It is essential for Korea to cope with changes in the 21st century world order with prudence, speed, and high-level strategies. The EAI GlobalNet21 Forum (Chair, Professor Chae Sung Chun) was launched in 2004 to bring together scholars from different areas of expertise to formulate practical strategies supported by the public which can overcome the polarized ideologies and politicized issues of diplomacy and security that we face today.

The GlobalNet21 Forum strives to foster regular dialogue and communication among domestic and foreign diplomatic security experts on pressing issues to formulate forward-looking sustainability and development strategies. This is because insight into current affairs can only be formed with a policy vision that encompasses 21st century values.

 

Chair: Chae Seong Chun, Professor of Political Science at Seoul National University

Members:

Hyung Min Joo, Professor of Political Science at Korea University

Inhee Park, Professor at the Ewha Womans University Graduate School of International Studies

Ji Hwan Hwang, Professor of International Affairs at University of Seoul

Minkyo Gu, Professor of Public Administration at Seoul National University

Seong Ho Shin, Professor at the Seoul National Graduate School of International Studies

 

ETC
GlobalNet21: Meeting 15 (Paper Summaries)

The Foreign Security Strategies of the Next U.S. Administration and the Korean Peninsula   Young-Sun Ha, Chairman of the National Security Panel Department of International Relations, Seoul National University The United States is facing a new era of 'changes'. As the Obama administration enters office, we can expect not only changes within the American society but also, changes within the international community that include the global economy, alliance and security. Then, how will these ‘changes’ appear? Will these changes hold severance from the Bush administration as a basis? Will these changes be a comprehensive change that includes all fields such as politics, economy and society? Would there be concentrated efforts in specific sectors and if there are, then what would be the intensity of these efforts? And also, would there be any sectors that are not relatively included in these changes? In order to forecast what paths the ship ‘USA’ would take with a new helmsman Obama, the current U.S. situations need to be examined. Namely, the ‘economic crisis’. When Americans were asked during an exit poll what they considered the most when they voted, 60% of them answered ‘economy’. Then ‘war in Iraq’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘health insurance’ accounted for 10% each. Therefore, in order to have an outlook on U.S-Korea relations when the Obama administration comes in office, the ‘6:1:1:1’ structure should be considered as the core. The U.S. rebuilding, which will set off from the economy, will eventually be linked to rearranging roles and status of the United States in the international community. And this will cause changes in U.S. foreign policy and security strategies. Timely countermeasures accordingly are matters of survival for Korea. However, there is more than just being ‘quick’. Pursuing empty countermeasures just to be in the same vein with the Obama administration is not commendable. What is important is the message we can convey to the new United States. The contents we are offering to the U.S. need to be appealing in order to convince and guide the U.S., who strictly follows practicality, to a right path. The National Security Panel at the East Asia Institute recognizing such sphere has prepared a policy report under the title, ‘Foreign Security Strategies of the Next US Administration and the Korean Peninsula’. This report offers appropriate policy proposals through U.S. history and profound analysis that calls upon the past, present and future.       The Map of U.S. Alliance Order in the 21st Century:Prospect through History   Sang Yoon Ma, International Studies, The Catholic University of Korea   Seeing both the changes and continuity A prospect that the Obama administration would take upon a new turn of U.S. foreign policy from the eight years of the Bush administration has been presented. It is clear that the new administration will bring significant changes in U.S. foreign policy. However, such changes should not be considered as a fundamental severance from the history because the changes attempted by the new administration will take place without altering the fundamental conditions such as self-identity of the U.S., its diplomatic traditions and characteristics of foreign threats. After the new administration comes in office, it is necessary to recognize the balance of changes and continuity when presenting an outlook on the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Recognizing threats of terrorism and pursuing alliance in transition continue   The United States will continue pursing alliances in transition even after the Bush administration as countermeasures to international terrorism. In other words, threats of terrorism and the ways U.S. recognizes them are expected to continue. Therefore, it can be expected that the Obama administration will continuously pursue alliances in transition, an idea centered around war against terrorism. President-elect Obama surely views the war in Iraq differently than the Bush administration in regard to war against terrorism, emphasizing that the war in Iraq is an unnecessary