EAI launched the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) in November 2013 to conduct research related to democratic governance and human rights promotion in Asia. EAI serves as a representative of domestic think tanks and leads the organization of regional think tanks in Asia. It is responsible for supporting and managing research related to democracy at associated research institutes. ADRN was established to analyze threats to democracy in Asia and to promote discussions and practical research projects that could contribute to the consolidation of democracy in the region. Aimed at presenting policies based on research, ADRN examines threats and challenges to democracy by identifying and studying practical agendas for developing regional democracy in Asia. The network includes 22 major think tanks from 14 Asian countries including Taiwan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines, as well as South Korea’s EAI. 

Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Dissent and Democracy in Modi’s New India

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Notes It has been more than one year since protestors took to the streets of Delhi in opposition against Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s passing of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). Designed to reconfigure India’s citizenship laws by preventing Muslim immigrants from applying, many Indians are concerned that the CAA is but another attempt by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to undermine the country’s secular foundations. Ramesh Thakur, Professor Emeritus in the Crawford School of Public Policy at Australian National University, outlines how Modi is attempting to reimagine India as a Hindu nation and goes on to examine the ways in which broad and varying groups of Indians are combating his vision. Whilst the COVID-19 pandemic has since hindered these efforts, he argues that Modi’s opponents are effectively combining methods of peaceful civil resistance with new conceptions of how democratic governance, constitutionalism, and minority rights are consolidated to form a counter-narrative to the government’s insular understanding. For Thakur, the re-solidifying of India’s traditionally unifying national identity have the potential to prevent the BJP, or any future government, from discrediting protests and overturning the open and tolerant underpinnings of the world’s largest democracy.     A year ago, Delhi was in flames as protests were met with imperious arrogance and the patriotism of the protestors was impugned with dark hints of foreign conspiracy. As I watched the blanket television coverage and prepared to return to Canberra, the professor in me wondered: What does citizenship mean in contemporary democratic societies as they become increasingly multicultural? Can dissent be used constructively to redefine the terms of engagement of minority groups with the state? Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s style of governance is to introduce hugely consequential laws without advance consultations with stakeholders and opposition parties, enact them within one to three days without referral to a parliamentary committee, enforce them with the heavy hand of the state, conflate India with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Modi, and delegitimize protestors as anti-national agitators in the pockets of foreign paymasters. The Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950. Last year’s celebrations marked a mass awakening to the critical importance of the social purposes of the state of India as embodied in the Constitution. Protestors who eschew violence strengthen India’s liberal democracy by affirming faith in the institutions and constitutional structures of the Republic to provide relief and redress. They also issued a clarion call on the conscience of the state to engage in dialogue with its citizens. These Indian examples should feature prominently in studies of how sectarian minorities can negotiate citizenship in multicultural societies everywhere. Differing from spontaneous and discrete protests, “civil resistance” covers a variety of coordinated methods like marches, demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, and collective non-cooperation to express opposition to policies and state authorities without inflicting physical harm or damage on an opponent. Civil disobedience was one of several political legacies inherited by independent India from the British Raj with regard to both the technique and the legitimacy of political protest. Mahatma Gandhi instrumentalized and operationalized Henry David Thoreau’s concept of civil disobedience (1849) into an effective technique for peaceful mass mobilization against a militarily much more powerful opponent. Gandhi’s notion of satyagraha (the literal meaning of the term is urging of truth upon the opponent) is deeply grounded in the power of moral suasion. More recently, people have been increasingly interested in its strategic logic as a more cost-effective alternative to violent resistance. In Why Civil Resistance Works, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan showed that from 1900–2006, civil resistance campaigns outperformed armed struggles in defeating authoritarian regimes, advancing democratization, and averting a relapse into civil war. In a complementary scholarly paper of black-led protests from 1960–72 (American Political Science Review, May 21, 2020), Princeton University’s Omar Wasow found that nonviolent protests are more politically effective in redressing black minority grievances in the US.   Reimagining India as a Hindu Rashtra (Nation) The 2019–20 social upheavals and political turmoil can only be understood against the backdrop of Modi’s first term (2014–19), when his development and good governance agenda capsized under a surge in Hindu zealotry. Muslim marginalization—despite their nearly 200 million strong population – is the flip side of Hindu primacy. The “othering” of India’s Muslims by Hindu bigots has depended on questioning their loyalty and allegiance to India and attempting to portray them as fifth columnists loyal to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. That underlying suspicion has been harvested politically by Modi and the BJP to push through a social agenda that has steadily marginalized the Muslims and promoted Hindus as more equal than others. In a seminal event in Modi’s new India, on September 28, 2015, 50-year old Mohammad Akhlaq was lynched at home in the presence of his family by Hindu villagers inflamed by the announcement at a local temple that the Muslim family ate beef. A BJP lawmaker praised the killer of Mahatma Gandhi as a patriot in December 2014; another urged all Muslims to go live in Bangladesh or Pakistan in February 2018; and in July 2018, a minister garlanded eight men convicted of lynching a Muslim man in 2017 in an act of cow vigilantism. This background helps to explain why Muslims and other minorities had begun to feel besieged by the Hindutva agenda—a majoritarian project by hardline Hindus to transform India from a secular republic into a Hindu Rashtra (nation)—during Modi’s first term. However, not wanting to provoke untoward incidents in an increasingly febrile atmosphere, they mostly kept their silence. The apprehensions of those who fear the BJP as the Trojan horse of Hindu fascism were fed by the vitriolic hatred aimed at Muslims by many BJP leaders in Modi’s first term. The hopes of those who believe that the party has exhausted the mobilizing potential of Hindu chauvinism and must tack to the center-right to survive in the rough and tumble marketplace of Indian politics rested on the tradition of Hindu tolerance and the middle ground of politics that imposes the restrictions of respectability and punishes extremism. Instead, re-election with an increased majority in May 2019 seems to have set free the inner demons of the project to make a Hindu Republic of India alongside the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The BJP and Hindutva ideologues interpreted their massive victory as a validation and endorsement of the cultural nationalist project to create a Hindu majoritarian state. On the day the results were announced and the scale of his victory became clear, Modi sounded an ominous warning: Is chunaav mein ek bhi rajnetik dal secularism ka naqab pehen kar janta ko gumrah nahi kar paya (“In this election, not one political party was able to don the garb of secularism to make the people lose their way”). The re-elected government moved swiftly in July to outlaw triple talaq, whereby Muslims could divorce their wives simply by uttering the decree three times. In August, it scrapped Article 370 of the Constitution that had guaranteed Kashmir’s political autonomy as India’s sole Muslim-majority province. The failure of institutional bulwarks against the assault on freedoms has been just as dispiriting. One after another, parliaments, political parties, media, and the judiciary have failed in their duty to hold the executive to account even as the cult of personality gathers pace around Modi. Anything he seeks or does is granted and ratified by a cipher cabinet and lauded by a sycophantic media. While most countries are moving to proscribe hate speech, India is embedding hate in law by criminalizing religious conversion for interfaith couples. For fanatics, Hindu girls do not marry Muslim men of their own volition but are victims of “love jihad” aimed at converting India into a Muslim nation. Love jihad laws ostensibly protect Hindu girls from predatory Muslim men. In reality, they betray the condescending assumptions that women are weak and passive victims without agency, the property of men with no right to make their own choices. Hindu chauvinists have also targeted the reconversion of Christians and Muslims as symbols of ghar wapsi (“homecoming”), on the grounds that in 1,200 years of Muslim rule (culminating in the Mughal Empire) and Christian rule (as part of the British Empire), state power was used to convert Hindus to these two foreign religions.   