The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn) invited you to the conference titled “The Military Coup and Future of Democracy in Myanmar.” The military seized control of Myanmar on February 1, 2021 following the November 2020 general election which resulted in huge victory for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party. The military claimed that the election was a “fraud” and executed the coup, while the citizens of Myanmar have continuously organized resistance against the military. In this context, with the experience and knowledge gained through operating the ‘Strengthening the Civil Society Organizations in Myanmar’ project for seven years, EAI invited Myanmar and East Asian Studies specialists based in South Korea and discussed the future of democracy in Myanmar.     [Video Timeline Information] 00:00:30 Opening Remarks 00:07:07 Session I Presentation on the Post-General Election Survey in Myanmar 01:11:15 Session II Challenges of Myanmar's Democratic Transition and Possible Ways for International Community to Preserve Democracy  

The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn), as a secretariat of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN), held the seventh online seminar of the [Democracy Cooperation] series, titled "Reassessing 2020: How Asia Coped with the COVID-19 Pandemic". During this seminar, ADRN members from Nepal, the Philippines, and Thailand discussed challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic on the countries and their response in both public and private sectors. The panelists further shared policy recommendations in examination of changes in domestic and foreign policy of major countries in Asia.   Date & Time: January 25, 2021 12:00 -13:30  (KST) Speakers:  Thawilwadee Bureekul (Director of Research and Development Office, King Prajadhipok’s Institute), Francisco A. Magno (Research Fellow, Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance), Pradip Pariyar (Executive Chairperson, Samata Foundation) Moderator: Jung Kim (Assistant Professor, University of North Korean Studies)      I. Overview   It has been over a year since the unprecedented pandemic crisis devastated the world, resulting in hundred million confirmed cases and 2.16 million deaths worldwide as of January 2021. COVID-19 has inflicted grave damages on Asian countries, endangering the socioeconomy and livelihoods of already vulnerable communities. This pandemic incurred especially significant impacts on the rising democratic countries in Asia, placing them into a trillema of limiting the spread of the virus, reviving the economy, and maintaining democracy. This online seminar provides an overview of the COVID-19 situation in Thailand, the Philippines, and Nepal to analyze their responses at the public and private levels, and to propose policy recommendations for 2021. It serves as a preview to the upcoming publication by the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN), “Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance,” encompassing research from 12 countries in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.   II. Challenges Posed by COVID-19 and Asia’s Response   Thailand: Government-led Response against COVID-19           Central emergency communications: Thailand faced communication challenges in delivering the government’s annoucnements in the initial stages of the pandemic. However, in March 2020, the COVID-19 Situation Management Center was established to serve as a central bureau that collects and reports information to the public on a daily basis. Under the leadership of the Prime Minister, all relevant agencies integrated their roles and operations in responding to the spread of coronavirus, contributing to an effective risk communications strategy. Economic support plans: The government provided financial support to unemployed people and vulnerable groups that have been severely impacted by COVID-19 and implemented lockdown measures. The state was especially tentative to the needs of small and medium sized enterprises in need of financial aid. 5000 baht allowance was provided for three months from April to June 2020, in an effort to prolong the economic cycle and empower them to handle with the crisis with liquidity.   The Philippines: COVID-19 Fuels the Rise of Corruption         Corruption scandal jeopardizes public health and finance: The corruption risks in the health sector surfaced at the height of the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 when whistleblowers provided allegations of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth)’s misuse of funds. Although the scandal was provoked by resigned workers, rampant financial violations had been previously observed in reports by the Commission on Audit. The PhilHealth scandal revealed the weak exercise of institutional control mechanisms in the state-run agency, and highlighted the importance of legislative and audit oversight agencies that function as accountability institutions within the system of checks-and-balances. Economy crippled by coronavirus: The Philippine economy suffered heavily with the onslaught of the COVID-19 virus, where its gross domestic product (GDP) dropped by 16.5% during the second quarter of 2020, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority. The country descended into economic recession given the two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth in 2020, after the 0.7% GDP decline during the first quarter of 2020.   Nepal: Pandemic Limits Civic Space and Drives Corruption     Civic space shrunk by legal measures: The government is implementing a series of amendment bills that would adversely affect the life of the vulnerable in Nepal who have already been hit hard by the pandemic. These bills include the National Human Rights Commissions Act, Media Council Bill, Bill on Mass Communication, and Bill on Information and Technology. At the same time, the Home Ministry recently instructed that the government distribute relief materials to victims of disasters only through the government, largely restricting roles of the civil society. Corruption exacerbated by the pandemic: In Nepal, which already ranks as the 113th least corrupt nation out of 180 countries, the level of perceived corruption rose significantly over the last year, according to a report by Transparency International. The case of medical procurement exemplifies such corruption and disbelief of citizens on the government. As the army was delegated the responsibility to purchase medical supplies, it was revealed that they exorbitantly added on prices for the items procured from China, exposing their collusion with Chinese suppliers.   III. Policy Recommendations   Thailand: Responses in Line with Democratic Principles           Government rules based on democratic governance: The government should apply democratic governance in preventing the widespread outbreak of coronavirus, while maintaining its accountability on crisis management. Laws and regulations should be enforced to protect citizens from the damages of the pandemic by reducing socioeconomic impacts via government measures. The government must also be held accountable in managing future crises as the COVID-19 pandemic, while at the same time guaranteeing transparency in its operations and abiding by democratic principles. Economic measures for the vulnerable: Sufficient social support should be provided to vulnerable people, students, informal laborers, migrant workers, etc. in the time of pandemic to minimize the social impact coupled with economic recession.   