EAI launched the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) in November 2013 to conduct research related to democratic governance and human rights promotion in Asia. EAI serves as a representative of domestic think tanks and leads the organization of regional think tanks in Asia. It is responsible for supporting and managing research related to democracy at associated research institutes. ADRN was established to analyze threats to democracy in Asia and to promote discussions and practical research projects that could contribute to the consolidation of democracy in the region. Aimed at presenting policies based on research, ADRN examines threats and challenges to democracy by identifying and studying practical agendas for developing regional democracy in Asia. The network includes 22 major think tanks from 14 Asian countries including Taiwan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines, as well as South Korea’s EAI. 

Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Democratic Backsliding in India

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [Editor’s note] Once considered the most populous democracy in the world, recent developments in India show that India is set on a path to losing its title. Analyses conducted by the Freedom House and the V-Dem Institute claiming that India’s democracy has lost its integrity is not a surprise to India-watchers observant of the recent trajectory of the Indian government. In this Issue Briefing, Neelanjan Sircar, Assistant Professor at Ashoka University, looks into the demotion of India’s status in various democratic indices. An investigation into Prime Minister Modi’s BJP government shows that the execution of anti-democratic laws and practices, prevalent throughout India’s history, has increased. The sedition law and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act have been used to stifle voices of opposition against the government. Additionally, not only has the mass media been increasingly biased towards the BHP, but the government has resorted to internet (and phone data) shutdowns and harassing key opposition leaders when it senses threat. Amid such troubling developments, the author calls upon the necessity for India to refrain from using legal machinery and harassing critics of the government. If such practices continue, prospects for the restoration of democracy in India will remain bleak.   An Overview of Democratic Decline India has long been considered the world’s most populous democracy, but recent developments in the country have called into question the integrity of its democracy. In May 2019, the incumbent Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi secured a second term in a landslide victory — winning 303 out of 543 seats (with its governing alliance winning a total of 353 seats). This marked the first time since 1984 that a single party won the majority of seats in back-to-back national elections. But along with electoral dominance have come charges of weakening state institutions and intimidation of political opponents and government critics, leading to what many scholars call “democratic backsliding.” These concerns gained worldwide attention with the publication of two recent reports from agencies that assess the quality of democracy around the world.   In its 2021 report, Freedom House, a non-governmental organization, downgraded India’s status from “free” to “partly free” because the Indian government “presided over rising violence and discriminatory policies affecting the Muslim population and pursued a crackdown on expressions of dissent by the media, academics, civil society groups, and protesters.”[1] Freedom House relies on country experts and internal procedures to assess a country’s quality of democracy.   Soon after this report was released, the Sweden-based V-Dem Institute downgraded India from an “electoral democracy” to an “electoral autocracy.”[2] Unlike the rating system used by the Freedom House, V-Dem uses a nearly exhaustive list of indicators and statistical modeling to derive its indices. These methods portrayed a similar diminution in the quality of India’s democracy, with V-Dem observing “a gradual deterioration where freedom of the media, academia, and civil society were curtailed first and to the greatest extent.”   To put things into perspective, the liberal democracy index (LDI) developed by V-Dem shows India’s democratic status at levels last seen between the years of 1975 and 1977 — when then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared martial law or “Emergency” across India — a period widely considered to have constituted the formal suspension of India’s democracy. Furthermore, these are not methods that judge only non-Western countries harshly. For instance, the United States also displays a precipitous drop in its LDI score after 2016, when Donald Trump was elected president.   From a theoretical standpoint, it has long been believed that democracies are most effective, that is, they are a form of government most accountable and sensitive to the concerns of citizens when political opposition and civil society can freely bring forth their points of view and criticisms of the ruling government. The ruling government is able to entrench itself in power without responding to citizens’ concerns when opponents of the ruling government (whether formal political actors or ordinary citizens) are harassed or intimidated and mass media refuses to give space to dissenting voices,   Stifling Dissent from Civil Society As in many cases of democratic backsliding, police action and disingenuous interpretation of the law have been used to target critics in civil society. India’s sedition law, section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, is over 150 years old and harkens back to British colonial rule, during which the law was actively used to suppress anti-colonial activities. In fact, Mahatma Gandhi was charged with sedition in the 1920s, a law he referred to as the “prince among the political sections of the Indian Penal Code designed to suppress the liberty of the citizen.”