1. Introduction   Following the People’s Movement of 2006, the country made significant strides towards a more democratic systеm of governance, with notable shifts occurring within the political landscape. All of the country’s major political parties began to emphasize the importance of “inclusion” as a goal. Nevertheless, the change has not significantly benefited the disadvantaged groups, including women, Dalit, Madheshi, Janajati, Muslims, and others. Overall, the level of participation of marginalized groups in the political process remains relatively low, despite the promises of inclusion in terms of caste and ethnicity made by political parties and subsequent governments.   Nevertheless, the people have finally identified a representative after two decades of absence, during which time they experienced a prolonged period of statelessness. Today, at least, the systеm is in place. The groundwork for a genuine democracy has been established. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the government at the local level be fully utilized to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the recent elections. The gradual approach towards an ideal democracy necessitates the integration of the people at the grassroots level with the state mechanism. There has been a notable discrepancy at the local level. The issues of good governance, gender and social inclusion, corruption, and impunity remain largely unaddressed.   At the present time, women and the most marginalized communities, such as the Dalits, are represented in the government. It is a mandatory requirement that each ward at the local level across the country accommodate a Dalit elected member. This is indicative of the progress that Nepal has made in its democratization process. Notwithstanding the altered context, the culture of representation, partnership, and participation remains significantly underdeveloped.   In order to ensure vertical accountability, it is essential to have in place horizontal accountability mechanisms like elections. These include independent and professional media, civil society, and other accountability mechanisms in between elections. In addition, the establishment of horizontal accountability mechanisms, namely the creation of robust and autonomous agencies, will serve to reinforce vertical accountability mechanisms (Lawoti 2019).   2. Rationale of the Study   In Nepal, following the abolition of the monarchy, the general public has been fully exercising their democratic right to choose their own leaders. Nepal, a federal democratic republic, has held significant elections in 2017 and 2022. In accordance with the Constitution, the country has adopted a mixed model of an electoral systеm. In consideration of the country’s context and a meticulous examination of the relative merits and drawbacks of the mixed systеm, the Nepalese electoral systеm incorporates both the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR) methods of voting. It is regarded as one of the most exemplary models of elections, exhibiting the principle of inclusion. Nevertheless, numerous challenges have arisen within the country, particularly with leaders failing to align their actions with the expectations of the electorate and major political parties engaging in a cycle of unstable coalition governments. The country faces a significant challenge in maintaining a stable government. Over the course of 16 years, Nepal has formed a coalition of parliamentarians on 12 occasions. The elected members have frequently switched between being in government and being out of government. The increasing influence of smaller political parties is contributing to a situation in which the formation of coalitions is becoming a determining factor in the political landscape, leading the country towards a state of prolonged instability.   Individuals assume governmental or parliamentary roles on numerous occasions, exploiting the provisions of the systеm. However, it is a crucial question in the present context to whom they are accountable. Those elected through both FPTP and PR appear to prioritize the interests of their respective parties. The election manifestos that are publicly declared right before the election are rarely fulfilled in practice. Individuals with criminal histories have been elected to government positions. Corruption and bribery have been pervasive within the political landscape. The tenets of the election code of conduct are grossly violated. The selection of an unsuitable leader, based on flawed input, has the potential to result in a lack of accountability to the electorate.   A multitude of actors are involved in the electoral process. However, the results of the election are not satisfactory, resulting in significant corruption during and after the electoral process. As a consequence of the lack of accountability of the entities and bodies associated with the electoral systеm in Nepal, a number of issues have become apparent, as outlined below.   Some political issues that have emerged include the formation of a predatory coalition between the ruling party and business houses, an unstable government, the formation of pre-election alliances among political parties, and a lack of effective institutional control over the electoral process. Similarly, there are some legal issues, including violations of the code of conduct during elections, an increase in corruption over the past 15 years (as reported by Transparency International Nepal in 2022), a lack of transparency regarding the rules, laws, and processes, delays in the formulation of laws and rules that have yet to be devised according to constitutional provisions, and a lack of transparency regarding the rules, laws, and processes.   3. Purpose of the Study   The purpose of this research is to explore and analyze the accountability of political and legal entities to the general public, identify deficiencies in the electoral systеm in Nepal, and assess the challenges in fulfilling the aspirations of voters.   The following questions are of particular importance:     1. What improvements could be made to the electoral systеm in Nepal? 2. What factors contribute to the inability of elected officials to fulfill the expectations of the general population of Nepal? What obstacles do they encounter in the fulfillment of their responsibilities? 3. What factors contribute to the prevalent discontent expressed in the mainstream media regarding the performance of elected officials? 4. What forms of assistance do elected officials anticipate from the media and civil society organizations (CSOs) to maintain accountability to their constituents?     4. Literature Review   4.1. Government Structure of Nepal   The government of Nepal is structured into three tiers: federal, provincial, and local. In accordance with the constitutional provision, the distribution of state power is allocated among the three-tier government systеm. The governments at the three levels are linked through the establishment of national development goals and objectives, which are set by the National Development Council. An intergovernmental relationship exists among the planning units at each level, both in terms of institutional structure and planning procedure. The distribution of state power among the three-tier government is defined by Article 57 of the Constitution.   The relationship between the three tiers of government is a two-way vertical one. This relationship exists between the federal government (FG), provincial government (PG), and local government (LG) and their respective planning entities during the different phases of the plan. This relationship can be further categorized as either a functional relationship or a resource-wise relationship. A defined relationship exists with regard to policy translation. In the preparation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of long-term, periodic, and annual plans, a vertical relationship shall be maintained between the planning entities of the FG, PG, and LG.   Figure 1. Relationship Between Three Tiers of the Government    Source: Taskforce Study Report Formulated by the NPC on 2016/09/25   4.2. Electoral Systеms in Nepal   The electoral systеm in Nepal reflects three key elements: the weight of public opinion, the consideration of popular interest, and the broad-based representation of social, economic, and political concerns of citizens. In addition to these functions, elections serve other vital purposes, including the selection of leaders, the conferral of legitimacy upon governance, and the establishment of accountability between the government and the electorate (Dahal 2001).   Nepal’s electoral systеm differs from the single-member-constituency systеm observed in the USA, UK, and Canada. In these countries, the candidate with the most votes in each constituency is declared the winner, even if this number falls below 50%. Nepal adheres to a mixed electoral systеm.   The Mixed Electoral Systеm (MES) preserves the proportionality benefits of the PR systеm while also ensuring that elected officials are assigned to specific geographical districts. Nevertheless, in instances where voters possess two ballots—one for the political party and one for their local representative—it remains uncertain whether the local representative vote is of lesser consequence than the party vote in determining the overall distribution of seats in the legislative body. Moreover, the MES can result in the creation of two distinct categories of legislators: those who are primarily responsible to and subservient to a constituency, and those who are drawn from the national party list and obedient to the party. Such a situation could have implications for the cohesion of elected political party groups.   The House of Representatives (HoR) is comprised of 275 elected seats, while the State Assemblies (SAs) have a total of 550 seats. The State Assemblies and the House of Representatives will be elected through a mixed electoral systеm, with 60 percent of representatives elected through the FPTP method and 40 percent through a systеm of PR that utilizes closed lists of candidates submitted by political parties. On Election Day, voters are thus required to cast four votes: one for an FPTP candidate for the House of Representatives (HoR), one for an FPTP candidate for their State Assembly (SA), one for the HoR party list, and one for the SA party list (IFES 2021).   5. Accountability of Government Bodies and Other Entities Towards the Voters   5.1. Election Commission   The Election Commission (EC) of Nepal is a constitutional election management body in Nepal. The Constitution of Nepal has established the framework for the EC in Section 24, Articles 245 to 247. The Constitution of Nepal has enshrined the competitive multiparty democratic systеm, adult franchise, and periodic elections as fundamental guiding principles of democracy. In accordance with the constitutional provisions, the Commission bears the responsibility for conducting elections at various levels—federal, provincial, and local bodies—in accordance with the prescribed electoral systеms (Election Commission of Nepal 2017).   The EC is responsible for conducting and supervising the national and local elections, as well as referenda on matters of national importance. They also make a final decision regarding the legitimacy of nominations for candidacy. The EC may delegate its authorities and duties to the Election Commissioner or the Government employee.   It is not feasible to conduct a fair and reliable election with the sole input of the EC. Therefore, in order to ensure the fairness and integrity of the electoral process, various judicial authorities have been established. Some of the aforementioned sectors are as follows:   5.2. Nepal Government   In accordance with Article 57 of the Constitution, the government is tasked with several responsibilities to ensure a clean, fair, and fearless election. These include creating a conducive environment for the election, finalizing election dates in coordination with the EC and political parties, and formulating laws to combat impunity and corruption. The government must also guarantee the safety of voters and candidates, support the Commission in enforcing the code of conduct, and ensure the safe and convenient transportation of senior citizens, individuals with illnesses, and persons with disabilities to voting centers. Additionally, it is responsible for coordinating with the EC to mobilize non-government sectors, as well as engaging election supervisors, media, and social organizations to properly manage and organize the election process.   A government lawyer has specific responsibilities both during and after an election and may be held accountable for fulfilling these duties. They are tasked with aiding and guiding law enforcement agencies in the investigation and prosecution of electoral crimes, ensuring all proceedings are lawful and supported by sufficient evidence. Additionally, they must provide support to plaintiffs in a tactful and effective manner. If a verdict is deemed unsatisfactory, it is the responsibility of the government lawyer to initiate an appeal in a higher court.   5.3. Parliaments   In order to ensure the timely and meaningful conduction of elections, it is incumbent upon parliamentarians to formulate the necessary policies and make the requisite amendments. Similarly, parliamentarians are expected to assess the performance of the EC and the government and provide constructive feedback, recommendations, and guidance as needed.   5.4. Political Parties   It is incumbent upon political parties to instruct their respective cadres to refrain from any form of intimidation, harassment, or unlawful influence exerted upon voters and candidates. Political parties should establish criteria for candidate nomination in accordance with existing legislation.   In collaboration with the EC, civil society organizations, and the government, political parties should implement training programs for their respective cadres to enhance their capacity for conducting fair elections. It is incumbent upon political parties to lend their support to the government in its efforts to control and punish those engaged in election-related crimes.   5.5. Election Supervisor, Civil Society and Media   Election supervisors, members of civil society, and media personnel carry significant responsibilities in ensuring transparency, fairness, and the timely dissemination of election results. The press should exert pressure on the relevant authorities to uphold the highest standards in these areas and assist government bodies in creating a safer environment that protects human rights for all. Collaborating with the EC and government entities, civil society is responsible for implementing voter education programs and ensuring that political parties and candidates adhere to the established election code of conduct. Additionally, they must provide necessary resources, training, and services to support the electoral process effectively.   6. Findings and Analysis   6.1. Uniqueness of Electoral Systеm   The two major elections held after the promulgation of the Constitution in 2015 are distinctive in that they are a mixed systеm (FPTP and PR with a 60:40 ratio). The principle of inclusion is reflected in the PR systеm at both the federal and local levels. The aforementioned reservations are intrinsic to the electoral systеm itself. The scope of the reservation is extensive, encompassing a diverse array of groups, including women, Dalits, Madhesi, Janajati, Muslims, and others. In the presidential, parliamentary, municipal, and ward levels, it is required that the chair and the deputy be of different genders.   A minimum of 33% female representation is required for nearly all formal parliamentary committees, ministries, and other official bodies.   6.2. Degree of Accountability   Members elected at the local level are more directly accountable to the public, whereas members elected at the provincial and federal levels have dual responsibilities: to their political parties and to the general public. It appears that elected members at the provincial and federal levels are more focused on the agenda of their political party and less focused on the needs of the general public. The parliamentarians are dedicated to their party leaders and are engaged in a competitive pursuit of securing an election ticket for the subsequent round, in the hope of pleasing the party leaders.   The party manifesto may initially appear to be quite attractive and in the public interest. However, maintaining a coalition in a multi-party systеm/government is a significant challenge. Therefore, the party manifesto is subject to dilution as a consequence of the greater influence exerted by the dynamics of the coalition.   7. Efforts to Promote Accountability   A number of donors and international development organizations have been providing support to the electoral systеm and the EC in collaboration with the Nepalese government since the introduction of federalism in Nepal. Immediately following the election, training is provided to elected members. A variety of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and government bodies collaborate to conduct training sessions for elected officials with the objective of ensuring accountability to the general public.   The majority of parliamentarians and ministers do not engage in the training programs. Such individuals often exhibit a self-assured demeanor, suggesting a belief that they possess comprehensive knowledge on the subject matter. Such individuals tend to believe that their extensive political experience and understanding of the nuances of governance equips them with the requisite knowledge to address the needs of the general public.   The training and assistance provided encompass various initiatives aimed at strengthening electoral and governance processes. These include capacity-building programs for the EC, voter education programs, and legislative drafting. Additional training focuses on skills to mitigate conflict and foster collaboration, ensuring that elected officials and civil servants fulfill their responsibilities and remain accountable to the public. Furthermore, specialized programs are offered to empower women to actively engage with the Constitution (Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Admіnistration 2021; Himalayan News Service 2018-02-05; NDI 2009).   7.1. Code of Conduct   The EC has made an election code of conduct for all voters and the candidates (Nepal Election Commission 2022). The code of conduct is disseminated to the general public and political party members through a series of training programs and via the election supervisors.   Some behaviors are overt and can be monitored and regulated, whereas others are covert and conducted surreptitiously. Adherence to the Code of Conduct is of paramount importance for elected officials, both during and after the electoral process. In the context of elections, a number of irregularities have been observed, including the induction of elected members, the use of bribery, the exertion of threats to influence candidacy and results, and the capture of polling stations. The tenets of electoral law are either disregarded or contravened. Campaigning programs often result in significant expenditures that exceed the limits set by the EC. Some candidates seek undue financial support from wealthy businessmen.   In some remote areas of Nepal, incidents such as intimidation and the consumption of alcohol in polling stations are not uncommon. In regions with challenging geographical features and limited transportation options, individuals with disabilities and the elderly may face difficulties in reaching polling centers, thereby hindering their ability to cast votes. Consequently, the number of votes cast for the selected candidate is reduced. The candidate(s) who are able to provide logistical support (travel, food, and accommodation) for the voters may have an advantage in the electoral process. Additionally, some villagers have been offered the waiver of their loans in exchange for casting their votes in accordance with the instructions provided.   Furthermore, the EC has been found to have some shortcomings. Some respondents indicated that the EC is not functioning in an autonomous manner. The dates of the elections are set by the incumbent government without any consultation or discussion with the EC. The financing of election security measures is not subject to sufficient regulation. The efficacy of voter education is undermined by its hasty admіnistration in the period preceding the election. The incumbent government has been observed to deliberately initiate or approve development projects in the period preceding elections. In rural areas, security and order is not adequately maintained.   7.2. Continuous Political Party Rule and the Division of Power   The two major political parties have been in continuous power since 1990. The Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) – United Marxist-Leninist (UML) have been in government, holding key ministries for the past 34 years. Even after declaration of Nepal as a republican country, they are still in power along with the Nepal Communist Party (NCP). The reason for this is that they are unable to secure an absolute majority (two-thirds) in the lower house. Such parties anticipate the outcome of elections and seek to form alliances in advance, with the objective of achieving the desired result. This has been the case since 2008.   The government was dissolved on 12 occasions between 2008 and the present. In order to maintain a two-thirds majority coalition government, frequent changes have been made to both the cabinet and the arithmetic equations of political party members. The dissolution of a coalition government at the federal level has repercussions at the lower levels as well.   Table 1. Prime Ministers of Nepal since 2008 No. Prime Ministers From Till Period in Month Political Party 1 Girija Prasad Koirala 28-May-08 18-Aug-08 3 NC 2 Pushpa Kamal Dahal 18-Aug-08 25-May-09 9 NCP-MC 3 Madhav Kumar Nepal 25-May-09 6-Feb-11 21 UML 4 Jhala Nath Khanal 6-Feb-11 29-Aug-11 6 UML 5 Baburam Bhattarai 29-Aug-11 14-Mar-13 19 NCP-MC 6 Khil Raj Regmi 14-Mar-13 11-Feb-14 11 Independent 7 Sushil Koirala 11-Feb-14 12-Oct-15 20 NC 8 KP Sharma Oli 12-Oct-15 4-Aug-16 23 UML 9 Pushpa Kamal Dahal 4-Aug-16 7-Jun-17 10 NCP-MC 10 Sher Bahadur Deuba 7-Jun-17 15-Feb-18 8 NC 11 KP Sharma Oli 15-Feb-18 13-Jul-21 41 UML 12 Sher Bahadur Deuba 13-Jul-21 26-Dec-22 17 NC 13 Pushpa Kamal Dahal 26-Dec-22 15-Jul-24 18 NCP-MC 14 KP Sharma Oli 15-Jul-24     UML NC: Nepali Congress, UML: United Marxist and Leninist, NCP-MC: Nepal Communist Party-Maoist Center   7.3. Significant Systеmic Corruption   Following the declaration of Nepal as a “secular, federal, democratic, republic nation” in 2008, a significant instance of systеmic corruption emerged. There has been a flagrant abuse of power. Those in positions of power, including ministers, parliamentarians, mayors, and high-level government bureaucrats, have been implicated in acts of corruption. Some have been incarcerated, while others are currently under investigation, and a few more are awaiting trial.   