The Philippines: Minimizing Information Asymmetry and Reviving Democratic Institutions     Information openness to prevent corruption: Minimizing information asymmetry can reduce corruption vulnerability, as evidenced by the recent case of PhilHealth where the poor information technology system paved the way for fraudulent claims. As it was allegedly said that some regional officials managed to avoid being assigned to other jurisdictions thanks to their strong political supports, corruption of public personnel is encouraged by a political culture driven by patronage. Likewise, the regular rotation of key officers and staff will lessen the risks of unhealthy relationships and corruption. Revival of democratic institutions: Reviving democratic institutions is a key to fighting corruption on a long-term basis. Democratic institutions serve to level the playing field both in political and economic aspects, enabling effective application of rules and incentives that govern our system. In an effort to counter the prevalence of corruption, it is important to strengthen public oversight agencies, especially the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Office of the Ombudsman, with enhanced financial and human resources. The outbreak of corruption scandals that accompanied the COVID-19 health crisis is an illustration of how democratic recession has negatively affected the state of public accountability, where the revival of democratic institutions will be crucial in fighting corruption as well as the pandemic.   Nepal: Good Governance as Key to Battling the Pandemic       Coherent national guidelines: A broad central policy guideline on pandemic control should be developed at a national, provincial and local level, taking Nepal’s contextual realities into consideration. Such relief standards set by the government need to correlate in the longer term, avoiding confusion and dispute over emergency management practices especially in the time of pandemic. The guideline should also involve and coordinate the roles of civil society organizations that can help the government deliver emergency supplies and necessary helps widely. Support for the marginalized: Government policies should effectively incorporate the marginalized citizens. Policies and tools for  information sharing, communication and education need to be developed and disseminated exclusively for calamities likes the coronavirus pandemic, earthquakes, floods, etc. The support and relief materials should also commensurate to the extent of marginalization and vulnerability of citizens. In tandem with the extended support for the vulnerable communities, laws should be strictly implemented against the violation of human rights of the marginalized and vulnerable communities, penalizing those who practice discrimination and exclusion during crises and pandemic. ■   IV. Moderator & Panelists ■ Jung Kim is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, South Korea. He teaches courses on International Relations in East Asia and Political Economy of the Two Koreas, among others. Prior to this, from 2009-2015, he was a Lecturer at the Underwood International College and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. During this time, Mr. Kim was also a Chief Researcher at The East Asia Institute. He pursued his Bachelors and Masters in Political Science at Korea University and went on the pursue his Ph.D. at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia. ■ Thawilwadee Bureekul is the Director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute, Thailand. She previously served on the National Reform Steering Committee, the National Reform Council, and the Constitutional Drafting Assembly. Her current academic interests lie in the field of good governance and gender equity, such as participatory and gender responsive budgeting; the preparation of action plans for leadership development and women’s participation in politics and decision-making; and gender-responsive local development planning and budgeting manuals. She has been heavily dedicated to research related to democracy, good governance, social equality, public participation, public policy, and voting behaviors. In 2015, she was the recipient of a prestigious award given to an outstanding woman by the National Council of Women of Thailand. She also succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and was accordingly presented with the “Women of the Year 2018” award by the Association for the Promotion of the Status of Women. ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU), Manila, Philippines. He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as president of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He completed his PhD in political science at the University of Hawaii. ■ Pradip Pariyar is the executive chairperson at SAMATA Foundation, which conducts policy research and advocates for the rights of the Dalits, the most marginalized community in Nepal, in order to end caste-based discrimination. As the elected president of the Association of Youth Organizations Nepal (AYON), he worked closely with government of Nepal to initiate a youth-responsive budget. He was a member of the government task force that developed Youth Vision 2025, a 10-year governmental national youth development policy plan. He has trained thousands of youths in leadership, peacebuilding, and conflict-sensitive journalism across Asia and Africa. He founded the Nepal Youth Forum to focus on policy advocacy, awareness, and youth empowerment. In 2011, Pariyar was selected as a youth fellow by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Pariyar serves as the chairperson of the Nepal Policy Center, a youth-led think tank. In 2015, he received the Youth Leadership Award from the Nepali Government’s Ministry of Youth and Sports for his decade-long contribution to youth leadership development across Nepal. He also received Asia 21 young Leaders Award from The Asia Society, New York. In 2020 He received Young Global Leaders Award from World Economic Forum.   ■ Typeset by:  Hyunjin Yim, Research Associate        Inquiries:  +82-2-2277-1683 (ext. 203) [email protected]   The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn) held the fifth online seminar of the [Democracy Cooperation] series, titled "Rising Threats to Democracy: Spread of Disinformation in Social Media". During this seminar, together with members of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN), EAI discussed the challenges that democracy faces, posed by the spread of misinformation in social media and shared ideas to pursue the right balance between protecting freedom of expression on social media and maintaining democratic values in Asia.   Date & Time: October 26, 2020 12:00-01:30 PM (KST) Speakers: Maiko Ichihara (Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University; Study team co-director, Democracy for the Future project, JCIE), Sook Jong Lee (Professor, Sungkyunkwan University; Senior Fellow, East Asia Institute), Francisco A. Magno (Research Fellow, Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance), Sri Nuryanti (Senior Researcher, Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences), Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay (Director, Society for Participatory Research in Asia), Aasiya Riaz (Joint Director, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency) Moderator: Chin-en Wu (Associate Research Fellow, Academica Sinica)     I. Rise of Social Media as Disinformation and Polarization Tools The popularity of social media in Asia has grown at an exponential rate, in line with new and advanced technological innovations. While such advances aim to provide people with assistance in everyday life, there is an ongoing heated debate on social media’s influence on the political landscape of democracies. Social media allows the public to communicate their political expressions and share ideas that can be translated to offline actions. It can be a liberating technology for those who are oppressed. On the other hand, social media can threaten democracy by further dividing the society through its echo-chamber function or by spreading disinformation and fake news which jeopardize democratic governance and weaken democratic institutions. Meanwhile, it is relatively unclear as to what impact social media poses on governance in Asia mainly due to the lack of in-depth research on this topic. This online seminar aims to provide a preview of the upcoming publication by the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) “Social Media, Disinformation and Democracy in Asia,” which encompasses research from 14 countries in Northeast Asia (Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand), and South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka). The full publication will be uploaded on the ADRN website (www.adrnresearch.org) in November 2020.   