.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note Future discussions on the North Korean nuclear issue, which is currently at a stalemate, will be influenced by how the November presidential election unfolds in the U.S. Professor Chaesung Chun of Seoul National University (Chair of the National Security Research Center at EAI), states that "the North Korean nuclear issue and the future of the Korean Peninsula are closely linked to changes in the Grand Strategy of the U.S." As a result, South Korea’s national interests are prone to being shaped by respective fluctuations in U.S. foreign policy. However, if South Korea wishes to gain an upper hand in shaping the North Korea policy, it should gather the necessary policy tools and "carefully outline principles inherent to the North Korean nuclear issue in the event that they are redefined by other actors such as the U.S." These policy tools must be identified in the process of maintaining close diplomatic relations with neighboring countries.     North Korea’s Nuclear Issue at a Stalemate North Korea’s nuclear problem, which is at a stalemate, will persist without a breakthrough in this year. With the November presidential election catching up to speed, debates have intensified in the United States (U.S.) over various domestic and economic issues, consequently diminishing interest in North Korea’s nuclear problem in the process. In addition, the governments of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), China, and Japan are currently occupied with addressing the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, allocating their policy resources towards relieving the pandemic. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely for the Trump administration to seek for a denuclearization agreement with North Korea in the near term. Instead, President Trump will focus on proposing foreign policy initiatives that will help him secure more votes leading up to the election. Since the beginning of the Democratic primary, many have been keen on assessing the proposed foreign policy views of the Democratic candidates. Although domestic and economic issues still lie at the core, diplomatic issues are increasingly gaining attention. As a result, the Democratic candidates’ views on North Korea are likely to emerge as crucial points of future discussions. So far, the candidates’ policy proposals regarding North Korea’s nuclear problem do not deviate much from the U.S. measures that have been tried over the past years. In addition to criticizing President Trump’s North Korea policy as a vanity project for the U.S. domestic politics, the Democratic candidates, despite their differences, seem to agree that future dialogues and step-by-step negotiations under certain conditions are necessary for reducing the North Korean threat. They have also been careful about mentioning the concept of CVID which will entail the possibility of imposing stronger sanctions and military pressure on North Korea since doing so may provoke security concerns among the U.S. public. To accommodate the recent tides of his rising popularity, Senator Bernie Sanders stated that he would be willing to meet Kim Jong-un to resolve the North Korea problem. Although Senator Sanders stands largely against the expansionary foreign policy of the U.S., such statement ironically does not seem much different from the Trump administration’s overall policy direction. In the end, Washington’s North Korea policy will have to undergo several revisions with the change of administrations and be newly defined in tandem with larger discussions on other issues faced by the U.S. Likewise, North Korea—having declared a long-term “head-on breakthrough” against the two major challenges of (1) economic crisis and (2) obstacles imposed by the external environment—will take the year to carefully plan its next steps in preparation for the inauguration of a new administration in the U.S.   U.S. Presidential Election and the Dispute over its Grand Strategy North Korea’s nuclear issue and the future of the Korean Peninsula are closely linked to changes in the U.S. grand strategy. Although North Korea is an impending issue for the U.S. and its foreign affairs, Washington’s North Korea policy will be inevitably redefined depending on its wider international and public strategies. It is no longer to be taken granted to find strong momentum in the U.S.-ROK alliance on the basis of shared military threats emanating from North Korea and common values such as regional and global human security. Rather, alliance cost-sharing becomes a hot issue between the two allies on faulty grounds that South Korea has been free-riding on the U.S. Some U.S. strategists have attempted to redefine the alliance as part of the U.S. military deterrence mechanism against China. U.S.-ROK relations and the purposes of the overall bilateral alliances are being newly perceived as a result of the Trump administration’s self-centered economic standpoint and security concerns vis-a-vis China. Instead of looking to resolve the North Korea problem in cooperation with China, the U.S. is increasingly leaning towards analyzing the issue with the geostrategic lens of U.S.-China competition. This trend is likely to continue and is unlikely to be reversed. It is difficult to tell whether the U.S. will be able to reconstruct the liberal international order and restore its leadership through allied cooperation against global problems. Democratic supporters criticize the Trump administration for demolishing U.S.-led international norms, undermining the liberal order, and for losing the trust of its allies and global leadership. Trump supporters, on the other hand, argue that although the Trump administration may have undertaken unconventional methods, its diplomatic strategy is rational; by gradually retrenching from regions that lack vital interests, the U.S. has been able to narrow down its expansive foreign policy to focus on the essentials. Globalists who comprise a supporting faction of the Democratic Party also argue that the U.S. public engagement strategy towards China has been successful and that China should continue to play the role of an appropriate and responsible stakeholder. However, it is also true that there has been a quick surge in opinions throughout Trump’s presidency in favor of holding U.S.-China disputes in the technology, politics, energy, socio-cultural and military sectors in check. Public opinion surveys on the future diplomatic strategy of the U.S. provide some key implications going forward. According to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center on December 17, 2019, approximately seven out of ten Americans (73 percent) answered “good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace,” while 26 percent of the Americans replied, “military strength will best achieve this.” There were more individuals who responded that the U.S. should consider the interests of its allies even if it means making compromises, in comparison with those who thought Washington should follow its own interests even when its allies strongly disagree (68 percent to 31 percent). These tendencies also differed depending on the respondents’ supporting party preference. The majority of Democrats and Democratic-learning independents, identified good diplomacy as the best way to ensure peace (90 percent), and added that even in case of a compromise the U.S. should consider the interests of its allies (83 percent). In comparison, only around half (53 percent) of Republicans and Republican learners saw good diplomatic relations as the best means of ensuring peace, while the remaining 46 percent contended that military strength precedes good diplomacy.  The U.S. public, however, provides a more cautious response to questions regarding U.S. foreign intervention. While 53 percent of all respondents answered that “it is best for the future of [the U.S.] to be active in world affairs,” 46 percent still responded, “[the U.S.] should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate more on problems here at home.” Furthermore, in terms of U.S. military power and status, 61 percent believed that the U.S. should aim to rise as the only military superpower while a mere 36 percent responded that it would be acceptable for other countries to become as militarily powerful as the U.S. The generational gap is also an important variable in determining the future of the U.S. diplomatic strategy. Around a quarter (27 percent) of respondents aged sixty-five or older said they would be accepting of another country that grows as militarily powerful as the U.S., while nearly half (48 percent) of individuals under thirty responded positively to the same question. Such difference between the age groups is also confirmed by the variance in the U.S. public’s negative perception of China. According to a Pew Research Center survey from August 31, 2019, around half (49%) of the respondents aged eighteen to twenty-nine, 58 percent aged thirty to forty-nine, and two-thirds (67 percent) aged over fifty carried a negative perception of China. As portrayed by these results, future generations of the U.S. are showing increasing reservations about the hegemonic role of the U.S. and indicating tolerance towards the rise of its hegemonic rival, China.   North Korea’s Nuclear Issue and the Future U.S.-ROK Relations The U.S. response to the North Korean nuclear issue has been based on several important considerations up until now. Washington has made it clear that it imposed sanctions on North Korea for the violation of international norms and principles based on nonproliferation, prevented the proliferation of its nuclear materials, weapons and related technology, and supported the security of its South Korean ally. In supporting South Korea, the U.S. has aimed to establish common grounds with China as a responsible great power emphasizing the shared goals of nuclear nonproliferation and its influence on North Korea as an ally Future U.S. approach to North Korea’s nuclear issue will likely be shaped by its changing trend in grand strategy which emphasizes its own national interests and geopolitical calculation. Rapid transformations in grand strategy leads to rather sudden changes in the U.S. North Korea nuclear policy. Among many powers whose direct interests are related to the future of North Korea, the U.S. has been showing the most substantial degree of policy fluctuations recently. In fact, North Korea has been consistently insisting on guarantees of regime security, consequent nuclear disarmament and phased denuclearization. While the “Three Principles of Non-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” are largely abstract, China’s policies towards the Korean Peninsula have also remained consistent over the years. South Korea’s approach has varied depending on whether it is headed by a liberal or a conservative administration, but regardless, it continues to pursue parallel development of both a peace process and a complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. In comparison, as a global hegemonic power with comprehensive and diverse strategic interests related to international security, the rise of China, and Asia’s regional architecture, the U.S. tends to rearrange and adjust its priorities and strategies in dealing with North Korea. These uncertainties, which have risen especially after the Trump administration, will likely continue throughout the next administrations. What have changed from the two summits between President Trump and Kim Jong-un is North Korea’s emergence as a normal actor in the international society, and the regime has been granted a certain degree of justification for its development of nuclear weapons. North Korea continues to