Abstract Climate change is causing a multilayered problem of spatial politics that encompasses the global, regional, and state level, and a complex countermeasure is required. Such complexity in the international environmental politics has been intensified due to the financial crisis at the end of 2008. It will be necessary to observe the effects the Global Financial Crisis has on the international politics of climate change and then analyze the confrontational structure that appeared after the 2009 Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. Based on this analysis, it would be possible to predict how the international politics of climate change that has characteristics of both great power politics and world governance will develop in the future.   It is the general belief that overall, the Global Financial Crisis affected negatively on the efforts for dealing with climate change. First, the financial crisis has intensified and expanded the concerns about the negative effect a climate change regime will have on the economic recovery and growth by each state’s economy. Secondly, it has created a more complicated conflict between developing and developed countries, which has always been one of the greatest obstacles for creating a climate change regime. Third, it is impossible to overlook that the financial crisis has had a negative influence on the formation of leadership for the climate change regime.   In this case it is expected that establishing a climate change regime would no longer be a simple task. At the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, it was decided to settle the discussion on the post-Kyoto system until after 2012 as the conflicts between developed states and developing states and the United States and China were not resolved. Also at the 2010 Cancun Conference, there was no ground breaking achievement in the discussions on maintaining the Kyoto system, the legal format of a new consensus, the level of pan-global reduction, the participation of the United States and the other developed states, the monitoring system such as measurement, report, and inspection, and the improvement in checking compliance. This reveals that the UN-oriented political process to build a climate change regime has not yet reached the level of rule setting, surpassing the level of norm setting. In addition, it also showed that the conflicts among the coalition groups of the Copenhagen conference grew more serious so it will be essential to provide a new leadership in the political process of building a climate change regime and future environment governance.   In order to predict the future of the climate change regime, it is critical to analyze the positions of the major actors such as the European Union, the United States, China, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the G-77, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). The European Union’s global leadership has been greatly strengthened since the United States has refused to ratify the Kyoto protocol, but it has been facing increasing skepticism following the Copenhagen conference. With the inauguration of the Obama administration, the United States is striving to exercise its leadership, but remains dissatisfied with the existing framework centered around the UN and is now trying to build a new kind of leadership, such as the AP6 (Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate).   China, on the other hand, is making an effort to use the process of international environmental politics as an opportunity to manifest its leadership against the United States by achieving higher effectiveness in energy use and developing clean energy technology. At the same time, Beijing is emphasizing the historical responsibility of developed states, calling for their primary action. The OPEC members form a group that is the most opposed to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and they are showing the characteristics of a defensive alliance in order to protect their national interests. As the effects of climate change are closely related to their survival, the AOSIS states are the strongest proponents of a climate change regime.   Considering the discrepancy of each actor’s standpoint and the stalemate of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), five scenarios for the institutionalization of the future climate change regime must be considered. First, it is possible that the work of the UNFCCC develops further and is institutionalized; second, building a new climate change regime through the approach of the great powers admitting the limitations of globalism; third, overcoming the limitations of globalism by diversifying the existing discussions in the UNFCCC; fourth, dealing with environmental issues through a market-oriented internationalism, within the World Trade Organization framework; and fifth, aside from the UNFCCC, creating a new Global Energy Organization and making it approach the environmental and climate issues from a resource-oriented internationalism. The first alternative currently earns the most support, but in the short to mid-term, the second and third options could provide a driving power for the establishment of a climate change regime. Eventually in a long term, all these efforts would lead to the formation of global governance on the environment.       The full text in Korean is available here

Abstract The Global Financial Crisis in 2008 led to a temporary decrease in the use of fossil fuel, providing an opportunity to discuss a new energy policy paradigm. Accordingly, global energy governance after the financial crisis displayed a change in ideas from a fossil fuel-based system to a green energy-based system. It is expected that the international demand for energy will continue to increase until 2030, particularly in emerging economies such as China and India. Fossil fuel will continue to be the most widely used energy source, while demand and supply of atomic energy and renewable energy will also expand. Still, when “easy oil” is drained and the development of alternative energy is delayed, the competition to secure energy resources is likely to become extremely intense. This competition regarding energy security under the circumstance where the existing international organizations and institutions have not yet created stable global energy governance could last for some time. Developing new clean energy and alternative energy to diminish dependence on fossil fuel is one feasible solution, but without the foundation of stable governance, any green growth strategy might encounter another level of competition and conflict. Most of these energy security problems can be observed in East Asia and consultation on energy cooperation in the region is making slow progress. At the same time, however, discussions on renewable energy, countering climate change, energy efficiency and reducing the use of energy are picking up speed, providing an opportunity to build new governance.   