the higher education of normal states by reforming the education system and increasing the number of universities. The industrial universities of Wonsan and Hamhung as well as the central universities of Pyongyang have all been reformed into standard universities. Moreover, Hwangbuk university and Pyongbuk university have also undergone reforms to follow the models of local universities created by Sariwon and Sinuiju cities. The most important changes made through these reforms include 1) curriculum correlation between regular courses, master’s courses, and doctoral courses of universities, 2) the shift from a graded school system to a credit system, 3) a reduction of common subjects and increase of elective subjects, and 4) expansion of university-industry cooperation institutes and institutional integration of central universities with other colleges. Finally, North Korea instituted a remote system during the 2017-2018 university entrance examinations and mobilized communications, the post office (for computer provision), police (to maintain security and control of test-takers and computers), and the electric power industry office (for power supply) to protect the integrity of the remote system.   The Dilemma of a North Korean-style “Normal State” Kim Jong Un faces numerous challenges in implementing his “destruction of the status quo” strategy to create a normal state, which necessitates deviating from the previous system’s problems, ills of the market, isolation from global society, and so on. However, the biggest dilemma is that Kim Jong Un’s subconscious remains rooted in maintaining North Korea’s ideology. Domestically, it may be that he cannot read the reality of North Korea’s changes, or it may be that he remains focused on his own survival. Internationally, North Korea continues to encounter dissonance between Trump’s principle of bilateral talks and Kim Jong Un’s principle of multilateral talks, and the opacity of denuclearization. After the collapse of the Singapore talks, Russia and China brought North Korea’s problems to the table in multilateral talks. Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang accelerated this process, as these visits are a good strategic check against the US in the ongoing trade war between the US and China as well as the denuclearization talks. North Korea’s dilemmas include 1) the dissonance between Kim Jong Un’s “destruction of the status quo” strategy and the solidity of the system built by independent stakeholders owing to marketization, 2) the dissonance between Kim Jong Un’s rejection of unconditional “mysticism of reception” and the advertising slogan of the Rodong Sinmun, and 3) dependence on “family politics” with Kim Yo-jong, Ri Sol-ju, Hyon Song-wol, Choe Son-hui, etc. As time passes, it has become clearer that underlying Kim Jong Un’s liberal leadership are North Korea’s intensifying “family politics” and his own mental fatigue. Economically, the regime faces the dilemma of unrealistic economic policies and routes, such as the focus on obtaining foreign currency in limited regions rather than on creating universal economic policies through reformation and opening. Central economic development zones are separated legally from the surrounding regions in terms of industrial infrastructure, transit infrastructure, and infrastructure for everyday life. These zones are under the control of central management. The right to inspect major tourist zones is held by the supervision and control organs to keep members of the public away.    South Korea at a Turning Point The premise under which North Korea may become a “normal state” rests on recovering trust and joining international society. It is important for North Korea to keep its promises, recover trust in its relationships with other states, stop its chronic buck-passing, and remain accountable for its actions. States can only develop and innovate when they adhere to certain tenets, such as keeping promises, engendering trust, and operating within fair rules of competition and reform. South Korea must play the role of leading North Korea to adhere to such rules. It is a fact that national interest is the main driver in the policymaking process. South Korea’s policy towards North Korea must prioritize diplomacy based on a combination of pragmatism and pressure ahead of peace. Pragmatic diplomacy is defined in this case as policy  driven by South Korea’s interests. Pressure diplomacy place an emphasis on the urgent goal of changing North Korea’s Constitution. If North Korea can alter its usual strategy of “agree first, renege later,” then it will be possible to realize the vision of economic cooperation, peace, and denuclearization. While North Korea continues to exchange strategic interests with China and Russia, South Korea’s autonomous diplomacy is suffering under pressure from the US, China, and North Korea. Because of this, South Korea must change its foreign policy strategy.     ■ Chae-Yeon Kang is a professor at the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University. Her major research areas are North Korean Political Economy, Inter-Korean Relations, Unification Policy, and Social Integration. Her recent articles include “North Korea’s Military First Politics and the 'Bureaucratic Market Economy’” (2019) and “A Cycle Model of North Korean Power Succession-Explaining the Regime’s Working Mechanism” (2018).   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note North Korea launched a series of missiles on May 4 and May 9, 2019, signaling both a departure from the long-awaited peace narrative and a shift towards its past behavior from 2017. Yet the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and the United States (U.S.) have largely refrained from defining these missiles as well as from directly stigmatizing North Korea. In this context, Professor Won Gon Park of Handong Global University’s School of International Studies states that in order to sustain the momentum towards denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, both South Korea and the U.S. should explicitly acknowledge the capacity of the North Korean missiles and practice deterrence against the regime. He also adds that “South Korea and the ROK-US alliance should review deterrence strategies and create far more robust and comprehensive measures without excluding the possibility of integrating the missile defense systems of the ROK and the US”.     After eighteen months of unusual calm, North Korea finally launched missiles on May 4 and May 9 of 2019. It was somewhat expected that North Korea would resume its military provocations after the breakdown of the second US-North Korea summit in February as compensation for the failure and a gambit for the next negotiation. However, North Korea’s ballistic missile provocations are a new threat to South Korea, which has no means to defend itself. On top of that it is becoming a real worrisome challenge to South Korea’s national security because of the lethargic responses of the South Korean and US governments. As of early June, the South Korean and US governments have not officially provided detailed information on the North Korean missiles. South Korean government officials just reiterate that the projectiles are “short range” missiles and refuse to confirm whether they are a new type of ballistic missile or not. As usual, the Trump administration’s evaluation of North Korean missiles is inconsistent. On May 24, John Bolton, the White House National Security Advisor, characterized the North Korean weapon tests as short-range ballistic missiles and a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. On May 29, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan agreed with Mr. Bolton that North Korea’s recent missile tests are a violation of United Nations resolutions.. However, President Trump expressed a very different view of North Korea’s missiles on his Twitter on May 25, saying “North Korea fired off some small weapons, which disturbed some of my people, and others, but not me.” He already mentioned on May 12 that it is not “a breach of trust.” The most disturbing fact vis-à-vis the North Korea missile launch is that both the South Korean and US governments have not given any warnings to North Korea. Rather, President Trump’s aforementioned statements are meant to give indulgentiam (indulgence) to North Korea. If North Korea launches the same missile again, the US could not punish it because “it is a small and not disturbing one.” This is a serious challenge for South Korea’s national security because the launched missiles are a new type of ballistic missile that South Korea has no means to defend itself from. It was not certain what kind of missile North Korea had used immediately following the first launch on May 4th. However, after the North Korean state-run Rodong Sinmun showed launch photos, it became virtually impossible to refute that they are a North Korean version of the Russian Iskander missile.  This missile has a range that would cover all of South Korea. Iskander-M, which is the Russian domestic version, has a range of 50 to 500 km and Iskander-E, the export version, has a range of 280 km. Yet there is report that it can cover up to 1,000 km. Russia intentionally reduced the Iskander range because it did not want to violate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Since the North Korean missile, which has a high chance of being developed using the Iskander-E as a base, flew 480 km, it is clear that the North has managed to extend the range. This missile can deliver a nuclear warhead. It is known that Iskander-M can carry 480 to 700 kg of warheads and if the range is shortened, it can carry up to 1,000 kg. It is a widely accepted fact that North Korea has succeeded in miniaturizing a nuclear warhead. The most serious threat posed by the missile is the fact that the current systems that have been deployed by the ROK or the ROK-US alliance do not provide adequate defense. The US Forces in Korea’s (USFK) ballistic missile defense systems such as the PAC-3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and South Korea’s missile defense systems of PAC-2 and Cheolmae-2, are not effective against this type of missile, as it is capable of flying above or below the target range of the aforementioned defense systems. More importantly, the missile performs “eccentric ballistic flight” which allows it to evade an anti-ballistic missile. Russia developed the missile mainly to outmaneuver the US missile defense system. There is an argument that PAC-3 MSE can intercept the missile, yet it has not been tested in the field and only the USFK has a limited number of PAC-3 MSE. The South Korean armed forces have a plan to deploy the PAC-3 MSE beginning in 2021. South Korea’s “Kill Chain” or “Strategic Target Strike,” a preemptive strike mechanism developed against the North Korean missile threat, would not