argue that it has been forced to develop nuclear weapons because of the hostile policy of the U.S. Subsequently, Pyongyang demands that economic sanctions be lifted and joint military exercises between South Korea and the U.S. be halted if the regime is to give up its nuclear weapons. This line of argument of North Korea, which represents a significant departure from the internationally agreed perception that economic sanctions and military deterrence are necessary to enforce nonproliferation norms, has now been introduced to broad international community. President Trump and other Democratic presidential candidates after these changes, now seriously thinks that a step by step approach- for example, North Korea’s freezing of nuclear activity rewarded by lifting economic sanction-may be realistic. It is unclear how these changes in U.S. policy will affect South Korea’s national interests. For South Korea, the North Korean nuclear issue poses challenges because it has been continuously reshaped and redefined by geopolitical circumstances and domestic politics of surrounding nations. As such, the changes in Washington’s approach towards North Korea are closely related to the fluctuations in its grand strategy and domestic situation. The upcoming presidential election will provide an opportunity for the U.S. to reassess and redefine Trump administration’s North Korea policy. South Korea should approach the North Korean issue with a carefully devised foreign policy strategy based on perceived changes in the U.S. hegemonic strategy and great power politics between the U.S. and China. Until now, South Korea’s policy towards North Korea was predicated on the continuing U.S. hegemonic role, and East Asian politics defined by the combination of cooperation and limited rivalry between the U.S. and China. From here onwards, South Korea’s strategic tilt between the U.S. and China will draw sharp attention when it decides its North Korea policy, and South Korea’s strategy will affect neighboring countries’ calculation in dealing with North Korean nuclear issue. As the great powers’ geostrategic concerns gradually overshadows the future of North Korean nuclear matter, South Korea needs to accumulate more policy means and leverages to act as a decisive actor. These policy means must be developed by maintaining close and balanced strategic relations with neighboring countries.      Chaesung Chun is the chair of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and a professor of the department of political science and International relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his PhD in international relations at Northwestern University in the United States, and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. His main research interests include international political theory, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsular affairs. He is the co-author of The Korean War: Threat and Peace, and the author of a number of publications including Are Politics Moral and International Politics in East Asia: History and Theory.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note President Donald Trump has made it clear that he has no intentions of holding another summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un. With the 2020 U.S. presidential election around the corner, North Korean nuclear weapons still remain an imminent threat to the United States and its allies. In his commentary, Professor Andrew Yeo of the Catholic University of America illustrates how U.S.-North Korea relations will likely proceed under the leadership of different presidential candidates. Assuming Kim Jong-un returns to the negotiation table, Professor Yeo suggests that future nuclear talks with the United States are more likely under a progressive Democratic leader such as Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren in the White House. On the other hand, developments in U.S.-North Korea relations are highly unlikely if Donald Trump wins his second term, or if a centrist Democratic candidate such as Michael Bloomberg and Joe Biden is elected.     North Korean nuclear diplomacy has stalled since the second Trump-Kim summit held in Hanoi one year ago. Although President Trump and Chairman Kim may still surprise the world with an unexpected third summit meeting, a breakthrough in nuclear diplomacy is unlikely to occur prior to the US presidential elections in November 2020. Given domestic political realities, what are the prospects of US-North Korea relations under a potential second Trump administration or a new Democrat administration? Drawing on recent public statements from the leading Democratic presidential candidates during interviews with the New York Times and Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), this essay evaluates the likelihood of diplomatic engagement with North Korea under different post-2020 election scenarios. The US foreign policy establishment overall remains skeptical on improved US-North Korea relations. However, assuming that the North Koreans return to the diplomatic table, renewed negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington appear more likely if a progressive Democratic candidate enters the White House than under either a moderate Democrat or a second- term Trump administration.   The Progressive Democratic Candidates Among the candidates for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Senator Bernie Sanders appear most open to diplomatic engagement with North Korea than others. When the New York Times asked candidates in December 2019 whether they would continue the personal diplomacy begun by President Trump with Kim Jong-un even without significant nuclear concessions, Warren and Sanders were the only two candidates to respond in the affirmative. Warren distinguished her approach from President Trump by stating such diplomacy would not be part of a “vanity project” but would have to be “part of a clear strategy, with substantive agreement already reached at the working level, and developed in close coordination with our allies and partners.” The two progressive candidates were more open to lifting economic sanctions in return for limited concessions from North Korea. Sanders and Warren stated they would not tighten sanctions, and both would offer sanctions relief in return for a North Korean freeze on fissile material development. For both candidates, sanctions relief did not require the North Koreans to make substantial progress on disarmament upfront.   Sanders articulated a “step-by-step” approach to rolling back North Korea’s nuclear program, stating that peace and disarmament must move in parallel. Sanders also advanced the goal of building “a new peace and security regime on the peninsula” and working “in close consultations with our South Korean ally.” Warren also offered a stepwise approach stating, “A pragmatic approach to diplomacy requires give and take on both sides, not demands that one side unilaterally disarm first.” Warren clarified her position on sanctions by further stating that she would consider “partial, time-limited sanctions relief and other confidence-building measures in exchange for a strong, verifiable agreement that freezes North Korea's nuclear and missile activities.” Warren is also the only candidate to explicitly mention the importance of inter-Korea dialogue moving in tandem with denuclearization negotiations as a means of working towards “a stable security architecture” for the Korean peninsula.   The Centrist Democratic Candidates In contrast to Sanders and Warren, none of the centrist Democratic candidates stated they would continue President Trump’s personal diplomacy with North Korea—at least not without gaining significant nuclear concessions from Pyongyang first. Former US vice president Joseph Biden and former New York City mayor and businessman Michael Bloomberg appeared tougher on sanctions than their progressive counterparts. Biden supported tighter sanctions on North Korea. Bloomberg did not favor increasing sanctions. However, he signaled reluctance to remove sanctions unless North Korea placed a freeze on its missile program in addition to fissile material production. The use of military force to pre-empt a North Korean nuclear or missile test also remained an open option for Biden and Bloomberg. Similar to Bloomberg, Mayor Pete Buttigieg remained open to an initial freeze agreement with North Korea in exchange for halting nuclear and missile tests (in addition to freezing its nuclear program). Buttigieg proposed “targeted sanctions relief, which could be reversed if the North Koreans did not uphold their end of the bargain.” But like Biden, and in contrast to Sanders and Warren, Buttigieg argued that substantial disarmament is needed before offering any sanctions relief. Likewise, Senator Klobuchar’s campaign released a brief response in line with Buttigieg’s remarks in that she is “prepared to offer incentives for positive actions, but these must be tied directly to verifiable and irreversible steps toward denuclearization.”   The Trump Administration To their credit, the Trump administration did not completely abandon diplomacy after the failed Hanoi Summit. In October 2019, US and North Korean officials held working level discussions in Stockholm. And as late as December 2019, the special U.S. envoy for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, traveled to Tokyo and Seoul in hopes of resuming denuclearization talks with North Korea before the end of the year. Unfortunately, the Stockholm meeting ended abruptly, and the North Koreans rejected further negotiations without first seeing a change in attitude from the Trump administration. Despite efforts at building trust and finding a package acceptable to North Koreans in return for denuclearization, the Trump government will unlikely reduce sanctions without North Korea taking further steps towards declaration, verification, and dismantlement of its nuclear program. This position has been articulated repeatedly by the Trump administration since 2018. Barring some major provocation or concession from Pyongyang, there is no reason to believe that President Trump will deviate from his current position if re-elected, despite having four more years to build on a potential major foreign policy legacy should denuclearization (and the normalization of US-North Korea relations) be realized.   Prospects for US-North Korea Relations From conflict with Iran to his own impeachment trial, other international and domestic crises have overshadowed diplomacy with North Korea making it unlikely that Trump will restart negotiations with Pyongyang prior to the November elections. It is possible that Kim Jong-un may reach out to President Trump again should he be re-elected in November. This is particularly true if Kim believes Trump can be flattered into lifting partial sanctions for a minimal freeze. However, two previous high stakes summit meetings with Trump did not produce any sanctions relief. From North Korea’s vantage point, the prospects for US-North Korea relations look more promising under a Sanders or Warren White House as both have essentially stated their openness to dialogue without placing an emphasis on preconditions. When considering multilateral negotiations, Sanders and Warren’s position may find greater standing in Beijing which has also encouraged a phased approach to denuclearization with the broader aim of establishing a peace regime. Beijing may therefore encourage (or pressure) Pyongyang to resume talks with Washington should it find the US position more amenable to its own.  