II. Country Cases of Disinformation in Social Media                                                       Japan: Japanese Online Trolls Provoke Anti-Korean Sentiments Record China, a Japanese domestic portal site on China-related news, has been distributing news with intentions to improve the image of China, promote positive Japan-China relations, and spread the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda. It also has instigated negative views on South Korea, highlighting a starkly negative view on Japan-Korean relations, which could have contributed to an increase in anti-Korean sentiments in Japan in recent years. Pro-China, Anti-Korea: In 2019, Record China only covered non-political issues on China including sports, celebrities and trade despite the ongoing political tension between Japan and China, creating pro-China sentiments. On the other hand, the majority of Korea-related topics that Record China covered included sensitive diplomatic issues including Korean boycotts of Japanese products, comfort women, trade disputes, and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Effects on democratic values: This potentially undermines the quasi-alliance between Japan and Korea, the two major democracies in the region whose cooperation is essential in maintaining peace, stability, rule of law, and freedom in Asia. Such bias further polarizes the Japanese society along a social cleavage between supporters and opponents of human rights protection for people who have roots in foreign countries. In this end, the Japanese viewers further need to raise awareness of Chinese influence in Asia, and cautions against China’s potential manipulation behind pro-China and anti-Korean sentiments in Japanese news outlets.   South Korea: Already Polarized Korean Politics Worsens Under the Attack of Disinformation While the function of social media as a liberation tool still continues in South Korea, the rise of its negative functions also emerged, threatening democracy. In the context of South Korea, the amplifying effect of political polarization posed by social media is deemed the most serious challenge, as can be observed in the disinformation and political polarization cases. Disinformation: Two opinion rigging scandles in the 2012 presidential election by National Intelligence Service (NIS) and another in 2017 by a blogger who is related to an influential governor are two major examples of political disinformation on social media. During the 2012 presidential election, the NIS chief was involved in the case where NIS staff uploaded negative comments on social media against the liberal candidate, which led to the imprisonment of the NIS chief. In 2017, pro-liberal blogger named “Druking” allegedly used a macro system to sway the public opinion more favorable toward the liberal candidate. Political polarization: The political setting of South Korea in which civil society and political society are sharply divided allows social media to play a perfect role as an echo chamber. The tendency of people communicating with the group sharing similar beliefs reinforces their political views and blocks the chance to get exposed to alternative views. Extreme and often incorrect views tend to prevail in social media and contribute to political polarization. Political leaders try to align with the staunch, opinionated supporters who are active on social media. This hinders the middle ground between the two opposite forces, not allowing enough room for democratic compromise and deliberation. Policy recommendations: Detailed laws and regulations that seek a smart balance between guaranteeing freedom of expression and regulating disinformation, as well as principles and practices that filter facts from disinformation need to be established. At the same time, the users on social media should also be vigilant on and be aware of dangerous functions of social media.   The Philippines: Marcos Family Rose from Dictator to Hero with Social Media on Its Backing Marcos family and social media: In the Philippines, social media evidently became a platform for mobilizing political support especially during elections. In an effort to refurbish the image of the former President Ferdinand Marcos and reverse its losing streak in national elections, his son Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., intensively used social media to highlight the golden age of history under the Marcos regime. Through an enormous propaganda and disinformation drive on a network of webistes, Facebook, Youtube and social media influencers, the Marcos Jr. spread contents that denied the corruption, economic plunder and human rights transgressions of the Marcos time, while exaggerating its achievements. The disinformation campaign succeeded, as Bongbong Marcos was elected Senator in 2010 and his sister Imee Marcos was also elected Senator in 2019. Disinformation and democracy: Social media strategists are now fully centralized and integrated in the overall architecture of the candidates’ political campaigns both at national and local levels. Populist leaders employ elite public relations firms and have engaged social media to spread their anti-establishment discourse. Such efforts include rejection of the legitimacy of prevailing democratic rules, dismissal of mainstream media, and allegations against liberal institutions that protect civil liberties and human rights. The spread of disinformation through social media has further strengthened personality-based politics and weakened rules-based governance in the Philippines.   Indonesia: Black Campaign Sways Voter Preference and Undermines Electoral Process Two major types of disinformation can be examined in Indonesia during the 2019 simultaneous election, in a country where social media exerts strong influence on political events with its people spending more than eight hours per day on social media in average. Disinformation aiming candidates: One case of disinformation was aimed to presidency and vice presidency candidates, to purposedly defeat the contestants and shift the voting preference of the people by falsely accusing the candidates of being involved in social taboos of Indonesia. Black campaign spread where an Indonesian politician allegedly invited people to eat pork (“babi”) after the election, which is a highly sensitive issue in Indonesia where the majority of the population is Muslims. However, the politician in fact mentioned of eating noodles (“bakmi”). Disinformation aiming the General Election Commission: The second case of disinformation targetted the General Election Commission during the 2019 General Election, with intentions to undermine the electoral process and the authority of the elected candidate. Hoax campaigns were carried out to deliver the fake news that ballot papers were sent from China in order to manipulate the election. Misinformation also spread that Arief Budiman, the chairperson of the General Election Commission, is a Chinese descendant and lacks integrity. These altogether undermined the credibility of the electoral system and democracy as a whole.    India: Fight against Fake News amid Pandemic In India, the market share for WhatsApp application is phenomenal with more than 400 million active users in India, making it as one of the rapidly-growing platforms. Fake news on WhatsApp poses a bigger problem given its encrypted nature, and the fact that it is challenging to identify, report and remove contents. The Indian government has held social media intermediaries liable for curbing the spread of fake news and misinformation on social media, while the Facebook and Twitter maintained the stance that they were only platforms, not publishers, and therefore are not responsible for the content that is published on their platforms. COVID-19: Amid pandemic, Indian society is undergoing a surge of fake news and misinformation on social media often including conspiracy theories scapegoating certain countries, groups or communities for the spread of the virus. Two categories of misinformation have been spreading consistently-regarding Muslim culture and the government. In early March 2020 when the Tablighi Jamaat religious congregation took place in a mosque in Delhi, several thousand participants were confirmed with coronavirus, sparking a plethora of misinformation blaming the entire Muslim community. Another trend of misinformation includes using politicians or institutions as a believable source of misinformation on government announcement and advisories, as well as doctored statistics on positive cases or deaths.  