* This report has been translated from the Korean version. The Korean version can be found here.   Survey Overview Between September and October 2020, the East Asia Institute (EAI), a private Korean think tank, and Japanese NGO The Genron NPO conducted joint public opinion polls in South Korea and Japan. The objective of this survey is to monitor the state of mutual public perceptions between Japanese and South Korean people and examine how it is changing over time, ultimately narrowing the current perception gap by promoting mutual understanding between the two countries. The results of the poll were presented at the “Korea-Japan Future Dialogue” on October 16-17 and served as the basis for discussion. The opinion poll in South Korea was conducted from September 11 to 25 through face-to-face interviews targeting men and women aged 19 and older. The number of valid samples obtained was 1,006. 50.0% were men and 50.0% were women. The final academic qualifications of respondents were as follows: 12.0% had received either elementary or middle school education; 41.7% had received a high school education, and 46.2% had received either university/junior college level education or higher education such as graduate/postgraduate course. The age distribution of respondents was as follows: 17.9% were between the ages of 19 and 29; 16.0% were between the ages of 30 and 39; 18.9% were between the ages of 40 and 49; 19.7% were between the ages of 50 and 59, and 27.5% were over age 60. The opinion poll in Japan was conducted between September 12 and October 4 through door-to-door visits and self-administered, targeting men and women aged 18 and older. The number of valid samples obtained was 1,000, of whom 48.6% were men and 51.4% were women. The final academic qualifications of respondents were as follows: 6.6% had completed either elementary or middle school; 47.5% had completed high school; 21.3% had completed junior college or technical school; 22.3% had obtained a bachelor’s degree; 0.9% had obtained a graduate or postgraduate degree; 0.8% selected ‘other’, and 0.6% had no response. The age distribution of respondents was as follows: 2.5% were below the age of 20; 11.8% were between the ages of 20 and 29; 14.9% were between the ages of 30 and 39; 17.4% were between the ages of 40 and 49; 14.6% were between the ages of 50 and 59, and 38.8% were above age 60.   Some of the key findings from the polls are as follows: •South Korean Favorable Perception towards Japan has plummeted, with young generations leading the trend •Japanese Favorable Perception towards South Korea saw an unexpected improvement from the downward trend •Not many South Koreans/Japanese support their own country’s policy towards the other country •The increasing number of South Koreans want a new solution on the forced labor issue •Historical disputes between South Korea and Japan might lead to another conflict between the two countries, if the pending issues remain unresolved      

    .a_wrap {font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} The East Asia Institute (EAI), together with Chey Institute for Advanced Studies(CIAS) and The Genron NPO hosted the 8th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue on October 16-17, 2020 in Seoul. The dialogue addressed the key results of the 2020 ‘Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey.’ Throughout the dialogue, panelists from the political, business and cultural sector as well as academia exchanged views on different historical and political issues concerning the two countries, and discussed ways in which the two countries could cooperate to promote regional peace and prosperity. The open dialogue held on October 17 was also live-streamed to reach a wider audience in both countries.   Hosted by: The East Asia Institute·Chey Institute for Advanced Studies·The Genron NPO   Program Date: October 17(Sat.) 13:00-17:50 Venue: Conference Hall, Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies 13:00 - 13:20 Opening Ceremony   SOHN Yul President, East Asia Institute; Professor, Yonsei University OGOURA Kazuo Former President of the Japan Foundation; Former Japanese Ambassador to the Republic of Korea   PARK In-Kuk President, Chey Institute for Advanced Studies LEE Hong-Gu, Former Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea KAZUYA Endo, Deputy Assistant Minister, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Japan 13:20 - 14:30 Open Session I   "Analysis of Korea-Japan Relations Based on the Results of the 2020 Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey"   Moderator SOHN Yul President, East Asia Institute; Professor, Yonsei University KUDO Yasushi President, The Genron NPO                  Presenter  KUDO Yasushi President, The Genron NPO           SOHN Yul President, East Asia Institute; Professor, Yonsei University 14:30 - 14:45 Break 14:45 - 15:55 Open Session II   "Korea-Japan’s Common Challenges and Prospect under the Changing Global Landscape"   Moderator PARK In-Kuk President, Chey Institute for Advanced Studies KUDO Yasushi President, The Genron NPO   Presenter  OKONOGI Masao Honorary Professor, Keio University PARK Chul-Hee Professor, Seoul National University 15:55 - 16:10 Q&A 16:10 - 16:20 Break 16:20 - 17:50 Open Session III   "Korea-Japan Youth Dialogue"   Moderator SOHN Yul President, East Asia Institute; Professor, Yonsei University KUDO Yasushi President, The Genron NPO   Presenter OKUZONO Hideki Professor, University of Shizuoka               KWON Yongseok Professor, Hitotsubashi University               LEE Jung Hwan Professor, Seoul National University   Youth Panel Discussion     Opening Ceremony   Open Session I   Open Session II   Open Session III  

I. The Rapid Evolution of AI and the Importance of Addressing Ethical Challenges   In recent years, the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) has transformed a wide range of societal domains, from industry to our daily lives. AI can be considered one of the most impactful technologies on human society since the popularization of the internet in the 1990s. In particular, the advent of generative AI may significantly affect human thought processes and labor environments. When OpenAI released ChatGPT on November 30, 2022, generative AI became accessible to the public. ChatGPT reached one million users within a week (Altman 2022), and within two months, it was estimated to have surpassed one hundred million users (Hu 2023).   ChatGPT features a conversational interface that appears like human-to-human interaction. Technically, it is built by combining a Large Language Model (LLM) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback. The technology that enables ChatGPT’s advanced text generation is called the “Transformer,” a systern composed of the Attention Mechanism and Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs). Introduced in 2017 by Ashish Vaswani and colleagues at Google in “Attention is All You Need,” the attention mechanism extracts necessary information from a series of words, while the MLP retrieves relevant learned content from large-scale data during processing. By iteratively predicting the most likely next word, Transformers generate coherent text.   LLMs such as ChatGPT are increasingly integrated into our daily lives. LINE Yahoo, a Japanese internet company, is funded through a joint holding company by Japan’s SoftBank and South Korea’s NAVER—well known in Japan. NAVER has developed and operates HyperCLOVA X, an LLM designed to understand Korean language in social contexts. NAVER reports that HyperCLOVA X uses 6,500 times more Korean-language data than OpenAI’s GPT-4, making it highly capable of reflecting Korean culture, social norms, and values. HyperCLOVA X can generate responses that resonate with Korean users, reflecting social norms in the language model’s outputs. Although HyperCLOVA X also handles English, Japanese, and Chinese, its primary focus on high-quality Korean data ensures that Korea’s socio-cultural values are embedded in its systern. As illustrated by HyperCLOVA X, LLMs trained on vast linguistic datasets tend to reflect the knowledge and values contained in those languages, including ethical norms of the societies where those languages are used.   A common challenge with LLMs is that their generated content can contain inaccuracies or refer to nonexistent entities—a phenomenon known as “hallucination.” Because LLMs predict the most statistically likely next word, they can generate combinations that do not exist. Errors may also arise if the data used for training contains inaccuracies. As AI is developed using such learning processes, some degree of error becomes inevitable. Accordingly, global policy interventions are needed to address potential social problems caused by AI.   Before the era of generative AI, AI was used for functions such as facial recognition and analyzing user preferences in video applications like YouTube or TikTok to maximize viewing time. AI has now become so pervasive in everyday software that we have reached a point where we cannot always discern whether our counterpart in a conversation is human or AI. As AI advances, it is increasingly critical to develop it with respect for human values, privacy, and fairness to prevent negative impacts on human society. All nations should cooperate to address the ethical issues surrounding AI. This article will discuss recent AI ethics debates in Japan and consider possibilities for collaboration between South Korea and Japan in the domain of AI ethics.   II. AI Risks and the Development of Japan’s AI Guidelines   To harness AI’s potential while mitigating its risks, it is essential to establish guidelines that ensure safe and ethical use of AI technologies. These guidelines provide frameworks for developers, businesses, and policymakers, promoting accountability, transparency, and public trust. In Japan, AI guidelines play a crucial role in ensuring that AI aligns with societal values and priorities.   In April 2024, the Japanese government released the “AI Business Operators’ Guidelines (METI 2024),” which consist of six detailed annexes designed to translate the main guidance into practical measures. These guidelines serve as a comprehensive reference for the various stakeholders implementing AI-related initiatives. The government views itself as having taken a leading role in global discussions on AI principles—within the G7, G20, OECD, and other international forums—and believes that establishing these guidelines enables Japan to promote the correct identification of AI risks, guided by international trends and stakeholder concerns. The ultimate goal is to facilitate voluntary, practical measures in everyday life.   Japan’s AI Business Operators’ Guidelines integrate and build upon “Human-Centered AI Society Principles (2019),” “AI Development Guidelines (2017),” “AI Utilization Guidelines (2019),” and “Governance Guidelines for Implementing AI Principles (2022).” The 2019 “Human-Centered AI Society Principles,” formulated by the government’s Council for Integrated Innovation Strategy, aim to utilize AI for addressing global challenges such as environmental issues, widening inequality, and resource depletion—an approach referred to as “Society 5.0.” In the Fifth Science and Technology Basic Plan, Society 5.0 is described as a “human-centered society that balances economic advancement with the resolution of social problems through a highly integrated systern of cyberspace and physical space.” Here, the government emphasizes harmonizing economic development with the resolution of societal challenges.   The core ideas of the Human-Centered AI Society Principles include:   1. Respect for human dignity—AI should augment and enhance human capabilities.   2. Diversity and inclusiveness—enabling diverse individuals to pursue their own forms of happiness.   3. Sustainability—leveraging AI to address issues such as inequality and environmental degradation.   Based on these ideas, the Principles outline seven guidelines: (1) Human-Centric Principle, (2) Principle of Education and Literacy, (3) Principle of Privacy Protection, (4) Principle of Security, (5) Principle of Fair Competition, (6) Principle of Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, and (7) Principle of Innovation. The Japanese government states that these guidelines will be periodically updated to reflect changes in international trends and new technologies.   The AI Business Operators’ Guidelines emphasize three core concepts:   1. Support for businesses’ voluntary efforts,   2. Coordination with international discussions,   3. Clarity for readers.   They are intended to ensure effectiveness and legitimacy through repeated multi-stakeholder review—including educational and research institutions, civil society, and private companies—and function as a living document that will continue to evolve. The Japanese government seeks consistency between the Society 5.0 vision and human-centered AI principles, motivated in part by Japan’s demographic challenges such as a rapidly aging population and labor shortages.   In 2023 and 2024, the Japanese government accelerated its AI policy. An “AI Strategy Council,” chaired by Professor Yutaka Matsuo of the University of Tokyo, leads governmental discussions. The council set a budget of 164.09-billion-yen (an increase of 44% from the previous fiscal year) for AI initiatives and decided to subsidize one-third to one-half of major firms’ costs to expand GPU (graphics processing unit) infrastructure—a critical AI resource. In 2023, the council compiled “Interim Points of Discussion on AI,” focusing on recent developments in generative AI. This report notes Japan’s long-standing affinity for technology and AI, suggesting that despite prolonged economic stagnation, the advent of AI could provide renewed momentum for growth. The report also identifies seven primary risks:   1. Leakage of Confidential Information and Misuse of Personal Data: Generative AI may collect user interaction data and use it for targeted advertising. Moreover, when training on internet data, AI systerns risk gathering personal information improperly.   2. Increased Ease and Sophistication of Crime: Generative AI can facilitate illegal activities, such as creating realistic deepfake voices or images at low cost, potentially enabling fraud or drug production. While Japan’s Penal Code and anti-hacking laws may cover some cases, emerging offenses require new legal measures.   3. Social Disruption through Misinformation: Generative AI can effortlessly produce and disseminate fake news or biased information, causing public unrest or interference in democratic processes. Tools to detect misinformation and curb its spread are necessary.   4. More Sophisticated Cyberattacks: AI-assisted cyberattacks may become more advanced. Generative AI can help craft emails that evade detection, impersonate humans, or even target AI systerns themselves.   5. Impacts on Education: Using AI to complete homework or write reports may hinder students’ creativity. Yet AI-based personalized learning could enhance educational outcomes. The Ministry of Education must urgently establish guidelines and boost AI literacy.   6. Copyright Violations: AI-generated content can closely resemble existing works, raising potential for increased copyright infringements. The government should promote awareness of current copyright law and consider further regulation of AI-generated outputs.   