Future debates on energy governance must progress with a transitional approach. This reflects a combination of the existing fossil fuel-oriented international energy relations and the new green energy relations focused on renewable energy. The structure of future energy governance is likely to show multilayered and multifaceted aspects. Furthermore, when building international governance on energy, it is necessary to recede from the simple logic of supply and demand. International energy cooperation should produce public goods that go beyond the approach of neo-mercantilism.       The full text in Korean is available here

Abstract The East Asian countries that went through the unprecedented Asian financial crisis merely ten years ago in 1997-8, were confronted with the Global Financial Crisis again in 2008. Unlike the previous crisis which had its origins in East Asia, the global crisis began in the United States. The East Asian countries were not direct victims of this crisis but were unable to avoid its indirect repercussions such as decline in exports and in some cases recession. At the same time, the United States and some other countries pointed out strongly that the crisis occurred due to the large scale surplus of East Asian countries. The development of this situation and the Global Financial Crisis once again confirmed the fact that the East Asian regional economy is closely coupled with the United States and other developed economies. The reaction of East Asian countries to the Global Financial Crisis unfolded in three directions. First, East Asian countries pursued self-rescue measures such as expanding foreign exchange holdings and supporting their economy through expansionary fiscal policies.   Secondly, the East Asian countries pushed forward further cooperation among states inside the region, using the experience of cooperation accumulated over the past ten years since the Asian Financial Crisis as a foundation. In other words, while swiftly supplying liquidity they strengthened cooperation among regional countries with the belief that they should refrain from relying excessively on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as on the United States to cope with the crisis. It is also difficult to deny that the regional cooperation following the Global Financial Crisis has been taking place inside the framework of the dynamics between China and Japan. Third, with the Global Financial Crisis East Asian countries have been seeking for a change in global governance as represented in the G20 summit. Consequently a certain level of progress has been achieved in this respect, such as reaching an agreement on the issue of reform of quota and voice in the IMF and World Bank. While conducting self-rescue measures and increasing cooperation among regional countries are reactive measures to the Global Economic Crisis, participation in global governance can be considered to be a more active measure since it seeks to reform the fundamental framework of the international economic order.   It is expected that the future East Asian financial order will reveal both change and continuity regarding the measures undertaken by the regional countries. The Global Financial Crisis reconfirmed the desirable geographic range of regional cooperation and clarified the importance of East Asian regional cooperation. Simultaneously, it also brought change in the focus of regional cooperation, shifting from trade to finance. It is possible to say that the Global Financial Crisis has had a considerable positive effect on the financial cooperation in East Asia.   However, financial cooperation among East Asian countries does have a strong characteristic of responding to an external crisis. The scope of this cooperation has been mainly concentrated on liquidity supply. Cooperation in terms of exchange rates, macroeconomic policies, and the introduction of a common currency has been very limited. The question remains on whether the future East Asian financial order will be able to acquire the internal motivation and capacity for cooperation rather than relying on an external cause as has been the case.   After the Global Financial Crisis, the emerging East Asian financial cooperation reflected the power structure in the region, specifically between China and Japan. It is notable that China now has officially acquired influence corresponding to its expanding national power and is on an equal footing with Japan. When looking at it from an institutional dimension, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization also reveals how China has reached the equal terms with Japan in East Asian regionalism. The extent of the institutionalization of financial cooperation will be determined at a level that reflects the interests of the two countries.       The full text in Korean is available here  

Abstract The 2008 Global Financial Crisis brought about great changes to trade in East Asia. Such changes can be witnessed in two aspects. First, the network feature of East Asia’s economy based on a production network is gaining strength with China at its heart. This asymmetrical interdependence with China though is causing concern in Japan and South Korea about possible economic subordination. Secondly, there is the active U.S. offensive. The United States, which has pursued a global multilateral approach to trade, paid relatively little attention to this shift in economic power in East Asia since it was immersed in its War on Terror. Nevertheless, in a situation where the global multilateral trade order led by the United States has reached its impasse, it now is mobilizing a complex strategy in order to confront the growing influence derived from a rising China. Efforts by the United States to develop a regional architecture can be understood in this regard.   Unlike China’s method of selecting a group of major nations and seeking individual Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with them using its increasing power in the market, the U.S. strategy is network-like. It promotes a flexible FTA network, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Even though the TPP is a mini FTA made up of four small countries, the United States is actively participating in this organization and carrying out a strategy of designing a platform that will reflect its interests. Australia and Vietnam have already been incorporated and are trying to influence its design and now Japan is preparing for admission. The influencing power that such a U.S.-led conception may display against the Chinese-led trade order depends on the sort of “architectural power” either country can display toward the region’s actors.       The full text in Korean is available here