[3]   In recent times, the sedition law has been used to explicitly generate a chilling effect among critics of the government. This sedition law has been used to jail student activists Anirban Bhattacharya, Kanhaiya Kumar, and Umar Khalid for raising “anti-national” slogans at a Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) campus event. In the aftermath, television media made unsubstantiated claims and accusations about the activists, partially based upon a doctored video, to sway public opinion against them.[4] More recently, student environmental activist Disha Ravi was jailed under the sedition law due to her role in furnishing a “toolkit” as a guide for digital campaigns critical of the government.[5]   These are not isolated incidents either. A database of sedition cases in India from 2010 to 2020 found that 65% of all cases had been filed since the election of Prime Minister Modi in 2014. More strikingly, 96% of the sedition cases filed against Indian citizens for being critical of the government or politicians between 2010 and 2020 were filed after Narendra Modi became the prime minister.[6]   Perhaps the most effective legal tool in stifling criticism has been India’s anti-terrorism law, known as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). Soon after having been re-elected, the government introduced an amendment to the UAPA to allow the designation of not only organizations (and members therein), but also individuals as terrorists. Under the UAPA, those arrested need not immediately informed about why they have been arrested (charges can be framed up to 180 days later) and are rarely given bail. Government data shows that the number of cases filed under the UAPA increased by more than 72% from 2015 to 2019 and between 2016 and 2019 only 2.2% of cases ended in conviction.[7] This has led many observers to conclude that the UAPA has been increasingly used to harass individuals critical of the government even when there is no defensible legal case — as cases can take many years to resolve due to India’s case backlog — while a person under trial must continue to be in jail.   One of the most high-profile uses of the UAPA has been in relation to the “Bhima Koregaon violence.” On January 1, 2018, groups representing the Dalit communities (those belonging to the “lowest” caste groups) held an event commemorating the Battle of Koregaon — a historically important event for Dalit communities — in the Bhima Koregaon village in the state of Maharashtra. After right-wing incitement, a group pelted stones upon those in the commemoration leading to the death of a 28-year-old in the subsequent confrontation, triggering massive statewide protests.[8]In the aftermath, several civil rights activists and scholars, most of whom had not taken part in the event — such as Hany Babu, Sudha Bharadwaj, Gautam Navlakha, Varavara Rao, Father Stan Swamy, Anand Teltumbde, Rona Wilson — were charged under the UAPA and are still in jail.[9] There are strong indications, however, that the basis of some of the charges stems from data planted on the computers of the activists,[10] and a number of those jailed are in poor health drawing attention from the UN Human Rights office.[11]   By May 2021, India had experienced a devastating second wave of the coronavirus pandemic, formally peaking at over 400,000 cases and 4,500 deaths per day. Nonetheless, it has been widely understood that this is a severe undercount due to limited testing availability and poor accounting of deaths.[12] Images of overcrowded hospitals, people dying due to the lack of oxygen availability, and makeshift burials and funerary pyres flashed across the globe. The government has sought to counter negative publicity through punitive action. In Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest state, chief minister Yogi Adityanath (who is aligned with the ruling BJP) instructed officials to take action against those “creating fear” by criticizing his government’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic, including hospitals that reported a shortage of oxygen.[13] In another example, the police in the capital city of Delhi, which is controlled by the central government, arrested 24 individuals for posting flyers that questioned Prime Minister Modi’s vaccine policy.[14]   Media and Stymying Political Opposition Since the BJP came to power in 2014, there has been a noticeable shift in Indian mass media.The Indian media is regularly accused of openly displaying bias for the ruling government, bowing to political pressure on a number of matters, and engaging in self-censorship.[15]Most worryingly, there is significant concern that the media engages in “dog whistle” tactics to vilify India’s Muslim community and generate greater Hindu-Muslim polarization (which is considered beneficial for the ruling Hindu nationalist BJP).[16]   With mass media viewed largely biased towards the ruling government, social media may plausibly create spaces for alternate or critical content. In practice, however, online spaces have been flooded with aggressive content and fake news produced by those associated with the Hindu nationalist ideology and anti-Muslim rhetoric.[17] A more troubling development is that the Indian government has resorted to internet (and phone data) shutdowns when it senses threat, essentially cutting off two-way communication between citizens and voices critical of the government. According to available data, of the 155 internet shutdowns recorded in 2020, 109 were in India.[18] (The next closest country was Yemen with six.) The disproportionate use of internet bans in India has been an effective tool in restricting the most critical voices from the political opposition.   But the restriction of opposing political voices does not only pertain to the domain of communication — key opposition leaders have also been jailed or harassed by the central government. On August 5, 2019, the ruling BJP changed the land protections for Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim majority state, which was a long-time demand from Hindu nationalists. At the same time, it unilaterally demoted the state to a “union territory” and divided the state into two. This demotion gave the central government significant power over the region, as regional political actors were often adversarial to the central government.