To North Korea, the position of the more moderate Democratic candidates, Biden and Bloomberg in particular, may not look all that different from past administrations. Thus under a moderate Democrat White House, US-North Korea relations may remain largely unchanged unless a major shift in external conditions prompt a policy shift. One point worth mentioning is the consistent position all Democratic contenders have taken in declaring their support for maintaining US military presence on the Korean peninsula, and working closely with US allies on North Korean denuclearization. Unfortunately, only one candidate, Michael Bloomberg, chose to address US-North Korea relations in more comprehensive terms (at least when prompted to discuss a denuclearization strategy). In response to the CFR questionnaire, Bloomberg stated, “the scope of U.S. sanctions on North Korea should be tied to the country’s behavior – on human rights, on cyber-crime and, most importantly, on its expanding nuclear and ballistic missile programs.” Biden was the only other candidate to mention human rights, but only in the context of critiquing Trump’s approach to North Korea. It is still too early to tell which Democratic candidate will secure his or her party’s presidential nomination, or whether any Democrat can successfully challenge Donald Trump, the Republican incumbent for the White House. Regardless of who wins, the next president will certainly face challenges in restarting negotiations with North Korea. Flexibility and patience, and coordination with US allies and regional actors, are some of the lessons the next administration, whether Democrat or Republican, might learn from past success and failures in negotiating with North Korea.     Note: This commentary does not serve as an endorsement for any particular candidate, but provides an analysis of US-North Korea relations based on public position statements of presidential candidates and the incumbent US administration.       Andrew Yeo is an associate professor of politics at the Catholic University of America in Washington DC and currently a Fulbright visiting research fellow at the University of the Philippines Diliman. He received his Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University. His publications include Asia’s Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century (Stanford University Press, 2019), North Korean Human Rights: Activists and Networks (Cambridge University Press 2018); Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (Cambridge University Press 2011); and Living in an Age of Mistrust: An Interdisciplinary Study of Declining Trust in Contemporary Society and Politics and How to get it Back (Routledge Press 2017). His research interests include international relations theory, Asian security, narratives and discourse, the formation of beliefs, ideas, and worldviews, civil society, social and transnational movements, U.S. grand strategy and global force posture, Korean politics, and North Korea.    Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note In his report at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Worker’s Party in Korea (WPK), Chairman Kim Jong-un emphasized his determination to "break through head-on" obstacles that lie ahead for his regime. Meanwhile, the United States continues to distrust the willingness of North Korea to denuclearize. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to envision a silver lining in future denuclearization talks between the United States and North Korea. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear issue is one that concerns all stakeholders and not just the two nations. In order to resolve such multilateral issue, EAI experts propose that South Korea reaffirm its position and develop a balanced four-point strategy that encompasses sanctions, deterrence, engagement and internal transformation. This commentary was written by Jinkyung Baek (Research Associate, EAI) and Chaesung Chun (Chair, Center for National Security Studies at EAI; Professor, Seoul National University) based on panel presentations at the [Global NK NuclearSIDE Talk] 2020 East Asia Institute North Korea Reunification Strategy Discussion on January 21, 2020.     Chairman Kim Jong-un replaced his New Year address with a report at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Worker’s Party in Korea (WPK) in early 2020. The report emphasized his determination to “break through head-on” dual obstacles related to the domestic economy and the international security environment. On the issue of denuclearization, Kim Jong-un insisted that he would not make any concessions, stating “no more talks [with the United States] until [its] complete and irreversible withdrawal of hostile policy (CIWH) toward North Korea.” Meanwhile, the United States continues to distrust the willingness of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) to denuclearize and has strengthened its commitment to the basic principles of the international order such as nuclear nonproliferation. As a result, there is little possibility that the U.S. would accept North Korea’s strategic attitude of maintaining minimum deterrence, which is what the regime innately desires to achieve. After finishing the construction of a nuclear missile which holds the capacity to threaten the U.S. mainland, Chairman Kim has aimed to achieve guarantees of regime security, the lifting of sanctions and the reduction of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. Once it accomplishes these goals, North Korea is likely to push for reform and opening by improving its foreign relations on the basis of step-by-step denuclearization efforts. For President Trump, it is important that he vaunts his diplomatic achievements and realize denuclearization through a “big deal” in light of the upcoming presidential election in November. With the strategies of Chairman Kim and President Trump acting as key variables in North Korea’s denuclearization, the year-end deadline that Pyongyang offered Washington for changing its North Korea policy has already passed and the challenge for reaching a consensus for North Korea’s nuclear issue still remains. North Korea’s denuclearization is a multilateral issue that is not limited to U.S.-North Korea bilateral relations. The deadlock in U.S.-North Korean negotiations has also brought about a standstill in the improvement in inter-Korean relations by acting as an obstacle in the exchanges and cooperation efforts between the two Koreas. While President Moon Jae-in aims to implement a step-by-step process in North Korea’s denuclearization and in the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by avoiding wars and pushing for inter-Korean dialogue, he is also taking steps to mediate U.S.-North Korean negotiations. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear issue is also a serious problem for China in regards to its policies extending beyond the Korean Peninsula including those toward the U.S. For Chinese president Xi Jinping, progress is denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime is favorable provided that it leads to the reduction of U.S. troops in the region. President Xi adheres to U.N. sanctions, but has also supported North Korea behind the scenes, taking caution against the expanding influence of the U.S. within the region. In a situation where it is unlikely for both the U.S. and North Korea to give preemptive concessions, it is practically inconceivable for the international community to ease economic sanctions placed upon the regime, which has declared to “break through head-on.” Economic sanctions imposed on North Korea have negatively impacted its economic growth for several years, leaving the country with large-scale trade deficits and weakened exports. North Korea has mustered self-reliance to boost its trade with China and build up its domestic infrastructure as well as tourism and service industries, but the country’s economic development—which requires high-level growth for a vast number of years—will soon reach a dead end without the lifting of economic sanctions. If economic sanctions persist despite internal efforts, the country could face a foreign exchange crisis due to a significant decline in its foreign currency holdings. Furthermore, continued decline in exports will damage North Korea’s markets. Given the past track records of the socialist countries such as Hungary and the Soviet Union, it is evident that North Korea will not wreak the benefits of reform and opening by policy alone if it retains its current administrative framework. In addition to nuclear deterrence and self-reliant efforts, the lifting of sanctions as well as reform and opening up based on its complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) are necessary conditions required for resolving the regime’s environmental challenges. In addition to supporting North Korea’s domestic efforts to resolve its nuclear issue, the international community should make a concerted effort to adopt a more proactive engagement policy toward North Korea. In this context, it is worth discussing North Korea’s persistent efforts to exclude the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) from the negotiating table while Seoul desires to assume the role of a mediator or a facilitator. For example, North Korea’s anti-South Korea media propaganda channel “Uriminzokkiri” emphasized in July 2019 that “with North Korea and the U.S. sitting down and discussing pending issues between the two countries, it is self-evident that the South doesn’t need to intervene.” In doing so, the channel called for an “exclusive communication channel” between the leaders of the U.S. and North Korea on January 11. Provided these circumstances, it is important that South Korea reaffirm its role in the negotiations and carefully construct its strategy in order to become a successful player in the North Korean denuclearization game. To this end, South Korea and the U.S. need to cooperate extensively with North Korea. Currently, the Trump administration is likely to respond in a more passive manner to the North Korean issue due to the upcoming presidential election and instabilities in the Middle East regarding Iran. Meanwhile, the South Korean government still prioritizes the improvement of inter-Korean relations and such difference in perception between Seoul and Washington could lead to insufficient developments, or the lack thereof, in North Korea’s denuclearization. Therefore, it is necessary that South Korea and the U.S. realign their policy objectives toward North Korea and approach the problem in a multi-faced manner with cooperation from other actors on a broader diplomatic front. Provided the evident structural weakness of U.S.-North Korean negotiations, South Korea should place an effort to facilitate multilateral negotiations with other nations under  the common goal of denuclearization. Multilateral efforts hold the potential to break the deadlock in negotiations and smooth the way for further U.S.