EAI launched the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) in November 2013 to conduct research related to democratic governance and human rights promotion in Asia. EAI serves as a representative of domestic think tanks and leads the organization of regional think tanks in Asia. It is responsible for supporting and managing research related to democracy at associated research institutes. ADRN was established to analyze threats to democracy in Asia and to promote discussions and practical research projects that could contribute to the consolidation of democracy in the region. Aimed at presenting policies based on research, ADRN examines threats and challenges to democracy by identifying and studying practical agendas for developing regional democracy in Asia. The network includes 22 major think tanks from 14 Asian countries including Taiwan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines, as well as South Korea’s EAI. 

Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Electoral Accountability in Thailand: Analyzing the 2023 Election (Interim Report)

Introduction   This research focuses on the 2023 Election which was hoped to be the most democratic election since the 2014 coup d’état. Although there was 2019 Election, however, it was hosted and conducted by the 2017 Constitution (Interim). Thus, the legislative body, consisted of Senates appointed based on the advice of the National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO), played a crucial role in electing the Prime Minister. This means the body of the Government still has a strong connection with the coup d’état, resulting in the distrust of people in the 2019 Election. With that said, in the 2023 Election, under the 2017 Constitution, although the “Transitory Provisions” allow Senates to be selected by a “Selection Committee” appointed by the NCPO, there was also a new election mechanism implemented: the two-ballot voting systеm. The two-ballot voting systеm allowed people to “vote for the party you love and the party you like”, allowing them to have more flexibility and choice in expressing their political preferences (Lohatepanont and Jatusripitak 2023). With all being said, we will explore the degree of Thailand’s vertical accountability based on the Varieties of Democracy measurements, and evaluate the accountability deficit during the 2023 Election.   1. Thailand’s Vertical Accountability Level in the V-Dem Figures   Accountability has been a long-discussed concept where it is defined as responsibility. It is a concept that is crucial to “good government” (Moncrieffe 1998).   This is due to the fact that accountability is indeed important to the effectiveness of a government since it may prevent the abuse of political power. The idea of accountability describes a relationship between two actors – one shall be accountable to the other when there is an obligation to do so. It is the concept that deals with two dimensions: answerability and enforcement (Schendler, Diamond and Plattner 1999).   Accountability can be categorized into many types, nonetheless, in a democratic systеm that an election plays a crucial part, it is worth discussing electoral (vertical) accountability. The essential aspect of electoral accountability is that people should be able to replace their legislators and government through voting. Voting allows citizens to select their representative who is likely to meet their expectations. This allows the people to hold politician accountable and also incentivizes the politician to keep themselves accountable to voters since they want to gain power and remain in power by being re-elected.   With that said, indicators specified by V-Dem can indicate how and to what extent vertical accountability is available in one country. The measurement has been grouped into electoral accountability and political parties (Lührmann, Marquardt and Mechkova 2017).   Figure 1. Vertical Accountability Index of Thailand (1997-2022)   The Vertical Accountability Index from V-Dem shows the level of vertical accountability in Thailand as follows[1]:   1997: In 1997, Thailand’s vertical accountability score was at 0.76, which is in line with when Thailand started to execute a constitution drafted by the people after being under a long military regime. The 1997 Constitution is marked as the constitution that has the most connection with the people (Thairath Plus 2022). This has set the country up for a more free, fair and stable election in the future.   2007: In 2007, Thailand’s vertical accountability score is at 0.69, which is lower than in 1997. This is due to the fact that a new Constitution was drafted in 2007. The 2007 Constitution was drafted by a committee appointed by a coup d’ état, resulting in the Constitution being less connected with the people.   2017: In 2017, Thailand’s vertical accountability score is at 0.52 which is lower than in 2007. This constitution was also a result of a coup d’ état and has even lesser connection with the people than before.   It can be seen that the vertical accountability score in Thailand has declined through each constitution. This is the result of the constitutions having less connection with the people. Thus, questions arise in regards to the legitimacy of the electoral management body, which is an “independent” organization according to the constitutions.   Since vertical accountability deals with the formal form of accountability, the institutions that relates most to an election, namely the election management body, shall be considered. The indicators of accountability for such an institution are as follows.     2. Legal Arrangement of Electoral Accountability in Thailand   2.1. The Head of Government   According to Articles 158 and 159 of the Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017), The King appoints the Prime Minister who is approved by The House of Representatives. The approval shall be done by an open vote.   With that being said, the Head of Government, namely the Prime Minister, shall be approved by the National Assembly. The National Assembly, which approved the Prime Minister from the 2023 Election, consists of Members of the Parliament (elected by the 2023 Election) and the Senate.   It is worth mentioning that the Senate, particularly the set of Senators who may approve the Prime Minister from the 2023 election, is appointed by a “Selection Committee,” appointed by the NCPO. This is in accordance to Article 269 of the Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017) Transitory Provisions.   2.2. Percent of Adult Citizens That Has the Legal Right to Vote   According to Article 95 of the Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017), a Thai person, who is not less than eighteen years of age, and has their household registered in the constituency for not less than ninety days up to the date of the election, has the right to vote.   The 2023 Election marked the election that has been participated the most in Thai history. Out of approximately 52 million eligible voters, 39,293,867 people cast their votes, representing a turnout of 75.22 percent (Workpoint Today 2023).   2.3. Schedule of the Election   Election Law and well-established precedent (or, at least, to layman’s understanding), stipulates that the term of the Prime Minister shall be four years; therefore, an election shall be hosted every four years. However, in reality, it can be seen that Thailand has gone through several coup d’état and dissolution of Parliament; therefore, in this author’s view, a concrete election schedule that no one may amend is absent. Moreover, there are also “ways” that an election can be scheduled earlier than planned.   The 2023 Election was a result of a dissolution of parliament by Prayuth Chan-ocha, a few days before the end of the House of Representative’s four years term. This results in the time frame for the Election Date being shifted. This is in accordance to Article 103 of the Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017). Other benefits include Members of Parliament having the opportunity to switch parties, as the required membership time is shortened and the time limit for utilizing campaign funds has also been shifted (iLaw 2023).   With all that said, it is not that the law is absent regarding the timeframe for hosting an election, but rather that the law has been exploited.   2.4. The Election Management Body   The electoral management body in Thailand is the Election Commission of Thailand, an independent organ under the Thai Constitution B.E. 2560 (2017). Nonetheless, Article 222 of the Constitution stipulates that the Election Commission consists of seven commissioners appointed by the King upon the advice of the Senate.   It should be noted that the Senate, that advised the King regarding the Election Commission, is the same set of Senate mentioned earlier in chapter 2.1. In addition, the term of the commissioners of the Election Commission of Thailand is seven years. Therefore, the Election Commission responsible for the 2023 Election is still the one that has been appointed by the Senate from the NCPO.   In regards to their duty by law, according to Article 224, the Election Commission has the duty to hold or arrange elections, supervise elections, and handle other responsibilities related to elections. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has previously ruled that the Election Commission of Thailand has the power and responsibility to hold an honest and fair election according to the Constitution and Organic Law, and if there were any irregularities regarding holding such election, they should investigate and decide on the matter. The exercise of power by the Election Commission in this sense, is according to the Constitution and not an executive power. With that being said, the Admіnistrative Court does not have the power to “check” the power exercised by the Election Commission concerning the election.   3. Electoral Accountability Gap: the 2023 Election   Quality of election can be assessed by identifying the autonomy and capacity of the electoral management body, the accuracy of the voter registry, the intentional irregularities, intimidation, and harassment by the government, the degree of the multiparty practice, and the degree of freeness and fairness of the election.   3.1. The Autonomy and Capacity of the Electoral Management Body   As mentioned earlier in chapter 2.4., although the Constitution stipulates that the Election Commission is an independent organ that shall conduct its duties impartially, the fact that its members were ‘selected’ and their terms allow them to remain in power until the recent election in 2023 raises concerns. Therefore, considering the origin of the commissioners, it is hard to say that the electoral management body in Thailand is fully independent and autonomous.   In terms of the capacity of the Election Commission of Thailand, while there is no specific number of governmental officers working at the Election Commission, it is notable that personnel expenses account for around 42 percent of the national budget, whereas the average personnel expenses of governments around the world are only at 19.4 percent of the national budget. Moreover, a statistic in 2021 indicates that the quality of the government personnel regarding public service ranked the 72nd out of 192 countries in the world, and regarding corruption, the ranking is 120th (Kumsang 2022).   As for other resources, namely funding, as mentioned earlier in the table above, the Cabinet has approved the budget of around 5,945 million THB (equivalent to 161 million USD) for the recent election, to be used by the Election Commission of Thailand. This amount is considered the highest budget allocated for hosting an election in Thai history (Isra News Agency 2023).   Nonetheless, the recent election hosted by the Election Commission of Thailand is heavily criticized due to several ‘mistakes’, such as missing voter’s names, votes cast by the wrong people, mistakes with mailed ballots, and incomplete lists of candidates at polling stations. These are the only problems raised at the early voting session (Reuters 2023).   It is worth mentioning that although the Election Commission is appointed by the recommendation of the Senate; however, the personnel and directors under the Office of the Election Commission go through a similar selection process as other government officer. Thus, when considering the budget of the Election Commission of Thailand, it should be considered separately with one part being for an Election (if any during that time period) and the other part for maintaining and completing other tasks (e.g. promoting and training election supervisors in the local area) of the Office of Election Commission.   3.2. Accuracy of the Voter Registry   A voting registry has been set up; however, many voters’ names went missing, despite being already registered. Another problem regarding the accuracy of the voter registry during the early election is that the names of registered voters were marked as “already voted” even before the actual voter arrived (BBC News 2023). Nevertheless, no official number of cases that had a problem with the voter registry were recorded.   3.3. Intentional Irregularities Conducted by the Government and Opposition   One of the irregularities apparent in this election is such as the mismatch number between the number of registered voters and that of actual voters who voted on Election Day (Naewna News 2023).   Other than that, Pongtorn Wisetsuwan, Executive Vice President of Thai Post Co., Ltd. stated in an interview that 300,000 voted envelopes were illegible. However, the Election Commission of Thailand claimed that the statement was untrue. There were only 10,000 envelopes that were illegible (BBC News 2023).   3.4. The Extent of the Election Is Multiparty in Practice   During the recent election, Thailand entered a new multiparty practice which consist of two political ideologies, many parties, and various policies. Therefore, the people have more choices in this election and they may choose the political ideology that best defines them (Kongkirati 2023).   3.5. Opposition Candidates Subjected to Repression, Intimidation, Violence, or Harassment by the Government   No official reports exist in regards to candidate repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by opposition parties or the government. Nonetheless, further studies shall be conducted in order to identify such issue.   3.6. The Extent the Election is Free and Fair   Considering the freeness and fairness of the election, we will need to take all aspects, that is, the pre-election period, Election Day, and the post-election process, into consideration.   During the pre-election, it can be seen that Election Day was initiated by the dissolution of the parliament, initiated by Prayut Chan-ocha. This gave him the advantage of gathering more party members for the Election. This enabled the time period that one shall be a member of a party, in order to stand for election of the Members of the House of Representatives, to be shorter in the case that new election is triggered by a dissolution of the parliament.[2] In addition, during the pre-election process, many voters registered for an early election. This matter has been mentioned earlier in this paper.   During the Election Day, “We Watch”, a civil society group founded in 2013 led by youth volunteers, has listed several problems, such as (i) the election candidates were misnumbered; (ii) the idea of voting confidentiality was ignored, there were no walls or thick board behind the voting ballot, allowing the votes to be seen; (iii) the accuracy of the voting registry is low, voters have found someone they do not know in their house registry; (iv) the number of voting ballot received before the voting was unavailable, illegible, or inaccessible; (v) the idea of transparency is ignored, resulting in the government officer denying private speculators and not allowing citizens to take photos or videos during the vote count (Prachatai 2023, We Watch 2023).   In regards to the post-election process, the outcome of the election was not respected. The Move Forward Party received the most votes, but became the Opposition Party (Thai PBS 2023).   4. Conclusion   The 2023 Election is an election that has been highly anticipated by the people, that it carries “the hope” of the people after being under a long regime that is a result of the 2014 coup d’état. With that being said, it is expected that vertical accountability in Thailand would be higher.   Nonetheless, considering the background of the election, the quality of the election, and the quality of political parties, it can be seen that vertical accountability in Thailand, as demonstrated through formal tools, still presents several problems, regardless of the capacity of the electoral management body. In addition, it is believed that the formal tools, designed by the Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017) by the commission appointed by the junta, are deeply flawed (Human Rights Watch 2023).   Moreover, the result of the 2023 Election, in which the Prime Minister candidate from the party that received the most votes was not elected, raises an important question about whether vertical accountability has been considered not only by the electoral management body but also by the political parties and stakeholders, or if such a concept has no meaning in the election. It suggests that the people, to whom the representatives are accountable, may only wield power on the voting day but not before or after.   With that said, many people have shifted to informal tools in holding a government accountable, namely diagonal accountability tools. Although laws, regulations, and arrests has been made, yet informal tools seem to bring more hope to the people and the power lays within their hands and is less tempered with than formal tools (and people would assume that formal tools are harder to amend and harder to be taken advantage of). ■   References   BBC News. 2023. “สรุปปัญหาเลือกตั้งล่วงหน้า กับคำถามบัตรเลือกตั้ง 300,000 ซอง “อ่านไม่ออก”.” May 8. https://www.bbc.com/thai/articles/cv24qn9n32no (Accessed October 16, 2023)   Human Rights Watch. 2023. “Thailand: Upcoming Election Fundamentally Flawed.” April 6. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/04/06/thailand-upcoming-election-fundamentally-flawed (Accessed October 17, 2023)   iLaw. 2023. “Dissolution of Parliament Does Not Return Power to the People, Only Delays Elections.” March 20. https://www.ilaw.or.th/articles/5743 (Accessed February 16, 2024)   Isra News Agency. 2023. “เปิดสถิติงบเลือกตั้ง 20 ปี เทียบปี 66 ไฉนมากสุด 5.9 พันล. - สัญญาณยุบสภาฯ มาแล้ว.” January 25. https://www.isranews.org/article/isranews-scoop/115501-inves099-287.html (Accessed October 16, 2023)   Kongkirati, Prajak. 2023. “ในความเคลื่อนไหว.” May 13. https://decode.plus/20230513-multi-party/ (Accessed October 16, 2023)   Kumsang, Chai. 2022. “รัฐราชการขยายใหญ่ เบียดพื้นที่การคลัง ยังด้อยประสิทธิภาพ.” The101.world. November 17. https://www.the101.world/bureaucratic-state/ (Accessed October 16, 2023)   Lohatepanont, Ken Mathis, and Napon Jatusripitak. 2023. "One Constituency, Two Parties: Ballot Splitting and Divided Loyalties in Thailand’s Election." Fulcrum. July 28. https://fulcrum.sg/one-constituency-two-parties-ballot-splitting-and-divided-loyalties-in-thailands-election/ (Accessed January 30, 2024)   Lührmann, Anna, Kyle L. Marquardt, and Valeriya Mechkova. 2017. Constraining Governments: New indices of vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability. Working Paper, Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg.   Moncrieffe, Joy Marie. 1998. “Reconceptualizing Political Accountability.” International Political Science Review 19, 4: 387-406.   Naewna News. 2023. “เช็คด่วน! เปิดข้อมูลบัตรเขย่ง 47 หน่วยเลือกตั้ง 16 จว. นับคะแนนใหม่ 11 มิ.ย.นี้.” June 8. https://www.naewna.com/politic/736069 (Accessed October 9, 2023)   Office of the Election Commission of Thailand. n.d. “Authorities and Duties of the Election Commmission.” https://www.ect.go.th/en/ect_en/authorities-and-duties (Accessed October 16, 2023)   Prachatai. 2023. “We Watch แถลงพบปัญหา #เลือกตั้ง66 ทั้งเรื่องกฎหมายยันสถานที่ เสนอประกาศผลทางการใน 7 วัน.” May 16. https://prachatai.com/journal/2023/05/104146 (Accessed October 17, 2023)   Reuters. 2023. “Thai election agency criticised after snags in early voting.” May 8. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thai-election-agency-criticised-after-snags-early-voting-2023-05-08/ (Accessed October 16, 2023)   Schendler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.   Thai PBS. 2023. “Move Forward becomes main opposition party.” August 23. https://www.thaipbsworld.com/move-forward-party-becomes-main-opposition-party/ (Accessed October 9, 2023)   Thairath Plus. 2022. อะไรทำให้รัฐธรรมนูญ 2540 ได้ชื่อว่า ‘รัฐธรรมนูญฉบับประชาชน’. December 9. https://plus.thairath.co.th/topic/politics&society/102513 (Accessed February 21, 2024)   Thairath. 2023. ถอดรหัสข่าวใหญ่ โค้งสุดท้ายเลือกตั้ง 2566 กกต.เตรียมง้างดาบ เชือดพรรคใด. May 3. https://www.thairath.co.th/scoop/theissue/2691107 (Accessed February 16, 2024)   We Watch. 2023. Public Statement On the Observation of Thailand’s General Election on 14 May 2023. Public Statement, Bangkok: We Watch.   Workpoint Today. 2023. กกต.แถลงเลือกตั้ง 66 คนออกมาใช้สิทธิมากที่สุดในประวัติศาสตร์ ยืนยันผล ‘ก้าวไกล’ ชนะอันดับ 1. 15 May. https://workpointtoday.com/election66-result/ (Accessed February 16, 2024)     [1] It should be noted that this author has used the vertical accountability score in the year that a new constitution has been drafted, as it is an important milestone that can represent drastic change in the law and the facts.   [2] According to Article 97(3) of the Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2560 (2017)     ■ Parin Jaruthavee is a young scholar who is passionate about developing her country further with Asian values. She is currently working at King Prajadhipok's Institute, which is the think-tank of the Thai parliament.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