war, unrelated to threats of terrorism. However, although he has a different view on the Iraq war, he still takes terrorism, especially nuclear weapons and threats of global terrorism, very seriously and has clearly stated that the U.S. will not yield in dealing with it. Relative change of status due to economic crisis? Strengthening cooperation with the allied nations, not unilateralism On the other hand, relative change of status of the U.S. power gives an outlook of certain changes in carrying out the alliance strategies. The draw-out of the Iraq war brought visible and invisible loss on the U.S. status. The U.S. status is relatively falling also because of newly risen economic powers such as Europe, Japan and BRICs. Especially current financial crisis and market stagnation show relative weakness of the U.S. economic strength. Although the probability of U.S. economic weakening causing weakening of the U.S. diplomatic power cannot be ignored, the relative fall of the U.S. power does not seem to continue on to sudden weakening of the U.S.’ global leadership. Although the U.S. economic power declined, U.S. still holds advance status in other fields especially in culture, knowledge, and technology. There is no nation in immediate view that would be able to replace the power that U.S. holds. However, the United States seems to restrain unilateralism and put weights on strengthening cooperation with the allied nations as its power is relatively declining. And also, as financial crisis and market stagnation require for concentrated U.S. focus on the domestic issues such as economic recovery, the U.S.’ will of engagement in the international affairs may weaken. However, the fact that all these possibilities also signify that the United States may request the allied nations for more international contribution should also be carefully considered. It is because the U.S.’ intention to save on the expenses will be reinforced by sharing the load of maintaining the world order through cooperation with the main allied nations.     President-elect Obama’s foreign and security policies and his main agenda (Press Summary)   Sang Hyun Lee (Security Studies Program Director, The Sejong Institute) The Foreign Policy Tone: Resolving International Issues Through Dialogue and Cooperation, Multilateral Security Organization and Partnership The basis of incoming Obama administration’s foreign and security policies has been to use dialogue and cooperation, multilateral security organization and partnerships to resolve international issues. As a presidential-candidate, Obama criticized the Bush administration’s foreign policy approach for their reluctance to engage in dialogue, which Obama saw as a very big problem. The unilateralist approach not only casted the US as arrogant, but it also increased anti-American feelings worldwide. These negative feelings made inroads into US leadership. Presidential-elect Obama argued that the strength of the US alone could not solve the complex issues of terror, nuclear proliferation, and infectious diseases, so therefore not only is the assistance of allies needed, but also help from the leadership of enemy states. Though the use of military force is on the table, stabilization operations at the level of combat missions are expected to focus on economic aid through which softpower can be utilized to earn the goodwill of the people. Main Agenda: Reviving the Economy, Recovering US Moral Leadership at the Global Level, Counter-terrorism and Nonproliferation The most pressing issue on the Obama administration’s diplomatic and security agenda is jump starting the US economy and recovering the moral leadership of the US at the global level. Those objectives with the issues of counter-terrorism and nonproliferation are the principle issues that will continue to be important. Even though there will be criticism for government intervention into the free market system, the decision to pass the historically, unprecedented $700 billion relief loan package shows the seriousness of the financial crisis that is facing the US. In parallel with the Obama administration strengthening economic cooperative efforts of the developed countries to revive the international economy, it is expected that effort will also be made to resuscitate the economies of the other countries. Obama has publically pledged to withdraw US troops in Iraq by 2010. In terms of Iran, Obama has stated that he is willing to meet with the Iranians without preconditions and at a moment’s notice within the purview of presidential power. Obama sees that it is possible to resolve the issues in this region by providing economic assistance and having diplomatic relations with Iraq and Iran as normal nations and not as military objectives. In terms of nuclear security, within 4 four years Obama is planning to seal safely the nuclear weapons that have been maintained in a lax manner and to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime and for countries like North Korea and Iran, who are not living up to their responsibilities within the system, to be faced automatically with measures. For this purpose, Obama has stated that the IAEA budget should be doubled. In the case of North Korea, Obama revealed that though he is willing to talk; he will not be yielding, but “tough” discussions. In regards to alliance policy, Obama has openly proposed that NATO needed to be strengthened to confront the new security