-North Korean dialogue. The Trump administration’s policy toward North Korea is likely to highlight immediate and short-term returns while South Korea’s North Korea policy must respond in a flexible manner to changes in North Korea’s stance and strategy. For example, South Korea’s North Korea policy has undergone various changes up until now from “entry to a nuclear freeze, exit from denuclearization,” to a “good enough deal” which was introduced in April-June 2018, to the newly proposed “preemptive countermeasure against the North” following October 2019. At this point, South Korea and the U.S. should cooperate on a more practical and concrete mid- to long-term strategy, which would include a working definition, the end goal, the final status, and corresponding measures for denuclearization. A systematic action plan for denuclearization should not be biased. Instead, it should incorporate and implement strategies related to sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and internal transformation in a composite and balanced manner. First, economic sanctions should continue to be enforced to ensure future dialogues with North Korea. To this end, a mid- and long-term sanctions roadmap needs to be laid out and agreed upon by South Korea and other stakeholders. At the same time, South Korea should also work to build security contingency capabilities for responding to North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons and missiles, actively utilize deterrence through the regular deployment of U.S. strategic assets, and forge the Korean-style three-axis defense system of Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) as well as the Korea Massive Punishment & Retaliation (KMPR) system. In addition to sanctions and deterrence, engagement remains a key strategy, and it is necessary to come up with measures for establishing a practical peace regime. This would include providing and planning financial backing for North Korea’s denuclearization, economic development, and its new byungjin policy. It is also important not to undermine North Korea’s efforts toward self-driven internal transformation and development. Last but not least, South Korea should join forces with the international community and commit to developing a new “head-on breakthrough strategy”—one that is different from what the Kim regime has announced. The new strategy should allow for an environment in which the international community could support and pave the way for North Korea to voluntarily run on its own path towards denuclearization.     Jinkyung Baek is a research associate and project manager at the East Asia Institute. She received her MA in international relations from the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom. Currently, her work at EAI focuses on North Korea and security research as well as democracy in Asia. As such, she is the project manager in charge of the Asia Democracy Research Network, and the Global North Korea website, which compiles published works on North Korea from the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. Her research interests include North Korea, international relations, and international security. Her recent publications include “North Korea’s Biological and Chemical Weapons and the Path to Denuclearization” (Global NK Commentary, 2019).   Chaesung Chun is the chair of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and a professor of the department of political science and International relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his PhD in international relations at Northwestern University in the United States, and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. His main research interests include international political theory, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsular affairs. He is the co-author of The Korean War: Threat and Peace, and the author of a number of publications including Are Politics Moral and International Politics in East Asia: History and Theory.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note In place of his annual New Year’s speech, Kim Jong Un presented the report, "On Social Construction and the Internal and External Policies of the Government of the Republic at the Present Stage" at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) in December 2019. The report specifically emphasizes North Korea’s internal and external difficulties, as well as its determination to overcome economic sanctions and evolve into a socialist powerhouse. As part of its head-on breakthrough strategy, North Korea has proclaimed that it will soon present a "new strategic weapon" and commit to developing its self-reliance in dealing with its domestic and international challenges. In this paper, Young-Sun Ha, chairman of EAI and professor emeritus of Seoul National University, argues that North Korea’s old ways of pursuing a head-on breakthrough are not enough for overcoming the country’s present challenges. For example, presenting security threats to the US through continued nuclear development will only tighten sanctions, thereby endangering the regime’s security rather than ensuring it. The author suggests that North Korea’s true head-on breakthrough will be to speed down the path of denuclearization and economic opening-up. Within this framework of a new head-on breakthrough strategy, South Korea’s role would be to cooperate with the international environment and help pave the way for the North Korean regime to develop domestic capabilities until it is stable enough to run on its own.      North Korean leader Kim Jong Un replaced his 2020 New Year’s address with a report entitled “On the Orientation of Our Immediate Struggle under the Present Internal and External Situation,” which was presented at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) in December 2019. The report came eight months after his speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April, “On Socialist Construction and the Internal and External Policies of the Government of the Republic at the Present Stage,” which outlined the basic plan for his national strategy. These shed light on how North Korea subjectively understands its internal and external environments and envisions new measures and policies going forward. Compared to the speech in April, the December report places particular emphasis on the difficulties posed by North Korea’s internal and external environments. For example, in the report, Kim assesses “that the challenges that have faced [North Korea] in the past several months have been so harsh and dangerous that others would not withstand even a single day but yield to them." With the increased recognition of both internal and external challenges, Kim has named this year’s propaganda slogan, “Let Us Break Through Head-on All the Barriers to Our Advance!” In analyzing domestic and international affairs, the December report highlights pressure from economic sanctions as an external challenge and difficulties of building a socialist power as an internal challenge. To begin with, Kim Jong Un points out obstacles faced by North Korea in implementing its three-step denuclearization policy. Such approach has been continuously echoed in statements ranging from the April 2018 announcement of the new strategic policy line to Ambassador Kim Myong Gil's press conference in early October, which followed the breakdown of working-level talks in Stockholm. For the first step of denuclearization policy, North Korea initiated the discontinuation of nuclear and ICBM tests and dismantlement of nuclear test ground as a confidence-building measure in exchange for a suspension of the joint ROK-US military exercises. For the second stage, the regime demands for an end to the US hostile policy towards North Korea and the lifting of economic sanctions in place of an immediate dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. These measures are to be taken in accordance with the “action for action” principle and ensure North Korea’s regime security. For the third step, North Korea proposes that nuclear disarmament talks on the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding areas be conducted from the perspective of ‘denuclearization on the Chosun [Korean] Peninsula’ as North Korea moves towards complete denuclearization. Yet North Korea has declared that it “cannot give up [its] future security just for visible economic results and happiness and comfort, given that there has been no change in [its] external environment owing to the US gangster-like acts both in the days when we went along the road of pushing economic construction and nuclear arms buildup in parallel and at present when we are working to concentrate all our efforts on economic construction and that hostile acts and nuclear threat and blackmail are still being intensified.” The December report further adds that “the world will witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the DPRK in the near future.” Such statements show North Korea’s shift towards a second byungjin line policy (parallel development of economy and nuclear weapons) after the policy of parallel development of the economy and nuclear weapons was declared in March 2013 and the nuclear-based economic construction policy in April 2018. In regards to external breakthrough, efforts to secure deterrence by developing nuclear weapons and making direct security threats to the US will only complicate rather than resolve North Korea’s international challenges. This is because the stronger North Korea’s nuclear deterrence grows, sanctions will tighten upon the regime and paradoxically threaten its security. At the same time, it is highly unlikely and impractical for the US—which abides by the principle of nuclear non-proliferation in preserving the international order—to accept a nuclear freeze over North Korea’s complete denuclearization. Secondly, North Korea continues to view the economic front as the basic line of its policy for overcoming internal challenges associated with its development into a socialist power. The regime hopes to reform the economic sector and mobilize all available production capabilities to sufficiently satisfy the demands of its people and continue pursuing economic development. These initiatives are key to North Korea’s current economic agenda. As such, the December report states that all sectors of North Korea’s economy showed a growing trend in 2019 despite “the heinous sanctions imposed by the hostile forces.” Yet the report also points out domestic economic challenges, contending that ”the conditions of the national economy have not turned better remarkably as a result of the failure of the motive force of its development to recover, and that the state's capability of execution and control for fulfilling the important economic tasks is weak.” Consequently, the report boils down North Korea’s economic concern into competition between self-reliance and sanctions. It also highlights that while “it is true that [North Korea] urgently need[s] [an] external environment favourable for [its] economic construction, [it] can never sell [its] dignity which [it has] so far defended as valuable as [the people’s] own life, in the hope of gorgeous transformation.” According to the report, the forces of sanctions will only increase if North Korea does not place an effort strengthen its self-reliance while awaiting the lifting of sanctions. Hence the report reaffirms the regime’s determination to engage in a head-on breakthrough of the tightening grip of the sanctions scheme and destroy it completely with the power invested in its self-reliance. However, North Korea cannot deal with its economic challenges with self-reliance alone. For China, it took around four decades of reform and opening-up since 1978 for the nation to accelerate its economic growth and emerge into the world’s second-largest economy behind the US, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of 14 trillion USD and per capita income of 10,000 USD. With a a mere 1000 USD per capita income, it will take North Korea an extensive period of accelerated economic growth to survive the global economic market in the 21st century. In that regard, lifting of economic sanctions through denuclearization is a necessity, not an option. Kim Jong Un ends the December report by calling forth North Korea’s revolutionary spirit with the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) at its core. He states that “[North Korea] should not look for the way of getting [itself] adapted to the objective factors to be controlled by them in the current struggle, but make a breakthrough head-on to put the objective factors under our control.” Yet it is impossible to successfully overcome current obstacles with nuclear deterrence and self-reliance. North Korea’s true head-on breakthrough will be to speed down the path of denuclearization and economic opening-up meanwhile building a regime that can preserve its security and dignity, traits that are priceless. The December report focuses primarily on North Korea’s internal and external capabilities and contains no mentions of inter-Korean relations unlike the previous administrative policy address. This is because South Korea has limited agency to act independently from the international environment and is largely unable to assist North Korea’s old ways of pursuing a head-on breakthrough. South Korea’s true role is to cooperate with the international environment and help pave the way the for North Korea to develop its own domestic capabilities, until it is stable to run on its own. Only when North Korea chooses this new way of pursuing a head-on breakthrough over its old ways would it be able to overcome its current obstacles.     