Adulterating Muslim Citizenship Adulteration of consumable foods and drinks is a common problem in many parts of India. Adulterating the citizenship of particular ethnonational groups is a novel phenomenon. In December 2019, the government passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), deepening the sense of the country’s Muslims that they are under siege. The CAA was bulldozed through both houses of Parliament in three days with no advance consultation with opposition parties or civil society. It is arbitrary in the choice of countries of origin and discriminatory in its selection of religious minorities. It provides preferential pathways to Indian citizenship for non-Muslim minorities from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It was meant to be complemented last year by the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the National Population Register, although the coronavirus pandemic seems to have put the project on hold. Their collective aim is to turn India’s Muslims into second-class citizens. Government denials are disingenuous in light of the high-profile and widely discussed incidents of 2014–19. In a document-poor country—only 61 of 70 lawmakers in Delhi’s territorial assembly have a birth certificate—they will empower authorities to declare, with a bias against Muslims, that even people born in India cannot provide documentary evidence of citizenship and should be disenfranchised and held in detention camps. The Constitution’s definition of citizenship is universal, inclusive, and secular. Because the CAA is arbitrary and discriminatory, there is a good chance that India’s Supreme Court will hold it to be unconstitutional. India’s humanitarianism would have won plaudits, not criticism, if all persecuted minorities in all of the neighboring states, including Islamic sects, were granted accelerated citizenship. In Myanmar, which unlike Afghanistan shares a border with India, the Rohingyas have suffered well-documented atrocities bordering on genocide. They are not welcome in Modi’s India. The state lacks the capacity to implement the NRC efficiently. Based on the Assam experience that took four years to complete in 2018, it could cost around $9bn, equivalent to two-thirds of the entire education budget. Those who cannot establish Indian identity (as with 1.9 million in Assam) will becomes stateless but cannot be deported. They will end up in detention centers, raising even more logistical, financial, legal, and ethical concerns. This happened, for example, with Mohammad Nur Hussain, his wife Sahera Begum, and their two children. Natives of Assam for several generations, they were harassed by authorities and spent more than a year in a detention camp before their citizenship was finally confirmed on December 16, 2020. “They called us illegal. How is it possible?,” they asked. Good question. The answer is, only in Modi’s India. The CAA pricked the constitutional conscience of India’s students, who flooded the streets in protest. They were met with the full force of the state’s jackboots and the party’s bilious vilification army. On December 15, 2019, speaking at a state election rally in Jharkand, Modi issued a high-pitched dog whistle. Who are the protestors, he asked: woh unke kapdon se hi pata chal jata hai (“they can be identified by their clothes,” meaning hijab-clad women and bearded men in skullcaps). Taking his cue from Modi, a senior police officer berated a protestor: “Go to Pakistan”—a sign of how deep the rot is in India’s institutions under Modi’s tacit tolerance of the cancer of religious bigotry. Footage of police brutality against students at Jamia Millia Islamia and Aligarh Muslim University, plus police as silent spectators while BJP-affiliated armed hoodlums thrashed students and professors at Jawaharlal Nehru University, shocked and galvanized Indians across the country. Meanwhile, in Shaheen Bagh elsewhere in Delhi, the ongoing sit-in protest by women welcomed the New Year with songs of independence and the national anthem. A 90-year old woman said: “My son’s name is Faizan, his father’s name is Imtiaz, his father’s name was Fakhruddin, his father’s name was Riyaz, his father’s name was Akbaruddin, let this Modi come and ask me if I belong here. I’ll show him.” As violence flared in December 2019 in anti-CAA protests across Uttar Pradesh (UP), the most populous and politically the most consequential state, Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath—an inflammatory Hindu preacher but a political neophyte who was hand-picked by Modi as head of the state government—issued an ominous threat. The protestors had been identified through video and CCTV footage, and inse hum iska badla lenge (“we will take revenge against them for this”). He received praise from BJP’s Bengal chief Dilip Ghosh for having shot protestors "like dogs". In an escalation of the assault on the foundations of the rule of law, in December 2020 the police raided the offices of Mehmood Pracha, the lawyer for many of those charged in the January-February riots. The irony is that many senior BJP leaders skyrocketed to prominence for cutting their political teeth as young protestors, including Modi himself in Gujarat in 1974, and others who agitated against Indira Gandhi’s draconian Emergency in 1975.   The Symbolism of Shaheen Bagh Protests began spontaneously and escalated rapidly to become the largest in decades. They represented the most significant mass mobilization against the Modi government. The months-long sit-in protest in Shaheen Bagh finally ended with the coronavirus pandemic’s social distancing requirements. The protestors channeled both Mahatma Gandhi and Pastor Martin Niemöller’s poignant lament about the failure of German intellectuals to speak out against atrocities against targeted groups, so that by the time they came for him, there was no one was left to speak for him. A placard exhorted: “Don’t be silent, don’t be violent.” No other democratic country has experienced comparable mass mobilization in defense of its core democratic identity against the elected government. To underline the significance, it’s worth remembering that India is the world’s biggest democracy, and the size of its electorate is bigger than all of the Western countries combined. Just the number of Indian Muslim voters exceeds the total number of voters in all Western countries other than the US. In common with nationalist parties everywhere, the BJP projects itself as the party of muscular nationalism. It came as a rude shock, therefore, when students, women, and other protestors across the country, including Muslims, appropriated the nationalist symbols with spontaneity and gaiety to celebrate their core Indianness. The tricolor was adopted as the symbol of the protest, the national anthem became its song, and the Preamble to the Constitution the vocabulary. On Republic Day, Jamia Millia students read aloud in public spaces the Preamble to the Constitution—which proclaims liberty, equality, justice and fraternity for all Indians and respect for all faiths—in Hindi, English, and Urdu (the language of India’s Muslims) before raising the tricolor and singing the national anthem. In Shaheen Bagh, three grandmothers were chosen to unfurl a 55-foot national flag with pride and joy. In the process, the women and the youth of India articulated a counter-narrative of patriotism and reset the terms of engagement between citizens, the government, and the Constitution. This is all the more striking for diverging from the trend of identitarian politics in many contemporary Western democratic societies, for example the “Great Replacement” theory propounded by Frenchman Renaud Camus. The BJP’s slogan of Akhand Bharat (“Indivisible India”) has an external reference point: India’s territorial integrity is sacrosanct and no foreign power will be allowed to break apart any part of it. The protestors “domesticated” the slogan: No Indian political party will be allowed to threaten the national integration of India by labelling and compartmentalizing them into identity groups divided by religion and caste.   A Revolution of Aspirations as Indian Muslims The hijab-clad and tricolor-draped young Muslim women challenged Modi’s dog-whistling narrative by instrumentalizing the Constitution to frame their engagement with democratic politics. Furthermore, they articulated their demands and asserted their rights as Indians, but without sacrificing their Muslim identity. By directing their demands and rights at the elected government, they expanded the conception of liberal democracy once again, rescuing it from the majoritarian trap into which the Modi government had placed it. In other words, democracy, citizenship, constitutional governance, and minority rights are all forged into one powerful national identity. They emphatically and visually rejected the BJP’s efforts to downsize their destiny as India’s Muslims and instead reimagined the idea of a liberal, pluralistic, tolerant, and inclusive India embodied in the Constitution. This is revolutionary, for the government had put on notice the whole notion of citizenship in modern India as a legal status, a bundle of entitlements and rights, and as civic identity and belonging to one’s homeland as a birthright. Refusing to be pigeonholed into victimhood and shorn of agency, they expanded the BJP’s political agenda to challenge PM Modi: What kind of India do you want? One trapped in the prison of past glory, where ancient Hindu texts replace modern science and technology in the classrooms? Addressing Parliament on December 12, a BJP MP claimed that speaking in Sanskrit can keep diabetes and cholesterol under control (he spoke in Hindi). Or one that puts in place policy settings to maintain social cohesion today and achieve greatness tomorrow? A direct consequence of this is that the tables were turned and the BJP and Modi government stood accused of constituting a clear and present danger to the Constitution, national unity, and territorial integrity of India.   A Tarnished “Brand: India” India’s core attributes as a global brand include an argumentative democracy, an opinionated society, a chaotic and cluttered but nonetheless inclusive governance, and living in comfortable ease with diversity. The CAA-NRC issue split Indians at home and the diaspora abroad, risking dismemberment by undermining social cohesion, political stability, and economic recovery, while draining diplomatic capital. The contrast could not be starker between the frisson of excitement following Modi’s 2014 victory and the escalating concerns over his authoritarian instincts today. Before the painstakingly cultivated goodwill, respect, and admiration for India dissipates completely, Modi must urgently restore a functioning system of domestic political accommodation and economic vitality. China’s Communist Party never admits to mistakes, but always learns from them. India’s PM Modi never admits to mistakes and seems too stubborn to learn from them. When the Indian national anthem was sung at the start of the Australia-India cricket test match in Sydney on January 7, 2021, TV cameras zoomed in on the face of Mohammed Siraj, the son of an auto-rickshaw driver from Hyderabad playing in his first series in national colors. Tears rolled silently and poignantly down his eyes as the emotional weight of the symbolism hit home. But to Hindutva fanatics, his loyalty to the country of his birth and that of his ancestors for several generations will always be suspect. Modi must reverse the sectarian polarization, rein in the hate-spewing Hindutva mobs, and practice as well as preach inclusion. An excellent role model for him to emulate is New Zealand PM Jacinda Ardern, whose brilliant performance in the immediate aftermath of the Christchurch mosque massacres in March 2019 drew global praise. The transition to a post-Nehruvian order will require the “politics of trust, credibility, inclusion, and consensus building,” says Yamini Aiyar. “A divisive, polarizing rhetoric, populist leadership, and coercion can help propel parties to power,” but will not be sufficient to create a self-sustaining social and political cohesion. The anti-CAA protestors disconnected patriotism from sectarian identity based on religion and caste and relocated it in the Constitution. The protests became powerful and effective instruments of mass civic education on citizenship in a liberal democracy. Citizenship in the democratic Republic of India was forged in the crucible of the independence struggle that was essentially a mass civil disobedience movement led by Mahatma Gandhi. Thus, the wellsprings of legitimacy of the strategy of nonviolent civil disobedience lie in nationalist origins and are fused inseparably into the drive for full citizenship in a free India. This makes it impossible for any Indian government to discredit and delegitimize dissent expressed through peaceful mass mobilization. Protests and civil disobedience are potent symbols of the collective aspirations of the community for a new, better, and brighter India..■       ■ Ramesh Thakur is a Professor Emeritus in the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University; Senior Research Fellow, Toda Peace Institute; and Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. His most recent book is Reviewing the Responsibility to Protect: Origins, Implementation and Controversies (Routledge, 2019).     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