7. Growing Risk of Unemployment: Generative AI’s capacity to automate creative tasks, such as writing and image creation, could lead to job losses. The government should study AI’s impact on employment and promote reskilling and labor mobility.   III. South Korea’s National AI Strategy   In 2019, the South Korean government released its National AI Strategy, in which Choi Ki-yong, Minister of Science and ICT, emphasized the realization of “human-centered AI.” In 2020, the Ministry of Science and ICT and the Korea Information Society Development Institute introduced the “National AI Ethics Framework,” which sets out basic and comprehensive standards for all members of society to observe when developing and deploying AI (Korean Institute of Science and Design Information n.d.).   The Framework’s highest value is humanity, and under three core principles—(1) Human Dignity, (2) Public Good, and (3) Technological Appropriateness—lie ten key requirements that span the AI lifecycle: (1) Guarantee of Human Rights, (2) Privacy Protection, (3) Respect for Diversity, (4) Non-Maleficence, (5) Publicness, (6) Solidarity, (7) Data Governance, (8) Responsibility, (9) Safety, and (10) Transparency.   In 2020, South Korea also published an AI Roadmap containing thirty priorities, including standards for high-risk AI. Notably, one provision discusses the possibility of granting legal personhood to AI. The government has aggressively steered AI ecosystern development, with President Yoon Suk-yeol in April 2024 declaring South Korea’s aim to become one of the top three AI nations. Given that Korea’s National AI Strategy highlights “human-centered AI,” the fundamental direction of Korean AI ethics does not differ markedly from Japan’s, suggesting that they share sufficient common ground for collaboration.   IV. The Role of Risk-Based Approaches and the “Hiroshima AI Process”   Japan’s AI Business Operators’ Guidelines adopt a risk-based approach, which involves identifying potential societal harms—such as discrimination or misinformation—early on and evaluating their severity and likelihood. Measures are then taken according to the level of risk, with ongoing risk management throughout the AI lifecycle. Multiple stakeholders participate in this process, and transparency is emphasized. By tailoring regulations to different levels of risk, governments aim to avoid inhibiting innovation through overly restrictive laws, while still maximizing AI’s social benefits. This approach is widely accepted internationally, including by the OECD and the G7, facilitating global consensus.   A critical diplomatic endeavor for advancing international cooperation on AI safety and ethics was Japan’s “Hiroshima AI Process (2023).” Conducted the year before Japan finalized its AI Business Operators’ Guidelines, the Hiroshima AI Process was a key step toward establishing international guidelines. At the April 2023 G7 Digital and Technology Ministers’ Meeting, (G7 Digital and Technology Ministers’ Meeting 2023) participants adopted a ministerial declaration highlighting “Responsible AI and AI Governance.” They reaffirmed that “AI policies and regulations should be human-centric, uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms (including privacy and personal data protection) consistent with democratic values, and be risk-based and forward-looking.”   In September 2023, the G7 Digital and Technology Ministers’ Statement further recognized the need to address the risks posed by rapid AI advances while harnessing their benefits. The October 2023 G7 Leaders’ Statement on the Hiroshima AI Process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2023) likewise underscores the “innovative opportunities” and “transformational potential” of cutting-edge AI systerns, demonstrating the global focus on generative AI at that time.   The document published under the Hiroshima AI Process, titled “Hiroshima Process International Guiding Principles for Organizations Developing Advanced AI systerns,” (Japanese Government 2023) begins by noting its goal of promoting safe, secure, and trustworthy AI worldwide. It underscores that “organizations should not develop or deploy advanced AI systerns in a way that undermines democratic values, are particularly harmful to individuals or communities, facilitate terrorism, enable criminal misuse, or pose substantial risks to safety, security, and human rights.”   The Hiroshima AI Process highlights democratic values, ethical AI practices, risk management, and international cooperation. This initiative contributed significantly by issuing a guiding framework to address the global evolution of AI. Such emphasis on democratic values could serve as a foundation for Japan–South Korea cooperation in AI ethics.   V. The Evolution of AI Policy in Japan   Japan’s AI development environment differs from that of U.S.-style Big Tech companies or China’s state-regulated private firms. The “Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy,” (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2017) published by the Japanese government in March 2017, noted that Japan lags the U.S. and China in AI-related academic publications, and placed priority on creating robust research and development environments involving both government and private sectors, as well as addressing Japan’s pressing shortage of AI talent. The strategy categorized AI’s development into three phases:   Phase 1: Promoting data-driven AI utilization in specific domains.   Phase 2: Advancing broader AI and data use across boundaries of individual fields.   Phase 3: Linking multiple domains in complex ways to form an AI ecosystern.   It also outlined three main approaches to cultivating AI talent:   1. Designing and implementing educational programs to produce immediately deployable personnel.   2. Encouraging joint research and workforce development collaborations between universities and industry.   3. Building on government and research institutions’ initiatives to further strengthen these programs.   Japan does not rely primarily on a U.S.-style start-up ecosystern fueled by massive venture capital investments. Instead, its approach involves close collaboration among universities, industry, and government for AI research, development, and commercialization. In May 2015, the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) established the “Artificial Intelligence Research Center.” Professor Junichi Tsujii, a leading expert in natural language processing and text mining, was appointed as the inaugural director. Tsujii noted that, as AI permeates all industrial sectors, failure to keep up would jeopardize entire industries.   Japan’s AI development agenda strongly reflects national social conditions. According to the “Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy,” Japan is on track to experience the world’s first major wave of rapid population aging. Leveraging AI to transform immense medical and caregiving data into a “world-leading advanced healthcare and caregiving systern” is a prominent goal. By 2030, more than 40% of Japan’s population will be seniors, and the government envisions a society where people remain actively employed even at age 80. Thus, AI is expected to solve social issues such as population aging and labor shortages. The same objectives appear in the government’s “Human-Centered AI Society Principles (2019),” which aims to utilize AI in addressing environmental crises, inequality, and resource depletion. Japan’s focus on “human-centeredness” thus underpins its AI ethics. Although South Korea’s concerns differ to some extent—for example, AI is connected to military capabilities due to demographic challenges—South Korea and Japan share pressing demographic concerns.   VI. AI Business Guidelines and Ethical Standards for AI Development   Anticipating AI’s widespread business applications, the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence (JSAI) discussed forming an ethics committee as early as 2014. At that time, Hitoshi Matsubara, then President of JSAI and professor at Future University Hakodate, requested Yutaka Matsuo at the University of Tokyo to consider establishing such a committee. The first meeting of the JSAI Ethics Committee was held at the University of Tokyo in December 2014 (Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Committee 2015).   Initially, the JSAI debated whether to call it an “Ethics Committee” or the “Committee on AI and Future Society.” In fact, a JSAI Ethics Committee had existed since 2007 but had become inactive. Its reestablishment in 2014 attracted considerable media attention. Notably, the Ethics Committee included the science fiction writer Satoshi Hase, illustrating the JSAI’s broad-based approach to future challenges. In 2017, the Ethics Committee released the “Ethical Guidelines of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence” (Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 2017). These guidelines center on professional ethics for researchers, but Article 9 states that if AI “is to become a member of society or its equivalent, it must adhere to the same ethical guidelines as JSAI members,” thereby extending ethical obligations to AI artifacts themselves.   A decade later, in 2024, Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry published the “AI Business Operators’ Guidelines,” rooted in the 2019 government principle of a “Human-Centered AI Society.” Also in 2019, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) published the “AI Utilization Guidelines” (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2019). That document notes that in 2016, at the G7 ICT Ministers’ Meeting (hosted by Japan), the Japanese government proposed an initial draft of AI development principles, and in 2018, Japan’s representatives introduced its “Human-Centered AI Society Principles,” “AI Development Guideline Draft,” and “AI Utilization Guidelines Draft” at the OECD AI Expert Group. Japan contends that the 2019 OECD Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence aligns with Japanese principles and guidelines.   Japanese private-sector initiatives for AI ethics have accelerated since then. In 2018, Sony Group announced its “Sony Group AI Ethics Guidelines” (Sony Group 2023), applicable to all officers and employees engaged in AI development and use. In 2019, NEC Group established its “AI and Human Rights Policy” (NEC Group 2019). In 2021, Hitachi formulated its “AI Ethics Principles,” reflecting both OECD discussions and the company’s Social Innovation business ethos.   In sum, Japan’s academic circles, government bodies, and private firms have adopted a risk-based approach, identifying high-risk domains and focusing on them. As for regulation, Japan does not have a comprehensive AI law; it relies on government-issued guidelines and private-sector codes of conduct. Japan has thus far refrained from enacting legislation specifically targeting AI, opting instead for a soft law approach. However, there has been a slight shift in this strategy. Building on the principles of “balancing risk management with the promotion of innovation” and “international cooperation,” the government is scheduled to submit a bill in January 2025 that will enable investigations into AI operators. An approach of soft law in contrast to the EU’s more stringent “hard law.” The EU, set to enforce its AI Act around 2026, seeks to protect human rights and freedoms by regulating training data and categorizing AI into four groups—unacceptable, high-risk, transparency-required, and minimal or no risk. High-risk and transparency-required systerns face mandatory obligations. Meanwhile, in the United States, the White House issued an “Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence,” calling for standards, testing requirements, measures against algorithmic discrimination, and privacy protection, while aiming to foster innovation and competitiveness.   In November 2024, South Korea’s Science, ICT, Broadcast, and Communications Committee approved the “Artificial Intelligence Industry Promotion and Trust Assurance Act” for parliamentary debate. This legislation would require that AI-generated works be labeled as AI-generated and imposes fines of up to 30 million won for non-compliance. South Korea’s approach appears more aligned with the EU’s hard law, potentially mandating strict safety standards for AI systerns. However, due to a declaration of martial law in December 2024 and the impeachment crisis of the president, the bill’s fate is uncertain.   VII. The Future of Cooperation Between South Korea and Japan on AI Ethics   As two democratic nations, South Korea and Japan share broad values—particularly the concepts of “human-centeredness,” “diversity,” and “sustainability” at the core of their AI ethics principles. South Korea clarifies commitments to human rights and the public good via its National AI Strategy and the “National AI Ethics Framework,” while Japan bases its approach on the “Human-Centered AI Society Principles” and the “AI Business Operators’ Guidelines,” employing a risk-based approach rooted in international consensus. Both countries should proactively participate in global discussions—through platforms like the Hiroshima AI Process, the G7, and the OECD—to influence and align with emerging international norms. In December 2024, the G7 reached an agreement on the fundamental aspects of a framework requiring AI developers to report risks. Implementation of this framework is also scheduled to commence in February 2025.   On the global stage, the war in Ukraine and other conflicts have ushered in the use of drones and other new weaponry, sparking concerns about AI’s role in modern warfare. For some time, the international community has debated the risks of lethal autonomous weapons systerns (LAWS), which delegate decision-making to AI. South Korea, facing tensions with North Korea, has stationed surveillance robots along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). As its defense industry thrives, South Korea supplies weaponry—particularly in Europe, which is wary of Russia’s border—and may continue to expand in this domain. In contrast, many Japanese private firms have exited the defense sector. Hence, South Korea has more concrete experience and expertise in weapons-related AI, enabling a potentially significant contribution to international discourse on the ethics of AI-equipped weapon systerns.   In February 2024, Japan established the AI Safety Institute, appointing Akiko Murakami as Executive Director. This institute evaluates AI safety methods, sets standards, and facilitates Japan’s international cooperation. The 2024 report of the Council for Integrated Innovation Strategy mentions three key areas for strengthening: (1) Integrated strategies for critical technologies, (2) Global collaboration, and (3) Enhancing AI competitiveness while ensuring safety and security. Specifically, Japan aims to take the lead in international rulemaking for AI. To achieve this, the government plans to strategically leverage bilateral and multilateral frameworks with allies and like-minded nations, as well as ASEAN partners, in coordination with industry and academia. From a South Korean standpoint, these efforts suggest avenues for deeper cooperation with Japan.   