[19] In order to prevent political resistance, the government jailed all key leaders (some of whom still continue to be in custody).[20] Even 82-year-old former chief minister Farooq Abdullah was kept in custody for 7 months.[21] On top of the jailing of key leaders, the government imposed a bruising internet ban that lasted for 18 months.[22]   This activity is not restricted to the contested region of Kashmir. Somewhat surprisingly, despite its dominance in national politics, the BJP has performed poorly in recent state elections.[23] In early 2021, the state of West Bengal went to the polls. The ruling chief minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee (from a party called the Trinamool Congress), has been a strong critic of the BJP. In order to shift the narrative, the BJP aggressively used its state resources in the election campaign, using central agencies like the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate cases and question politicians during the electoral campaign.[24]In the aftermath of the election, in which the BJP was defeated soundly, the CBI has arrested 4 key political leaders, including 2 ministers of the government, affiliated with Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress in a seven-year-old case that had been lying dormant.[25]   In principle, India’s institutions are supposed to act as a check against the erosion of democratic norms, or, at minimum, not function in a biased manner. But often these same institutions have been complicit in stymying critical voices. The Supreme Court, for instance, has been viewed as one of strongest and most independent in the entire world — and one that can effectively counter moves by politicians to curtail liberty. However, like many other contexts undergoing similar cases of democratic backsliding like Hungary and Turkey, the Court has stood down,[26] refusing to act during the aforementioned mass arrests in Jammu and Kashmir.[27] This is not only limited to the courts. In addition to the central police, the income tax department has been regularly used to intimidate politicians,[29] Perhaps most prominently, the ceremonial post of the governor in the Indian system (a political appointee from the central government) has been used to harass state governments in opposition to the ruling BJP.[30] In short, the democratic breakdown is built upon the complicity and manipulation of India’s existing institutions.   Conclusion While the demotion of India’s status in various democratic indices was domestically controversial, a closer look provides a genuine empirical basis for such demotion. While it is true that there have been anti-democratic laws and practices throughout India’s history, some of which harken back to British colonial rule, the conduct of Prime Minister Modi’s BJP government shows a significant increase in the use of these tools. Upon assuming power in 2014, and especially after the re-election in 2019, the ruling BJP has used legal machinery and centrally controlled institutions to harass opposition political leaders and critics of the government in civil society. Indeed, a close reading of the reports that accompany the Freedom House and V-Dem reports highlights these exact factors for the demotion of India’s status in their respective indices. Without a course correction, India will continue down the path of democratic erosion. ■     [1] Freedom in the World 2021— India Country Report. https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2021 [2] Autocratization Turns Viral: Democracy Report 2021. https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/c9/3f/c93f8e74-a3fd-4bac-adfd-ee2cfbc0a375/dr_2021.pdf [3] Republic of dissent: Gandhi’s sedition trial. Live Mint. January 25, 2019. https://www.livemint.com/politics/news/republic-of-dissent-gandhi-s-sedition-trial-1548352744498.html [4] 'We faced a trial by media': The Umar Khalid and Anirban Bhattacharya interview. Scroll. March 19, 2016. https://scroll.in/article/805353/we-faced-a-trial-by-media-the-umar-khalid-and-anirban-bhattacharya-interview [5] Climate Activist Jailed in India as Government Clamps Down on Dissent. New York Times. February 15, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/15/world/asia/climate-activist-jailed-india.html [6] Our New Database Reveals Rise In Sedition Cases In The Modi Era. Article 14. February 2, 2021. https://www.article-14.com/post/our-new-database-reveals-rise-in-sedition-cases-in-the-modi-era [7] Parliament proceedings | Over 72% rise in number of UAPA cases registered in 2019. The Hindu. March 10, 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/parliament-proceedings-over-72-rise-in-number-of-uapa-cases-registered-in-2019/article34029252.ece [8] Violence in Maharashtra as Dalits protest death of 28-year-old in Bhima Koregaon clashes, bandh called in state. Hindustan Times. January 2, 2018. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/violence-in-maharashtra-as-dalits-protest-death-of-28-year-old-in-bhima-koregaon-clashes/story-zerVWqrSjLjF2x53oHMVXL.html [9] Manufacturing Evidence: How the Police is framing and arresting constitutional rights defenders in India. The Polis Project. August 13, 2020. https://thepolisproject.com/manufacturing-evidence-how-the-police-framed-and-arrested-constitutional-right-defenders-in-india/ [10] Further evidence in case against Indian activists accused of terrorism was planted, new report says. Washington Post. April 21, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/04/20/india-bhima-koregaon-activists-report/ [11] UN Human Rights Office Urges Release of Bhima Koregaon Activists 'at the Very Least on Bail’. The Wire. January 24, 2021. https://thewire.in/rights/un-human-rights-office-bhima-koregaon [12] As Covid-19 Devastates India, Deaths Go Undercounted. New York Times. April 24, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/world/asia/india-coronavirus-deaths.html [13] Oxygen shortage | Some hospitals creating fear: Yogi Adityanath. The Hindu. April 26, 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/oxygen-shortage-some-hospitals-creating-fear-adityanath/article34409725.ece [14] Arrests over PM Modi's posters ‘illegal’, says plea in Supreme Court. Hindustan Times. May 18, 2021. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/arrests-over-pm-modi-s-posters-illegal-says-plea-in-supreme-court-101621293711703.html [15] Edward Anderson and Christophe Jaffrelot. 2018. Hindu nationalism and the ‘saffronisation ofthe public sphere’: an interview with Christophe Jaffrelot. Contemporary South Asia. Vol 26, No. 2: 468-482. [16] Shakuntala Banaji and Ram Bhat. September 24, 2020. Disinformation against Indian Muslims during the COVID-19 pandemic. Media@LSE Blog. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2020/09/24/disinformation-against-indian-muslims-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/ [17] By design and delusion, the project to radicalise Hindu India gains momentum. Scroll.  March 9, 2019. https://scroll.in/article/915757/by-design-and-delusion-the-project-to-radicalise-hindu-india-gains-momentum [18] Internet shutdowns report: Shattered dreams and lost opportunities.  Access Now.  March 3, 2021. https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-report-a-year-in-the-fight/ [19] The interplay between Kashmir and India’s democratic project. Hindustan Times. September 14, 2019. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/the-interplay-between-kashmir-and-india-s-democratic-project/story-styS64AQc8SRxLZxl0lZXO.html [20] Jailed Kashmiri leaders’ families seek their release in the wake of pandemic. The Hindu. May 6, 2021. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/jailed-kashmiri-leaders-families-seek-their-release-in-the-wake-of-pandemic/article34500450.ece [21] Farooq Abdullah meets son Omar in Srinagar sub-jail day after release from 7-month detention. Hindustan Times.  March 14, 2020.https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/farooq-abdullah-meets-son-omar-in-srinagar-sub-jail-day-after-release-from-7-month-detention/story-6ErpcQYCMD8DcCGmYjBhUP.html [22] 4G Is Back in J&K After 18 Months, But it Can't Compensate for What We Lost. The Wire. February 7, 2021. https://thewire.in/rights/jammu-and-kashmir-4g-internet-costs [24] CBI, ED, IT probes against opposition politicians — on at election time, off after that. Print.April 16, 2021. https://theprint.in/india/cbi-ed-it-probes-against-opposition-politicians-on-at-election-time-off-after-that/640596/ [25] Bail On Hold, Mamata Banerjee's 2 Ministers, 2 Others Spend Night In Jail. NDTV. May 18, 2021. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/four-including-mamata-banerjees-ministers-arrested-in-narada-bribery-case-get-bail-2443606 [26] With Freedom at Stake, Courts Are Collapsing. New York Times. September 9, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/opinion/hungary-turkey-india-courts.html [27] Is the SC abdicating its responsibility? Mumbai Mirror. August 24, 2019.https://mumbaimirror.indiatimes.com/opinion/columnists/by-invitation/is-the-sc-abdicating-its-responsibility/articleshow/70812765.cms [28] Income tax department raids DMK leader Kanimozhi’s house in Tamil Nadu’s Thoothukudi. Hindustan Times. April 16, 2019. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/income-tax-department-raids-dmk-leader-kanimozhi-s-house-in-tamil-nadu-s-thoothukudi/story-JYQXZfvcSCH3tcunGDTC6K.html [29]‘Not so sasti anymore’: Actor Tapsee Pannu takes dig after I-T raids on her, Anurag Kashyap. The Print. March 6, 2021. https://theprint.in/india/not-so-sasti-anymore-actor-tapsee-pannu-takes-dig-after-i-t-raids-on-her-anurag-kashyap/616836/ [30]Governors Vs states – Delhi ‘sultanate’ back amid growing sense of bias.The Federal. October 21, 2020. https://thefederal.com/analysis/governors-vs-states-delhi-sultanate-back-amid-growing-sense-of-bias/     Neelanjan Sircar is a Senior Visiting Fellow at Centre for Policy Research (CPR) and Assistant Professor at Ashoka University. His research interests include Indian political economy and comparative political behavior with an eye to Bayesian statistics, causal inference, social network analysis, and game theory. Dr. Sircar is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania. He received a bachelor's degree in applied mathematics and economics from UC Berkeley in 2003 and a PhD in political science from Columbia University in 2014.     Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

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Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Myanmar Crisis Needs Concerted Democracy Support from Asian Middle Powers

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [Editor’s note] Myanmar’s fight for democracy endures amid violent crackdowns inflicted by the military government. While the number of fatalities and casualties, especially those among the youth and children participating in the nationwide civil disobedience movement (CDM) continues to increase, democracies in the region have become increasingly alert towards the situation in Myanmar. Hun Joon Kim, professor at Korea University, and Sook Jong Lee, professor at Sungkyunkwan University and senior fellow at the East Asia Institute, state that while middle power democracies of India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea have made significant moves against the military coup in support of Myanmar’s path towards democracy, they should coordinate among themselves to pursue more substantial ways of engagement. Civil societies of Asian middle power democracies have shown moral and financial support to the CDM in Myanmar and have manifested unusually high levels of empathy and support for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. To sustain such support and facilitate change towards democratic transition remains a challenge – one that requires unequivocal support from Asian middle power democracies.     