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Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Vertical Accountability in Pakistan (Interim Report)

1. Background   When reviewing academic literature on the subject, it becomes apparent that researchers have worked diligently to refine the definition of accountability in the political and governmental spheres. For the purposes of this paper, we define accountability as “the de facto constraints on the government’s use of political power through requirements for justification of its actions and potential sanctions by both citizens and oversight institutions” (Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova 2020). Further, we define vertical accountability as “the ability of a state’s population to hold its government accountable through elections and political parties” (Plattner, Diamond, and Schedler 1999). Meanwhile, horizontal accountability refers to state institutions keeping each other in check, while diagonal accountability involves non-state actors such as civil society organizations and the media.   While the research on vertical accountability specific to Pakistan is limited, academics and journalists have written extensively on the state of democracy and elections in Pakistan. Historical evidence, the aforementioned research on democratic institutions and election indices can be used to assess Pakistan’s level of vertical accountability. During 76 years since its independence, Pakistan has seen more than three decades of military dictatorships. Even during democratic periods, while there has not been overt military rule, it is widely understood that the seat of power has been Rawalpindi, where the military is headquartered, rather than Islamabad, the nation’s capital.   The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Gothenburg measures democracy in countries across the world, using multiple indicators and indices. In its 2024 report, it evaluated countries’ democratic standing based on their performance on its Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), which includes the electoral democracy index as well as indicators for institutional checks and balances and respect for civil liberties. Thus, inexplicitly the LDI assesses vertical, horizontal and diagonal accountability respectively. As per the V-Dem LDI, South and Central Asia is the second most autocratic region in the world, with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh all qualifying as electoral autocracies. In the report, an electoral autocracy is defined as a country that holds multiparty elections for the executive but has insufficient levels of fundamental freedoms including the freedom of expression, freedom of association and free and fair elections. The V-Dem Institute has forecast further autocratization in both India and Pakistan.   Mechkova et al. (2019) found that strong vertical accountability is often a precursor to horizontal and diagonal accountability (Walsh 2020). The yardsticks of vertical accountability are specifically gauged by the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI), which consists of indicators such as free and fair elections, freedom of expression and suffrage. According to the V-Dem report, the quality of elections has worsened globally, and the autonomy of Election Management Bodies is under attack. The Institute contends that elections are often the last institution that is autocratized, which could mean that the weakening of democracies is at an advanced stage globally.   Figure 1. Electoral Democracy Index 2023 (V-Dem)   Pakistan ranked as the 118th country on the Electoral Democracy Index 2023, out of a total of 179 countries. Looking at the historical graph, Pakistan’s score plummeted during periods of military rule: 1958-1971, 1977-1988, 1999-2008. After the election victory of opposition parties and the resignation of military dictator Pervez Musharraf as president in 2008, there was an upward trend in Pakistan’s scores until about 2014. From 2014 to the present, the trend has largely been downward, specifically over 2023.   Figure 2. Electoral Democracy Index for Pakistan (V-Dem)   The V-Dem 2024 report classifies Pakistan as a country that has witnessed a bell-turn episode on the liberal democracy index, “where democratization turns into autocratization within a maximum of five years after the end of democratic advances.” The events of 2023, which saw increasing levels of political repression as well as delayed elections, lend credence to this claim. While Pakistan’s 12th general election was finally held on February 8th, 2024, that is not necessarily positive on its own. As the V-Dem report states, elections are “critical events” that can be the decisive factor in a country’s trajectory towards democratization or autocratization. In the following sections, we assess whether Pakistan’s trajectory for vertical accountability post-2024 election is headed in a positive or negative direction.     2. Mechanisms of Vertical Accountability in Pakistan   There are two broad measures of vertical accountability. The first measure is elections – whether they are free and fair, whether executives are directly elected, whether there is universal suffrage and whether the election management body is autonomous and performs its role adequately. The second measure is political parties – whether there is a diversity of political parties, whether barriers exist to forming or joining a party and whether all parties are given a level playing field. The legal and institutional framework for both these measures in Pakistan is described below.   2.1. The Electoral Systеm and the Election Management Body   Pakistan has a federal systеm, with two houses of parliament and four provincial assemblies. In 2024, there are 266 constituencies in Pakistan’s National Assembly (the lower house of parliament) and 593 constituencies in the four Provincial Assemblies. These 859 constituencies should be filled by directly elected representatives for a term of 5 years. Additionally, there are 60 seats reserved for women and 10 for non-Muslim minorities in the National Assembly, while there are 132 seats reserved for women and 24 for non-Muslim minorities in the Provincial Assemblies. These reserved seats are allotted to political parties based on the proportion of general seats that they win. The Senate (the upper house of parliament) is elected indirectly by the members of provincial assemblies. According to Article 224 of the Constitution of Pakistan, a general election must take place within 60 days of an assembly completing its term, or within 90 days if an assembly is dissolved prematurely.   The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) is the election management body of Pakistan. The ECP Secretariat is in Islamabad, but it has offices at the provincial, divisional and district level. Article 218 of the Constitution of Pakistan tasks the Election Commission with conducting “election to both Houses of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), Provincial Assemblies and for election to such other public offices as may be specified by law.” The ECP consists of the Chief Election Commissioner and four additional members representing each province. Other than holding elections, the ECP is also responsible for preparing electoral rolls, appointing election tribunals and delimiting constituencies. Under Article 220 of the Constitution of Pakistan, all executive branches of government are required to assist the ECP in performing their duties. With the passage of the Elections Act, 2017, not only was the ECP made more autonomous, but also more checks and balances were built into the systеm.   2.2. Political Parties and Freedom of Association   Pakistan’s two legacy political parties are the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). These two dynastic parties have been in power for the majority of Pakistan’s democratic years. However, in the last decade a new force has emerged and effectively forced a tri-party systеm. This third party is former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). In each province, there are also additional regional parties that continue to secure a sizable mandate in the general elections.   Article 17 of the Constitution of Pakistan grants the fundamental right of forming or joining a political party to all citizens. The Elections Act 2017 further lists the requirements for a political party, including having a distinct structure and name. It also prohibits political parties from acting against the Constitution of Pakistan, undermining the sovereignty of Pakistan, promoting hatred, giving members military training and receiving foreign funding. The Elections Act 2017 also lays out the requirements to enlist a party with the ECP to participate as a political party in general elections.     3. The Performance of Mechanisms of Vertical Accountability in Pakistan   Despite a comprehensive legal framework governing electoral processes and political parties, the practical reality is starkly different. Freedom House’s analysis of political rights and civil liberties in Pakistan underscores this incongruity. Freedom House categorizes Pakistan as a “partly free” country. Pakistan received a score of 15 out of 40 on political rights, which was based on an analysis of the electoral process, political pluralism, and the participation and functioning of government. This low score, despite strong legal provisions, is emblematic of the inherent challenges within Pakistan’s electoral framework and political dynamics.     3.1. Performance Case Study: 2024 General Election   This incoherence between the legal framework and ground realities becomes abundantly clear when analyzing the most recent general election held on February 8, 2024. The fairness of elections in Pakistan is undergoing a concerning decline, as corroborated by Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT)’s report on the most recent general election. The 2024 general election had a 49% score on their fairness assessment. This can be compared to 52% in 2018, 57% in 2013 and 40% in 2008. PILDAT analyzed the election in a segmented fashion, giving scores to the pre-poll, polling day and post-poll phases.   In the pre-poll phase, despite clear constitutionally mandated time limits, considerable delays occurred in scheduling the election. There was also increased political repression and lack of impartiality from state institutions. These institutions included the judiciary, the caretaker governments and the military establishment. The PTI was the prime target, facing media censorship and legal battles. The party’s leadership as well as grassroots members were arrested and detained. Additionally, worsening law and order in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan impeded on electioneering and voting activities.   On polling day, the most controversial event was the caretaker government’s decision to suspend mobile phone and internet services, which created problems for public participation in the electoral process and made it difficult for election observers and the media to monitor and report on the polling processes. Additionally, the shutdown compromised the ECP’s Election Management Systеm (EMS), introduced to digitally deliver each constituency’s results to the ECP. The failure of the EMS created a déjà vu moment, reminding voters of the 2018 general election, which became contentious when the ECP’s Result Transmission Systеm (RTS) allegedly failed, and election results stopped coming in from across the country.   This delay in reporting results, and the lack of any comprehensive explanation from the ECP as to why they were unable to meet result reporting deadlines set out in the law, have further damaged the integrity of the 2024 general election. There is a widespread perception amongst the electorate that it was not the EMS that became inoperable; rather, pre-planned irregularities took place in the polls to ensure certain candidates’ victory. In the post-poll phase, many parties have also alleged rigging. With every election, the public’s confidence in their own ability to hold governments accountable through voting appears to weaken.   The low voter turnout in Pakistan’s general elections is indicative of the deteriorating state of vertical accountability in Pakistan. Turnout in the 2024 election was 48%, even worse than 2018’s 52%. Meanwhile, public confidence in the institution conducting the elections is also low. In Gallup’s most recent survey before the elections, only 42% of Pakistanis approved of the ECP.   Despite the provision of universal suffrage in Pakistan, significant barriers persist in registering women voters. Possession of a computerized national identity card (CNIC) is required for registration as a voter. However, women are less likely to possess CNICs and are also subject to familial restrictions in getting a CNIC or registering to vote. While the gender gap in registered voters has shrunk, the percentage of women who voted in the 2024 general election was less than that in the 2018 election, underscoring persistent challenges in achieving equitable electoral participation.     3.2. Shrinking Space for Political Parties   As political parties are increasingly sidelined and marginalized, the military establishment consolidates its influence, perpetuating a vicious cycle. Freedom House contends that in recent years, a political party’s ability to prosper in Pakistan is directly linked to the quality of their relationship with unelected military elites “which have used legal and extralegal means to sideline figures they object to.” This means that not only is the electorate unable to hold the government to account, but political parties are also constrained in their abilities to hold the government of the day accountable.   Presently, the PTI is at the receiving end of state repression, which is very similar to the treatment received by the PML-N during the 2018 general election cycle. Additionally, nationalist parties from Balochistan and political movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) are also deprived of political space. Moreover, the use of the anti-state label against anyone with a different worldview has stunted diversity of views and political pluralism. There is little tolerance or space for parties that do not conform to a certain worldview or are not right-leaning. In this repressive environment, democratic governance within political parties is also decreasing. They are becoming more dynastic as they rely on trusted family members to run amidst intense state pressure and crackdowns.     4. Recommendations for Improving Vertical Accountability in Pakistan   While the gap in the institutional ideals and the political realities appears to have widened in the last few years, there are short-term remedies and long-term solutions that can strengthen democracy and vertical accountability in Pakistan. These measures would seek to strengthen the integrity of the electoral process, renew public trust, and increase public participation. At the same time, there is a need for political parties to unite and set the agenda for a political path forward. As long as military intervention from behind the scenes continues, there cannot be a flourishing democracy or robust vertical accountability in Pakistan.   In the short term, the Election Commission of Pakistan and the newly elected government must work to restore public confidence in the election process. This can be achieved by expediting the resolution of electoral disputes through increased resources for election tribunals. Additionally, parliament can deliberate on forming an independent inquiry commission, akin to the one formed to probe the 2013 elections, to investigate any allegations of electoral wrongdoing, specifically focusing on the performance of the ECP and the wrongful involvement of any state institutions. It is imperative that any actors found responsible for wrongdoing face accountability, and that electoral and legal reforms are implemented to prevent such malpractices from recurring.   In the long term, there is a need to strengthen democratic norms and practices across state institutions. A clear delineation of powers is required among the military establishment, the judiciary, and the executive to prevent unconstitutional interference. Political parties must unite around the agenda of democratic principles, prioritizing the collective interests of Pakistani democracy over short-term individual gains. Without political actors making a long-term and steadfast commitment to strengthening vertical accountability — i.e., elections and political parties — Pakistan’s democracy will remain fragile and vulnerable to autocratic tendencies. Through a vibrant political party landscape as well as free and fair elections, the Pakistani electorate can hold governments accountable and begin to build further accountability structures such as horizontal and diagonal accountability measures. ■   References   Election Commission of Pakistan. n.d. “Constitutional Provisions Relating to the ECP.” https://ecp.gov.pk/overview-of-ecp (Accessed April 9, 2024)   ______. n.d. “Elections Act, 2017 (as modified up to 5th August 2023).” https://ecp.gov.pk/storage/files/2/Elections%20Act%202017%20updated/Updated%20Elections%20Act%202017-231011-105435.pdf (Accessed April 9, 2024)   International Foundation for Electoral Systеms. 2024. “Elections in Pakistan: 2024 General.” https://www.ifes.org/tools-resources/election-snapshots/elections-pakistan-2024-general-elections (Accessed April 9, 2024)   Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World 2023: Pakistan.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/pakistan/freedom-world/2023 (Accessed April 9, 2024)   Lührmann, Anna, Kyle L. Marquardt, And Valeriya Mechkova. 2020. “Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Accountability.” American Political Science Review 114, 3: 811–820. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000222 (Accessed April 9, 2024)   Nord, Marina, Martin Lundstedt, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Cecilia Borella, Tiago Fernandes, Lisa Gastaldi, Ana Good God, Natalia Natsika, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2024. “Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot.” University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute. https://v-dem.net/documents/43/v-dem_dr2024_lowres.pdf (Accessed April 9, 2024)   Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency: PILDAT. 2024. “Assessment of the Quality of General Election 2024.” https://pildat.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/ASSESSMENTOFTHEQUALITYOFGENERALELECTION2024.pdf (Accessed April 9, 2024)   Plattner, Marc F., Larry Diamond, and Andreas Schedler. 1999. The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.   Walsh, Emily. 2020. “Political Accountability: Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Constraints on Governments.” University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: V-Dem Policy Brief, No. 22. https://v-dem.net/media/publications/pb_22_final.pdf (Accessed April 9, 2024)     ■ Alena Sadiq is a Program Officer at the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT).     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Alena Sadiq 2024-07-04Views : 3321
Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Vertical Accountability in Mongolia: The Power of the People (Interim Report)

1. Introduction: The State of Accountability of Mongolia   In this series of reports on accountability, three types of accountability will be examined: government accountability to its citizens (vertical accountability), government responsibility to other institutions (horizontal accountability), and government accountability to the media and civil society groups (diagonal accountability). This report examines vertical accountability in the Mongolian political systеm. Existing research considers that in a systеm with vertical accountability, citizens can hold their government accountable through elections and political parties (Lührmann 2020, p. 813).   The most important change is that the latest “Democracy Report 2024” placed Mongolia in the democratic “gray zone” between “electoral democracy” and “electoral autocracy.” From 1992 to 2022, Mongolian performance in V-Dem Projects accountability indices was consistently classified as an “electoral democracy.” On average, it scores relatively high in vertical and diagonal accountability indices, but its performance in horizontal accountability is in decline (Figure 1). Since the institutionalization of democracy with the 1992 constitution, its vertical accountability performance and subsequent decline make the case most similar to India (Figure 2).   Figure 1. V-Dem Accountability Indices: 1989 to 2023 Source: Data obtained from V-Dem Project   Figure 2. V-Dem Vertical Accountability Asia: 1992 vs. 2023 Source: Data obtained from V-Dem Project   In general, these scores describe a systеm where elections result in the transfer of power, but there are flaws in governance. In the case of Mongolia, these flaws are related to (1) poor government accountability, (2) poor enforcement of legislation that is part of institutional control mechanisms and increasingly (3) freedom of the media. Over the years, the main challenge to analyzing and evaluating government performance and policies was the lack of transparency in decision-making and a lack of access to admіnistrative information. Moreover, most of the significant legislation introduced in the past few years was introduced hastily with little challenge by the opposition or public oversight, which is required by the legislative process.   Consecutive constitutional amendments, starting from the significant amendments in 2019, followed by a further amendment on August 25, 2022, and culminating in the 31 May 2023 amendment, introduced a mixed electoral systеm with 78 members of parliament elected by majoritarian and 48 by proportional representation. The landmark cyber security law (2021) and human rights laws also received minimal scrutiny and were passed without public discussion. Moreover, only the president’s veto stopped controversial social media laws that the Mongolian parliament passed after a considerable public outcry (Buyanjargal 2023; Ooluun 2023). There was also condemnation from the civil society groups and the international community (CIVICUS Monitor 2023; Jamgansuren 2023; Dulamkhorloo Baatar 2023). These laws granted the government broad control over online content, including censorship of discussions about officials and the ability to shut down the internet. Legally, in cases of such procedural breech, the Constitutional Court of Mongolia can challenge the adopted legislation(On the Proceedings of Disputes in the Constitutional Court [Үндсэн Хуулийн Цэцэд Маргаан Хянан Шийдвэрлэх Ажиллагааны Тухай] 1995). Yet, the Constitutional Court is a highly politicized institution; thus, so far, no challenges to this legislation have been issued. Nonetheless, in the case of the social media laws, the presidential veto was supported by 89 percent of the parliamentarians, and the bill was rejected (RSF 2023a).   Another recent development is that small parties without a seat in parliament opposed the new electoral laws that decreased the number of electoral districts from 29 to 13 enlarged regional constituencies. Such large electoral districts are known to benefit large parties with extensive resources and networks in the rural areas, putting small parties and independent candidates at a considerable disadvantage in the 2024 parliamentary elections. The media reports that the Constitutional Court is “considering” whether to take on the case (Uyan 2024; Nomin 2024). The result of their decision would further highlight whether the government is planning to uphold inclusivity as part of its commitment to a democratic electoral process. Notably, the 2024 electoral systеm’s majoritarian seat distribution gave the urban constituencies only 24 mandates out of 78, further reducing their chances (Ulaanbaatar News 2023). Moreover, it is yet to be specified how the proportional candidate lists would accommodate and represent them.   Given this, the disregard for transparency in legislative procedure and public scrutiny, together with the overall deterioration in horizontal accountability, invoke concerns. As evident from the adoption of recent legislation, the government continuously excluded stakeholders and undermined freedom of speech. Findings from cross-national research show that the erosion of horizontal accountability is related to the deterioration in the quality of democracy (Sato et al. 2022).   Given this gap, the two sides of vertical accountability in Mongolia will be analyzed: (1) the government’s side through its organization of elections and the political party landscape, and (2) the public’s side through the perception of government performance and accountability. This report will investigate vertical accountability since citizens’ vigilance is one of the last bastions of resistance to the processes set by the government.     2. Electoral Accountability and Declining Party Competition   2.1. Elections and Political Party Landscape   After the 1992 Constitution institutionalized democracy in Mongolia, the voter turnout was relatively high in most elections, but still, we can observe a gradual decline in voter participation (Figure 3). It was very high in the 1990s, mainly due to the novelty effects, but then, similar to other democracies, the enthusiasm decreased over time. Nevertheless, it remains high for parliamentary elections and is mainly decreasing for the presidential elections, highlighting the greater weight of parliament in the political systеm. The COVID-19 restrictions can explain the low turnout for the most recent 2021 presidential election. Nevertheless, it will be seen in the June 2024 parliamentary elections that the participation of two-thirds of the electorate became the new norm.   Figure 3. Voter Turnout in Parliamentary and Presidential Elections since 1992 Source: Data from the General Election Committee of Mongolia   Another main development is that the mostly majoritarian systеm led to the dominance of two parties, as smaller parties were unable to compete outside of the capital. The challenges for smaller parties, newcomers, and women were primarily due to resources that became increasingly relevant to running campaigns, establishing and maintaining rural networks, and covering large electoral districts. In rural areas, the poorly developed infrastructure, geographic size, and scattered population required considerable funds for campaigning. Therefore, except for the two main parties, there was rarely any other political representation visible outside of Ulaanbaatar. The Mongolian People’s Party (successor to the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party) and the Democratic Party (successor of the Democratic Union Coalition) are considered the main political forces. However, the future of DP is uncertain, as it still cannot recover from the defeat in the past two elections, and opinion poll results are unfavorable.   Table 1. Electoral Systеm: 1992 to 2024   Elections Electoral Systеm Number of Constituencies Number of Seats Mandates MPRP/MPP DUC/DP         Rural Urban % Votes % Seats % Votes % Seats 2024 Mixed* 13+1 78+48 54+* 24+* - - - - 2020 Majoritarian 29 76 52 24 49.3 81.6 24.5 14.5 2016 Majoritarian 76 76 48 28 46.5 85.5 34.2 11.8 2012 Mixed* 26+1 48+28 * * 33.5 35.4 34.2 52.1 2008 Majoritarian 26 76 56 20 43.0 59.2 39.2 36.8 2004 Majoritarian 76 76 56 20 48.8 47.4 44.8 44.7 2000 Majoritarian 76 76 56 20 51.5 94.7 24.1 1.3 1996 Majoritarian 76 76 56 20 45.7 65.8 39.9 32.9 1992 Majoritarian 26 76 52 24 57.1 92.1 31.3 6.6   Source: Data from the General Election Committee of Mongolia   *Note: The 2012 and 2024 electoral systеms are mixed (majoritarian and proportional), where the proportional part is based on a nationwide candidate list. This makes the allocation of rural vs urban number of mandates not directly applicable. Still, at the time of writing the exact structure and procedures for the proportional element of the upcoming 2024 parliamentary election has not been specified.   From Table 1, we can see that based on the performance of the two main parties in the past elections, the relationship between the total votes cast and the number of seats obtained is not proportional. The type of electoral systеm, the number (directly related to size) of constituencies, and, more recently, gerrymandering led to distortions. In some of the elections, those discrepancies were considerable (See Figures 4 and 5), which was also reflected in the increasing criticism of the electoral systеm. There was also the role of urban and rural cleavages and the related distribution of Ulaanbaatar and rural area mandates. Historically, the rural constituencies favored the MPRP/MPP. Thus, the high number of rural mandates in the rural area mostly benefited the ruling party.   Figure 4. MPRP and MPP Votes and Seats     Figure 5. DUC and DP Votes and Seats Source: Data from the General Election Committee of Mongolia   At the same time, party registration was rarely a problem, and to date, dozens of parties emerged right before the elections just to disappear shortly afterward. As noted earlier, for smaller parties, the main challenge was the lack of resources, which continuously disadvantaged them in the rural areas and made them unable to compete with larger parties. The size of electoral districts and a lack of established rural networks were a main challenge they could not overcome. This was the same for independent candidates, newcomers, and women, who lacked main party affiliation and support. After the 2016 defeat of one of the main parties — the Democratic Party — and the subsequent crisis within the party, it has not recovered and is currently a lesser political force. Due to the fragmentation of its leadership and a lack of opposition, it is becoming less of a challenger based on the recent public announcement of its leadership (DP leader Gantumur and his talks about forming a coalition with the main party after the 2024 elections). Consequently, the current one-party dominant systеm became solidified (Figure 6).   Figure 6. Parties in Parliament since 1992 Source: Data from the General Election Committee of Mongolia   2.2. Perceptions on Vertical Accountability   In the end, all these trends contributed to the systеmatic lack of opposition, and the gradual (re)establishment of the one-party dominant political systеm. In the previous report on “Horizontal Accountability in Mongolia” (Ganbat and Sumaadii 2024), we concluded that the current systеm of checks and balances among the government institutions has been undermined. Thus, there is a lack of institutional ways to direct public concerns. In such a context where institutions capable of controlling power are compromised, how can the public form democratic pressure? Existing literature suggests that the challenge of one-party dominant systеms is an increasing vulnerability to mass protest (Ulfelder 2005). Indeed, in the current political climate, unless the systеm evolves in response to the numerous criticisms and addresses its problems with systеmic corruption, the only remaining political outlet is citizen’s protest.   Following that, we can deduce that the increasing numbers of protesters in the last few years are a symptom of major institutional deficiencies. Despite 2023 being themed by Mongolian officials as the “year of anti-corruption” over the past few years, Mongolia’s position in various global rankings has steadily worsened. In 2023 Transparency International’s assessments, Mongolia’s corruption ranking further declined from previous years and stands at 121 out of 180 with a Corruption Perception Index of 35, which places it among countries with a serious corruption problem (TI 2024). The Press Freedom Index ranked 88th in 2023 (RSF 2023b). The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index Expert Survey revealed a decline from 35 to 33 points (WJP 2023).   A major challenge related to weak institutions is that systеmic corruption is a significant concern for the citizens. Over time, the inability (or a lack of political will) to solve corruption has resulted in a political climate where there is very little public trust in government institutions. Historically, almost all political institutions receive low levels of trust from the population. At the same time, civil society and the government admіnistration received more trust. Notably, the level of trust in the president was fluctuating but was still relatively high until recently. Of particular importance is that political parties are the least trusted of all, and there is a strong belief that current parties do not represent public opinion (Figures 7 and 8). Adding to this is the fact that a majority agrees that corruption is a common practice in the country (Figure 9), thus further fueling public skepticism about government accountability.   Figure 7. Trust in Political Institutions Source: Data obtained from the Sant Maral Foundation, Politbarometer Surveys 2008-2023   Figure 8. Parties Represent Public Opinion Source: Data obtained from the Sant Maral Foundation, Politbarometer Surveys 2000-2023   Figure 9. Perception of Corruption Source: Data obtained from Sant Maral Foundation Corruption Benchmark Survey 2006-2019   Given the prevailing lack of trust in institutional remedies, it is crucial to evaluate the probable actions citizens might take. Long-term surveys reveal a decline in indecision among citizens regarding their response to governmental failures. While a third opt for a passive approach, waiting for improvement, there has been an uptick in those inclined to oppose the government through voting in elections. By 2023, slightly over a quarter of respondents favored this approach. At the same time, there is a rise in those considering protest, with one in seven respondents favoring this option in recent years. It should also be noted that legal channels and joining opposition parties are unpopular, underscoring the skepticism towards institutional solutions. As a result, the citizens do not believe that they can hold the government accountable through any of the institutions and, more importantly, political parties. In the end, elections are left as the main institutional mechanism. In such a context, it is most likely that protest votes will increase, especially in urban constituencies (known to be more radicalized), and newcomers will have a better chance.   Figure 10. What would you do If the government failed to meet your expectations? Source: Data obtained from Sant Maral Foundation Politbarometer Surveys   Unsurprisingly, the increasing number of protests (with a temporary break during the COVID-19 restrictions) was a symptom of the accumulated institutional deficiencies. The demonstrations about air pollution during the winters of 2015 to 2019 were well organized and had specific goals. There were also protests triggered by corruption scandals such as the “SME Scandal,” the “60 billion MNT Scandal,” the “Green Bus Scandal,” the “Do Your Job” protest, and more recently, the “Coal Theft Scandal,” which saw the protestors storming the government.   In response to the growing tide of protests within Mongolian society, the government reinstated a law dating back to 1994 prohibiting protests on Sukhbaatar Square in front of the Parliament Building. This action only solidified the public perception that the government has failed to effectively address the underlying causes of public discontent and can only resort to banning protests reminiscent of its former communist-style governance. The move further implied an incapacity to engage with criticism and a fear of public unrest.     3. Conclusion   Ideally, the constitution provides a stable framework on which politics can unfold. Yet, the electoral framework introduced distortions between votes and seats and hindered the development of a balanced and equal-opportunity multi-party political systеm. Over time, the unresolved challenges led to disillusionment in the current establishments’ capacity or willingness to implement genuine reform to improve democratic governance. In a democratic ideal, multi-party systеms expand the political choices of citizens and provide more outlets for dissent. To date, the multi-party systеm has yet to be fully realized. The lack of opportunities for most minor political actors to gain a foothold in the political systеm led to the dominance of the first two parties and currently, one party. The main problem is that the electoral systеm needs to evolve to consider transparency, fairness, and inclusivity in the electoral process.   Moreover, there is a considerable lack of accountability and transparency in governance, which introduces significant risks. Among them, the risk of corruption and risk for the quality of governance are considerably high and unlikely to be resolved given the current politicization of the judiciary. Altogether, this adds to the public frustration with the governance and views that the current political elites have reached the limits of their personal capacities, and, therefore, more professionals are needed in the government.   One of the main findings in the public opinion polls of the last few years is that the public has started to demand more professionalism from the government (Iveel M. 2024). “Do your job” was one of the slogans during the youth protest of 2022, reflecting the public sentiment frustrated with the current governance. As noted earlier, for the active part of the population, elections are the main institutional way to hold the government accountable. At other times, protest is becoming increasingly relevant.   Given this, it should also be noted that there are more than enough legal avenues to hold government officials accountable. However, as with much of other legislation in Mongolia, implementation problems exist. In the past thirty years, numerous measures have been introduced to remedy the corruption challenges in the country. More recently, the ‘whistleblower laws’ were attempted. Yet, as with most other legislation, the implementation ran into problems. Generally, since Mongolia has no law protecting whistleblowers yet, the current draft has been under review (for nearly ten years). In the meantime, there are no secure and easily accessible channels for reporting corruption. Thus, anti-corruption activists, whistleblowers, and witnesses are inadequately protected (Jamiyasuren 2023a).   At a procedural level, a typical situation is when a misconduct claim ends in a legal void because it is constantly passed between different agencies until it becomes irrelevant or the claim period expires. Whether it is deliberate or due to general inefficiencies is debatable. However, it is quite common for a misconduct case to enter a so-called “legal oblivion” (Jamiyasuren 2023b). The typical case can involve three to four responsible authorities that delay response; each period of a claim typically lasts from 4 to 12 years or until the claim period expires by laws of admіnistrative and criminal procedures. Most likely until the claim becomes irrelevant or the responsible official is no longer in the related position (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, based on such widespread situations, citizens became highly reluctant to use formal ways of resolving conflicts.   Under these circumstances, vertical accountability in Mongolia is unlikely to improve in the short term. As a result, the 2024 parliamentary elections will be a decisive factor for the future of Mongolian democracy. The stakes are high, and the systеm has accumulated considerable social tensions. When and how the newly elected officials address them will determine whether the new systеm can facilitate further institutional change to improve democratic governance, or whether citizens will have to take the initiative into their own hands. ■   References   Buyanjargal, Myagmardorj. 