As neighboring countries with closely intertwined industries, South Korea and Japan hold complementary strengths in technological and social contexts. With the global rise of generative AI, how each country embeds its language and socio-cultural norms into AI models will become a key issue—one that underscores the importance of “AI sovereignty.” Standing apart from the AI giants of the U.S. and China, South Korea and Japan can collaborate to highlight the importance of national sovereignty in AI, reflecting distinct socio-cultural norms and shared demographic concerns, including low birth rates and aging populations.   Joint efforts between South Korea and Japan in AI ethics could yield a collaborative ecosystern. Potential avenues include refining mutual guidelines and technical standards, sharing data, undertaking joint research and development, and reinforcing coordination in multilateral forums to shape the rules of AI governance. Such cooperation would accelerate the realization of an AI-powered society characterized by “trustworthiness,” “transparency,” and “accountability,” reinforcing the two countries’ leadership standing in international discourse. Their shared democratic values, emphasis on ethical principles, practical applications for solving social challenges, and active engagement in international norm-setting form a robust foundation for a “human-centered AI society.” By working together, South Korea and Japan can present an advanced model of AI ethics to the global community and thereby contribute to shaping a more equitable international order. ■   References   Altman, Sam. 2022. “ChatGPT Launched on Wednesday. Today It Crossed 1 Million Users!” X, December 5. https://x.com/sama/status/1599668808285028353 (Accessed December 22, 2024).   Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2017. Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy 2017. https://www.ai-japan.go.jp/menu/learn/ai-strategy-1/75ddfd6ab65e8bcd6fe80e4676d902967c53ca4d.pdf (Accessed December 22, 2024).   G7 Digital and Technology Ministers’ Meeting. 2023. Ministerial Declaration. April 30. Accessed December 22, 2024. https://www.digital.go.jp/assets/contents/node/information/field_ref_resources/efdaf817-4962-442d-8b5d-9fa1215cb56a/5c1391d9/20230519_news_g7_results_japanese_00.pdf.   Hu, Krystal. 2023. “ChatGPT Sets Record for Fastest-Growing User Base - Analyst Note.” Reuters, February 3. https://www.reuters.com/technology/chatgpt-sets-record-fastest-growing-user-base-analyst-note-2023-02-01/. (Accessed December 22, 2024).   Japanese Government. 2023. Hiroshima Process International Guiding Principles for Organizations Developing Advanced AI systerns. https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ai/ai_senryaku/6kai/kokusaishishin.pdf. (Accessed December 22, 2024).   Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Committee. 2015. Purpose for the Establishment of the Ethics Committee of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence. https://www.ai-gakkai.or.jp/ai-elsi/about/purpose. (Accessed December 22, 2024).   Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence. 2017. Ethical Guidelines. https://www.ai-gakkai.or.jp/ai-elsi/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2017/02/%E4%BA%BA%E5%B7%A5%E7%9F%A5%E8%83%BD%E5%AD%A6%E4%BC%9A%E5%80%AB%E7%90%86%E6%8C%87%E9%87%9D.pdf. (Accessed December 22, 2024).   Korean Institute of Science and Design Information (KISDI). n.d. Artificial Intelligence Standards (In Korean). https://ai.kisdi.re.kr/aieth/main/contents.do?menuNo=400029. (Accessed December 22, 2024).   Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 2024. “AI Business Operators’ Guidelines (Version 1.0) (In Japanese).” April 19. https://www.meti.go.jp/shingikai/mono_info_service/ai_shakai_jisso/pdf/20240419_3.pdf. (Accessed December 22, 2024).   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2023. G7 Hiroshima Summit Outcome Documents (In Japanese). https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100573465.pdf. (Accessed December 22, 2024).   Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 2019. AI Utilization Guidelines (In Japanese). https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000624438.pdf. (Accessed December 22, 2024).   NEC Group. 2019. AI and Human Rights Policy (In Japanese). https://jpn.nec.com/press/201904/images/0201-01-01.pdf. (Accessed December 22, 2024).   Sony Group. 2023. AI Ethics Activities (In Japanese). https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ai/ningen/r5_1kai/siryo1.pdf. (Accessed December 22, 2024).     ■ Makoto Shiono is Group Head for Emerging Technologies and Director of Management at the Institute of Geoeconomics, International House of Japan.     ■ Typeset by Chaerin Kim, Research Assistant     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

I. Introduction and Motivation   1. AI’s Growing Impact on Science and Potential of AGI   The intersection of artificial intelligence and scientific research represents one of the most promising frontiers in modern scientific history. As artificial intelligence (AI) systerns demonstrate increasingly sophisticated capabilities in areas such as data analysis, and experimental design, we stand at the threshold of a fundamental transformation in scientific methodology. The emergence of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) promises to revolutionize not only how we conduct scientific research but also our fundamental understanding of natural phenomena and technological possibilities (Mitchell 2024).   DeepMind: “AI, and ultimately AGI, has the potential to drive one of the greatest transformations in history. By solving some of the hardest scientific and engineering challenges of our time, we’re working to create breakthrough technologies that could advance science, transform work, serve diverse communities — and improve billions of people’s lives.” (Google DeepMind n.d.).   Recent years have witnessed unprecedented breakthroughs in AI capabilities. Large language models have demonstrated remarkable abilities in scientific literature analysis and knowledge synthesis. Multi-modal AI systerns have shown promise in complex pattern recognition across diverse scientific domains. Scientific AI applications have accelerated discovery in fields ranging from drug development to materials science, from climate modeling to particle physics. These developments suggest that AGI could catalyze scientific progress in areas previously perceived as impossible.   2. Korea-Japan Cooperation Imperative for AGI Development   The strategic importance of Korea-Japan cooperation in AGI development cannot be overstated. Both nations possess unique strengths and capabilities that could create significant progress in global AGI research and development. This cooperation is driven by several compelling factors: Complementary technological strengths, shared regional challenges, and combined research capabilities.   First, Japan’s advanced industrial base, renowned for precision engineering and robotics, complements Korea’s dynamic technology sector, particularly in semiconductors and digital infrastructure. This technological synergy creates a robust foundation for AGI development.   Second, both nations face similar societal challenges, including rapidly aging populations requiring innovative healthcare solutions, environmental concerns requiring sophisticated monitoring and mitigation strategies, energy security issues demanding smart grid solutions and efficient resource management in a rapidly changing global landscape.   Lastly, the research ecosysterns of both countries offer complementary advantages. Japan’s strength in fundamental research and long-term scientific projects. Korea’s agility in technology commercialization and rapid deployment. Combined research infrastructure that can compete at global scale.   II. Analysis of current status   1. Current Status of Korea’s AI Policy and International Cooperation   1) Korea’s AI Strategy   Korea’s artificial intelligence strategy can be divided into two main axes: establishing a legal and institutional foundation and implementing specific AI development policies.   First, looking at the legal and institutional foundation, the “Special Act on National Strategic Technology Development” enacted in September 2023 established a legal foundation for the systernatic development of national strategic technologies, including AI. This law encompasses comprehensive content including selection and management of national strategic technologies, establishment of basic plans, designation of policy support institutions, strategic research projects and specialized research institutes, promotion of challenging R&D, and establishment of regional technology innovation hubs. Additionally, in September 2023, the ‘Digital Rights Charter’ was announced, presenting the basic direction for digital order norms in the AI era. This is structured around five basic principles: guaranteeing freedom and rights in the digital environment, ensuring fair access and equal opportunities, implementing a safe and reliable digital society, promoting digital innovation based on autonomy and creativity, and advancing human welfare.   As for specific AI development policies, the “Ultra-large AI Competitiveness Enhancement Plan” and the “National AI Implementation Plan” are representative cases. The Ultra-large AI Competitiveness Enhancement Plan focuses on expanding infrastructure, including Korean text data construction, support for core HW/SW development, and promotion of new R&D projects. In particular, pursues the “Ultra-large AI 5 Flagship Projects” to develop ultra-large AI application services in five areas: law, medicine, psychological counseling, culture and arts, and academic research.   The National AI Implementation Plan approaches from four aspects: public welfare, industry competitiveness, government systerns, and daily life. In terms of public welfare, it aims to improve the quality of life for citizens through social care for the vulnerable, medical assistance AI, and childcare platforms. In terms of industry competitiveness, it supports the improvement of expert work efficiency and overall industrial AI adoption through ultra-large AI flagship projects. For government systerns, it enhances administrative efficiency in areas such as disaster response, water quality management, and statistical classification automation. In terms of daily life, it promotes AI literacy improvement and AI standardization for all citizens.   As an extension of these efforts, the enactment of the AI Basic Law and the launch of the AI Safety Research Institute by the end of 2024, suggesting that the institutional foundation for AI development will be further strengthened.   2) Korea’s AI International Cooperation Strategy   Korea’s international AI cooperation is primarily focused on bilateral cooperation with like-minded countries, including the United States and the EU, as well as securing leadership and influence in new emerging technology forums.   In the field of AI, Korea demonstrated its commitment to establishing global regulatory leadership for safe and inclusive AI development by hosting the Global AI Safety Summit in May 2024. Furthermore, in September 2024, Korea launched the Global AI Frontier Lab with top researchers from Korea and the United States, initiating concrete cooperation between the two nations. This project brings together leading scholars and researchers from both countries to pursue global AI research and development in the areas of fundamental AI, trustworthy AI, and healthcare AI, with the goal of achieving world-leading and world-first research outcomes.   2. Current Status of Japan’s AI Policy and International Cooperation   1) Japan’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy   The Japanese government announced its “AI Strategy” in 2019, aiming to realize Society 5.0. This expanded upon the “AI Technology Strategy” announced in 2017, developing into a comprehensive strategy encompassing talent, industry, society, and governance beyond the technological domain. This strategy presents strategic objectives across four areas—talent, industry, technology development, and international cooperation—based on three principles: dignity, diversity and inclusion, and sustainability.   Looking at the main contents of the strategy, in terms of talent, it aims to nurture human resources suitable for the AI era and attract global talent. It focuses on practical industrial application of AI and securing global leadership. It also pursues the establishment of technological systerns for implementing a sustainable society and accelerating SDGs achievement through the construction of international research, education, and social infrastructure networks led by Japan.   To achieve these goals, implementation tasks were identified along two axes. The “future foundation building field” including education and research, and the “industrial and social foundation establishment field” including promotion of AI utilization in society, industry, and public sectors, and data infrastructure construction. Subsequently, through “AI Strategy 2021” and “AI strategy 2022,” follow-up measures were presented in response to emerging issues and technological developments. Notably, in the AI strategy 2022, the construction of AI-based disaster and pandemic crisis response technology infrastructure was added to strengthen national resilience after COVID-19.   Additionally, Japan presented seven principles through the “AI Social Principles” in 2019. They consist of human-centricity, education and literacy, privacy protection, safety, fair competition, fairness/transparency, and innovation. These principles aim to promote the responsibility and participation of all citizens living in an AI society.   2) Japan’s International AI Cooperation Strategy   Japan’s AI international cooperation is primarily centered on close collaboration with the United States. Notable examples include the launch of a $110 million AI research cooperation between the University of Washington, University of Tsukuba, Carnegie Mellon University, and Keio University, supported by global companies such as NVIDIA, Arm, Amazon, and Microsoft.   In the field of AI ethics, both countries agreed to mutually support the establishment of AI safety research institutes and strengthen cooperation in standards, methods, and evaluations for AI safety. Particularly, they agreed to cooperate in certification and labeling of official government content and development of related technologies and standards to reduce risks and damages from AI-generated content.   At the research institution level, various cooperations are being pursued, including AI and quantum technology cooperation between Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) and NVIDIA, high-performance computing and AI project agreements between the U.S. Department of Energy and Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and the signing of an MOU for AI scientific cooperation between Argonne National Laboratory and RIKEN.   3. Current Status of AGI for Science and Science for AGI   The current landscape of AGI applications in scientific research reveals both significant progress and substantial opportunities for advancement. This section analyzes the present state of AGI capabilities and their impact on scientific research methodologies.   