work against the new North Korean missile either. In order to hit a target preemptively, the system requires at least 30 minutes for detecting, tracing, and destroying. However since the new missile uses solid fuel and has a transporter erector launcher, it only needs 10 to 15 minutes for the actual launch. The new missile has far enhanced accuracy. Unlike other North Korean ballistic missiles, it has a 5-7m circular error probable (CEP), which represents very high precision. It also uses an inertial navigation system (INS) and an optical digital scene-mapping area correlator (DSMAC) rather than GPS or the Russian version of GPS, GLONAS. INS and DSMAC are self-propelled mechanisms that allow a missile to find a target by itself. With these successful tests of the new missile, North Korea will produce more and deploy them in the field. As mentioned, the intention behind North Korea’s missile launches is to increase its leverage in negotiations with both the US and South Korea. Because of the practical difficulty involved in deterrence and defense against the missile, North Korea can demand more. North Korea also can resume missile launches of the same kind at any time because it received exoneration from President Trump. North Korea does not have any reason at this point not to launch further missiles, as it can enhance its capability through further tests and simultaneously put President Trump in a more difficult position domestically. Only President Trump keeps insisting that the missile test is not a threat. US Congress, the media, American experts, and even his top officials continue to sound the alarm and criticize the North’s missile launches. In this situation, if North Korea resumes missile provocations, President Trump cannot go back to the old days of the “Maximum Pressure” campaign and rather will likely choose to coax the North by lowering its bar for denuclearization.  This is what North Korea has intended. South Korea’s defense is in jeopardy. Not a single official in the South Korean government has spelled out the danger of the North’s new missile. The South Korean government has instead busied itself not saying that the missile is the “ballistic,” or “Iskander” version. It remains impossible to come up with any kind of countermeasure without identifying the missile first. In order to avoid being led down a road that would break down negotiations, the South Korean and US governments should officially announce the exact capability of the North Korean missile and strongly warn the North not to repeat such provocations. At the same time, South Korea and the ROK-US alliance should review deterrence strategies and create far more robust and comprehensive measures without excluding the possibility of integrating the missile defense systems of the ROK and the US.     ■ Won Gon Park ([email protected]) is a professor at the School of International Studies at Handong Global University. He is also a member of the Policy Advisory Board of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Unification for the Republic of Korea.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note Denuclearization talks have been at a stalemate since the failure of the U.S.-North Korea Hanoi summit. Yet with the year-end deadline set for bilateral negotiations, this year is critical in advancing the denuclearization process. Chun Chaesung, Director of East Asia Institute’s Center for National Security Studies, argues that the following are needed for this year’s efforts to lead to trust-building and reasonable outcomes: reaffirmation of the denuclearization roadmap’s basic principles; discussions and negotiations related to North Korea’s regime security; coordination on North Korea policy based on mutual trust; and an acknowledgement of ties between developments in inter-Korean affairs, denuclearization and South Korea’s diplomacy with the major powers. He suggests that “South Korea should systematically strengthen diplomacy with neighbouring countries and build trust with North Korea while simultaneously facilitating international and other diplomatic discussions related to North Korea’s regime security.     This year has emerged as an important period as North Korea has set a deadline for negotiations for one year after the collapse of the Hanoi negotiations. If the third summit between the US and North Korea does not go smoothly early next year, 2020 will prove to be a difficult year in the process of North Korea’s denuclearization. North Korea has already test-fired short-range ballistic missiles, signaling it will return to building up its nuclear arsenal if denuclearization negotiations do not go smoothly. The regime is also likely to focus on ensuring stability both domestically and among its allies as it works actively with China and Russia, as well as continuing to pursue independent economic development strategies. It is hard to imagine that President Trump will be willing to take bold and preemptive measures attempting to persuade North Korea to denuclearize as the US political situation heats up ahead of the 2020 presidential elections. Past experiences teaches that while a failure in negotiations with North Korea is a major detriment to American presidential approval ratings, successful negotiations do not play a decisive role in the outcome of domestic American politics. If the next year passes with no breakthrough in the current standoff between the US and North Korea, the mid to long-term situation will be determined by the level of North Korea's nuclear growth and the next president's strategy on North Korea, whether that is Trump or someone else. Ultimately, how this year is spent will determine whether or not there will be a successful third US-North Korea Summit. At the 14th Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Jong Un appeared to continue his efforts to stabilize the regime following his generational succession to the leadership, placing a relatively reduced emphasis on the strength of the military and a greater focus on building up the economy, science and education. At a political level, the regime has stabilized, but it is anticipated that only remarkable economic achievements after the declaration of its successful rise to the status of nuclear state will allow it to maintain stable governance in the long run. The denuclearization of North Korea is a process that guarantees the stability of the regime and its system externally, and economic development will solidify the legitimacy of Kim Jong Un's leadership through tangible results. The US continues to put pressure and impose sanctions on North Korea in the current state where a complete halt to the North's nuclear ambitions is not guaranteed. Talks in Hanoi went nowhere after a massive lead-up, but it is inevitable that further negotiations will take place as it is certain that North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. Complete and verified denuclearization will move forward only if both sides present and agree upon objectives for the denuclearization process and pledge to adhere to proper verification procedures for freezing North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Many US strategists also insist that the agreed-upon denuclearization concept include a denuclearization implementation procedure that is as compressed as possible. The problem is that these processes require each party to go through a period of trust-building and seeking of rational alternatives. No firm agreement or clear progress emerged from the DPRK-US summit in Hanoi, the ROK-US summit, or the DPRK-Russia summit. That does not mean there have been no achievements. North Korea's denuclearization process by definition involves a variety of summit-level conversations, and is currently in the middle of exploring how realistic the alternatives are and what level of negotiations can be agreed upon internationally. Off-the-table negotiations are therefore still a meaningful part of this process. If done well, they could succeed in building trust between all parties involved. What efforts should be made now to ensure that this year's apparent lack of clear progress leads to trust-building and the search for reasonable alternatives? First, the basic principles of the denuclearization roadmap should be reaffirmed. Denuclearization and the creation of a peace regime must be pursued in parallel as they are both key to guaranteeing North Korea's regime, and it is only through such a guarantee that North Korea can realize denuclearization. The peace regime lies at the very heart of concluding a peace treaty, but is a far more comprehensive process. Trust between the two Koreas, the United States, and China must be built first, and this will inevitably be based on long-term mutual negotiations and successes. Various factors such as confidence building and arms reduction, which are essential elements for a peace regime, proceed differently according to the trust-building process. Second, full-fledged discussions and negotiations are required to provide the North Korean regime with the security it needs. Although North Korea's denuclearization will take place amidst a full declaration of nuclear assets, verification, and the easing of economic sanctions, ultimately, political, military and security guarantees for North Korea will emerge as the most important agenda. Last year, North Korea demanded a military security guarantee in advance of beginning the denuclearization process. This demand was made within the frame of security vs. security, such as the declaration of the end of the war and the complete suspension of ROK-US military exercises. However, now that the declaration of the end of the war has stalled, the framework has shifted to one of security vs. the economy, with North Korea focusing its demands on the lifting of economic sanctions. North Korea hopes to gain not only economic benefits, but also through this process intends to verify the sincerity of the ROK-US response and gain a sense of security. After this period, it will eventually demand security-security and military-security guarantees. Even if the complete dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and the partial demobilization of North Korea’s other nuclear facilities were to have occurred through a small deal in Hanoi, the government would have demanded a physical security guarantee, or a verifiable withdrawal of the hostile policy towards the North after a certain period of time. In the absence of any satisfactory regime guarantee, North Korea will cease negotiations after it reaps economic rewards in the wake of the termination of sanctions, which will be perceived by the United States as a violation of the terms of negotiation and by North Korea as an inevitable consequence of imperfect regime guarantees. Therefore, the conditions for guaranteeing political, military and security systems should be thoroughly