threats of the 21st century. He also expressed without exception the importance of the alliances in Asia, He sees the need to strengthen the alliances with Korea, Japan, and Australia to ensure the continuation of the peace and prosperity enjoyed by them, which means the need to construct an alliance infrastructure that has direction and at the same time a creation of a multilateral security arrangement that goes beyond the bilateral arrangements. Because of this view, the Obama administration is expected to continue Korea-US alliance as the “21st century strategic alliance.” Finally, in terms of energy and environmental issues, the goal of the Democratic Party’s energy policy is that through the decrease in oil consumption the dangers from global warming will decline. Going forward, the Democratic Party has put forth a platform to inject $150 billion into alternative energy development over a 10 year period, to decrease crude oil consumption by 35% by 2030, and to decrease greenhouse gas emissions to 80% of 1990 levels by 2050. It is the position that alternative energy needs to be fostered by the government rather than left to invisible hand of the market.         Predictions about Obama Administration’s Security Strategy: Public Declarations and Reality   Dong Sun Lee (Korea University) Issues Facing the New Obama Government The election of Barack Obama means that change is coming to the US security strategy, but it is difficult to see a sudden departure from the current strategy. Because the Iraq War and the financial crisis, the principle issues facing the US are problems that can not be resolved in the short run. Furthermore, the US political, economic, and military resources have been exhausted, so it will be difficult for President-elect Obama to reshape the international order to his ideal. Cautious Expansion of a Values-based Alliance The next government will take a more cautious approach in expanding a values-based alliance. Obama has emphasized the need to prevent nuclear proliferation by strengthening the security of nuclear-related facilities and materials. To realize this goal, it is necessary to have the cooperation of the Russians. If the expansion of NATO is advanced, then the Russians will be antagonized and this will work to the detriment of a nuclear-secured world. In addition, because China’s cooperation is needed to strengthen PSI, the possibility is high that even the cautious efforts to promote a democratic alliance in Asia will be seen by China as an effort to contain China. Utilizing International Organizations/Multilateral Diplomacy and the Pursuit of Direct Dialogue Though the Obama government will be aggressive at utilizing international organizations and multilateral diplomatic vehicles, we must not automatically exclude the possibility of unilateral action. In certain cases, a unilateral strategy can be adopted, which Obama has repeated in his campaign speeches. According to his presidential campaign speeches North he would be willing to talk directly with Korea and Iran and so it is possible he would not be able to take into account the opinions of the affected countries. Limit the Use of Offensive Military Strategies The next administration will limit as one can offensive military strategies such as preemptive strike and preventive war. The use of military power will be reduced to allow for the realization of the idealized goal: the growth of democracy. However, this does not mean that the use of military power will be abandoned. Obama has stated throughout the campaign that he will not exclude the military option in the denuclearization negotiations with North Korea and Iran. However, due to the expected severe damage and costs of such an action, in reality the possible use of the military option on North Korea and Iran is slim. Nuclear Proliferation Problem In responding to the nuclear proliferation problem, as stated in his speeches Obama is willing to talk to Iran and other involved countries without preconditions. This effort will help the Six-Party Talks to achieve a certain level of success, but the complete dismantlement of the nuclear program and verification issues, which in the later phase is expected to undergo difficult negotiations. Thus, in the eventuality diplomatic efforts would run up against an obstacle, there is a possibility that the Obama administration will take a play out of the Republic Party play book and opt to go with a hard line strategy. Moreover, the US during the period of NPT violations is seen to be aggressively promoting automatic sanctions and the proposed securing of uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel rod reprocessing facilities as a way to strengthen the NPT regime, but it not possible to be optimistic about the success of such actions. Should the level of security anxiety not decline, the majority of countries will choose not to abandon the option of developing nuclear weapons, and to prevent the reliance on a third country for their nuclear fuel rod supplies. Deepen Close Economic Ties Through Free Trade The Obama government will promote deeper economic ties through free trade. In the beginning of his term, Obama will accept the automobile and other special industrial sector labor demands and promote fair trade, while there may be an increase in trade pressures with the principle trading nations, but the administration will not stray too far from the basic principles of free trade. The reason is that because various economic sectors demand support for free trade and the positive trade effects on the whole economy can not be ignored.       