Policy recommendations: First, the government must enact appropriate legislations to hold social media intermediaries and culprits liable, while at the same time allowing freedom of expression. The social media industries should also develop and deploy technology that identifies fake news, and the media should promote self-regulation. The civil society and educational institutions, together with fact-checkers, need to increase digital literacy and raise awareness of its citizens.   Pakistan: Social Media is the Last Civic Space for Democratic Discourse Although in Pakistan social media is gaining prominence as a communication tool for political discourse, state regulation against social media and its hybrid democracy where military still holds dominance greatly restrict the freedom of speech on social media. Whereas legal regulation against social media began as an anti-terrorist action against hate speech and extremism, it is now being used for political purposes in the legal regime of Pakistan, curbing people’s rights and freedom. State regulation: In Pakistan, the government has the authority and the ability to enforce a strict policy against social media, often imposing disproportionately harsh punishments. For example, government organizations such as the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) have the authority to arbitrarily block or remove unlawful contents that are against the “glory of islam, integrity, security, defense, public order, contempt of court, decency, morality, incitement of any offense, etc.” By law, social media companies including Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, etc. operating in Pakistan are obliged to follow the guidance of the PTA. Such regulations also target journalists, opinion leaders and whistleblowers, leading to the self-censorship in media. Political intentions: In Pakistan’s hybrid governance, social media is considered a tool of propaganda rather than a platform of information sharing. The government announced the “5th generation warfare” or “hybrid warfare” against social media, implying that social media is not deemed an independent source of information. In addition, systematic use of troll armies have been used by the state and political parties, labeling anyone who stands for citizens rights an anti-state activist. While traditional media is already under the state control, no TV channels are allowed to broadcast real-time and such regulation is also being applied on social media as well, making any kind of open discussion among citizens challenging. ■     III. Moderator & Panelists   ■ Chin-en Wu is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his PhD from the University of Michigan. He serves as one of the co-PIs of the Asian Barometer Survey. His main research interests include political economy, democratization, and the relationship between regime type and economic reforms. ■ Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia, New Delhi, working on participation, democratic governance, and civil society development for more than three decades. He has 25 years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSO s. He serves on the Steering Committee of ADRN and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a PhD in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India. ■ Maiko Ichihara is Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law and the School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, a study team co-director of Democracy for the Future project at Japan Center for International Exchange, and a Visiting Scholar in Democracy, Conflict, and Governance program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, Japanese foreign policy, and democracy assistance. She earned her Ph.D. in political science from the George Washington University and her M.A. from Columbia University. Her recent publications include: "Universality to Plurality?: Values in Japanese Foreign Policy," in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017). ■ Sook Jong Lee is a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University and senior fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016). ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU), Manila, Philippines. He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as president of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He completed his PhD in political science at the University of Hawaii. ■ Sri Nuryanti is a researcher at the Center for Political Studies, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta, Indonesia. She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007–12, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007 to 2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a Co-Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Association and the Executive Council member of the International Peace Research Association. She is director in charge of the Electoral Research Institute, Jakarta, Indonesia. ■ Aasiya Riaz is joint director at PILDAT, the leading Pakistani think tank she co-founded in 2001, and she leads PILDAT’s projects and activities. Trained in the field of media and political communication at the London School of Economics, UK, Aasiya has also worked with the mainstream press and electronic media in Pakistan as a political analyst. She has been a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as a distinguished fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Stanford University.     ■ Typeset by:  Hyunjin Yim, Research Associate        Inquiries:  +82-2-2277-1683 (ext. 203) [email protected]

The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn) held the third online seminar [Democratic Cooperation] series, titled as “Enhancing Democratic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific Region”. During this seminar, together with thought leaders from six democracies, EAI discussed visions and challenges for democratic unity in the Indo-Pacific region, and shared workable ideas to promote democratic community in the region.   Date & Time: September 18, 2020 10:00-11:30 AM (KST) Panelists: Teresita Quintos Deles (Co-Founder and Chair, International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance), Michael J. Green (Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS; Director of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University), Dhruva Jaishankar (Director, U.S. Initiative, Observer Research Foundation), Marty Natalegawa (Former Foreign Minister of Indonesia), Yukio Takasu (Chairman of the Study Team on the Future of Democracy, Japan Center for International Exchange; Former Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations) Moderator: Sook Jong Lee (Professor, Sungkyunkwan University; Senior Fellow, East Asia Institute)      I. Threats to Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region Democratic backsliding is a global phenomenon that has been occurring since the mid-2000s. The COVID-19 pandemic is further challenging democratic principles and resilience. The Indo-Pacific region is no exception with existing authoritarian rules and populist politics, now added by new challenges due to the battle against the pandemic. The protection and promotion of democracy in this region are particularly crucial for sustaining geopolitical stability that has been disrupted by increasing strategic competition between the United States and China. Divserse and inclusive cooperation among like-minded countries to support democracy in the region is emphazied. Developing appropriate narratives and strengthening democratic norms are emphasized by all panelists.   II. Country-level Views on Democratic Partnership                                                       How the U.S. Is Changing Its Views on Democracy         The U.S. public and leaders are more than ever willing to secure its democracy and advance democratic values abroad. Threats against democratic values from Russia and China mobilized the US public and politicians to protect democracy home and abroad. Public and intellectual support for strengthening alliances and partnerships is also record-high, and all emphasize cooperation despite the diversity of each nation’s democratic practices. In addition, the new generation in the US who witnessed the success of democratization in Asia is willing to support the idea of sharing the best practices and learning from each other to protect and advance values of democracy and human rights in Asia. This turn to cooperation contrasts with the past democracy promotion efforts such as the counterinsurgency campaigns in Mindanao.   