discussed in parallel in order to establish a long-term peace regime. Military agreements between South and North Korea are not sufficient to dismantle all existing nuclear weapons and to ensure safety. A security guarantee mechanism in Northeast Asia, including the US and China, is essential. Moreover, at a time when the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China is accelerating, the government must consider how to guarantee the security of North Korea’s military internationally. South Korea should engage in multilateral and multidimensional strategic dialogues with the US, China, and other Northeast Asian countries regarding what a peace regime in North Korea would look like. Currently, the North Korean nuclear issue is rapidly declining as a priority in the US due to Venezuela and other complicated domestic factors ahead of the presidential elections, and the North's missile launches are once again raising skepticism over Kim Jong Un's true willingness to denuclearize. While the voices calling for stronger sanctions are expected to grow, South Korea is increasing the urgency of its effort to create an overall roadmap for denuclearization. It is particularly necessary to engage in strategic dialogues with US strategists who are insisting on realistic negotiations with North Korea. Third, even at the current stalled stage of denuclearization, measures must continue to be taken towards North Korea to build trust. There is not necessarily a conflict between maintaining economic sanctions against North Korea and providing humanitarian aid and social and cultural exchanges. It appears that a fundamental distrust of the international community is driving North Korea to seek military means to respond to the unwillingness to ease sanctions. To counter this, measures that do not conflict with the existing sanctions must be found and implemented. A pressing question is what will incentivize North Korea at this stage. It is clear that vague rhetoric about the country’s bright future and the realization of its economic potential are not persuasive to the regime. Thus, a package of visible and specific strategic engagement should be prepared. Alternative options such as the North Korea Fund proposed by Gen. Vincent Brooks, the former commander of the USFK, could be helpful. This proposal aims to strengthen trust by collecting substantial funds at an international level, creating an aid fund through a highly visible process to show North Korea that the international community is willing to make an effort. Fourth, the close connection between denuclearization, the improvement of inter-Korean relations, and South Korea's diplomacy with great powers must be recognized. Currently, South Korea's diplomacy faces the criticism that it is overly focused on North Korea policy, losing sight of regional power politics. Of course, the government has been carrying out diplomacy toward neighboring countries as well. The problem is the relative pace of how preemptively South Korean diplomacy reads and responds to changes at a time when the diplomatic landscape in Northeast Asia and Asia is being reshuffled around US-China competition. If the ROK government does not act fast enough, their efforts will not be fully recognized. Some may think that South Korea will obtain a great deal of political and diplomatic capital if denuclearization is achieved. But such capital will not be decisive amid the changes in the Asian landscape. Rather, the denuclearization issue is likely to lose its regional significance and become isolated as the US alliance remains centered on the Indo-Pacific strategy, alliances shift, and the strategies of neighboring countries approach a level of confrontation in response to China's BRI strategy. We must realize that South Korea’s failures in its diplomatic efforts toward neighboring countries translate into the setting adrift of the delicate denuclearization process. When regional diplomacy in Asia and diplomacy with neighboring powers is carried out wisely, it is possible to push ahead with denuclearization as well. South Korea’s strategy toward denuclearization and regional power politics are not in a zero-sum relationship, and both diplomatic horizons and diplomatic means must be broadened and strengthened. Ultimately, the key factor which requires attention is what must be prepared now in order to ensure that an agreement that goes beyond the intermediate stage of denuclearization is reached in the first half of next year. We cannot produce tangible results immediately. South Korea must systematically strengthen diplomacy towards neighboring countries while also building the basis of trust with North Korea and leading international and working-level dialogues to ensure the security of North Korea’s regime. In order to completely denuclearize North Korea, South Korea must spend this year figuring out how to combine a roadmap to the full declaration of nuclear assets and a nuclear freeze and verification with an appropriate degree of rewards from South Korea and the US and the provision of a roadmap to guarantee the regime's security.     ■ Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the International Relations Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. He also serves as a professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note China’ role in the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula has gained heightened international attention since denuclearization talks have come to a halt. Dong Ryul Lee, a professor at Dongduk Women's University, states that China has been relatively inactive since the breakdown of the Hanoi summit with the underlying presupposition that the North Korean nuclear problem is a long-term issue. He emphasizes that "China’s role" will likely increase in future denuclearization negotiations. Yet due to domestic constraints, China is unlikely to participate as actively in the peacebuilding initiative on the Korean Peninsula as South Korea may hope for.     China’s Silence on the No Deal Hanoi Summit China's role in negotiations for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is drawing renewed attention since the unexpected breakdown of the US-North Korea summit in Hanoi. China has been continuously emphasizing its intention to play a “constructive role” while remaining sensitive to “China Passing” in the denuclearization and peace processes on the Korean Peninsula. Yet different interpretations and speculations have been proposed as to the specific role and steps China will likely take in future denuclearization efforts. There was a time when expectations and demands surrounding China’s role in the sanctions regime against North Korea were heightened, with ideas such as the “China Responsibility Theory” gaining traction and calls for more pressure to be applied to China. The phrase “China Passing” has also emerged as a result of the inter-Korean and the US-North Korea summits in 2018 and the emergence of the possibility of a declaration of an end to the war between the Koreas and the United States. After the sudden series of summits between North Korea and China, Washington has also proposed its own “China behind-the-scenes theory.” Despite China's insistence on taking on a more constructive role, controversy over China's role has intensified as it has yet to identify its actual specific role as compared to the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002. Although denuclearization negotiations have been developing since 2018, China's most prominent diplomatic move during this time has been its four consecutive summits with North Korea. However, it is questionable whether China has played a leading role in these, as all four summits were arranged through Kim Jong Un's visits to China at the request of North Korea. It is unusual that China has not yet taken additional steps beyond releasing public statements after the US-North Korea summit ended in an unexpected “no deal.” China has continuously claimed that the North Korea nuclear problem should be resolved bilaterally between the US and North Korea, and as such, it should have been that much more perplexed about the lack of a deal resulting from Hanoi. It is particularly interesting to observe China’s “quiet” stance following the breakdown of the Hanoi summit considering its previous attempts to play a more prominent role in denuclearization talks. For instance, Beijing had sought active involvement prior to and following the US-North Korea summit in Singapore despite controversies surrounding its so-called behind-the-scenes role, and even throughout its summits with North Korea. It may be that China's unexpected and cautious moves reflect Beijing’s intention to watch the North Korea-US Hanoi Summit unfold in the face of conflict, including the trade disputes between Washington and Beijing. A review of remarks made by Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi and Premier Li Keqiang at a press conference of the Second Session of the 13th National People’s Congress in 2019 shows a glimpse of China's complex intentions. Despite the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit, both Minister Wang Yi and Premier Li Keqiang assessed the outcome positively and expressed optimism that dialogue could resume. They also stated that denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime are difficult to achieve in a single step, and that it will take a long time; therefore, all parties concerned should be patient and focus first on simple, achievable goals. The most interesting aspect is that despite the fact that the international community continues to argue about the underlying reasons behind the Hanoi Summit's breakdown, China has remained reticent and seemingly uninterested. While China has expressed a strong hope and expectation that dialogue will resume, it is not seeking to act as a practical mediator by pursuing diplomatic actions to resume discussions as it has done in the past. China may have been actively expressing its hopes for the resumption of negotiations out of fear that the rupture of US-North Korea negotiations could lead to renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsula. However, on the other hand, China is also concerned that the US and North Korea may be hastily pushing the negotiation process forward. In short, China does not want US-North Korea dialogue to escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but at the same time, it is also attentive to the ongoing and rapid developments on the Korean Peninsula, such as the pursuit of a peace regime. China supported the US-North Korea summits, but behind this support lie numerous reservations about the potential for the success of the negotiations. In particular, China questioned the intentions and motives of the Trump administration. Considering the realities of the difficulty in achieving denuclearization progress in a short period of time, China has raised doubts about the continuity of US policy on North Korea following the exit of the Trump administration. China is considering the North Korean nuclear problem as an issue that should be managed in a fairly long-term context.   