Table 2. List of Significant Instances of Corruption since 2008 No. Major Scandals Approx. Amount (NPR) 1 Gold smuggling N/A 2 Fake Bhutanese Refugees 288.17 million 3 Lalita land scam N/A 4 Omni scandal N/A 5 Tax Embezzlement 10.02 billion 6 Budhigandaki Hydropower 9 billion 7 Printing press 700 million 8 CCTV scandal N/A   7.4. Election Expense and Predatory Relations with Businessmen   EC guidelines limit campaign expenses to NPR 2.5 million (equivalent to USD 18,000) for General Assembly and NPR 1.5 million (equivalent to USD 10,800) for Provincial Assembly. Political leaders are seeking the support of businessmen in order to obtain the necessary funds, and in turn, the politicians are working in favor of the businessmen.   A former minister asserts that a minimum of NPR 50 million (equivalent to USD 360,000) is required to secure an election victory. He further states, “Our average five-year income would be approximately four million, and we believe that we must recover this amount during our tenure.”   7.5. Candidacy Nomination by Political Parties   The nomination of candidates by political parties is a common practice in Nepal, observed across the political spectrum, including among smaller and newer parties. In the case of FPTP candidates, nomination is principally based on the contribution of the proposed member to their respective political parties.   The formal process is as follows. Firstly, the district committees nominate members from each district and send the recommendations to the central committee. Subsequently, the central committee members finalize the list of candidates who compete through FPTP. However, in reality, the party president exercises ultimate decision-making authority in an autocratic manner. In addition, undue influences are exerted by neighboring countries with regard to regional politics.   7.6. Selection of PR Candidates   In principle, 110 members of parliaments are selected from Dalits, Janajatis, women and Madheshi communities by central committees of the respective parties. However, in contrast, influential party members, particularly those with the prerogative of the Party President, have been known to make decisions that result in nepotism and favoritism. For example, individuals from the elite and privileged classes and castes have been observed to occupy seats. For instance, in the case of the spouse of the General Secretary of UML, this individual has been elected as a parliamentarian under the PR systеm. From the Nepali Congress, a spouse of a prominent leader serves in the parliament through the PR systеm. Similarly, from the CPN (Maoist), a daughter and brother respectively hold the positions of mayor and speaker in the upper house.   Senior politicians themselves have opted for the PR systеm over direct elections, as it is a more cost-effective option for them. Rather than engaging in electoral competition, some individuals choose to make a financial contribution to the party in question. This can be described as a form of illicit procurement of seats in the PR systеm. Elected members assert that the financial expenditure incurred during the electoral process (FPTP) could potentially reach up to NPR 50 million per seat.   7.7. Political Manifestation during Election   The concept of accountability is not a mandatory legal requirement. In an interview, a former member of the Constituent Assembly observed that voters are not particularly concerned with election manifestos and are instead guided by political parties. He additionally stated that voters anticipate personal benefits from election candidates. Voters are less concerned with the policies and laws that elected members will enact for the general public and instead focus on the potential benefits they may receive from these elected members, such as employment or business opportunities. Additionally, a senior journalist posited that voters should establish deadlines and inquire of elected officials what actions they have taken to ensure accountability.   7.8. The Advent of Novel Perspectives   “The PR model is financially burdensome, as it necessitates greater representation and resources, which consequently increases expenses for the government,” asserted senior leaders from the NC and UML. The influence of minor political parties has resulted in a disproportionate amount of power, which has led to a lack of decision-making progress. The practice of political representation is being misused by political parties. Those who have held prominent positions of authority on numerous occasions are frequently recommended for PR seats. “Those who are concerned about the potential consequences of losing elections under the FPTP systеm are also seeking PR tickets,” states a professor of political science and former chief of the Central Department of Political Science. There have been calls from within the major political parties (such as the NC and the UML) for the removal of the PR systеm and the adoption of a full FPTP systеm. In contrast, the CPN-UML has expressed support for a full PR systеm and direct election of the state head.   8. Conclusion   The relatively low level of voter education in Nepal requires further endeavor. It would be prudent to consider voter education as a continuous process with adequate and timely period rather than a one-time event. In addition, it is imperative that the EC monitor and regulate the mounting costs associated with electoral processes and assume responsibility for the effective oversight of the security and safety of the general public. It would be prudent for the legislature to enact a law that would prohibit political parties from forming pre-alliances prior to the election. Such a measure would help to prevent the manipulation of election results. Voters bear responsibility for selecting inappropriate leaders. They should be encouraged to exercise their right to vote in a considered manner, and to hold elected leaders to account by questioning them about their election manifesto and the timelines they have set for achieving the goals set out in it. Those in positions of leadership and political parties in general should demonstrate respect for the principles of proportional representation and comply with the constitutional provisions that govern them. ■   References   ACE Project. 2005. “Holding the Government Accountable.” https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esa/esa05 (Accessed October 14, 2024)   Bishwakarma, J. B. 2013. Dalit in Nepali Media. Kathmandu: Martin Chautari.   Dahal, Dev Raj. 2001. “Electoral Systеm and Election Management in Nepal.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/NP/Electoral%20Systеm%20and%20Election%20Management%20in%20Nepal.doc/view (Accessed October 14, 2024)   Himalayan News Service. 2018. “Training organised for civil servants, elected representatives.” February 5. https://thehimalayantimes.com/kathmandu/training-organised-civil-servants-elected-representatives (Accessed October 14, 2024)   International Foundation for Electoral Systеms: IFES. 2017. “Elections in Nepal: 2017 House of Representatives and State Assembly Elections.” November 21. https://www.ifes.org/tools-resources/faqs/elections-nepal-2017-house-representatives-and-state-assembly-elections (Accessed October 14, 2024)   Lawoti, Mahendra. 2019. “Democracy, Accountability, And A New Nepal.” Social Science Baha. October 23. https://soscbaha.org/lecture-series/democracy-accountability-and-a-new-nepal/ (Accessed October 14, 2024)   Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Admіnistration. 2021. “Legislative Law Drafting training for local level conducted by Province 1.” https://plgsp.gov.np/legislative-law-drafting-training-local-level-conducted-province-1 (Accessed October 14, 2024)   National Democratic Institute: NDI. 2009. “Nepal: Training Women to Engage in the Constitution-Drafting Process through the Nepali Women’s Leadership Academy.” March 16. https://www.ndi.org/our-stories/nepal-training-women-engage-constitution-drafting-process-through-nepali-women%E2%80%99s (Accessed October 14, 2024)   Nepal Election Commission. 2022. “The Election Code of Conduct, 2022.” https://election.gov.np/admіn/public/storage/HoR/LAw/Election%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20final%20.pdf (Accessed October 14, 2024)   Ocampo, JA, and N Gomez Arteaga. 2014. “Accountable and effective development cooperation in a post-2015 era.” https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf13/dcf_germany_bkgd_study_3_global_accountability.pdf (Accessed October 14, 2024)   Wilson, Evan Michael. 2016. “Answerability versus Enforceability: A Study of Accountability in the Relationships Between Donors and Recipients of Foreign Aid.” Master’s Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/51799 (Accessed October 14, 2024)     ■ Ujjwal Sundas is a Director of Program and Research at Samata Foundation.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Japan is experiencing a major political fund scandal. It is aligned that the Abe and Nikai factions within the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) failed to report a significant portion of income from political fundraising parties. The total amount is estimated to be approximately 800 million yen (approximately USD 5.5 million) over the five-year period from 2018 to 2022. As of January 2024, a lower house member Yoshitaka Ikeda had been arrested, and the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office was reported to be considering prosecuting the treasurers of the two factions (NHK 2024-01-13).   While the Abe and Nikai factions together possessed about 140 Diet members prior to the 2024 election, only two have thus far commented on the case in public. It has been reported that the leadership of the factions has asked their members not to speak publicly about the case. This indicates a lack of accountability in Japanese politics.   Given the lack of enthusiasm among individual Diet members to engage with the public on this issue, the government’s approach to political reform seems somewhat tepid and superficial. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida took the initiative of establishing a political party reform body within the LDP. However, an investigation revealed that ten of the 38 members of that body were affiliated with the Abe faction (NHK 2024-01-11). Kishida is criticized for his reluctance to implement meaningful reforms.   This scandal demonstrates a weak accountability in Japanese politics. Why did the faction members not raise this issue voluntarily? Why have they been refraining from talking about the case to the public, although they are elected officials who should abide by the law? In sum, what are the reasons for the lack of vertical accountability in governance in Japan? This paper argues that, while freedom of the press and of speech is well protected in the country, weak political participation of citizens, or weak exercise of “positive liberty,” fails to hold politicians, the party, and the government accountable.   1. Governance in Japan   In Japan’s governance, the bureaucracy has historically held significant influence over policy creation and implementation, with citizens expected to adhere to these policies.[1] Although the political landscape changed under the Abe admіnistration, which strengthened the power of the cabinet secretariat over the bureaucracy, the centrality of the bureaucracy’s role returned under the Kishida admіnistrations. The legislature’s lack of sufficient expertise and knowledgeable personnel has contributed to the bureaucracy’s continued dominance. Each Diet member in Japan possesses only two to three staff, whereas each American congress member has about 40. In addition, by conducting its politics of influence peddling until the mid-1990s, the LDP had established patron-client relations between politicians and citizens (Kobayashi 1997, Chapter 7; Kono and Iwasaki 2004).   From the perspective of society, Japanese tend to refrain from challenging the state on matters that they perceive as patronizing. Instead, they demonstrate a reluctance to engage in political participation, relying on the government to address collective action problems in the public sphere. Because of such an attitude towards political participation, the number of people with a political party affiliation is relatively low. The International Social Survey Program study of Citizenship conducted in 2004 revealed that only less than 5% of respondents specified their political party affiliation “when asked which party” they typically support. This is a clear contrast to the United States, where over 40% of respondents specified their political party affiliation in the same research. Although the United States shows an exceptionally high percentage of individuals with political affiliation compared to other countries, North European and other Anglo-Saxon countries also had about or more than 10% of respondents specifying their party affiliations (Gibson et al. 2004, “Party Affiliation”). In comparison to other developed democracies, the lack of interest in political participation is distinctive in the case of Japanese citizens.   Rather than engaging in political processes and contributing to the resolution of collective action problems, Japanese citizens tend to expect and depend on the state. Compared to their interest in policy outputs, their interest in inputs is substantially weaker (Murayama 2003; Neary 2003). The Japanese population demonstrated a lack of interest in political participation in post-World War II period. The general population has historically demonstrated a lack of motivation to influence political processes. Instead, they have tended to rely on the government as a “charitable parent” who provides protection to its citizens, as articulated by Japanese philosopher and political activist Osamu Kuno (Kuno 1970; Yatsuhiro 1980, 6, 45-46). In light of these observations, the state-society relations literature of comparative politics and the domestic politics literature of international relations have consistently categorized Japan as a strong state, a statist country, or an elitist democracy (e.g., Katzenstein 1978; Katzenstein 1985; Risse-Kappen 1991).   2. Inactive Civil Society and Low Civil Liberty   Robert Dahl argues that two dimensions are necessary for a country to be a democracy, or “polyarchy” in his term: public contestation and participation (Dahl 1971). There has been a notable level of public contestation in Japan since the conclusion of the World War II. Despite the LDP’s nearly 40-year tenure between 1955 and 1993, the context was one of freedom of elections. Although the party conducted a politics of influence peddling during its years in office, citizens exercised their freedom to criticize the government, holding demonstrations and contesting in elections. Since Freedom House started collecting data on political rights and civil liberties in 1972, Japan has consistently scored either 1 or 2 out of 7 (with 1 being best and 7 being worst) on civil liberties (Figure 1).   Figure 1. Japan’s Civil Liberty Scores, 1972–2022 Source: Freedom House n.d.   While Dahl measures political participation based on suffrage, citizens’ political participation can also be measured by the existence of a vibrant civil society from the viewpoint of the civil society literature (Tocqueville 1969; Coleman 1988; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993). Participatory democracy is a systеm in which civic associations play an active role in addressing collective action problems in the public sphere. It regards citizens not only as subjects to be governed, but also as governors, influenced by communitarianism, where the common good is considered ‘the behavioral principle of the people’.   However, citizens are not necessarily active in participating in politics and solving collective action problems in all democracies. Italy serves as an illustrated example. Scholars such as Edward Banfield and Robert Putnam have posited that a political culture of vertical personal relations can impede the flourishing of civil society (Banfield 1958; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993). This seems to apply to the case of Japan as well.   The type of liberty exercised by the Japanese seems to affect state-society relations. In order to satisfy the two requisites of democracy which were defined by Dahl, different types of liberty are necessary. For the exercise of public contestation, the concept of negative liberty, as defined by Isaiah Berlin, is essential. Negative liberty can be defined as the absence of limitations or interference from others. Public contestation may occur at various scales, from boycotts and strikes to demonstrations. Such actions are feasible when the guarantee of liberty from external influence is in place. On the other hand, in addition to negative liberty, positive liberty is a prerequisite for political participation. This is the liberty to engage with others, form agreements with them, and let oneself and others obey certain limitations, which cannot be attained through the mere exercise of negative liberty (Berlin 1958).   The Japanese people tend to only exercise public contestation or negative liberty, but they often lack the will to participate in political activities, which would constitute positive liberty. What factors have contributed to this phenomenon? An insight into this phenomenon can be gained from an examination of the Japanese understanding of the concept of the public (see, for example, Sasaki and Kim 2002; Yamakawa 1999).   3. Concept of the Public in Japan   As Jürgen Habermas observed, the concept of the public has undergone a transformation within Western culture. In feudal societies during the medieval period, the concept was used to express high social status or power. With the advent of the modern state, the public concept came to be used as a synonym for the state, as states expanded their admіnistrative functions. However, as citizens’ economic activities became increasingly distinct from those of the state, the public concept came to encompass the citizenry (Habermas 1991). Additionally, Hannah Arendt defines the modern public sphere as relations among citizens (Arendt 1973).   In contrast, the concept of the public in Japan has remained largely unchanged over time. As was understood in the feudal systеm, the term “public” continues to be used to refer to those at the pinnacle of the social hierarchy in Japan. From the introduction of the public concept in Japan until the present, the term has been used to refer to a variety of figures, including lords, emperors, dominators, heroes, warlords, and bureaucrats, depending on the assumed hierarchy. In contrast, the term “private” has historically been used to refer to subjects and common people (Kim 2002, i). While the term “public” is subject to interpretation depending on the assumed hierarchy, the very concept of the public itself has remained consistent. Yoshiko Terao explains the genesis and etymological origins of the public concept in Japan as follows:   The Japanese word “oyake [(public or 公)]” originally meant “great house,” which obtained the reading when the words “公” and “私 [(private or I)]” were brought from China. Then “公” and “私” rooted representing structural relations which function to support the feudal systеm during the Edo period. In the Edo’s feudal systеm, the shogunate was the “公” and feudal clans were “私,” while feudal clans were the “公” and vassals were “私” in their relations. Such systеm was embedded into the very bottom of the feudal systеm as can be seen in the word “奉公” [which means “apprenticeship” but writes as “contribution to the public”]. When comparing this structure to the public/private relationships of the West, Western public/private basically do not have hierarchical relations but were considered to constitute different spheres, while “公” was always positioned higher in the relations between “公” and “私,” and was considered to have higher values. The public, as the main players in the public sphere of Europe and America, is a group of individuals who is in charge of the public and are rational. They are the group of citizens who can be rational in their dialogues with rational others in the public sphere. “私” as first-person pronoun was established in the latter half of the medieval period, and differing from “我 (I),” “私” as a humble term taking a back seat to the others as a “公” cannot be an existence to have momentum to claim and justify its existence and thinking (Terao 1997, 135. Square brackets were added by the author).   Due to this understanding of the public as those at the apex of the hierarchy, the actors engaged in governance within the public sphere are perceived as exclusively state actors. As Terao points out, while the “general public” in English tends to have the connotation of sovereign members, “koshu (公衆)” as its Japanese translation does not have such a connotation, but it simply denotes people (Terao 1997, 136). As a result of this understanding of the public concept, Japanese citizens have typically refrained from engaging in political participation, asserting their rights only when these are contested. As posited by Hiroshi Minami, a Japanese psychologist, “selfhood is asserted in Japan usually only from the viewpoint of selfish individual benefits, not from the viewpoint of autonomous individual dignity being free from the interference of authority” (Minami 1953, 40). In other words, citizens are regarded as voicing their opinions not to fulfill their civic duty of participating in public governance, but rather as people who are not responsible for it.   Japanese citizens tend to have little interest in making inputs in politics and public policy (Murayama 2003). This makes a contrast when compared to citizens of other Western countries in providing input through avenues such as advocacy and lobbying. The number of NGOs with an advocacy function is relatively limited in Japan, as Robert Pekkanen points out (Pekkanen 2006). A survey conducted by the Johns Hopkins University group revealed a notable discrepancy in the ratio of service-providing NGOs to advocacy NGOs between Sweden and Japan. While the ration in Sweden was 1 to 1.07, in the early 1990s, it was significantly lower in Japan, at approximately 1 to 0.14.[2] The Japanese in general are not interested in the exercise of positive liberty or participation in politics. Japanese citizens rely on the authority for governance and tend not to take individual actions or participate politically (Kawashima 2000). Problems within the public sphere have historically been perceived as matters to be addressed by state actors.   4. Lights for Change   While this political culture remains dominant in Japan, there have been multiple indications of a shift in attitudes. First, the Internet has become the dominant platform for citizens to raise ’their voices and launch petition campaigns virtually, even for those who are not willing to engage in street protests. Social networking sites are also utilized as a means of expressing one’s views.   Members of younger generations are becoming increasingly active in a variety of social and political activities, including speaking out, conducting fundraising campaigns, engaging in advocacy, and so forth. One such indication was observed in the case of the coup in Myanmar in February 2021. Young activists, journalists, and filmmakers remain committed to spreading information about Myanmar, fostering awareness, and advocating for a change in Japan’s policy towards the country.   