Abstract The 2008 Global Financial Crisis posed a serious question toward the justification and the sustainability of the world economic order governed by the West. Skepticism toward the West’s political and economic leadership is linked with the possible hegemonic shift between the United States and China, and there is even the prospect of an all-out reform of the international economic order. As the global economic order still finds itself in a transitional state, it is difficult to grasp its true characteristics of change. Still, it would be possible to point out that the impact of the economic crisis has brought: the change of U.S. and Chinese economic power, the negative prospect of neoliberalism as the dominant economic ideology, and the transformation of global economic governance.   Among these changes, it is increasingly important to understand the transformation of global economic governance. The global economic governance that will arise after the economic crisis will likely be in the shape of a complex network. This refers to the manner of governance in which intergovernmental organizations, intergovernmental networks, trans-governmental networks, and transnational networks share a sense of responsibility and authority toward resolving global economic problems. In other words, a complex network is a system in which hierarchical organizations represented by the state, together with other parallel networks set the rules for global economic activities.   According to mainstream international political theory, a change in world order takes place due to material, ideological, and institutional factors which the global financial crisis had a great impact upon. It further intensified the debate between the relative decline of the United States and its maintenance of material capacity; the Western economic model of liberalism and the Chinese economic model of statism; and the official Bretton Woods system and an unofficial network system. Out of this came the “complex network era” where there is an increasing diversity and complexity in format and actors. Namely, state actors such as China and other newly rising powers brought more diversification among the participants of global governance. A network actor like the G20 summit has become significantly important. The increase of bilateral currency swap has also shown that network is becoming more important as a mode of governance.   In particular, the emergence of the G20 summit as the main forum for economic cooperation initiated this complex network in many respects. The G20 itself is a network of networks. The G20 process is a multi-layered network comprised of Summit meeting, finance Ministers and Vice-ministers’ conferences, the central bank’s presidents and vice-presidents’ conferences, groups of professionals and government officials’ conferences, and business summit. It weaves diverse actors into governance through a series of skilled networking like discussion functions, outsourcing, and capacity fortification. In addition, as a forum for international governance, the G20 strengthens its network by launching network actors like the Financial Stability Board (FSB) or by indirectly leading to the forming of institutions like the 3G (Global Governance Group) and the C10 (Committee of Ten).   It is evident that the Global Financial Crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the post-war global economic order and has therefore provoked the need to search for an alternative order. From the governance perspective we have entered a complex network era in which traditional hierarchical organizations like the state and official international organizations interact with network players like transnational unions and non-state actors. In a complex network era a state’s power and leadership depends on the extent of its interconnectedness. It must select an adequate consulting partner required for problem solving and be able to mobilize public and private actors. Therefore, under this new global economic governance it will be required that Korean diplomacy not only addresses traditional inter-state diplomacy but also to take on a network strategy that includes transnational actors such as international organizations, inter-governmental networks, civil society, and a network of professionals.       The full text in Korean is available here  

Abstract  The rise of China and the change in its relationship with the United States has a greater influence on the Korean Peninsula than in the global or regional (East Asia) spheres. This will be particularly felt in the case of the U.S-ROK alliance, the North Korean nuclear crisis, and the peace building process in Northeast Asia. As a result the security order that has existed on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Cold War relying upon a unipolar United States might face fundamental change. It will be necessary to analyze the local security environment on the Korean Peninsula under a new global and regional order.   To begin with, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been expanding its role in line with the Obama administration’s National Security Strategy 2010 and the U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement. While promoting the “Koreanization” of South Korea’s defense on the Korean Peninsula through adjustments in the U.S.-ROK alliance, the United States has been encouraging Korea’s active participation by also expanding the role of the alliance in the global sphere. In this respect, the United States is pursuing a new notion of alliance to achieve strategic flexibility that it has been striving for since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, China has been trying to alter the U.S.