Google’s 9 ways in which AI is advancing science are as follows (Google 2024): 1. Cracking the 50-year “grand challenge” of protein structure prediction 2. Showing the human brain in unprecedented detail to support health research 3. Saving lives with accurate flood forecasting 4. Spotting wildfires earlier to help firefighters stop them faster 5. Predicting weather faster and with more accuracy 6. Advancing the frontier of mathematical reasoning 7. Using quantum computing to accurately predict chemical reactivity and kinetics 8. Accelerating materials science and the potential for more sustainable solar cells, batteries and superconductors 9. Taking a meaningful step toward nuclear fusion and abundant clean energy   The most promising areas in AI for Science are as follows (Wang et al. 2023): 1. Weather forecasting, 2. Battery design optimization 3. Magnetic control of nuclear fusion reactors 4. Planning chemical synthesis pathway 5. Neural solvers of differential equations 6. Hydropower station location planning 7. Synthetic electronic health record generation 8. Rare event selection in particle collisions 9. Language modelling for biomedical sequences 10. High-throughput virtual screening 11. Navigation in the hypothesis space 12. Super-resolution 3D live-cell imagination 13. Symbolic regression   According to Wang et al. (2023), AI is indispensable in most of the science research process including optimizing parameters and function, automating procedures to collect, visualize, and process data, exploring vast spaces of candidate hypotheses to form theories, and generating hypotheses and estimating their uncertainty to suggest relevant experiments in different areas.   [Figure 1] Learning meaningful representations of Scientific data Source: (Wang et al. 2023).   Concurrent efforts are underway across various fundamental scientific disciplines to overcome the inherent limitations of AI including explainability and model performance enhancement. Just as deep learning was founded on neuronal operational principles, diverse research initiatives persist:   1. Developing novel AI architectures based on comprehensive research in neuroscience and life sciences, 2. Constructing more accurate, efficient, stable, and explainable models grounded in various physical, mathematical, and statistical theories, 3. Expanding AI’s application domains through integration with advanced engineering research, such as improving the capabilities of AI-based humanoid robots.   A critical point is that the United States and China maintain significant leadership in both AGI for Science and Science for AGI research than other nations in the world. This indicates that the current substantial gap in AI and scientific research capabilities between leading nations (e.g. U.S., China) and others will continue to widen.   This expanding disparity is likely to appear into an innovation gap, which could subsequently lead to comprehensive divergences in national competitiveness across multiple dimensions, including economic growth and prosperity, social development, and security.   III. Common Challenges   1. Human Capital   Both South Korea and Japan are experiencing significant challenges in cultivating talents in AI and frontier scientific fields due to severe demographic challenges: declining birth rates, aging populations, low enrollment rates in STEM fields, and insufficient doctoral and post-doctoral human resources. South Korea and Japan not only struggle to attract talent due to less competitive compensation and treatment compared to global big tech companies and leading AI nations such as the United States and China, but they also face substantial brain drain.   The cultivation and retention of high level talent is critical in both AGI and scientific research. However, both South Korea and Japan nations face difficulties in talent development and acquisition not only in each domain, but encounter even greater challenges in developing and securing talent in the convergence areas where these two domains intersect.   2. Data   A critical component of AGI is securing high-quality foundational data. While both Korea and Japan maintain strong competitiveness in advanced manufacturing and scientific research, they still face relative deficiencies in both the quantity and quality of sophisticated scientific datasets compared to advanced countries and firms.   As future AGI evolves toward multi-modal intelligence based on diverse forms of data, the variety, volume, and complexity of data become increasingly crucial. However, both nations face difficulties in overcoming their disadvantaged position due to inherent constraints such as population. In this context, several critical challenges emerge: addressing the rapidly approaching shortage of original data, managing synthetic data production and administration, and potentially complementing data deficiencies through bilateral cooperation.   3. Infrastructure & Funding   The training of large language models and conducting cutting-edge scientific research not only need exceptional human capital and high-quality data but also need state-of-the-art infrastructure supported by substantial financial investments.   AI data centers, requiring large number of AI chips each exceeding 30,000 USD, are fundamental to AI training, along with various critical hardware components including power infrastructure. Similarly, advanced scientific research demands high-performance experimental equipment and large-scale fundamental research facilities requiring significant capital investment.   Consequently, the majority of cutting-edge artificial intelligence research revolves around a select few big tech companies capable of sustaining such enormous resource requirements. In fundamental scientific research, the disparity between prestigious universities and other institutions continues to expand exponentially. While both the United States and China are making substantial governmental and corporate investments to secure artificial intelligence competitiveness, it is reasonable to assert that no other nations possess the capability to achieve meaningful economies of scale in scientific research and artificial intelligence investment, either at the corporate or national level.   4. International Governance Fragmentation   Along with the challenges in talent, data, infrastructure, and funding, the most significant challenge in current international AI cooperation is the fragmentation of the global artificial intelligence and science ecosystern due to U.S.-China strategic competition.   The entire ecosystern of AI and scientific research require substantially more rigorous security compliance across all stages—from joint research and resource sharing to talent exchange, technology transfer, and commercialization—compared to previous periods. Furthermore, mechanisms such as U.S. export controls and outbound investment screening have not only diminished the momentum of AI and scientific research exchange between the United States and China but have also significantly impacted international cooperation among major middle power nations.   While this comprehensive securitization of AI and scientific research might be deemed inevitable for national security purposes, it universally diminishes the efficiency of global collaborative research and research productivity. Moreover, this creates an abnormal and distorted environment for the majority of nations that must supplement their domestic innovation ecosystern through international cooperation, except for the few superpowers. Although the U.S.-China scientific and technological agreement has been extended in limited domains in December 2024, decoupling in the most critical AI sectors is likely to further complicate the challenging landscape of international scientific and technological cooperation (Gilbert and Mallapaty 2024).   IV. Cooperation Items   1. Mid-to-Long Term AGI Vision Alignment   Strengthening multi-layered policy vision coherence between the two countries should be the first priority for effectively promoting AGI for Science, Science for AGI cooperation between Korea and Japan with a long-term perspective targeting 2050.   Korea has presented Science and Technology Innovation 2045 and Japan has presented Society 5.0 as national long-term visions. There is a need to jointly explore potential cooperation opportunity to achieve the preferred future that both countries aim to realize through these long-term visions. For example, as both countries’ visions present clear objectives in areas such as aging population, environmental pollution, climate change, disease control, natural disaster and digital transformation, there is a serious need to explore Korea-Japan AI for Science cooperation as a methodology for achieving these goals.   After completing the exploration of joint items at the highest level, there is a need to design and institutionalize specific action plans, roadmaps, and flagship projects at various levels including ministries, agencies, research institutes, companies, and universities. Additionally, the budget required for these long-term cooperation needs to be designed in a flexible and sustainable manner.   Finally, the long-term AGI for Science, Science for AGI cooperation vision between the two countries should be actively communicated and resonated with civil society in both countries. Currently citizens of both countries share common concerns about social impacts from excessive technological development, and international cooperation in cutting-edge technology fields needs to more transparently convey its necessity, legitimacy, and safety to the citizens of the partner country.   1. Vision alignment: Joint policy frameworks development, shared research roadmaps, coordinated investment strategies, regular high-level dialogues, regulatory harmonization, shared compliance frameworks, joint foresight mechanisms, joint exploration committee   2. Civil society: Education programs, social impact assessment, transparency initiatives, cultural exchange programs   2. Trans-generation AGI for Science, Science for AGI Project   One of the most representative tasks for promoting long-term AGI for Science, Science for AGI cooperation between Korea and Japan is designing a trans-generation project between the two countries. This project goes beyond simply providing research funding for significantly longer periods. It supports full-cycle cooperation (planning, design, implementation) of core research groups between two countries, along with joint commercialization of key research outcomes and collaborative development of core talent.   Furthermore, from a long-term perspective, we need to identify grand challenge research topics that are hyper-risky for the private sector to operate. Rather than supporting research with high success probability that marginally improves the world, both countries should support game-changing, breakthrough research that could transform the world with higher possibility of failure.   Currently, with few exceptions, universities in Korea and Japan have mandatory retirement ages, and research achievements accumulated over long periods by senior researchers are often lost or leaked externally without proper transmission. To improve this systern, we should support the post-retirement activities of distinguished scholars and foster trans-generational cooperation between the two countries by matching them with new junior talent who will inherit their expertise.   1. Trans-humanoid intelligent systerns: surpassing both human intellectual and physical constraints, integrating advanced AI with robotic capabilities, enhancing human-machine interaction capabilities   2. Next generation high performance & eco-friendly infrastructure: ultra-high speed processing capabilities, ultra-low power consumption systerns, ultra-low carbon emission infrastructure   3. Frontier AI model (post transformer) for life extension: AGI model with extraordinary performance, no complex risk and lower dependency on data for solving grand challenge such as life extension   3. AGI for Post-SDGs   Finally, Korea and Japan need to jointly design projects on how to achieve post-SDGs using AGI after the current SDGs end in 2030. Recent studies measuring AI’s impacts on sustainable development have shown very positive effects in all areas except gender equality and international cooperation. However, if we fail to address various current limitations and dependencies, the emergence of AGI with far more powerful capabilities than present could potentially have greater negative impacts on our future sustainability goals.   [Figure 2] AI’s impact on SDGs Source: (Vinuesa et al. 2020).   Therefore, Korean-Japanese cooperation should be planned to complement various side effects that occurred in the existing AI for SDGs domain and to predict and solve problems likely to arise in the future AGI for SDGs era. In this process, the problems that need to be solved using AGI should be divided into global challenges and regional challenges.   1. AGI for Next Grand Challenges: Development of solutions that predict and prevent the emergence of global challenges such as pandemics, climate change, biodiversity loss, and natural disasters, and AI inequalities.   2. AGI for Next Regional Challenges: Development of solutions to address socioeconomic polarization between classes and regions in social services (such as healthcare, education, and mobility) caused by aging population and low birth rates. ■   References   Gilbert, Natasha, and Smriti Mallapaty. 2024. “US and China Sign New Science Pact—but with Severe Restrictions.” Nature.   Google. 2024. “9 Ways AI Is Advancing Science.” Google Blog, November 18. https://blog.google/technology/ai/google-ai-big-scientific-breakthroughs-2024/.   Google DeepMind. n.d. “Our Mission: Build AI Responsibly to Benefit Humanity.” DeepMind. https://deepmind.google/about/.   Mitchell, Melanie. 2024. “Debates on the Nature of Artificial General Intelligence.” Science 383(6689): eado7069.   Vinuesa, Ricardo, et al. 2020. “The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.” Nature Communications 11(1): 233.   Wang, Hanchen, et al. 2023. “Scientific Discovery in the Age of Artificial Intelligence.” Nature 620(7972): 47-60.     ■ Seoin Baek is Assistant Professor at Hanyang University ERICA.     ■ Typeset by Chaerin Kim, Research Assistant     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