Can we thus hope to conclude that society is undergoing a transformation? Possibly, but some substantial research would be necessary before making such an assertion. ■   References   Arendt, Hannah. 1973. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   Banfield, Edward C. 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York: Free Press.   Berlin, Isaiah. 1958. Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   Coleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” The American Journal of Sociology 94: S95-S120.   Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.   Freedom House. n.d. “Freedom in the World: Country and Territory Ratings and Statuses, 1973-2023.” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world (accessed November 18, 2023).   Gibson, Rachel, Shaun Wilson, and Markus Hadler. 2004. “International Social Survey Programme 2004: Citizenship.” Cologne: GESIS Data Archive. https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11372 (accessed January 15, 2024)   Habermas, Jürgen. 1991. (translated by Thomas Burger, with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence), The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.   Hyden, Goran. 1999. “Governance and the Reconstitution of Political Order.” In State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, by Richard Joseph. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.   Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   Katzenstein, Peter J. 1985. Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.   Katzenstein, Peter J., and ed. 1978. Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.   Kawashima, Takeyoshi. 2000. Nihon Shakai no Kazokuteki Kosei (Family-like Structure of the Japanese Society). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.   Kim, Tae-Chang. 2002. “Hajimeni: Ima naze nihon ni okeru “ooyake” to “watakushi” nanoka (Introduction: The Importance of “Public” and “Private” in Japan Now).” In Kokyo tetsugaku 3: Nihon ni okeru ooyake to watakushi (Public Philosophy 3: Public and Private in Japan), by Tsuyoshi Sasaki, Tae-Chang Kim and eds. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai.   Kjaer, Anne Mette. 2004. Governance. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity.   Kobayashi, Yoshiaki. 1997. Gendai nihon no seiji katei (Political Process in the Current Japan). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.   Kono, Takeshi, and Masahiro Iwasaki. 2004. Rieki yudo seiji: Kokusai hikaku to mekanizumu (Politics of Patronage: International Comparisons and Mechanisms). Tokyo: Ashi Shobo.   Kuno, Osamu. 1970. “Niju yonenme wo mukaeru kenpo (Constitution Reaching Its 24th Years).” Mainichi Shimbun, May 1 and 2.   Minami, Hiroshi. 1953. Nihonjin no shinri (Psychology of the Japanese). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.   Murayama, Hiroshi. 2003. Nihon no minshusei no bunkateki tokucho (Cultural Characteristics of Japanese Democracy). Kyoto: Koyo Shobo, 2003.   Neary, Ian. 2003. “State and Civil Society in Japan.” Asian Affairs 34, 1 : 27-32.   NHK. 2024a. “Jimin “seiji sasshin honbu” de hatsukaigo: Kishida shusho ga tokaikaku ni ketsui (LDP’s “Political Reform Headquarters” Holds First Meeting; Prime Minister Kishida Determined to Reform Party).” NHK, January 11.   ______. 2024b. “Seiji shikin jiken: Abe ha to nikai ha no kaikei sekininsha wo zaitaku kiso de kento (Political Fund Case: Treasurers of Abe’s and Nikkai’s factions to be considered for home prosecution).” NHK, January 13.   Pekkanen, Robert. 2006. Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members Without Advocates. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.   Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.   Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1991. “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies.” World Politics 43 (July 1991): 479-512.   Sasaki, Tsuyoshi, Tae-Chang Kim, and eds. 2002. Kokyo tetsugaku 3: Nihon ni okeru ooyake to watakushi (Public Philosophy 3: Public and Private in Japan). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.   Terao, Yoshiko. 1997. “Toshi kiban seibi ni miru wagakuni no kindaiho no genkai (Limitations of Japan’s Modern Laws concerning Urban Infrastructure Improvement).” In Gendai no Ho 9: Toshi to Ho (Modern Law 9: Cities and Law), by Masahiko Iwamura, et al and eds. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.   Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1969. (George Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer ed.), Democracy in America. New York: Perennial Classics.   Yamakawa, Katsumi. 1999. “Kokyosei no gainen ni tsuite (On the Concept of the Public).” Keynote lecture at the Annual Meeting of Nihon Kokyo Seisaku Gakkai (Public Policy Studies Association Japan).   Yatsuhiro, Nakagawa. 1980. Obei demokurashi heno chosen: Nihon seiji bunka ron (Challenge to Western Democracy: Japanese Political Culture). Tokyo: Hara Shobo.     [1] On the central role bureaucracy plays in Japan, see, for example, Johnson 1982.   [2] The number for Sweden is as of 1992, and that for Japan is as of 1995. The Johns Hopkins University, Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project.     ■ Maiko Ichihara is a Professor in the Graduate School of Law and the School of International and Public Policy, and Assistant Vice President for International Affairs at Hitotsubashi University, Japan.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

1. Introduction   The concept of vertical accountability entails the election of representatives by citizens through democratic processes. This mechanism provides individuals with the opportunity to choose their leaders and contribute to the formulation of governmental policies. The presidential and parliamentary elections in Taiwan are regarded as being conducted in a fair and competitive manner (Murkowski 2016). In its 2022 report, Freedom House rated Taiwan as free in both political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2022). As the function of vertical accountability is sound in general, this paper will examine some of the issues that can be further addressed to improve democratic quality or prevent a regression in this regard.   2. Taiwan’s Electoral Systеms   Taiwan has adopted a semi-presidential systеm, in which the president is directly elected and may serve up to two consecutive four-year terms. Additionally, the president has the authority to nominate and replace the premier. In Taiwan, the President is elected through a direct popular vote systеm. The election is held every four years, concurrently with the legislative Yuan member election. The candidate who obtains a majority of the votes cast is elected President. The President-elect serves a four-year term and may be re-elected for one consecutive term.   In Taiwan, members of the Legislative Yuan, the country’s unicameral parliament, are elected through a mixed-member majoritarian systеm. The Legislative Yuan is comprised of 113 seats, including 73 single-member district seats, 34 party-list proportional representation seats, and six aboriginal seats. In single-member districts, the legislator is elected through a first-past-the-post (FPTP) systеm. The candidate who receives the highest number of votes wins the seat. Each voter casts two ballots: one for the district seat and another for the party-list seats. The distribution of party-list seats is based on the proportion of the overall popular vote received by each party. Subsequently, political parties submit lists of candidates for these at-large seats, and the seats are allocated to the respective parties based on their proportion of the total votes cast. In order to gain representation in the Legislative Yuan, political parties are required to secure a minimum of 5% of the total valid votes cast or win at least three district seats to qualify for at-large seats. The six aboriginal seats are elected through a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systеm.   As of 2024, Taiwan has held eight presidential elections and ten parliamentary elections. In 2016, Taiwan experienced its third transfer of executive authority between political parties. The previous two transfers occurred in 2000 and 2008. The 2016 election also marked the first parliamentary majority for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), one of the two main parties in addition to the Kuomintang (KMT). In 2024, the DPP continued to secure the presidency, yet it suffered a setback in terms of parliamentary representation, with the opposition parties, namely the KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).   The concurrent election of the president and the legislators mitigated the potential for a divided government. In addition, the change in the electoral formula for legislative elections, from a SNTV to a single-member district, has also been observed to increase the number of seats held by the president’s party. Since 2008, both the KMT and the DPP have held the majority of seats in parliament. In such circumstances, the president’s party is better positioned to exert control over both the executive and legislative branches. In essence, the systеm is closer to a presidential systеm with a unified government. Similar to the practices of numerous semi-presidential countries, in instances of a lower approval rate or policy failures, the president, who is the ultimate decision-maker behind the main policies, has the authority to replace the premier to address public discontent. Thus, due to the fixed term of the presidency, the citizenry is unable to hold the ultimate decision-maker accountable between elections.   3. V-Dem score and Asian Barometer   In V-Dem, vertical accountability is comprised of three essential components. The initial aspect concerns the quality of elections, which involves an overall evaluation of the integrity, fairness, and transparency of the electoral procedures. The subsequent element pertains to the percentage of the eligible population that participates in the electoral process. This component assesses the inclusiveness of the democratic systеm by considering the proportion of individuals with voting rights who exercise them. The third aspect assesses the method used to select the chief executive, specifically whether this is achieved through a direct or indirect approach.   It is pertinent to conduct a comparative analysis of Taiwan’s performance in the context of countries currently undergoing the third wave of democratization like Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as in comparison to established Asian democracies, including Japan and India. By comparing Taiwan’s performance in these aspects to that of other nations, we can gain a more nuanced comprehension of the advancements it has made in democracy. The present study employs data from the year 2021 to demonstrate the aforementioned pattern. The graph below provides a visual representation of these comparisons, revealing Taiwan’s strengths in vertical and horizontal accountability.   As seen from Figure 1, Taiwan exhibits a notably high level of vertical accountability, indicating the efficacy of electoral processes and party competition. In terms of vertical accountability, Taiwan’s performance is superior to that of the majority of emerging and East Asian democratic countries. The high scores can be attributed to three factors.   Figure 1. Horizontal Accountability and Vertical Accountability   Firstly, the election in Taiwan is perceived to be fair and transparent. The electoral commission, which is responsible for delineating electoral districts and admіnistering elections, is largely autonomous. Furthermore, the judiciary in Taiwan operates with a high degree of autonomy, with court regulations largely insulated from political or inappropriate influences. The courts, which frequently adjudicate cases pertaining to vote buying, defamation, and violations of election law, are not partisan in their decision-making. Secondly, Taiwan has an automatic registration systеm, whereby all citizens residing in Taiwan are automatically sent election notification letters several days prior to the election. This allows them to cast their ballots in a voting booth located within walking distance of their residence. The election date is typically set for a Saturday. Therefore, the cost of voting is minimal. Thirdly, the President and members of parliament are directly elected by the Taiwanese people. Subsequently, the president is responsible for nominating the prime minister and has the authority to dismiss them at their discretion.   The concept of horizontal accountability pertains to the maintenance of a systеm of checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. In comparison to other newly established democracies, Taiwan’s performance in horizontal accountability is approximately moderate. However, compared to South Korea, and several Latin American countries, its scores are relatively lower. The absence of robust horizontal and diagonal accountability mechanisms may result in the deterioration of a democracy into an electoral democracy. Fortunately, judicial systеm in Taiwan is characterized by a notable degree of independence. This aligns with the general perception that Taiwan’s judicial systеm has become relatively independent following democratization and is not unduly influenced by the executive branch.   Diagonal accountability refers to the oversight exerted by citizens, social groups, and the media on government actions that fall outside the purview of the representative political systеm (Malena et al. 2004). This mechanism ensures that government actions and decisions are subject to scrutiny by civil society, thereby promoting transparency and preventing the misuse of power.   The concept of diagonal accountability encompasses a range of actions and mechanisms that can be employed by citizens, civil society organizations, and an independent media to ensure governmental accountability. The measurement in V-Dem includes four aspects: media freedom, civil society characteristics, freedom of expression, and the extent of citizen engagement in political affairs. As illustrated in Figure 2, Taiwan exhibits a comparable level of performance in diagonal accountability to that observed in vertical accountability. The high performance of diagonal accountability in Taiwan denotes the capacity and active participation of civil society organizations, which contribute to the strengthening of vertical accountability. In the case that the government seeks to weaken vertical accountability, mass media and civil society organizations can collaborate to prevent the government from making wrong decisions.   Figure 2. Vertical Accountability and Diagonal Accountability   Figure 3 depicts the change of Taiwan’s vertical accountability index. Following the Second World War, Taiwan’s score was relatively low due to the implementation of martial law and the holding of regular elections only at the county level. The data clearly illustrate a significant upswing in Taiwan’s horizontal accountability score in the late 1960s, coinciding with the gradual expansion of elected members of parliament. In the early 1990s, a further notable increase was observed, along with the country’s transition to democracy. Notably, this score has exhibited a commendable level of stability since that time. Taiwan’s remarkable increase and stability in vertical accountability since its democratic transition in the early 1990s, as depicted in the graph, underscores the country’s commitment to democratic principles.   Figure 3. Vertical Accountability Index in Taiwan, 1900-2023   4. Election Participation   As illustrated in Table 1, the voter turnout for presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan has exhibited a consistently high level of participation, with over 70% of the eligible population casting their ballots in most elections. In 2016, however, due to a significant poll gap between the two leading candidates, voter turnout declined to 66%. Following the 2008 electoral reform, the presidential and parliamentary elections are held concurrently. Consequently, the voter turnout for these two elections is almost identical. Therefore, we limit our analysis to the presidential election turnout.   Table 1. Political Participation, 2008-2024     President election turnout percentage of candidates who are below 40 percentage of male candidates percentage of female candidates 2008 76% 19% 71% 29% 2012 74% 12% 68% 32% 2016 66% 18% 66% 34% 2020 75% 19% 62% 38% 2024 72% 17% 59% 41% Source: Central Election Commission   Table 1 also shows the age and gender distribution of parliamentary candidates across years. It can be observed that the rate of youth participation has not increased significantly, remaining below 20%. This means that candidates under 40 years of age constitute less than 20% of all candidates, which is not proportionate to the proportion of young people. With regard to the gender difference, while male candidate participation remains relatively high, female participation has been increasing across years, from 29% in 2008 to 41% in 2024, denoting the rising female participation in politics.   Furthermore, the election participation rate of young voters and gender groups can be examined. In order to facilitate a comparative analysis of electoral participation in Taiwan with that in other Asian countries, we utilize the fifth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS).   First, we use the following question: “Thinking of whether you voted or not ever since you became eligible for voting, how would you describe yourself – have you voted in every election, voted in most elections, voted in some elections or hardly ever voted?” This was done in order to capture political participation. The respondents who indicated that they had voted in every election and in most elections were classified as frequent voters, while those who responded that they had voted in some elections and had hardly ever voted were classified as infrequent voters. As can be seen from Figure 4, more than eighty percent of respondents reply that they are frequent voters. The electoral participation rate in Taiwan is not significantly higher than that observed in most other democracies in the Indo-Asia region. Only Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia exhibit significantly higher rates of electoral participation. The response to this question is inherently susceptible to social desirability bias, which presents a significant challenge in cross-country comparisons.   Figure 4. Election Participation Rate   The subsequent section examines the election participation rate, disaggregated by gender. As seen from Figure 5, the voting rate is approximately equivalent between male and female voters in Taiwan. In certain countries, such as Japan, Korea, and Malaysia, male citizens exhibit a higher turnout. In the Philippines, however, women have a higher election participation rate than men.   Figure 5. Election Participation Rate by Gender   Next, we look at the election participation rate, breakdown by age groups, as shown in Figure 6. The voting rate is considerably lower among young voters below the age of 40 in Taiwan. In the majority of countries within this region, young citizens are considerably less likely to be frequent voters. The discrepancy between the voting rates of young and adult citizens can reach 30 to 40 percentage points in countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In contrast, in some countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and India, the election participation rate gaps are much smaller between age groups.   Figure 6. Election Participation Rate by Age   5. Issues Debated in Elections   In the recent general elections, the main candidates focused primarily on issues related to national defense, security, and sovereignty, with limited discussion on other public policy issues. The issue of sovereignty is largely rooted in political identity and can be employed as a means of consolidating support from core supporters in an effective manner. Conversely, a number of significant socio-economic concerns in Taiwan, including the potential insolvency of the labor pension scheme, severe demographic challenges, global warming, labor shortages, and the fiscal costs of energy subsidies, have not been subjected to sufficient scrutiny and debate. Instead, the three candidates and the media have primarily focused on discrediting their opponents based on minor flaws in their real estate holdings.   For example, in the 2024 presidential election, the three principal candidates did sparsely propose certain policies pertaining to these critical issues. However, there has been a lack of comprehensive discourse and sufficient public attention. Moreover, the three candidates frequently eschew addressing the fundamental causes of these issues by proposing measures that could potentially disadvantage specific groups. For example, concerning the mounting deficits in the labor pension scheme, all three candidates refrain from contemplating the potential of augmenting the contributions of laborers. In lieu of proposing alternative solutions, the candidates have pledged to maintain the current approach of relying on government funding to address the pension fund deficits.   With regard to their respective election platforms and campaign trails, the three sets of candidates demonstrate no discernible differences in their policy positions on a range of socio-economic issues, including industrial, labor, education, housing, and health policies. Political parties are generally aware of the appropriate policies beneficial to society as a whole; however, they often prioritize those that will not jeopardize their chances of winning elections. With regard to the energy issue, the KMT and TPP support the continued utilization of nuclear energy, whereas the DPP advocates for its immediate phase-out. The most notable divergence in political positions among candidates lies in cross-strait relationship.   Regarding cross-strait relations, the candidates all advocate for a close Taiwan-American alliance, increasing Taiwan’s defense deterrence, and engagement in dialogue with the mainland on the basis of equality and dignity. The U.S. academic and media Anticipated that the election of any of the three candidates will not result in any significant alterations to the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship. All candidates have visited the United States, met with scholars from universities and think tanks, and held discussions with American officials, ensuring a clear understanding of their positions on the relationships.   However, the concepts of “equality and dignity” is interpreted differently by the three parties. Hou You-yi accepts a “One China with Different Interpretations” framework, which encompasses both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China. Additionally, he is opposed to Taiwanese independence and has cautioned against the risk of war. Similarly to his predecessors, Lai Ching-te does not accept the “One China” policy, stating that it is equivalent to “one country, two systеms.” The KMT has accused Lai Ching-te of pro-Taiwan independence and of inciting military conflicts. In turn, Lai Ching-te has characterized the KMT’s policy as tantamount to surrender. Ko Wen-je’s stance is more ambiguous. Additionally, in terms of cross-strait economic relations, Lai Ching-te emphasizes the strong linkage between economic and national security. It would be prudent for Taiwan to reduce its reliance on the Chinese market while simultaneously seeking to strengthen its economic ties with its democratic allies. In contrast, the KMT advocates for the establishment of more robust economic ties with mainland China.   