Patterns in China's Role on the North Korean Nuclear Issue China has shown a certain pattern in its response to the North Korean nuclear issue over the past 26 years, and its reaction to the Hanoi summit is aligned with this pattern. Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993, China has expanded its strategic presence while consistently maintaining its original position on denuclearization, peace and stability, and a peaceful resolution through negotiations and dialogue on the Korean Peninsula. In other words, China played a limited role as a quiet observer or “backdoor coordinator” during the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993, arranged three-way talks between the US and North Korea during the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003, and expanded its influence as a de facto mediator in the Six-Party Talks. However, since North Korea's sixth nuclear test in September 2017, China has been unusually quick to participate in strong sanctions against the North Korea, thereby strengthening its cooperation with the United States. Although China played a role in 2003 and 2017, respectively, through different steps - mediating dialogue and tightening sanctions - the two periods share commonalities in that the possibility of US military action in the North Korean nuclear issue has increased and the crisis on the Korean Peninsula has escalated. In other words, China decided that denuclearization was a matter between North Korea and the US, and that there was no need to consume what leverage China had when its role was limited to begin with. On the other hand, when the crisis on the Korean Peninsula was likely to escalate, China played a role in driving dialogue and easing tensions by applying a combination of pressure and persuasion towards North Korea. Nevertheless, they maintained a prudent stance by not pressuring North Korea to the extent that instability and the crisis in the North Korean regime could escalate, or North Korea-China relations collapse. China perceives that a crisis in North Korea might destabilize the Korean Peninsula. In fact, China has participated in pressuring North Korea through sanctions since Pyongyang’s sixth nuclear test, but continues to stress that the purpose of these sanctions was to drive dialogue. In this process, China has first considered the US variable in the North Korean nuclear issue. China agreed with North Korea by sticking to its position that the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved through negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, but also wanted to avoid deepening tensions with the US. Rather, China wanted to maintain its cooperative stance with the US in regards to the North Korean nuclear issue. China has always agreed on the principles of denuclearization in summit talks with the US, and also cooperated with the US in adopting nine UN Security Council resolutions against North Korea up until September 2017. In short, in the past China gradually expanded its role in the North Korean nuclear issue, but it has responded this time by considering its relations with the US and North Korea rather than being proactive and preemptive. In other words, the major variables of China’s relations with the US, the stability of the North Korea regime and the situation on the Korean Peninsula have influenced China’s strategy and role, but its policy stance of managing North Korea as a geopolitical buffer zone has remained unchanged.   The Strategy and Role of the Xi Jinping Government on the Denuclearization and Peace Process of the Korean Peninsula The Xi Jinping administration is expected to maintain the existing Chinese policy stance on North Korea's nuclear issue. Given the complex domestic and international issues facing the Xi administration, its Korean Peninsula policy is basically aimed to “stabilize through the status quo,” and to maintain a “balanced diplomacy toward both North and South Korea.” A low-cost, stable international environment is still important for China to focus on securing new economic growth engines and maintain regime stability. In particular, China considers the development of this unseen and complex situation in which relations with the US are uncertain that could lead to a change in the relationship between the forces on the Korean Peninsula as an increasingly unstable variable. However, the situation facing the Xi administration is not that simple. With the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the peace process centered on negotiations between the US and North Korea since 2018, China’s “meddling” role and the “need for pressure and persuasion against North Korea” has been reduced. The role of mediator has been taken over by South Korea, and direct talks between the US and North Korea have led to a reduction in pressure and demand for persuasion from North Korea. China's status and position as a player driving the negotiations forward have been temporarily weakened as denuclearization negotiations have progressed and fluctuated faster than expected. The new development since 2018 is clearly a new challenge for China as well which needs a new response. While the US is intensifying pressure on China, dialogue and negotiations between the US and North Korea are underway. China has a more limited scope restricting its movements than it ever has in the past. China’s policy on the Korean Peninsula has not been successful either. China is facing challenges in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and its “Two Koreas” policy due to the issue of THAAD deployment with South Korea and the issue of nuclear weapons development with North Korea. These issues are challenging China’s strategic status as the only country among the four powers on the Korean Peninsula that maintains a certain cooperative relationship with both Koreas. Therefore, China aims to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, but at the same time hopes to manage the situation in a stable manner rather than embracing any sudden changes in the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Although the North Korean nuclear issue is an important security issue for China, chances are low that it will become a high priority. Since China considers the North Korean nuclear problem as a long-term agenda item, it aims to restore relations with North Korea by both minimizing instability on the Korean Peninsula and maintaining its influence in the region. China's complicated strategy focuses on the issues of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, which will inevitably be linked to denuclearization negotiations. China is also wary of the fact that establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will inevitably cause a disruption to the current status of the US Forces in Korea and the ROK-US alliance. China may intend to do what it can to delay any changes to the situation, as there are concerns that the Korean Peninsula could slip into a new situation of uncertainty if USFK and the ROK-US alliance are placed on the negotiating table in earnest amid the current conflicts between Washington and Beijing. Therefore, rather than playing a leading role in the denuclearization and peace process of the Korean Peninsula in the future, China is expected to place a priority on managing its relations with North Korea and securing its position while keeping an eye on the progress of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. However, in the future, the “China role” is likely to become an increasingly prominent one in any scenario of denuclearization negotiations. China’s discontent to the proposed three- or four-party end-of-war declarations that exclude its presence, its four unusual summits with North Korea within the last ten months, and President Trump’s comments on “China’s behind-the-scenes role” imply that the role of China cannot be overlooked. In order for denuclearization to become complete and irreversible, a peace regime will eventually have to be established on the Korean Peninsula and a regime of reform and openness implemented in North Korea. The role that China plays in both of these processes will inevitably be an important one. Under the current US-China rivalry, in which the US maintains strategic superiority, the US-China conflict will not have a direct negative impact until the denuclearization negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang are in place. However, if the denuclearization process accelerates and problems emerge regarding the shifting order on the Korean Peninsula, and possibly regarding the establishment of a peace regime, elements of the US-China rivalry are likely to act as obstacles, even potentially reversing the progress that has been made thus far. In short, China recognizes the drastic changes in the status quo of the Korean Peninsula as an issue that further complicates its own situation, given its unstable domestic circumstances and the uncertainty of its rivalry and conflict with the US. In other words, given China's domestic political agenda, it is hard to expect China to serve as a facilitator or “active mediator” supporting and cooperating with the denuclearization peace initiatives that South Korea is pursuing.     ■ Dong Ryul Lee has been a professor in the Department of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women’s University since 1997. He was President of The Korean Association for Contemporary Chinese Studies in 2018 and now serves as a policy advisor to the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His research interests include Chinese foreign policy, international relations in East Asia, and Chinese nationalism and minorities. He was a visiting scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University from 2005 to 2006. He received his Ph.D. in international politics from Peking University.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note Since the second U.S.-North Korea summit ended without reaching a final agreement, there has been no progress in the denuclearization of North Korea or in building peace on the Korean Peninsula. This is due to the gap between the definitions of denuclearization adhered to by North Korea and the United States, which has scarcely narrowed. These differences also exist between South Korea and the United States. Won Gon Park, a professor at the School of International Studies at Handong Global University, states that South Korea and the United States have different perceptions and approaches to sanctions aimed at resolving North Korea’s denuclearization issues. He adds that close cooperation between South Korea and the United States is essential for the denuclearization of North Korea. The author emphasizes that South Korea, which continues to change its stance in accordance with the changing denuclearization situation, should now develop a “Seoul Process” in its denuclearization policymaking. In other words, we need to come up with ways to lead the denuclearization situation rather than be dragged along.     