1. Introduction   On April 23, leaders of ASEAN countries undertook the first meaningful initiative in Jakarta since the February 1 military coup. A belated Five-Point Consensus was made in order to stop state violence, which had resulted in the deaths of 774 victims, including young people, university students, and women and children as of early May (AAPP, 2021.5.8). Countries demanded the immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue to reach a peaceful solution, mediation by a special envoy from ASEAN’s chair, humanitarian assistance, and a visit by a special envoy and delegation. However, even after the consensus, there were an additional 40 fatalities and 439 casualties over the course of the following two weeks. The nationwide civil disobedience movement (CDM) is still ongoing and the National Unity Government (NUG) was formally established. ASEAN has been backed by the international community as the legitimate focal body to resolve the crisis, while major Western countries including the US introduced sanctions targeted only against military leaders and their financial networks.   Foreign and development ministers from G7 countries made a joint statement in London on May 7 and warned that more effective measures including preventing the supply, sale, or transfer of weapons, exercising due diligence in conducting business with military-affiliated business, and relocating development aid from the military regime to the Burmese people. However, prospects for an imminent implementation of such measures remain gloomy. Big businesses who have been working closely with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), the single largest source of revenue, are vigorously lobbying G7 governments against further sanctions. Moreover, China, with a definite “Three Support and Three Avoids” policy on Myanmar, objects to any “inappropriate intervention” by the UN Security Council (UNSC) or “external forces from fueling the unrest.”   The purpose of outside intervention on the current crisis falls somewhere between taking a minimal position of preventing the Myanmar military from seizing the lives of more civilian protestors and a maximal position of recognizing the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar and punishing coup leaders by indicting them to the International Criminal Court.[1] The common demand of the international community is to urge the military to stop the brutal crackdown and release arrested politicians and protestors. Outsiders also encourage dialogue among major domestic parties to return to the hybrid government under the 2008 constitution either by honoring the results of the previous November elections or by holding a new election within this year as promised by the coup leader Min Aung Hlaing. The direction of the further development of the democracy of Myanmar must be negotiated and navigated through the free will of local stakeholders themselves through democratic processes. However, military leaders are not responding to these calls. If the international community tolerates illegitimate military rule in Myanmar as if nothing has happened, there is potential for further exacerbation of democratic backsliding in the region.   Witnessing the grave critical juncture in Myanmar democracy, both the governments and the civil societies of middle power democracies of India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea have made significant moves against the military coup and its subsequent violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations. Can these four middle power democracies help Myanmar exit from chaotic conflict? This issue brief aims to overview Asian middle power democracies’ responses to the Myanmar crisis and explore what further contributions they can make to support a peaceful resolution.   2. Asian Middle Powers’ Myanmar Democracy Support   Both the governments and civil societies in Asian middle power democracies quickly responded to the Myanmar coup. Taking into account their diplomatic relations with the Tatmadaw or geopolitical considerations, the four middle power democracies took somewhat different approaches. Japan and India, for example, undertook quiet diplomacy with low-key moves while South Korea undertook a more assertive and vocal diplomacy. India and Indonesia took a more pragmatic and conciliatory approach due to their past relationships with the country. However, at the core, every country shared its deepest concerns about the military coup and the following bloody suppression of peaceful protestors. Additionally, civil societies in all four Asian democracies were alert and highly attentive to the situation and engaged in organized support for protestors in Myanmar.   Government Responses   Among the four democracies examined here, the South Korean government has issued strong statements and announced sanctions. This assertiveness is unusual and unprecedented for Korean diplomacy. President Moon Jae-in issued SNS messages several times.[2] High-level officers in the foreign and justice ministries met with the Myanmar ambassador, students, and residents to pay heed to their concerns. The National Assembly adopted a resolution on February 26, referring the coup to a “serious defiance of democracy.” So far, five measures are in place. First, the government suspended new exchanges and cooperation in the field of defense and security. Second, the government ceased the exports of military supplies and decided to strictly control exports of dual-use items. Third, the government is under review of official development assistance (ODA) while continuing projects which are directly linked to the livelihoods of the people and humanitarian assistance. Fourth, the government implemented special humanitarian measures that permit Burmese residents in Korea extend their stay until the situation stabilizes. Fifth, the government raised travel advisories to all areas of Myanmar.   On the other hand, both the Japanese and Indian governments have taken a soft and low-key approach to diplomacy. They took similar routes in condemning the coup and delivering deep concerns over the military violence. As the third largest investor and the largest donor to Myanmar, Japan brokered a cease-fire last November between the Tatmadaw and the rebel Arakan Army. Using such leverage, the Japanese government has tried to establish connections with the Tatmadaw to build channels for communication regarding the current crisis. However, the Japanese government was unequivocal in expressing its strong condemnation of the military’s use of violence against protestors and demanding the release of political prisoners. The Japanese government has decided to not offer new ODA and is considering the idea of banning existing ODA as well. Japan has also cooperated with India for backroom negotiations with the Tatmadaw inside the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.