In comparison to previous candidates from the KMT, Hou demonstrates a notable shift towards a more robust emphasis on democracy and Taiwan’s sovereignty, accompanied by a discernible expression of skepticism towards the Beijing government. They advocate a diplomatic policy for Taiwan that is pro-American, friendly with Japan, and engaging with China. The DPP’s policy is characterized by a pro-American, pro-Japanese, and anti-communist China stance.   In recent years, candidates have frequently elevated the stakes of general elections to a level where the outcome has been seen as a choice between the survival of democracy, the preservation of sovereignty, or the future of the country. Against the backdrop of China’s rising threat of force over Taiwan, the ruling party seized the opportunity to exploit the perceived threat. During the election campaign, the DPP candidate cast himself as the defender of Taiwan’s sovereignty, claiming that if the opposition candidate was elected, Taiwan would be forced to surrender to China, democracy would collapse, and Taiwan’s sovereignty would be weakened. In response to a multitude of criticisms levied against its domestic policies, the DPP has sought to deflect attention by attributing the blame to China, such as the dissemination of misinformation. The victory of the DPP in this election is undoubtedly influenced by the ongoing threat from China, coupled with the ruling party’s exploitation of the existential threats. However, the DPP garnered merely 40% of the vote, suggesting that the rhetoric of existential threat may not resonate profoundly with the majority of Taiwanese voters. Some voters may prefer more dialogues with mainland China, thereby reducing the potential for miscalculation and the risk of military confrontation.   On the other side, the KMT also leveraged the China threat by framing the election as a choice between war and peace. They asserted that the s pro-Taiwan independence stance and confrontational approach of Lai would contribute to the escalation of conflict, forcing young people to go to the battlefield. Lai has repeatedly stated that he has no intention of modifying the official name of the Republic of China or amending the constitution.   6. Potentially Threatening to Vertical Accountability   The external threats to Taiwan’s liberal democracy originate directly from China. Additionally, it is attempting to leverage its political and economic influence to shape public opinion and influence the policies of political parties in Taiwan. The dissemination of misinformation represents one of numerous strategies that China is utilizing to exert influence over Taiwan. One objective is to exert influence over the competition between political parties in Taiwan. Such narratives tend to denigrate the performance of the DPP government, impugning its ability to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait. This strategy aims to diminish the approval rating of the ruling party and boost support for the opposition parties that are more amenable to China’s policies. Such actions have the effect of distorting the competitive landscape between political parties.   Conversely, in recent years, China has provided financial support to individual politicians with the objective of assisting candidates and political parties that are aligned with China’s interests in winning presidential elections. Subsequently, several of them have been subjected to investigation and prosecution. The scope of these activities is, in general, quite limited and does not extend to the mainstream political parties.   The second threat arises from the potential for supposedly neutral government agencies to intervene for political gain. By strategically emphasizing the significance of the election, the government provides itself with a rationale for its actions. Such circumstances have the potential to compromise the fairness of the electoral process and erode public confidence in the democratic process. For example, in the days preceding the election, China launched a satellite that passed over Taiwanese airspace. The Defense Ministry issued an air raid alert, stating that it was a Chinese missile test (Central News Agency 2024-01-09). The dissemination of misinformation contributed to an increased perception of national security threats and potentially enhanced support for the ruling party. The government has also intervened more frequently in the electoral process by instructing law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute political opponents and citizens for disseminating false information and aiding China’s infiltration before the election. In recent years, Taiwan has passed the Social Order Maintenance Act to tackle fake news and the Anti-Infiltration Act to counter Chinese influence in elections and politics.   While China is known for engaging in cognitive warfare and infiltration, the DPP also exploited this threat. In the context of fake news, the act of criticizing the government or commenting on government policies may be perceived as cognitive warfare, which could result in legal consequences and a chilling effect on free speech (Wu 2023). Additionally, the Ministry of Justice proposed more rigorous examination of new immigrants from China to counter foreign influence, sparking controversy due to its targeted focus on a specific group.   Another issue concerns the willingness to abide by the fundamental rules. Such actions are not exclusive to a particular political party. The acceptance of the result of democratic competition represents a fundamental tenet of democratic governance. Taiwan has undergone eight presidential elections and several party turnovers. Taiwan has successfully surpassed the two-turnover test of democratic consolidation proposed by Samuel Huntington. However, there have been instances where candidates have not adhered to the established regulations during the primary phase. While this phenomenon is most prevalent at the local primary level, it has been manifested in this electoral cycle as well. During the DPP primary, Tsai Ing-wen postponed the primary and modified the electoral rules on multiple occasions following a decline in her poll ratings due to a challenge from her former premier. Subsequently, she was able to reclaim her victory following Xi Jinping’s speech, which prompted Taiwanese citizens to rally behind her. Concurrently, Terry Kuo, the chair of Foxconn, who participated in the primary as the KMT candidate, similarly declined to endorse the winner of the election after placing second in 2020 and again in 2024.   7. Direct Democracy and its Problems   Because of the alleged failure of representative democracy to address the needs of the people, the New Power Party (NPP) also promotes direct democracy. In 2018, the NPP and the DPP government proposed amendments to the Referendum Act, lowering the threshold of eligible voters required to initiate a referendum proposal (from 0.5 percent to 0.01 percent) and the threshold required to put a referendum proposal to a vote (from 5 percent to 1.5 percent). Furthermore, the amendments reduced the quorum required to pass a proposal. Before the amendment, it was necessary for at least 50 percent of the electorate to cast ballots, with an absolute relative majority of valid votes being required. The current legislation requires that at least 25 percent of the electorate cast ballots and that a relative majority of valid votes be cast. Furthermore, the recently enacted legislation has eliminated the necessity for a review committee, which was previously empowered to reject a referendum proposal. As a direct consequence of the alteration to the quorum, the number of citizen initiatives has mushroomed significantly. In the 2018 municipal and county elections, ten referendum proposals were put to a vote, encompassing a range of issues including same-sex marriage, nuclear power, and air pollution, as well as changing the name used for Olympic and international competitions from Chinese Taipei to Taiwan.   In its review of the referendum law, the NPP proposed an extension to include the possibility of deciding constitutional clauses by referendum. One of the most important issues is the designation of the nation’s official title and territory. These are particularly contentious issues, given Taiwan’s unique position within the global power structure. The NPP also proposed amending the law to require that any cross-strait political negotiations be subjected to a referendum prior to their commencement. The term “political negotiations” is quite vague. Following the Sunflower Movement, the implications of trade agreements have also become a matter of significant political and national security concern. Ultimately, these two proposals were rejected by other major political parties.   As a consequence of the recent amendment to the referendum law, which reduced the quorum requirement, ten referendum cases were put to a vote in the 2018 local elections. The sheer number of cases is overwhelming for the public to understand, digest, and ultimately make informed decisions about. Furthermore, the proposal, deliberation, and voting processes for such cases are conducted within a relatively short timeframe of just two months. The current practice of direct democracy does not allow thorough social deliberation that can be found in some mature democracies. Taiwan is a society that is divided along national identity lines and in its views of cross-strait political and economic relationships. The format of a referendum often presents a binary choice, which may limit the potential for compromise. In the case of identity-related issues, it would be preferable to engage in deliberation and pursue compromise within the framework of representative institutions.   After two years, in 2020, the DPP government reached the conclusion that the implementation of multiple referendums proposed by opposition parties could potentially have an adverse impact on its electoral prospects. Consequently, the ruling party opted to amend the referendum law. The revised law restricts the impact of referendums on presidential elections by scheduling them on a biannual basis, rather than concurrently with presidential elections. ■   References   Central News Agency. 2024. “Wrong Translation of National Missile Raid Alert Department of Defense Apologize.” [國家級警報衛星誤譯成飛彈 國防部致歉] January 9. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202401095003.aspx (Accessed January 28, 2024)   Freedom House. 2022. “Freedom in the World 2022: Taiwan.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedom-world/2022 (Accessed September 2, 2024)   Malena, Carmen, Reiner Forster, and Janamejay Singh. 2004. Social Accountability: An Introduction to the Concept and Emerging Practice. Social development papers: No. 76. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.   Murkowski, Lisa. 2016. “International Election Observation Mission, 2016 - Taiwan.” Congressional Record 162, 33.   Wu, Chin-en. 2023. “Taiwan’s Civic Space Threatened by Chinese Misinformation and the Government’s Worrisome Legislative Responses.” ADRN Issue Briefing. February 10. http://adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?idx=294 (Accessed January 28, 2024)     ■ Chin-en Wu is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

1. Introduction   India’s electoral democracy has thrived over the past 77 years since the country gained independence from British colonial rule. Its foundation has been fortified through distinct contributions of various pillars, including the parliament, the judiciary, political parties, media, civil society, and most significantly, the citizens. Despite concerns and uncertainties from various corners, the framers of the Indian Constitution and the Constituent Assembly made a pivotal decision by embracing universal franchise. This move opened up the opportunity for every adult Indian to participate in voting and select their representatives. India embraced constitutional federalism with a unitary structure featuring two tiers of government: the union government and state governments. Subsequently, in 1992, two significant constitutional amendments introduced a third tier of government as an institution of local governance, comprising Panchayats (village councils) in rural areas and Municipalities in urban areas. This paper focuses on recent political discourses concerning electoral accountability at the national level.   2. Citizen Participation in Elections   The voter turnout, or electoral participation of citizens, is a key indicator of the strength of a democracy. India is frequently designated as the world’s largest democracy due to the significant number of people who exercise their right to vote as granted by the Indian Constitution. Given the country’s diverse population, encompassing different genders, religions, castes, ethnicities, geographies, languages, abilities, and more, the specific breakdown of participation has been a topic of interest for scholars. This section will explore the historical context of overall voter turnout, with a particular focus on the participation of women and youth.   As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, voter participation has increased substantially over the years. The voter turnout has gone up from 44.9 percent in the first Lok Sabha (parliamentary) elections held in 1952 to 58.2 percent in 2009. The 2014 Lok Sabha election marked a notable shift in electoral participation, observing a turnout of 66 percent, exceeding the previous record of 64 percent set during the 1984 national elections. This election witnessed a turnout that was approximately 8 percent higher than that the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, which had a turnout of 58.2 percent. The 2019 Lok Sabha elections registered an even higher turnout, reaching 67.1 percent.   Figure 1. Participation in Lok Sabha Elections (1952 to 2019 Elections) Source: Election Commission of India   Figure 2. Voter Turnout Percentage in Lok Sabha Elections (1952 to 2019) Source: Election Commission of India   Figure 3. Gender Gaps in Lok Sabha Election Participation (1962 to 2019) Source: Election Commission of India   The participation of women in elections is an essential indicator of the development of a democratic systеm in any country around the world (Thomas and Wilcox 2005). In India, women of voting age have been eligible to vote since the first general election, with minimal resistance. This was a truly historic achievement, considering that in numerous developed countries, women’s suffrage was only attained through arduous and often violent struggles (Roychowdhury 2024).   This remarkable surge in female voter participation is undoubtedly a cause for celebration. However, it also reveals several paradoxical aspects. Firstly, although female voter turnout in India is increasing, female labor force participation, which is a crucial driver of women’s political engagement, remains lower than that of peer economies (Roscher 2024). Secondly, numerous studies confirm that women remain less engaged in various measures of political involvement than men, including contacting elected representatives, attending public meetings, and participating in campaign activities (Kumar 2024). Despite the increasing number of female voters in India, the representation of women in parliament and state legislatures remains significantly lacking (Deshpande 2004).   Based on these observations, some theorists argue that the electoral processes in India are biased in favor of male dominance, deliberately excluding women from equal power sharing. However, this argument is countered by others who highlight the fact that since the 1990s, there has been a rise in women’s participation in electoral competition and their involvement in grassroots politics, particularly in local governance, suggesting a move towards greater gender inclusivity (Rai 2017). The rise in female participation as candidates in local government elections can be attributed, at least in part, to affirmative action policies that reserve seats for women.   In recent years, political scholars have accorded several plausible reasons for such an increase in female voter’ participation. Rai (2017) posits that the role of electronic media in creating awareness about rights, awareness generation, and advocacy efforts by civil society and women’s groups, the initiatives of the Election Commission of India in conducting free, fair, and violence-free elections, reservations for women at the local governance, and changing positive perceptions of women about politics, have collectively contributed to increased women’s participation.   Two-thirds of India’s population is below the age of 35, contributing to the country’s youthful demographic profile. Despite their active engagement in various social movements, there is a need to enhance youth participation in elections, both as registered electorates and voters. Several factors contribute to this situation, including voter apathy, cynicism towards the electoral process, a lack of political representation from their demographic, admіnistrative challenges, logistical hurdles like paperwork processing, and the opportunity costs associated with voting (The Economic Times 2024-04-05).   As evidenced by studies conducted by Lokniti-CSDS, the youth voter turnout increased from 54 percent in 2009 to 68 percent in 2014, surpassing the overall voter turnout rate. However, despite a 9.3 percent increase in the electorate size, the 2019 elections witnessed a stagnation in voter turnout, with approximately 67.4 percent. The Election Commission of India identified that the youth, especially those from urban areas, display less interest in participating in the elections.   Figure 4. Voter Turnout among Youth and Others (2004-2019) Source: Attri and Mishra 2020, based on CSDS Surveys The data is weighted as per the actual voter turnout.   The political parties and civil society must assume greater responsibility for mobilizing young people in electoral processes. Although the student wings of major political parties have played a significant role in introducing young people to politics and fostering political leadership, their integration into political parties requires closer examination. The aspirations of younger political leaders frequently encounter obstacles when they interact with more experienced figures within the party. The majority of political parties are unwilling to disrupt the status quo, which leaves young aspirants feeling increasingly adrift and marginalized. As a result, many individuals choose to leave the party, while others become disillusioned and withdraw from active politics entirely (Hazarika 2024). The issue of youth voter apathy is complexed and requires a collaborative and multi-pronged approach to resolve it.   3. The Election Commission of India   The Election Commission of India has a long and distinguished history since its formation in 1950. It has overseen 17 parliamentary elections (Lok Sabha or Lower House) and several hundred State Assembly elections. The Constitution of India (Articles 324–329) provides for the Election Commission of India and also stipulates clear guidelines to ensure its autonomy. In contrast to other Indian institutions, the Election Commission of India is not a colonial legacy. Rather, it represents the values and democratic principles that a nascent India aspired to achieve (Kumar 2022).   The Election Commission of India is currently constituted as a three-member body, comprising one Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and two Election Commissioners (ECs). Under Article 324(2) of the Constitution, the President appoints the CEC and ECs. Furthermore, the Constitution stipulates that the President, who acts on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, shall make the appointments ‘subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament’ (Anand 2022).   The independence of the CEC and ECs is paramount in ensuring free and fair elections. This is obviously contingent upon the degree of independence and transparency in the appointment procedures of the CEC and ECs, which have been subjects of political and legal discourse for some time. The current debate was triggered by a Constitution bench, constituted in 2022, comprising five judges of the Supreme Court. This was in response to a batch of four public interest litigations (submitted in 2015, 2017, 2021, and 2022) which broadly sought the issuance of directives to the union government for the establishment of a neutral and independent selection panel for the purpose of recommending names to the President for appointment as CEC and ECs. In the absence of a legal framework that defines the appointment process, the CEC and ECs have been appointed by the President on the advice of a committee comprising the prime minister, the leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha, and in case that no leader of the opposition is available, the leader of the largest opposition party in the Lok Sabha in terms of numerical strength, and the Chief Justice of India.   In December 2023, Parliament enacted a new Act, replacing the 1991 Act, which outlines a procedure for appointing the CEC and ECs. The law established a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha, and a Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister. The selection will be made from five names that have been shortlisted by a screening panel, which is headed by the law minister and comprises two union secretaries (Chopra 2024).   Since the Supreme Court bench had specified that its appointment norms are “subject to any law to be made by parliament,” the union government was well within its rights to bring this law. However, the appointment process proposed in the law has been perceived as a potential threat to the reforms sought by the Supreme Court and other civil society groups. Additionally, opposition political parties also criticized the committee’s composition, citing the potential for it to effectively sideline the leader of the opposition, who could be consistently outvoted by the Prime Minister and the union minister.   The Election Commission of India is frequently lauded for its adept management of the massive and intricate election processes using the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM). However, despite the EVM being considered an important Indian innovation, there are reservations regarding its credibility and critics who challenge its reliability. Since its introduction, the EVM has been the subject of considerable mistrust, with political parties and observers frequently making claims that it can be hacked or tampered with.   