Ramesh Thakur 2021-01-20Views : 41494
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Unpacking Myanmar’s 2020 Vote

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Notes In November 2020, general elections were held in Myanmar. The elections resulted in the National League of Democracy (NLD) once again winning the highest number of seats. The 2020 election saw a high number of voters despite the COVID-19 crisis. Moe Thuzar, a fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, explains that the higher level of citizen participation in this election shows that Myanmar’s public is aware of the importance of elections, which are the core of democracy. However, she also notes the fact that more than a million people in Myanmar were disenfranchised from the vote, such as the Rohingya. She argues that although the election results and implementation are a good sign of country’s continued steps towards democracy, there is much remaining to be done in the future to deepen and consolidate Myanmar’s democratic transition.        A Resounding Mandate for the Incumbent On November 8, Myanmar’s electorate spoke with a resounding vote that returned the incumbent National League for Democracy (NLD) to a second term with a higher number of seats in the Hluttaw, Myanmar’s legislature. The NLD’s victory was an assured outcome, as there continues to be strong and unwavering support for its leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The NLD’s wins in many ethnic areas, along with a high voter turnout despite a COVID-19 surge across Myanmar, proved incorrect the many assumptions about a lower vote for the NLD amid criticisms of its performance and claims that its popularity had declined, especially in ethnic states. That the NLD would receive a second mandate was a certainty among analysts, commentators, and observers. There were, however, differing views on the extent of that returned mandate and how strong it would be for the reasons mentioned above. Thus, the “surprise”—a very pleasant one for the NLD, its supporters, and the people who voted to continue the democratic transition under the NLD’s leadership—was the overwhelming majority of votes for the NLD. The ruling party, running for the first time as an incumbent, secured 396 seats in Myanmar’s legislature, well beyond the 322 seats needed for a comfortable two-thirds majority to form a government and six seats more than they secured in their 2015 landslide win. The 2020 vote thus constitutes a second landslide in Myanmar’s second openly contested multi-party elections.   What Caused this Second Landslide? Analysts are now assessing several factors that contributed to the high voter turnout and the NLD’s resounding mandate. Foremost is the consolidation of support for the NLD led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. People across Myanmar, and particularly in the traditional “stronghold” areas that have voted for the NLD in the past, view her as taking on the defense of national interests in the face of international scrutiny of Myanmar over the Rohingya issue. Additionally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, she demonstrated a new kind of leadership conducted entirely online, communicating and coordinating responses to the public via her Facebook page which she set up in April 2020 expressly for that purpose. There was also some confidence in the government’s COVID-19 response during the initial stages of the pandemic, when caseloads and casualties were among the lowest in Southeast Asia despite the challenges faced by Myanmar’s testing and response capacity. Even when the election campaign period coincided with a surge in COVID-19 cases, the government’s lockdown measures in urban areas met with some approval and compliance, but there was a release of pent-up energy post-election, starting with early community celebrations of the NLD victory. During the election campaign period, opposition political parties initially called for postponing or delaying the vote despite joining the campaign fray themselves. The lockdown measures and COVID-related travel and movement restrictions affected election campaigning for smaller and ethnic political parties. However, the introduction of staggered and early voting for senior citizens (as well as other eligible voters applying to vote early) allowed senior citizens above the age of 60 to cast their votes early either at home or at local polling stations. These measures also garnered more overseas votes. Statements made by the military days before the polls also galvanized people to turn out and vote for the NLD as the only choice to continue with the democratic transition. The Myanmar electorate still harbors a substantial disinclination for any return of a larger military role in politics. Thus, at the ground level, the choice seemed binary, regardless of policy platforms or candidates. Many voters took the attitude of “we vote for the NLD because we don’t want the military.”  The NLD also managed to outperform ethnic political parties in several areas. The ethnic political parties were keen to win a larger share of seats in the legislature at both the Union and the State/Region level, and thus competed in the elections on a platform of being better able to promote or represent the various needs and concerns of ethnic constituencies. Opposition parties presented alternative approaches or visions to tackling change and transition. The NLD’s election strategy seemed to have taken all this into account and its candidates in several of Myanmar’s states and regions worked the ground accordingly. The NLD thus managed to flip some votes that went to the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in 2015, while the ethnic political parties in Shan State and Rakhine State still secured a larger number of seats, consistent with the pattern of 2015. The 2020 general election constituted Myanmar’s largest democratic exercise, and was largely a safe and fair experience for the more than 30 million voters who participated. Political parties who competed for seats and lost conceded defeat graciously, with the exception of the USDP which called for a re-run of the elections and encouraged its supporters to stage public demonstrations.   Who Did Not or Could Not Vote? Media at home and abroad had earlier picked up on the controversy of disallowing voting in certain ethnic areas. International media also highlighted the disenfranchisement of Rohingya communities. There were thus more than a million who could not vote in Myanmar’s 2020 general election. While the Rohingya communities in Myanmar and in the refugee camps in Bangladesh were topmost in the international community’s minds regarding disenfranchisement, many in Myanmar voiced their concern over the UEC’s late announcement of voting cancellation in large swathes of Rakhine State and Shan State, as well as parts of Kachin, Kayin, Chin, and Mon States, and Bago Region. Voting in these areas was cancelled for security reasons due to ongoing civil conflict. While such an announcement had been expected, there was outcry over how late it was made and the lack of clarity on whether and how the UEC had sought views and recommendations from ministries and departments dealing with security issues. The voting cancellations barred candidates from competing in 15 Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) constituencies and for seven Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house) seats. The voting cancellations and disenfranchisement of voters are indeed unfortunate; yet, they do not disqualify the democratic mandate received by the incumbent. There are now some indications that supplementary or additional elections may be held in some of these areas where voting was cancelled. Several post-election analyses and discussions have highlighted the importance of reviewing the current electoral system to address the flaws in it that prevent inclusive elections with a level playing field for all.   What Will a Second Mandate Bring? Will Foreign Policy Change? The returned mandate for the NLD has reassured businesses and investors of continuity in key economic policies, especially with regard to business and investment plans and projects. The NLD administration in its second term will also need to tackle the urgent priority of mitigating the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Recognizing this, the government started drafting the Myanmar Economic Response and Recovery Plan in September 2020 as a successor to the COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan which was issued in April. Days after the election, the government also issued a new 90-page Development Assistance Policy 2020. Another area of continuity will be the country’s foreign policy, with more nuance placed on economic diplomacy and diversification. There are also hopes to engage the incoming Biden administration in the US within the ASEAN context and in bilateral relations. In other words, the NLD will prioritize engaging with international partners on key aspects of the country’s continued democratic transition. One of these aspects will be managing the long-pending repatriation of Rohingya communities. Myanmar’s domestic security situation is linked to the country’s external role and image with regard to this issue. The requirement to create safe and conducive conditions for Rohingya repatriation has been affected by the security situation in Rakhine State, and is unlikely to be able to proceed until the overall security situation improves there. The ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces, continue to engage in conflict in Rakhine State. Prior to the election, the AA abducted three NLD candidates and still had not released them as of November 18, 2020 despite calls from the NLD and concerns expressed by the US and French Embassies in Myanmar.   The Military and its Future Role The military continues to hold 25 percent of the seats in Myanmar’s legislature at Union and State/Region-levels. The Commander-in-Chief still appoints three ministerial portfolios: Defense, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs. However, there is recognition that civil-military relations need to return to more constructive ground after the election. The government and military made a recent overture to ethnic armed groups—a larger number than before—to continue with the nationwide ceasefire negotiations under the Union Peace Process. This overture is an early indicator of an interest to reach a constructive understanding wherein the civilian government and the military can work together in pursuit of broader national interests. The NLD’s election manifesto included several points on its vision for the military’s future role. The NLD pledged to ensure that the military’s first duty would be to protect the citizens and that it (the military) would uphold the policies of the country’s democratically elected government. The NLD also pledged to develop the military in line with modern standards in terms of combat ability and equip it with advanced technology.   What Does the 2020 Vote Mean for Myanmar’s Future Democratization? If anything, the higher voter turnout in 2020 demonstrated that Myanmar’s public is aware of the importance of participating in one of the rituals of democracy, elections. Various electoral awareness and pre-election surveys have shown that between 2015 and 2020, political awareness and engagement has increased. However, elections are just one aspect of democracy. In addition to the right to vote and stand in an election, there are also other key elements such as freedom of expression and respect for the rule of law. Myanmar is still continuing along the path to entrench these fully in society.  Myanmar’s current democratization process is one that the military government scoped and scheduled via a seven-step Roadmap announced in 2003. The 2008 Constitution, which currently frames Myanmar’s political life, was a result of this seven-step process. The Constitution is viewed as a constraint to Myanmar’s full democratization unless and until constitutional amendments can be successfully negotiated. However, even with these constraints, the Global Democracy Index developed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, or International IDEA, places Myanmar squarely in the mid-range of democratic performance. There is still much more to be done. The recent vote has highlighted areas where Myanmar’s nascent democratic institutions can be further strengthened. With the challenge to respond to the economic and social fallout of COVID-19 at the top of governance responsibility for many governments around the world, topics of inclusion, equality, consultation, and evidence-based decision making will underpin national, regional, and global responses. These topics are also important elements for the future of democracy in Myanmar, and may provide the basis for a new roadmap towards a healthy, inclusive, and genuine democracy in the country. Myanmar’s 2020 vote is another step taken along this journey. ■     ■ Moe Thuzar is a Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. She serves as co-coordinator of the Institute’s Myanmar Studies Programme.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate / Director, Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