2023. “Parliament Approves Law in a Few Days and Undermines Freedom of Speech!” The UB Post. January 23. https://www.theubposts.com/a/12593 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   CIVICUS Monitor. 2023. “Civil Society Raises Concerns about Detention of Activist and Restrictive Social Media Law as Anti-Corruption Protests Erupt in Mongolia.” March 2. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/civil-society-raises-concerns-about-detention-of-activist-and-restrictive-social-media-law-as-anti-corruption-protests-erupt-in-mongolia/ (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Dulamkhorloo Baatar. 2023. “Nest Center NGO and MFCC Opposes New Law on Social Network.” Nest Center for Journalism Innovation and Development. January 26. https://www.nestmongolia.org/blog/nest-condemns-new-law (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Ganbat Damba, and Mina Sumaadii. 2024. “Horizontal Accountability in Mongolia: The Challenges of (Counter) Balancing. in Asia Democracy Research Network. 2024. “Horizontal Accountability in Asia: Country Cases (Final Report Ⅰ).” ADRN Working Paper. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&idx=353 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Iveel M. 2024. “L.Sumati: Voters Are Waiting for New and Professional Election Candidates.” UB Post, February 24, No.022 (2706) edition.   Jamgansuren, Delgersaikhan. 2023. “Law on Protection of Human Rights on Social Media.” Lehmanlaw Mongolia LLP. February 17. https://lehmanlaw.mn/blog/law-on-protection-of-human-rights-on-social-media/ (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Jamiyasuren, Oimandakh. 2023a. “Whistleblower Campaign ‘...Нэгдье’ - a Paper Fight?!” Mongolia Awakening. August 27. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/whistleblower-campaign-нэгдье-paper-fight-oimandakh-jamiyansuren/ (Accessed April 4, 2024)   ______. 2023b. “Kraken Systеm of Mongolia.” Mongolia Awakening. September 11. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/kraken-systеm-mongolia-oimandakh-jamiyansuren (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Lührmann, Anna, Kyle L. Marquardt, and Valeriya Mechkova. 2020. “Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Accountability.” American Political Science Review 114, 3: 811–820. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000222 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Nomin, B. 2024. “Will Tsets Review the Decision to Enlarge Electoral Districts? [Тойргийг томсгосон тогтоолыг Цэц шүүх үү]” Unuudur. February 28. https://www.unuudur.mn/a/265327 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   On the Proceedings of Disputes in the Constitutional Court [Үндсэн Хуулийн Цэцэд Маргаан Хянан Шийдвэрлэх Ажиллагааны Тухай]. 1995. https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail?lawId=19 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Ooluun, B. 2023. “Parliament Accepts President’s Veto on the Law on Protecting Human Rights on Social Media.” MONTSAME News Agency. March 17. https://montsame.mn/en/read/314889 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Reporters Without Borders: RSF. 2023a. “Mongolia: RSF Urges Legislators Not to Override Presidential Veto of Dangerous Social Media Bill.” March 15. https://rsf.org/en/mongolia-rsf-urges-legislators-not-override-presidential-veto-dangerous-social-media-bill (Accessed April 4, 2024)   ______. 2023b. “Mongolia.” December 22. https://rsf.org/en/country/mongolia (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Sato, Yuko, Martin Lundstedt, Kelly Morrison, Vanessa A. Boese, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2022. ‘Institutional Order in Episodes of Autocratization’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4239798 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Transparency International: TI. 2024. “2023 Corruption Perceptions Index: Explore the Results.” January 30. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Ulaanbaatar News. 2023. “ASSEMBLY: The number of parliamentary constituencies and mandates for the 2024 regular election was approved [ЧУУЛГАН: УИХ-ын 2024 оны ээлжит сонгуулийн тойрог, мандатын тоог баталлаа],” December 21. https://ubn.mn/p/54373 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Ulfelder, Jay. 2005. “Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes.” International Political Science Review 26, 3: 311–334. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512105053786 (Accessed April 4, 2024)   Uyan, U. 2024. “The Claim That Established Electoral Districts Violate the Constitutiona Was Referred to the Constitutional Court [Сонгуулийн Тойрог Тогтоохдоо Үндсэн Хууль Зөрчсөн Гэж ҮХЦ-д Ханджээ].” Eguur.MN. February 27. Улс төрийн мэдээ. https://eguur.mn/477856/ (Accessed April 4, 2024)   World Justice Project: WJP. 2023. “WJP Rule of Law Index.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index (Accessed April 4, 2024)     ■ Mina Sumaadii is a Senior Researcher at the Sant Maral Foundation, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.   ■ Ganbat Damba is the Chairman of Board at the Academy of Political Education, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Mina Sumaadii 2024-07-04Views : 11600
Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Assessing Horizontal Accountability in Mongolia: Weak Judiciary Combatting Corruption Scandals

1. Introduction   1.1. Background   Recent socio-economic and political shifts in Mongolia depict a concerning trajectory of diminishing democratic values. The once-promised democratic systеm, deeply rooted in transparency, accountability, and justice, now appears under threat. Like many emerging democracies, Mongolia confronts a multitude of challenges. Central to these challenges is the delicate balance of institutional design and its operation, with horizontal accountability emerging as a pivotal concept. This principle ensures that state institutions keep each other in check, preventing power abuses and guaranteeing operations within legal bounds.   These challenges are evident in the annual unveiling of corruption scandals involving substantial embezzlement of public funds that shake the foundation of Mongolian society. Furthermore, the country’s legal foundation has witnessed considerable changes. Since 2000, the Mongolian Constitution — the bedrock of its democratic systеm — has undergone four amendments. Remarkably, three of these changes occurred between 2019 and 2023, spearheaded by the Mongolian People’s Party and often carried out with limited public consultations. Historically, the robust constitution of Mongolia has been celebrated as a pillar of democracy in Central Asia, ensuring a balanced distribution of power among the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. However, recent sentiments indicate growing concerns. As reported in 2023, the individuals entrusted with upholding the Constitution now appear to be undermining it (Tumurtogoo 2023). The post-2019 amendments have generally curtailed presidential authority, bolstered executive power, and imperiled the foundational balance of power across the branches. While rationalized as measures to augment state policy ownership, ensure stability, and heighten accountability within the executive branch, these changes pose risks to the power balance between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches.   In these times of declining public trust and legal changes present the debate surrounding the role and power of the judiciary and oversight institutions in Mongolia. On one side, there are increasing concerns about institutional inefficiency and potential biases among these institutions and a push to decentralize, reduce funding, and staffing of the judiciary and oversight bodies due to waning trust. Conversely, on the other side, there are arguments that robust and well-resourced judiciary and oversight institutions are foundational for maintaining checks and balances, especially in overseeing the executive branch. Empowering these bodies is crucial not just for governance but also for restoring public trust.   As such, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate by assessing the judicial and oversight institutions’ independence, responsiveness, and capacity. In particular, the Independent Authority Against Corruption Agency was focused among the judicial bodies. In order to measure the accountability level of judiciary, its trust level, independence and impartiality, and responsiveness and timeliness will be key elements of accountability questions.   In answering the questions, the paper will rely on the review of secondary and publicly available information retrieved from media, news and public hearing testimonies published. Furthermore, the paper examines opinions from international bodies, NGOs that have closely followed the selected corruption case and the commentary and analyses of experts and scholars. Public perception survey results as well as international indices were used to provide contextual and historical information about the Judiciary and horizontal accountability.   2. Description of Corruption Scandals   In 2017, the “60 billion tugrugs (MNT)” (25 million USD) deal ahead of the presidential election was exposed when voice recordings of high-level officials’ plan to rearrange government positions for set bribery were released. In 2019, after the Speaker of Parliament M. Enkhbold was dismissed in relation to the MNT 60 billion case to sell key government offices in exchange for election financing, several ruling party members were sentenced to four-year imprisonment by the district court. However, at the appellate at Capital City Court, the decision was dismissed (Шүүхийн шийдвэрийн хураангуй 2019). An independent media source exposed the ‘SME embezzlement’ corruption scandal in 2018. The district-level courts also made decisions to prosecute affiliated officials in 2020. One former member of parliament (MP), B. Undarmaa, was sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment but was released on the grounds of ‘poor health.’ A new scandal called ‘Coal Mafia’ arose in December 2022. These cases show that even today, there were no clear court decisions and prosecutions against the ruling party members and their affiliates involved in corruption scandals. The scale and depth of the scandal were unprecedented, allegedly reaching MNT 40 trillion (more than one billion USD) (Davaabazar 2022).   Since its beginning in February 2023, the ‘Development Bank’ case encompasses 80 defendants and 460 individual lawsuits (S. Undarmaa 2023). The state-run Development Bank of Mongolia (DBM) is grappling with a substantial bond repayment of approximately 800 million USD due by the close of 2023. Despite this, the bank has been under continuous examination for issues since its foundation in 2012, especially regarding sizable enterprises that have secured long-term project loans from the DBM over the years. Due to a recent economic downturn and overly rosy forecasts, 69 companies have reportedly lagged in their repayments. By early 2022, the DBM’s non-performing loans surged to 500 million USD. Few years ago, the government initiated a corruption probe, which led to a criminal investigation focusing on several debtors, including prominent legislators. Several politicians from the Mongolian People’s Party and one member from the opposition HUN Party were involved in the case for ‘abuse of power and money laundering’ (Adiya 2022).   The aftermath of each scandal typically sees a surge of public outrage, often culminating in mass protests and significant media scrutiny (Adiya 2022; Bayartsogt 2018; Bekmurzaev 2023; Dierkes 2022; Lkhaajav 2017). These widespread demands for accountability often go disregarded, with tangible results rarely materializing.   It should be noted that prior corruption scandals, such as the Chinggis Bond under the Democratic Party’s majority, have also occurred. However, for the sake of relevance and timeliness, this paper narrows its focus to the most prominent and publicly recognized cases from the past eight years.   3. Horizontal Accountability Trends in Mongolia   The Horizontal Accountability Index from V-Dem provides an empirical metric to measure the extent to which state entities in a country can hold one another accountable. Analyzing the data for Mongolia from 1990 to 2022 reveals interesting trends and fluctuations that offer insights into the country’s evolving governance structure and democratic practices.   Figure 1. V-Dem Horizontal Accountability Index: Mongolia 1992-2022 Source: V-Dem 2023   • Initial Surge (1990-1992): Beginning with a score of 0.686 in 1990, there is a sharp rise to 0.909 in 1992. This period corresponds with Mongolia’s shift towards democracy, and the spike suggests rapid institutional reforms aimed at introducing checks and balances. • Stability and Marginal Fluctuations (1993-1999): Post the initial surge, the index stabilizes in the high 0.8 to low 0.9 range. This period reflects a consolidation phase, with Mongolia striving to maintain a balance of power among its state institutions. • Decline at the Turn of the Century (2000-2005): Starting in 2000 was a noticeable dip, which reached a low of 0.839 in 2005. This downward trajectory could indicate challenges in sustaining institutional checks, possibly due to political or economic factors. • Relative Stability with Mild Resurgence (2006-2012): The period sees the index oscillating in the mid-0.8 range with a slight rise to 0.869 by 2012, suggesting efforts to re-strengthen horizontal accountability mechanisms. • Dips and Peaks (2013-2020): This period is marked by significant fluctuations, from a dip to 0.825 in 2013 to a resurgence in 2019-2020. Such fluctuations indicate political changes and institutional reforms impacting the balance of power. • Recent Decline (2021-2022): A concerning decline has been observed in the last two years, with the index dropping to 0.724 in 2022, the lowest in the dataset. This drop suggests recent challenges or setbacks in ensuring horizontal accountability.   Over three decades, Mongolia’s Horizontal Accountability Index has seen notable shifts. While the 1990s reflected a promising start in institutionalizing checks and balances, subsequent years presented a mix of challenges and recoveries. The most recent decline signals a potential need for a renewed emphasis on bolstering mechanisms that ensure state entities remain accountable to one another. Analyzing whether these trends and the varying public trust in institutions central to horizontal accountability—especially in terms of how the judiciary and oversight bodies address corruption scandals—would be insightful.   3.1. Public Trust in Institutions   While public perceptions don’t directly measure the judiciary’s capacity to hold the executive accountable, they can, especially when grounded in tangible events, offer valuable insights into its performance. The implications of these high-profile corruption scandals and the delayed and unclear court decisions have resulted in public distrust in the court. However, distrust in the judicial systеm has been high since the democratic transition more than three decades ago.   • According to a 1994 survey conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Academy of Sciences, court was the second most corrupt institution at soum levels (Mont 2002). • In 2005, a public opinion survey conducted as part of the ‘Judicial Reform Program’ found that 90 percent of the respondents believed court decisions favor wealthier and more influential individuals over ordinary ones (Чимид 2006, p. 157). • In 2008, the Open Society Foundation surveyed professionals in the judicial systеm and found that 54 percent of the participants believed ‘conditions for impartiality and independence are not met in Mongolia’ (White 2008, p. 15). To the statement ‘interference of other organs of the state and politicians is high,’ 42 percent agreed and 38 percent said not sure. The research also collected anecdotal evidence from anonymous judges on how prominent political figures directly attempted to interfere in their decisions. • The Asian Barometer Survey in 2018 found that the proportion of respondents saying they trust the Courts was 36.7%, slightly higher than trust in parliament (34.7%) and much lower than trust in the president and prime minister (68.0%). Figure 2 shows that trust in the courts has been lower than in other institutions (Asian Barometer Survey). • As the Sant Maral Foundation’s public opinion surveys between 2007 and 2022 show, the proportion of respondents indicating trust in the courts is higher than those reported in the Asian Barometer Survey mentioned above. However, a similar trend of lower levels of trust in the courts compared to other institutions is observable.   Figure 2. Proportion of respondents answering ‘trust or trust a lot’ in different institutions, ABS 2002-2018 Source: Asian Barometer Survey, author’s calculation   Figure 3. Confidence in institutions 2000-2022 Source: Sant Maral Foundation, 1992-2022   4. The Judicial Branch’s Independence   To assess the judicial branch’s independence, we look at the factors that affect it, including legislation and structure of the judicial systеm, budget allocation, selection and dismissal procedure of judges, and ethical and disciplinary proceedings of the judges.   Table 1. Legal and institutional capacity of the Judicial Branch (2017-2022)   Key capacity areas Status Legislation Constitution of Mongolia (1992) stipulates the independence of court and impartiality of judges.  Laws: The organization and operations of courts and the Judicial General Council are regulated by law. Law on the Judiciary (2021); Law on Judicial Admіnistration; Law on the Legal Status of Judges; Law on the Legal Status of Citizens’ Representatives in Court Trials; and Law on Mediation. Structure Three-tiered systеm: Supreme court, provincial and capital city courts (appellate), and soum/inter-soum and district courts (first instance).  Courts: Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction (civil and criminal cases); Admіnistrative Court (admіnistrative cases) and Constitutional Court (constitutional disputes and cases) Budget allocation (% of total government expenditure) Courts are financed by the State. Between 2012-2022, on average 0.70% of the government expenditure was spent to finance judicial sector. The highest was in 2015 reaching 0.85% and the lowest in 2018 at 0.62%. Selection and dismissal procedure of key persons Judicial General Council is responsible for selection.  President of Mongolia is in charge of appointing.   The Constitution of Mongolia (1992) assures the structure and independence of the judicial systеm in Articles 48-55. Mongolia’s three-tiered judiciary comprises the Supreme Court, aimag (provincial) and capital city courts, and soum and district courts. As stated in Article 48, courts operate based on specific laws, receive financing from the state budget, and the state guarantees their economic operations. The Law on Courts (2012) governed these institutions until the Law on the Judiciary superseded it in 2021. Other pertinent legal documents include the Law on Judicial Admіnistration, the Law on the Legal Status of Judges, the Law on the Legal Status of Citizens’ Representatives in Court Trials, and the Law on Mediation.   4.1. Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary   An understanding of the historical and legislative context is required to understand whether the Judiciary branch has handled the Development Bank of Mongolia and other prominent corruption cases with independence and impartiality. Article 49.2 of the Constitution asserts, “Judges shall be impartial and bound only by the law. Interference in the judges’ duties by any individual or official—including the President, National Parliament members, Government officials, political party representatives, or members of other voluntary organizations—is prohibited.” The Judicial General Council plays a crucial role in safeguarding judicial independence, overseeing the selection of judges, and protecting judges’ constitutional rights (Article 49). However, the practical implementation of Article 49, beyond mere rhetoric, remains questionable.   Political figures influence the selection of judges. While the Judicial General Council conducts preliminary selections and proposes candidates, Parliament nominates them. Ultimately, it is the President of Mongolia who appoints them. Some scholars posit that since the Judicial General Council conducts the initial presentations, this ensures a degree of independence for judges from political sway. However, opposing views, including those from the OSCE (2021), emphasize the President’s considerable influence over aspects such as court organization, judges’ statuses, appointments, and dismissals.   