Over the years, the technology utilized in EVMs has undergone advancements. The third generation of EVMs consist of three units: a ballot unit, a control unit, and a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) machine. The majority of former and current CECs have expressed strong support for the use of EVMs. They argue that EVMs are more efficient and reduce malpractices such as rigging and booth capturing, which were prevalent with paper ballots. Furthermore, the issue of invalid votes due to improper marking or ink smudging in paper ballots is frequently highlighted. Debnath et al. (2017) found that the introduction of EVMs has led to a significant decline in electoral fraud, particularly in politically pivotal regions where rigging was prevalent. Additionally, there has been a decrease in crimes like murder and rape. In its judgment rendered in April 2024, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its trust in the integrity of the electoral process. While the controversies surrounding the procedure for EVM use were temporarily resolved by the Supreme Court judgment in April 2024, it is highly unlikely that the debate will be considered definitively settled for all time.   4. One Nation, One Election: Simultaneous Election   In India, the Lok Sabha (the Lower House) and State Legislative Assembly elections were simultaneously held during the first four rounds in 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967. Subsequently, due to the premature dissolutions of the Lok Sabha, State Legislative Assemblies, or both, the elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies are held at different times.   In its election manifesto for 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the ruling party in India, promised to hold simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha, the State Legislative Assemblies, and the Local Government (including Panchayati Raj Institutions and Municipalities). The concept of simultaneous elections has been mooted in the past by the Election Commission of India in 1982 and the Law Commission in 1999. While a few political parties, part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) headed by the BJP, have argued that holding simultaneous elections at all three levels is the only way to ensure ‘free and fair’ elections, most opposition parties have presented a variety of arguments against this move.   The Kovind Committee, established in September 2023, has been mandated to examine and make recommendations for conducting simultaneous elections in accordance with the existing constitutional framework. The panel has been tasked with proposing specific amendments to the Constitution and any other legal changes necessary to enable simultaneous elections. Additionally, the panel is tasked with providing an assessment of whether the proposed amendments necessitate the assent of at least half of the state assemblies, as stipulated in Article 368. Subsequently, the High Level Committee (HLC) has started intensive consultations with various stakeholders including political parties, civil society groups, elected representatives, and Law Commissions, among others.   Those in favor of simultaneous elections present compelling arguments regarding the financial burden and constraints on governance and development caused by frequent elections. The preparation of a single electoral roll would result in cost savings, as would a reduction in the number of security forces and civilian officials required. It would reduce the influence of money in the electoral process, as the necessity for campaign financing by political parties would be significantly reduced. Additionally, it is argued that an excess of elections leads to voter fatigue.   On the other hand, there are compelling arguments against implementing simultaneous elections. Firstly, the initiative of the BJP-led union government is perceived as hostile to the idea and spirit of constitutional federalism, particularly given the lack of meaningful consultation with non-BJP-ruled states. Secondly, the implementation of simultaneous elections may result in the eclipsing of salient local and regional concerns in favor of national interests, which could potentially give rise to regional discontent. Thirdly, proponents of simultaneous elections argue that it would save costs, but this claim is negated by the need to procure a large number of EVMs and VVPATs. Furthermore, biennial elections to the Upper House (Rajya Sabha) and by-elections would require the allocation of resources and financial expenditure. Lastly, periodic elections ensure that important issues remain in the public domain and keep political parties and elected representatives accountable (Kumar 2024).   5. Financing of Political Parties and Election Campaigns   The issue of financing political parties and election campaigns in India has remained unresolved for decades. The absence of transparency and inconsistent policies pertaining to this matter have had a negative impact on the accountability and transparency of political parties. As Gowda and Sridharan (2012) have observed, flawed political party funding and election expenditure laws are one of the main contributing factors to corruption in the government and political systеm. These legislative provisions facilitate the exploitation of discretionary powers by political parties and their representatives for the purpose of raising funds for electoral campaigns and parties. Similarly, Vaishnav (2019) posited, “as the costs of elections have increased, politicians – and the bureaucrats under their influence – have become experts at skillfully manipulating regulations and policies in exchange for campaign funds. Moreover, should a candidate be fortunate enough to secure a higher office, the subsequent effort to rebuild their financial resources for future elections starts anew.” Given the Indian people’s aspirations for a democratic polity, it is imperative to identify a more effective solution to this problem.   In India, political parties have traditionally obtained funding through private donations and membership fees. Corporate contributions to political parties were permitted, although certain restrictions were in place. The Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1951, regulated campaign expenditures during elections. Candidates who exceeded the spending limits set by the RPA could face disqualification and have their election results nullified.   The debate on the subject of political party financing was revived in 2024, when a Constitution bench of five judges, led by the Chief Justice of India, invalidated the ‘Electoral Bond’ scheme implemented by the BJP-led union government. The Electoral Bond Scheme was introduced in 2017 through the Finance Bill, thereby allowing Indian citizens or bodies incorporated in India to purchase unlimited quantities of electoral bonds from specified State Bank of India (SBI) branches. Subsequently, these bonds could be donated to registered political parties, which could then redeem them through their verified accounts.   In the same year, Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), an Indian non-governmental organization (NGO), filed petitions with the Supreme Court challenging the amendments to the Finance Act. The petitions alleged that the acts were passed as money bills improperly to avoid scrutiny by the Upper House (Rajya Sabha). The petitioners also contended that the Electoral Bond Scheme would encourage opacity in political funding and could result in widespread electoral corruption. However, in 2018, the union government notified the Electoral Bond Scheme.   In 2023, a three-member bench of the Supreme Court referred the petition against the validity of the Electoral Bond scheme to a Constitution bench of five judges. On February 15, 2024, the Constitution bench ruled the Electoral Bond Scheme unconstitutional, stating that anonymous Electoral Bonds violated the Right to Information and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Supreme Court directed the SBI to disclose details of Electoral Bond donations to the Election Commission and ordered the Election Commission to publish this information on its website by March 13, 2024. On March 4, the SBI requested an extension until June 30, 2024, to provide information about Electoral Bonds to the Election Commission. Despite the SBI’s procrastination, the Supreme Court ordered the disclosure of information regarding electoral bonds by the close of business on March 12, 2024 (Outlook 2024-03-12).   The lack of transparency in political party financing has been identified as a significant concern, particularly in relation to the opacity of campaign finance. As evidenced by the data, the ruling BJP received 47.5 percent of the total funds, followed by the All India Trinamool Congress (AITMC) with 12.6 percent and the Indian National Congress (INC) with 11.1 percent. While this data suggests potential wrongdoing, the ruling party has unequivocally denied any such allegations. A preliminary analysis revealed that several companies that donated bonds to political parties were also facing financial offense charges by investigative authorities of the union government. A number of political pundits and opposition parties have raised concerns about the possibility of a quid pro quo arrangement (Bose 2024).   6. Conclusion   India is continuously regarded as the largest electoral democracy in the world. Despite concerns raised by a multiplicity of political groups about transparency and accountability of electoral processes, voter participation has consistently increased in recent elections. As India seeks to establish itself as a global leader based on its democratic credibility, it is crucial to maintain and enhance the internal democratic framework. The attainment of this objective is contingent upon the maintenance of electoral process integrity. Similarly, ensuring the representation and inclusivity of various sections of society, particularly women and youth, in elections would make the process more inclusive. Political parties have already recognized the growing participation of women as voters, despite their lower participation in the economy and broader political activities.   Indian politics has consistently demonstrated a notable degree of competitiveness and vibrancy. However, over the past decade, India has witnessed an unprecedented level of polarization among political parties. This has had an impact on the intense competition among political parties, which has often been conducted in a manner that is devoid of basic decency. In this context, the role of the Election Commission as an independent and impartial institution is of paramount importance in restoring a sense of decency in electoral competition. The rule of law must be complemented by a sense of morality and values based on democratic principles.   The Supreme Court’s annulment of the Electoral Bond Scheme has also resulted in a policy vacuum with regard to the future of political funding. As the new government is formed in the next couple of months, it would be prudent for Parliament to prioritize extensive consultations among political parties, businesses, and civil society to develop a transparent and accountable mechanism for financing political parties and election campaigns. ■   References   Anand, Utkarsh. 2022. “Independence of Election Commission destroyed by all govts, says Supreme Court.” Hindustan Times. November 23. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/independence-of-ec-destroyed-by-all-govts-says-sc-101669139785719.html (Accessed May 3, 2024)   Attri, Vibha, and Jyoti Mishra. 2020. “The Youth Vote in Lok Sabha Elections 20191.” Indian Politics & Policy 3, 1: 87-107. https://www.ippjournal.org/uploads/1/3/6/5/136597491/the_youth_vote_in_lok_sabha_elections_2019.pdf (Accessed May 18, 2024)   Bose, Prasenjit. 2024. “Decoding electoral bonds data,” The Hindu. March 19. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/decoding-electoral-bonds-data/article67969866.ece (Accessed May 1, 2024)   Chopra, Ritika. 2024. “Explained: The new process for picking Election Commissioners, why it was brought in.” Indian Express. February 9. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/picking-election-commissioners-9149779/ (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Debnath, Sisir, Mudit Kapoor, and Shamika Ravi. 2017. “The Impact of Electronic Voting Machines on Electoral Frauds, Democracy, and Development,” Brookings Institution, March 16. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/evm_march2017.pdf (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Deshpande, Rajeshwari. 2004. “How Gendered was Women’s Participation Women in Election 2004?” Economic and Political Weekly 39, 51: 5431–5436.   Election Commission of India. Election Results – Full Statistical Report. https://www.eci.gov.in/statistical-reports (Accessible only in India)   Gowda, M. V. Rajeev, and E. Sridharan. 2012. “Reforming India’s Party Financing and Election Expenditure Laws.” Election Law Journal 11, 2: 226-240. https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/upiasi/Reforming%20India%27s%20Party%20Financing%20and%20Election%20Expenditure%20Laws.pdf (Accessed April 10, 2024)   Hazarika, Thajeb Ali. 2024. “Why Indian youth is not at the polls: Political parties need to do more.” Indian Express. May 10. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/why-indian-youth-is-not-at-the-polls-political-parties-need-to-do-more-9319104/ (Accessed May 18, 2024)   Kumar, Ashutosh. 2023. “Understanding simultaneous elections.” The Hindu. November 30 (Updated on April 10, 2024). https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/understanding-simultaneous-elections- explained/article67592051.ece (Accessed April 15, 2024)   Kumar, Sanjay. 2022. Elections in India: An Overview. New York: Routledge.   Outlook. 2024. “Electoral Bonds Scheme Timeline: The Journey From Its Inception To Supreme Court Holding It Unconstitutional.” March 12. https://www.outlookindia.com/national/electoral-bonds-scheme-timeline-the-journey-from-its-inception-to-supreme-court-holding-it-unconstitutional (Accessed May 11, 2024)   Rai, Praveen. 2017. “Women’s participation in electoral politics in India: Silent feminization.” South Asia Research 37, 1: 58–77. https://doi.org/10.1177/0262728016675529 (Accessed May 16, 2024)   Roscher, Franziska. 2024. “How Clientelist Party Mobilization Closes the Gender Turnout Gap: Theory and Evidence from India.” January 8. https://franziskaroscher.com/research.html (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Roychowdhury, Adrija. 2024. “From 1951-2019: How women voters outnumbered men in Lok Sabha polls.” Indian Express. May 7. https://indianexpress.com/article/research/from-1951-to-2019-how-women-voters-outnumbered-men-9306969/ (Accessed May 16, 2024)   The Economic Times. 2024. “Why young voters are less interested in elections?” April 5. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/lok-sabha/india/why-young-voters-are-less-interested-in-elections/articleshow/109066465.cms (Accessed May 18, 2024)   Thomas, Sue, and Clyde Wilcox (Eds). 2005. Women and Elective Office: Past, Present and Future. New York: Oxford University Press.   Vaishnav, Milan. 2019. “Electoral Bonds: The Safeguards of Indian Democracy Are Crumbling.” Originally published by HuffPost India on November 25, 2019. Republished in www.carnegieendowment.org. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/11/electoral-bonds-the-safeguards-of-indian-democracy-are-crumbling?lang=en (Accessed May 1, 2024)     ■ Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is a Director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), India.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

1. Introduction   To what extent do political institutions in South Korea meet the democratic norm of vertical accountability? Do they actually demonstrate accountability to voters? If the de jure institutions of vertical accountability do not align with the de facto performance of such accountability, where are the discrepancies? Despite the theoretical and practical importance of accountability in the political systеm, few studies have provided empirical evidence on both the de jure institutions of vertical accountability and their de facto performance.   To address this gap, this project examines the de jure institutions of vertical accountability and the de facto performance of vertical accountability in South Korea. Specifically, the study addresses four research questions: (1) Which constitutional and legal mechanisms hold the Korean government accountable? (de jure accountability) (2) To what extent do these accountability mechanisms function effectively? (de facto accountability) (3) Are there discrepancies between the de jure and de facto accountability? (4) What short-term remedies and long-term reforms could address these discrepancies? As a first step toward answering these questions, this memo reviews electoral accountability in South Korea.   In terms of methodology, this memo employs mixed methods. A review of de jure accountability is based on articles and chapters of the constitution and relevant laws.[1] To evaluate de facto accountability, I use Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data from 1980 to 2022. Cross-national comparisons will also be conducted to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the Korean case. The mean performance of three sets of countries is used as a comparison: (1) OECD countries, (2) ADRN participants, and (3) 18 third-wave democracies: Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. These 18 cases consist of the six largest third-wave democracies in each region. The selection criterion follows Kim (2022).   The structure of this memo is as follows. The next chapter defines vertical accountability and describes its subtypes, domains, and the items used to assess each. Chapter 3 reviews de jure and de facto electoral accountability in Korea, while Chapter 4 discusses diagonal accountability. The concluding chapter discusses short-term remedies and long-term reforms that could mitigate the discrepancies between de jure and de facto accountability in South Korea.   2. Definitions and Subtypes of Vertical Accountability   As accountability is at the center of democratic governance and policymaking, numerous studies have defined accountability and its subtypes. For example, Luhrmann et al. (2020) define accountability as “de facto constraints on the governments use of political power through requirements for justification of its actions and potential sanctions” (Luhrmann et al. 2020, 811). Subtypes of accountability are organized according to the spatial relationship between the government and voters, bodies within the government, and the government and civil society. Firstly, the accountability between the government and voters is referred to as vertical accountability or electoral accountability. Schedler and colleagues define it as “the ability of a state’s population to hold its government accountable through elections and political parties” (Schedler et al. 1999). Thus, the level of electoral accountability is contingent upon the quality of elections and political parties.   The second subtype is horizontal accountability, where state institutions hold the executive branch of the government accountable. This type of accountability consists of the checks and balances between the executive body and the legislative body, as well as judicial oversight of the executive body. This may include demands for information and punishment of improper behavior (O’Donnell 1998; Rose-Ackerman 1996).   The third subtype is diagonal accountability, in which civil society holds the government accountable, for example, by providing information about the government or pressuring it to change its policies (Grimes 2013; Malena and Forster 2004; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). Electoral accountability describes citizens’ power to hold the government accountable by participating through formal channels such as elections. In contrast, diagonal accountability denotes the ability or power of citizens to hold the government accountable via non-electoral and informal tools.   It should be noted that this memo conceptualizes vertical accountability in a broad manner, encompassing both electoral accountability and diagonal accountability. This is based on the premise that vertical accountability should capture both citizens’ formal and informal avenues through which citizens can hold the government accountable.   Each vertical accountability subtype has several domains. Electoral accountability has two domains: the quality of elections and the quality of political parties. This is because the primary mechanism through which citizens hold the government accountable is by voting. The evaluation of the quality of elections is typically concerned with the eligibility of voters, the ease of the voting process, the fairness and competitiveness of elections, the regularity and peaceful conduct of elections, and the supervision of electoral processes by a capable and autonomous electoral management body. The evaluation of the quality of political parties focuses on party formation and the independence of the opposition from the ruling regime. To evaluate the de jure and de facto characteristics of elections using empirical evidence, items that reflect these two domains are selected from the V-Dem variables, as indicated in Table 1.   The domains of diagonal accountability concentrate on the extent to which citizens can engage in policy-making processes that extend beyond electoral participation. They are evaluated by observing media freedom, civil society organizations (CSOs), freedom of expression, and citizens’ engagement in politics. The items that assess diagonal accountability are listed in Table 1.   Table 1. Domains and Items to Assess Vertical Accountability     Domain Item Electoral Accountability Quality of elections Voting rights restrictions Accuracy of the voter registry Free and fair elections Multi-party elections Intentional irregularities Intimidation and harassment Autonomy of the EMB Capacity of the EMB Quality of parties Barriers to party formation Independence of the opposition Diagonal Accountability Quality of media freedom Media censorship Quality of CSOs Citizens’ voluntary participation in CSOs Quality of freedom of expression Citizens’ freedom to discuss political issues and the freedom of academic and cultural expression Quality of engagement of citizens in politics The width and depth of public deliberations   3. De Jure and De Facto Electoral Accountability in Korea   3.1. De Jure Quality of Elections   In South Korea, the de jure quality of elections is secured via the Constitution and electoral laws. Firstly, voting rights are the primary measure of election quality, such as whether there are restrictions on voting rights and how accurate the voter registry is. Article 15 of the Public Official Election Act states that all Korean citizens over the age of 18 have equal voting rights. Furthermore, the voter registry is uncomplicated; all Korean citizens over the age of 18 are automatically registered as voters in accordance with Chapter 5 of the Public Official Election Act.   Secondly, the democratic process of elections is well institutionalized in Korea. Multi-party elections are dictated by Article 8 of the Constitution, which states that “the establishment of political parties shall be free, and the plural party systеm shall be guaranteed.” Free and fair elections are also secured by Articles 41 and 67 of the Constitution, which declare free, fair, and direct elections for the legislature and the President, respectively.