Whether It Be Trump or Biden, Democracy Will Matter The Biden campaign has advocated democracy as a central theme to its foreign policy, in the candidate’s Foreign Affairs article and major speeches, making it obvious that democracy will matter in the Biden Administration. However, at the same time, unlike the first Trump Administration’s anti-democratic moves, the second Trump Administration, if Trump is elected again, then his second term administration will have to recognize the importance of democratic norms to foreign policy. Otherwise, the zero-sum ideological framing of American foreign policy may deter its efforts to strengthen democratic governance.   The Philippines, Where Democracy Has Bloomed with Democratic Partnership For the Phillippine democracy, which survived the Marcos dictatorship and is maintaining its freedom with the help from regional and global solidarity, democratic partnership continues to be valuable. The regional networking and partnership for democracy especially in the Philippines' context, develops a shared understanding of the threats to democracy; shares knowledge and good practices on protecting democratic values; and amplifies voices of resistance in a regional and global setting. However, the Philippines is undergoing challenges in democracy development due to rising populism, fundamentalism and China’s encroachment, which need to be addressed through the promotion of practice and policy at every level: regional, national, organizational and individual.   World’s Largest Democracy, India Currently, India’s democratic cooperation consists of three elements: coordination and norm-setting; development partnerships; and technical assistance and training. However, democratic cooperation from the Indian perspective largely focuses on bilateral areas, and India needs to invest more efforts in joint projects with other countries including the U.S., Japan, Europe and more in promoting democracies.   Indonesia’s Conundrum: Democracy vs. Non-Interference, or Both? In an effort to balance between the promotion of democracy and respect for the principle of non-interference, Indonesia deliberately and purposefully introduced the idea of ASEAN Political-Security Community, which puts forth that a community cannot only be economic but also include democratic development, good governance, and respect for human rights. However, the challenge for Indonesia now is to provide a concrete leadership in its practice and to nurture and develop programs for democracy, and to further address that the promotion of democratic values does not contradict the respect for the principle of non-interference.   Amid the Global Backsliding of Democracy, Japan Should Do More Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has pursued the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision since 2016, under the three pillars: democratization; economic prosperity; and peace and stability. However, unlike the last two pillars, Japan’s efforts in the democracy front have been limited due to the political and historical sensitivity of the issues. Japan's government-to-government cooperation framework has also limited Japan to respond only when there is a request made by another government. However, it is the responsibility and duty of Japan to work against the backsliding of democratic governance, free trade, and rule-based international order. Given the worrisome trend of weakening democracy, especially in the context of COVID-19, Japan should give the first pillar of democracy an equal emphasis as economy and security.   III. Visions for Democratic Partnership   Embracing the Diversity of Democracy and Pursuing a Common Goal within Like-Minded   Democracies Michael J. Green highlights that while we should recognize that democracies are not monolithic but eclectic, there should be a caucus of like-minded democracies. This caucus can  together develop a common and coordinated agenda in various regional groupings in the Indo-Pacific region including the East Asia Summit(EAS), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN). The caucus should also establish a common set of strategic objectives for the region and a matrix of tools with strengths from each country, in recognition of the eclectic forms of democracies.  Dhruva Jaishankar mentions a valuable avenue for discussions on democracy cooperation within the developing world would be to begin by understanding the varied challenges posed to democracies. This is attributed to the fact that democratic traditions differ based on countries. For example Japan is more homogenous compared to India or Indonesia which are more pluralistic. Also, finding the middle point between European Union and ASEAN would successfully lead to effective democratic cooperation among like-minded countries.  Marty Natalegawa also echos that the partnership "on" democracy is better than the partnership "of" democracies excluding nondemocractic countries. The former is more inclusive, tolerant of diversity of views from various countries with different outlooks and stages on democracy. This inclusiveness is expected to bring in a positive contagion and multiplier effect, which was illustrated in the case of democratic developments in Myanmar, Fiji, and some countries in the Pacific. The democratic partnership should continue to provide an alternative script where current problems can find a solution through democratic response than authoritarian one. Yukio Takasu notes that in pursuing democratic governance, it is crucial that we pursue a democratic ‘partnership’ than democratic ‘unity’, and that we pursue ‘support’ for democratic governance than democracy ‘promotion’. This reiterates the importance of acknowledging the diverse shapes of democracy, and making the partnership inclusive than exclusive, and refraining from pursuing an identical form of democracy. Each country has the right to choose their particular political system. However, the universal value should be maintained, including good governance, accountability and transparency, equality, rule of law, freedom of expression, etc.   Political Leadership on the Promotion of Democratic Partnership Teresita Quintos-Deles points that given the situation in the Philippines where the central threat to democracy emanates from the state itself, Philippine pro-democracy forces should band among themselves and build solidarity with democratic forces, including democratic governments and civil society actors. Government actors should be remined that deterioration of democracy in the Philippines leads to failure of other partnership projects including economic ones, and not only democratic parnership.  Marty Natalegawa warns of the ‘deafening silence’ and the ‘incapability’ of current leaders to speak up on situations that are clearly against principles that countries in ASEAN collectively subscribed to formally and officially. The absence of leadership at the formal state-to-state level and the lack of civil society partnership needs to be addressed for a successful cooperation on democracy.   Not Only the States but Also Civil Society Should Lead Teresita Quintos-Deles emphasizes the importance of promoting participation of and amplifying the voices of the marginalized and the youth. When democracy projects are carried out by formal organizations and elitist leadership, the needs of the marginalized are easily ignored. At the same time, the younger generation needs to be involved in the discourse and assume leadership roles in addressing constraints of democracy development.   Yukio Takasu states that partnership at all levels should take place, especially at the civil society level, between think-tanks, and within academia, and not only through the government. In addition to raising political support from parliamentary groups in Japan on the promotion of democratic partnership, efforts are made to partner with research groups and to form a network of civil society organizations in order to promote policy dialogue.   