-ROK alliance with its own political, military, and economic tools. By strengthening its relations with Seoul, Beijing is seeking to bring South Korea out of its Cold War-structured alliance. Therefore South Korea now faces the burden of deciding how to restructure its alliance with the United States and its relationship with China.   The North Korean nuclear crisis has been intensifying as the Six-Party Talks remains stalled and the problems of instability continue to surround the leadership succession presently ongoing in North Korea. However, the issue of North Korea has also become a source of division within U.S.-China relations amidst power transition. The United States has chosen to manage the North Korean nuclear crisis in the global sphere rather than on the Korean Peninsula as manifested through its policy of “strategic patience.” This also extends to the future of the North Korean regime which the United States is content to wait out rather than actively press for change. On the other side, China has continued to exert pressure to restart the Six-Party Talks in order to stabilize the situation. It also seeks to preserve stability within the North Korean system in order to create a “buffer zone” that will protect China’s own economic growth. Through its unique economic leverage over North Korea, China is stabilizing the situation there and in this way backs the North Korean regime’s process of hereditary leadership succession that is currently ongoing. The way in which the North Korean issue became the focus of U.S-China rivalry was very evident with the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. These events are connected to the geopolitical power shift that has been going on in the region.   The security environment on the Korean Peninsula has been part of the debate on the possibility of establishing a Northeast Asian peace order. The debate on the building of a peace regime in the Korean Peninsula are linked to the search for a new peace order in Northeast Asia based on the changes in U.S.-China and China-Japan relations including the U.S.-Japan alliance. China cannot engage in military competition with the United States, therefore it will have to extend further cooperation for its own economic development and stability. This will become evident in China’s Northeast Asian networking strategy. Japan is also placing a greater emphasis on Asia after restructuring the U.S.-Japan relationship that took place following its long term economic recession, changes in domestic politics, and its weakening power in Northeast Asia. This is not merely due to the Democratic Party of Japan’s coming to power in 2009, but an unavoidable strategic decision considering Japan’s weak economic situation. Amidst such changes in Northeast Asia’s international relations and its geopolitical location between China and Japan, South Korea will have to carefully craft its strategic options. A degree of change will be expected to be dramatic in Northeast Asia’s security environment from 2012, which is when presidential elections will take place in both South Korea and the United States, while in China there will be a shift in leadership.       The full text in Korean is available here  

Abstract    The future security environment in East Asia will be influenced in several ways: the continued U.S effort to maintain its global influence, China’s strategy to expand its influence in the region, the two countries’ reciprocal interactions, the capacity for resource mobilization which effects their strategic decisions, and the corresponding reaction of East Asian countries. In particular, the financial crisis is proving to have had a far more negative effect on the resource mobilization capacity of the United States than on China. The financial crisis has further created anxieties toward the U.S.-centered political economic structure, weakening the justification and reliance on the so-called unipolar world order that prevailed during the twenty years following the end of the Cold War. With China continuously maintaining a high growth rate even after the financial crisis and becoming the greatest holder of American debt, the relative decline of the United States in the economic sector is now an undeniable reality. China has increasingly asserted itself in East Asia and this new posture highlights the potential for confrontation in U.S.-China relations. Following the financial crisis, East Asia’s security environment will not go through a fundamental change that involves drastic shifts in power. Rather the effects of the crisis will be felt in an indirect but comprehensive way that will have an impact on East Asian countries’ perspectives and resource mobilizing capacities in the mid to long run.   It is still unclear whether future U.S.-China relations in East Asia will show a confrontation over influence or comprehensive cooperation to meet transnational security challenges. However, if the two countries were to succeed in re-identifying each other’s interests in terms of common goals in the region, within a multilateral cooperative network, it would be possible to expect stability in East Asia. Of course there are certain pitfalls; firstly regarding short-term policy, it is really hard to find common ground between the “offshore balancing strategy” of the United States and China’s policies for defending its “core interests.” Secondly, the financial crisis may lead to strengthened bilateral interdependence, but it could also lead to deteriorating security relations between the two as the crisis has incited unilateral approaches.   The Cheonan incident is a very good example of this kind of pitfall. The tug-of-war between the two regarding the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea which included the participation of the USS George Washington aircraft carrier revealed the intense power struggle between them. This was very different from their previous official position towards each other, which included China as a “responsible stakeholder.” It is possible to say that the United States successfully maintained its influence in this region following the Cheonan incident and its subsequent strong measures of support for South Korea. The relocation issue of the U.S. Marine Corps base in Okinawa also concluded in a favorable way to the United States. Meanwhile China also tried to secure its influence in the region. By expressing strong opposition toward the joint U.S.