I. Introduction Economic cooperation between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan is no longer just about promoting trade and investment. In the era of U.S.-China competition, joint efforts to respond to the securitization of the economy have been much discussed recently. It is not surprising that the discussions on bilateral economic cooperation at the 2023 Korea-Japan summits have focused on economic security policy cooperation. Cooperation in economic security policy is arguably one of the most important ways for the ROK and Japan to dually respond to recent geopolitical and geoeconomic global structural changes. Furthermore, it is necessary to move beyond economic security policy cooperation to produce a joint response to effectively overcome the political economic trends of de-globalization.   However, from a more long-term perspective, economic cooperation between the ROK and Japan should also consider that both countries are out of the growth stage. Even if the unpredictable situation of U.S.-China competition gets lifted in any form, this will not change the post-growth nature of both countries’ economies. The presence and influence of both countries in terms of economic size will shrink amid demographic changes of a shrinking population and aging. In this context, the ROK and Japan should find ways to maintain their competitiveness in the global economy, and to do so, they will need to pool their wisdom. This article is intended to propose the long-term direction of economic cooperation between the ROK and Japan.   II. Challenges to the ROK and Japan around 2050   1. U.S.- China Competition and De-globalization   While China’s economic growth has long been expected to challenge the U.S.-led international order, the conflict was not realized until the 2000s. However, in the 2010s, as China’s challenge to the U.S.-led international order became more explicit, the United States gradually adopted a more proactive stance in response. The U.S.-China trade conflict, sparked by the first Trump administration, soon became linked to the two countries’ high-tech competition (Blackwill and Fontaine 2024). This trend has intensified under the Biden administration. Both decoupling and de-risking imply the balancing posture of the U.S. toward China’s economic growth and technological autonomy.   The U.S.-China competition has led to interdependence’s weaponization. Interdependence is no longer mutually beneficial in the economic securitization initiated by the U.S.-China competition (Farell and Newman 2023). Trade, energy, and resource dependence have become political weaknesses in recent years. For the ROK and Japan, which have developed as trading nations in the liberal international order, economic securitization has meant a deterioration in the international economic environment.   However, U.S.-China competition is not the sole reason for de-globalization. The current trend of de-globalization had already arisen after the Global Financial Crisis in the late 2000s (James 2018). Most countries have seen a decline in the preference for free trade policies and a strengthening of political voices in favor of domestic protectionism. The preference for de-globalization politics, linked to the rise of populism worldwide, is symbolized by twice Trump’s wins in the U.S. presidential elections (Gusterson 2017).   The U.S.-China rivalry is also expected to be quite prolonged. However, even if it ends sooner than expected in any form, de-globalization is likely to remain robust in the longer term. In the post-war world order, the ROK and Japan were not active supporters of protectionism or de-globalization trends, and it is clear that the current trend of de-globalization is also harmful to both countries’ future.   2. Low Growth and Mature Economies Korea and Japan are also similar in that both countries are in a condition of low growth. Japan’s low growth has been a phenomenon for more than 30 years, but unlike the cyclical nature of the 1990s, it has stemmed from structural problems in the Japanese economy since the 2000s. The escape from low growth through structural reforms that eliminate inefficiencies in Japan’s economic structure is a persistent theme in Japanese political economic discourse (Gao 2000). However, even with structural reforms, Japan’s maximum potential growth rate is lower than in the past. It is because Japan’s low growth is now originated from the maturity of its economic structure.   The Japanese story is repeated in the ROK. The ROK’s slide into low growth has been much more rapid. The ROK’s and Japan’s per capita have become similar in recent years because the ROK has experienced relatively high growth since the 1990s, while Japan has been sluggish. However, the fact that the ROK’s growth rate was lower than Japan’s in 2023 is an important indicator. It means that the ROK is following Japan’s experience of transitioning to low growth.   The low growth of the ROK and Japan may not be a problem, as it has stemmed from the maturation of their economic structures. However, it raises the question of whether the current low growth status can be sustained in the face of population shrinking and aging. Furthermore, the ROK and Japan will inevitably become less significant in the future global economy regarding their quantitative portion. By 2050, Japan is projected to drop to the sixth largest economy in the world, and the ROK will struggle to maintain its current top 15 ranking ([Figure 1]). Higher economic growth rates in emerging economies are expected to drive this. Though uncertainties remain about the economic prospects of these economies, their growing presence in the global economy is inevitable.   [Figure 1] Projections for the World’s Largest Economies (measured in USD)   The ROK and Japan share a common future challenge in that it will be difficult to maintain the current low growth rate due to demographic changes, and it will be challenging to maintain their position in the global economy. Therefore, they are in the same situation; they must innovate their social structures and actively engage with emerging economies.   III. ROK-Japan Economic Cooperation, Old and New   The ROK-Japan economic relations have shifted from a “vertical asymmetrical relationship” to a “horizontal symmetrical relationship” like the overall ROK-Japan relations (Kimiya 2021). This is a classic example of the “flying geese” model (Kojima 2000). Japan’s commercial loans and foreign direct investment in the ROK’s early industrialization are highly critical. The ROK-Japan economic cooperation since the 1960s has shaped the asymmetrical relationship between the two countries. Capital investment and technological cooperation from Japan play an important role in the ROK’s economic development (Abe 2015).   However, economic asymmetries between the ROK and Japan were mitigated due to Japan’s prolonged recession and the ROK’s economic success. The ROK’s trade dependence on Japan has steadily decreased as the country’s industrialization has progressed. As the ROK successfully shifted from a labor-intensive industrial structure to the same type of industrial structure as Japan, the level of competition in the global market increased. This trend results from the ROK’s effective strategic choices in economic development. With the development of global value chains, the direct trade and production relationship between the ROK and Japan has become less direct (Kim 2015).   Economic cooperation incentives are not clear from the perspective of trade and investment. New momentum in bilateral economic cooperation is rarely seen in the symmetrical relationship between the ROK and Japan. Apart from high interdependence at the firm level, it has become difficult to find logic and incentives for the two governments to cooperate in the economic sphere.   However, governments should adopt new perspectives on their rationales for bilateral economic cooperation. Rather than emphasizing increasing trade and investment, the ROK and Japan can cooperate to respond to challenges related to de-globalization and shrinking. The ROK and Japan share these challenges nowadays. The new direction of ROK-Japan economic cooperation should focus on addressing these common challenges together.   IV. Cooperation Against De-Globalization First, the ROK-Japan economic cooperation should be given to the two countries’ joint response to the de-globalization trend amid the US-China strategic competition and efforts to restore the liberal order of the global economic architecture.   1. Supply Chain Stability In the era of the U.S.-China competition, the securitization of the economy has become a global trend. The re-emphasis on shrinking risks and increasing one’s capabilities in economic and industrial structures is now prevailing in most countries’ policies as a name of economic security policies (Drezner et al. 2021). There are common characteristics in economic security policies: 3P. Most governments’ economic security policies are organized as protection, promotion, and partnership.   How is the ROK-Japan partnership in economic security policies well incorporated with their own protection policy and promotion policy? Between the ROK and Japan, partnership for protection is supply chain cooperation, whereas partnership for promotion is cooperation in developing future emerging technologies. Both partnerships have been incorporated in all statements of the bilateral summit between President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida and the trilateral summit among the U.S., the ROK, and Japan in Camp David (Office of the President 2023a; 2023b; 2023c).   Partnerships for protection are likely to be developed comparatively faster. The ROK and Japan share the same condition in the global production systern: high foreign dependence on energy and raw materials. Since the 2000s, the PRC has been active in weaponizing its dominant position in the supply chain. Japan experienced a Chinese rare earth embargo during the 2010 Senkaku dispute, and the ROK experienced Chinese economic retaliation following the deployment of THAAD in 2016. Supply chain stability for Japan and the ROK aims to avoid unilateral dependence on China. However, in the context of de-globalization, the policy target of securing supply chain stability is expanding. Measures such as diversifying import lines, domestic stockpiling, and strengthening domestic production systerns are required to secure supply chain stability. Diversification of import lines, joint stockpiling, and mutual supply cooperation for items highly dependent on overseas markets have become a core part of cooperation for economic security policies between the ROK and Japan. Both governments have already agreed to strengthen supply chains for hydrogen and ammonia (The Japan Times 2024).   In addition, the two governments agreed that both countries’ corporations would jointly invest in a third-country project funded by a government financial organization and work together to build a supply chain (METI News Release 2024). In economic security, supply chain cooperation is one of the fastest moving and most necessary aspects of cooperation. Furthermore, joint measures to respond to energy supply chain instability, secure sea lane stability, and establish a hydrogen economy are being explored as bilateral functional cooperation between the two governments.   2. New Global Rule Setting   Recent global economic security policy trends are also linked to a boom in the state’s active involvement in industrial policy. In most industrialized countries and emerging economies, deregulation and neoliberal economic policies are no longer welcome. While this is linked to the growing political preference for de-globalization in many countries, the view that the state should be more active in securing future national competitiveness is more widely accepted (Mazzucato 2021). The state’s active involvement in economic and industrial policy, often referred to as New Industrial Policy, is in line with recent trends in technological innovation (Tyson and Zysman 2023).   Developed and emerging economies seek to increase their technological competitiveness in the newly emerging advanced technologies. The global economy’s central industries and core technologies fluctuate with technological innovations. Both the ROK and Japan are making government investments in emerging technologies, and there has been recent talk of bilateral cooperation on emerging technology development.   Another dimension of bilateral cooperation on emerging technologies is cooperation in shaping international norms for emerging technologies. Digital economization, coupled with the development of emerging technologies in cyber and AI, makes it challenging to deal with traditional trade rules. Moreover, with the WTO, the center of traditional trade rules, already dysfunctional, international norms that ensure the stable use of emerging technologies are still under discussion. The problem is that the U.S. and China, which should play a central role in shaping international norms for emerging technologies, are engaged in mutually exclusive norm-setting efforts. While many experts argue that a bilateral agreement on emerging technologies would be the most effective and necessary, there is widespread skepticism about its feasibility (Huq 2024).   The ROK and Japan are working together to join the U.S. and developed countries to form international norms. Significantly, the G7 has recently become a critical stage for forging international norms on AI and cyber technology. As a member of the G7, Japan has significant positional power in the G7-centered international norm formation process. Although the ROK is a partner country of the G7, it has a competitive edge in emerging technologies. Under increasing uncertainties of the Trump administration, the G7 platform should be complemented by cooperation among like-minded countries. To Japan and the ROK, the EU (and the UK) is the crucial partner in the global norm-setting. It is also necessary to advance the ROK-Japan bilateral cooperation in these areas.   V. Cooperation Against Shrinking In the 21st century, the ROK and Japan are unlikely to maintain their positions in the global GDP rankings. Various ways to maintain national competitiveness should be explored, and cooperation strategies between the ROK and Japan could be considered.   1. Technology Development Cooperation for Responding Tasks   Developing emerging technologies are also considered significant in the economic security policies of most countries. Cooperation on technological development has been an essential topic in the discussions on economic security policy cooperation between the ROK and Japan. However, cooperation on emerging technology development between the two countries is a long-term challenge compared to supply chain cooperation. There are clear complementarities as well as competitiveness in many industrial sectors of the two. It is not easy for two countries that have been competing in the global market to establish large-scale cooperation on developing emerging technologies, which will be a key part of their industrial competitiveness in the future, in a short period.   However, there is a lot of space for the ROK and Japan to work together on how to utilize emerging technologies. While emerging technologies are a source of future national competitiveness in themselves, they are also a method to respond to the demographic challenges in both countries. Increased care needs due to a growing elderly and labor shortages due to a declining working-age population are among the biggest concerns for the future of both countries. There is not enough labor supply to meet the growing demand for social services caused by the elderly. There is a broad consensus among policymakers that the working-age population should be directed to the more productive sectors. Finding ways to not only meet the care needs of the elderly but also to effectively maintain society in the face of a shrinking labor supply is a challenge for both the ROK and Japan in an era of population decline.   The idea of using emerging technologies to compensate for the labor shortages we face in an era of shrinking populations is an old one. But for the ROK and Japan, it needs to be done now. Of course, a technocratic view in which technological innovation completely replaces labor is not practical (Acemoglu and Johnson 2023). Instead, new technologies such as AI and cyber have recently emerged as important in maximizing labor productivity.   