In 2019, legislative amendments granted the National Security Council, comprising the president, prime minister, and the speaker of parliament, authority over judge appointments and dismissals. These amendments led to the removal of 17 judges in June 2019. Many civil society organizations, including Transparency International, voiced their disapproval, highlighting significant threats to the rule of law (Transparency International 2019). Nonetheless, the reformed Law on Judiciary in 2021 provided clearer guidelines on judicial appointments and bolstered measures to ensure the judiciary’s independence (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022).   The Judicial General Council’s autonomy has historically been in question. The specifics of its organization remain ambiguous in the Constitution. Ex-Member of Parliament Lundendorj, referencing the 1992 Constitution draft, revealed that the UN Human Rights Council had cautioned about a nebulous Judicial General Council structure, warning of potential dominance by the ruling parliamentary party (Лүндэндорж 2021). Over three decades, the Judicial General Council’s structure underwent five notable shifts:   • 1992-1996: Dubbed the ‘President- Judicial General Council’ phase. The President appointed 10 out of the 12 council members, with the Council selecting its chair. • 1996-2002: A ‘Ministry of Justice-President’ hybrid era saw the Ministry’s amplified role. Given the period’s parliamentary instability, the Council experienced turbulence; the Judicial General Council Chair switched five times in six years, highlighting the Council’s political susceptibility. • 2002-2012: Termed the ‘President – Self Governance of Judges’ phase. Of 14 members, 57% were judges chosen by aimag/capital city judges’ assemblies. • 2012-2020: Essentially evolved into an ‘Extension of the President’s Office’. All Judicial General Council members were presidential appointees, sidelining representatives from the Ministry of Justice and Parliament, which underscored the President’s accruing power. A survey revealed 44 percent of 144 judges felt the president overly dominated the judicial systеm (Мөнхсайхан, Цагаанбаяр, Алтансүх 2015). Notably, 13 out of 173 judges claimed unjustified presidential rejections for various appointments. • 2021 onwards: The ‘Self Governance and Parliament’ era commenced. A pivot toward parliamentary inclusion took place to mitigate the president’s outsized role. Subsequent amendments mandated that half of the Judicial General Council members were to be chosen by the Judges’ General Assembly and the rest by parliament (Law on the Judiciary of Mongolia, Article 76.2, 2021). The OSCE’s 2021 evaluation of this Law recommends excluding top executive officials and MPs from potential membership, a stipulation not yet incorporated, which might perpetuate concerns of undue executive and political influence on the Judiciary (OSCE 2021).   Numerous international monitoring bodies have underscored the importance of improving Mongolia’s judge selection and appointment procedures to exclude political entities, particularly the president and parliament. Yet, the modifications to the structure of the Judicial General Council and the judge selection process suggest enduring political sway. It is interesting to note that prior assessments of Mongolia’s judicial reform, including its independence, have highlighted both political party influence and the co-opting of donor-funded judicial reform initiatives by the country’s judicial elite (White B. T. 2009).   4.2. Responsiveness and Timeliness   Assessing the timeliness and responsiveness of the judiciary, especially in the context of a corruption case, requires a keen focus on the duration, efficiency, and adaptability of judicial proceedings.   A 2018 assessment by Transparency International showed that only 24 percent of corruption cases in Mongolia were prosecuted, while 76 percent were dropped by prosecutors. Mongolia should eliminate any interference by the National Security Council in the independence of the anti-corruption agency and establish a well-resourced and specialized anti-corruption court (Merkle 2018). The Development Bank corruption case shows that lawsuits related to corruption cases generally take significant time to resolve. Some disputes have been pending in court for 69 months.   5. Conclusions   The assessment of horizontal accountability in Mongolia, particularly focusing on the judiciary’s role in combating corruption scandals, highlights several critical points. The analysis of Mongolia’s V-Dem Horizontal Accountability Index shows recent declines suggesting a need for renewed emphasis on reinforcing mechanisms for state entities to hold each other accountable. Public perceptions provide valuable insights into the judiciary’s performance, high-profile corruption scandals and delayed and unclear court decisions have contributed to public distrust in the judiciary. This distrust is not a recent phenomenon, as it has persisted since Mongolia’s transition to democracy more than three decades ago.   Assessing the timeliness and responsiveness of the judiciary in corruption cases underscores the need to focus on the efficiency, duration, and adaptability of judicial proceedings. The delays in lawsuits related to corruption cases call for enhanced efficiency and effectiveness in the judicial systеm.   While the Mongolian Constitution and subsequent legislative amendments assert the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, the practical application of these provisions suggests significant political influence, especially from the executive branch. This influence is evident in the appointment process of judges, the structure and evolution of the Judicial General Council, and the considerable sway of political figures over judicial decisions and reforms. Despite international concerns and recommendations, political interference in Mongolia’s judicial sector persists, and the judiciary’s autonomy remains questionable.   Addressing Mongolia’s horizontal accountability challenges demands comprehensive reforms to enhance the independence, capacity, and transparency of its judiciary. These reforms should prioritize reducing political influence in the judiciary, improving efficiency in handling corruption cases, and fostering public trust in the judicial systеm. Furthermore, the potentials for establishing a specialized anti-corruption court should be carefully examined to combat corruption and bolster judiciary’s capacity to hold the executive accountable. ■   References   Adiya, Amar. 2022. “Backlash over Development Bank of Mongolia Exposes Social and Political Tensions.” Mongolia Weekly, April 27. Accessed June 15, 2023. https://www.mongoliaweekly.org/post/backlash-over-development-bank-of-mongolia-exposes-social-and-political-tensions   Asian Barometer Survey. (n.d.). Datasets from the Asian Barometer Survey Wave 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Asian Barometer Survey.   Bayartsogt, Khaliun. 2018. “A scandal in Mongolia: heads roll in government after US$1.3m SME fund embezzlement.” South China Morning Post, November 6. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2171965/scandal-mongolia-heads-roll-government-after-us13m-sme-fund   Bekmurzaev, Nurbek. 2023. “Mongolia embroiled in a major corruption scandal over the allocation of educational loans.” GlobalVoices, May 29. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://www.scribd.com/article/649063238/Mongolia-Embroiled-In-A-Major-Corruption-Scandal-Over-The-Allocation-Of-Educational-Loans   Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2022. BTI 2022 Country Report — Mongolia. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Accessed April 16, 2023. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/MNG#pos4   Davaabazar, B. 2022. “ТООЦООЛОЛ: 40 их наяд төгрөг яаж гарсан бэ?” ikon.mn, December 9. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://ikon.mn/n/2qpk   Dierkes, Julian. 2022. “Mass Protests in Mongolia Decry ‘Coal Mafia,’ Corruption.” The Diplomat, December 6. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/mass-protests-in-mongolia-decry-coal-mafia-corruption/   Guarnieri, Carlo. 2003. “Courts as an Instrument of Horizontal Accountability: The Case of Latin Europe.” In Democracy and the Rule of Law, ed. J. M. Maravall and A. Przeworski, 223-241. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   Law on the Judiciary of Mongolia, 2021 Article 76.2.   Lkhaajav, Bolor. 2017. “Ahead of Presidential Election, Mongolia Corruption Scandal Has a New Twist.” The Diplomat, June 19. Accessed June 15, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/ahead-of-presidential-election-mongolia-corruption-scandal-has-a-new-twist/   Merkle, Ortrun. 2018. “Mongolia: Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption.” Anti-Corruption Helpdesk. Transparency International. Accessed April 16, 2023. https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Country-Profile-Mongolia_2018.pdf   Mont, Robert La. 2002. “Some Means of Addressing Judicial Corruption in Mongolia.” Policy Documentation Center. Accessed April 8, 2023. http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002274/01/Judicial_Corruption_in_Mongolia.pdf   OSCE. 2021. Opinion on the Law on the Judiciary. Warsaw: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Accessed April 8, 2023. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/8/509672.pdf   S. Undarmaa. 2023. “Хөгжлийн банкны 460 гаруй хавтаст хэрэг, 257 оролцогч.” News.mn, February 15. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://news.mn/r/2627570/   Sant Maral Foundation. 1992-2022. Politbarometer Dataset. Ulaanbaatar: Sant Maral Foundation. https://www.santmaral.org/publications   Transparency International. 2019. “Rule of Law and Independence of Judiciary Under Threat in Mongolia.” July 4. Accessed April 8, 2023. https://www.transparency.org/en/press/rule-of-law-and-independence-of-judiciary-under-threat-in-mongolia   Tumurtogoo, Anand. 2023. “A charter under siege.” Asia Democracy Chronicles, February 15. Accessed June 10, 2023. https://adnchronicles.org/2023/02/13/a-charter-under-siege/   Varieties of Democracy. 2023. Country Graph: Mongolia Horizontal Accountability Index. https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/   White, Brent T. 2008. Report on The Status of Court Reform in Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar: Open Society Forum.   ______. 2009. “Rotten to the Core: Project Capture and the Failure of Judicial Reform in Mongolia.” East Asia Law Review 4, 209-275.   Лүндэндорж, Н. 2021. “ШЕЗ-д нэртэйгээр нь намайг оруулахгүй гээд журамдаа биччихгүй яасан юм бол гэж инээд хүрч сууна.” ikon.mn, Accessed April 6, 2023. December 13. https://ikon.mn/n/2ep5   Мөнхсайхан, О., Цагаанбаяр, Г., Алтансүх, Ж. 2015. Монгол улс дахь шүүхийн захиргааны загвар: тулгамдсан асуудал, шийдвэрлэх арга зам. Улаанбаатар: ННФ.   Чимид, Б. 2006. Монгол Улсын Шүүхийн эрх мэдлийн стратеги төлөвлөгөөний биелэлтийг зохион байгуулсан нь. Улаанбаатар.   Шүүхийн шийдвэрийн хураангуй. 2019. Capital City Court of Civil Appeals. Accessed March 6, 2023. https://appealcourt.mn/site/huraangui/       ■ Tamir Chultemsuren is the Vice Dean of the National University of Mongolia’s School of Arts, Sciences and Social Sciences, and holds a doctoral degree in Sociology. Dr. Chultemsuren is one of the co-founders of the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia (IRIM) and has been Chairman of the Board of IRIM since 2011. Having attended various academic seminars and functions across the U.S., Ireland, Hungary, Portugal, Turkey, Finland, Kazakhstan, Austria, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, Tamir has diverse and in-depth experience in engaging partners in cross-cultural settings. His areas of expertise are social research—civic participation, mass protest, and public perception; policy research—education policy and institution strengthening, monitoring, and evaluation; and project management.   ■ Dolgion Aldar is a research professional focused on promoting evidence-based policy-making and social cohesion in Mongolia. She spent five years as CEO of the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia (IRIM), one of the first organizations to promote independent and third-party research in the country. Dolgion is currently working with the Asia Foundation in Cambodia as Program Director for Ponlok Chomnes Data and Dialogue for Development. Prior to this role, she served in UNDP in Timor-Leste as a Socio-Economic Expert. She currently serves as a Secretary of the Research Committee on Social Indicators of the International Sociological Association. She is a member of the Social Well-Being Research Consortium in Asia and the Asia Democracy Research Network. Dolgion holds a master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Manchester, and both a master’s and a bachelor’s degree in Sociology from the National University of Mongolia.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Tamir Chultemsuren 2023-09-13Views : 18761
Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Horizontal Accountability in Nepal

1. Introduction   Nepal underwent a major political transition in the early 2000s, marked by a shift from an absolute monarchy to a federal democratic republic. This transition culminated in the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, which established a multi-level governance systеm consisting of federal, provincial, and local governments. However, the transition has not been without challenges, including political instability, weak governance systеms, and social and economic inequalities.   The transition, characterized by a decade-long civil war between Maoist rebels and government forces, ended in 2006 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This agreement led to the integration of Maoist rebels into the political mainstream and paved the way for drafting a new constitution. This new constitution established a federal systеm of governance with a bicameral federal parliament and an independent judiciary. It also created several new institutions, including the National Human Rights Commission and the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority.   Despite these significant changes, the transition has been marked by political instability, with frequent changes in government and a lack of continuity in policymaking. This instability has also led to a lack of accountability and transparency, with little progress in addressing corruption and ensuring effective service delivery. Social and economic inequalities have also been persistent challenges in Nepal. The country’s human development indicators remain among the lowest in South Asia, with high poverty levels, malnutrition, and illiteracy. Discrimination and marginalization of certain castes also continue to be a significant problem.   The implementation of the federal systеm has also been challenging, with disputes over the division of powers and resources between the federal, provincial, and local governments. There are concerns about the ability of local governments to deliver effective services, and resource allocation has been a contentious issue, with accusations that the federal government has not provided adequate resources to the provincial and local governments. One of the key challenges of governance in Nepal is the lack of capacity and resources of government institutions. Government institutions at all levels, including the federal, provincial, and local, suffer from a shortage of skilled personnel, inadequate budget, and inadequate infrastructure. This has resulted in ineffective service delivery, weak regulatory systеms, and low admіnistrative efficiency.   Corruption is another significant challenge facing governance in Nepal. Despite having laws and regulations to prevent corruption, there remains a lack of political will to enforce them. Corruption in Nepal is pervasive, with government officials and politicians often involved in corrupt activities, leading to a loss of public trust in the government and public institutions. Nepal has also faced significant challenges in terms of political stability. Since the Constitution’s adoption in 2015, the country has faced multiple changes in government, including the resignation of two prime ministers, leading to a lack of continuity in governance. This has also impacted the implementation of policies and programs, leading to slow economic and social development.   As previously stated, in recent years, there have been efforts to address the governance challenges in Nepal. The government has initiated various reform programs to improve admіnistrative efficiency, service delivery, and accountability. These programs include the Civil Service Reform Program, the Local Governance and Community Development Program, and the Economic Governance and Development Program. Additionally, CSOs are essential in strengthening governance in Nepal. However, there have been challenges in the operations of CSOs, including government interference and restrictions on their activities.   Another significant challenge facing governance in Nepal is the country’s geography, with the rugged terrain making service delivery difficult, particularly in remote areas. The government has launched various initiatives to address this issue, including providing mobile services, extending road networks, and establishing satellite offices.   2. Constitutional and Political Framework in Nepal   2.1. Constitutional Provisions   The Constitution of Nepal guarantees 31 fundamental rights, including communication rights (Article 19) and the right to information (Article 27), which provides an essential purpose for access to information from public officials unless rated as classified. The constitution also clearly states the principles of the separation of powers and checks and balances between the organs of the state, namely the legislative, executive, and judiciary. Similarly, the federal parliament has established ten parliamentary committees for the oversight of ten various thematic areas. Of these committees, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), in particular, attracts interest regarding the surveillance of public finances.   2.2. Judicial Systеm   The preamble of the Constitution clearly states the three organs of the state, which have an “impartial, independent and competent” judiciary systеm in place. The judiciary is organized as a unitary arrangement, with the provision of the Supreme Court, High Court, and District Courts. The Supreme Court has a Constitutional Bench under constitutional remedy, which investigates inter-governmental jurisdictional disputes. At the local level, a Judicial Committee exists comprising the Deputy Mayor or Vice Chairperson of local governments as the head and two members from the elected representatives. The jurisdiction of the committee has been confined to non-criminal cases.   2.3. Oversight Through Constitutional Bodies   Nepal’s Constitution of 2015 envisioned 13 constitutional commissions. These commissions have been formed in order to empower and protect the rights of marginalized communities, backward communities, and other disadvantages. With the executive, judiciary, and legislative being on equal par in terms of their functional independence and autonomy to perform checks and balances, the 13 commissions, which can work in close collaboration with civil society to democratize society, are yet to reach the people and check the government but are limited to their jurisdiction with recommendation power and no executive role.   The 13 commissions include the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), Auditor General, Public Service Commission Election Commission, National Human Rights Commission, and National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission. However, National Women Commission, National Dalit Commission, National Inclusion Commission, Indigenous Nationalities Commission, Madhesi Commission, Tharu Commission, and Muslim Commission are subject to review every ten years.   The work, role, and results of these commissions are brought into question frequently. The appointments of the chiefs of these commissions are strongly influenced by the political systеm and political interest, which are often used as a political weapon at the point of bargaining for political power distribution. This leads the people of Nepal to frequently question the independency and ethical conduct of these bodies, which has also lost its credibility in recent times in the public sphere.   