-ROK exercises in the Yellow Sea and the subsequent modification in the scale of the exercises, China successfully secured respect from the United States that the Yellow Sea was under their exclusive area of influence. This case clearly shows that the two countries have no intention of giving up their respective influence in East Asia. We can then expect that the logic of balance of power will prevail for some time in the region.   In this regard, it would be inappropriate and naive to expect that the future military security order in East Asia will not experience conflict because the Cold War-era has ended. It is always possible that tension can increase in the areas where the parties’ core interest is not at stake. Although the Global Financial Crisis had an impact on slowing down military buildup in the region, the recent provocations by North Korea has cast a negative effect back on the region. However, it is important to remember that it can be not only expensive but also dangerous to pursue unilateral security as it can easily fall into the pitfall of a security dilemma. Long-term security can be established through multilateral cooperation. If this basic principle could be widely shared among East Asian countries, it could be possible to manage security relations in the region more effectively.       The full text in Korean is available here

Abstract   Up until the current period, the crucial elements of change in international security can be summa-rized as the power change among the major actors, change in the nature of war, change in the structure of the economy, and the entrance of core actors following regional integration. The recent appear-ance of a complex world order linked to “the rise of the rest” and a multi-centered/non-centered net-work world order are putting pressure on the need for change in both understanding the security threats and developing military strategies.   The Global Financial Crisis is creating further multi-polarization of the international order. Ri-chard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, has defined the characteristic of the in-ternational order in the twenty-first century as the “age of non-polarity.” In such an order no one, two, or multiple states are dominant; rather it consists of various actors that possess diverse types of power. It is possible to say that the structure of non-polarity will lead to an international network order, becoming a widespread phenomenon. In the mili-tary security dimension it has already brought about multimodal, multivariant and multinodal aspects or hybrid threats. Such a complex security environment requires a “whole-of-government (whole-of-nation)” approach which combines all components of national power including military power. The Obama administration believes that transnational problems in the twenty-first century world order can only be solved through a network approach.   The Obama administration’s National Security Strategy 2010 stated its goal for rebuilding Ameri-can leadership as “building at home, shaping abroad.” In order for this to succeed the United States must see the world as it is and respond ac-cordingly. The truth is that no country can manage all global problems by itself. Washington must pre-pare for the future through cooperation with coun-tries capable of bringing about change. A look at the U.S. Department of Defense’s recent strategy review reports, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, Nuclear Posture Review, and Ballistic Mis-sile Defense Review, show how the United States generally defines the type and range of threat, and instead of choosing a single method to deal with it they propose flexible strategies according to the situation and context.   Ever since the financial crisis, there have been two identifiable factors regulating American strat-egy. The first factor is the rise of China and its ag-gressive conversion; the second is domestic politi-cal pressures related to reducing the national de-fense budget and the Obama administration’s do-mestic agenda. The rise of China has been judged to be the greatest challenge for American diplomacy in the following decades, and the administration has identified relations with China as its most im-portant bilateral relationship. Washington wants Beijing to take on a more constructive role in the current international order; however concerns re-main on its rapid military modernization. China has been expanding its strategic capabilities to reach the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, while the military balance with Taiwan is steadily going in China’s favor despite increasing economic ex-changes across the Straits. The United States is also concerned about China’s enhancing capability fo-cused on “anti-access/area-denial.” The failure to adapt to these new strategies will limit the U.S. movements in the region.   The other constraining factor that the United States faces is the pressure to make cuts in the na-tional defense budget. This is certainly an afteref-fect of the protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but apart from this it is clearly abnormal for a single country to account for almost half of the world’s total defense spending. Furthermore, following the financial crisis it will be difficult for the national defense budget to continue expanding in the way it has been doing. Still it would appear that the U.S. defense budget will not be facing considerable curtailments any time soon since its remains committed to the war efforts in Afghanistan.   The U.S. response is indeed its own choice, but a large part of it is also due to the inevitable change in the international environment. An economy in recession, President Obama’s declining public support, and the negative results from the 2010 mid-term elections are all simultaneously functioning as factors for change. The future now depends on how swiftly the United States carries out “Building at Home” and recovers its confidence through “Shaping Abroad.” In this context, South Korea must search for a new vision that will allow it to cope with strategic adjustments by the United States as well as China’s increasing importance in Northeast Asia.       The full text in Korean is available here