Moe Thuzar 2020-12-07Views : 35447
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Misinformation and Polarization in Japan: The Suga Administration and the Science Council of Japan

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Notes It has been nearly two months since Yoshihide Suga took over as Japan’s Prime Minister after a decade under Shinzo Abe. Although it has only been a short time, Suga has already been criticized for refusing to appoint six of the 105 candidates for the Science Council of Japan. In this article, Professor Maiko Ichihara points out that this case illustrates two important dangers Japan’s democracy faces today including 1) the regression of the government’s democratic norms and practices, and 2) the polarization of Japanese society. Professor Ichihara argues that the Japanese government needs to avert “deterioration of populism” and “social confusion” by addressing the issue of misinformation and polarization.      Attack on Democratic Practices Two weeks into the new Suga administration, the future of Japan's democracy is uncertain. Prime Minister Suga refused to appoint six of the 105 candidates nominated for the Science Council of Japan (SCJ), in a reversal of a longstanding government practice of not intervening in the appointment of Council members. Although members were initially chosen by election from among scholars throughout Japan following the creation of the SCJ in 1949, eventually the excesses of the electoral campaign became a problem. Thus, since 1984, members have been nominated by the SCJ itself. Under the Science Council of Japan Act, the candidates nominated by the SCJ are then appointed to office by the Prime Minister. The interpretation of the article, from initial Diet discussions in 1983 until today, has been that the Prime Minister’s role is purely an official one and that he does not reject the chosen candidates. This is a democratic practice maintained in order to preserve the independence of the SCJ and allow it to make objective recommendations to the government. Suga nonetheless declined to appoint six of the current candidates. All six are scholars of the humanities and social sciences who had expressed opposition to key policies of the Abe administration such as the 2013 State Secrecy Act and the 2015 Security Laws. It is highly probable that Suga, who held the position of Cabinet Secretary throughout the Abe administration, refused to appoint these scholars on the basis of ideology. Academics and the general public have been asking for an explanation of the rationale behind the rejection of these nominees and requesting the retraction of this decision, arguing that this intervention constitutes a violation of the very foundations of Japan’s democracy. As of the time of this writing, the Suga administration has consistently refused to do either. In response to this case of governmental threat to academic freedom, transparency, and accountability, a petition campaign launched by university professors gathered more than 143,000 signatures.[1] Over 600 academic associations have published statements describing the rejection of the nominations as problematic. The hashtag "We protest the intrusion into the personnel issues of the Science Council of Japan" has been shared on more than 11,000 tweets as of November 16, 2020.[2] However, misinformation to the detriment of the SCJ was disseminated to such an extent that shortly after the rejection of the nomination, it had become difficult to grasp the true nature of the issue. As a consequence, many have come to have misperceptions of the SCJ, and voices critical of the Council have spread. The actors who disseminated the misinformation include politicians, TV commentators, and writers, using platforms ranging from TV to blogs, Twitter, and YouTube. The content of the misinformation covers two major areas: generating the impression that the SCJ as an organization clings to vested interests, and that the SCJ is an anti-Japan and pro-China organization.   Misinformation on Vested Interests of the SCJ Four days after the rejection of the appointment, Fumio Hirai, a senior commentator for Fuji Television, misinformed the public on a Fuji TV program by saying that if scholars work for the SCJ for six years, they will receive a lifetime pension of 2.5 million yen per annum. This misinformation gave the erroneous impression that the academics who challenged the rejection of the appointment were clamoring for the pension as their vested interest. This misinformation was circulated on right-wing curation sites such as Anonymous Post and Share News Japan, and a number of videos were uploaded to YouTube and rapidly spread on Twitter.[3] The protest that this was misinformation was immediately raised from many quarters, and Fuji TV corrected the information on air the next day, but the correction itself also contained misleading information.[4] On October 2, Akihisa Nagashima, a member of the House of Representatives from the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), tweeted similar misinformation. Together with a claim that a large amount of taxpayer money is invested in the SCJ and thus the Council should be subject to public scrutiny, his tweet further aggravated the misperception that the SCJ is an organization with vested interests. Nagashima later corrected the misinformation, but the tweet has been retweeted more than 9,000 times and has 12,000 likes as of November 18, 2020 (Figure 1).   Figure 1.  Akihisa Nagashima’s Misinformation Tweet Source: Akihisa Nagashima’s Twitter page (October 2, 2020). https://twitter.com/nagashima21/status/1312195682728439808 (accessed on November 20, 2020).   The impression of the SCJ as an organization clinging to vested interests was further reinforced by former Osaka Governor Toru Hashimoto comment on Twitter which gave the impression that the Council’s status of being funded by taxpayer money is unusual. On October 5, Hashimoto tweeted that the SCJ’s counterparts in the UK and the US do not receive taxpayer money, and criticized the SCJ stating it should “stand on its own feet in terms of money before calling for academic freedom and independence” (Figure 2). In reality, however, both the National Academy of Sciences in the US and The Royal Society in the UK, counterparts of the SCJ, are funded by public monies.[5] Hashimoto did not admit that his tweet had misinformation, but an hour later he tweeted a correction, saying that his tweet had not been fully explained. His tweet with this misinformation has received more than 8,400 likes as of November 18, 2020.     Figure 2.  Toru Hashimoto's Misinformation Tweet Source: Toru Hashimoto’s Twitter page (October 5, 2020). https://twitter.com/hashimoto_lo/status/1313278992619692032 (accessed on November 20, 2020).   Furthermore, the right-wing YouTube channel Front Japan Sakura disinformed the public by stating that the SCJ is a pressure group that is reallocating 4 trillion yen of grants-in-aid for scientific research (kakenhi).[6] However, the actual budget for the kakenhi hovers around 200 billion yen per year,[7] and the SCJ has no influence over decisions on its allocation.[8] This video has not corrected the disinformation and has been viewed more than 40,000 times as of November 18, 2020. A clip which features only this disinformation was tweeted and has been retweeted more than 1,500 times so far.[9]   Misinformation about the SCJ as an Anti-Japanese and Pro-China Organization The second type of misinformation going around is the allegation that the SCJ is complicit in China's military research while prohibiting military research domestically. Reflecting on its complicity in research during the world wars, the SCJ issued a statement in 1950, shortly after its establishment, that it would "never conduct scientific research for the purpose of wars," and more recently, in 2017, it issued a statement affirming the 1950 decision.[10] The first half of the misinformation above stems from this fact. However, the SCJ does not have the authority to impose a ban on military-related research in universities, and thus this information is misleading at best.[11] However, further misinformation on this issue has been circulating on the internet. On October 5, Professor Emeritus Tadashi Narabayashi of Hokkaido University, a board member of the conservative Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, posted on both the institute’s website and the Twitter account the piece of misinformation that the SCJ had forcibly cancelled military-related research at Hokkaido University. This has been retweeted more than 13,000 times, and was quoted by the Sankei Shimbun, Gendai Business, and Daily Sports. Although the think tank corrected this article on October 12, the spread of the initial misinformation has not stopped.[12] In addition, Yoshiko Sakurai, president of the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, falsely stated on BS Fuji Prime News on October 14 that National Defense Academy graduates have been rejected by universities even if they want to attend graduate school.[13] This misinformation spread the impression that the SCJ has been forcing Japanese universities to contain Japan's military research and military personnel. These rumors were bolstered by another piece of misinformation which alleged that the SCJ is cooperating with China's Thousand Talents Plan. Thousand Talents is a plan by the Chinese government to invite outstanding researchers from various countries to work or conduct research in China, and its unparalleled treatment has raised international suspicion that it may be encouraging technology leakage, theft, and espionage. The source of this misinformation is believed to be a blog posted on August 6 by LDP House of Representatives member Akira Amari.[14] However, it is not factual that the SCJ cooperates with China's Thousand Talents Plan, which was confirmed by Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato in a press conference on October 12.[15] Amari slightly revised the content of the blog, but not only did he not explicitly deny SCJ’s cooperation with the Thousand Talents plan, he modified the blog content without widespread notification of the change.[16] This misinformation spread rapidly, and Amari’s blog entry has been posted on 34 Facebook pages as of November 16, 2020. Most of these are right-wing groups such as “Japan’s National Interest” (Nihon no kokueki wo kangaeru) and right-wing media outlets such as Toranomon News and Unreported Facts (Hodo sarenai jijitsu), with more than 2,800 interactions on Amari’s blog on Facebook alone. In addition, a YouTube video disseminating the disinformation that the SCJ is cooperating with the Thousand Talents Plan was uploaded on October 3, 2020, and as of the time of this writing on November 19, 2020, it had been viewed over 550,000 times with more than 20,000 likes.[17] An October 7 article in Zakzak, a media outlet run by Fuji Evening News, carried a similar statement by the writer Ryusho Kadota.[18] In addition, even Yoichi Takahashi, a Special Advisor to the Cabinet, misleadingly tweeted, “Science Council: ditching reform, but raising taxes for reconstruction, collaborating with the Chinese Academy but preventing military research in Japan” (Figure 3).   Figure 3.  Yoichi Takahashi’s Misleading Tweet Source: Yoichi Takahashi’s Twitter. https://twitter.com/YoichiTakahashi/status/1314825914849529856 (Accessed on November 20, 2020).   The Manifestation of Polarization The FactCheck Initiative Japan, as well as its member organizations BuzzFeed News, Mainichi Shimbun, and InFact, took the proliferation of this misinformation seriously and conducted a flurry of fact checks on questionable information about the SCJ, which resulted in the publication of correct information. As the corrections have been widely disseminated through aggregator sites such as Yahoo! Japan, the population that perceives the misinformation as such has also expanded. However, as Chris Walker points out, misinformation spreads at an astonishingly rapid rate compared to accurate information,[19] and misinformation about the SCJ issue has already become entrenched in a certain segment of the population. The sequence of confusion surrounding the SCJ reveals the polarization that has already deepened in Japan to a significant degree. In the traditional mass media, Sankei Shimbun ran articles on the problems within the SCJ, while Asahi and Mainichi Shimbun continued to run articles on the rejection of the appointments as a serious issue for academic freedom and democracy. Among the new media, the conservative media outlets JBPress and Anonymous Post published articles with misinformation about the SCJ, while BuzzFeed News churned out one article after the other fact-checking the same misinformation. While large numbers of people have followed websites, Twitter, and YouTube videos containing misinformation, hashtags criticizing the government’s rejection of the appointments have also been shared in large numbers. The media and the general public were already divided over various allegations surrounding former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his administration. However, the polarization was revealed much more clearly over the SCJ issue which was received by certain groups as a class struggle rather than a mere ideological conflict. The misinformation that aroused suspicion about the SCJ was impactful because a broad swath of the population saw the use of taxpayer money for the Council, together with its efficiency and trustworthiness, as more important than the government intervention. Those who view the issue through the lens of class struggle overlap to a significant degree with those who perceive themselves as socially exploited. These people are opposed to the SCJ, to academics, and to the mass media that support the Council on this issue, perceiving them altogether as a class of the “haves” possessing both high income and output opportunities through the media.   Future Dangers The SCJ issue illuminates two major dangers Japan’s democracy is facing. The first is further erosion of the government’s democratic norms and practices. The government's control of personnel affairs has tightened since the Abe administration, and the government has interfered even in areas where independence is critical, such as the judiciary and the media (NHK). The intervention in the SCJ is an extension of this tightening, and carries the implication that the government might attempt to further suppress criticism through increased personnel interventions in the future. These violations of democratic norms and practices will have a negative impact on Japan's democratic system itself. It is thus reasonable that scholars and the broader public demand both an explanation and a reversal, as they fear that the intervention will lead to further violations of academic freedom and democracy in the mid to long-term. The second danger is the further polarization of Japanese society. The economic disparity in Japan, which has been increasing under the implementation of neoliberal economic policies since the 1990s, has been the fundamental factor underlying this polarization. The growing economic disparity caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to exacerbate social polarization in the future. Redressing polarization through effective countermeasures against disinformation and redistribution policies are key to the future of Japan's democracy. In the United States and elsewhere, there are countless examples of social chaos caused by disinformation and polarization. It is imperative that the Japanese government urgently address both dis/misinformation and polarization to prevent the deterioration of populism and social confusion. ■   Acknowledgments This research was assisted by a grant from the Abe Fellowship Program administered by the Social Science Research Council in cooperation with and with funds provided by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership.   [1] "Call on Prime Minister Suga to withdraw His Rejection of the Appointment of Science Council of Japan Members!" [in Japanese], Change.org. https://www.change.org/p/%E8%8F%85%E9%A6%96%E7%9B%B8%E3%81%AB%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E5%AD%A6%E8%A1%93%E4%BC%9A%E8%AD%B0%E4%BC%9A%E5%93%A1%E4%BB%BB%E5%91%BD%E6%8B%92%E5%90%A6%E3%81%AE%E6%92%A4%E5%9B%9E%E3%82%92%E6%B1%82%E3%82%81%E3%81%BE%E3%81%99 [2] Survey using Buzzsumo conducted by the author, November 16, 2020. [3] As of November 18, 2020, Anonymous Post has published 97 articles about the SCJ. [4] Kota Hatachi, “‘They will Receive a Lifetime Pension of 2.5 Million Yen per Annum if They Work for Six Years in the SCJ’ is Wrong. Broadcast on Fuji TV and disseminated on the Internet” [in Japanese], BuzzFeed News (October 5, 2020). https://www.buzzfeed.com/jp/kotahatachi/de6kutode250onumademoraeruharihuziterebiganettode [5] Yuto Chiba, "'No Taxpayer Money is Spent on Academic Organizations in the US and the UK is wrong. Statement by Toru Hashimoto over the SCJ spreads" [in Japanese], BuzzFeed News (October 12, 2020). https://www.buzzfeed.com/jp/yutochiba/gakujutukaigi-fact-check-2 [6] "1/2 [Front Japan Sakura] Can we "Abolish"? The SCJ/Go Taiwan, with Support from Europe [Sakura R2/10/12]" [in Japanese], YouTube (October 12, 2020). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jSl0DxQzP4k [7] ““The SCJ Reallocates Kakenhi Budget of 4 Trillion Yen” is Wrong. The Internet Laments, “We can Make a Science-based Country with 4 Trillion”” [in Japanese], Huffington Post (October 14, 2020). https://www.huffingtonpost.jp/entry/story_jp_5f866842c5b6c4bb5470e9d0 [8] Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, “Government's 2020 Budget Proposal for the Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Kakenhi)” [in Japanese]. https://www.jsps.go.jp/j-grantsinaid/06_jsps_info/g_191223/index.html [9] Take5's Misinformation on Twitter. https://twitter.com/akasayiigaremus/status/1315629424444760064 (accessed on November 20, 2020). [10] The SCJ, "On Military Security Studies" [in Japanese] (April 2018). http://www.scj.go.jp/ja/member/iinkai/gunjianzen/pdf/gaiyou.pdf [11] Yuto Chiba and Kota Hatachi, "A Senior Member of the SCJ 'Barged into the President's Office of Hokkaido University and Forced to Withdraw from the Study' is incorrect. Article Corrected, but Misinformation spreads" [in Japanese], BuzzFeed News (October 13, 2020). https://www.buzzfeed.com/jp/yutochiba/gakujutukaigi-fact-check-3 [12] Ibid. [13] InFact, "[FactCheck] 'The University of Tokyo and other universities turn them down, even if Defense University graduates want to go to graduate school,' is not true, Sakurai's comment spreads" [in Japanese] (October 15, 2020). https://infact.press/2020/10/post-9066/ [14] Akira Amari, "Diet Report No. 410" [in Japanese] (August 6, 2020). https://amari-akira.com/01_parliament/2020/410.html [15] Prime Minister's Office of Japan, "Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Conference, Monday morning, October 12, 2020" [in Japanese]. https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/202010/12_a.html [16] Kota Hatachi, "LDP Amari Quietly Revises his Blog, Stating that the SCJ 'Actively Cooperates with China's Thousand Talent Plan'" [in Japanese], BuzzFeed News (October 12, 2020). https://www.buzzfeed.com/jp/kotahatachi/thousand-talents-plan-2 [17] Tsukasa Jonen, "A Scathing Criticism of the SCJ by Researchers and Professors. 'Japan's Advanced Science Defense Measures' are conducted for 'Thousand Talents Plan'," YouTube [in Japanese] (October 3, 2020). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X_zvYah8ZAs [18] "The SCJ is the One that has been Infringing on ‘Academic Freedom,’ Declares Ryusho Kadota!” [in Japanese], Zakzak (October 7, 2020). https://www.zakzak.co.jp/soc/news/201007/pol2010070002-n2.html [19] Chris Stokel-Walker, "Fake News Travels Six Times Faster Than the Truth on Twitter," NewScientist (March 8, 2018). https://www.newscientist.com/article/2163226-fake-news-travels-six-times-faster-than-the-truth-on-twitter/       ■ Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and a Visiting Scholar in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is also a co-chair of the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications include: “Universality to Plurality? Values in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberalism: Japan and the International Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017).     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate / Director, Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