3. Gaps and Challenges with Accountability   Accountability plays a vital role in checks and balances, surveillance, and institutional constraints on the exercise of power. In democracies, a legislative body plays the role of monitoring and providing control over the functioning of the executive body. However, there seem to be gaps in accountability mechanisms in Nepal. The ill development of relevant norms regarding sanctions and the distance between formal institutions and actual practices of accountability at the minute level are some of the main issues of democracies in many developing countries, including Nepal.   3.1. Local Government Operation Act   The federal mechanism of Nepal has a clear division of rights in all three levels of government, and the Local Government Operation Act is a milestone document in strengthening the local governance systеm. The Local Government Operation Act has mandated 35 powers to the federal level, 21 powers for Province level, 25 concurrent powers of federation and province levels, 22 powers of local level, 15 concurrent powers of federal, province and local levels. However, there are major drawbacks to the Local Government Operation Act, as reflected in the absence of planned and targeted investment in the development of marginalized communities. Unlike the former block grant mechanism, there is an absence of mandatory allocation of plans and programs to the targeted communities, while this differs on a case basis across the nation. Social accountability is on the verge of disappearance in this context. Marginalized communities are being continually marginalized due to this provision. Additionally, the situation of the same remains to be stagnant and aloof from the mainstream development.   Fortunately, the introduction of Local Government Institutional Self-Assessment (LISA) has dragged the local governments to invest in targeted thematic areas and communities. Though inadequate, a small step forward has been set in this early stage of Nepal’s federal mechanism.   3.2. Intra-Government Accountability: Local Level   Local-level governance is an essential aspect of Nepal’s political systеm; however, intra-governmental accountability issues often hinder the effective functioning of local-level governments. Intra-governmental accountability refers to the extent to which different levels of government hold each other accountable for their actions.   One of the main intra-governmental accountability issues in Nepal’s local-level governments is the lack of coordination and communication between different levels of government. The country’s federal systеm of governance has created three levels of government: federal, provincial, and local. However, there is often a lack of coordination and communication between these different levels, which leads to inefficiencies and overlaps in service delivery.   Another issue is the lack of clear delineation of responsibilities between different levels of government. This ambiguity often leads to confusion about who is responsible for specific tasks and can lead to a lack of accountability. In addition, there is often a lack of clarity about the allocation of resources, which can lead to disputes and inefficiencies.   A third issue is the lack of capacity at the local level. Many local-level governments lack the necessary resources and expertise to carry out their responsibilities effectively. This lack of capacity can lead to inefficiencies and a lack of accountability.   Finally, there is a lack of transparency and public participation in local-level governance. Citizens often do not have access to information about local government activities, and there are limited opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making processes. This lack of transparency and public participation can lead to a lack of accountability and can undermine citizens’ trust in the government.   3.3. World Justice Project “Rule of Law index”- a Reflection of Case Scenario   The World Justice Project (WJP) is an independent organization with the mission to promote the rule of law around the world. Each year, the WJP releases a report evaluating the rule of law in different countries based on a comprehensive set of indicators. In the most recent report, Nepal was ranked 105 out of 126 countries.   The report evaluates countries based on eight factors: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. Nepal’s performance on these factors varied widely. One of the areas where Nepal performed poorly was corruption. The report found that corruption was a significant problem in Nepal, particularly in the public sector. The lack of effective measures to combat corruption was a major factor contributing to this issue. Nepal also scored poorly in the area of civil justice. The report found that the country’s court systеm was slow, inefficient, and lacked independence. There were also concerns about access to justice, particularly for marginalized and disadvantaged groups.   On the other hand, Nepal scored relatively well in the area of fundamental rights. The country has a constitutional commitment to protecting fundamental rights and a vibrant civil society advocates for these rights. However, there were concerns about how these rights were implemented and enforced, particularly for marginalized groups. Nepal’s performance on the other indicators was mixed. The country scored relatively well in the area of order and security, but there were concerns about the excessive use of force by law enforcement agencies. Nepal also scored relatively well in the area of regulatory enforcement, but there were concerns about the lack of effective regulation in some areas.   Overall, the WJP report highlighted several areas where Nepal needs to improve the rule of law. In particular, the country needs to take more effective measures to combat corruption and improve the efficiency and independence of its court systеm. There is also a need to improve access to justice and ensure that the fundamental rights of all citizens are effectively protected, including marginalized and disadvantaged groups. To address these issues, the Nepali government and civil society need to work together to implement reforms that promote the rule of law, which could include measures to strengthen the judiciary’s independence, improve the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies, and promote greater transparency and accountability in government. There is also a need to increase public awareness of the importance of the rule of law and to build greater public support for these reforms.   4. Conclusion and Recommendations   Nepal’s transition to a federal democratic republic has been marked by significant challenges, including political instability, weak governance systеms, and persistent social and economic inequalities. However, there have been efforts to address these challenges, including reform programs, civil society initiatives, and government initiatives aimed at improving service delivery and accountability. It is essential to continue these efforts to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic and social development in Nepal.   There is a need for improved coordination and communication between different levels of government in order to address these intra-governmental issues. Clear delineation of responsibilities and resource allocation is also necessary. Necessary resources and expertise need to be provided to local-level governments to allow them to carry out their duties effectively. There is also a need for increased transparency and public participation in local-level governance to ensure accountability.   The Constitution of Nepal has provided adequate legal frameworks, mechanisms, procedures, and opportunities for the state and civil actors to strengthen the true essence of the constitution. Longed prosperity is achievable only through confirming ethical accountability and transparency, which may sound utopian in nature, while there are factors contributing to attaining the same within a certain period. The federal mechanism of Nepal is relatively young, despite the fact that the actors involved are the ones who were already used to the prior systеm. Both the bureaucratic organization and the representatives need to work together with civil society to empower the disadvantaged, unreached, and underrepresented communities and construct a strong culture of rationality, accountability, and transparency which must be the ultimate process in attaining synergy. This could be fulfilled through initiatives such as the inter and intra government coordination center. The lack of coordination between the constitutional bodies and the governments is clearly visible due the gap in collaboration among the same. The systеmic crisis in the collaboration leads to degrading quality of service delivery, raises question to the governance mechanism, transparency and accountability of the state against the long run vision of and journey towards the prosperity of the nation.   The WJP report highlights several areas where Nepal needs to improve the rule of law. While there are some areas where the country is performing relatively well, there are also significant challenges that need to be addressed. By working together, the government and civil society can take steps to promote the rule of law and build a more just and equitable society for all Nepalese.   In conclusion, horizontal accountability is crucial for an effective functioning democracy in Nepal. While the Constitution provides a strong framework for horizontal accountability, it is still challenging to implement due to weak institutions, lack of transparency, and political interference. Greater transparency, free and independent media, a strong and independent judiciary, a robust civil society, and responsible private sector behavior are needed to strengthen horizontal accountability. Only by working together can Nepal achieve an authentic and functioning democracy. ■   References   Almeida Lopes Fernandes, Gustavo Andrey, Marco Antonio Carvalho Teixeira, Ivan Filipe de Almeida Lopes Fernandes, and Fabiano Angélico. 2020. “The Failures of Horizontal Accountability at the Subnational Level: A Perspective from the Global South.” Development in Practice 30, 5: 687-693. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09614524.2020.1773764?journalCode=cdip20   Amnesty International Nepal. 2019. “NEPAL: LAND for LANDLESS PEASANTS COMMENTS and RECOMMENDATIONS on AMENDMENT to the LANDS ACT 1964.” Accessed January 9, 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/ASA3112212019ENGLISH.pdf   Bhattarai, Prakash. 2019. “The New Federal Structure in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities for Quality Governance.” External Democracy Promotion: EDP. April 23. https://www.external-democracy-promotion.eu/the-new-federal-structure-in-nepal-challenges-and-opportunities-for-quality-governance/   Bhusal, Thaneshwar. 2017. “Paving the Way for Women: Implication of Nepal’s Local Elections.” BroadAgenda. June 6. https://www.broadagenda.com.au/2017/paving-the-way-for-women-implication-of-nepals-local-electionsnew-blog-post/   Election Commission. 2017 (2074 BS). Election Results. Kathmandu: Election Commission Nepal.   Election Commission. 2022 (2079 BS). Election Results. Kathmandu: Election Commission Nepal.   Gurung, Mahendra Man. 2021. “The Right to Know.” The Kathmandu Post. September 27. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://kathmandupost.com/columns/2021/09/27/the-right-to-know#:~:text=Nepal%20is%20the%20first%20country,fundamental%20right%20of%20the%20citizen   Human Rights Watch. 2021. “Nepal: Lack of Accountability Undermining the Rule of Law.” January 13. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/nepal-lack-accountability-undermining-rule-law   Informal Sector Service Centre: INSEC. 2023. “Nepal Human Rights Year Book 2023.” Accessed March 21, 2023. https://inseconline.org/en/human-rights-year-book-2023/   Kisan, Yam Bahadur, Ram Bahadur Charmakar, and Prakash Nepali. 2014. “Nepal: Access to Justice for Dalits.” Samata Foundation Equity Watch 2014. Accessed March 20, 2023. https://samatafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Equity-Watch-2014_Nepal_Access-to-Justice-for-Dalits_English-1.pdf   Nepal Admіnistrative Staff College. 2018. “Nepal National Governance Survey- 2018.” Accessed March 21, 2023. https://www.nasc.org.np/nngs-2018   Nepal Law Commission. 2015. “The Constitution of Nepal.” Accessed March 20, 2023. https://lawcommission.gov.np/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Constitution-of-Nepal.pdf   Paswan, Bhola. 2017. “Technically Included, Practically Left Out.” The Record. May 13. Accessed March 21, 2023. https://www.recordnepal.com/technically-included-practically-left-out   Paudel, Ramesh C., and Anil Kumar Gupta. 2019. “Determinants of Accountability in the Bureaucracy: The Case of Nepal.” Modern Economy 10, 9: 2085-2109. https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=95234   Poudel, Keshab. 2022. “Constitutional Bodies Everywhere, Nowhere.” SpotlightNepal. May 1. https://www.spotlightnepal.com/2022/05/01/constituioal-bodies-everywhere-nowhere/   Sijapati, Bandita. 2017. “The Quest for Achieving Universal Social Protection in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities.” Indian Journal of Human Development 11, 1: 17–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/0973703017696378   Thapa, Deepak, Nyima Dorjee Bhotia, Binay Jung Thapa, Vibhav Pradhan, Shalini Gupta, and Manesh Shrestha. 2021. Resilient Social Protection for an Inclusive Development. Kathmandu: Himal Books.   Timilsina, Krishna Prasad. 2020. “Problems and Prospects of Local Judicial Committee in Nepal.” Journal of Political Science 20: 124–141. https://doi.org/10.3126/jps.v20i0.31798   World Justice Project. n. d. “WJP Rule of Law Index.” Accessed April 30, 2023. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global     ■ Tirupati Pariyar is a Program Manager at Samata Foundation. Mr. Pariyar has keen interest in thematic areas of democracy, governance, human rights, and social inclusion. Mr. Pariyar is a student of law and public admіnistration. Representing Dalit community (marginalized due to caste), Mr. Pariyar is committed to advocating for marginalized and underrepresented groups in Nepal through research, and evidence based policy advocacy and development programming. In addition to advocacy initiatives, Mr. Pariyar is also dedicated to fostering the next generation of leaders and extensively engage in writing for the cause of Dalit and untouchability in Nepal via mainstream media. Mr. Pariyar is the initiator of Dignity app, which is a cell phone based application allowing victims of discrimination and untouchability to report and generate support in accessing justice.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

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Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Horizontal Accountability in Mongolia

1. Introduction   The 1992 Constitution is considered the “blueprint of Mongolia democracy” (Sanders 1992). This Constitution served Mongolia’s democracy well as, to date, eight electoral cycles were held regularly, had uncertain outcomes, and resulted in multiparty competitions for people’s votes. In the Varieties of Democracy Project’s liberal democracy index, Mongolia started with a score of 0.41 in 1991 and, with slight fluctuations, ended with a score of 0.49 in 2021 (V-Dem Project 2022). At its height, it reached 0.61 in 1999. Nonetheless, these scores consistently place Mongolia in the “electoral democracy” category. At the same time, the horizontal accountability index (scaled low to high (0-1)) had a score of 0.9 in 1991 and throughout the remainder of the 1990s (V-Dem Project 2022). Yet, it decreased following each constitutional amendment in 1999/2000 and 2019. Eventually, after fluctuations, it ended with a score of 0.78 in 2021 (V-Demo Project 2022). While in the broader historical context, the scores in the last three decades are at their highest level since Mongolia transitioned to democracy, the gradual decrease in the horizontal accountability index follows the general trend of declining government accountability.   Sato et al. (2022) found that in the autocratization process, institutional decay starts with horizontal accountability, followed by declines in diagonal accountability and, finally, vertical accountability. According to recent developments, some early signs of democratic erosion can already be found in Mongolia. As the balance of power between different branches becomes uneven, we will address some of the issues of concern, potentially pointing out some general prescriptions that can counter the process. Further investigation can also offer an institutional explanation of Mongolia’s good democratic performance and ineffective governance.   Consequently, the organization of this study is as follows. We begin with introducing the constitutional checks and balances systеm in Mongolia. Next, we describe the existing hierarchy of power among the government branches. Then, we address the legal procedures available to counterbalance the misconduct found in each government branch. After that, we assess the judicial branch’s independence in more detail. Finally, we examine oversight agencies and their capabilities and conclude the study.   2. Checks and Balances   The Constitution (1992) introduced a semi-presidential form of government. This power arrangement resulted in constant power struggles between the president’s office, the prime minister and his cabinet, and the parliament. This constitutional arrangement is credited with setting the Mongolian democracy on a long-term structural advantage among democratizing post-communist states overall (Fish 1998). On the positive side, during Mongolia’s transition to democracy, no branch could monopolize power, which became an optimistic institutional arrangement preventing it from drifting to authoritarianism seen in the former Soviet Union states in Asia (Fish 2001). However, on the negative side, this arrangement can lead to power disputes and political deadlocks during cohabitation (the president and main parliamentary party from opposing parties) and divided governments.   Historically, the most prominent example was when disputes between different government branches paralyzed the 1996-2000 parliamentary term and contributed to debates about the democratic systеm’s political stability or functionality. However, changing this systеm was never a popular idea based on opinion polls, as most of the population supported democracy as a form of governance (Sant Maral Foundation 2022). Therefore, the introduction of the first constitutional amendments partially addressed constitutional conflicts. Such political deadlocks during cohabitation (the president and major party in parliament from opposing parties) and later coalition governments align with the general research on semi-presidential systеms.   In the first place, the 1992 Constitution’s institutional equilibrium introduced an overlap between the president’s office, the prime minister, and the parliament. The design was based on the principles of checks and balances among different branches of government that relied on coordination. In practice, the Constitution relied on consensus[1] among the executive and legislative branches; an aspiration too difficult to achieve during periods of divided governments and cohabitation in a new democracy. Moreover, the absence or underdevelopment of institutions to ensure the continuity of policies exacerbated the debates about stability and functionality.   Eventually, two major constitutional amendments were introduced to remedy some of these institutional conflicts. As a solution, they shifted the balance of power from the president to the parliament. While the decision rests on an argument that such shifts reduce the possibility of strongman politics that an all-powerful president may entail, due to the one-party dominance, it still led to a power concentration and an all-powerful parliament and prime minister. As a result, the past balance of power between different branches of government became uneven, and the institutional equilibrium that has served Mongolian democracy well since 1992 has changed. It is still early to assess whether this is a positive or negative development, as further constitutional amendments are being discussed and scheduled for 2023. Yet, some recent developments, with the abrupt introduction of legislation without public discussion or minimal oversight, are a cause for concern (examples – August 2022 Constitutional Amendment, Cyber Security Laws, and Human Rights Laws).   