Asia-Led, Not U.S.-Led Regional Partnership Yukio Takasu underlines that regional partnership should be led by Asian countries, not the U.S. The democratic partnership should not be regarded as an effort by the U.S. to balance against China intrusion, but Asian countries in the region should pursue a shared vision in promoting partnership. Michael J. Green mentions that democracy is under attack by China grounded upon its engagement of information warfare. To protect democracy, countries in Asia need to play an important role, instead of being led by the US, which remains dominant. However, the US will persist as an important actor in promoting democracy since it has the largest budget allocated for democracy promotion with its experiences of success and failure. ■     IV. Chair & Panelists ■ Sook Jong Lee is a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University and senior fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016). ■ Teresita Quintos-Deles has been at the forefront of peace initiatives in the Philippines, starting as a civil society activist and, more recently, as a public servant. She was the first woman to be appointed as Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, with Cabinet rank, serving a first term in 2003-2005 and a second term under the 2nd Aquino government in 2010- 2016.  Under her watch, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed in 2014.  She sat as an Expert-Member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (UN CEDAW) in 1991-1994.  In 2017, she served as a UN Senior Mediation Adviser, with a special focus on Gender and Inclusion. She currently chairs the International Center on Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance (INCITEGov), which she co-founded in 2005; and serves as chair-convenor of the women’s coalition EveryWoman. ■ Michael J. Green is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and director of Asian Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He served on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) from 2001 through 2005. Dr. Green has authored numerous books and articles on East Asian security, including, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (Columbia University Press, 2017). He received his master’s and doctoral degrees from SAIS and did additional graduate and postgraduate research at Tokyo University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received his master’s and doctoral degrees from SAIS and did additional graduate and postgraduate research at Tokyo University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received his bachelor’s degree in history from Kenyon College with highest honors. ■ Dhruva Jaishankar is a Nonresident Fellow at the Lowy Institute, and Director of the US Initiative at Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. Previously, he was a Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings India in New Delhi and the Brookings Institution in Washington DC. His research examines India’s role in the international system and the effects of global developments on India’s politics, economics, and society, with a particular focus on India’s relations with the United States, Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and Europe. Jaishankar holds a bachelor’s degree in history and classics from Macalester College, and a master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown University. ■ Marty Natalegawa served as Foreign Minister of Indonesia (2009 – 2014).  He was Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN (2007-9) and Ambassador to the UK and to Ireland (2005-7). He authored “Does ASEAN Matter? A view from Within” (2018). He is a member of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Advisory Board on Mediation. He is also presently a member of the International Academic Advisory Committee of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies; the Southeast Asia Advisory Board of the CSIS; International Crisis Group Board of Trustees; Global Advisory Committee of the Jeju Forum; University of Western Australia’s Public Policy Institute Advisory Board; the Board of Directors of the Global Centre for Pluralism, Ottawa and is a Prominent Research Scholar and member of the Honorary Board of the Bank of Indonesia Institute. He is a member of the UN SG’s Advisory Board on Disarmament and the Board of Trustees of the UNIDIR. He is also ASPI Distinguished Fellow. He earned a D.Phil. from the ANU; an M.Phil. from University of Cambridge; and a BSc (Hons) from the LSE. ■ Yukio Takasu is a Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General on Human Security. He served as a former UN Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, and a former Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations. In his personal capacity, he chairs “The Future of Democracy” study project (2018-2022) by the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) on expanding support for democratic governance in Asia. Mr. Takasu is Visiting Professor of Ritsumeikan University, and has held academic positions at Harvard University, the University of Tokyo, the Graduate University for Policy Studies. Mr. Takasu was educated at the University of Tokyo (Faculty of Law) and Oxford University (Merton College). His publications include “SDGs and Japan: Human Security Index of Japan” (2019).     ■ Typeset by:  Hyunjin Yim, Research Associate        Inquiries:  +82-2-2277-1683 (ext. 203) [email protected]

The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn) held the second online seminar [Democratic Cooperation] series, titled as “Democratic Principles at Test: How Asian Democracies Are Combating the Pandemic. During this seminar, together with the members from Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN), EAI discussed challenges that arise amid the pandemic and have the potential to damage democracy and share ideas for balancing public safety and democratic principles.   Date and Time: August 28, 2020 12:30 - 2:00 PM (KST) Panelists: Ketty Chen (Vice President, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy), Maiko Ichihara (Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University; Study team co-director, Democracy for the Future project, JCIE), I Ketut Putra Erawan (Executive Director, Institute for Peace and Democracy), Jung Kim (Assistant Professor, University of North Korean Studies), Niranjan Sahoo (Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation) Moderator: Sook Jong Lee (Professor, Sungkyunkwan University; Senior Fellow, East Asia Institute)       I. Executive Summary The COVID-19 pandemic presents democratic countries with the dual agenda of managing and controlling the pandemic meanwhile maintaining and preserving democratic principles. Democracies in Asia including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, India and Indonesia have taken different measures in response to the pandemic. In terms of both the number of infected people and the infection rate adjusted to the population size, these five Asian countries are most infected in the order of India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Panelists of this webinar explain the quarantine measures and the challenges posed to their democratic governance.                                                 How Did Asian Democracies Respond to COVID-19?                                 Immigration Control and Domestic Lockdowns: Five Asian countries have taken immigration control measures to stop the inflow of the virus from other countries. Taiwan took preemptive immigration control measures while South Korea and Japan have attempted to maintain open borders, by administering tests and social distancing guidance. Some measures are more conspicuous than those related to immigration. South Korea, Japan and Taiwan stand out as three countries that did not impose domestic lockdowns unlike India and Indonesia which enforced complete and partial lockdowns respectively. India enforced a 21-day nationwide lockdown within only four hours of prior notice, causing significant domestic chaos. This measure has put many urban migrant workers, who are anxious to return to their hometown, in a predicament. 