The ROK and Japan can cooperate in developing technologies such as AI and cyber, but there is also a lot of room for cooperation in using technology to respond to various societal challenges in the era of population decline. This is where the Strategic Innovation Program (SIP), which Japan has been promoting for over a decade, comes into play (Cabinet Office 2024). Rather than focusing on developing specific technologies, SIP emphasizes the convergent use of technologies to respond to various social challenges. Over the five-year period from 2023 to 2027, a total of 14 technology development issues were targeted for support under the SIP, including building a sustainable food chain, building an integrated healthcare systern, building an inclusive community platform, building a platform to realize learning and working methods in the era of the pandemic, building a maritime security platform, building a smart energy management systern, building a circular economy systern, building a smart disaster prevention network, building a smart infrastructure management systern, building a smart mobility platform, developing basic technologies and rules for the expansion of human-collaborative robots, developing basic technologies and rules for the expansion of the virtual economy, promoting the application of advanced quantum technologies to social problems, and building an ecosystern for innovation and incubation of material commercialization. These selected tasks have in common the use of advanced technologies to solve various social problems such as aging, population decline, and local extinction.   Technological cooperation between the ROK and Japan can be pursued not only in developing technologies themselves but also in finding wisdom on how to utilize technology for social tasks in the age of declining population. Using the SIP as a platform, government officials from both countries must discuss the possibilities of cooperation for problem-based technology utilization cooperation between the ROK and Japan.   2. Deepening Ties with the Global South   As emerging economies, represented by the Global South, become increasingly important, Korea and Japan seek to deepen economic ties with them through trade, investment, and infrastructure development cooperation. The Global South countries have again raised North-South issues without falling into either side of the US-China rivalry (Ito 2023). To Japan, the rise of Global South demands the necessity of developing their ODA and infrastructure investment policies. It would be one of hedging strategies against US-China competition (Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty 2024).   Japan’s problem is that it is difficult to maintain the level of quantitative expansion in ODA and infrastructure investment in emerging economies to counter China’s aggressive offensive over the past decade. Japan and the ROK must further strengthen their cooperation in ODA and infrastructure investment to target emerging economies. Joint investment in infrastructure markets in third countries has always been discussed as a method of bilateral economic cooperation.   As the ROK and Japan seek to develop ties with emerging economies, knowledge-sharing projects are becoming essential. As leading examples of countries that have experienced growth through connectivity to the global market, sharing their development experiences with countries seeking similar growth paths will help enhance their engagement with emerging economies. In the future, the ROK and Korea could collaborate to provide knowledge-sharing projects to emerging countries.   VI. Building Roadmap for Future Development Cooperation in North Korea Since the maturation of their economic structures, both the ROK and Japan have had experience in pursuing wealth acquisition through increased overseas investment. Even now, investment in emerging economies in the Global South is essential for both countries to maintain their economic influence in the global economy. However, a space near both countries could be a promising investment area for the future: North Korea. North Korea remains an undeveloped region close to the ROK and Japan. Due to geopolitical considerations, the ROK’s and Japan’s involvement in developing these regions is currently not feasible. However, from a longer perspective, North Korea could provide momentum for economic revitalization in both countries. If North Korea is integrated into the international community and connected to global markets, the ROK and Japan will have the closest source of low-wage, skilled labor for investment.   Even if development cooperation in North Korea is not immediately feasible, Japan and the ROK can work together to devise a roadmap for it. It is possible to discuss the creation of a joint investment fund between the ROK and Japan. The ROK and Japan could consider jointly investing in the North Korean Development Trust Fund or Northeast Asian Development Bank, which had been considered a policy tool for opening up North Korea to the ROK in the past.   North Korea’s infrastructure development is believed to require vast financial resources. When North Korea opened up, calculations in the 2010s estimated that it would need KRW 306 trillion in infrastructure investment in the first 10 years (Park 2019). The primary responsibility for financing this is obviously the North Korean government, but it is unlikely that North Korea will be able to take on this role. In the long term, as North Korea opens up to the world and becomes more connected to global markets and international finance, it will be necessary for Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and private banks to provide development cooperation funding and develop public-private partnership financing. However, North Korea’s current lack of connectivity to international financial markets and unfamiliarity with international financial norms make it difficult for the country to move directly to this type of financing. Given the unique nature of inter-Korean relations, the ROK is considered the most likely non-North Korean source for infrastructure investment. However, it is not realistic to expect the ROK to cover all or even most of North Korea’s infrastructure construction needs.   It has been discussed that the most realistic international cooperation for infrastructure investment in North Korea would be establishing a multi-donor trust fund funded by relevant countries, including the ROK. The idea is to establish a North Korea Development Trust Fund and entrust its management to the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank (Lee 2014). The North Korea Development Trust Fund is the most realistic multilateral international cooperation option for infrastructure investment in North Korea in the post-nuclear era, before North Korea’s membership in the IMF is realized.   Multilateral trust funds are funds contributed by multiple donors for specific development purposes and projects and administered in consultation with the government of the recipient country through an international management agency, usually a United Nations organization or an international financial institution such as the World Bank, which is designated as a management agency to manage the fund and support projects. Since the 2000s, it has been used to fight hunger, improve health, and reconstruct conflict zones in poor countries under the management of the United Nations Development Group or the World Bank.   In addition to the multilateral framework centered on the MDBs, international cooperation on infrastructure investment in North Korea can also be organized at the regional level. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which is currently no different from other MDBs, has implications for international cooperation on infrastructure investment in North Korea because it was founded as a regional cooperation framework with a non-economic political goal of supporting the transition from socialism in the former Eastern Bloc countries (Yoon 2014).   Discussions on establishing an MDB specialized for the Northeast Asian region have been ongoing since the 1990s, with talk of establishing a Northeast Asian Development Bank. The need for additional international financing for development needs in Northeast Asia was discussed during the post-Cold War regionalism boom, and there was considerable consensus on the need for a Northeast Asia Development Bank in the early 1990s, as proposed by former ROK Prime Minister Nam Deok-woo and the Tokyo Foundation in Japan. In the early 1990s, China’s Northeast and Russia’s eastern regions were underdeveloped and not sufficiently resourced to meet their development finance needs. However, after China’s economic growth and Russia’s stabilization, no Northeast Asian countries were eligible except for Mongolia. In the 2000s, the ROK reactivated the idea of a Northeast Asian Development Bank and discussed using it to finance North Korean development (Zang 2014).   Although it has been discussed as a regional cooperative financing organization for development cooperation in North Korea, the Northeast Asian Development Bank concept is unlikely to play a leading role and differentiate itself from other MDBs in supporting North Korea. However, exploring a regional institutional framework in addition to the multilateral framework for international cooperation on infrastructure investment in North Korea is significant in diversifying cooperation. If North Korea returns to the international community, discussions on linking regional development initiatives to North Korean development will evolve. While regional development initiatives may compete in North Korea, it will be necessary to establish a cooperative framework to effectively integrate regional development initiatives into infrastructure investment in North Korea. While unrealistic in the short term, a strategic joint contribution between the ROK and Japan to the North Korea Development Trust Fund or the Northeast Asian Development Bank is a long-term consideration.   VII. Conclusion Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, economic cooperation has been a central pillar in the development of the ROK-Japan relations over the past 60 years. However, economic cooperation focusing on promoting investment and trade has become less effective as their economic relationship has changed. Instead, cooperation on economic security policies has emerged as a central theme in the current U.S.-China rivalry, and cooperation on economic security policies is likely to drive bilateral economic cooperation for the foreseeable future.   In the longer term, however, the ROK and Japan will also need to jointly address concerns about their diminishing presence in the international community stemming from low growth and demographic change. To this end, technological cooperation to address social tasks arising from demographic decline and cooperation to increase engagement in the Global South will be crucially considered. Furthermore, although geopolitically unrealistic at this moment, joint efforts to bring North Korea into the international community should not be forgotten.■   References   Cabinet Office. “Cross-ministerial Strategic Innovation Promotion Program (in Japanese).” https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/gaiyo/sip/index.html (Accessed December 31, 2024). Goldman Sachs. 2022. The Path to 2075 — Slower Global Growth, But Convergence Remains Intact. https://www.goldmansachs.com/.../report.pdf (Accessed December 31, 2024). Huq, Aziz. 2024. “A World Divided Over Artificial Intelligence: Geopolitics Gets in the Way of Global Regulation of a Powerful Technology.” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/.../world-divided-over-artificial-intelligence (Accessed December 31, 2024). Ito, Tory. 2023. “India’s ‘Global South’ Diplomacy and How Japan Should Respond.” http://ssdpaki.la.coocan.jp/proposals/145.html (Accessed December 31, 2024). METI News Release. 2024. “Japan-Korea Director-General Meeting Held in the Field of Hydrogen and Derivatives, Including Ammonia.” February 16. https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/0216_001.html (Accessed December 31, 2024). Office of the President. 2023a. “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States.” August 13. https://www.president.go.kr/newsroom/press/yeE9qWlT (Accessed December 31, 2024). ______. 2023b. “Joint Press Conference on the Korea-Japan Summit.” March 16. https://www.president.go.kr/president/speeches/qBjKQLZX (Accessed December 31, 2024). ______. 2023c. “Joint Press Conference on the Korea-Japan Summit.” May 8. https://www.president.go.kr/president/speeches/fVLH4DuS (Accessed December 31, 2024). The Japan Times. 2023. “Tokyo and Seoul to set up hydrogen and ammonia supply chain: report.” November 10. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2023/11/10/japan-south-korea-ammonia-hydrogen/ (Accessed December 31, 2024). Tyson, Laura and Zysman, John. 2023. “The New Industrial Policy and Its Critics.” Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org/.../the-case-for-new-industrial-policy.     ■ Junghwan Lee is Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.     ■ Typeset by Sheewon Min,  Research Associate;  Chaerin Kim, Research Assistant     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