[2] The Public Official Election Act defines the principles and rules for all elections. The Act’s Article 1 declares that the goal of the law is to make all elections free, fair, and democratic. Article 7 stipulates that candidates and parties should compete fairly and abide by laws.   Any intentional interference with the electoral process is subject to legal sanction. Articles 237 to 239 of the Public Official Election Act delineate the actions deemed to be obstructions to the freedom of elections and prescribe the penalties for such actions.   Thirdly, the quality of elections is determined by the autonomy and capacity of the Electoral Management Body (EMB). To determine the de jure autonomy of the EMB, an evaluation of the regulations pertaining to the appointment of members, term limits, and the protection of the EMB from political pressure must be conducted. The Constitution defines the establishment and purpose of the EMB. Article 114, Paragraph 2 describes the process of appointing nine members to the EMB, three by the President, with three appointments made by the National Assembly, and three by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Their six-year terms are secured under Article 114, Paragraph 3. It is also noteworthy that the members’ terms are protected unless they commit a serious crime.[3] Article 114, Paragraph 6 and Article 115, Paragraph 1 provide a legal basis for enhancing the capacity of the EMB, citing the EMB’s legal authority to establish regulations and issue instructions regarding the admіnistration of elections.[4] Additionally, Article 5 of the Public Official Election Law permits the EMB to request assistance from any government office with priority. This confers additional capacity upon the EMB. The second row of Table 1 provides a summary of the de jure and de facto qualities of elections in Korea.   3.2. De Facto Quality of Elections   The evaluation of the de facto quality of elections in South Korea is based on eight variables from V-Dem, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The figures show the temporal trajectory of eight variables from 1981 to 2022. Universal suffrage was instituted beginning with the first elections in 1948. Universal adult enrollment on the voter registry is easy and clear. Elections have been conducted in a free and fair manner since the country’s democratization in 1987.   Prior to the 1970s, elections conducted under authoritarian regimes had been competitive, with significant opposition parties. However, the opposition parties became weak after dictator Park Chung-hee’s auto-coup in 1972, which resulted in the dissolution of all parties and the legislature (Kim 2008). A jump in the quality of multi-party elections transpired in 1985, when the 12th legislative elections ended with the unexpected victory of a nascent opposition party. A second jump occurred in 1987, when the inaugural fully democratic presidential elections were held. Since then, South Korea has scored highly on the multi-party election item.   Figure 1. De facto Quality of Elections     Intentional irregularities are defined as cases where the incumbent and/or opposition parties engage in intentional actions that interrupt the electoral process. These actions may include the use of duplicate IDs, an intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, or false collation of votes. While some irregularities observed prior to the year 2000, there have been few instances of such occurrences since that time, with a notable exception. The sudden drop in the irregularities score between 2012 and 2015 reflects the National Intelligence Service (NIS) public opinion manipulation scandal. In this scandal, agents of the NIS, working on behalf of then-incumbent presidential candidate Park Geun-hye, engaged in illegal surveillance of some opposition politicians and posted pro-government opinions on social media to sway public opinion.[5]   Intimidation and harassment refer to situations in which opposition parties are subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government or the ruling party. Such incidents were frequent under the authoritarian regime, but became less frequent following democratization. Since 1996, there have been no documented incidents of intimidation and harassment.   Figure 2. De facto Quality of Elections     A crucial yet understudied aspect of electoral quality in Korea is the autonomy and capacity of the EMB. Since democratization, the EMB has gradually increased its capacity and autonomy. To evaluate the increase in the capacity and autonomy of the EMB, Figures 3 and 4 present a comparison between the autonomy and capacity of Korea’s EMB with the mean values for third-wave democracies, OECD countries, and ADRN participants, respectively. As a consequence of the democratization occurred in numerous countries during the late 1980s, the level of autonomy increased in third-wave countries and ADRN participants, including South Korea.   Figure 3. Comparison of the Autonomy of EMBs     Figure 4. Comparison of the Capacity of EMBs     An interesting point of increase occurred in 1998. The gradual expansion of the EMB’s legal authority and experience contributed to an increase in its autonomy and capacity. In 1992, a new law was enacted that allowed members of the EMB to issue suspensions or warnings and to request investigations into violations of election laws under Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the Election Commission Act.[6] In 1994, the Public Official Election Act merged several existing electoral laws, thereby reinforcing the EMB’s capacity to oversee the electoral process and to investigate any illicit activities connected with it. In accordance with this legal authority, the EMB assumed responsibility for monitoring all electoral processes, preventing any violations of election law, and punishing illegal election tampering. The National Election Commission (NEC) has on numerous occasions requested that prosecutors file criminal charges using their investigation records regarding election crimes committed by high-ranking politicians, both within the government and in opposition parties.   An analysis by Choi and Cho (2020) posited an additional rationale for the EMB’s elevated degree of autonomy and capacity. In a comparative analysis of 35 countries based on ELECT data from 2016, the South Korean EMB was found to have the fourth largest staff and the second largest budget. The substantial investment in human capital and financial resources would serve to enhance the power of the EMB.   Table 2 provides a summary of the de jure and de facto quality of elections in Korea.   Table 2. De Jure and De Facto Quality of Elections   Item De Jure Quality De Facto Quality Voting rights restrictions Election Act, Article 15 No restrictions Accuracy of the voter registry Election Act, Chapter 5 Easy and clear Free and fair elections Constitution, Article 8, 41, 67 Highly free and fair Multi-party elections Constitution, Article 8 Highly competitive Intentional irregularities   Rarely observed Intimidation and harassment Election Act, Articles 237 to 239 Rarely observed Autonomy of the EMB Constitution, Article 114 High Capacity of the EMB Constitution, Article 114-115 High   3.3. De Jure Quality of Parties   The quality of parties assesses the independence of the opposition and the existence of any barriers to the formation of political parties. The de jure quality is ensured by Article 8 of the Constitution. Article 8, Paragraph 1 states that the establishment of political parties shall be free, and the plural party systеm shall be guaranteed. Additionally, the Political Parties Act, Chapter VI, provides a legal basis guaranteeing the activities of political parties. The Political Parties Act, Article 37, Paragraph 1 states that political parties shall have freedom in the activities provided for in the Constitution and statutes.   Both the Constitution and the Political Parties Act provide a legal basis for securing the independence of parties by requiring that the government support their activities. Constitution Article 8, Paragraph 3 grants the protection of the State to political parties and also requires government to provide parties with financial support. Such support provides financial independence to opposition parties. The Political Parties Act, Article 37, Paragraph 2 enshrines the freedom of party activities, stipulating that activities such as the recruitment of party members and the promotion of policies and current issues through printed materials, facilities, and advertisements should be guaranteed as normal activities of political parties.[7]   The Constitution does not impose any restrictions on the formation of political parties, except in cases where a party’s actions are deemed to be in violation of the democratic order. Paragraph 4 defines a condition for party dissolution, stating that the Constitutional Court can dissolve a party whose purpose or activities are contrary to the fundamental democratic order.[8]   3.4. De Facto Quality of Parties   The de facto quality of political parties in Korea can be evaluated using eight variables from V-Dem, as illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. Since the advent of democracy, there has been a notable increase in the autonomy of opposition parties. This has resulted in a relatively stable level of party independence, which is slightly above the mean for OECD countries, as shown in Figure 5. Figure 6 depicts the extent of obstacles to party formation, with higher scores indicating a lack of barriers. Since the country’s transition to democracy, there have been no discernible impediments to the formation of political parties in South Korea. As illustrated in Figure 6, the country’s score for this variable is in close alignment with the mean among OECD countries.   Figure 5. Comparison of the Independence of Opposition Parties     Figure 6. Comparison of Barriers to Party Formation     Table 3 provides a summary of the de jure and de facto quality of parties. With regard to the independence of opposition parties and the question of party formation, it can be concluded that there is no threat to vertical accountability in Korea based on the quality of the parties in question.   Table 3. De Jure and De Facto Quality of Parties   Item De Jure Quality De Facto Quality Barriers to party formation Constitution Article 8, Paragraph 4 No restrictions Independence of the opposition Constitution Article 8, Paragraphs 1 and 3, The Political Parties Act Article 37, Paragraphs 1 and 2 Very independent   4. Concluding Remarks   The objective of this project is to address the following subjects regarding the constitutional and legal mechanisms of vertical accountability in South Korea: the de facto performance of accountability, any discrepancies between the de jure and de facto accountability, and solutions that could resolve such discrepancies. As the first step to achieve this objective, this memo has initially examined the de jure institutions of electoral accountability and the de facto performance of electoral accountability in South Korea. The de jure institutions of electoral accountability are well-designed and secured by the Constitution and relevant legislation, including the Election Act and the Political Parties Act. Furthermore, the de facto performance of electoral accountability in South Korea is comparable to or exceeds the mean values observed among OECD countries. In certain instances, South Korea’s performance surpasses the mean values observed among third-wave democracies and ADRN countries. No evident discrepancies are observed between the de jure and de facto dimensions of accountability in Korea. With respect to electoral accountability, the democratic systеm in Korea is functioning effectively.   In light of these findings, the subsequent memo will undertake a comparative analysis of the de jure and de facto diagonal accountability mechanisms in Korea. ■   References   Choi, Jaedong, and Jinman Cho. 2020. “Do National Election Commission’s Institutional Design and Workforces Have an Impact on Electoral Integrity?” Journal of Parliamentary Research 15, 2: 145-170.   Forster, Reiner, Carmen Malena, and Janamejay Singh. 2004. “Social Accountability: An Introduction to the Concept and Emerging Practice.” World Bank Working Paper No. 31042. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/327691468779445304/social-accountability-an-introduction-to-the-concept-and-emerging-practice (Accessed August 14, 2024)   Grimes, Marcia. 2013. “The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link between Civil Society and Good Government.” Studies in Comparative International Development 48, 4: 380-402.   Kim, Jung. 2023. “Horizontal Accountability and Democratic Resilience: The Case of South Korea in Comparative Perspective.” ADRN Working Paper Series. May 11. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&idx=312 (Accessed August 14, 2024)   Kim, Soo Jin. 2008. “A Study of Opposition Party in Park Chung Hee Era.” Korea and World Politics 24, 4: 27-59.   Luhrmann, Anna, Kyle Marquardt, and Valeriya Mechkova. 2020. “Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal Accountability.” American Political Science Review 114, 3:811-820.   O’Donnell, Guillermo A. 1998. “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.” Journal of Democracy 9, 3: 112-126.   Peruzzotti, Enrique, and Smulovitz Catalina, eds. 2006. Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New Latin American Democracies. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.   Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1996. “Democracy and ‘Grand’ Corruption.” International Social Science Journal 48, 149: 365-380.   Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner. 1999. The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.     [1] For the English translations of Korean laws, I rely on the Korean Law Translation Center founded by the Korea Legislation Research Institute, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/main.do.   [2] Article 41 Paragraph 1 states that “the National Assembly shall be composed of members elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot by the citizens.” Article 67 Paragraph 1 states that “the President shall be elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot by the people.”   [3] Paragraph 5 of Article 114 states that “No member of the Commission shall be expelled from office except by impeachment or a sentence of imprisonment without prison labor or heavier punishment.”   [4] Paragraph 6 of Article 114 states that “The National Election Commission may establish, within the limit of Acts and decrees, regulations relating to the management of elections, national referenda, and admіnistrative affairs concerning political parties and may also establish regulations relating to internal discipline that are compatible with the Act.” Paragraph 1 of Article 115 states that “Election commissions at each level may issue necessary instructions to admіnistrative agencies concerned with respect to admіnistrative affairs pertaining to elections and national referenda such as the preparation of the pollbooks.”   [5] See this news article for more details: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40824793 (Accessed on March 2, 2024).   [6] Article 14, Paragraph 1 (Suspension, Warning, etc. for Violations of Election Laws) states that where a member or staff of each election commission discovers a violation of an election law in the course of performing his/her duties, he/she shall halt the violation, issue a warning or corrective order, and may request a competent investigation authority to launch an investigation or file a criminal charge if such violation is deemed significantly detrimental to the impartiality of an election or an order of suspension, warning, or correction is not complied with.   [7] The Political Parties Act, Article 37, Paragraph 2 states that the activities of political parties promoting their own policies and current political issues without supporting and recommending the specific political parties or the candidates for election to public offices (including persons intending to become the candidates) or opposing them by utilizing printed materials, facilities, advertisements, etc., and activities for recruiting party members (excluding door-to-door visits) shall be guaranteed as normal activities of political parties.   [8] The Political Parties Act, Article 37, Paragraph 4 states that if the purposes or activities of a political party are contrary to the fundamental democratic order, the Government may bring an action against it in the Constitutional Court for its dissolution, and the political party shall be dissolved in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court.     ■ Sunkyoung Park is a Professor in the Division of Global Korean Studies at Korea University.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

1. Introduction   The Political landscape of the Philippines is dominated by the rich and the famous. This unfortunate situation is abetted by the underdeveloped character of political parties in the country. Political parties are important actors in a democratic systеm. They are expected to provide an organizational avenue for the aggregation of interests, the formulation of policy choices, the cultivation of leaders, and the engagement of citizens in electoral processes and the holding of governments to be accountable for their actions.   However, historical evidence indicates that Philippine political parties frequently prioritize the narrow objective of providing partisan vehicles for candidates seeking election rather than mobilizing the public in pursuit of coherent policy programs that would benefit the general population. Consequently, candidates are selected on their ability to command resources and their potential for success in an election, rather than on the strength of their commitment to specific policies, values, and principles.   The weak party systеm in the Philippines has contributed to the rise of populism and the erosion of the essential checks and balances that are vital for a vibrant democracy. Given the lack of effective disciplinary structures within political parties, politicians, including legislators typically align themselves with the party or parties of the winning presidential candidate. This facilitates the deterioration of legislative oversight and the advancement of executive aggrandizement. It is imperative that a Political Party Development Act be enacted to reinforce the political party systеm and foster the growth of democratic institutions. The legislation of a Campaign Finance Reform Act would serve to regulate campaign contributions and promote transparency with respect to the sources of funds and campaign expenditures. Furthermore, reforms are necessary to align the Party-List systеm with the objective of amplifying the voices of marginalized sectors through the electoral process.   To elaborate on these points, we will attempt to address the following questions: To what extent are political parties effective in aggregating interests, crafting policies, cultivating leaders, and engaging citizens to hold governments accountable through the electoral process? What measures might be taken to enhance the efficacy of political parties as institutions of representation in the Philippine democracy? What electoral reforms are required to promote voice and accountability?   2. Between Citizens and Leaders: Tue Question of Representation   The question of citizen-leader relations is a fundamental aspect of representative democracy. The way citizens perceive their relationship with leaders, the interactions between the represented and representatives, and the expectations of ordinary citizens regarding the role of elected officials as representatives of the public good are fundamental aspects that shape the dynamics and activities of elites within such a systеm (cf. Dovi 2012). Schmitter (2015, 36) sums it up as a two-way systеm, wherein citizens “with equal political rights and obligations have at their disposal regular and reliable means to access information, demand justification, and apply sanctions on their rulers,” who in turn can enjoy political legitimacy and a level of support despite criticisms from the public.   Tied with a Schumpeterian interpretation of democracy as a process of political elites circulating through competitive elections, the issue of citizen-leader relations can be seen as intimately tied with that of electoral accountability. Ashworth (2012) posits that electoral accountability can be construed as a systеm of rewards and punishments that can ensure policymakers remain responsive to the will and welfare of their constituents. In essence, it is a congruence between the interests and conduct of policymakers and their constituents (cf. Hellwig and Samuels 2008).   Despite the ideals that underpin such a schema, the circulation of elites can result in the consolidation of power in the hands of a few if conditions become disempowering for the ordinary citizen (Borja 2015, 2017). In other words, electoral accountability can collapse under the weight of power asymmetry. Consequently, such a vicious cycle can result in a democratic crisis driven by the disempowerment of the ruled and a lack of obligations and accountability among rulers (Stoker 2006; Stoker and Evans 2014; Schmitter 2015).   Overall, from the perspectives of both structural analysis and political psychology, electoral accountability becomes a question of values, expectations, and the institutional arrangements that can facilitate a confrontation between the decision-making processes of citizen-voters and policymakers (cf. Svolik 2013). Placed in electoral cycles, the question becomes whether electoral accountability is pursued under virtuous (i.e. democratizing) or vicious (i.e. oligarchic) conditions.   Turning to the case of the Philippines as a defective democracy (Rivera 2016; Teehankee and Calimbahin 2020) that is more oligarchic than democratic, this short essay elucidates the accountability deficit identified by Arugay (2005). This deficit refers to the lack of accountability among government officials that has led to abuses and corruption. From a historical and structural perspective, this can be considered a consequence of a long-standing rule by oligarchs whose sense of accountability is primarily oriented towards their relations with one another (e.g., inter-elite patronage) rather than their constituents (cf. Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2012; Rivera 2016).   Thus, what are the challenges facing electoral accountability in the Philippines from the perspectives of both structural and political psychological factors? The following section addresses this issue from both a structural and a psychological perspective. This section will illustrate that alongside limitations in the electoral systеm of the Philippines, there is a value systеm that allows leaders to avoid accountability as public servants.   