3Ts (Test-Tracing-Treatment): South Korea and Taiwan implemented 3T strategies more extensively whereas Japan, Indonesia and India showed limited testing capacity. South Korea and Taiwan tracked individuals who tested positive and those entering the country using mobile applications, with South Korea even using GPS data, credit card records, and security cameras for contact tracing. On the other hand, only one percent of the Japanese population was tested, one of the lowest testing rates worldwide. Indonesia’s provincial governments and local hospitals did not have enough resources to match up to the testing and treatment requirements. India, despite having managed to increase its daily testing capacity to more than a million, still has long way to go due to its under-resourced public health system.   Combat the Virus or Save the Economy? Quarantine vs. Economy: Achieving balance between lockdown and daily economic life arises as a crucial concern for democracies, especially as the pandemic is expected to continue until next year. Indonesia’s policy, Pembatasan Aktivitas Bersekala Besar (PSBB), is an illustration of such a concern. It limits the movement of citizens to certain locations with guidelines are provided by experts. South Korea has also been recognized as a country that has sought for balance by partially reducing people’s mobility based on mass testing and contact tracing and by utilizing the public quarantine strategy that avoids extreme limitations. These measures were met by bottom-up efforts to cooperate with the government guidelines.   Rule of Law: Crisis or Chance? Democracy continued in some countries, but others took advantage of the pandemic situation as a pretext for the misuse of democratic values. Japan saw continued support for rule of law even after the situation was declared a national emergency, as freedom of press, speech and assembly, as well as access to information were allowed as long as there was social distancing. The government also refrained from using contact tracing due to privacy concerns. South Korea, according to Varieties of Decmoracy’s Pandemic Democratic Violation Index, is one of the 24 countries out of 146 that did not violate democratic values in responding to COVID-19: there was no time limit on emergency measures; no discrimnatory measures; no de-jure violation of non-derogable rights; no restriction on media freedom; no disproportionate limitation on the role of legislature; and no abusive enforcement. Taiwan safeguarded its democracy from information warfare and disinformation campaigns. The Taiwanese administration attempted to deter authoritarian attempts to spread disinformation defamining its performance by acting swiftly and effectively to share correct information. India is experiencing misuse of emergency power from the executive branch, with the pandemic as an “easy excuse” for extending its power: many states are imposing censorship on media reporting, penalizing and in some cases, arresting people who raise inconvenient questions about the state response to pandemic. At the same time, India’s judiciary and legislative pillars are being largely paralyzed as COVID-19 closed operations within the parliament and state assemblies, and as courts operate virtually to hear urgent matters, making room for almost “draconian” executive branch to pass ordinances.   Bipartisan Consensus: Fighting Together or Fighting Against One Another? Bipartisan consensus and the conveying of a consistent message remain a priority during a crisis when citizens become highly vulnerable to fake news and disinformation. Most Asian countries have effectively done so, with Taiwan overcoming the politically divided bipartisan system and both parties jointly responding with “one heart.” South Korea’s ruling and opposition parties also reached consensus in handling the pandemic, and successfully gained public trust, helping the nation to rise as an exemplary case in responding to the pandemic. Nevertheless, this did not lead to unconditional bipartisan agreement, as viewed by a drastic fall in President Moon’s approval rating from 71 percent in May to 39 percent in August after the proposal of several bills unrelated to COVID-19. This shows that political support for the government depends heavily on voters’ perception of its performance rather than its partisanship. India saw bipartisan support in the beginning of pandemic but soon entered a period of sharp polarization between the ruling and opposition parties, greatly harming collective efforts to fight the rapidly spreading pandemic. Indonesia did not see harsh opposition as major opposition leaders have been absorbed in the Jokowi Kabinet since 2019. However, some opposition leaders and parties have questioned the concept of emergency stated in the decree.   Hand in Hand with Civil Society? Taiwan is a country of highly vibrant civil societies in the region, which was once again manifested in the time of pandemic. Civil society has collaborated with the government to fight against COVID-19, beginning with the development of mobile applications to let citizens know of stocks of facial masks, and the creation of effective information campaigns for encouraging its citizens to follow the government’s rules. Similarly, Japan was able to maintain democracy by preserving its civic space and media freedom. Civil society in Indonesia is struggling, but it is continuing to exercise checks and balance against the government. However, the mainstream media, which is largely owned by political leaders, remains politicized and polarized, making it difficult to share right information and maintain freedom of expression.     Where Do Minorities Stand? Emergency crisis further marginalizes the minority, as illustrated by the case of Indonesia where 90 percent of its population works in the informal sector with no money to pay the rent and no means to work from home. The Muslim community in India has also been the target of Islamaphobia (linked to the Tablighi Jamaat incident in mid-March) and stigmatized as a spreader of the virus. Similarly, religious minorities in South Korea including Sincheonji, a religious cult, and far-right Protestant churches are confronting rising criticisms. In Japan, the government implemented discriminatory policies towards the vulnerable minority including schoolchildren of Korean schools by excluding them from the list of recipients eligible for the government’s economic support. However, Taiwan is effectively protecting its minority, protecting migrant workers by requiring employers to provide them with facial masks.   Challenges ahead of the ‘Nth Wave’? South Korean government’s capacity to respond to the pandemic is now being tested, in the face of its second big wave. Dealing with the religious minority including Protestants, whose size is expected to grow, and striking the balance between liberty and security will be necessary. Japanese government’s decision-making process lacks a science-based approach, and does not provide full-scale testing capacity. Japan made policy, such as the "Go To Travel” campaign, without sufficient prior consultations with public health experts, leading to an increase in confirmed cases. Japan also needs to enhance its testing capacity, by moving away from the current system where citizens have to go through health centers to ask permission for testing. Indonesia's key governmental agenda is to address the problem of inequality. Currently, the majority of its population faces the threat of losing livelihoods. Networks of activism in civil society, media and the government should all conjoin to cooperatively deal with the problem.  