Maiko Ichihara 2020-11-30Views : 20099
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Thailand’s Long Road to Democracy

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Notes Despite the democratic movements and protests in Thailand, the 2019 democracy index still notes Thailand as a ”flawed democracy.” However, Dr. Kevin Hewison, emeritus Distinguished Professor at Chapel Hill and an adjunct professor at the University of Macau, argues that the latest movement is distinctive from the previous democracy movements in Thailand. Dr. Hewison points out that the latest movement is distinctive because 1) students are leading the movement, 2) technology allowed a short notice protest, 3) protests are not centralized compared to Hong Kong’s recent protest, and 4) protesters demand the monarchy to adhere to the constitution and scale back its political and economic power. In order to push forward democratization efforts, Dr. Hewison contends that a “developed constitutional system can protect a weak or unpopular monarch.”     The sight of thousands of protesters on Bangkok’s streets from June 2020, demanding that another government be brought down is nothing new. After all, since the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) donned yellow shirts and demonstrated against Thaksin Shinawatra’s government in 2005, leading to the 2006 military coup, there have been several groups on the streets, often drawing thousands of supporters. Most recently, it was the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) that paved the way for the 2014 coup. Yet, the current protests have several new and distinguishing features, including an assessment that the monarchy is an impediment to democratization. This article seeks to show what is distinctive about this latest movement and to compare it with previous democracy movements in Thailand. It also explains reasons why the monarchy is identified as anti-democratic.   Protests, old and new Larry Diamond has recently observed that “[t]he last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the most dramatic expansion of democracy in the history of the world.”[1] Thailand had been part of that expansion. Since 2006, however, Thailand’s democratic progress has been undone. Despite their names and the support of the country’s middle classes, the PAD and PDRC were anti-democratic. Both groups promoted political regression by undermining elected governments, declaring their loyalty to the monarchy, and making demands for authoritarian politics. These movements laid the groundwork for two periods of military rule. The result of these interventions has indeed been authoritarianism. For example, in the five years following the 2014 coup, the military junta drafted laws and rules that prepared for 20 years of military-dominated administration. It did this while allocating increased political and economic power to the monarchy. With anti-junta movements quickly snuffed out, the judiciary wielded as political weapon against opponents, and hundreds jailed or facing charges like lèse majesté, sedition and computer crimes, authoritarian politics seemed almost indestructible. This descent into autocracy was made all the more resilient by the widespread international backsliding on democratic politics. In demanding democratic reform, the demonstrators of 2020 mark themselves as quite different from PAD and PDRC. While acknowledging the red shirt’s sacrifices for democratization, today’s demonstrators are generationally distinct from the red shirts and have moved beyond Thaksin’s politics.[2] The most recent protests have been massive and peaceful, demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, a new constitution, an end to political repression, and reforms to the monarchy and military. In short, they want a political system that is more democratic and less repressive. The current movement exhibit several characteristics that distinguish it from previous movements. First, it is university and high school students who are in the vanguard. Students led the first effort for democratic reform in 1973, rising against a military regime.[3] Yet it has been almost 50 years since students led the calls for democracy. The current demonstrators acknowledge the events of 1973 and the vicious 1976 rollback when military-aligned right-wing vigilantes supporting the monarchy murdered students at Thammasat University. In the current iteration, rallies have been held at dozens of universities and schools, with uniformed high school students making thoughtful and impassioned speeches to crowds of thousands. Some of their symbols of revolt against oppressive school regulations – such as white ribbons – have becomes symbols of the wider protests. Second, the current uprising is the first that is technology driven and networked, with protesters called together at short notice using smart phone apps. News and vision of the rallies is also circulated on social media platforms. Phones have even become elements of rallies as support is shown by the mass use of phone flashlights. While earlier uprisings have mainly been Bangkok-based, smartphones have allowed the rallies to be nationwide events. Smartphones mean that rallies can be called, and locations changed, at short notice, bamboozling the authorities. The result is “flash mobs,” but on a larger scale than that term implies. The May 1992 uprising, where the military and police killing and injuring hundreds, was sometimes called the “mobile phone mob,” but this drew attention to support from Bangkok’s middle class rather than the use of technology.[4] Third, drawing comparisons with protests in Hong Kong, the current movement lacks a centralized structure; it is “leaderless,” politically innovative, inclusive, and spatially dispersed.[5] Several high-profile speakers and activists became centers of attention in July and August, but were soon arrested and had long detentions. However, others soon took their places and even larger rallies resulted, each throwing up new “leaders” as speakers. The rallies have been remarkably inventive, with multi-centered but well-disciplined rallies that featured costumes, entertainers and artists, as well as a diversity of speakers. The manipulation of royal and state symbolism, the use of protest memes, and the use of earlier sites of pro-democracy rebellion – including the Rajaprasong intersection where red shirts were shot down in 2010 – show that the young are “democracy historians.” The protest sites have included universities, schools, central city streets, urban transport hubs, and suburban malls in Bangkok. Similar patterns were seen in provincial towns and cities. From July 18 and October 10, it was reported that there were some 246 protest events in 62 provinces around the country.[6] Demonstrators embraced difference, and while politics was the core of rallies, LGBTI symbols and actors have been highly visible. Finally, and really marking the new generation of protesters as different from predecessors is their demand that the monarchy be brought under the constitution and that its political and economic power be wound back. Following the 2006 coup, anti-monarchism had expanded, including among red shirts, the regime’s political repression limited its expression.[7] The recent demonstrations changed that, with their calls for monarchy reform now being widely discussed and debated. From the language and memes used, it is evident that part of the learning about the monarchy and its political role has come from Thai political exiles, many of whom fled the country following the 2014 coup. Indeed, in their August 10 listing of 10 demands of the monarchy, the students acknowledged the work of exiled monarchy critics, historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul and political scientist Pavin Chachavalpongpun.[8] It is no coincidence that some of these “democracy historians” have chosen to call themselves “Khana Ratsadon 2563.” The original Khana Ratsadon, known in English as the People’s Party, overthrew Thailand’s absolute monarchy in 1932 and established constitutionalism.[9] Adopting that name and appending the current year in the Buddhist calculation (2563=2020) is an adamant statement of adherence to the principles of the People’s Party: that the king be brought under the constitution, and that he cannot act independently without parliamentary approval.[10] Previous democracy movements did not declare the monarchy an impediment to democratic reform, instead targeting the military. Why is it, after 88 years, today’s rebellious youth view the monarchy as the obstacle to democracy? Simply put, those calling for reform have determined that the monarchy represents a keystone of a tripartite alliance that has defeated democratization: monarchy, military, and big business. The protesters appear to believe that this triple alliance can only be undone if the monarchy is reformed. How did it come to this?   Monarchy vs. democracy Today’s monarchy was largely (re-)invented during the second half of the 20th century. Forced to accept a constitution in 1932, the monarchy was stripped of its most significant political power and lost control of palace wealth. The reign of King Bhumibol, which began in 1946 and ended in 2016, witnessed a remarkable restoration of both political authority and royal wealth. This restoration resulted from a political struggle by the palace that bore fruit in the late 1950s when Bhumibol developed a partnership with military coup leader Gen Sarit Thanarat.[11] The monarchy’s relationship with the military has strengthened and deepened to a stage where the current military leadership considers “protecting” the monarchy as its principal duty. Bhumibol, remained suspicious of electoral politics, considered elected politicians “dangerous,” treated constitutions with disdain, and regularly approved military coups.[12] As might be expected of a monarch, he was politically conservative and preferred a conservative polity. An incessant political meddler, Bhumibol favored “behind-the-scenes” manipulation, operating through trusted mediators and political schemers who made up the “network monarchy.”[13] By the end of the 20th century, the monarchy had regained and expanded its political authority. Related, constant, overbearing propaganda meant the throne’s public prestige grew to a level not seen since the 19th century. As the throne accumulated the capacity to influence and change political events, it also rebuilt its wealth. From claims of royal penury in the early 1950s, by 2005, the Crown Property Bureau – representing the bulk of the monarch’s wealth – had amassed wealth valued between US$27 and 40 billion.[14] By 2019, this wealth may have expanded to as much as $70 billion.[15] This makes the Crown the largest conglomerate in the country, a position that has brought it into alliance with Thailand’s big capitalists, involving business partnerships but also expressed in the ideological and political spheres. Thailand’s biggest tycoons are regularly seen donating to the palace, building their prestige and that of the monarchy. At the same time, in the political battles between Thaksin supporters and royalist forces, many of the biggest business families threw their money and influence behind the conservatives and military.[16] Under General Prayuth’s regime, as the protesters have noticed, not only has his government received strong support from the largest business groups, but they have been significantly benefitted from state projects and contracts. Knowing that previous democracy protesters have tried and failed to remove the military from politics, the new campaigners have decided that the keystone of the tripartite ruling alliance must be removed. Since Vajiralongkorn took the throne, he has demonstrated the power of the monarchy, his conservatism, and a desire to further expand the throne’s political and economic power. That the king and military have an accommodation built around the military’s capacity for repression and with Prayuth’s government rolling back constitutional constraints on the monarchy, democratic reform appears even more urgent. That urgency is underlined by the struggle over the symbols of 1932. With Vajiralongkorn and the regime erasing memorials to 1932, Khana Ratsadon 2563 has attempted to use and revive them.[17] Recognizing Vajiralongkorn’s neo-traditionalism and his preference for royal absolutism, the protesters feel constitutionalism under threat. The King’s view of the protests is opaque. Despite a recent “interview” that had him mention “compromise,” this is not a characteristic he has previously demonstrated. As a trained military officer, he demands obedience and he has shown a propensity for erratic and furious behavior.[18] His several public meetings with ultra-royalists suggest that he views the protesters as a threat to the throne. Until the recent protests, the maintenance of the monarchy’s prestige has relied on the regime and military stamping out anti-monarchism. From 2014, the regime charged and jailed hundreds.[19] More worrying, and an important stimulus for the emergence of the recent protests, some believe that the regime is also responsible for the enforced disappearance and murder of several exiled anti-monarchy activists.[20] Clearly, by challenging the King, the activists take on a powerful opponent. Vajiralongkorn is economically powerful. Not only has he inherited his father’s immense wealth, but he has made it his own, having both constitution and law changed to make the Crown’s wealth his personal property. The royal family also receives more than US$1 billion a year in taxpayer funding, to be spent on “protecting” and “revering” the royal family.[21] Taxpayer funding maintains an extensive ideological apparatus that projects the King as the “father of the nation,” responding to emergencies and “caring” for his people. Such promotion has been more difficult to sustain when the King spends most of his time living in Germany. Even so, vast resources are expended by scores of ministers and senior bureaucrats who must repeatedly demonstrate their loyalty to the monarchy. In his still short reign, Vajiralongkorn has amassed considerable political clout. Revisions he demanded in the 2017 constitution – something the protesters have targeted – and the transfer of palace administration and thousands of police and military to Vajiralongkorn’s personal control. Considerable effort has also gone into creating a quasi-military Royal Thai Volunteers, composed mostly of soldiers, bureaucrats and others who uphold the monarchy, who work to make the often absent King “present” and “connected” to his country. The King’s major alliance remains with the military leadership. Loyalty to the monarchy motivates the military leadership, with the top brass having made their careers through service to the throne.[22] With more than 360,000 active and 200,000 reserve personnel, a 2019 budget of more than $7.5 billion, and a penchant for shooting demonstrators, the military remains a dangerous defender of the status quo. Today, the military’s leadership backs Prayuth’s government in opposing students and others it identifies as anti-monarchists. With Vajiralongkorn having cemented his control over military promotions, he has also filled his palace with former high-ranking officers.[23] These moves have blurred the lines between palace, military, and regime. One of the major efforts by the Prayuth regime to shore up its political control and to defeat anti-monarchism has involved internal psychological warfare using the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). Credited with “defeating” the red shirts after 2010, ISOC links the military and civilian administration making it “a potent tool with which conservative elites can undermine and control electoral democracy and through which the military can maintain its power.”[24] Its well-funded operations run in parallel with civilian agencies and most notably with the powerful Ministry of Interior, with a network of agents and officials throughout the country. Its activities include surveillance that extends to the community level and online, developing, funding and mobilizing right-wing groups, the harassment and detention of political opponents and the disruption of their activities. Today, all state agencies must abide by ISOC’s plans and work with ISOC supervision, making it a powerful and dangerous opponent for the pro-democracy students.[25]   Concluding comments The struggle for democratic reform in Thailand has extended over nine decades. Democratic expansion has always seen an authoritarian reaction and democratic rollback. The fight continues, with the outcome uncertain. The current protesters have emphasized the monarchy and military in authoritarian alliance, with the attention to the monarchy unprecedented. More than 20 years ago, in criticizing the then monarch’s opposition to democratization, I pointed out that “[a] developed constitutional system can protect a weak or unpopular monarch.” Vajiralongkorn seems less interested than his father and as then, “this may well prove to be to the detriment of the dynasty and the institution.”[26]■   [1] Larry Diamond, “Democratic regression in comparative perspective: scope, methods, and causes,” Democratization, 2020, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2020.1807517. [2] The red shirts also demanded elections and democratic reform, but their demands were snuffed out by military repression, first in 2010 and again after the 2014 coup – see several contributions to Michael J. Montesano, Terence Chong, and Mark Heng (eds), After the Coup. The National Council for Peace and Order Era and the Future of Thailand, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019. [3] Ruth-Inge Heinze, “Ten Days in October -- Students vs. the Military: An Account of the Student Uprising in Thailand,” Asian Survey, 14 (6), 1974, pp. 491–508. [4] See David Murray, Angels and Devils, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p. 141; Philip Shenon, “The 'Mobile Phone Mob' Faces Guns and Tanks,” The New York Times, May 24, 1992. [5] Ruji Auethavornpipat, “Thailand’s protests and preventing a ‘second 6 October’,” New Mandala, November 2, 2020, accessed November 2, 2020, https://www.newmandala.org/thailands-protests-and-preventing-a-second-6-october/; on Hong Kong, see Tin-yuet Ting, “From ‘be water’ to ‘be fire’: nascent smart mob and networked protests in Hong Kong,” Social Movement Studies, 19 (3), 2020, pp. 362-368. [6] Tyrell Haberkorn, “The Fight for Democracy in Thailand,” Dissent, October 21, 2020, accessed October 21, 2020, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-fight-for-democracy-in-thailand. [7] Anonymous, “Anti-Royalism in Thailand Since 2006: Ideological Shifts and Resistance,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48 (3), 2018, pp. 363-394. [8] Prachatai, “Demonstration at Thammasat calling for reform on politics and monarchy,” Prachatai, August 13, 2020, accessed November 1, 2020, https://prachatai.com/english/node/8717. [9] See Federico Ferrara, The Political Development of Modern Thailand, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, ch. 3. [10] “Announcement of the People’s Party No. 1 (1932),” in Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit (eds), Pridi by Pridi. Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2000, pp. 70-72. [11] Kevin Hewison, “Monarchy and Succession,” in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, London: Routledge, pp. 118-133. [12] Kevin Hewison, “The Monarchy and Democratisation,” in Kevin Hewison (ed.), Political Change in Thailand. Democracy and Participation, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 58-74. [13] Duncan McCargo. “Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand,” The Pacific Review, 18 (4), 2005, pp. 499-519. [14] Porphant Ouyyanont, “The Crown Property Bureau in Thailand and the crisis of 1997,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38 (1), 2008, p. 184. [15] Kevin Hewison, “Crazy Rich Thais: Thailand’s Capitalist Class, 1980–2019,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 51 (2), 2021, DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2019.1647942. [16] See Ilya Garger, “The Color of Money: Political Affiliations of Thai Business Families,” Capital Profile Special Report, August 28, 2014. [17] On erasure, see Panu Wongcha-um and Panarat Thepgumpanat, “In Thailand, it's statues of democracy leaders that are disappearing,” Reuters, June 24, 2020, accessed November 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-democracy-monuments-idUSKBN23V024. For the protesters’ response, see Tassanee Vejpongsa, “Thai protesters install plaque symbolizing democracy,” AP, September 20, 2020, accessed November 2, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/bangkok-thailand-archive-democracy-f29b2b08490dce3f2716780eb4131bcf. [18] Hewison, “Monarchy and Succession,” pp. 125-127. [19] David Streckfuss, “Lèse-majesté within Thailand’s regime of intimidation,” in Pavin (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, pp. 134-144. [20] Hathairat Phaholtap and David Streckfuss, “The ten demands that shook Thailand,” New Mandala, September 2, 2020, accessed November 3, 2020, https://www.newmandala.org/the-ten-demands-that-shook-thailand/. [21] “Thanathorn wants more transparency in annual budget for monarchy,” The Nation, September 6, 2020, accessed November 3, 2020, https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30394107. [22] Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat, “The Resilience of Monarchised Military in Thailand,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46 (3), 2016, pp. 425-444. [23] Paul Chambers, “Red rim soldiers: the changing leadership of Thailand’s military in 2020,” New Mandala, September 21, 2020, accessed November 3, 2020, https://www.newmandala.org/the-changing-leadership-of-thailands-military-in-2020/. [24] Puangthong Pawakapan, The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period, Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute TRS17/17, 2017, p. 1. [25] Puangthong, The Central Role, pp. 25-26. [26] Hewison, “The Monarchy and Democratisation,” p. 74.     ■ Kevin Hewison is the Weldon E. Thornton Emeritus Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and an adjunct professor with the University of Macau. His Research interest includes globalization and social change in Southeast Asia, especially Thailand, democratization, and labor issues. His recent publication include: “Black Site: The Cold War and the Shaping of Thailand’s Politics,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 50 (4), 2020 and Thai Constitutional Court dissolves another major party, East Asia Forum, and “Monarchy and Succession,” in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, London: Routledge.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