Young-Sun Ha is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the East Asia Institute, and also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Washington.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]     "IMG_3855" by Shafquat Towheed is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note In this paper, EAI research associate Jinkyung Baek and Handong University Professor Won Gon Park use the results of a public opinion survey conducted by EAI and the content of a policy debate as a basis to assess the mid-term performance of Moon Jae-in’s administration. In the opinion survey, respondents had the lowest opinion of Moon’s policy towards North Korea (4.5 out of 10) as compared to his overall diplomatic policy (ranging from 4.5 to 5.0). A significant number of respondents (49.8%) also indicated that unstable inter-Korean relations were a major threat South Koreans are currently facing. The authors suggest there is a need to re-examine the idea that reconciliation between the two Koreas and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula form a virtuous cycle, and emphasize that to achieve such a cycle Moon’s administration must embrace a balanced approach to EAI’s complex four-point strategy of engagement, internal transformation, sanctions, and deterrence.     Moon Jae-in’s administration took office in May of 2017 and presented the goal of their North Korea policy as establishing “peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.” Specifically, their strategies included strengthening security and responsibility for national defense, promoting reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas while leading international cooperation through diplomacy, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In accordance with these strategies and governance tasks, Moon’s administration held firm in seeking dialogue and compromise throughout 2017 despite numerous provocations from North Korea. As a result, they were able to successfully achieve inter-Korean dialogue in 2018. However, following the breakdown in negotiations between North Korea and the US at the Hanoi Summit in February of 2019, Kim Jong Un pledged during his speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly in April to readjust inter-Korean relations. Since this declaration, North Korea has thoroughly removed South Korea from its priority list, instead focusing on US-DPRK relations. The importance and seriousness of the security issues on the Korean Peninsula, which has wavered back and forth between calm and turbulence, emerged in the public opinion survey conducted by EAI to assess the Moon administration’s mid-term performance as well. The survey was conducted over a period of six days, from October 24-29, 2019, among 1,000 adults aged 19 and over via telephone and email.   Perceptions of Security on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korea Threat According to the survey, 31.2% of South Koreans felt that the situation on the Peninsula was unstable, while 27.2% indicated they felt it was stable (Figure 1). These results reveal a wide gap in the perceptions of South Koreans on the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Figure 1. What is the current security situation on the Korean Peninsula?     While South Koreans appear to have somewhat differing opinions on the overall security situation, there was relative consensus as to the biggest threat factor facing the country. As shown in Figure 2, 49.8% of respondents selected unstable inter-Korean relations for this question. When asked which neighboring country posed the greatest threat, respondents overwhelmingly chose the nuclear weapons and missiles being developed by Kim Jong Un’s regime (Figure 3). The fact that 54.6% of respondents felt that North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile development pose a greater threat to South Korea than Abe’s militarism or the Trump administration’s America First policy is indicative of just how serious of a threat North Korea is perceived to be. Figure 2. What are the biggest threat factors facing South Korea? (First and second choice ranked)   Figure 3. Which neighboring country poses the greatest threat to South Korea?(First and second choice ranked)   A Negative Outlook for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula As part of the effort towards denuclearization and building a peace structure on the Korean Peninsula, three inter-Korean summits and two US-DPRK summits were held in 2018 and 2019 as well as the recent meeting in Stockholm between the US and the DPRK. Thanks to these summits, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have lessened. However, South Koreans have continued to watch North Korea’s ongoing nuclear and missile provocations from 2017 to 2019 and unsurprisingly remain skeptical about the potential for these efforts to bear any fruit. It would appear that the majority of South Koreans have lost faith in Chairman Kim’s willingness to denuclearize. When asked about the likelihood of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the majority of survey respondents (33.3%) indicated that they believed denuclearization would be achieved, but it would take a long time. Just 2.3% of respondents stated they believed it would occur in the relatively near future. In contrast, 18.2% of respondents said that denuclearization would not happen, and 20.7% indicated they had never thought it would happen. As in the past, it would appear that the majority of South Koreans are not holding their breath expecting North Korea to denuclearize soon. Figure 4. How likely is it that the Korean Peninsula will denuclearize? We can also see this negative outlook on North Korean denuclearization in the responses to the question about Kim Jong Un’s perceived willingness to denuclearize. As shown in Figure 5, when asked how much faith respondents had in Kim Jong Un’s willingness to denuclearize, just 13.7% of respondents selected “a great deal of faith” or “some faith,” while 64.6% said that they had no faith. This means that a staggering 50.9% more respondents had a negative rather than a positive outlook. The difference in the responses to the same question in the 2018 survey was just 30%, providing clear evidence that the divide in public opinion is growing. Figure 5. How much faith do you have in Chairman Kim Jong Un’s willingness to denuclearize?    Perceptions of Moon Jae-in’s Policy towards North Korea Moon Jae-in’s administration established “peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula” as the goal of its North Korea policy, and has continued to work towards denuclearizing the Peninsula and engaging in dialogue with the regime. However, despite the fact that policy towards North Korea was one of the main tasks of this administration, public perceptions rated the government’s success with this policy at just 4.5 out of 10. This rating was nearly identical to the public perception of policy towards Japan (5.0), the US (4.6), and policy towards China (4.6), and was the lowest of the four. Figure 6. Midterm Assessment of Moon Jae-in’s Performance (Out of 10 points) When the responses to this question are broken down by age, it becomes apparent that respondents in their 40s had a more positive outlook on Moon Jae-in’s performance with North Korea policy, rating it a 5.5, or 1 point higher than the overall average. In contrast, respondents in their 60s and 70s gave the administration a rating of 3.5, indicating a negative perception overall (Figure 7). Figure 7. Assessment of Moon Jae-in’s Performance (by age group) (Out of 10 points)   The Tasks Ahead for True Peace and Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula Amidst the difficulties encountered by the policies of the Moon administration to create peace and prosperity on the Peninsula, South Koreans seem keen at the prospect of strengthening inter-Korean exchanges with a relatively high number, 27.1%, selecting this as a task for the government. Respondents seemed to consider this more urgent than cooperation with other countries in Northeast Asia, as just 22.9% responded that cooperation was essential to push ahead with North Korean denuclearization, 6.9% said that it was important to strengthen strategic cooperation with China, and 19.4% said that it was necessary to restore ROK-Japan relations. Moreover, an impressive 26.2% of respondents indicated that they felt it was very important to make efforts to unite public opinion regardless of age, ideology, and region in order to counter external threats to the nation. Figure 8. Which tasks are important to mitigate outside threats? (First and second choice ranked) Figure 9 also reveals a similar order of priorities as Figure 8, as respondents chose policy towards North Korean when asked which issues the Moon administration should consider first.  We can see in Figure 9 that 26.3% of respondents chose uniting public opinion and 21.7% selected expanding inter-Korean exchanges. Following these figures were 18.1% of South Koreans who believed that it is necessary to maintain economic sanctions against North Korea for denuclearization and 15.2% who prioritized strengthening security arrangements. The results seem to show a need to consider bolstering measures against North Korea as well. Figure 9. What should Moon Jae-in’s priority be? The public says that South Korea needs to continue building up its national defenses and strengthen its security architecture. The threat posed by North Korea is not limited to nuclear weapons: it also comprises chemical and biological weapons as well as conventional methods of warfare. Taking this into consideration, the survey asked respondents whether South Korea should continue to build up its national defenses if after North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons and missiles and a peace structure between the two Koreas is achieved, North Korea still retains its biological, chemical, and convention weapons. The response was an overwhelming 84% in favor of doing so, nearly seven times greater than those who responded negatively (Figure 10). This result demonstrates that the threat which South Koreans perceive from North Korea stems from a fear of their entire weapons system and goes beyond the nuclear weapons and missiles that are the focus of the international community. Figure 10. Will South Korea’s national defense capabilities increase after denuclearization? The policy goal put forth by the Moon administration of bringing “peace and prosperity to the Korean Peninsula” is headed in the right direction. The administration’s policy of approaching the principle of North Korea’s denuclearization from a foundation of