3. Challenges to Electoral Accountability in the Philippines   According to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database (Coppedge et al. 2023), the vertical accountability index of the Philippines scores with an average of 0.76 from 1986 to 2023 (post-Marcos period). The index of scaled between low and high (0-1), measuring electoral accountability (i.e., the quality of elections, enfranchisement, and direct election of the chief executive) and the general quality of political parties (i.e., barriers to party formation and the autonomy of parties from the ruling regime).   This result is, however, juxtaposed with the following: firstly, there is an average score of 0.19 for the party institutionalization index. This index assesses the following aspects of the incumbent political party systеm: (1) party organization, (2) linkages with civil society, (3) the presence of distinct party platforms, and (4) party cohesion within an elected legislature. The average score indicates that while Filipino politics enjoys a vibrant electoral systеm, it is primarily based on the influence of individual leaders rather than on the development of party politics.   Secondly, the Philippines also exhibits a low score about the participatory democracy index, with an average of 0.35. This suggests that political participation is largely confined to the electoral process. The recent study by Borja, Torneo, and Hecita (2024) provides further insight into this phenomenon, illustrating how for many Filipinos, political participation is largely confined to the ballot. Following to the casting of their votes, most individuals return to silence as spectators to a politics that they deem as beyond their capacity to control or comprehend.   Lastly, in relation to the value ascribed to the person of the president (whether they are imbuing the leader with extraordinary characteristics and abilities), the Philippines exhibits a relatively low score of 1.99 on a scale of 1 to 4 (low to high). However, there was a notable increase from 2016 to 2021, with the current value exceeding 2.0 at 2.32. The 2016 spike reflects the impact of Rodrigo Duterte’s populism on pre-existing leader-centric tendencies among Filipinos (Borja 2023). The mythos constructed around him as a strongman exacerbated the emphasis on the individual leaders tied with fanaticism among supporters of representative politics in the Philippines.   Furthermore, the spike did not revert to pre-Duterte levels due to two possible factors. The Duterte family continues to exert influence in the political sphere, with Rodrigo Duterte, his daughter Vice President Sara Duterte and son Davao City Mayor Sebastian Duterte, representing the family’s distinct leadership style. Conversely, the incumbent President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. embodies the long shadow cast by the authoritarian legacy of his father and namesake – the shadow of a unifying and strong-handed form of leadership (Teehankee 2023).   How might these seemingly contradictory tendencies surrounding the issue of vertical accountability be made sense of? To address this, it is important to note that expectations play a crucial role in generating demand for electoral accountability. Nonetheless, expectations are not isolated phenomena; they are shaped by multitude of cognitive factors. Such attitudes can in turn shape the evaluation of the entire political systеm (Svolik 2013). A consequence of repeated exposure to the corrupt and abusive practices of policymakers is that citizen-voters may come to perceive all politicians as corrupt. Consequently, this can lead to a pervasive pessimism over government, which in turn can facilitate the establishment of lower barriers for actual crooks.   From Svolik’s (2013) insights on the matter, we identify two general concerns: the structural and psycho-political factors that shape expectations and the barriers that constitute electoral accountability. When considered collectively, the question arises as to whether citizen-voters can effectively (i.e., they desire it and there are institutional arrangements that accommodate such a demand) impose costs and disincentives on elected officials through the ballot. As we will demonstrate, the challenge to electoral accountability in the Philippines can be construed as a vicious cycle of weak institutions and a lack of demand from ordinary citizen-voters.   In terms of structural-institutional factors, the Philippines is confronted with two significant challenges: a weak party systеm and a pluralistic electoral systеm. These two factors have the potential to undermine the fundamental principles of majority rule, both in terms of quality and quantity.   A weak party systеm, driven by entrenched structures of patronage and clientelism, characterizes Filipino politics (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2012; Rivera 2016). This, in turn, constitutes the essence of what Teehankee and Calimbahin (2020) identify as the defective democracy of Filipino politics, wherein regular elections serve merely to legitimize members of an oligarchy. Moreover, this phenomenon contributes to the anarchy of political parties that are founded upon a proliferation of such organizations, which are driven more by patron-client relations, money politics, and turncoatism (changing party affiliation) rather than party discipline and distinct political programs (Kasuya and Teehankee 2020). Overall, the structures of representative politics in the Philippines breeds a limited systеm of accountability that caters more to sustaining the rule of elites rather than holding policy-makers responsible to their constituents.   Adding to this, the pluralistic “first-past-the-post” electoral systеm of the Philippines places government in a “winner-takes-all” situation. Tied with patronage and turncoatism as the norms of the ruling elite, this pluralist systеm combines a weak popular mandate with super-majorities in the legislative branch. This may result in a diminution of the voice of criticism and opposition within the halls of government. Consequently, it also results in a diminished accountability of policymakers to citizen-voters following elections. This is particularly the case for those who become members of supermajorities driven by patronage. Overall, while there is a lack of incentives to maintain a robust chain of accountability between electors and the elected, there are greater incentives for elected officials to align themselves with a patron.   Regarding the psycho-political tendencies that underpin the pursuit of electoral accountability, it is evident that several Filipinos exhibit illiberal attitudes towards their leaders and incumbent institutions (Borja 2023). Many are willing to confer absolute power upon those they deem to be “morally upright,” despite supporting the sustenance of incumbent institutions for political representation. Moreover, many Filipinos perceive political legitimacy as contingent upon open and competitive elections, rather than upon virtue and capability sans electoral competition. Simply put, the appeal of strongman politics is juxtaposed with a warped understanding of representation and electoral legitimacy.   Focusing on the latter point, data from Waves 3 and 4 of the Asia Barometer Survey (ABS) indicate that a significant proportion of the population perceives government leaders as autonomous trustees, entrusted with the responsibility of identifying and pursuing the interests of their constituents, rather than as delegates bound by the obligation to execute the demands of their constituents. Furthermore, the government is regarded as a parent figure, who can decide what is “good” for the public rather than as an employee. Fleshing out the latter, Wave 5 of the ABS pins down the matter of accountability. It asks respondents whether it is more important for citizens to hold the government accountable, even if that results in slower decision-making, or vice versa, in favor of greater decisiveness at the expense of accountability. Most respondents from the Philippines (53.1%) indicated a preference for decisiveness over accountability. From these observations, the psycho-political foundations of electoral politics in the Philippines are almost Caesarism in orientation, with a focus on leaders that is at the expense of incumbent liberal institutions.   Overall, the structure of Filipino politics and the political values held by citizen-voters have rendered the systеm incapable of generating a demand for electoral accountability. From the perspective of cycles and habits, it can be argued that this condition is self-perpetuating, creating a vicious cycle that renders political accountability a non-issue for many Filipinos, including both citizen-voters and policymakers. How can such a cycle be broken? This essay concludes with some general directions for reform.   4. General Directions for Reform   It is evident that changes do not occur instantaneously. However, this dictum conceals the reality that the relationship between structures and individual agency is shaped by the role of habits. In other words, the question of electoral accountability in the Philippines becomes a matter of disrupting the habits of policymakers and citizen-voters that devalue accountability itself. A great deal has been written about the possibility of reforming the political systеm in the Philippines, particularly in relation to the political party systеm. Proposals have been put forth to strengthen party discipline by imposing penalties for defections and encouraging parties to adapt a more programmatic approach to elections.   Moreover, mass-based parties continue to represent the gold standard for reformist efforts. Such a systеm can only function effectively if political parties can serve as a genuinely democratic conduit between ordinary citizens and the policy-making process. This democratic function must be twofold. Firstly, political parties must facilitate political participation outside of the electoral process. Such involvement need not be contingent upon formal party membership. Nonetheless, it is imperative that political parties are able to facilitate effective non-electoral modes of participation. Secondly, mass-based parties must ensure that representation is contingent upon accountability, rather than being based on idolatry or acquiescence. It is possible for a political party to be mass-based without being accountable. This can result in the formation of a mass movement that is dependent on the charismatic leadership of a single figure. This represents a potential future for party politics in the Philippines, given the sustained leader-centric tendencies among its citizens.   Consequently, addressing the issues of personality-centric and leader-centric politics, as well as the prevalence of patronage and clientelism in the Philippines, necessitates the development of a political party systеm that encompasses both leaders and citizens under the umbrella of a policy-oriented approach to electoral politics.   We endorse these calls and underscore the necessity of integrating accountability as a fundamental element of civic-political education in the Philippines. Considering Svolik’s (2013) insights on expectations, it is imperative that civic-political education in the Philippines be geared towards lifting the expectations of citizen-voters regarding the ideal of electoral accountability. Nonetheless, such an approach necessitates the provision of exemplars; citizen-voters must observe and experience the possibility of holding elected officials to account in the periods preceding, during, and following elections. Thus, we return to the question of incumbent institutions, especially those concerned with justice. This gives rise to the question of rupture. If we consider the electoral accountability deficit as a form of cycle, at which points is this process more vulnerable and susceptible to reform? We leave this question for future inquiries. ■   References   Arugay, Aries. 2005. “The accountability deficit in the Philippines: Implications and prospects for democratic consolidation.” Philippine Political Science Journal 26, 1: 63-88.   Ashworth, Scott. 2012. “Electoral accountability: Recent theoretical and empirical work.” Annual Review of Political Science 15: 183-201.   Borja, Anthony Lawrence. 2015. “Re-conceptualising political alienation: On spectators, spectacles and public protests. Theoria 62, 144: 40-59.   ______. 2017. “‘Tis but a Habit in an Unconsolidated Democracy: Habitual Voting, Political Alienation and Spectatorship.” Theoria 64, 150: 19-40.   ______. 2023. “Political Illiberalism in the Philippines: Analyzing Illiberal Political Values.” Asia-Pacific Social Science Review 23, 1: 63-78.   Borja, Anthony Lawrence, Ador Torneo, and Ian Jayson Hecita. 2024. “Challenges to Democratization from the Perspective of Political Inaction: Insights into Political Disempowerment and Citizenship in the Philippines.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034241239060 (Accessed August 12, 2024)   Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, et al. 2023. “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v13” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds23 (Accessed August 12, 2024)   Dovi, Suzanne. 2012. The Good Representative. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Publications.   Hellwig, Timothy, and David Samuels. 2008. “Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes.” British Journal of Political Science 38, 1: 65-90.   Hutchcroft, Paul, and Joel Rocamora. 2012. “Patronage-based parties and the democratic deficit in the Philippines: origins, evolution, and the imperatives of reform.” In R. Robison (Ed.) Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics (pp. 97-119). New York: Routledge.   Kasuya, Yuko, and Julio Teehankee. 2020. “Duterte Presidency and the 2019 midterm election: An anarchy of parties?” Philippine Political Science Journal 41, 1–2: 106–126.   Rivera, Temario. 2016. “Philippine democratization: Summing-up key conceptual, institutional, and developmental issues.” In F. Miranda & T. Rivera (Eds.), Chasing the wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy (pp. 246–262). Quezon City: Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines (CHRP) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).   Schmitter, Philippe. 2015. “Crisis and transition, but not decline.” Journal of Democracy 26, 1: 32-44.   Schneider, Carsten, and Philippe Schmitter. 2004. “Liberalization, transition and consolidation: Measuring the components of democratization.” Democratization 11, 5: 59–90.   Stoker, Gerry, and Mark Evans. 2014. “The “democracy-politics paradox”: The dynamics of political alienation.” Democratic Theory 1, 2: 26-36.   Stoker, Gerry. 2006. “Explaining political disenchantment: Finding pathways to democratic renewal.” The Political Quarterly 77, 2: 184–194.   Svolik, Milan. 2013. “Learning to love democracy: Electoral accountability and the success of democracy.” American Journal of Political Science 57, 3: 685-702.   Teehankee, Julio, and Cleo Anne Calimbahin. 2020. “Mapping the Philippines’ Defective Democracy.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 47, 2: 97–125.   Teehankee, Julio. 2023. Beyond nostalgia: the Marcos political comeback in the Philippines. Southeast Asia Working Paper Series (7). London School of Economics and Political Science: London.     ■ Francisco A. Magno is a Professor at De La Salle University.   ■ Anthony Lawrence Borja is an Associate Professor at De La Salle University.   ■ Jeuny Mari D. Custodio is M.A. Student of Political Science at De La Salle University.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

1. Introduction   Conceptually, citizens in all regime types can exercise government accountability (Lindberg 2013). The possibility of acquiring government accountability is more likely to happen in democratic countries, especially vertical accountability. The reason is luminous since elections have been the core of democratic governments where the citizens transfer their power to the elected officials to govern. This act of delegating authority empowers the government to perform its authority legally. On the other hand, it generates the responsibility of the government to be responsible and accountable for its doings. Therefore, vertical accountability is reflected by the ability of the citizens to hold their government accountable through elections.   As with many democratic countries, Indonesia has conducted elections to elect executives and legislative members at the national level since 1995. However, only legislative elections had the direct election systеm, while the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) appointees elected the president and vice president. The systеm was improved by the successful reformation conducted by activists, scholars, and students in 1998, followed by establishing the direct election systеm for executive and legislative members. In the post-reformation, the government has consistently held regular elections at both local and national levels once every five years. Indonesia has conducted approximately six national elections since 1998, in 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019, and 2024.   Ideally, the more experienced Indonesia is in holding regular elections, the more powerful its citizens are to acquire government accountability. However, after a significant lapse in the post-1999 era, the score of vertical accountability in Indonesia has failed to improve. Based on V-Dem data on the vertical accountability index in Indonesia, on a scale of 0-1, Indonesia achieves a score of 0.85, which means the citizens have the power to hold the government accountable through elections or other channels of political participation. However, it has slightly decreased since 2018, showing no improvement in pulsing vertical accountability to the maximum level, as depicted by the figure below.   Figure 1. Index of Vertical Accountability in Indonesia     This decreasing trend of vertical accountability is in line and parallel with the decline of democratic regimes happening worldwide, specifically in newly democratic countries. Therefore, to prevent democratic decline in Indonesia, vertical accountability must be improved. Theoretical overview refers to O’Donnel (1998), who suggests that a democratic country that lacks vertical accountability has regular elections, social mobilization, and media oversight; however, these are only periodic, irregular, and possibly unreliable. In this regard, scholars are often entitled to the situation by the authoritarian executives that exist when vertical accountability is manifested. Another scholar, Anderson (2008), used the case of Nicaragua and focused on illegal executive behavior by former president Alemán. In her findings, elections and popular mobilization have strengthened the legislature’s independence. However, vertical accountability mechanisms have proven more effective than expected in restraining executive authoritarianism and fostering institutions of horizontal accountability. The case of Nicaragua shows that citizens can use the power balance and separate the institutional mandate of presidential democracy to limit authoritarianism.   Therefore, the cure for increasing vertical accountability rests in the effectiveness of elections as the channel for citizens to use to empower elected officials and, at the same time, to demand accountability and control the elected executives and legislatives from their abuse of power or any possibility of wrongdoings. In this regard, the effectiveness of an election relies on the quality of the election itself. When the election has good quality, it will yield accountable and responsible elected officials. However, in the case of a rigged election, the goal of creating a democratic government will fade away. To ensure the election has quality and integrity, especially the quality of political parties, the quality of media freedom, the quality of civil society organizations (CSOs), and the freedom of expression, as well as people participation, many aspects should be exercised. These factors make up the bulk of this paper, which aims to examine the practice of vertical accountability in Indonesia.   Vertical accountability is an essential component of democratic governance, playing a vital role in ensuring that elected representatives remain responsive to the wishes and needs of their constituents in Indonesia and other democratic nations. Based on this background, this study will cover the main analytic focal points, including the quality of elections and political parties for the former and the quality of media freedom, CSOs, freedom of expression, and the engagement of citizens in the elections and politics. This study coverage aims to identify the gaps between the institutional mechanisms of vertical accountability and the actual performance over time in the case of Indonesian democracy, specifically to analyze the quality of elections, political parties, media freedom, CSOs, and the freedom of expression and citizen engagement in politics.   2. Legal Framework of Vertical Accountability Mechanism in Indonesia   Vertical accountability in the context of the Indonesian Parliament refers to the relationship between the legislative branch and the citizens or voters. It’s a mechanism that allows the people to hold their elected representatives accountable, including the president, vice president, and executives at the local level (governor, regent, or mayor). To those elected, citizens, as the ‘vertical’ element, have the means to express their expectations, concerns, and evaluations. This process typically involves regular elections, public consultations, and engagement between parliamentarians and their constituents. All of these vertical accountability mechanisms were written legally in the Indonesian constitution (UUD 1945) and also in the various laws, including the electoral laws (Undang-Undang Pemilu 7/2017), the policymaking laws (Undang-Undang Pembuatan Undang-Undang), and the laws on parliamentary members roles (Undang-Undang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah/ UU MD3).   Regarding the electoral laws (Undang-Undang 7/2017), national elections are conducted once every five years (periodic election) to choose the president and vice president. The people of Indonesia directly elect the president and vice president via these legislative elections. Every five years, Indonesians also vote for members of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat: MPR), which consists of the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah: DPD) and the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat: DPR). The DPR is the lower house and is made up of elected members, while the DPD represents the regions of Indonesia.   a. President and vice president elections: These national elections are held every five years. The people of Indonesia directly elect the president and vice president.   b. Legislative Election: Every five years, Indonesians also vote for members of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which consists of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) and the People’s Representative Council (DPR). The DPR is the lower house and is made up of elected members, while the DPD represents the regions of Indonesia.   c. Local elections: Indonesia conducts elections at the regional level, which includes the election of governors, mayors, and regents.   d. Village-level elections: At the grassroots level, Indonesians participate in village and sub-district elections to select village chiefs and community leaders. These elections are held every six years.   