Similarly, India’s millions of migrants and low-wage laborers were hit hardest by the lockdown, one of the toughest of its kind. The lockdown made life difficult for millions and made them incapable of paying their monthly rents. This is critical as 90% of Indian laborers belong to the informal sector, of which 70 % do not have regular social protection such as pensions or health insurance. Adding to woes, India’s GDP has contracted (24%) to an all time low raising doubts about the state’s capacity to fight the prolonged pandemic. ■     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University and senior fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016). ■ Ketty W. Chen is the Vice President of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD). She is responsible for overseeing international affairs and general administration at the TFD. Dr. Chen is a political scientist by training and received her doctoral degree in political science from the University of Oklahoma, specializing in comparative politics, democratization, international relations and political philosophy. Dr. Chen also holds two Master’s degrees in political science and international relations from the University of Oklahoma and dual Bachelor of Arts degrees in political science and psychology from the Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas.  Dr. Chen also served as the Chair of the Women’s Rights Working Group for Liberal International and has been referenced in a number of publications and international media outlets, including the Wall Street Journal, the Associated Press, Al Jazeera, LA Times, New York Times, Financial Times, Voice of America, BBC-World, Libération and Le Monde. Her book chapters on Taiwan’s social movement in “Taiwan’s Social Movements Under Ma Ying-jeou” and “Cities Unsilenced” were published in 2017. ■ Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law and the School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University, Japan. She is a committee member of the World Movement for Democracy, East Asia Democracy Forum, and Partnership for Democratic Governance (Japan). Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations and democracy assistance. She earned her Ph.D. in political science from the George Washington University and her M.A. from Columbia University. Her recent publications include: "Universality to Plurality?: Values in Japanese Foreign Policy," in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2018). ■ I Ketut Putra Erawan is an active scholar and researcher working on democracy issues in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. He is the executive director of Institute for Peace and Democracy, an Indonesian think-tank and the implementing agency of the Bali Democracy Forum. In 2005-2009, Dr. Erawan served as director of the Graduate Program in Political Science at Gadjah Mada University. He was a special advisor for the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, an expert for the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Indonesia, a member of the Steering Committee for the Australia and Indonesia Governance Research Partnership, a member of the Academic Committee of the Rotary Peace Center at the Chulalongkorn University in Thailand,, and a consultant for the World Bank, World Bank Institute, UNDP, and various Indonesian agencies. ■ Jung Kim is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, South Korea. He teaches courses on International Relations in East Asia and Political Economy of the Two Koreas, among others. Prior to this, from 2009-2015, he was a Lecturer at the Underwood International College and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. During this time, Mr. Kim was also a Chief Researcher at The East Asia Institute. He pursued his Bachelors and Masters in Political Science at Korea University and went on the pursue his Ph.D. at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia. ■ Niranjan Sahoo is Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi since 2004. He has published extensively on issues of democracy, human rights, decentralized governance, constitutionalism, and nation-building in South Asia. His current research focuses on the domestic drivers of India’s foreign policy objectives with regard to democracy and human rights in South Asia as well as new social movements and the changing nature of democracy in India. A recipient of 2010 ASIA Fellow Award (funded by The Ford Foundation), Dr. Sahoo recently was a Visiting Asia Fellow at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.     ■ Typeset by Hyunjin Yim, Research Assistant             For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 203)  |  [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn) invited you to the first online seminar [Democratic Cooperation] series, titled as “Political Transition and its Moving Forward: Challenges and Lessons for Myanmar”. During this seminar, together with the members from Myanmar Democracy Research Network (MDRN) and Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN), EAI discussed stories of democracy from Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea mainly by listening to the case studies of Myanmar.   Date and Time: August 3(Mon), 2020 12:30 - 1:30 PM (KST) Speaker: Myat Thu (Chairperson. Yangon School of Political Science) Discussants: Jin Seok Bae(Professor of Political Science, Gyeongsang National University), Sri Nuryanti (Researcher, Indonesian Institute of Sciences), Thawilwadee Bureekul (Director of Research and Development Office, King Prajadhipok's Institute) Moderator: Nishan de Mel (Executive Director, Verite Research)    

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} The East Asia Institute (President: Yul Sohn) hosted the third online seminar series of COVID-19 and the New World Order, The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Future of Democracy in Asia. There were rounds of discussions on the role of democracy during the pandemic, and region-specific perspectives on Asian democracy.   Date & Time: July 16(Thur) 12:00 - 1:00 PM (KST) Speakers: Larry Diamond(Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Hoover Institution, Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University) Discussants: Francisco A. Magno(Professor at De La Salle University & Director at Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance) Maiko Ichihara(Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law and the School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University) U Khine Win(Executive Director of Sandhi Governance Institute) Moderator:  Sook Jong Lee (Senior Fellow, EAI; Professor, Sungkyunkwan University)       ■ Francisco A. Magno is the Director of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance at De La Salle University where he previously served as Chair of the Political Science Department and Director of the Social Development Research Center. He has conducted teaching and research at Florida State University, University of Reading, Waseda University, Hiroshima University, University of Hawaii, and University of the Philippines. His works appeared in journals such as Pacific Affairs, Security Dialogue, Peace Review, International Review of Public Administration, Environmental History, Philippine Political Science Journal, and Philippine Studies.                                                                                                                                                                                            ■ Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law and the School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University, and currently a Visiting Scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. She is a committee member of the World Movement for Democracy, East Asia Democracy Forum, and Partnership for Democratic Governance, and is a co-chair of Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. She has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications includes: “The Role of Democracy Promotion in Japanese Foreign Policy” in Nicholas Szechenyi, ed., Asianism and Universalism: The Evolution of Norms and Power in Modern Asia (Washington DC: Center for International and Strategic Studies, 2019).   ■ U Khine Win is executive director at Sandhi Governance Institute. He continues its research and social movement activities for transparency and accountability in the public sector, and governance of democratic civil society in Myanmar.   ■ Sook Jong Lee is a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University and senior fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).     ■ For inquiries: Juhyun Jun, Research Associate/Project Manager  02 2277 1683 (ext. 204)  |  [email protected]                       The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.