ROK-US cooperation is heading in the right direction as well. Specifically, South Korea’s response to the clear demand of the North Korean regime broadcast through the KCNA in December 2018 for “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” establishing the goal of “focusing on multilateral efforts to lead North Korea down the path of denuclearization” is in line with the policy directions of both the US and the international community as a whole. South Korea’s emphasis on the importance of drawing a roadmap to complete denuclearization comprising a freeze followed by elimination, as well as on the first steps in the initial stages of North Korea’s denuclearization, as also in accordance with US policy as the US works to negotiate with North Korea on the nuclear issue. The portion of the Moon administration’s policy of “preparing a roadmap, pushing ahead with negotiations for a peace structure depending on the progress made in denuclearization, and concluding a peace agreement as the final step of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue” remove all doubts that the administration is making an early push for a peace agreement. However, the idea that reconciliation between the two Koreas and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula form a virtuous cycle begs for a second look. The government’s policy that inter-Korean reconciliation can give rise to the impetus for North Korean denuclearization is limited in two ways. First, there are a variety of measures restraining the potential for inter-Korean reconciliation and North Korean denuclearization such as the economic sanctions imposed against the regime. Moreover, this policy is overly reliant on North Korea. Even with sanctions, it may appear as though the two Koreas are close in terms of arranging reunions for separated family members, trust-building measures between the two militaries, and so on, but none of this is possible without North Korea’s cooperation. Kim Jong Un’s speech in April during the SPA criticizing the South, declaring that they would sever ties, and generally continue to exclude South Korea leave Moon’s administration in the position of unilaterally pursuing inter-Korean reconciliation. As a result, South Korea is suffering from weakened negotiating power with the North and declining confidence of the international community. The situation is also apparent in the results of the survey, in which respondents indicated that, as in the past, they not only favor cooperation with North Korea to achieve denuclearization and peace on the Peninsula, they also believe that it is necessary to continue to impose comprehensive economic sanctions. To achieve true peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, the Moon administration must in its latter days abandon its unconditional pursuit of inter-Korean reconciliation and instead embrace a balanced approach to EAI’s complex four-point strategy of engagement, internal transformation, sanctions, and deterrence.     Jinkyung Baek is a research associate and project manager at the East Asia Institute. She received her MA in international relations from the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom. Currently, her work at EAI focuses on North Korea and security research as well as democracy in Asia. As such, she is the project manager in charge of the Asia Democracy Research Network, and the Global North Korea website, which compiles published works on North Korea from the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. Her research interests include North Korea, international relations, and international security. Her recent publications include “North Korea’s Biological and Chemical Weapons and the Path to Denuclearization” (Global NK Commentary, 2019).   Won Gon Park ([email protected]) is a professor at the School of International Studies at Handong Global University. He is also a member of the Policy Advisory Board of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Korea. He received his Ph.D. in diplomacy from Seoul National University. His research interests include international relations in Northeast Asia, security theory, diplomacy, North Korea, and the ROK-US alliance. His recent publications include “Assessment of the Obama Administration’s Diplomacy and Security Strategy and Prospects for the Foreign Strategy of the New Administration” (2016) (joint authorship), “A Study on Just War Theory: A Comparison of Pacifism and Realism” (2016), “Changes in and Prospects for the East Asian Security Order: A South Korean Perspective" (2016), "A Theoretical Review and Critical Analysis of South Korea’s Proactive Deterrence Strategy" (2015), and “The Future Structure of the US-ROK Alliance: A Focus on a Radical Overhaul” (2014).   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note South Korea and the United States have maintained a stable and long-enduring alliance. However, a recent chain of events involving the North Korean nuclear issue, military cooperation between China and Russia, and deteriorating relations between South Korea and Japan present challenges for cooperation between South Korea and the US. In this Global NK commentary, Professor Leif-Eric Easley of Ewha University discusses the ROK-US alliance by responding to concerns recently outlined by Richard Armitage and Victor Cha. Professor Easley points out that South Korea’s willingness for defense exchanges with China and for joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) does not imply that Seoul is "leaning towards Beijing." He concludes that it is important to avoid overinterpreting facts on the ground because doing so "can damage the very trust between Washington and Seoul that alliance managers work tirelessly to defend."     When two top alliance managers coauthor a Washington Post op-ed entitled “The 66-year alliance between the US and South Korea is in deep trouble,” policymakers and analysts should pay attention. Cooperation between South Korea and the United States faces a complicated landscape including North Korea’s continued provocations and diplomatic recalcitrance, China’s growing regional assertiveness and military cooperation with Russia, a severe downturn in relations between Seoul and Tokyo, and uncertainty surrounding the US-China trade war. But there are several empirical cases in the recent op-ed that require an on-the-ground perspective in Seoul to understand challenges for maintaining trust in the alliance. Richard Armitage and Victor Cha write that Seoul’s aborted threat to cancel its General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan was “an act of alliance abuse” toward the United States. However, the Moon administration’s misfire on the intelligence-sharing pact can be better described as an emergency flare calling for US attention, prompted by Japan’s new export restrictions applied against South Korea this summer. The Moon government should be commended for pulling back from killing GSOMIA, while Japan should be encouraged to engage in talks toward lifting its export restrictions. The US was insufficiently engaged in alliance management at critical moments over the past year as Korea-Japan historical disputes escalated and a radar-lock incident at sea went unresolved. As a consequence, Washington had to overcompensate with heavy pressure to save GSOMIA. Quiet diplomacy is now needed to uphold trilateral cooperation and forge compromise during ongoing negotiations. Defense cost-sharing talks between Washington and Seoul are especially challenging this year because the initial US request was unprecedentedly high. But the Korean public largely associates this with Trump’s particular bargaining style. Korean public opinion is not represented by a handful of students climbing a wall with placards to make a political stunt, so it may overstate national sentiment to say that “the Korean people’s anger at perceived Washington greed was evident in demonstrations this month when protesters broke the perimeter of the US ambassador’s residence.” The general reaction to that incident was that the young people involved will learn their lesson after facing the rule of law (which they are), and South Korean police need to increase security around the compound (which they have). Mentioning demonstrations in Seoul conjures up recent images of dueling mass protests over prosecutorial reform and a failed justice minister—contentious issues in South Korea’s polarized domestic politics. But there are no such mass protests against the US at this time, and no angry mobs storming the embassy or ambassador’s residence. On foreign policy, some Americans lament that Seoul “will not support Washington’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept” for fear of offending China. In fact, South Korea has spelled out in detail the positive overlap between its “New Southern Policy” and the US “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” including in a fact sheet jointly released in November 2019. Washington can call for greater coordination and more vocal support from Seoul on regional cooperation, but US foreign policy also needs to consider allies’ circumstances and national interests. On South Korea’s end, some diplomatic finesse is required as Seoul’s top security and diplomatic partner appears to be entering a protracted rivalry with Seoul’s top trade partner and immediate neighbor. Nonetheless, South Korea is actively courting new partners in India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), largely to hedge against China’s economic coercion.  Still, Armitage and Cha are concerned that the Moon government is “leaning toward Beijing.” As evidence, they point to how South Korea “wants to join China’s proposed multilateral trade arrangement.” However, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is not China’s but a process initiated by ASEAN seven years ago. It is unusual to single out South Korea’s participation with China when RCEP includes all ten ASEAN countries plus Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Moreover, it was Washington that ceded agenda-setting on trade in Asia by pulling out of the higher-quality Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and pursuing a trade war against China not coordinated with US allies. South Korea has an important middle power role to play in Asia by upholding international norms and developing regional networks that involve common interests with the United States. Yet Armitage and Cha write, “in another ominous sign of the US-South Korea alliance weakening, the South Korean and Chinese defense ministers on the sidelines of a multilateral gathering in Southeast Asia inked an agreement to increase defense exchanges.” Seoul pursuing reciprocal visits with Chinese defense officials and trying to get hotlines to actually work with Beijing are efforts at confidence building and crisis prevention. A more proximate sign of trouble for American leadership at Asian regional meetings is the non-attendance of the US president, which leaves a perceived vacuum for China to fill.  Throughout their distinguished careers, Armitage and Cha have ably and effectively argued in favor of the extensive mutual benefits of US alliances. They now worry that a perfect storm of the challenges above could result in a “premature withdrawal of US troops from the [Korean] Peninsula.” Among policymakers and analysts, it is an honorable charge to sound the alarm to prevent worst-case scenarios and guard against poor judgement by unpredictable leaders. Yet while reading signals from current events, it is important not to be alarmist—because overinterpreting facts on the ground can damage the very trust between Washington and Seoul that alliance managers work tirelessly to defend.     ■ Leif-Eric Easley is an associate professor of international studies at Ewha University in Seoul. His research focuses on trilateral cooperation among South Korea, Japan and the United States on engaging China, Myanmar and North Korea.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note The intensification of US-China competition is heavily affecting the countries all around the world including the Korean Peninsula. This competition is difficult to explain without analyzing Trump’s America First policy. In this Global NK commentary, Professor Won Gon Park of Handong Global University states that the Trump administration pursues ‘selective engagement’ by “seeking to revise alliances so that allies shoulder their fair share of responsibilities and costs to provide public goods for the security of the world.” He adds that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is also becoming increasingly difficult to achieve due to the US-China competition. In particular, South Korea will likely be pressured by the US to balance China while China continues to shield North Korea from UN sanctions. Professor Park argues that 2020 will be an especially challenging year for the Korean Peninsula. If no progress is made in the denuclearization progress within this year, which is the self-imposed deadline set by North Korea, North Korea may act in a ‘new way’ that resembles its provocative behavior throughout 2017.       Nobody dares to deny that Donald J. Trump is an unconventional American president. He did not have a political career before coming to the White House. Since he was elected, he has blatantly denied the role of the US as a leading promoter of international norms and principles, instead pursuing narrowly defined tangible material interests with the slogan “America First.” As the president, Trump has executed some of his campaign pledges such as issuing anti-immigration executive orders, building a wall along the US-Mexico border, pulling out from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and withdrawing from the Paris climate accords. The fulfillment of these promises has run counter to the internationalism established and continually promoted by the US since 1945, with a few exceptions such as the Nixon period. President Trump has also harshly criticized America’s traditional allies—mainly South Korea, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and NATO—for not shouldering enough of the costs of the alliances, while seemingly advocating in favor of some authoritarian regimes by boasting of his personal relationships with the leaders of North Korea and Russia. The most appalling action of late in which President Trump engaged was the abrupt decision to pull US troops out of Syria. After his phone call with Turkish President Erdoğan, Trump unilaterally announced the withdrawal of US forces from Syria without prior consultation with his top officials. The Kurds, who have fought with the US against ISIS for years, have suddenly found themselves outnumbered and outgunned against Turkish troops, who consider them terrorists. Even though the Kurds are stateless, meaning that they do not have a formal treaty with the US as a coherent and legal entity in the international community, it is understandable that they expected the US to help them gain certain territories to govern autonomously as more than 11,000 Kurds shed their blood fighting together with American troops. After three years at the helm, it is time to answer the essential questions, namely of how Trump’s policies should be defined and whether his leadership is a one-time phenomenon of an “unconventional” president or whether it is indicative of a deeper change within the US. Such questions have already sparked many arguments in the fields of American politics and international relations. While the issue remains controversial, after three years of the Trump presidency, many scholars have agreed that we will see more Trumps in the future. The Washington Post columnist Fareed Zakaria recently wrote an article titled “Trump’s misbehavior fits a global trend,” arguing that because “we are living in times of great change” people feel insecure and anxious. According to Zakaria, 21 out of 27 democratic countries no longer believe that elections can bring about change. This has led people to support “populist leaders who play on their fears, seize on scapegoats and promise to take decisive action on their behalf.” It is well known that Zakaria is one of the most vocal critics of Trump. Just a week before the presidential election, he called Trump an “American cancer,” yet it is worthwhile to pay attention to the fact that many other prominent scholars all over the world come to a similar conclusion. If Trump is a phenomenon, then the consequences of Trump’s foreign policy are far more serious. Trump is not an isolationist, but rather pursues ‘selective engagement’ in world affairs. Essentially, President Obama shared the same approach by pulling US troops from Iraq and not becoming heavily involved in Syria. Because the Obama administration felt that the US had overreached through George W. Bush’s “war on terror,” Obama calculated that it was time to retrench and focus on domestic reform. In a sense, Trump has had a similar approach of retrenchment as he has frequently said things like, for example, “bring our boys back home,” and actually implemented that in Syria, yet there are very important differences. Obama emphasized the importance of a “Rules-Based International Order” (RBIO) as the main principle for international relations while Trump has more brusquely put US interests first and expressed his contempt for the existing order, calling it “wildly unfair.” The most obvious trend that can be easily seen is the US’s bashing of China. Vice President Mike Pence reiterated the US commitment to balancing China in his speech at the Wilson Center in October 2019, which followed his previous year’s speech expressing the same at the Hudson Institute. The US Department of Defense and Department of State released the reports Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region and A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision respectively in 2019. These reports clearly defined China as a “revisionist state” who “seeks to reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations.” The Trump administration is not alone, as the American foreign policy community in general shares the view that the US should contain the “rise of China” even though it would cost the US to decouple the economies of the two countries. A majority of scholars have expressed their expectations that competition between the US and China will continue for a while, with some even saying it could last a generation. Trump’s America will continue to pursue selective engagement, seek to revise alliances so that allies shoulder their fair share of responsibilities and costs to provide public goods for the security of the world, short-term economic interests, and balancing against China. The Korean Peninsula will be influenced more heavily by this “new normal” started by Trump than any other place in the world. First, South Korea is facing daunting challenges vis-à-vis its alliance with the US in terms of cost and responsibility sharing. The Trump administration conducted a “global review” in the first half of this year to find new ways to demand that allies shoulder a larger share of the cost burden. The details of the new framework are not yet publicly known, but it seems that the demands of the US are not limited to increasing the cost of stationed US forces and include an “alliance contribution” that goes beyond the Korean peninsula. As of the end of November 2019, there are no signs that the Trump administration will back off its initial demand that South Korea fork over an extra $5 billion USD, five times what South Korea paid in 2019. Second, as shown by South Korea’s attempt to pull out of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan, the US emphasizes ally contributions and the building of a network for a new architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. South Korea’s announcement that it would halt GSOMIA in August and intended to terminate the agreement completely within three months of November 23 encountered fierce opposition from the US. Nearly all relevant US high officials except for the president and the vice president delivered clear messages to South Korea not to withdraw from GSOMIA because doing so would only help North Korea and China. Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley defined GSOMIA as “the key to security and stability in the region” on his way to visit South Korea. The US has seen GSOMIA as one of the most important mechanisms in implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy and worries that South Korea’s pull out will undermine its network building. At this moment, although there is still room to improve the US execution of the Indo-Pacific strategy, it is apparent that South Korea can expect to face more serious pressure from the US to side with its efforts to balance China. Third, North Korea’s denuclearization is growing more difficult to achieve due to the intensifying competition between the US and China. China supports North Korea within the boundary of UN sanctions. While there is speculation that China has opened its backdoor to help North Korea economically, at least on the surface, China has tried to cooperate with the US and the international community to achieve complete denuclearization. However, the Chinese definition of denuclearization is more similar to North Korea’s ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,’ which includes the requirement for the US to abandon the extended deterrence of South Korea. If the competition between the US and China evolves further, China’s position will deviate further from the US and it will step up its shameless support of the North. North Korea will in turn be less willing to give up its nuclear capabilities and it will lead to the final collapse of diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the North. The year 2020 will be a huge challenge for the Korean peninsula. North Korea’s self-imposed deadline at the end of 2019 is rapidly approaching. The burden sharing negotiations between the US and South Korea are supposed to conclude by the end of this year. If the negotiations between the US and the DPRK fail to achieve any progress this year, 2020 could begin with North Korea’s ‘new way,’ which does not exclude the possibility of tensions similar to those which plague the Korean Peninsula throughout 2017. If the ROK and the US burden-sharing negotiations fail, the US will likely come up with some new corresponding measures. However, it is difficult to guess what nature of such measures will be because of Trump’s unpredictability. Finally, in November 2020, the Korean Peninsula and the world will see whether the unprecedented changes of the past four years will continue at the same rate for another four years. Four more years of Trump will cement the changes he has made and decrease any chance that the US will reverse its course.     ■ Won Gon Park ([email protected]) is a professor at the School of International Studies at Handong Global University. He is also a member of the Policy Advisory Board of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Korea.