Kevin Hewison 2020-11-05Views : 20027
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] The Hong Kong National Security Law amidst Sino-US Rivalry

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note Under the “One Country Two Systems” principle, Hong Kong is supposed to enjoy a degree of autonomy from mainland China. Professor Ma Ngok of the Chinese University of Hong Kong analyzes the content and context of the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL), which was enacted by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) in May-June 2020. Its enactment is considered as China's responsive measure to the anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong and other political fallouts. Professor Ma Ngok argues that since HKNSL was only announced an hour before it came into effect and was drafted without prior consultations with Hong Kong, it is considered as a violation of the Basic Law by the Hong Kong Bar Association. In addition, HKNSL also led the U.S. to pass Hong Kong’s Human Rights and Democracy Act as well as enforce sanctions upon China and individuals responsible for the law and other human rights violations. As such, Professor Ma Ngok contends that HKNSL should be analyzed within the wider framework of intensifying U.S.-China competition.     Hong Kong people were shocked by the sudden enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) in May-June 2020. HKNSL signaled Beijing’s hard line against the opposition movement and protests in Hong Kong. Throughout the two months since the law’s enactment, Hong Kong’s image as a free city has taken a severe blow. The HKNSL promptly drove the United States government to announce the end of “One Country, Two Systems” for Hong Kong, impose sanctions on China and Hong Kong officials, and pursue other punitive moves amidst a period of heightened Sino-U.S. tensions.  HKNSL can be seen as Beijing’s response to the months of anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong since June 2019, and its various political fallouts. In the beginning, the protests were directed against a bill that would allow criminal suspects residing in Hong Kong to be extradited to areas outside Hong Kong for trial, including mainland China. Critics saw the proposed law as a threat to the autonomy and human rights in Hong Kong, as many Hong Kong residents do not have strong confidence in mainland China’s legal due process and rights protection. After the two million-people demonstrations in June 2019, the movement escalated into more violent crashes which were met with a forceful crackdown by the Hong Kong police. Protesters initiated a wide range of actions including peaceful protests, strikes, blocking traffic, and attacks on pro-government shops and police stations. Throughout the seven months of clashes in 2019, the Hong Kong police made more than 9,000 arrests, from which 2,000 were charged with various offences. HKNSL was seen as a drastic move by Beijing to circumvent the normal legislative procedures in Hong Kong. It was met by accusations of violating the “One Country Two Systems” principle and risked foreign sanctions. Two developments during the 2019 protests were crucial for prompting Beijing’s enactment of HKNSL. In 2019, Hong Kong politicians and activists lobbied extensively overseas for sanctions on China and Hong Kong, placing pressure on the U.S. Congress and government to pass the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. The Act would enable the U.S. government to cancel Hong Kong’s special trade status if it considers that the autonomy and freedom of Hong Kong are under threat to the extent that the “One Country, Two Systems” is no longer being upheld. The U.S. government may also sanction individuals responsible for damaging Hong Kong’s human rights. The Act was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by President Trump in November 2019. Hong Kong activists also lobbied for other western countries to follow the U.S. example by enacting Magnitsky-Act-like legislations to sanction people who offend human rights in Hong Kong. The other trend that alarmed Beijing was the rising support for pro-independence or self-determination ideas in Hong Kong. Anti-China or “localist” sentiments had been on the rise in Hong Kong since 2008, especially among the younger generation. After the 2014 Umbrella Movement failed to bring about full democracy in Hong Kong, residents had been disillusioned by the lack of democratic progress and tighter control from Beijing. They came to believe that Hong Kong would not enjoy true freedom and democracy under Chinese sovereignty. When “Liberate Hong Kong; Revolution of Our Times(光復香港, 時代革命),” a slogan coined by independentist Edward Leung, was used by many as a battle cry during the 2019 movement, Beijing saw the Anti-Extradition protests as a separatist movement. It is believed that Beijing made the decision about HKNSL in the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in October 2019, whose legislative process is suspected to have been delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Before the enactment of HKNSL there were no laws in Hong Kong to forbid international lobbying against China or Hong Kong, nor ban separatist ideas or actions. Article 23 of the Basic Law stipulates that the Hong Kong government should enact laws on its own to prohibit treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state secrets, and prohibit foreign political organizations from conducting political activities in Hong Kong. In 2003, the Hong Kong government proposed a National Security Bill, but was forced to withdraw it after 500,000 people took to the streets to protest the Bill. By 2019, Hong Kong still had not enacted laws under Article 23, which Beijing saw as a major “constitutional loophole.”  HKNSL came as a shock for various reasons. Many in Hong Kong had believed that while Beijing was unhappy about the aforementioned “loophole,” the National Security Law would be enacted through Hong Kong’s legislative process as stipulated in the Basic Law. In contrast, the law was drafted in Beijing and within the national legislature, without prior consultations with Hong Kong. The contents of the law were decided by the NPC Standing Committee, and the provisions were disclosed on June 30, 2020, one hour before it came into effect. The Hong Kong Bar Association identified this as a violation of the Basic Law. The provisions of the HKNSL are harsh and all-encompassing. The law generally seeks to forbid four categories of offences: (a) secession; (b) subversion; (c) terrorist activities; (d) collusion with foreign government or external elements. Anybody who organizes, plans, commits or participates in acts that are related to these offences, either with or without violence, and those who incite, advocate or provide financial support to these acts can be found guilty. “Principal offenders” can be sent to jail for no less than 10 years, up to life imprisonment. The law is deemed applicable to non-Hong Kong people and to acts outside Hong Kong (Article 58). A Committee for Safeguarding National Security would be set up in Hong Kong, together with an Office for Safeguarding National Security staffed by mainland officials, which will be responsible for supervising the implementation of the law, investigation and intelligence. The decisions by the Committee are not subject to judicial review in Hong Kong. A group of designated judges, appointed by the Hong Kong Chief Executive, will handle the court cases related to national security. If deemed necessary, trials for national security cases can be without a jury, be closed to the public and the media, and the suspect can be denied bail. Article 55 rules that if the case is too complex, involving foreign elements and there is an imminent threat to national security, the mainland judiciary can take over the case. The writing of HKNSL has a clear eye on the 2019 protests and opposition movements from that period. The “Collusion” section criminalizes those who “request” or “conspire with” a foreign country, institution, organization or individual to impose sanctions on Hong Kong or China. Violent street actions, strikes, the blocking of roads, rail tracks and public transport, which are protest repertoires from 2019, can all be charged under “terrorist activities,” and are punishable by long jail sentences. Filibusters by legislators or attacks on government buildings (e.g. police stations) can be charged under “subversion” since Article 22 (3) and (4) ban acts that “seriously interfering in, disrupting, or undermining the performance of duties and functions” of the Chinese and Hong Kong governments. Mainland officials will come to directly oversee national security matters, and it seems that when a case enters the realm of national security, the defendants can be denied basic legal rights usually enjoyed by individuals under the common law system. Beijing may have underestimated the international responses to HKNSL. The anti-extradition protests since June 2019 have aroused a lot of western attention to and sympathy for Hong Kong. Amidst heightened Sino-U.S. rivalry, the Hong Kong issue has become an important item on the bilateral negotiation agenda. U.S. attitude to China has taken a sharp turn in recent years. The U.S. government increasingly views China as an economic rival and as a powerful autocratic country that threatens global democracy and freedom. Sympathizing with Hong Kong’s anti-extradition protests, and with the pressure to adopt sanctions that would deter China from further damaging Hong Kong’s freedom, the U.S. government expedited the passing of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic further aggravated Sino-U.S. relations, and heightened hostile sentiments of other western and non-western countries towards China. Support for Hong Kong in its battle against China became a bipartisan consensus in U.S. The imposition of HKNSL by the NPC led the U.S. to adopt sanctions against China and Hong Kong. The passing of HKNSL also received condemnation and expressions of concern from Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and others. The U.S. Congress swiftly passed a new Hong Kong Autonomy Act, which was signed into law on July 14 by President Trump. The official position of the U.S. government is that due to HKNSL, Hong Kong has lost its freedom and autonomy to merit a special trade status different from that of China. Therefore, with HKNSL, trade restrictions on China can also be imposed on Hong Kong. In August, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Department announced that goods from Hong Kong could no longer bear the label “Made in Hong Kong,” but should use “Made in China” instead. On August 7, the U.S. announced sanctions on 11 officials from China and Hong Kong, including Chief Executive Carrie Lam, for their roles in the enactment of HKNSL and involvement in human rights violations in Hong Kong during the previous last year. Other western countries have not yet followed the U.S. footsteps in adopting sanctions. Their immediate response was to stop extradition agreements with Hong Kong (including Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Finland and the U.S.). The United Kingdom and other countries made policy changes that would facilitate Hong Kong people to migrate to or seek political refuge in their state. The United Kingdom (U.K.) government saw HKNSL as a breach of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, and declared that an estimated 2.9 million Hong Kong residents born before 1997 and are eligible for the British National Overseas (BNO) passport, would be allowed to reside and work in the United Kingdom for up to five years, and then convert to a full citizenship a year later. The Chinese and Hong Kong governments have emphasized that HKNSL targets only a small number of separatists, terrorists, or foreign collaborators, and that the “One Country, Two Systems” principle and related freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong people would not be affected. Yet the damages and negative image created by the law far exceed this. Political groups such as Demosisto, a young group led by Joshua Wong, and some other pro-independence groups, dissolved themselves after the enactment of the law. Activist and former legislator Nathan Law, who partook actively in international lobbying, left Hong Kong for London to continue his lobbying work. Politically sensitive books were pulled from shelves of libraries and bookstores. During the two months after the enactment of HKNSL, the number of arrests has not been as extensive as many had feared. On July 1, ten protesters were arrested under HKNSL, mostly for chanting slogans or showing placards related to independence. On July 29, four members of a pro-independence student group, which had disbanded itself on July 1, were arrested for sharing a pro-independence declaration on the internet. Some pro-independence activists, who had fled Hong Kong by July 1, were placed on the wanted list. The most eye-catching arrests took place on August 10, two days after the U.S. announced sanctions on China and Hong Kong officials. Media tycoon Jimmy Lai, whose newspaper Apple Daily has been a most important and popular pro-democracy paper in Hong Kong, was arrested together with his two sons and associates. The photo showing 200 police officers searching the Apple Daily premise did irreparable damage to the image of press freedom in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s reputation as a free city had taken a severe blow since the 2019 protests, and HKNSL has only exacerbated the problem.   Conclusion Hong Kong has walked itself into the mega-chess game of Sino-U.S. rivalry within a renewed Cold War setup. Since 2019, activists and protesters in Hong Kong thought they needed to raise the stakes of confrontation with Beijing by demanding for western sanctions, looking to extract concessions from China and force political change. The hard-line response from Beijing, including HKNSL, quickly escalated the stakes. The freedom and autonomy in Hong Kong would become an important chip in the Sino-U.S. diplomacy for some time to come. It is still too early to see the full impacts of HKNSL on the freedom and civil society development in Hong Kong. With its broad coverage, vague wordings and heavy penalty, HKNSL hangs as a Sword of Damocles over most dissidents and civil society groups in Hong Kong even without an extensive application. Western pressure and possible sanctions are able to temporarily constrain the law’s extensiveness and harshness. The maintenance of the freedom and autonomy of Hong Kong is taking on much complicated dimensions, embedded in the bigger picture of new Sino-U.S. confrontations.■     ■ Ma Ngok is Associate Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interest includes Hong Kong Government and Politics, Democratization, Parties and Elections, and social movements. He has published seven books and more than 20 journal articles on Hong Kong politics. His most recent work includes The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong Amsterdam University Press.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 209)  |  [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

Ma Ngok 2020-08-31Views : 95979
Commentary Issue Briefing
[Asia Democracy Issue Briefing] Corona-Tracking and Privacy: The Opposite Approaches of South Korea and Japan