The year 2050 is now just a quarter-century away. However, the coming 25 years will be a transformative period that could fundamentally reshape the foundations of global politics. The dynamics of great power relations will shift, and the rise of emerging economies will become even more pronounced. In this evolving landscape, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan must reconsider the conventional wisdom long adhered to and redefine their strategic approach to an increasingly complex world.   As ROK and Japan look toward 2050, their relationship must adapt to an era of geopolitical uncertainty, economic transformation, and societal change. By adopting pragmatic strategies and leveraging shared strengths, both nations can ensure that the partnership remains resilient and prepared—not only for their national interests, but for regional and global stability. Achieving this will require a multidimensional approach that strengthens security cooperation, fosters economic innovation, advances sustainability efforts, and cultivates leaders of a new generation committed to a forward-looking partnership.   I. Security Cooperation for Regional Stability   The security landscape in Northeast Asia is becoming increasingly complex. As North Korea enhances its nuclear capabilities and deepens its strategic ties with Russia, ensuring long-term stability on the Korean Peninsula, even under high tensions, requires every effort to maintain stability. At the same time, the goal of achieving North Korea’s complete denuclearization must be upheld, and every opportunity to advance this objective should be seized.   Despite these shared concerns, security coordination remains limited. The U.S.-ROK alliance prioritizes deterring North Korea, while the U.S.-Japan alliance addresses broader regional threats. However, beyond immediate security challenges, South Korea and Japan must consider how their cooperation can contribute to long-term U.S.-China strategic stability. A more strategic and structured partnership is needed to reinforce regional deterrence while mitigating the risks of escalating tensions.   Though strengthening trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. forms the foundation for this effort, Seoul and Tokyo must also pursue independent strategies to manage their respective relations with China. While maintaining deterrence remains a priority, neither country can afford excessive confrontation with Beijing, given their deep economic interdependence. A balanced approach that enhances deterrence while preserving channels for diplomatic engagement will be essential for managing regional stability.   To strengthen cooperation, Hirohito Ogi proposes a framework of “Foundational Cooperation,” emphasizing logistical coordination, intelligence sharing, and joint defense production without requiring identical security commitments. Practical steps forward include enhanced missile defense collaboration, strengthened cybersecurity measures, and expanded joint exercises. While differences in strategic priorities persist, deeper cooperation is essential for long-term stability. South Korea and Japan must shift from reactive security policies to a proactive, structured defense partnership, to ensure resilience against evolving regional threats.   II. Economic Security and Industrial Competitiveness   South Korea and Japan have been among the first nations to respond to the growing securitization of the global economy, as they jointly recognized the need to balance economic resilience with industrial competitiveness. Economic security has become a central pillar of the bilateral relations of the two countries in response to growing supply chain disruptions and rising geopolitical tensions. Both nations understand the importance of securing critical supply chains—particularly in semiconductors and strategic minerals—while ensuring that economic security policies do not hinder technological innovation. From Japan’s perspective, long-term trade stability and strategic alignment in key sectors such as advanced manufacturing, robotics, and quantum computing are paramount in importance. Meanwhile, Korean experts call for preventing excessive economic fragmentation, resulting from over-securitization.   Despite these shared concerns, differences persist in trade policy and technology standardization. Tokyo has prioritized regional economic frameworks such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). On the other hand, Seoul has taken a more flexible approach, balancing economic diversification with domestic industrial policies. However, both nations have a mutual interest in reducing trade friction and maintaining technological leadership. Establishing a ROK-Japan economic security dialogue could serve as a platform to coordinate industrial policy, enhance supply chain resilience, and promote regulatory alignment in emerging technologies.   III. Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies   The rapid evolution of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is reshaping economies, security frameworks, and social structures. Both South Korea and Japan are well-positioned to be global leaders in this domain. However, while both nations have developed ambitious AI strategies, different approaches reflect distinct policy priorities. South Korea has focused on ultra-large AI models and infrastructure expansion, aiming for rapid integration across industries. In contrast, Japan has embedded AI within its Society 5.0 vision, underscoring human-centered AI governance and ethical deployment.   Despite these differences, there is strong potential for bilateral alignment in AI governance models to ensure that AI-driven innovations adhere to ethical, safety, and transparency standards. A key area of convergence lies in the development of AI guidelines for data governance, cybersecurity, and algorithmic transparency. Additionally, both countries recognize the necessity of joint AI applications in healthcare, disaster response, and eldercare robotics, particularly as they navigate similar demographic challenges.   However, aligning data-sharing policies and regulatory frameworks remains a challenge. Japan has traditionally favored a cautious, phased regulatory approach, while South Korea has demonstrated a greater willingness to experiment with AI-driven automation in industrial sectors. To bridge these gaps, a ‘ROK-Japan AI and Digital Economy Task Force’ could serve as a platform for policy dialogue, regulatory coordination, and collaborative research on key AI applications. Such cooperation would enhance technological leadership, increasing the contribution to shaping global AI governance.   IV. Energy, Climate, and Sustainability Cooperation   Though achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 is a shared policy objective for both the ROK and Japan, their energy transition strategies differ based on divergent national priorities. Seoul has renewed its focus on nuclear power and hydrogen energy to strengthen energy security. On the other hand, Tokyo has balanced nuclear energy with hydrogen and ammonia-based energy innovations to diversify its decarbonization efforts.   A key area for deeper collaboration is joint hydrogen supply chain development, where both nations can coordinate infrastructure investment, technological standardization, and regulatory frameworks. It would also be promising to cooperate in carbon capture and storage (CCS), renewable energy integration, and green finance, which would enhance regional leadership in clean energy technologies.   Despite such different policy orientations, particularly regarding the pace and scope of nuclear energy expansion, incremental steps toward cooperation could include joint research on nuclear safety, advanced reactor technology, and next-generation energy solutions. By leveraging their complementary strengths, South Korea and Japan can drive innovation in sustainable energy and establish a cooperative framework for addressing global climate challenges.   V. Cooperation vis-à-vis Common Domestic Challenges   Both South Korea and Japan face rapid population decline, labor shortages, and an aging society, requiring innovative policy solutions to sustain economic growth and social stability. While Japan has prioritized automation and human-machine teaming, South Korea has focused on structural labor reforms and digital adaptation. These strategies are not mutually exclusive; they create opportunities for joint research and policy collaboration in workforce automation, digital healthcare, and labor mobility.   Beyond economic and technological adaptation, societal engagement between the two countries will foster long-term trust and cooperation. Despite historical tensions, both nations recognize the value of expanding cultural exchanges, student mobility programs, and professional training partnerships. Strengthening these people-to-people channels will guarantee that future generations acknowledge ROK-Japan relations not through the lens of past conflicts, but as shared opportunities and a common vision for the future.   VI. Youth as Catalysts that Shape a New Era of Bilateral Relations   Public opinion surveys indicate that younger generations in South Korea and Japan are more open to bilateral engagement than older demographics. Their interactions—whether in cultural industries, technology start-ups, or environmental activism—demonstrate a willingness to collaborate beyond the constraints of historical grievances and shape a more forward-looking relationship.   To sustain this momentum, Seoul and Tokyo should expand youth-led initiatives in technology, sustainability, and entrepreneurship, fostering long-term engagement. A bilateral youth innovation fund could support start-ups focused on climate solutions, digital transformation, and creative industries, while cross-border leadership programs could cultivate the policy and business leaders of the next generation dedicated to deepening bilateral cooperation. By empowering young leaders and institutionalizing these initiatives, South Korea and Japan can lay the foundation for a resilient, future-oriented partnership.   VII. Conclusion: A Shared Vision for 2050   When it comes to the bilateral relationship between the two nations, South Korea and Japan stand at a pivotal juncture. Choices made by the countries today—on security, economic policy, AI cooperation, energy collaboration, and societal adaptation—will not only shape their trajectories but also influence the broader regional and global order. By adopting a strategic and pragmatic approach, both nations can set exemplary examples as they demonstrate that cooperation remains the most effective path even amid geopolitical fragmentation.   Sustained progress requires institutional mechanisms that deepen security, economic, and technological cooperation while actively engaging with future generations. The ability to align security priorities with economic and technological competitiveness, navigate geopolitical tensions while maintaining diplomatic flexibility, and address domestic challenges with long-term sustainability will determine whether Seoul and Tokyo can emerge as key architects of the regional order in the Indo Pacific.   To achieve this vision, it is imperative that political, economic, and academic leaders continue sincere and constructive dialogue. The commitment to open and forward-looking discussions across these sectors will be essential in navigating uncertainties and ensuring a stable, cooperative future. As we approach 2050, fostering an enduring framework for engagement is not merely an option—it is a collective responsibility of the two countries.   By embracing resilient and forward-looking cooperation, South Korea and Japan can transform their partnership into a global model, shaping a more stable and prosperous regional order in the decades ahead. ■     ■ Ken Jimbo is President of the Asia Pacific Initiative and Professor of International Relations at Keio University.     ■ Typeset by Sheewon Min,  Research Associate;  Chaerin Kim, Research Assistant     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

I. Introduction   The population decline, a pressing issue attributed to aging and low birth rates, is a common and urgent challenge for Japan and South Korea. Japan’s population peaked in 2008; since then, it has declined for 15 consecutive years. In 2023, the Japanese elderly population (aged 65 or over) reached 29.1% — the highest in the world (Cabinet Office 2024). Similarly, South Korea’s population peaked in 2020 and has decreased. As of 2024, its elderly population is projected to account for 19.2% of the total population (Statistics Korea 2024).   Japan is at the forefront among aging countries. As of 2023, Japan’s total population—both Japanese and foreign residents—is 124.88 million, a decrease of about 530,000 from 2022. Although the number of foreign residents has increased at a record pace, the number of Japanese nationals alone decreased to 121.56 million, by 86 thousand people (-0.7%) from 2022, the largest decrease ever (NHK 2024).   This article will discuss the common challenges brought about by population decline in Japan and South Korea; specific challenges for Japan; the relationship between population decline and national power; and issues for future cooperation between Japan and South Korea towards 2050.   II. Common Challenges   Japan and South Korea face several common challenges regarding population decline. First is the heavy burden of the social security systern on national finances. The number of elderly people continues to rise while the working-age population rapidly decreases. Working-age population supports the social security systern based on intergenerational support. Aging and population decline are becoming enormous burdens for Japanese fiscal policy.   Japan’s social security expenses account for 22.4% of its GDP in 2024. Given the severe security situation involving North Korea, China, and Russia, the Japanese government aims to expand its defense expenditure to around 2% of GDP. Hence, Japan spends around 11 times of its defense spending on its social security.   Second, it is becoming more difficult to recruit young first responders. Japan and South Korea face common security threats—North Korea, China, and Russia. Also, the two nations suffer from natural disasters, including typhoons and earthquakes. In order to respond to national security threats and natural disasters, maintaining the number of first responders, such as military personnel, firefighters, and law enforcement officials (police and coastguard), is essential. Given the population decline, crisis management bodies are competing to hire skilled talent. The new challenge for them is to attract female first responders, considering the emergence of requirements for diversity and inclusion. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) tried to recruit 20,000 officers in 2023, but they only managed to hire 10,000 (Cabinet Secretariat of Japan 2024).   Third is Aging China. Similar to Japan and South Korea, China is also struggling with an aging society and population decline. Chinese population started to decline in 2022. China’s rapid promotion of self-reliance and indigenous innovation in the medical equipment sector poses potential economic security risks for the Japanese government and companies. Some Japanese firms view China’s “very warm welcome” to medical sector investments, followed by a push for domestic independence, as a threat to their existing operations. For both Japan and South Korea, the reality of population decline signals an urgent need to develop and deploy robots and AI. Meanwhile, China is rapidly enhancing its robot technology. As with EV batteries and solar panels, issues of economic security arise if reliance on Chinese robotics technology becomes excessive.   Fourth, Japan and South Korea share concerns about the disappearance of local municipalities. Local communities risk losing social and medical infrastructure, as well as social security services, due to depopulation.   III. Impact of Predicting “Potentially Disappearing Municipalities”   In Japan, population decline is particularly serious in rural areas (as well as in some wards of Tokyo) with low birth rates. Depopulation and a shortage of manpower raise the question of how to maintain and develop local service provisions.   Of the 1,718 municipalities in Japan, more than half (885, or about 52%) are officially categorized as depopulated municipalities, making the maintenance of basic services a nationwide issue. Because of lower population density and labor shortages, businesses are being forced to downsize or withdraw from certain areas. In depopulated areas, it is increasingly difficult to provide essential services, leaving many elderly people as “shopping refugees.” Industries most affected include wholesale and retail, logistics, nursing care, healthcare, education, childcare, after-school care, housekeeping support, funeral services, gas stations, and local transportation. Profit-driven companies often struggle to continue operating in areas with declining populations, while local governments’ ability to provide basic services is also limited.   In 2014, a group of experts conducted an analysis of the sustainability of 1,729 municipalities across Japan. The group, Japan Policy Council, chaired by former Iwate Prefecture Governor Hiroya Masuda, indicated that 896 municipalities could disappear between 2010 and 2040. That estimate was received in Japan with shock.   