Aside from electoral laws, the Press Law regulated media freedom. The 1999 Press Law ended the Suharto era censorship and control of information. It further led to the creation of the Dewan Pers, a press council that is independent of the government and which, over the years, has established itself as an institution capable of settling most media-related disputes out of court. Journalists must nevertheless contend with a blasphemy law that makes it hard to criticize religions and with the Law on Information and Electronic Transaction (Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik: the ITE law), under which journalists can be jailed for up to six years for online defamation (article 27) or online hate speech (article 28). These offences, however, are not clearly defined. The adoption of a new Penal Code in December 2022 poses new threats to the free exercise of journalism, with several provisions relating to blasphemy and articles meant to fight against fake news” that, as they stand, seriously jeopardize investigative journalism. Meanwhile, the law of policymaking, Law 13/2022, regulates public participation and civic engagement.   3. The Quality of Regular Elections in Indonesia   However, deep analyses must expose whether the quality of vertical accountability in Indonesian democracy is at stake because of a recent decision at the Constitutional Court that provided a pathway for the son of the current president to become the candidate for the vice president in the 2024 election.   The experience of holding elections regularly every five years in Indonesia has successfully built up a global perspective that Indonesia has become more and more democratic; however, the fact is that the election process is, to some extent, interfered with by the political elites and the president as the incumbent, so the election result often mobilizes the executives. Consequently, the results are far from the ideal of public interest. The government formed after the election thus serves the interest of the political party elites or the presidential coalitions. In this sense, it is hard to ensure that the electoral mechanism can hold the government accountable since the formation of the elected officials is more determined by the political party elites and the president as the incumbent. This condition nowadays can be seen in the political dynamics toward the recent election in 2024. Recently, the president, as an executive, used his power to politicize the constitutional court to change the age limit required for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. This intention arises from the coalition that supports the president in making the president’s son eligible to run as a candidate for vice president in the recent election. The integrity of the election would be questioned publicly when the president’s son follows the election race, thereby impacting the valuation of democratic procedures in Indonesia.   Even though the electoral result depends on the people, as Indonesia adopted the majority systеm in the electoral design, the citizens will not easily be free to express their participation both through voting in the election as participating in formal channels and expressing their opinion through the demonstration or creating petitions in the informal tools. The recent news said Constitutional Court Justice Saldi Isra was accused of ethical violation because he depicted his dissenting legal opinion when deciding the age limit for the president and vice-presidential candidates. This condition shows how the government no longer favors different expressions. Related to this condition, the vertical accountability performance in Indonesia is now at a critical point. Therefore, a deep analysis is needed to prevent authoritarian executives from emerging in Indonesia’s democracy.   Vertical accountability in Indonesia is realized through periodic elections and exercised via public hearings, town hall meetings, and direct communication channels between parliamentarians and their constituencies. Citizens possess the right to voice their concerns, demand transparency, and expect their representatives to act in their best interests. This accountability structure ensures that the Indonesian Parliament remains responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people, helping to maintain the integrity of the democratic process. It also serves as a crucial mechanism for citizens to participate in shaping the nation’s policies and legislation by holding their elected officials accountable for their actions, votes, and overall performance.   Indonesia can practice vertical accountability through the following channels:   1. Legislative sessions through which Parliament conducts open legislative sessions where members discuss proposed bills and policies. These sessions are accessible to the public and are often televised or live-streamed.   2. Public hearings serve as a platform for citizens and interest groups to express their views on specific legislative matters. These hearings allow direct interaction between members of Parliament and the public.   3. Each member of Parliament typically has an office that offers constituent services. Constituents can visit these offices to seek assistance, express concerns, or request support on various issues.   4. Members of Parliament may organize public consultations in their respective constituencies. These meetings allow constituents to discuss concerns and provide input on legislative matters.   5. Parliament maintains an official website that provides information on legislative activities, members of Parliament, proposed bills, and contact details. Constituents can access important information and resources through the website.   6. Many members of Parliament use social media platforms to engage with constituents. They share updates, host Q&A sessions, and interact with the public through platforms that include X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, and Instagram.   7. Town hall meetings are organized in various regions, allowing constituents to meet with members of Parliament face-to-face, ask questions, and share their opinions on legislative issues.   8. Constituents can send letters, emails, or other forms of correspondence to their representatives to express concerns, seek assistance, or provide feedback on legislative matters.   9. Parliamentarians engage in community outreach programs, attending local events and meetings to remain accessible and in touch with the concerns of their constituents. Members of Parliament may visit their constituencies to directly engage with constituents and learn about local issues and needs.   10. Members of Parliament often appear in the media, including television and radio programs, to discuss legislative matters and interact with the public.   11. Parliament provides regular reports and updates on its activities, such as passing bills, committee work, and budget discussions. These reports may be distributed to the public or made available online.   4. The Quality of Political Parties   Vertical accountability is essential for maintaining a healthy and vibrant democracy in Indonesia. It ensures that political parties remain connected to the electorate, responsive to their needs, and transparent in their operations. It also encourages parties to uphold their commitments, fostering trust and legitimacy among the citizenry. Vertical accountability serves as a cornerstone of democratic governance, enabling citizens in Indonesia to influence the actions and policies of political parties and, ultimately, to shape the country’s political landscape. Unfortunately, these attempts are hardly achieved since the political parties have several problems that undermine their ability to serve the people’s aspirations in influencing public policies.   Institutional aspects, including personalization issues, oligarchy, transparency, and internal democracy, comprise the problems of political parties. Also, many studies reveal that political parties in the reform era have not been able to become public institutions that demonstrate their responsibility towards their voters. Compared to the regimes before reformation, in the New Order era, political parties became the ruling political machines more directed at the interests of perpetuating the status quo. Meanwhile, when entering reform, political parties faced huge demands from society, while political parties were not yet ready with good institutions. Several factors mean that the party’s institutional level has not developed well. The existing parties are generally relatively new, so the party infrastructure has not been well developed. Apart from that, parties often experience conflicts that drain energy and time so that there is no time to build political party institutions. Political party elites have yet to make a political party article of association and by laws for managing political parties.   Considering these problems, political parties are unable to play their functions optimally. Political parties lack the ability to mobilize and represent citizens’ interests or connect citizens with the government. Thus, the conditions of political parties reduce public trust in political parties, political party elites, and their representative members. The basic level of party identification (party ID) proves this condition. Based on the results of a national survey conducted by Indikator Politik in 2021, the political party ID is approximately 7 percent. The data reflected that only 6.8 percent of 1,200 respondents across all provinces in Indonesia stated that there was a political party that they, the respondents, felt close to. The data from the remaining 92.3 percent reflected that none were attached to any political party.   5. The Quality of Media Freedom   Media freedom is defined by the ability of journalists to report freely on matters of public interest and is a crucial indicator of democracy. In this regard, a free press is critical in establishing vertical accountability since it has the ability to inform citizens of their leaders’ successes or failures, convey the people’s needs and desires to government bodies, and provide a platform for the open exchange of information and ideas. When media freedom is restricted, these vital functions break down, leading to poor decision-making and harmful outcomes for leaders and citizens alike. As a result, the citizens will lack information to engage with the government agenda.   Unfortunately, the freedom of the media in Indonesia is not in good condition. Based on a survey result of Reporter without Borders (RSF), Indonesia has been ranked 108 out of 180 countries. This data seems in line with the data from the Indonesian Press Council’s Press Freedom Index (Indeks Kemerdekaan Pers: IKP) released in 2022, which stated that Indonesia scored 77.88 on the index, 1.86 points higher than the previous year. According to the Press Council, in the last five years (2018-2022), the IKP has increased, indicating that the national press is in a state of sufficient freedom to broadcast information and news. Several provinces with the highest IKP include East Kalimantan (83.78), Jambi (83.68), and Central Kalimantan (83.23). The provinces with the lowest IKP were West Papua (69.23), North Maluku (69.84), and East Java (72.88), which suggests that journalists in Indonesia have challenging situations where they were likely to have faced intimidation, arrest, and physical violence while investigating a corruption case or a case related to the political elites holding positions in the government.   The condition is made worse by the existence of the Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana: KUHP) and Law on Information and Electronic Transactions (Informasi dan Transaksi Elektronik: ITE), which contains several articles that threaten the freedom of the press and threaten journalists and press companies as perpetrators of criminal acts when carrying out journalistic duties. In addition, there was a blocking of eight platforms at the end of July 2022, which impacted the work of journalists. Meanwhile, attacks on journalists and the media continued to occur. AJI Indonesia recorded 61 cases in 2022, targeting 97 journalists and 14 media organizations. This figure has increased from the previous 43 cases in 2021. From January to April 2023, there were already 33 cases of attacks on journalists. This figure increased from the same period in 2022, which was 15 cases. Attacks against journalists include threats of being banned from reporting, harassment and prosecution, deletion of coverage, physical abuse, sexual/gender-based violence, digital attacks, and terror and intimidation.   6. The Quality of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)   Mass organizations are close to the community due to their participation in providing basic services, especially to those untouched by the government. In addition, mass organizations are usually formed based on similar characteristics, such as religion or ethnicity, so that ties with their members become stronger. Public perception of mass organizations tends to be based on the activities, behaviour, or even the direction of the mass organization’s political views. Mass organizations can also be people’s choice to enter politics without involvement in practical politics. Interesting characteristics of mass organizations in Indonesia are political cadre formation and community empowerment. In many countries, cadre formation and community empowerment are the main things that differentiate between political parties and mass organizations or interest organizations in general. In Indonesia, large mass organizations have the capacity to carry out cadre formation, as seen from their representation in public positions. This capability is significant, especially in specific areas dominated by mass organizations.   Existing laws and regulations (Local Government Law, Mass Organizations Law, and Community Participation in Political Party) are sufficient to accommodate the continuity of mass organizations, including participation in the political process. However, what needs attention is its implementation. At the regional level, the strong will from regional governments to involve mass organizations in formulating regional policies, especially the strategic policies that give impact to society. Regional governments need to provide easy access to information so that mass organizations are willing and able to be involved in formulating these policies. In addition, members of mass organizations can be provided with political education to improve the quality of political participation of mass organizations and to promote synergy with political parties and political party wing organizations.   Unfortunately, the fact that the number of mass organizations is not positively proportional to the population of Indonesia accompanies the conditions for improving the quality of political participation of mass organizations. As of October 2023, data from the Ministry of Home Affairs shows that the number of mass organizations that are legal entities has only reached 561,020, meaning that the number of mass organizations, which ideally play a very important role in political education, supervision, and implementation of the upcoming elections, is not enough to significantly guard the Indonesian people, which has a population of more than 200 million.   7. The Quality of Freedom of Expression   The quality of freedom of expression is experiencing significant challenges because data on the decline in democracy scores in Indonesia, captured by Freedom House in 2023, results from the decrease in scores for freedom of expression in Indonesia. There are at least three indications of narrowing space for civil liberties in Indonesia, including the weakening of the press through media conglomeration and repression of journalists, the taking away of digital freedom, which is part of human rights, and the erosion of academic freedom on campus.   The space for civil liberties is getting narrower, mainly because there are still many violations of freedom of opinion and assembly. For example, there are a series of prohibitions on gatherings or demonstrations, blocking information, forced disbandment, organizational restrictions, and acts of intimidation. Referring to data collected by YLBHI (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia: Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation) through CSOs spread across 16 provinces, the highest data on civil rights violations is the freedom to express opinions in public and gather with 6,128 victims throughout 2019. The details of the victims are 43 percent students, 9 percent activists, and 1 percent journalists. Meanwhile, the perpetrators of the most violations were the police, namely 69 percent.   At least more than 30 of them were children, and approximately 51 people were declared dead. Asfinawati said this data was higher than last year and emphasized that violations of civil liberties during the Jokowi admіnistration were getting worse. Because YLBHI currently only collects case data from 16 provinces, the data could also be larger. The criminalization rate is also high, and this generally occurs when people express their voices to defend their rights. For example, when the state confiscates land in the name of development, this results in criminalization. Then, during the anti-mining movement in 2019, labor actions and reform actions were carried out.   There were 47 criminalization cases against civilians, with 1,019 victims throughout 2019. Among the criminalization that often occur are arbitrary arrests by law enforcement officers. The authorities also carried out a hunt against people who took part in the action and were about to go home. The hunt for someone accused to be criminal was searched everywhere to their home, their office, everywhere. Even if they are voluntarily reported they would be treated harshly. Those activists who were caught by police were usually arrested and beaten arbitrarily. In fact, according to YLBHI, almost all of the people arrested were also beaten, which is considered inhumane. YLBHI suggest that there is no need to use violence if the victim does not resist at all and surrenders.   8. The Quality of Citizen Engagement in Politics   Civic engagement is often referred to as civic participation, and it concerns all actions related to citizens, whether carried out individually or in groups, to support the policies made by the government and through various activities in the community. Civic engagement requires the government’s willingness to open the space for public participation, especially in public policymaking. Indonesia has several channels for civic engagement, such as public hearings when making policies at the national level.   Normatively, community participation in forming statutory regulations occurs through providing input as regulated by the P3 Law. Meanwhile, Law 13/2022 was expanded to include all the stages of forming statutory regulations, including planning, drafting, discussing, ratifying or enacting, and promulgating. The most critical stages for receiving community input are the planning, discussion, and preparation stages. Such rights are given to the community as regulated by Article 96 paragraph (1) of Law Number 13 of 2022 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Legislative Regulations (Undang-Undang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan/UU P3). The regulations on public participation in UU P3 are quite adequate because it is impossible for legislators to determine more technical matters in law. Therefore, Article 96 paragraph (9) of UU P3 mandates each institution to propose a draft law to regulate more technical matters regarding public participation in DPR regulations, DPD regulations, and presidential regulations.   Unfortunately, in its implementation, public participation in policymaking is often considered ineffective in influencing the government policymaking process. This happens because political lobbying in parliament usually occurs in closed rooms, not in open discussions in the parliament room. The creation of the Omnibus Law is one case that ultimately gave rise to a massive public reaction.   9. Conclusion   It is challenging to establish vertical accountability in the Indonesian government since all aspects previously listed have conditions hindering the ability of citizens to play their role in checking the government’s accountability. Although the reform movement has been in place since 1999, the improvement in the democratic institution has failed to sustain vertical accountability. The dynamics of recent election also shows that the public demanding that the government, especially the incumbent president is not to interfere to the process of election especially in enforcing his underaged son to run for election. In the end, the government intervention in the 2024 election remains in place.   This condition violates the essence of the election itself, as the public has to share their voices through the voting mechanism, but because of this intervention, their voices become meaningless. On the other side, the political parties seem to have distanced themselves from the citizens and failed to perform their roles to bring the agenda of the public, therefore successfully cutting out the channel provided for the citizens to ensure the political party representatives execute their demands for accountability in parliament. The dysfunction of political parties is followed by the ineffectiveness of parliament’s open forum to engage citizens in policymaking. This condition was worsened by the condition of media freedom, where the independence of journalists to inform and investigate decreased to a certain level.   Based on the quality of elections, political parties, public engagement, and media freedom, these four aspects are essential to achieve vertical accountability. The government must take serious steps to improve these four conditions. ■   References   Acheampong, J. O., M. K. Dzordzomenyoh, J. N. Bawole, A. Ahenkan, and E. K. Sakyi. 2023. “Vertical accountability among ministries of state in an emerging economy: A case study of Ghana.” Cogent Business & Management 10, 2.   Anderson, L. E. 2006. “The authoritarian executive? Horizontal and vertical accountability in Nicaragua.” Latin American Politics and Society 48, 2: 141-169.   Boas, T. C., F. D. Hidalgo, and M. A. 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Perlman. 2020. “Horizontal, vertical, and hybrid: An empirical look at the forms of accountability.” Admіnistration & Society 52, 9: 1410-1438.   Relly, J. E. 2012. “Examining a model of vertical accountability: A cross-national study of the influence of information access on the control of corruption.” Government Information Quarterly 29, 3: 335-345.   Schillemans, T. 2010. “Redundant accountability: The joint impact of horizontal and vertical accountability on autonomous agencies.” Public Admіnistration Quarterly 34, 3: 300-337.     ■ Devi Darmawan is a Researcher at the Research Center for Politics at the Indonesian Research and Innovation Agency.   ■ Sri Nuryanti is a Director of Regional Research and Innovation Policy at the Indonesian Research and Innovation Agency.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]