After the breakdown of the second US-North Korea summit, many people regarded the South Korean government as the biggest failure. It is rather apparent that the South Korean government did not anticipate the sudden rupture in the negotiations; there were reports that South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his senior staff had even planned to gather to watch the signing ceremony of the agreement in Hanoi on TV at the Blue House. On the other hand, Japanese media reports said that Prime Minister Abe Shinzo had been informed by the US government that there was a chance of a walkout because the US had prepared three options, including “no agreement.” It is uncertain whether the South Korean government had the detailed US negotiation plan or not. But it is very clear that it had high expectations the summit would end in some kind of agreement between the US and the DPRK. It is no secret that the ROK and the US have different perceptions and approaches to the denuclearization of North Korea. The South Korean government does acknowledge the importance of sanctions on North Korea, yet it keeps emphasizing that sanctions alone are not the ultimate goal; rather, they should be used to induce meaningful denuclearization measures. In other words, sanctions can be relaxed even in advance as an incentive for North Korea’s actions. On the other hand, the US government has emphasized the necessity and importance of sanctions and reiterated its intentions to maintain them until complete denuclearization has been achieved. The US government perception on the importance of sanctions has been reinforced since the Hanoi summit. With growing suspicion over North Korea’s willingness to give up its nuclear program, the US sense of the effectiveness of sanctions was confirmed when Chairman Kim himself accidently revealed North Korea’s weakness during the summit, saying “we don't have time.” However, the South Korean government has maintained an obsession with sanction relief, and is clearly chafing to resume inter-Korean projects such as the Geumgang Mountain tours and operation of the Kaesong industrial complex. On March 6, right after the Hanoi summit, South Korean Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Ambassador Lee Do-hoon met with United States Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun in Washington. The main purpose of the visit was to hear the full results of the Hanoi summit and discuss possible next steps. However, it is also known that Ambassador Lee brought up the subject of resuming inter-Korean projects, because despite the breakdown of the Hanoi summit, President Moon vividly expressed his willingness to “consult with the United States on ways to resume tourism to Geumgang Mountain and the operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex” in his address made on March 1st, South Korea’s Independence Movement Day. However, the US high official who met Ambassador Lee had an unplanned press briefing right after the meeting and said that the administration was “not” reviewing exemptions from sanctions for the Kaesong Industrial Complex or tourism of Mt. Geumgang. This is just one episode where the ROK has deviated from US denuclearization policy. More fundamentally, the ROK and the United States have different perceptions on the definition of denuclearization. Special Representative Biegun mentioned on January 31st that “there was no detailed definition or shared agreement of what denuclearization entails” between the US and the DPRK. US National Security Adviser John Bolton stated that one major reason that the US gave a “big deal” document during the summit was to deliver the American definition of denuclearization in written form. On the other hand, it is well-known that the DPRK’s definition of denuclearization is not the denuclearization of North Korea alone, but the denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula, which demands the removal of the US nuclear threat first, according to commentary from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) made on December 20th 2018. In spite of the explicit discrepancy between the US and DPRK, the South Korean government keeps mentioning that there is no difference in the definition of denuclearization between the US, North Korea, and South Korea, as most recently reiterated by ROK Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa in March after the summit. There is no doubt that in order to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea, very close cooperation between South Korea and the US is imperative. For that purpose, the South Korean government needs to have a “principled denuclearization policy.” Going back to the presidential election in 2017, then-candidate Moon Jae-in and his party suggested a two-stage approach of freezing and abandonment as a method for North Korean denuclearization. It was an approach that put a freeze on the nuclear program as an initial step and complete denuclearization as the exit point at the final phase. After the US decided to have a summit with North Korea in March 2018, the South Korean government’s denuclearization policy shifted to an “all-in-one” approach. This approach puts everything in a box and comes up with a solution at once. Within a certain time limit, if North Korea should dismantle all of its WMDs first, the US would meet that with corresponding measures including the lifting of all sanctions and the normalization of relationships with the North at the end of complete denuclearization. However, when this approach faced vociferous opposition from the North, the South government suggested an approach of “comprehensive agreement and phased implementation.” This is a compromise between the all-in-one approach favored by the US and the phased and synchronized approach advocated by the North. The US and the North need to agree on a road map with a clearly defined end state and a defined concept of denuclearization; yet, the implementation of actual denuclearization measures must be phased and include corresponding compensation measures. During the Singapore summit when the US agreed with the North’s approach to denuclearization, which is a synchronized and phased approach, the South Korean government also swiftly supported it. Especially after the Pyongyang inter-Korean summit in September 2018, the South Korean government has focused on the dismantlement of the Yongbyon facility with an emphasis on a lifting of sanctions as a corresponding measure. In October, ROK Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa mentioned the possibility of lifting the South’s unilateral sanctions, i.e. the May 24th measures, in the National Assembly. However, after the Hanoi summit in February 2019, the South Korean government once again changed its denuclearization policy with symbolic words such as “good enough deal” and “early harvest.” This is an approach that is similar to the South’s previous suggestion of a “comprehensive agreement and phased implementation.” During the Hanoi summit, the US demanded “a big deal or a grand bargain” with “a total solution.” The South Korean government has considered US demands of an all-or-nothing type of approach to be unrealistic, and insisted on a compromise between the US and North Korea. According to a South Korean senior official, “in order to see meaningful progress in the denuclearization talks, there should first be trust-building measures, which I will call an ‘early harvest’.” Moon Chung-in, a special adviser for foreign affairs and national security, has explained South Korean government policy as “a compromise such as a comprehensive agreement on the exchange of FFVD for what Pyongyang wants, one that is implemented incrementally based on a mutually acceptable road map.” As usual, the current South Korean government’s approach has invited another round of debate. Some argue that since it is far from what the US has pursued, it will widen the gap between South Korea and the US. Others insist that it is inevitable to have step-by-step implementation even if the US and the North agree on the road map that includes a definition of denuclearization and the end state of the process. Considering the complexity of the North’s denuclearization and the various unpredictable factors which will be difficult, if not impossible, to control over the coming years during the process of denuclearization, it is very difficult to come up with a singular, fixed approach. However, it is this very complexity which makes the best approach one that goes back to the basics. Because the South Korean government has continually changed its approach to reflect fluctuating circumstances, it places the South betwixt and between. Seoul has been criticized by both Washington and Pyongyang. The US government implicitly expressed its grievance that the South has not actively put pressure on the North to accept a total solution. The North Korean government has insisted that the South should not be a mediator but a player together with the North to compete against the US. It is time to end the “never ending story” of South Korea’s denuclearization policy making. Although there a perfect, complete, and impeccable approach does not exist, the South must strive to at least lead the situation, not be led by outside circumstances. Previous EAI commentators have suggested a comprehensive policy for the North’s denuclearization (Global NK Commentary, March 6 2019, November 14 2018), and hold that just remembering the basics vis-a-vis denuclearization will be sufficient to start the process in earnest. The definition of denuclearization should be clarified first. Without that, no matter what fancy words people use, the situation will end by accepting the North as a de facto nuclear weapons state. The North’s nuclear program should be frozen right away. The moratorium on testing is not an actual step towards denuclearization. A road map that includes reporting, verification, and dismantlement should be agreed upon as the end state. “Not a word, but a deed” needs to be implemented in the early stages. The North should carry out their promised dismantlement of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and Tongchang-ri missile site with verification. At the same time, it is unrealistic to believe that denuclearization can proceed without any corresponding measures being taken by the US and the South until the denuclearization process has been completed. The best way is to divide the whole denuclearization process into two phases. In the first phase, with the agreed-upon road map that includes a definition and end state of denuclearization, the North should give up and dismantle its essential capabilities. Upon verification, the North needs to receive some corresponding measures, including a partial lifting of sanctions. The second stage is to complete the denuclearization of the North and come up with a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula. It is time for the South Korean government to stop trying to follow and to develop a “Seoul Process” for denuclearization of the North in a way that will last, and finally, to lead the process.     ■ Won Gon Park ([email protected]) is a professor at the School of International Studies at Handong Global University. He is also a member of the Policy Advisory Board of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Unification for the Republic of Korea.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.     After the second US-North Korea summit, which failed to result in a final agreement, North Korea clarified its denuclearization calculation during a late-night news conference. First, when the US lifts some of the UN sanctions which impede the civilian economy, especially the people’s livelihood, North Korea will completely and permanently dismantle the production facilities of all nuclear materials, including plutonium and uranium, in the Yongbyon complex, through a joint project involving technicians from both North Korea and the US in the presence of US inspectors. Second, North Korea will make a written pledge to permanently halt nuclear weapon tests and long-range missiles test launches. Third, the most important issue is security guarantees in the process of denuclearization. However, as it would be more burdensome for the United States to take military-related measures towards such guarantees, North Korea suggests a partial lifting of sanctions as a corresponding measure. Fourth, for complete denuclearization, this early stage process is unavoidable and North Korea must implement this process at the current stage. Fifth, as the United States continued to insist at the talks that North Korea must take one more measure beyond the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, it seems clear that the United States is not prepared to accept North Korea’s proposal. Meanwhile, the United States explained its own calculations with relation to North Korea’s denuclearization at a press conference right after the summit. First, for North Korea to fully denuclearize, it is not sufficient to permanently dismantle its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon- it must include additional nuclear facilities which are designated by the United States. Second, the core sanctions that North Korea wants lifted cannot be removed in exchange for the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility alone. Third, North Korea currently has a different vision of denuclearization than the United States. But over the past year, the gap between the two visions has been reduced to some extent, and the US expects to ultimately share the same vision with North Korea. Fourth, if North Korea chooses to denuclearize, it will seek international support to become an economic power. The greatest achievement of the second North Korea-US summit was to clearly prove that there is no potential for convergence between the current North Korean and American trajectories towards North Korea’s denuclearization. Since the Singapore Summit, there has been a deep divide among domestic and foreign policymakers and experts between the optimistic and pessimistic views on the possibility of convergence between the two different calculations. EAI has voiced ongoing criticism of the dichotomy between these two views and pointed out that North Korea has been seeking to implement a three-step negotiation strategy for the North Korean vision of complete denuclearization, which differs from the vision shared and pursued by the US and South Korea. In the first phase, North Korea proposed the voluntary destruction of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site as well as the Tongchang-ri missile facility and missile engine test site in exchange for a suspension of the joint ROK-US military exercises as a confidence building measure. In the second phase, North Korea will demand, based on the principle of “action for action,” an end to the US hostile policy against North Korea; a security guarantee for the regime; and an easing of economic sanctions in exchange for the permanent disposal of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. In the third phase, North Korea will propose nuclear disarmament talks which will include the disarmament of the Korean Peninsula as well as the surrounding regions (EAI Issue Briefing (2018.6.21)/Global NK Commentary (2019.1.4)). The second summit clearly showed that neither the optimists who believe that North Korea will accept complete denuclearization nor the pessimists who argue the opposite have the solution to this problem. Rather, it demonstrated the accuracy of prudent analysis which asserts that North Korea will negotiate present and future denuclearization through confidence building and corresponding measures, but that North Korea will not give up the nuclear weapons which are necessary as a minimum deterrence for its survival. Therefore, the nuclear facilities of Yongbyon can be dismantled if the United States offers an appropriate corresponding measure, but North Korea is not willing to report its complete nuclear facilities as the US demanded. North Korea currently faces a difficult challenge. The North’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho said at the press conference “our principled position won’t change in the slightest degree, even if the United States proposes negotiations again in the future. Our measures will not change. ” However, as long as North Korea continues along its current trajectory, it is hard to expect that the other side will be willing to provide the corresponding measures of an easing of sanctions and a security guarantee that the North wants. Moreover, as Kim Jong Un said during his 2019 New Year’s Address, if the North seeks “a new way for defending the sovereignty of the country and the supreme interest of the state and for achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula”, the regime will still not have a guarantee and sanctions will be strengthened. As a consequence, North Korea will face a second “Arduous March.” Thus, North Korea must recalculate its current trajectory and seek “a new way for guaranteeing the regime and achieving prosperity without nuclear weapons.” In order to see tangible results towards achieving the North’s complete denuclearization at the third summit, the United States must seek to complement the calculations which have played into its own trajectory in these negotiations. First, the United States should push forward a discussion through close cooperation with South Korea and China on a security guarantee for the regime which encompasses both diplomatic and military aspects. The guarantee must be so powerful that North Korea becomes willing to place its trust in such a guarantee rather than in its nuclear weapons. Only then will North Korea be able to recalculate its trajectory to aim for complete denuclearization. There is an urgent need to hold immediate discussions on how to build multiple-layered regime guarantees on a bilateral level, such as between North Korea and the US, North Korea and China, and South Korea and North Korea; on a multilateral level such as through the Six-Party Talks; and on an international level including the UN. Second, there must be international discussions regarding how to provide sanctions relief and support for the economy in steps which correspond to the reporting, inspection and destruction of all of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, including those at Yongbyon. North Korea can demonstrate its sincere willingness to engage in the process of complete denuclearization by taking these steps. South Korea, from a perspective of prudence beyond both optimism and pessimism, must also recalculate its own trajectory so that it may converge with those of North Korea and the US to achieve a successful third North Korea-US Summit. More importantly, there must be recognition that the third summit will be totally different from the first summit. The first summit was held at the level of confidence building based on North Korea’s three phases of negotiation. The second summit proved that the existing North Korean and American denuclearization trajectories will never converge. Through the third summit, both North Korea and the US should reach an agreement by establishing new trajectories that can encompass the needs of both parties. Therefore, unlike the past two summits, the role of South Korea in the third summit matters. South Korea must induce North Korea to recalculate its trajectory to aim for the complete denuclearization of North Korea and, at the same time, create a new path towards denuclearization which includes a more attractive security guarantee and economic prosperity together with the United States. In this way, the trajectories of the three countries may hope to converge at the third meeting. North Korea’s complete denuclearization is moving rapidly towards the moment of truth. While the last two summits were exploratory forays, the third summit should be a historic meeting between all of the winners in the ring.     ■ Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.     The second summit between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un has been set for February 27 and 28 in Vietnam. The question is what kind of progress the two leaders will make after their highly symbolic but unsubstantial meeting in Singapore in June of last year. How much and what kind of concessions will Kim make in his declared efforts of denuclearization? How much will Trump reward Kim with normalizing relations between Washington and Pyongyang as was promised in the last meeting? As many experts speculate over the prospects of the upcoming summit between the two unpredictable leaders, one thing seems to be clear. Mr. Trump represents a unique opportunity for Kim.  