The Obama Administration’s East Asia and Korean Peninsula Policy Seongho Sheen (GSIS, Seoul National University) It will be difficult for the East Asia Policy to become a top priority. The Pursuit of a Stable Asia through a Pragmatic and Realistic Approach Obama’s foreign policy priority will be in the following order the recovery from the economic crisis, the War on Terror in the Middle East region, East Asia and alliance policies of which the Iraq situation and War on Terror are the dependent variables. If the Iraq and Afghanistan situation does not resolve itself quickly, the Obama administration will have to take a more pragmatic and realistic approach to promote stability in Asia. China Policy: The Outstanding East Asia Question About a Shared Partnership In the long-run when gauging the rise of China, China is being acknowledged as a responsible stakeholder with its participation in the Six-Party Talks, the stable maintenance of the One China policy, East Asia’s multilateral security cooperation. The Obama administration is promoting a cooperative relationship with China so that the important issues facing Asia can be properly addressed. Japan Policy: Pursuing a Balanced Alliance Japan continues to be acknowledged as a close Asia alliance partner, who has basic values in common with the US. However, if in the previous administration had an overly close relationship with Japan, the Obama administration is expected to have a more balanced policy and relationship with Korea, other allies, and China. Korean Peninsula Policy: A Flexible and Pragmatic Approach a Legacy of the 2nd Bush Administration The foremost Korean Peninsula issue with the most resilience will be the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue at the Six-Party Talks. Obama revealed during the campaign at various times that he is willing to have direct talks with the North. But, in a similar context, the offer of membership into the World Trade Organization, economic investment, diplomatic normalization with the US as part of a US compensation package that was offered to Iran, the North Koreans were offered the proposed package in a similar context for complete verification on North Korea’s nuclear program dismantlement to signify their denuclearization. However, in contrast to the hard line, conservative tone of the Republicans, Obama’s direct dialogue efforts may result in a North Korea demanding more compensation and a brinkmanship-type of response from the North. The North’s delay tactics and an Obama confronted with foreign and domestic criticisms could switch to a more hard line policy like militaristic posturing of the 1994 Clinton response, which could bring about another crisis. In regards to the Korea-US alliance, the return of wartime operations control and the US military’s strategic flexibility will continue to be promoted as Korea’s defenses become Koreanized, so that the US could use its resources that would have gone to US troops stationed abroad would be used instead to help the US recover from the financial crisis. At the same time, it can be expected that the US will request that Korea act on promise by the Lee Myung Bak administration to make contributions to world and regional peace with ROK military troops. For instance, should the War on Terror in Afghanistan accelerate, Korea could be ask to participate. On the other hand, should the US-China political and military relations become amicable then Korea can push for a strategic cooperative partnership with China, which should give Korea some breathing room. The East Asia and Korean Peninsula political and military policies of the next administration to be inherit from the 2nd Bush administration will be more a flexible and pragmatic approach, than the previous hard line and aggressive approach of Bush’s first term.   An Economic-Centered Foreign Policy Could Create New Tensions The problem is that the Obama administration’s economics-centered foreign policy could create new tensions for East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Obama during his campaign pointed to unfair trade practices by foreign countries and that overseas cheap labor costs were a few of the principle causes of a weak US economy and rising unemployment. Obama took the position that China’s manipulation of its currency and unfair trade practices were the expressions of China’s rise, and he was also critical of the Korea-US FTA. Of course, to overcome the global economic crisis, Obama needs to closely cooperate with China who holds about $2 trillion in their reserves. However, should the new Obama administration to resolve domestic unemployment and to get the US trade balance into the black, one method would be to demand of China the following: currency revaluation and a reform of unfair trading practices, and a tightening up of China’s labor conditions, and environmental reform. But, then the US-China relationship will result in serious friction. In the same vein, before next year’s KORUS FTA ratification the automobile sector or rice and beef industry sectors should be renegotiated, and if Korea were to request the same labor conditions and environmental protection as the US, then the same problems that arose during the Mad Cow Crisis and other trade frictions will result.