Ten years later, an analysis by a largely similar group of the experts—the Population Strategy Council (Chairman: Akio Mimura, Honorary Chairman of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Vice Chairman: Hiroya Masuda)—suggests there could be 744 municipalities at risk of disappearing by 2050 . The decrease in the number of potentially disappearing municipalities over the past decade is attributed to an influx of foreign residents and increased competition among municipalities to attract younger populations.   However, Japan’s fundamental problems of declining population, an aging society, and low birth rates remain unsolved. A study of population data from 1980 to 2020 shows that the population of women aged 20–39 has already halved in 879 municipalities.   The Population Strategy Council also argues that Japan will be forced into continuous downsizing and retrenchment. Although these disappearing municipalities pose a threat to local governments and traditional Japanese values, they do not necessarily spell the decline of Japan’s national power overall.   It is often said that population decline can lead to the decline of national power. This narrative, however, is worth considering.   IV. Population Decline and National Power   Traditionally, when population issues were discussed, the major issue was overpopulation (Tadokoro 2016). A classic theory is Malthus’s argument in 19th Century that although population and labor increase, the amount of arable land does not grow at the same pace, resulting in a declining yield per person. Classical realists in international politics, such as Hans Morgenthau, also generally viewed population as a national resource.   From the 19th century onward, however, the premise of Malthusian arguments that agriculture is the basis of productivity largely collapsed. The relationship between population and national power became more nuanced due to the Industrial Revolution and the expansion of productivity through innovation. These innovations enabled a few European countries to gain considerable national power and to exert enormous influence worldwide.   However, the relationship between population size and national power is not so obvious. National wealth is no longer limited to agriculture or industry; services such as finance and ICT also play pivotal roles in generating national wealth. What matters most is achieving high productivity that can outpace population decline through continuous innovation.   As one indicator for observing innovation capabilities, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, publishes the Global Innovation Index (GII) every year (WIPO 2024). The GII was originally developed in 2007 with the support of INSEAD. The GII is a ranking of the innovation capabilities and results of world economies. It measures innovation based on criteria that consider national inputs on institutions, business/regulatory environment, education, ICT infrastructure, market sophistication (credit, investment, and trade), and outputs of knowledge and creative services. [1] In the GII 2024, Switzerland is ranked first, Sweden second, and Singapore fourth. As such, countries with relatively small populations—such as Switzerland (8 million), Sweden (11 million), and Singapore (6 million)—demonstrate development models powered by continuous innovation. Japan, the 13th in the GII, and South Korea, the 6th, can learn from those countries with relatively small populations and continuous innovation.   For instance, Singapore built a robust industrial foundation in financial services and advanced technologies such as semiconductors and biotechnology. Singapore also benefited from welcoming immigrants as knowledge workers and young labor from Asia and the Middle East. Out of approximately 6 million people in Singapore, 3.6 million are Singaporean citizens (around 60%), while the remaining 40% are permanent residents (originally immigrants, 9%) and non-residents (31%), including foreign workforces, their dependents, and international students (National Population and Talent Division 2024).   Furthermore, Daron Acemoglu empirically argued that there was no negative correlation between population aging and per capita GDP growth; in actuality, there was a positive correlation. Since the early 1990s or 2000s, many have expressed concerns about the adverse effects of aging in developed countries, yet Acemoglu and Restrepo’s research indicates there was no evidence of a negative relationship between aging and GDP per capita (1990–2015); on the contrary, the relationship is significantly positive (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017). Acemoglu’s research suggests that the adoption of robotics and machines, as well as AI, plays a critical role in the positive correlation.   V. Future Cooperation Towards 2050   As discussed, both Japan and South Korea face population decline and aging, and they can exchange lessons learned and good practices of effective policies to tackle these challenges. There are common areas to share lessons learned: the birth rate of their own nationals, immigration and integration, and human-machine teaming.   To raise the birth rate, the Japanese government has been trying to create a society that offers bright hopes for the future, encouraging marriage, childbearing, and child-rearing. This includes supporting individuals’ pursuit of happiness and raising incomes for younger generations. To facilitate such policies, the Japanese government launched the Children and Families Agency in April 2023. Such policies, however, only focus on Japanese citizens.   Towards 2050, it’s obvious that Japan, as well as South Korea, cannot sustain the societies only by Japanese or South Korean citizens—both nations need to foster a collaborative society with immigrants. Japan’s foreign-resident population reached 3.32 million in 2023, an increase of about 330,000 from the previous year (+11%). Many of these foreign nationals come as “skilled trainees” who work in agriculture, manufacturing, and the service industries.   In addition to continuing these traditional efforts, Japan and South Korea have huge potential to promote robotics and automation—this will surely be useful for other aging nations globally. In such efforts, a key concept will be “human-machine teaming.”   VI. Robotics, Automation, and Human-Machine Teaming   As robotics and automation technologies that replace human labor advance, government entities, companies, and healthcare facilities can increasingly automate production processes. Countries experiencing rapid aging and labor shortages tend to adopt robotics more readily, thereby boosting productivity and achieving positive economic effects. When labor becomes scarce, capital investment in labor-saving innovations increases, making these new technologies more productive. Consequently, population decline does not necessarily hinder economic growth; if it triggers new technologies and increases productivity, it can even foster economic expansion (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018).   Healthcare services, such as hospitals and elderly care facilities, are known as one of the most labor-intensive industries. Another famous industry that traditionally requires a human workforce is the automobile industry. Since the emergence of electronic vehicles (EV), automobile industries are not just utilizing robots but also fully automating the production cycle, with very limited human monitoring. Unlike the automobile industry, in healthcare services, human care is required in medical facilities, hospitals, or long-term nursing facilities. In such facilities, human-machine teaming is the key to continuing the required services in an aging society.   Especially in healthcare facilities, Japan and South Korea have been actively developing and deploying robotics to address workforce shortages and increase productivity. Japan has been developing robots to care for elderly people for over two decades, with public and private investment accelerating markedly in the 2010s (Wright 2023). The Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), has endorsed the use of robots and AI in nursing and medical care facilities. In labor-intensive nursing care, technologies like image recognition AI, sensors, and robots can help deliver high-quality services with fewer workers. Recently, affordable robotics in healthcare industries are becoming available in Japan and South Korea. Healthcare industries in the two nations promoted the implementation of automation in healthcare facilities—consequently, those companies have been constantly expanding their business in the global healthcare industry.   With regard to human-machine teaming in hospitals, Japanese companies developed several care robots, such as Hug, a lifting robot; Paro, a robotic seal; and Pepper, a humanoid robot. Hug was meant to prevent care workers from having to manually lift residents. Paro offers a robotic form of animal therapy, while also acting as a distraction aid for some people with dementia who made repeated demands of staff throughout the day. Pepper, initially known as a simple humanoid robot, used in nursing care homes to run recreational exercise sessions so that staff would be freed for other duties (Wright 2023). HOSPI, manufactured by Panasonic, is an autonomous delivery robot used in hospitals to transport fragile and bulky medicine, medical specimens and patients’ case notes. HOSPI has been implemented at the Changi General Hospital in Singapore since 2015. HOSPI is equipped with sensors and programmed with the hospital’s map data to avoid obstacles, such as patients in wheelchairs, and complete deliveries with minimal supervision by humans. The HOSPI autonomous robot communicates and relays information on its whereabouts to the control center, enabling its location to be monitored and recorded 24/7 (Panasonic Newsroom 2015).   In South Korea, several facilities have introduced companion robots that provide basic social interaction and remind elderly individuals to take medications or perform daily exercises. LG Electronics developed LG CLOi, which is a service robot to assist with tasks such as delivering medications, carrying medical supplies, and guiding patients through hospital corridors. Several hospitals in South Korea have tested or are in the process of adopting these robots to reduce staff workload and infection risks (LG Press Release 2022). Many major hospitals in South Korea, such as Severance Hospital and Samsung Medical Center, have adopted the Da Vinci robotic surgical systern, invented in the United States, for procedures ranging from urology to cardiothoracic surgery (Bae 2008). These systerns enable more precise, minimally invasive procedures, resulting in faster patient recovery and reduced labor demands.     font-size: 16px;">Rehabilitation is another area that requires human workforces. South Korean and Japanese companies and research institutions have developed exoskeletons, or wearable robotic suits, that aid in the rehabilitation process for stroke patients or individuals with mobility impairments. By supporting the user’s body and providing guided movement, these exoskeletons can accelerate recovery and improve patient independence. Startup companies, such as CYBERDYNE, a company spun off from Tsukuba University in Japan (Cyberdyne n.d.), and Angel Robotics in Seoul, developed gait-training robots that help patients with walking difficulties regain walking ability (Angel Robotics n.d.).     Some robots also incorporate AI-powered monitoring systerns to track vital signs or detect falls. Startups are working with local governments and nursing facilities to test AI-driven robots that can support routine caregiving tasks—such as serving meals, assisting with hygiene, and alerting medical staff to emergencies—thereby reducing the burden on human caregivers.   As part of South Korea’s Digital New Deal policy, which was launched in 2020, the ROK government has invested in AI, IoT, and robotics solutions to modernize the healthcare sector. This includes funding research on telemedicine platforms that integrate robotic support, enabling remote monitoring and intervention, particularly valuable in rural or understaffed regions. Korean Universities, private tech firms, and medical centers often collaborate to develop and pilot advanced robotics solutions. KT and The Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), for instance, have partnered with local hospitals to design next-generation healthcare robots for use in surgical theaters and long-term care settings (Korea Tech Today 2021).   Implementing robots and automation to promote human-machine teaming is not only useful to lighten the workload for medical professionals; it can also standardize and even improve care quality and efficiency. Moreover, these innovations reduce the risk of infections and injuries for medical staff, while allowing caregivers to focus on higher-level patient needs—such as personalized care, patient communication, and emotional support.   VII. Conclusion   Japan and South Korea face significant challenges due to population decline, including the heavy burden of the social security systern on national finances, the recruitment of young first responders, the Aging China, and the disappearing local municipalities. Nonetheless, historical examples and contemporary research suggest that a shrinking labor force can spur innovation and raise productivity, mitigating some of the presumed negative effects. The key lies in continuing innovation and collaborative efforts—not only between the public and private sectors but also between nations facing similar demographic shifts. As both Japan and South Korea look toward 2050, in addition to continuing tireless efforts to raise birth rates and foster collaborative societies with immigrants, the role of human-machine teaming is critical in shaping their socioeconomic futures. ■   References   Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. 2017. “Secular Stagnation? 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December 20.   Cyberdyne. n.d. “Homepage.” https://www.cyberdyne.jp/english/.   Korea Tech Today. 2021. “KT, KAIST to Develop ICT-Based Care Solutions for Vulnerable Groups.” April 26.   LG Electronics Press Release. 2022. “LG’S CLOi GuideBot is Designed to Revolutionise the Customer Service Experience.” June 28.   National Population and Talent Division, Strategy Group Prime Minister’s Office. 2024. “Population in Brief 2024: Key Trends.” September 24. https://www.population.gov.sg/population-in-brief-2024-key-trends/.   NHK. 2024. “Japan’s Population: 124.88 Million, Decreased by Approximately 530,000 from Last Year, Foreigners at Record High (in Japanese).” July 24.   Panasonic Group Newsroom. 2015. “Panasonic Autonomous Delivery Robots - HOSPI - Aid Hospital Operations at Changi General Hospital.” July 23.   Statistics Korea. 2024. “2024 Statistics on the Aged.” September 26.   Tadokoro, Masayuki. 2016. “Population Size and Power Shift: Are Bigger Countries Necessarily More Powerful? (in Japanese).” International Relations 183: 15-30.   World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 2024. “Global Innovation Index Database.” https://www.wipo.int/gii-ranking/en/.   Wright, James. 2023. “Inside Japan’s Long Experiment in Automating Elder Care.” MIT Technology Review, January 9.     ■ Yoshiyuki Sagara is Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Pacific Initiative, International House of Japan.     ■ Typeset by Chaerin Kim, Research Assistant     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]