Trump is unique because he is the first American president, and possibly the only one, who is willing to meet with Kim without many preconditions. This is exactly what happened in the last meeting, after which many Americans criticized Trump for giving Kim the prestige of sharing a world stage with the American president in exchange for nothing. The second meeting has been set in a similar manner, with Mr. Trump announcing the meeting even as his negotiator is still finalizing the terms and conditions in Pyongyang. Trump is unique because he is not beholden to the traditional American values of human rights and promoting democracy. In his commentary to the Chair of CSIS Korea, Robert King, a former special envoy for North Korea human rights issues, noted the total absence of the subject in Trump’s 2019 State of the Union Speech. It was a sharp contrast to 2018, when the President strongly condemned Kim’s human rights abuses, saying “no regime has oppressed its own citizens more totally or brutally than the cruel dictatorship in North Korea.” Everyone knows North Korea has serious human rights issues. Yet, past US insistence that human rights be addressed was one of the main stumbling blocks preventing a nuclear deal with Pyongyang, which suspected the Americans of seeking regime change. In his analysis of the US nuclear negotiation with Libya, Bruce Jentleson of Duke University argued that the Bush administration’s focus on achieving policy change of denuclearization instead of regime change was the key to the successful deal with Kaddafi. Trump is unique also in what King calls his “transactional approach to foreign policy.” He is willing to make deals based on raw national interests as well as personal motives. Trump wants a legacy that he can claim nobody has done before. In his speech last week, Trump boasted that he was the one who prevented a major war with North Korea. Stating that there has not been a missile launch in 15 months, he said “as part of a bold new diplomacy,” he and Kim “continue our historic push for peace on the Korean Peninsula.” In his New Year Address, Chairman Kim put strong emphasis on North Korea’s economic development. If Kim really wants economic reform, he has all the support he needs. As Kim paid his fourth visit to Xi Jinping after his speech in January, it is no secret that China wants to see Kim pursue Chinese-style economic reform and willingness to provide the necessary support. Perhaps more importantly, South Korean President Moon Jae-in wants to see the North Koreans prosper instead of regime collapse. In his New Year’s news conference, Moon mentioned the possibility of reopening Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang Tours as part of broadening inter-Korean economic cooperation. In his National Security Strategy paper published December last year, Moon made it clear that his government wants to build a permanent peace regime on the Peninsula which will lead to sustainable development in inter-Korean relations and common prosperity. Moon’s peace drive reflects the sentiment of the South Korean public. In the latest Korea Gallup poll, 65 percent of South Koreans indicated that they preferred a gradual unification to a rapid absorption of the North, which had only 19 percent support. And 12 percent stated that they did not want any unification at all. Yet, with US sanctions, neither Beijing nor Seoul can help Kim with his ambitious economic initiative. The good news is that now Kim has another big supporter for his economic agenda: Mr. Trump. Trump tweeted that he “looks forward to meeting Chairman Kim who realizes so well that North Korea possesses great economic potential.” In his latest tweet, Trump again emphasized that “North Korea, under the leadership of Kim Jong Un, will become a great Economic Powerhouse. He may surprise some but he won’t surprise me, because I have gotten to know him & fully understand how capable he is. North Korea will become a different kind of Rocket - an Economic one!” The real challenge is what concessions Kim is willing to make. Kim has to make a strategic decision to show the skeptics and the world a convincing case for North Korea’s denuclearization efforts. That will require a delicate balancing act between his impulse to hedge by maintaining a certain level of nuclear capability and meaningful denuclearization of North Korea’s nuclear material stockpile and production capability, as well as ICBMs and related technologies. The second summit will not solve all the denuclearization issues. But it ought to result in concrete enough measures as a starting point for a real peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Trump is the best, and maybe the last, opportunity Kim has now. But time is running out fast as the Trump presidency is increasingly consumed by mushrooming political scandals, special counsel Mueller’s investigation, opposition from House Democrats, and the possibility of impeachment. Let Mr. Trump declare a real deal of the century before it is too late. But ultimately, it is all up to Kim.     ■ Seong-Ho Sheen is a professor at Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. He is also a member of Policy Advisory Board of Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf. ■ This commentary has been translated from the Korean version. The Korean version can be found here.     Editor’s Note Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year’s Address has provoked a variety of responses and interpretations among experts. EAI experts assess that a second North Korea-US summit is likely to be held. However, as North Korea and the US have different definitions of what constitutes “complete denuclearization,” a second summit will result in an exchange of short term rather than any significant progress towards resolving the fundamental problems that plague denuclearization negotiations. This commentary discusses the mixed reviews and understandings of North Korea's New Year's Address, the likelihood of a second North Korea-US summit, progress on denuclearization thus far, and the strategic considerations of South Korea as they map out their approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. This commentary was written by Dr. Chaesung Chun, Chair of the International Relations Studies Center at the East Asia Institute and professor at Seoul National University. The commentary is based on the discussions held during EAI’s New Year’s Roundtable in early January 2019, and Professor Chun served as the lead writer.     Mixed Views of North Korea's New Year's Address The South Korean government and various experts from Korea and overseas have taken mixed views on the North's strategy and intentions following Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year's Address. President Trump and experts within the United States, a key actor in North Korea's denuclearization and peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula, have a different point of view. Those who take an optimistic view on North Korea's denuclearization believe that Kim Jong Un has already made a strategic decision to pursue complete denuclearization and is focusing North Korea’s resources and policy on the economy. They trust that he is sincerely pushing for step-by-step denuclearization measures, and perceive the difficulties in  negotiations to be the result of mutual distrust between North Korea and the US, as well as Washington's lukewarm compensation offers. Those who take a pessimistic view believe that North Korea is still enhancing its nuclear and missile capabilities, has yet to take any concrete steps towards a freeze, and feel the regime has not made its intention to completely denuclearize clear. Further, the pessimists hold that North Korea is still seeking to weaken the Korea-US alliance, maximize the amount of potential economic compensation, strengthen relations with China and Russia, and ultimately aims to be recognized as a normal nuclear state. Such opposing analysis of the same text arise from the pre-conceived notions and beliefs that the readers hold regarding North Korea. However, North Korea's New Year's Address is intended to be strategically ambiguous and open to a diversity of interpretation. As much as the New Year's Address lays out the North Korean regime’s highest expectations for the country, it also includes a level of optimism regarding North Korea’s capability and future as well as a high-level strategy to achieve its goals. This year’s New Year's Address places a heavy emphasis on the economy and a strong desire for development. The word "economy" is mentioned 38 times, which is a significant increase compared to 21 times in 2018, and 18 times in 2017. There is a remarkable emphasis on the need to build a self-reliant economy, improve the quality of people's lives, and the regime’s desire to demonstrate its success in these realms to the international community. Numerous references were made to elements of North Korea’s goal of a self-reliant economy, such as the development of native technology, use of domestic resources, revolutionary zeal, and creative innovation. North Korea measures the success of its economy through the results of construction projects. This year’s address also focused on welfare for farmers and coal miners. But it is critical to realize that the decision to pursue a policy focused on building the economy does not imply a strategic change in economic development measures. The economic development strategy pursued by the Party remains within the framework of socialism, and follows the socialist distribution principle and the Party-centered economic development strategy, revealing the limits of its search for a new system. In other words, it refers to various sectors such as electricity, coal, and the construction of tourist zones under the banner of a socialist self-reliant economy. However, it failed to present a vision that fundamentally crosses the existing boundaries. In other words, the strategy presented in New Year's Address, which shows how the North Korean leadership understands the economy and outlines a range of strategic options to facilitate a qualitative economic leap, has a limited chance of revolutionizing the North's economic reality and the lives of the people. Furthermore, this strategy cannot be seen as an economic development strategy that considers denuclearization. This is because it is unclear how the strategic decision to pursue economic development and denuclearization will be linked as economic sanctions are expected to continue while the regime aims to achieve economic independence. Secondly, the New Year's Address clarifies that North Korea will not pursue the production, use, deployment and relocation of nuclear weapons. However, it is not clear whether this refers to a freeze in line with what the international community has demanded as an early stage of denuclearization. Some people feel that the simple mention of the word "denuclearization” represents a meaningful step. Kim Jong Un renewed North Korea’s declaration of a halt to the production of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, some criticize it as a passive policy that does not actually halt the continued production of nuclear materials, the continued development of nuclear technology, and the sophistication of ballistic missiles; in other words, it is still far from a true freeze. Although some Americans have expressed extremely optimistic views towards North Korea's policy, the majority