Young-Sun Ha etc. 2008-11-06Views : 16579
ETC
GlobalNet21: Meeting 15

∎ Topic: The Obama Administrations's Security and Foreign Policy Strategy and the Korean                Peninsula ∎ Date: November 7, 2008 4:00 PM ∎ Location: Best Western Kukdo Hotel Minutes ━━━━━━━━ ∎ Welcoming Remarks by Sook-Jong Lee The just completed US elections held much significance for many people. President-elect Barack H. Obama's victory speech showcased the leadership of hope that he espoused during the campaign. The Americans are not the only ones who are interested and have high expectations of the incoming adminstration, but those feelings are being echoed around the world. In Korea, various institutions are holding policy discussion forums to discuss about the new US administration. EAI GlobalNet21 will especially be the venue to discuss the security and foreign policy of the Obama administration and what changes that would bring to the US East Asia policy, as well as what Korea's response should be to those changes. ∎ Introduction by Young-Sun Ha When discussing the foreign policy of the incoming US administration, there are three things that need to be considered. First, it will be impossible to have this discussion without taking into account the sudden and unanticipated financial crisis facing the US and the ensuing global financial difficulties. This crisis is without doubt the central issue of Obama's presidential transition team. It is necessary to be mindful of this fact when the discussing security and foreign policy issues. Secondly, when looking at Obama's campaign, presidential-elect, and other public speeches, as well as private conversations, the prefix "re" appears often. In other words, "re" refers to "new." Indeed, the question needs to be asked "What does the incoming Obama administration mean when it talks about "new"? And how will this "new" materialize? The answer to these questions will soon be answered by the transition team's basic values and philosophical leanings. During the discussion, the philosophical questions and the knotty problem of reality will need to be addressed. Thirdly, the Korean Peninsula issues and the related-issues of the US relationship, with both North and South Korea will need to be parsed in a cool-headed manner. The purpose of this discussion is not simply to an exercise to project what the next administration's policies will be, it is about understanding the linkages between the Korea and these issues and finding appropriate solutions. To get to this point, the interests of Korea and the US need to overlap and an understanding needs to be created on how the parts that cause tension can be harmonized. ∎ Discussion Domestic Politics ㅇ The discontinuity between the Bush and Obama administrations should not be discounted. The differences between the administrations will be very large. The reason for this line of thinking is: 1. The failures of the Bush administration made the election of Obama a possibility; 2. Obama has “grand ambitions” in contrast to that of Bush; 3. Obama very successfully ran his massive election organization by setting the major agenda items and priority.   Consequently, the formulated strategy is in response to Bush's aggressive foreign policy. In certain respects, it can be thought of as 1970's conservative engagement. Someone once referred to the appearance of FDR(Franklin Delano Roosevelt) as that sword. ㅇ If Obama supporters' demographics are analyzed, he received the most support from Latin Americans, the youth, and African Americans. Not only that, without the broad support of the American public, Obama could not have been elected president. However, one thing that needs to be clear is that Obama does not have a secure support base. The reason being is that Obama has not been clear on who he represents. He does not have a positive identity for uniting his support base. Therefore, going forward as the Obama administration solidifies his support base, it will his task to decide beforehand to continue successful policy execution. ㅇ The Obama administration's first task is to help the US recover from the financial crisis. For the time being, the financial crisis will be priority number one, so other issues will be pushed to the back. The central task will be to determine what regulations will be applied and what resources will be mobilized to overcome the crisis. As McCain has stated before, there is a high possibility of the Obama administration becoming a "spender government." Obama has made a committment to funding economic recovery, medical care reform, etc, but where will the resources be coming from? It will not be an easy task to be promoting reform, while pushing for a balanced budget. ㅇThe Obama administration is starting off with two wars and the financial crisis, which are weighty and very important issues. It will be without a doubt a difficult start. In this situation, it will be difficult to push for bold policy initiatives. Therefore, it is difficult to be assured on how much of a distinction Obama can make between Bush and himself. ㅇ After being faced with overcoming a financial crisis, in reality, can the Obama administration be able to put forth a new vision? What can Obama add beyond what Clinton spoke about 16 years before? It may be that the current economic malaise that began in the US and has spread throughout the globe will be the event to bring about a huge transformation, however it is doubtful that Obama will be able to propose change that will be the start of a new era under his watch. The outlook is that perhaps the current neo-liberal framework can be preserved, while sections of this framework can be revised.   