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} ■ You can visit our Global North Korea site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note Despite the continuing efforts to resolve the North Korean problem, with the second US-North Korea summit and the working-level meeting in Stockholm, there have been no signs that a resolution is near, and North Korea remains a threat to the international community. Assistant professor Tom Le of Pomona College goes beyond the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, discussing other dangers such as the potential for horizontal proliferation, cyberattacks, and the imminent humanitarian crisis which will occur when the state ultimately fails. Professor Le explores the possible outcomes of the North Korean situation, however it ends up. He places a strong focus on the inevitable consequences of state failure, explaining “North Korea has acquired nuclear weapons. The next great threat will be mass migration.” He discusses the impact that such migration would have on East Asia as a whole, stating “North Koreans are less likely to find a state willing to take them in by the hundreds of thousands because decades of condemnation have sowed distrust at best and apathy at worst among the region’s stakeholders.” Finally, Professor Le talks about North Korea as a unifying factor in East Asian international relations, predicting what implications the disappearance of the regime as a common enemy will have for East Asian relations going forward.     Despite limited progress since the June 30, 2019 meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un at the DMZ, the opportunity to resolve the North Korea nuclear problem without the use of force has not been this great in decades. It is easy to forget that Trump may have brought “fire and fury” to the Korean Peninsula a little more than two years ago. Moreover, bombastic North Korean rhetoric and weapons tests without summits involving heads of state have been the norm. The most recent working-level talks held on October 5 in Stockholm may not have yielded an agreement, but limited progress is still progress. Optimism can also be found in the favorable context in which none of the relevant regional stakeholders are spoilers to a denuclearization agreement. Trump may be the most eager to strike a deal because it would be his most significant foreign policy win. Not only would a deal fulfill his desire to eclipse Barack Obama’s North Korea legacy, it would also provide a useful talking point in the 2020 elections. At the very least, it would distract from the current impeachment proceedings. Moon Jae-in has also pegged his legacy on improving relations with the North and has sacrificed much public support for his dovish policies. Forward momentum of any kind would also draw attention from his ineffective domestic economic and anti-corruption efforts. In addition, poor relations with Japan have led Moon to double down on a future tied to North Korea, where he even claimed that a united “peace economy” would replace Japan’s economic superiority in “one burst.” China, Japan, and Russia are mostly concerned with American trade wars and have not slowed down the negotiation process. Lastly, as a nuclear power, North Korea is in its strongest bargaining position ever, which may allow it to extract enough concessions to be satisfied with a deal. Yet, denuclearization has always been in the interest of these stakeholders to some degree. The North Korea nuclear puzzle has been tough to solve because over the years, rhetorical obstacles have been placed that make all possible outcomes prohibitively costly. In his 2002 State of the Union Address, George W. Bush placed North Korea in the trio of states that constituted an “axis of evil” due to its weapons of mass destruction and human rights violations. However, negotiators have often treated denuclearization and upholding human rights as mutually exclusive, with the former taking priority. As a result, the paths forward require a tolerance of human rights violations that will ultimately lead to regional instability. East Asia cannot afford to keep kicking the can down the road, yet continues to do so because North Korea has served as a unifier for the region.   Possible Outcomes North Korea poses three problems for the international community. First, its nuclear program is an immediate threat to Japan, South Korea, and the US. Relatedly, horizontal proliferation becomes increasingly difficult to prevent if North Korea can acquire nuclear weapons without consequence. Second, the North Korean humanitarian crises caused by poor governance and gross human rights violations are an affront to international law and the morality of people throughout the world. Third, its non-nuclear threats such as illicit cyber activity are increasing in frequency and impact. A grand bargain would address not only the nuclear problem, but also the other issues that originate from the authoritarian Kim regime. Reunification would be that grand bargain. This most ambitious—and implausible—scenario would come with enormous costs. If the Moon administration could overcome the growing sentiment against reunification, especially among South Korea’s youth, it would still have to pay for the reconstruction of a failed state. Bearish analysts estimate a 3 trillion dollar and multi-decade price tag. If the Moon government insists that South Korea remain in the driver’s seat during the reunification process, it will be unlikely to draw the international financial support necessary for the endeavor, particularly from Japan. The more difficult problem is what to do with the Kim family. The pragmatic approach would be to allow them to remain in government. To do so, however, would require hawkish politicians, human rights-focused NGOs, and the public to ignore the Kim family’s human rights record, one rightly earned from assassinations, prison camps, and a complete dereliction of duty to the North Korean people. The Kim family is also unlikely to believe that it would receive the Napoleon treatment in a free and democratic society. Thus, if the Kim family cannot be removed, then complete nuclearization without regime change is the more likely scenario. Whether this occurs through Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID) or Final Fully Verifiable Denuclearization (FFVD), this scenario requires unprecedented cooperation from North Korea. Moreover, the closer to denuclearization one gets, the less likely human rights issue will be raised because it would be seen as a violation of good faith negotiations by Kim. Trump and Moon seem aware of this as they have framed the North Korean humanitarian crisis in terms of economics rather than human rights. What Kim desires is an India and Pakistan model, where North Korea can keep its nuclear weapons and the US ends its economic sanctions. Variants of this outcome are a freeze or a complete breakdown of talks while North Korea continues to develop its nuclear program. The latter two scenarios would have the highest chance of American military intervention. Such an intervention remains unlikely as the US public has little appetite for a major war after Afghanistan and Iraq, nor would China sit idly by. Hence, the most likely scenario is the eventual collapse of the Kim regime and the North Korean state. The long history of tabling human rights issues for immediate security needs while simultaneously isolating North Korea economically and politically has created the perfect storm for a humanitarian catastrophe that will spread throughout Asia. According to the Global Hunger Index, malnourishment has increased 6% over the last decade and now sits at 47.8%. The North Korean economy has shown abysmal or negative growth and falls further behind in global competitiveness each year. These poor conditions have led to over a quarter million defectors since 1953. These figures will pale in comparison to the millions of refugees that will pour out of North Korea when the state collapses. Even with China’s support and nuclear blackmail, the current North Korean economy is not sustainable. This should be obvious as many states fail even without being completely removed from the global economy.   East Asia’s Punching Bag East Asia is not prepared for a humanitarian crisis that extends beyond North Korean borders. That is to say, it has tolerated a crisis that has remained within North Korea to preserve the status quo. As a result, the region lacks the institutional resources necessary to address the instability to come. There is a robust scholarship that explains why East Asia does not have a NATO-like institution, and instead, prefers a “complex patchwork” of institutions or a US-led hub-and-spoke model. A common thread among the various theories is that the institutions that bind East Asia are built on common threat rather than common cause. The arrangement of states is more akin to a bracelet made up of interlocking bilateral relations that surround North Korea. The US has strong ties with Japan and South Korea, but under Abe Shinzo, Japan has better relations with Russia than South Korea. Similarly, South Korea is tied more closely to China and the US than Japan. China’s positive relations with Russia and South Korea complete the bracelet. Any semblance of greater cooperation has related to managing the North Korea puzzle, which is defined by efforts to limit its nuclear program while allowing the Kim regime to exist. When relations between Japan and South Korea deteriorate, most recently in the “white list” trade war and the Moon administration’s decision to withdraw from the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the US uses the North Korean threat as a reason to cooperate. Without North Korea as the problem, other issues that cause insecurity come to the forefront, such as South Korea-Japan history disputes, US-China great power competition, and US bases and alliance burden sharing, to name a few.   Conclusion The post-Cold War model is unsustainable because it requires North Korea to remain a threat, but not to the degree that would cause significant harm beyond its domestic population. This balancing act has been sustained more by luck and a disheartening indifference to human suffering than by sound regional security management. It is also a model that has failed in all regards because North Korea has acquired nuclear weapons. The next great threat will be mass migration. It may have taken 116 years for the Hundred Years’ War to end, but like all conflicts, its resolution was inevitable. Failed states rarely last a century. North Korea’s isolation, failing economy, and human rights violations will eventually lead to its collapse, and as it stands, East Asia is not prepared to deal with the consequences. One need look no further than the failure to handle the Rohingya refugee crisis, or the region’s reluctance to take in Syrian and Yemini refugees. North Koreans are less likely to find a state willing to take them in by the hundreds of thousands because decades of condemnation have sowed distrust at best and apathy at worst among the region’s stakeholders. The stability of East Asia has been built on the ability of North Koreans to endure the Kim family. When one looks into a mirror, there are two people. The person you see, and the person you don’t want to.     ■ Tom Phuong Le is an assistant professor of politics at Pomona College. His research interests include militarism norms, Japanese security policy, and war memory and reconciliation. Le’s work has been published in the Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs and the Journal of Asian Studies, as well as in popular outlets such as Foreign Affairs, The Washington Post, The Hill and The Diplomat. Le received a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Irvine and BAs in history and political science at the University of California, Davis. He is a research associate at the PRIME Institute (Meiji Gakuin University), a CSIS US-Korea NextGen Fellow, and an AFIHJ Next Generation Fellow.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]