In the constitutional design, the separation of power in the legislative and judicial branches is clear. According to Article 20, the unicameral parliament, the State Great Khural, holds the legislative power. Article 47.1 states that courts and the Supreme Court exercise judicial power. However, the executive branch was always more ambivalent due to an overlap between the president and the prime minister. Article 38.1 of the Constitution explicitly states that the cabinet, led by the prime minister, is “the highest executive organ of the State.” Yet, the president’s role in appointments and legislative initiatives given by Article 33.1 implies executive power.   3. Hierarchy of Power   Despite legal ambivalence on the exact political hierarchy, the presidency is considered the top of the political establishment. It is so despite significant constitutional limitations because the presidency symbolizes the peak of political power in Mongolia, backed by a direct national vote and popular legitimacy that comes with it, after which other state positions would be considered downgrading. It is disputable whether the second highest position is the prime minister or the chairman (speaker) of parliament. Constitutionally, the prime minister is a much more powerful position than the presidency and is more visible to the public. Following the constitutional amendments, in 2019, it became clear that the prime minister is the head of the executive and holds most of its powers. For example, in cases where there is no consensus on the structure and composition of the cabinet with the president, the prime minister can form his own cabinet by only presenting it to the parliament and president (2019 amended version Article 39.4). However, according to the Constitution, the prime minister and his cabinet are collectively responsible solely to the parliament (Articles 25.1.6 and 41.2). Also, given the more extensive powers of the legislative branch and, in particular, powers to remove the immunity of parliamentarians (Law on the Parliament 2020, Article 9.1), the speaker of the parliament effectively holds the second highest position. The speaker also replaces the president in case of absence, incapacity, or resignation. Therefore, the prime minister holds the third highest position.   The ideal design of the presidency was to mediate between conflicting parties and factions or be “above politics.” (Chimid et al. 2016) Before the 2019 constitutional amendments, presidents could not afford to be non-partisan in the first term if they sought re-election. After these 2019 amendments, which raised the age of presidential candidates to 50 (formerly 45) and limited them to one six-year term, the president’s incentives for “activism” during their time in office and role in the separation of power have considerably decreased. Currently, the president’s role as a counter-balancing power is minimal, and the most substantial power is veto power, which remains limited by the parliament’s ability to override it by two-thirds of its members. In addition, before the 2019 constitutional amendments, the president played a prominent role in judicial nominations.[2] After the 2019 amendments, the number of appointed judges is limited to five out of ten, and the rest are selected through open hearings (Article 49.5).[3] The Constitution remained ambivalent on who exactly is to make these appointments, leaving it to speculation that it most likely is the parliament. Nonetheless, new laws will presumably detail the nominations and appointments.   Constitutionally, the Supreme Court is the highest judicial body. The Judicial General Council (JGC) is its admіnistrative body. In cases of Supreme Court Justices, the JGC selects and nominates judges for an appointment either by the president or the parliament. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court authority to examine all lower court decisions and provide official interpretation of all laws except the Constitution. Articles 64.1 and 66 give the Constitutional Court the general power of constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, given the appointment systеm, it is highly disputed whether the judiciary and the prosecutors can be truly independent in the existing systеm. Furthermore, in 2019, the Law on the Legal Status of Judges allowed the National Security Council (the President, Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament) to remove judges (Transparency International 2019; Dierkes 2019).   In 2019, the Mongolian People’s Party-led government pushed comprehensive constitutional amendments that shifted the balance of power to the parliament and limited the presidential term. However, these changes did not go far enough in changing the nature of the political systеm, and it remained semi-presidential. At the time of writing, there are talks about further constitutional amendments; however, the contents are not publicly available. It is only a matter of speculation that it will likely be a further shift to a parliamentary systеm. A complete transition to parliamentarism has been a long-sought political goal by political elites. The prevalent belief is that stability in decision-making would result from a shift of power to parliament and the creation of a powerful prime minister position. Ambitious presidents mostly supported the transition to the presidential systеm. Nonetheless, one of the significant changes introduced by the 2019 constitutional amendments was a considerable change in the checks and balances systеm. The institutional equilibrium between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches shifted toward an all-powerful parliament and prime minister.   4. Counter-balancing Misconduct   Due to the numerous laws passed in the last thirty years, there is a saying that Mongolian Law lasts three days. As a result, in comparison to the Constitution, the Law on Parliament and Law on Cabinet (1993) were amended dozens of times (at the time of writing, the count is 38+ times each), making it a highly contested area to interpret for lawyers or anyone, for that matter. Some areas are ambivalent or untraceable after amendments because various political interests clashed, and high-level politics is involved.   Regarding the constitutional procedures for removing prime ministers, a vote of no confidence has removed prime ministers at least three times.[4] Others managed to survive the vote of no confidence. As for presidential impeachments, no president has been removed while in office yet. N. Enkhbayar was arrested following his term in office and is the only former president that returned to party politics. Other former presidents retired from political life. In contrast, the parliament consists of 76 members, and after eight election cycles, there are many more parliamentarians to investigate. From the beginning, the most challenging obstacle for the prosecution was parliament immunity, guaranteed by the Constitution in Article 29.2 and legalized by Article 9.8 (formerly Article 34.7) in Law on the Parliament (May 07, 2020, version). Nevertheless, Article 9.1 states that the parliament shall decide whether to suspend the powers of a member of parliament. More specifically, in Article 9.1.1, when “the State Prosecutor General has submitted a proposal to the State Assembly to arrest him with evidence in the course of his criminal act or at the scene of the crime, and then to suspend his powers.”   Following this, the existing checks and balances are such that high-level public officials rarely get prosecuted. The presence of public outrage and demonstrations is one of the deciding factors in bringing up high-profile cases. Among recent issues that received significant public attention was the dismissal of Speaker M. Enkhbold in 2019 after the public outcry over high-profile corruption scandals (Bittner 2019). Regarding the Constitutional Court, a notable high-profile case was the removal of its Chairman D. Odbayar, due to mounting public pressure over his involvement in the sexual harassment of a South Korean flight attendant on a flight from Ulaanbaatar to Incheon (IKON News Agency 2019). There are other cases involving parliament members; however, many happened after their term in office or were eventually overturned. The main reason is that the judiciary can hardly maintain its political neutrality or independence under existing power arrangements.   5. Judicial Branch’s Independence   As previously stated, constitutionally, the Supreme Court has the authority to examine all lower court decisions and provide official interpretation of all laws except the Constitution (Article 50). The Constitutional Court holds the general power of constitutional interpretation (Articles 64.1 and 66). There is a debate among scholars and politicians about the need for a separate Constitutional Court when a Supreme Court could take over the duty of constitutional interpretation. After much back and forth in arguments, the most plausible clue to date comes from the composition of the Constitutional Court. While members of the Supreme Court are explicitly required to be professional lawyers (Article 51.3),[5] the members of the Constitutional Court had to have high qualifications in politics and law (Article 65.2),[6] and their nominations applied the principle of the distribution of power between different branches. The Constitutional Court has nine members of the following distribution: the parliament nominates three members, the president nominates three members, and the Supreme Court nominates three members (Article 65).   Overall, the existing systеm of judicial nominations is one of the major barriers to judicial independence. The political nominations of justices and the prosecutor general introduce a high risk of politicization of the judiciary. The next big obstacle is the amendments to the Law on the Legal Status of Judges in 2019 that allow the National Security Council to remove judges (Transparency International 2019; Dierkes 2019). There are plausible arguments that it is necessary due to existing corruption in the legal systеm. The problem is that high-level corruption is endemic in the whole systеm, and the removal of judges can also serve political motives. Consequently, the issues with the judiciary’s political neutrality and independence undermine the judicial branch’s function as a counterbalance to the other branches of government.   6. Oversight Agencies and Their Capabilities   Mongolia has a longstanding problem with corruption in the public sector, but the main obstacle to legislation is not as much existence of loopholes and inconsistencies, but the issues summarized as the weak rule of law. According to Transparency International’s assessments, Mongolia’s 2021 corruption ranking stands at 110 out of 180 with a Corruption Perception Index of 35, which places it among countries with a serious corruption problem (Transparency International 2022).   The two major oversight agencies are the Mongolian National Audit Office and the Independent Authority Against Corruption of Mongolia (IAAC). The Mongolian National Audit Office is the country’s central audit institution. The Law on State Audit (2020) gives it a broad mandate.[7] In practice, it is limited in human resources and often runs into issues with overall capacity (ADB 2019). Unsurprisingly, when high-level politics is added, it is rare that a state audit finds any wrongdoings. The Constitution grants the parliament budgetary powers under Article 25.1.7. In response, Article 6.1 of the Law on State Audit gives the Mongolian National Audit Office the mandate to audit all except the parliament.[8]   The IAAC is another oversight institution with an overly broad mandate that allows it to investigate corruption cases and educate the public about prevention mechanisms. According to the Law on Anti-Corruption (2006), the IAAC is in charge of income and asset declarations of the president, the prime minister and his cabinet, members of parliament, and officials appointed by them (Article 11.1.1). To date, the most considerable obstacles to its capacity to actively investigate corruption cases of high-level public office holders are issues of either political immunity or amnesty laws. As of July 2021, Mongolia has passed its seventh amnesty law (Baljmaa 2020). The problem is that some of these amnesty laws would apply to a broad range of cases that would also grant protection from prosecution for corruption or lead to the termination of cases under investigation by the IAAC (UNCAC Coalition 2015). Generally, the IAAC faces frequent accusations of operating at random or with significant political bias. In the past, the president could appoint the head of the IAAC, but in January 2021, the parliament made amendments to the Law on Anti-Corruption that shifted this power to the prime minister (Article 21, updated; Baljmaa 2020). This shift can be seen as further empowering the prime minister’s position.   These institutional factors contribute to the deterioration of proper checks and balances in the systеm and explain why so much of this high-level corruption tends to go undetected or under-investigated.   7. Conclusion   We can conclude that several major factors are challenging the proper functioning of checks and balances in the systеm. Importantly, there is a lack of judicial independence. In the existing systеm, the key judiciary members are most likely to be political appointees; as a result, their political neutrality and independence are questionable. Relatedly, it becomes a further issue when dealing with cases that involve the high office. Correspondingly, due to politicization and limited capacity, the major oversight agencies, such as the National Audit and the IAAC, are not free from political interference. As for other avenues, there is a lack of support and opportunities to involve citizen oversight agencies. Overall, these challenges create considerable gaps in horizontal accountability in the systеm. The long-term institutional advantages and the current weakness of the opposition have also led to a systеm with one-party dominance. Given all of the benefits of the status quo, it is unlikely that the current political elite would push and implement the necessary reforms, leaving citizens’ vigilance and participation as the primary tools leading to policy change. ■   References   Asian Development Bank: ADB. 2019. “Mongolia: Strengthening the Supreme Audit Function.” ADB Technical Assistance Report. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/52285/52285-001-tar-en.pdf   Baljmaa T. 2020. “Law on Anti-Corruption Amended.” MONTSAME News Agency. December 31. https://montsame.mn/en/read/248530   ———. 2021. “Mongolia Adopts Seventh Amnesty Law.” MONTSAME News Agency. July 5. https://montsame.mn/en/read/269044   Bittner, Peter. 2019. “Mongolia’s Crisis of Democracy Continues.” The Diplomat. January 31. https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/mongolias-crisis-of-democracy-continues/   Chimid, Enhbaatar, Tom Ginsburg, Amarjargal Peljid, Batchimeg Migeddorj, Davaadulam Tsegmed, Munkhsaikhan Odonkhuu, and Solongo Damdinsuren. 2016. “Assessment of the Performance of the 1992 Constitution of Mongolia.” United Nations Development Programme. https://www.undp.org/mongolia/publications/assessment-performance-1992-constitution-mongolia   Dierkes, Julian. 2019. “The Beginning of the End of Democracy?” Mongolia Focus (blog). March 27. https://blogs.ubc.ca/mongolia/2019/judicial-appointments-national-security-council/   Fish, Steven Michael. 1998. “Mongolia: Democracy Without Prerequisites.” Journal of Democracy 9, 3: 127–141. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1998.0044   ———. 2001. “The Inner Asian Anomaly: Mongolia’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34, 3: 323–338. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(01)00011-3   IKON News Agency. 2019. “Chairman of Tsets D. Odbayar Was Dismissed from His Post [Цэцийн Дарга Д.Одбаярыг Албан Тушаалаас Нь Чөлөөллөө].” November 22. https://ikon.mn/n/1qba   Law on Anti-Corruption [Авлигын эсрэг хууль] (2006). https://legalinfo.mn/   Law on State Audit [Төрийн аудитын хууль] (2020). https://legalinfo.mn/   Law on the Cabinet [Засгийн газрын тухай хууль] (1993). https://legalinfo.mn/   Law on the Legal Status of Judges [Шүүгчийн эрх зүйн байдлын тухай хууль] (2019). https://legalinfo.mn/   Law on the Parliament [Их Хурлын тухай хууль] (2020). https://legalinfo.mn/   Sant Maral Foundation. 2022. “Politbarometer #21.” https://www.santmaral.org/publications   Sato, Yuko, Martin Lundstedt, Kelly Morrison, Vanessa A. Boese, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2022. “Institutional Order in Episodes of Autocratization.” V-Dem Working Paper 133. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4239798   The Constitution of Mongolia (1992). https://legalinfo.mn/   Transparency International. 2019. “Rule of Law and Independence of Judiciary Under Threat in Mongolia.” July 4. https://www.transparency.org/en/press/rule-of-law-and-independence-of-judiciary-under-threat-in-mongolia   ______. 2022. “2021 Corruption Perceptions Index - Explore the Results.” January 25. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021   UNCAC Coalition. 2015. “International Organisations Call on Mongolian Parliament to Withdraw Corruption Amnesty Law.” October 8. https://uncaccoalition.org/international-organisations-call-on-mongolian-parliament-to-withdraw-corruption-amnesty-law/   V-Dem Project. 2022. “V-Dem Dataset V12.” https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22     [1] Consensus or concurrence (depending on the translation) between the president and parliament was explicitly required in many articles in the 1992 Constitution, but later most of them were reversed by amendments in 1999/2000 and 2019. [2] Before 2019 the president could appoint all judges upon the proposal of the Judicial General Council (Article 51.2) and could appoint the prosecutor general and his deputies in consensus with the parliament (Article 56.2). [3] Amendment of 2019 - Article 49.5: Five members of the Judicial General Council (hereinafter “Council”) shall be selected from among the judges and openly nominate the other five members. They shall work once for four years, and a Chairman of the Council shall be elected from among the members of the Judicial General Council. Report on Council activities in connection with ensuring the independence of judges shall be presented to the Supreme Court. The Organization of the Council, operational regulation, the requirement for its members, and the rules of appointment shall be determined by law. [4] The exact number is difficult to trace due to the absence of open information on the topic. [5] Article 51.3 “A Mongolian citizen who has reached thirty-five years of age with a higher education in law and a professional career of no less than ten years may be appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court.” [6] Article 65.2 “A member of the Constitutional Court shall be a Mongolian citizen who has reached forty years of age and has high qualifications in politics and law.” [7] Law on State Audit, Article 5.1. “The main goal of the state audit is to monitor the planning, distribution, use and spending of public finances, budgets and public property in a legal, economical, efficient and effective manner, as well as improving public financial management and supporting sustainable economic development.” [8] Law on State Audit, Article 6.5 states that it can audit the parliament “if requested by parliament.”     ■ Ganbat Damba is the Chairman of Board at the Academy of Political Education, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. From 1999 to 2010 he worked as an Executive director of the Academy. Since 2009 to 2017 he was an advisor to the President of Mongolia on research and a Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia. Since September, 2017-2021 he was an Ambassador of Mongolia to Federal Republic of Germany. He became Ph.D. in 2002 at the Academy of Science of Mongolia. He has published various articles examining democratization, democratic and authoritarian values, elections, political party development and on principles of foreign and security policy of Mongolia.   ■ Mina Sumaadii is a Senior Researcher at the Sant Maral Foundation, Mongolia. She is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of International Studies, Sichuan University, China. Her research focuses on foreign policy and democratization in Eurasia. She received her PhD at the Graduate School of Global Politics at the Free University of Berlin, Germany, and did her MA in Political Science at the Central European University in Hungary and BA in Political Science and Sociology at the Dickinson State University in the US. In her free time, Mina likes to listen to podcasts.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Ganbat Damba 2023-06-02Views : 15271
Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Parliamentary Supervision in Taiwan: Consensus Building versus Majoritarian Rule

1. Political Institutions   Taiwan adopted a semi-presidential systеm in which the president is directly elected and can serve up to two terms and nominate the premier. The Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, has 113 members who are elected every four years. It includes 73 geographical seats, 34 party-list seats, and six aboriginal seats. As of 2023, Taiwan has held seven presidential elections and nine parliamentary elections. Taiwan experienced its third transfer of executive power between parties in 2016. The previous two transfers took place in 2000 and 2008. The 2016 election also marks the first parliamentary majority for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), one of the two main parties in addition to the Kuomintang (KMT).   Under Taiwan’s semi-presidential systеm, Congress can file a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister. The president can dissolve the parliament and appeal to the voters as a countermeasure. Taiwan and France have a similar constitutional provision that the president appoints the premier without the consent of the parliament. In France, however, when the president’s party does not enjoy a majority of seats in the parliament, the opposing camp obtains the right to form the cabinet where the president’s party is excluded, which means that cohabitation between the two main political camps occurs. In contrast, the likelihood of proposing a vote of no confidence in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan is very low. The president has the power to dissolve the parliament only if the latter passes a vote of no confidence. The cost and uncertainty of running for the legislature election are very high. When a divided government occurs, the opposition party that controls the parliament does not dare to propose a motion of no confidence but instead chooses to block the minority government’s legislative agenda, resulting in a legislative deadlock. This situation happened during the two terms of President Chen Shui-bian between 2000 and 2008.   Since 2008, the KMT and DPP governments have enjoyed most of the seats in the parliament. The concurrent election of the president and the legislators after 2008 reduced the likelihood of a divided government. In addition, since 2008, the change in the election formula from a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) to a single-member district also tends to boost the seats of the president’s party. Under these conditions, the president’s party can more easily control the executive and legislative branches. The systеm, in essence, is closer to the presidential systеm with a unified government.   However, the new political structure does not guarantee that the presidents can push through their legislative agenda without considerable difficulty. Their legislative power depends on several confounding factors. The first factor concerns whether the president is also the party chairman. The president tends to have more power presiding over the executive and legislative branches with party chairmanship. Most of the time during the Ma and Tsai governments, the presidents also served the president of their parties. Therefore, we will focus on the other factors.   The second factor is associated with the degree of party unity. When there are strong factions within the ruling party, the president may be unable to pass all the bills he wants. During President Ma’s admіnistration, the President and Speaker Wang Jin-pyng were not congruent on many things, hindering the President’s ability to control the legislative agenda. The third factor concerns the law-making rules in the parliament. When the legislative procedures allow the opposition party and civil society organizations (CSOs) to exercise filibuster actions, they are permitted to enjoy de facto veto power on some contentious issues. The president often finds it difficult to pass some important bills. The last two factors are critical to the executive and legislative relationship, and we will explore them in detail below.   2. How the Constitutional and Legal Mechanisms of Horizontal Accountability Fulfilled Their Expected Functions   The arrangement of the legislative process in democracies faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the political systеm encourages consensus building and power sharing. On the other hand, a desired political systеm also needs to allow the ruling party to pass the bills that the government prioritizes.   Since democratization in 1987, Taiwan has witnessed several party turnovers. The smooth transition of executive power has disguised the truth that the majority party is not able to exercise its lawmaking power smoothly. Since the first party turnover in 2000, gridlock in parliament has become frequent. During President Chen’s government, a minority government that did not have majority support in the parliament, the coalition of the KMT and the People First Party blocked many major legislative bills introduced by the DPP government, some of which were drafted under KMT President Lee’s terms before 2000.   Although the KMT has enjoyed a majority of seats in Parliament since 2008, it was unable to push its own agenda forward in many cases. Issues relating to pension reforms, beef imports from the United States, recruitment of college students from Mainland China, and service sector trade agreements across the Strait are some notable examples from President Ma’s tenure. A problem that arises from immobilism is that it harms electoral accountability. It is similar to the divided government situation, where voters cannot tell which party is responsible for the final political and economic outputs.   Unlike the filibuster rule in the U.S. Congress, where only ongoing, non-stop speech is allowed and recognized, the methods of filibusters in Taiwan’s parliament are quite extensive. Multiple amendments, physical clashes, and blocking of the committee and the chamber are all tolerated in the Legislative Yuan. There are no formal rules to end a filibuster. Unlike other democracies, the committee chair and speaker in Taiwan do not have the power to end a filibuster. In many Western parliaments, there are motions to end the debate on a matter, limit the amount of time that members of parliament (MPs) can spend on a particular bill, and timetable a bill’s progress by setting out the time allowed for debate at each stage in advance. As a result, despite being a majority party in the parliament, Presidents Ma remained unable to advance their party’s policy agenda because of filibustering.   The party caucus negotiation mechanism is the central mechanism for ending filibusters and allowing parties to negotiate in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan. Party whips can ask the speaker to send the bills that cannot reach consensus in the committee to the party caucus negotiation mechanism, comprised of all the party whips with a party caucus. With a small number of participants, all with mandates from their respective parties, the meeting can more easily reach a consensus. If all sides agree with the amendment, the bill is sent to the plenary session, and a roll-call vote is held. Almost all such bills approved in the meeting will pass the second and third reading without much difficulty.   Before 2016, given the frequent filibuster actions taken by the opposition parties, this mechanism helped to reach agreements between the ruling party and the opposition parties regarding contentious bills. A bill is not pushed forward into the plenary session unless a consensus is reached in the negotiation process. In other words, the opposition parties enjoyed veto power regarding the bills they strongly opposed. Two notable cases were the pension schemes reform of civil servants and public school teachers and the pension schemes reform of laborers. During this period, the mechanism essentially made Taiwan’s legislative process close to the consensus model proposed by Lijphart (2012). The government institutions of Taiwan, including the semi-presidential systеm that is, in essence, close to a presidential systеm; and the first-past-the-post electoral systеm that entails a high disproportionality of seats to votes, make it a majoritarian systеm. However, filibusters and party caucus negotiation mechanisms essentially convert the political systеm into a consensus model. The ruling party needs to amend the bills to be accepted by the opposition parties, and the opposition party can also block the bills they do not like. The downside of the quasi-consensus model is that the ruling party is unable to push through some of the core agendas.   However, not all bills that failed to reach a consensus in the party caucus negotiation mechanism were killed. In a few highly significant and non-identity bills, such as the US beef cases, the Ma government pushed through a roll-call vote, imposed strict party discipline, and passed the bills.   In some cases, filibusters launched by the opposition party involve a third player-civil society groups, thus increasing the hurdles to passing laws. The Sunflower Movement in March 2014 is a salient example. The issue at stake was the service trade agreement between Taiwan and China. After the DPP blocked this agreement in the committee for a month, the KMT committee chair suspended the review and sent the bill to the floor for a vote, sparking massive student protests that occupied the floor of the Legislative Yuan. One significant reason the student groups acted was that they believed the DPP MPs would back off in the review process.   When the DPP took power in 2016, the opposition party, the KMT, like its predecessor, quickly sought to block several DPP initiatives using various filibuster tactics. The DPP responded swiftly by restricting the debate in the Parliament. More importantly, the DPP changed the rule of the party caucus negotiation mechanism. The ruling party still negotiates with the opposition parties in the party caucus negotiation mechanism; however, if no agreement is reached, a bill is not killed. The retirement of the long-serving KMT speakers who were able to effectively mediate disagreements among parties reduces the mechanism’s effectiveness in fostering agreement. In addition, the DPP is more assertive than the KMT in exercising its majority rights. Both factors contribute to the weakening of the party caucus negotiation mechanism. As a result, the party caucus negotiation mechanism ceased to be the gate through which the opposition parties could block the bills they did not like. If parties cannot reach an agreement in the negotiation, the bill simply moves to the plenary session, and the ruling party can get it passed with its majority seats (Ting 2021).   In general, bills related to the national identity, such as abolishing the Mongolian and Tibetan council and transitional justice, are least likely to reach a consensus in the party caucus negotiation mechanism. But now, the ruling party can bypass the party caucus negotiation mechanism and move on to the second and third readings (Ting 2021).   The positive impact of this new process is that the ruling party is able to pass the bills they want. Fights in Parliament result in immobilism. In a highly competitive international economic structure, delays and immobilism may put Taiwan’s development at a more significant disadvantage, Recent changes in legislative process may set a precedent for future governments, rendering the country’s legislative process closer to a majoritarian model.   Taiwan’s civil society, which includes academics, students, NGOs, the civic tech community, grassroots advocates, and the news media, plays an important role in its legislative process, as mentioned above. When the ruling party controls the executive and legislative branches and the party caucus negotiation mechanism is weakened, the opposition parties have no effective tactics to stop legislation. Civil society’s response has become the sole force that can block the contentious bills. However, the effectiveness of such factor depends on the size of civil society organizations that oppose the bills. In some cases, such as the pension reform of civil servants in 2017, the protesters of the anti-pension reform also sought to break into and occupy the Legislative Yuan but failed because of police interruption. It appears that the police, after the Sunflower Movement, have ramped up their ability to prevent protesters from breaking into the parliament. More importantly, such action did not garner extensive social support to block the bills. The government was eventually able to get the pension reform passed.   After its defeat in the 2018 local elections, the DPP blamed the disinformation war for distorting the truth, demonizing political leaders, and planting a misleading view of the government, putting the DPP at a distinct disadvantage. The government and DPP legislators proposed or planned to propose several items of legislation designed to curb disinformation. The most important one is the Digital Intermediary Services Bill, introduced in 2022, which would have given government agencies the power to initiate legal action against online news stories that were deemed to violate the law or damage the public interest. A court would have 48 hours to decide whether a story had to be removed from internet platforms. Before the court made its decision, the government agency could require the platform provider to add a warning to the post for 30 days. Faced with extensive opposition from civil society organizations, netizens, and internet providers, the government withdrew the bill (Wu 2013).   In addition, before 2016, party caucus negotiation meetings were closed-door; therefore, there are no discussion records. Party supporters were not able to track the positions of individual party whips. As such, party whips were not held accountable for the decision to concede in the meeting. Since 2016, the party caucus negotiations have been videotaped, which tends to increase the pressure on the individual whips and induce them not to concede in the meeting. This factor ihas also likely contributed to the less compromised model after 2016.   3. What are the Determinants of Horizontal Accountability Performance?   Weak control of legislative power by the ruling party in a united government hurts the governability of the democracy. As Galston (2018) points out, gridlock is a significant reason people have lost confidence in representative democracy, as weak governance increases popular discontent with the existing political systеm. This situation points to a dilemma that Taiwan faces. On the one hand, it must ensure majority rule to enhance governability. When checks and balances are pushed to an extreme, they weaken democratic governability. On the other hand, a desired systеm would also need to encourage power-sharing and consensus-building. Especially regarding the Taiwan-China relationship, the threat from China is looming and genuine, and the opposition and the civil society, by and large, are uncomfortable with a closer economic relationship between Taiwan and China. Therefore, people demand that the Ma government step back from its close relationship with China. The 2012 Taiwan Election and Democracy Survey shows that during President Ma’s term, people who considered the rise of China a threat to Taiwan tended to endorse strong checks and balances.   Because of the dichotomous nature of national identity issues and the lack of democratic norms in the legislative reviewing process, the opposition party tried hard to filibuster the main legislative agenda of the ruling party. The deliberation of any issue related to China often escalates to the level of saving Taiwan or selling Taiwan. This attitude exists not only among the elite but also among the public. This national identity cleavage causes great distrust in the political actors representing the other camp. People often question the loyalty of political leaders to Taiwan or the Republic of China. People supporting the opposition party are uncomfortable letting the other party rule alone. They seek many different ways to hinder the government’s policy agenda.   4. What Should Be Done to Improve the State of Horizontal Accountability Performance?   In an ethnically divided society, power sharing is crucial. In the winner-take-all nature of Taiwan’s political systеm, there is not much room for institutional power sharing in the elections and the process of government formation. Under the semi-presidential systеm, the party that controls the presidency also controls the parliament. Moreover, the elections of the presidential and legislature both adopt the single-member-district electoral systеms, rendering the election results highly disproportional. These two institutional features render institutional power sharing largely absent.   Under this institutional structure, tactics such as the division of the government, filibustering, closed-door party caucus negotiation, and even the occupation of parliament essentially serve as non-institutional power-sharing mechanisms. The function of the party caucus negotiation mechanism also serves as a way of encouraging consensus building. These mechanisms prevent drastic changes in important policies. In some sense, this is a good thing for a divided society to maintain social peace. These informal power-sharing mechanisms, however, have their downsides. For instance, they harm the ruling party’s ability to advance its policy agenda. In addition, the current systеm fails to encourage the formation of an accepted quorum in the parliament. In each legislative battle, there are fierce fights until one side eventually concedes. These fights tear society apart without being able to cultivate democratic norms gradually. Taiwan must encourage the formation of a norm in which opposition elites are willing to respect the opponents’ right to govern, and things may slowly change in that direction. Since the Tsai Ing-wen admіnistration began in 2016, the ruling party has been able to force a vote by shortening the debate in committees, employing the police force to prevent social groups from occupying the parliament, and weakening the party caucus negotiation mechanism.   Taiwan is a divided society with different national identities and views of the cross-strait political and economic relationship. It is preferable to encourage deliberation and compromise regarding identity-related issues. It might be better to maintain a party caucus negotiation mechanism regarding identity-related bills and encourage political parties to seek compromise. However, for non-identity issues such as economic reforms, weakening the party caucus negotiation mechanism and allowing the ruling party to advance its policy agenda should be the right direction. It is sometimes challenging to distinguish between the two cases as they often overlap. For example, Taiwan’s trade liberalization is closely related to the trade relationship across the Taiwan Strait. Other issues relating to emigration and foreign student policy involve the China factor but to a different extent. As such, there is no easy solution for this kind of policy. ■   References   Galston, William A. 2018. “The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 29, 2: 5-19.   Lijphart, Arend. 2012. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (Second Edition). New Haven: Yale University Press.   Ting, Ting. 2021. “The Institutional Changes and Institutionalization of the Party Negotiation Mechanism in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan.” (我國立法院黨團協商的制度變遷與制度化). Taiwan Journal of Political Science 88: 1-50.   Wu, Chin-en. 2023. “Taiwan’s Civic Space Threatened by Chinese Misinformation and the Government’s Worrisome Legislative Responses.” ADRN Issue Briefing. February 10. http://adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?idx=294     ■ Chin-en Wu is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Michigan. He is a core member of the Asian Barometer Survey. His main research interest includes political economy, democratization, and political trust. His works appeared in Democratization, Studies in Comparative International Development, and Political Research Quarterly.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Chin-en Wu 2023-06-02Views : 13539