Editor's Note In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, governments all around the world have come up with various countermeasures to track and flatten the curve of the virus. Professor Maiko Ichihara from the Hitotusubashi University’s Graduate School of Law looks at IT-based tracking methods as one of these countermeasures, which have been widely used in countries including China, Singapore, and Malaysia but gained the most attention for its use in South Korea. In this paper, she analyzes the effectiveness of the South Korean government’s tracking system with regard to the reduced time required for data collection and analysis. But in doing so, she also raises possible concerns related to privacy breaches due to the sources the government uses to collect the data of COVID-19 patients. She also compares South Korea’s technology with Japan’s less invasive tracking app, COCOA, which relies on Bluetooth to detect devices that are in the vicinity of confirmed patients. While it is based on the user’s own initiative to download and use the app themselves, it lessens the effectiveness of the system. Professor Ichihara concludes that the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the importance of “preserving privacy and freedom both online and offline.”   .a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;}   COVID-19 emerged as an invisible enemy for the human being. It is not easy to fight this enemy when we do not know who is infected or what surfaces the virus may be on. Governments have begun using IT to track infected people in order to make this invisible enemy as visible and manageable as possible. IT-based tracking methods were in use even before the COVID-19 outbreak, triggered by the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. As a countermeasure against terrorism, technologies such as biometric identification and facial recognition were developed and widely used, especially for immigration control. Advances in AI have further increased the speed and accuracy of personal identification, and combined with the widespread use of GPS, the Internet, smartphones, closed-circuit TVs, and IC cards, the foundations have been laid for individual surveillance. Various countries and regions, including China, Singapore, and Penang in Malaysia, have built smart cities using these technologies. However, to date there has not been large-scale surveillance of individuals in democratic countries.   COVID-19 Tracking by South Korea In this context, the South Korean government's early initiation of coronavirus tracking has attracted attention. The government's swift deployment of tracking measures was made possible by its experience with the MERS epidemic in 2015. The Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Act was amended in response to MERS to make it possible for the government to request telecommunication and other relevant companies to provide personal information on those who are infected or suspected of infection. Based on this Act, the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) has used credit card history, closed-circuit TV records, GPS functions on phones, and smart cards for public transportation to track the moves of confirmed cases, and has alerted those who may have come into contact with them. Although the names of the infected are not disclosed, their behavioral histories, along with personal information such as gender, age, and nationality, have been made public on the KCDC website. Those who enter the country from abroad are required to install a self-examination app at the immigration office and register information about their passport number, country of residence, and health status. They must enter their health information for 14 days, and if they forget to do so for four days, they will be reported to the police. In late March, the Korea Electronic Technology Institute, KCDC, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport developed the Epidemic Investigation Support System (EISS) based on a Smart City data platform, which collects information related to urban planning. The Smart City was originally scheduled to be tested in February 2020 but has been converted to a COVID-19 countermeasure system. Once KCDC enters the information on confirmed cases, authorized agents request personal information needed to track these cases from the telecommunication and credit card companies through EISS. In response, the companies upload the information to EISS either automatically or manually. The tracking and analysis of hotspots using the EISS reduced the time required to collect and analyze data on infected persons from 2–3 days to less than one hour. As a result, South Korea has quickly examined and isolated infection suspects. Messages are also shared with people who might have come into contact with the infected persons to raise awareness of their own potential for infection. Despite the early outbreak in Daegue, the tracking system has contributed to controlling the spread of infection to this day, allowing people to continue their daily lives without lockdown. The country even managed to hold its legislative election in April. The EISS has paid attention to minimizing privacy breaches and to preventing the hacking of personal information. Personal information of infected people can be browsed on EISS only up to 14 days according to the virus’s incubation period. The number of investigators authorized to access the information is limited as well. The only data accessible is related to the infection route, and information from closed-circuit TV or face recognition systems are not linked to it. To prevent hacking, investigators log in via VPN and two-factor authentication. The database is encrypted. However, this approach still does not eliminate privacy violation completely. The fact that the authority obtains personal information without the consent of either the individuals themselves or the courts is problematic and raises concerns of abuse. In particular, there is no clear timeframe set for the use of this system and the storage of individual data. The pandemic itself is expected to be prolonged, and the possibility of the use of the system for different purposes after the pandemic cannot be completely ruled out. This concern was compounded by the revelation that the South Korean government is still holding personal data on those who were infected with MERS in 2015. Kwon Jun-wook, director of the National Institute of Health, told a press conference in early June that they have decided to store data on MERS-infected individuals permanently. This is a move that violates the Personal Information Protection Act, which requires data on infected individuals to be deleted without delay. Although the government says that it will delete information on the confirmed cases of COVID-19 after the pandemic, based on the MERS precedent, the government's statement is not considered credible. In addition, the fact that an excessive amount of personal information on infected individuals is made public has been a problem, both domestically and internationally. Social media is used to search for the infected persons and to pry into their private lives, violating their individual dignity and discriminating against them. Oh Byoung-il of the Korean Progressive Network says that the personal information of infected people such as gender, nationality, and age are not necessary in warning about the possibility of contact. In addition, people with symptoms may be hesitant to take a COVID-19 test if they fear the breach of privacy, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea warns.Nevertheless, individual tracking is used in South Korea because the public generally supports the government's approach of controlling the virus while tolerating privacy violations to some extent.   Japan Hesitant to Obtain Personal Information In Japan, on the other hand, there has always been a strong sense of aversion to the invasion of privacy, and the government has not allowed health officials to access personal information. While Japan has traced the moves of confirmed cases to prevent the formation of clusters just as in South Korea, information on their moves has been obtained through interviews. The introduction of an app to track contact with infected people was examined carefully, and COCOA was introduced on June 19, five months after the first case of infection was discovered in Japan. While the South Korean system allows the authority to access personal information, COCOA is a system developed by Google and Apple which uses Bluetooth to reveal information on contact. It notes within the individual’s own phone the presence of devices that have been within one meter of each other for more than 15 minutes, with a random IDs issued every 10 minutes. The ID information stored on the individual's phone is not sent to the central server, but if a person tests positive for COVID-19 and enters the number issued by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare into the app himself/herself, the ID-related information is sent to the central server. Notifications are then sent to the devices that may have been in the vicinity of the device of the confirmed case. The system is not tied to personal information, such as location, and the government cannot access personal information through COCOA. Nevertheless, due to the fear of personal information leaks, the number of downloads within a month of the announcement was only 7.69 million. The download is limited especially among the younger generation. There is also a probability that people will not register the fact of infection, and indeed, the number of registrations of infection in one month was only 27. Without an increase in the number of users, the effectiveness of this system will not increase. Some commentators point out that the weak level of trust in government might be a stumbling block for downloads. In addition, there is also a widespread concern in the society about the misuse of information by the app companies. As such, concerns about privacy violations have prevented the government from an effective use of IT-based tracking in Japan. However, the government’s approach unfortunately did not guarantee the protection of human rights; the absence of coercive government control led to voluntary mutual monitoring of people in the society. The emergence of a number of so-called “Jishuku Keisatsu” (self-restraint police), who voluntarily protest, report to the police, and threaten people for going out, not wearing masks, or continuing to operate their businesses has become a social problem. Despite the government's choice of measures to respect privacy and civil liberties, people are acting to suppress each other's civil liberties.   Conclusion While there is no protection of human rights without life, we need to move with one eye on the post-COVID society. Allowing excessive privacy violations by governments is dangerous because it could be the basis for an authoritarian surveillance society; the encapsulation of various restrictive measures in the EISS is sensible. In addition, it would be desirable for the Korean government to set deadlines for access to personal information and commit to deleting personal information after the pandemic, and to do so in a manner that allows for public scrutiny. In Japan, there is a need for continued advocacy on how mutual surveillance suppresses civil liberties. It is advisable to educate people about the issue of self-restraint police, as has occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, as a part of civic education. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to increased interaction on the Internet and will make it even easier to monitor individuals in the future. We need to begin tackling this issue and take steps to preserve privacy and freedom both online and offline.■     ■ Maiko Ichihara is Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and a Visiting Scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. She is also a co-chair of the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications include: “Universality to Plurality? Values in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberalism: Japan and the International Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017).   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 209)  |  [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

Maiko Ichihara 2020-07-27Views : 14332
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Executive powers of Ordinance versus Legislation: The Case of Pakistan

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ You can visit our ADRN site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note In Pakistan, governments have promulgated a number of ordinances as a way to bypass legislative procedures in the Parliament. Over the years, governments, regardless of what type of the governments they are, have resorted to the practice of promulgating ordinances instead of engaging with oppositions and constructive debates, which is essential to retain the spirit of democracy. In this context, Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob argues that the Constitution should be amended to omit the provision of ordinances so that the only legitimate route for legislations is one that should passes through the Parliament. Mr. Mehboob further stresses the importance of public awareness on the promulgation of ordinances as a highly undesirable practice in a democracy.     Pakistan is one of the few democratic countries that have retained the power to legislate by executive decree, or ordinances. In a classical democracy, legislation is the sole prerogative of the legislature but in Pakistan and a few other countries, the executive branch can be authorized to legislate under a constitutional provision. Article 89 of the Constitution of Pakistan authorizes that the “President may, except when the Senate or National Assembly is in session, if satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action, make and promulgate an ordinance as the circumstances may require.” Apparently, this provision was meant to be used only under very extraordinary situations when the Parliament is neither in session nor can be summoned to meet at an early date while the legislation is of such an urgent nature that it cannot be deferred. However, when we look back at the circumstances since the enactment of the 1973 Constitution in Pakistan in which ordinances have been issued, it is difficult to identify an ordinance of such urgent nature that could not have waited until the next parliamentary session. An overwhelming majority of the ordinances have been promulgated in Pakistan out of convenience because the government at the time did not want to debate with the Parliament in order to justify the proposed legislation. Ordinances have become a handy tool for bypassing the Parliament. During several occasions, governments have resorted to ordinances in situations where they lack the majority in either of the two houses of the Parliament. In addition, instead of engaging with the opposition and incorporating their ideas into the proposed legislation, successive governments have adopted the shortcut approach of law-making through promulgating ordinances. Prior to the adoption of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2010, which barred ordinances from being promulgated more than once, ordinances were issued multiple times to overcome their 120-day limitation. It was also common for ordinances to be promulgated a day or a few hours before the convening of the house of Parliament, which practically defied the very essence of the constitutional provision on ordinances. Although India, Pakistan's neighbor, also has a constitutional provisions regarding ordinances, India has not used this provision with so much relish as Pakistan. Since August 1973, Pakistan has promulgated more than three times as many ordinances (1,774) compared with India (533). Over the years, it has become very clear in Pakistan that the practice of promulgating ordinances runs counter to the spirit of democracy. There has hardly been a government during the past 46-plus years since the passing of the 1973 Constitution that has retained the spirit of democracy by refraining from enacting ordinances. This applies to a total of 28 governments led by an equal number of chief executives during the past 46 or so years including 16 elected governments, ten caretaker governments and two military governments. The two military governments led by Gen Ziaul Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf ran for a combined duration of almost 11 years (this does not include the periods when quasi-democratic setups was established under the presidency of the two military dictators). During these purely military governments, a total of 680 ordinances were promulgated which corresponds to over 63 ordinances per year. Ten caretaker governments lasted for a total duration of more than two years and issued 140 ordinances, translating to a little less than 59 ordinances per year. 16 elected governments, with a total duration of a little over 33 years, issued 954 ordinances. The average number of ordinances in this case works out to a little less than 29 per year. The above analysis indicates that military governments, on average, have promulgated the highest number—more than 63 per year—of ordinances. Caretaker governments promulgated the next highest number — a little less than 59 ordinances per year during their combined duration. Elected democratic governments, although they carry the most scrutiny by the public, issued a relatively low number—of less than 29—ordinances per year during their total duration. With regard to the two military governments, although Gen Zia’s government issued far more ordinances in absolute terms (407) compared to the ones promulgated by Gen Musharraf’s government (273), the average number of ordinances issued during Musharraf's government (around 88 per year) exceeded that of Zia's government (around 53 ordinances per year). Among the caretaker setups, Malik Meraj Khalid’s government (November 1996 to February 1997) issued the highest number of ordinances, totaling 51 in just over three and a half months. In terms of the performance of the 16 elected governments in promulgating ordinances, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto’s second government (October 1993 to November 1996) issued the highest number of ordinances (357) while Mohammad Khan Junejo’s government (March 1985 to May 1988) issued the least number of ordinances (10). Prime Minister Imran Khan’s current government, though criticized for issuing a large number of ordinances since August 2018, ranks ninth among the 16 elected governments since 1973 in terms of the average number of ordinances issued per year with 18 ordinances. Prime Minister Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government also has a thin majority in the National Assembly and lacks a majority by a considerable margin in the Senate. The spirit of democracy demands that the Constitution be preferably amended to omit the provision of ordinances so that the only legitimate route for legislations is one that passes through the Parliament. In the meantime, awareness should be created so that the public can identify the promulgation of ordinances as a highly undesirable practice in a democracy. In doing so, voters will hold such a practice or excessive ordinance promulgation against any government and strive for a more inclusive legislation in the Parliament.     ■ Ahmed Bilal Mehboob is the founder and president of PILDAT. He has over 25-year experience in senior management and advisory positions and over 15-year experience in design, planning and implementation of projects in the field of parliamentary development, strengthening democratic institutions, democratization, political discourse, election monitoring and dialogues for reconciliation. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, one of Pakistan’s leading analysts of political, legislative, and electoral affairs, has been devoted to strengthening democracy and democratic institutions and providing thought leadership on crucial issues that affect quality of democracy and governance in the country. Mr. Mehboob has carved a non-partisan political research initiative from the platform of PILDAT and spearheaded objective and non-partisan, evidence-based analysis and policy reform initiatives on areas such as political and institutional reform including in areas of democracy, governance, rule of law, political parties, local governments, electoral processes, civil-military relations, federation-provinces relations, women and youth in politics, etc. Under the leadership of Mr. Mehboob, PILDAT, established in 2001, is widely recognized for quality, seriousness and objectivity of its policy analyses and reform proposals.   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.    