[3]   India has unique geopolitical interests regarding the Myanmar conflict. Sharing a border longer than 1,600 km, New Delhi’s low-key responses are guarded by the domain of security. As Myanmar’s armed insurgent groups are operating in the bordering region, the Indian government developed a close rapport with the Tatmadaw for border security. Also, India launched major infrastructure initiatives such as the Kalada Multi-Modal Transit Transportation Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway to compete with China, regarding its massive infrastructure projects in Myanmar. India also provides more than $1billion to Myanmar to strengthen its electoral process and provide technical assistance in education and health care services. Despite close ties with the Tatmadaw, however, Indian representatives such as Indra Pandey, Indian representative at the United Nations Human Rights Council, made a statement demanding the rule of law and the democratic process. As a non-permanent UN Security Council member this year, the Indian government put efforts to move the council forward. For example, it played a key role in pushing the UN Security Council to issue the first press statement calling for the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other government officials on February 4.   On the other hand, Indonesia sought more concerted actions using its ASEAN based leadership. Indonesia’s foreign minister visited several member countries for consultation on the crisis. President Joko Widodo at the ASEAN Summit on April 24 stated that “The situation in Myanmar is something that is unacceptable…and violence must be stopped, and democracy, stability, and peace in Myanmar must be restored.”[4] Indonesia believes that an ASEAN-led option is the best among the worst and ASEAN should offer a formula that can make conflicting parties commit to “Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led” dialogues. How Indonesia, together with Singapore and Malaysia, two other ASEAN members that have manifested an attitude to take action regarding the crisis, can persuade the less willing Tatmadaw remains to be seen. In the meantime, many consider that the principle of ASEAN centrality would fail to deliver a breakthrough in resolving the crisis.   Civil Society Responses   Civil societies in Asian democracies have also been active in supporting the Myanmar protestors and their CDM. Such supportive activities are divided into three types. First, civil society organizations in Asian democracies actively supported the Myanmar protestors through rallies, petitions, and fundraising. In Japan, for example, fundraising activities have taken place both online and offline. In South Korea, about 240 civil society organizations formed an umbrella network supporting democracy in Myanmar and organized several awareness campaigns and political rallies. This network, along with individual citizens, local government branches, and local parliaments has raised funds for CDM. The most active organizations are related to organizations revolving around the Gwangju democratic movement that commemorate the citizen uprising in Gwangju on May 18, 1980 against the military and individual citizens of Gwangju. This is mainly due to the similarity between the two events in terms of how the coup and massacres are unfolding, but the connection has already been established a decade ago when the 5.18 Memorial Foundation actively reached out to support fledging Southeast Asian democracies.   Second, civil society organizations in Asian democracies not only support Myanmar protestors, but also further exert pressure upon their own governments and businesses working closely with the Myanmar military. In Japan, there are ongoing petition campaigns led by university students aimed to pressure the Japanese government’s diplomacy. In India, civil society voices and public opinion in Mizoram are pressuring somewhat passive regional governments to take a more active position in supporting Myanmar protestors and CDM. In South Korea, university students and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) are protesting in front of companies whose investments are tightly linked to the military. Upon such pressure, one of the companies decided to terminate a joint venture with the Myanmar Economic Holdings Public Limited (MEHL).   Third, other actors such as the media, think tanks, and scholars in Asian democracies are supporting protestors. Both traditional and new media such as SNS have made efforts to spread the word and support protestors. Sisain, a progressive South Korean media, is providing an outlet for local Myanmar reporters whose voices have been suppressed. SNS users who have previously worked in Myanmar are posting first-hand stories from Myanmar friends. In India, national media broadcasted the flight of Myanmar refugees and has helped direct public opinion. Moreover, research institutes and scholars in Japan and South Korea show support for Myanmar democracy by signing petitions, publicizing their research on the fairness of elections based on survey research, or organizing scholarly events supporting protestors.   3. More Concerted Actions among Asian Middle Power Democracies are Necessary   Despite the abovementioned efforts on the Myanmar crisis made by the four middle power democracies, it is apparent that there is a huge lack of consultation and concerted actions among themselves. While government and civil societies of these four countries developed a like-minded cause and positions, i.e., helping Myanmar people achieve their aspirations of restoring their democracy, they are not coordinating their actions as an ad-hoc plurilateral network. Although bilateral options are still important, emphasis should be put on multilateral options since “enhancing solidarity” among middle power democracies is an important feature in the current geopolitical configuration (Keleinfeld et al. 2021). Informal consultation and coordinated actions among like-minded middle power democracies on the Myanmar crisis can be a good issue-specific middle-power campaign integrating governmental and nongovernmental actors and linking diverse multilateral spaces and venues (Paris, 2019).