still regard it as vague and feel that it falls far short of a nuclear freeze. Immediately after North Korea's New Year's Address, President Trump welcomed North Korea's comments on its nuclear weapons and sent a message expressing his trust in North Korea's economic potential. Furthermore, he stated he was looking forward to receiving another personal letter from Kim Jong Un. The possibility of a second North Korea-US summit continues to be discussed. North Korea believes that the outcome of the North Korea-US summit in Singapore was an agreement to take a phased and simultaneous approach to denuclearization that North Korea has employed, and is pursuing de facto nuclear disarmament talks on the possibility of complete denuclearization. President Trump has postulated the willingness of North Korea to completely denuclearize, and accepted a step-by-step approach. However, the differences between the North Korean and American perspectives on the concept of complete denuclearization have not been resolved. North Korea is offering various preconditions ahead of its denuclearization with the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, the US is finding it difficult to accept any preconditions for complete denuclearization. As there are still many challenges ahead, such as the US demand for a list of all nuclear and missile capabilities, objective verification of disarmament by members of the international community, processing existing nuclear weapons, and easing economic sanctions, it is difficult to find the starting point for negotiations. Thirdly, North Korea's New Year's Address considers the progress of inter-Korean relations made in 2018 to have been very satisfying; however, tasks its proposed for 2019 are tough. North Korea wishes to define the military agreement as a de facto non-aggression treaty and subsequently break the military hostility across the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, North Korea is demanding a permanent suspension of ROK-US military drills and a halt to the entry of strategic assets and equipment from outside the country. North Korea is insisting on multilateral negotiations for a peace regime without discussing the declaration of the end of the war, which can be interpreted as a precondition for China's participation. The regime’s demand to re-open the Kaesong Industrial Complex and resume Mt. Geumgang tours, while stating that it will never allow outside forces to intervene, is seen as an attempt to separate inter-Korean exchanges from international sanctions. The progress of the inter-Korean relationship over military, economic and peace regime negotiations is in fact a complicated matter that spans the ROK-US alliance, conventional disarmament between the two Koreas, international sanctions against North Korea, and the power balance within Northeast Asia. The essence of the issue is international relations, which are inextricably linked to denuclearization negotiations. In addition, it is impossible for South Korea, which must take into consideration many factors, to treat this simply as a national issue, and North Korea's demands contradict this. The US pays attention to the demands laid out in North Korea's New Year's Address such as the demand for the progress of inter-Korean relations separate from denuclearization, the weakening of the ROK-US alliance, the weakening of Korea's conventional military posture, and China's growing role, which will no doubt heavily impact future North Korea-US negotiations.   The Possibility of Holding a Second North Korea-US Summit and Making Progress on the North Korean Nuclear Issue Since the proposals in the New Year's Address are essentially the regime’s wish list, it is possible to proceed with negotiations while simultaneously fleshing out North Korea's options in accordance with South Korea and the US. On the other hand, the North will hold a tricky negotiation with the US to agree on conditions necessary to pursue denuclearization, and in addition will demand further progress in inter-Korean relations, the opening of an early multilateral peace regime, and the easing of sanctions. If denuclearization negotiations do not go as intended, North Korea may be "compelled to find a new way for defending the sovereignty of the country and the supreme interests of the state and for achieving peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula" as expressed in its New Year's Address. The key to North Korea's denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will be resolved during the North Korea-US summit this year. President Trump has stated that he is expecting a second North Korea-US summit to be held in the near future, while adding that Kim Jong Un's personal letter was “magnificent.” As both sides seem to be counting on the prospect, it is highly likely that a second summit will be held. However, it is still uncertain whether difficult issues that have not been coordinated in the working-level talks can be resolved during the dialogue between the two leaders, particularly as the two countries maintain different opinions on fundamental principles and concepts of denuclearization. Even if the talks take place, it is probable that the leaders will only be able to exchange incentives to focus on short-term performance, while failing to agree on any clear principles to resolve the fundamental problem. Then again, they may find themselves facing a difficult situation in which no progress can be made without agreement on major issues at the next working-level meeting. North Korea plans to pursue de facto nuclear disarmament based on a phased and simultaneous resolution of the issue during the second North Korea-US summit, and decide whether to denuclearize at the final stage. North Korea may pursue a different strategic line if the US does not "put forward fair proposals on the principle of recognizing and respecting each other by abandoning their dogged insistence broadmindedly and conduct negotiations with a proper stand and the will to settle issues" as expressed in New Year's Address. North Korea's definition of complete denuclearization is the denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, which includes denuclearization of South Korea and the US. However, South Korea and the US define “complete denuclearization” as the denuclearization of North Korea. If North Korea pursues denuclearization, risking the security of its regime and its politics, denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is not just a bargaining chip, but a fundamental issue, and what security assurance the two allies will provide for this matter is important. If a second North Korea-US summit is held without a clear alternative, and President Trump is not fully prepared to address the core of the problem and propose alternatives, it is difficult to see how further progress can be made.   South Korea's Future Strategy for North Korea's Nuclear Issue In addition, the New Year’s Address calls for North Korea to improve its relationships with South Korea and foreign countries, which necessitates an appropriate response from South Korea. First of all, it is important to recognize that there is still a discrepancy between North Korea and the international community regarding the goals of denuclearization. If North Korea’s process of nuclear disarmament negotiations implies taking a more simultaneous, step-by-step approach, it will be very difficult to persuade the US to agree. This is because the US will not accept a phased nuclear disarmament without an overall negotiation framework for denuclearization in place. On the other hand, if the US pursues denuclearization without fundamentally considering the North Korean regime and security concerns and presenting a policy of fundamental engagement, North Korea will likely remain unconvinced. Any US engagement policy must be put in place within a long-term vision of North Korea's denuclearization. Second, it should be acknowledged that it may take a long time to reconcile the differences of opinion between the two countries. Although the South Korean government values holding a second North Korea-US summit in order to sustain dialogue, coordination, power competition outside the negotiation table, and even a stalemate may be necessary for successful future dialogue. Whether or not a second North Korea-US summit takes place, it is fundamental to lay the groundwork for future summits. Thus, opinions on goals and processes must be gathered from North Korea, the US, China, and the rest of the international community. This process will require time; thus, South Korea should recognize that North Korea's denuclearization cannot be achieved within a short period. Third, there must be ongoing pursuit of a combined strategy of engagement and support for North Korea's internal transformation, as well as military deterrence and sanctions. Negotiations for denuclearization, inter-Korean exchanges, cooperation, and peace regimes are important, but South Korea should also anticipate North Korea’s direction and strategies in terms of the military, diplomacy, and economy after denuclearization occurs and a peace regime has been consolidated. North Korea’s strategy following the establishment of a peace regime will be defined by competition, cooperation, and inter-Korean relations. Thus, South Korea will need to consider how much military power to maintain and to what degree it will use economic sanctions to limit and guide North Korea’s choices. Fourth, amid shifts in the international community, South Korea should create a regional strategy and a plan for the future of the ROK-US alliance. With the current US-China rivalry, North Korea’s denuclearization issue is closely related to matters of the international concern; thus, South Korea's regional and denuclearization strategy should be pushed at the same time. The future of the ROK-US alliance will experience uncertainty as the denuclearization of North Korea and establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula progresses. Short-term tasks such as joint military training and transfer of wartime operational control, as well as long-term issues such as the role and size of the US Forces Korea (USFK), will be magnified. Moreover, the Trump administration is reevaluating the overall strategy of the alliance in terms of American national interest based on economic logic, and in the process, ROK-US-Japan strategic cooperation is showing signs of weakening. As the ROK-US alliance is not restricted to the Korean Peninsula, opportunities should be made for the two countries to discuss South Korea’s regional strategy in the process of resolving North Korean nuclear issue.     ■ Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the International Relations Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. He also serves as a professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]