Global Strategy ㅇ If the post-Cold War period can be summarized by three distinct features of international society, it would be military unipolarity, political multipolarity, and with economics being the first priority. There are changes occurring to these three characteristics: political multipolarity and economics "first" prioritization are getting stronger, while on the other hand, there is an increasing possibility that overtime the US-centered military unipolarity will lessen. US foreign policy can be viewed from this standpoint. Especially in terms of Iraq, Obama at first revealed a firm stance to withdraw US troops from Iraq, However, it should be noted that his later stance changed. For the US, the withdrawal of US troops was never going to be an easy problem to resolve. The campaign strategy took the approach that the US troop presence would not be extended, but going forward the actual Iraq policy could be something different. ㅇ Up until now, Obama more so than other presidential candidates showed a strong affinity for the concepts of freedom and democracy. On a personal level, Obama may be an idealist, but in terms of actual methods of achieving his policy objectives, he is a pragmatic realist. Even in a democracy, he is thought of as an individual with strong pluralistic values, who is far from the dogmatism of liberal democracy. In other words, Obama's vision of democracy can be summed up as "you and I may be different, but we can go together." In terms of international strategy, values espoused by the US will be applied flexibly and direct talks and compromise will be used. Obama is the person who will be ale to expand democracy and values-based alliances, which go hand in hand. ㅇ An interesting fact of this US presidential election is that it was not only about domestic political problems, but was conducted from a global perspective. A feeling that a global president was being elected pervaded the election. As the world watched, each person could imagine the hope and change that Obama spoke about. ㅇ When considering the US financial situation, the burden of direct engagement policies will be large. So, rather than direct engagement in problem regions, the possibility of choosing off-shore balancing is high. This means that the next administration will have a more passive foreign policy than that of the Bush administration. However, whether off-shore balancing is selected or not will depend on the changing tenor of the issues and the time period.   East Asian and Korean Peninsula Strategy ㅇ On issues related to the Korean Peninsula, the Korea-US Alliance in the future will be facing more discussions over the topic of burden sharing. The US in the midst of a financial difficulties in order to maintain their status as the world's only superpower is demanding their alliance partners to take a considerable burden. Even on the North Korean issue, the framework of the Six-Party Talks will be sustained and be the focal point, rather than direct US-DPRK talks. This is due to the continued US distrust of China. The elaborate plan between Korea and the US and achieving the planned coordination between the US and North Korea is the best scheme. But, the North Korea is not an easy adversary. So, we need to have a set response ready. Having known precisely 'what we can and can not do' and 'what we can demand of the US and what we can not,' we need to be able to influence the direction of the US North Korea policy. ㅇ On issues related to East Asia, the possibility of the US joining the East Asia Community is low. However, the US is not disinterested in East Asia issues. In this region the US would mostly likely have an interest in a US-China-Japan trilateral cooperative system. In other words, with the US preferring the engagement shape of a US-China-Japan trilateral cooperation on essential East Asia issues, the US will play a role as an important interlocutor in this region. The US will need to make the effort that Korea will not feel left out. ㅇ Obama as a freshman Congressman has little foreign policy experience. This is a very exceptional case. In regards to foreign policy, it is expected that the Obama administration's 'real ability' will undergo a vigorous scrutiny process. Especially, this early period will be the test-bed for the Obama administration. In this situation, at minimum the Obama administration should be aware that the North Korea nuclear issue will possibly be the first test period's issue.