[5] Here are some measures through which middle power democracies can coordinate utilizing their bilateral relations with Myanmar and their actions in regional and global organizations.   Bilateral measures to coordinate First of all, all middle power democracies can enhance humanitarian assistance to the people in Myanmar. In addition to the prevailing pandemic situation, many shops are closed and economic sustainability has been greatly undermined amid the violent crackdowns. Vulnerable populations such as women, children, injured people, and internally displaced people should be prioritized. Myanmar is one of poorest countries and its economic situation has further exacerbated with the CDM. A recent estimate from the World Bank shows a possible 9.8% contraction from earlier predictions, illustrative of the serious decline of the economic condition of the country. Myanmar is in desperate need of funding to continue CDM and other projects directly linked to the lives of Myanmar people.   Second, while more humanitarian aid is essential, ODA to the energy industries and infrastructure buildings that are related to the Tatmadaw should be suspended. China is by far the largest trade partner to Myanmar, accounting for one third of exports and imports from and to Myanmar. On the other hand, Japan and India are, respectively, the third and fourth largest partners that receive Myanmar’s exports. In terms of foreign investment, Singapore accounts for more than a quarter of the total, which has provided some leverage for Singapore. Since these goods are closely tied with ordinary people’s income, export reduction is not a good option. Instead, pulling the ODA card, with humanitarian aid out of the picture, can be coordinated among middle power donors.   Third, coordination regarding migration and refugee policy is necessary to cope with Myanmar students, workers, and residents who are already in their country. South Korea’s policy, which guaranteed Myanmar people’s safety by delaying their return to their home country depending on the political situation, could be a good model. This immigration policy has been in effect since March 15. They can also implement common travel bans and restrictions against military leaders and their families.   Fourth, it is reported that besides China, North Korea, and Russia, democracies such as India, Israel, the Philippines, and Ukraine sold arms to Myanmar. Asian democracies, at least temporarily, should cease the exports of military supplies and strictly control the exports of dual-use items. This, with no doubt, will eventually lead to imposing an international arms embargo on Myanmar. Concerted policies led by democratic countries will send a strong message to the military, condemning their violent suppression of peaceful protesters.   Multilateral options   First, ASEAN is the most relevant forum in resolving the Myanmar crisis since the Consensus is the only international document that the Myanmar military has committed to so far. Asian middle power democracies must support ASEAN to move forward and actually implement effective measures in the Consensus – i.e. selecting, sending, and administrating mediation by a special envoy and also guarantee humanitarian assistance. Support from regional middle power democracies such as South Korea, Japan, and India would certainly help when it is further backed up by China and the US.   Second, another way is to start from international human rights conventions which Myanmar is a state party to – International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The first starting point would be the 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. A commonality among regional and international conventions is their involvement of women and children. The proportion of women in the protests is high; the fact that there are women and child victims of violence is also appalling. The international society should eventually hold the military accountable for all atrocities committed either by using domestic measures like trials or truth commissions using universal jurisdiction or international measures like the International Criminal Court. However, the first criteria to examine should be what Myanmar itself has already committed to comply.   Third, the UNSC, the body with the most effective tool to address this issue, is in a gridlock due to China and Russia. So far, the UNSC has only issued a presidential press statement (February 4, 2021), a presidential statement (March 10, 2021), and a press element (April 1, 2021), which fall short of resolutions. Moreover, the content of these documents was disappointing as it not only lacked specific follow-up measures, but also did not specifically underline responsible parties and the nature of the political turmoil – i.e. the military coup. The UNSC also had an Arria-formula meeting on April 9, 2021 and several consultation meetings with experts and UN officials. Asia middle power democratic countries should press the UNSC for further action using other UN bodies such as the UN General Assembly or Human Rights Council (HRC).   4. Conclusion   Middle power democracies have been increasingly called upon to address their region’s democratic crisis and revamp global support for democracy using their comparative strengths.[6] The current crisis in Myanmar has more actively engaged Asian middle power democracies. Beyond the conventional ASEAN-led noninterventionist diplomacy, several non-ASEAN Asian countries like South Korea have taken unprecedentedly engaging measures. Above all, civil societies of Asian middle power democracies have shown moral and financial support to the CDM in Myanmar. There are unusually high levels of empathy and support for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar, placing increasing levels of pressure for their governments to engage in the region’s democratic crisis.   