Ahmed Bilal Mehboob 2020-06-24Views : 10931
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Guarding Democratic Values: South Korea’s Successful Fight against the Coronavirus

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ You can visit our ADRN site to view the original text or download the pdf.   Editor's Note COVID-19 has overtaken the international community throughout the first quarter of 2020. It has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and over three million confirmed cases, wreaking havoc on all aspects of society, including the global economy and politics. The countries affected by COVID-19 include those where members of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) reside. Some of these countries have officially announced lockdowns of cities or the entire country, with economic activities slowing to a near-total halt. During this pandemic, South Korea, which is a member country of ADRN, has emerged as a global model for its handling of the COVID-19 crisis. Dr. Sook Jong Lee discusses South Korea’s management of COVID-19 and the democratic value it offers. She explains that South Korea has been relatively successful in managing the pandemic, which has been praised by several figures of the United States. She points out that the public’s voluntary compliance with social distancing has been the key to success. Regarding South Korea’s recent election, she explains that the postponement of the general election has not been discussed seriously since it is considered to be a “fundamental component of democracy” by Koreans. However, she also proposes that South Korea needs to strike “the right balance between surveillance and privacy” in handling the pandemic by utilizing advanced IT infrastructure to practice contact tracing.     South Korea’s Impressive COVID-19 Crisis Management Aggressive testing by public health authorities, efficient contact tracing utilizing the country’s advanced IT infrastructure, and physical distancing campaigns are all credited for making South Korea’s fight against COVID-19 so successful. The country’s successful flattening of the virus curve has drawn international attention.[1] South Korea is currently working on sharing its quarantine model with other countries.[2] The country’s first confirmed patient of this deadly virus was reported on January 20. The number of patients remained very low until mid-February, when the city of Daegu became South Korea’s epicenter. The curve of infections peaked in early March and began to flatten in late March. As of May 13, South Korea has reported a total of 10,962 confirmed cases, with 1,008 currently in isolation and a death toll of 259.[3] Thanks to this impressive health crisis management, President Moon Jae-in’s once declining approval rate rose sharply and his party won a landslide victory in the April 15 parliamentary elections. This successful crisis management of COVID-19 has been praised by American media and public officials, including U.S. President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The reason is obvious. While the Chinese government boasts of its relatively quick “ending” of COVID-19 using draconian lockdown measures, the Korean case is applauded as an alternative democratic model. For example, Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin wrote that South Korea has shown that democracies are better suited to protect public health by focusing on transparency and openness in contrast to Beijing’s pattern of distortion and distraction.[4] It is true that illiberal democracies are centralizing power while closing democratic space.[5] For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has used the coronavirus to strengthen his authoritarian rule. The Chinese government admonished Dr. Lee Wenliang, a whistleblower about the virus when it first emerged, and oppressed opinions that don’t adhere to the official party line. Liberal democracies are not free from the risk of making missteps that can undermine democratic governance. President Emmanuel Macron alluded to the idea that the French constitution gives the president emergency powers, but he withdrew this remark amidst criticism. President Donald Trump tweeted that his constitutional power over the states is “total.”[6] It is worthwhile to examine the challenges when democracies try to strike a balance between public safety and individual liberty by looking at how South Korea overcame these same challenges. With 16.1% of the total government budget for 2020, South Korea’s Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) spends more than any other ministry. But its health budget remains at just 2.5% while the remainder is used on social welfare programs. Nevertheless, the country’s health system is strong, with well-equipped medical facilities and inexpensive medical services readily available under the national health insurance program. After the 2015 MERS outbreak, the government reorganized its disease control system in cooperation with the medical community. In this context, after the RNA sequence of the novel coronavirus was made public on January 10, Korean biotech companies quickly developed COVID-19 test kits by early February and the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) fast-tracked approval.[7] The MOHW also was innovative in dealing with the excessive demand for masks after some brief initial confusion.[8] The KCDC has emerged as a trustworthy control tower by informing people about the status of virus outbreaks and clearly explaining what guidelines everyone should follow. Its Director-General, Jeong Eun-kyung, has particularly contributed to building public trust in government with her persuasive posture and professional expertise. The KCDC’s daily briefings have been accepted as a reliable source information that leaves no room for political interpretation. Considering the divided politics that have invited controversy in government crisis management in the past, delegating much of the public authority to the KCDC was a wise move. Now, politicians are in favor of promoting the KCDC as an independent agency from its current status as part of the MOHW.   Worthwhile Health Crisis Governance Issues for Democracies The South Korean government’s policy on movement restrictions was not welcomed by the public initially. One controversial issue has been travel bans. The government evacuated Koreans from Wuhan City after the WHO’s official announcement on January 30 that COVID-19 was a global health emergency. The government then banned travelers from Hubei Province, where Wuhan is located, on February 4. As other East Asian countries like Taiwan and Singapore introduced bans on travel from anywhere in mainland China, this limited travel ban became a target for criticism. Opposition politicians attacked President Moon for kowtowing to Xi Jinping to preserve the possibility of an official visit to South Korea later this year. Public opinion was also negative for two reasons. First, some believed that the outbreak in Daegu City could have been prevented if a travel ban for all of mainland China had been introduced earlier. Second, some people did not agree with the rationale of continuing to allow the entry of travelers to sustain the economy even as numerous countries banned travelers from South Korea. But the Moon government has consistently maintained an open-door policy, introducing strict quarantine measures for both Koreans and foreigners entering the country at the end of March. Except for Hubei Province, Korea did not introduce any travel bans, although the government did eventually stop allowing visa-free travel from countries that had enacted bans on Korean travelers[9]. Among OECD countries, only South Korea and the UK have kept an essentially open international travel policy in containing COVID-19 so far. Korea’s open containment policy is further highlighted by the handling of Daegu City, South Korea’s COVID-19 epicenter. As the number of infected people in the city began to skyrocket in late February, a ruling party spokesperson suggested locking the city down. This idea immediately drew wide criticism and he stepped down from his position. Keeping the city open is viewed as a politically sensitive issue—the city has been the stronghold of conservative politicians for decades, including the former President Park Geun-hye, who was impeached. The secret of Korea’s successful containment of the virus outbreak also lies in the public’s voluntary compliance with social distancing. The South Korean government initially launched a four-week social distancing campaign until April 19 and then extended it to May 5. The campaign encouraged the cancellation of events with large numbers of attendees. Schooling and church services moved online, while companies were encouraged to implement work from home when possible. Shops and restaurants have stayed open except for a temporary closure of entertainment clubs and room salons. Since the enforcement of this campaign has been essentially voluntary, it could not have been successful without the cooperation of civil society. The biggest experiment in social distancing was the parliamentary election held on April 15. More than a quarter of voters cast their ballots during two days of pre-election day voting, which were instituted to distribute the number of voters over a period of several days and avoid crowding. Voters, all wearing masks, lined up six feet apart and had their temperatures taken before they entered the voting booth. Special booths were set up for those who had a fever, and the booths were thoroughly disinfected after each use. Voters in self-isolation during the elections were permitted to go vote during a special limited time period after regular voting had closed for the day. The idea of postponing the election was never seriously debated, since carrying out an election on its scheduled date is viewed as such a fundamental component of democracy by South Koreans. One issue South Koreans need to pay heed to is striking the right balance between surveillance and privacy. People confirmed to have contracted the coronavirus are tracked by the GPS in their smartphones, and a record of their movements is sent to the smartphones of everyone nearby as an emergency alert. These people are identified by numbers rather than names. But, there is no question that this system is invasive. Stricter surveillance is applied to people who are self-isolating, usually at home, following a possible exposure. Their compliance with quarantine is monitored by their smartphone GPS, and a supervising officer calls several times a day to check whether they are really at their residence. After several instances of people cheating or violating this surveillance rule, the idea of having those in quarantine wear wrist band monitors entered the policy debate. Civic groups have protested that this measure would harm the privacy and human rights of individuals. The health authority compromised, agreeing to implement wrist band monitors only when people who have already violated the self-isolation rules once consent to do so. The recent episode of popular attacks against sexual minorities deserves special attention. Following multiple days of zero new domestic cases, the government relaxed its physical distancing campaign on May 6. However, a young man who visited several clubs in the Itaewon district in Seoul during a long public holiday in early May was diagnosed just after the social distancing campaign ended, and turned out to be another super-spreader. Young men and women with active social lives can become silent virus disseminators. Several of the clubs that this particular young man visited were identified as gay clubs, and he was outed as a homosexual and has faced personal attacks in digital spaces ever since. Many other patrons of these clubs who might have been infected through this Itaewon link remain fearful of being tested for the virus as they don’t wish to be involuntarily outed and face the harsh social stigma that remains pervasive in South Korea against sexual minorities. The number of those who have been infected through the Itaewon clubs is approaching 119 as of May 13, and the planned re-opening of schools has been delayed. Public anger over the resurgence of COVID-19 cases has led to harsh criticism of gay people online as being irresponsible about public safety. In an attempt to quell the fears of people who may have been exposed and encourage everyone to get tested, the government has increased penalties for anyone who does not come forward and also made it possible for residents to be tested by only providing their phone number and not their name.   Searching for the Right Balance between Public Safety and Individual Privacy South Korea deserves a huge amount of credit for managing the coronavirus crisis democratically. The government has constantly maintained an open disease containment policy both domestically and internationally. It has provided information about the spread of COVID-19 transparently and offered reliable and consistent guidelines. Its collaboration with biotech companies was critical in producing large numbers of test kits for use. South Korean civil society has actively participated in the social distancing campaign critical in mitigating the spread of COVID in the community. Without public trust in government, their voluntary compliance would not be possible. Balancing the responsibility of the government to conduct surveillance with the value of individual privacy rights is not an easy task during an unprecedented health crisis like this. Nevertheless, some measures for tracking the infected disproportionally discount individual rights. Popular attacks against the gay community should be stopped in particular. This issue must be addressed by all democracies since this liberal value of individual rights is the crucial criteria that distinguishes democratic health governance from authoritarian health governance. In addition, all democratic governments must relinquish their enforcement power once the crisis has ended. As people will rely more on the government during the economic recovery phase, civil society groups should act as a check against centralized administrative power to ensure that it is not abused or misused.   [1] https://www.businessinsider.com/south-koreas-coronavirus-curve-timeline-2020-4; [2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xAVolr-_LqY&feature=youtu.be; https://medium.com/@indica/the-korean-playbook-for-covid-19-translated-c726aa21c0a3 [3] COVID-19, Republic of Korea, http://ncov.mohw.go.kr/en/ [4] Josh Rogin, “South Korea shows that democracies can succeed against the coronavirus,” Washington Post, March 11, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/11/south-korea-shows-that-democracies-can-succeed-against-coronavirus/ [5] Frances Z. Brown et al., “How Will the Coronavirus Reshape Democracy and Governance Globally?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/06/how-will-coronavirus-reshape-democracy-and-governance-globally-pub-81470 [6] Constanze Stelzenmuller, “Coronavirus is also a threat to democratic institutions,” April 15, 2020, Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/15/coronavirus-is-also-a-threat-to-democratic-constitutions [7] “South Korea Listened to the Experts,” CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/07/opinions/terence-kealey-south-korea-listened-to-the-experts/index.html [8] Manufacturers could not provide enough masks to consumers due to excessive demand. Masks were difficult to buy even at a higher price. After the government introduced a temporary mask export ban and appointed designated days for members of the public to purchase masks in pharmacies according to the last digit of the year they were born, long queues to buy masks disappeared in April. [9] http://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20200409/2033366/1/S-Korea-belatedly-imposes-travel-ban-on-88-countries     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University and senior fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).   ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

Sook Jong Lee 2020-05-19Views : 13565