2008-11-06Views : 26847
ETC
GlobalNet 21: Meeting 8

The 8th EAI GlobalNet 21 Forum was held at Mae-hwa Hall in Press Center on Feb. 13. The presenter was Robert J. EINHORN, a senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, where he works on a broad range of nonproliferation, arms control, and other national security issues. Before coming to CSIS, he served in the U.S. government for 29 years. From November 1999 to August 2001, he was assistant secretary for nonproliferation at the Department of State, where he was responsible for nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missile delivery systems, and advanced conventional arms. The topic of this forum was “U.S. Policy toward North Korea”. The Summary is as follows: He first noted that Bush Administration policy toward North Korea has been marked by division. He identified three major groups struggling to define American policy toward North Korea: hardliners, transformers and moderates. The hardliner group believes that making new nuclear deal would be a mistake given North Korean track record. The group considers that North Korea treats getting rid of nuclear and giving up the regime same so North Korea would surely cheat on any agreement. For this reason, it is uncomfortable with the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement on 19th, September 2005 and, therefore, this group continues opposing bilateral agreement between U.S. and North Korea. The hardliners support a more moderate position only tactically, because they think talks will fail, mobilizing international pressure in North Korea. They have also seized on the anti-counterfeiting measures as a way to destabilize the regime. The transformer group does not like Kim Jong Il and it shares the hardliner skepticism about the regime giving up its nuclear weapons. It doubts America can undermine the North Korean regime especially without assistance from South Korea or Japan and see no choice but to negotiate. The transformers are more positive than hardliners’ opinion about South Korea’s assistance that is used to leverage North Korea’s independence. It would offer tangible rewards to North Korea in an agreement only for tangible improvement in market mechanisms, human rights, and military policies. Also, the transformers are positive about the Roh government efforts, but think that South Korean aid must be more conditional and used to produce change in the North. The transformers see anti-counterfeiting measures as additional negotiating leverage. The moderate group likewise thinks regime collapse is unlikely and hopes to see change in the North, but it is less confident than the transformers that nuclear agreement will provide sufficient leverage. It does not think an agreement should be held hostage to transformational goals, but that progress should be matched with reward. The moderates would still pursue anti-counterfeiting measures, but less aggressively or visibly. Similarly, the moderates believe bilateral talks between America and North Korea are a good way to let the North know what they would need to do to be rewarded. Einhorn concluded by remarking that there is a lot over overlap in Washington among the three groups, even within individual positions. However, a common conclusion for all is that there is not viable military option. He said it was unclear which group would prevail, but that President Bush does not need to make a decision while keeping its nuclear weapons and pursuing the current strategy, while the Bush Administration may see little benefit in moving toward normalized relations. Therefore, further progress will require North Korea seriously coming to the negotiating table and the Bush Administration making a credible statement that it will normalize relations if the North gives up its nuclear weapons...(Continued)

2009-05-11Views : 13500
Multimedia
The 20th Global Net 21 Forum with Amb. Robert Joseph: Discussion (Highlights)

  The East Asia Institute invited Ambassador Robert Joseph for the 20th EAI Global Net 21 Forum on March 28, 2011. He presented on “Global Nonproliferation Regime and its implication on Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula,” and shared his insights with Korean academics and experts.   Ambassador Robert Joseph is Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and Professor in the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies (Missouri State University). Prior to July 2007, Ambassador Joseph served as U.S. Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation. From May 2005 until March 2007, he was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.   Below is the main points from the discussion following his presentation on the given topic.   The Six-Party Talks, Libya Case and Changing North Korea's Strategic Calculus It could be argued that the Libyan example would actually make it far more difficult in persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear program. Robert Joseph explained that it is important for the international community to change Pyongyang’s strategic calculus regarding its nuclear program.   No. 1 Non-proliferation Tool for the U.S. and How to Put Pressure on North Korea Amb. Joseph presented how crucial the U.S. nuclear deterrence efforts in the region are. Then he emphasized that while diplomacy was important, it must be accompanied by the full range of the U.S. instruments of power to place maximum pressure on North Korea.

2011-04-18Views : 15521