For now, the most pressing issue is how to sustain such governmental and civil society support and facilitate change towards a desirable democratic transition. First of all, Asian middle power democracies should seek solidarity with each other. When they know they are standing alongside like-minded countries in addressing the Myanmar crisis, they can create impacts through consultation and coordination. When individual countries’ responses are coordinated, the scale of their leverage can be strong enough to encourage change beyond the current stalemate. While strengthening ASEAN-led dialogues, Asian middle power democracies should also seek a series of Myanmar democracy campaigns using bigger platforms like the Asian Regional Forum or the European human rights organization, not to mention the UN and its agencies. Both the governments and civil societies of conventional roles of middle powers have been a facilitator, a mediator or an agenda setter in regional and global affairs. Asian middle power democracies have not accumulated such experiences compared to conventional Western middle powers.[7] However, Asian middle powers should take more bold actions at this urgent time to help the Myanmar people out of the crisis with resource power and committed democratic values.■      [1] For example, former Timor-Leste President J. Ramos-Horta addressed these points in his keynote speech at the ADRN Online Seminar “The Voice of Solidarity for the Restoration of Democracy in Myanmar” on April 29, 2021. (http://www.eai.or.kr/new/en/pub/view.asp?intSeq=20489&board=eng_multimedia&keyword_option=&keyword=&more=) [2] He expressed “deep concern (February 2),” “condemned the use of violence (February 28),” and said “deeply shocked… and strongly condemns the continuing brutal violence (March 28).” [3] Sahoo, Niranjan and Ichihara, Maiko. “The Quad Can End the Crisis in Myanmar,” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2021. [4] Paddock, Richard C. “General Who Led Myanmar’s Coup Joins Regional Talks on the Crisis,” New York Times, April 24, 2021. [5] Paris, Roland,. “Can Middle Powers Save the Liberal World Order?,” Chatham House Briefing, June 2019. [6] Kleinfeld, Rachel, et al. “How Middle-Power Democracies Can Help Renovate Global Democracy Support,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 4, 2021. [7] Lee, Sook Jong eds., Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016).     Typeset by Seung Yeon Lee, Research Assistant For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) I [email protected]    

Hun Joon Kim, Sook Jong Lee 2021-05-20Views : 10834
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Nepal’s Supreme Court Overturned PM K.P. Oli’s Decision to Dissolve Parliament

[Editor’s note] Change has dawned upon Nepal following the declaration of the 2015 Constitution, yet the future of its government seems bleak. Pradip Pariyar, Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation, states that the old game of parliamentary politics is being revived in Nepal through a series of questionable events that unfolded in the Nepalese parliament over the past few months. Prime Minister K.P. Oli’s controversial recommendation to dissolve the House of Representatives was followed by strong backlash from both his faction and rival factions. Amidst the two months of uncertainty following the dissolution of the parliament, Nepali people brought their dissatisfaction to the streets, protesting against the decision. While the Supreme Court ultimately decided against the dissolution, deeming it unconstitutional, it was revealed that there was internal support for Oli’s contentious decision, including backing from Chief Justice Cholendra. Despite the expectation that Oli would resign from the post due to the trouble he brought upon the government as well as his limited capacity to handle national matters amidst the pandemic, Oli remains in power today.   “On recent Supreme Court judgment that overturned PM K.P. Oli's decision to dissolve parliament illegally (In Nepal)” Following the declaration of the 2015 Constitution of Nepal, the successful elections on all three tiers of the government, federal, provincial, and local, became a sign of hope for Nepal, a fledgling democracy. Upon assuming office in February 2018, the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) was expected to deliver its promises on development, good governance, and the implementation, as well as the amendment of the constitution. However, in reality, Prime Minister K.P. Oli failed to deliver all aspects of his promise. It can be said that the peak of Oli's failure was when he announced the dissolution of the lower house of the Parliament after the rift in the NCP began.    The Dissolution of the NCP and the Parliament: the Demise of Oli's Legitimacy   The Maoist Center (MC) merged with the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) to create the Nepal Communist Party (NCP). This coalition was viewed as a historical leap for the "communist movement” as voters for both parties believed that a unified party would not only bring on stability but would also ensure good governance and prosperity. As the party emerged victorious with winning a majority of seats in the federal parliament, even critics hoped for a stable government that would put economic development and good governance at the core of its agenda. However, due to internal disagreement the coalition dissolved with the departure of MC. On December 20, 2020, the cabinet led by Oli recommended the dissolution of the House of Representatives. Oli called for a fresh mandate through parliamentary elections and stated that the lower house would be dissolved based on Article 76(1) and (7), and Article 85 of the constitution. Article 76 (1) states, "The President shall appoint the leader of a parliamentary party that commands the majority in the House of Representatives as the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers shall be constituted under his or her chairpersonship." Article 76 (7) states that if the Prime Minister fails to obtain vote of confidence or cannot be appointed, the President, on recommendation of the PM, can dissolve the House of Representatives and declare a date of election within six months of the dissolution. However, these clauses were insufficient to justify the dissolution. Therefore, PM Oli also took to Article 85 to support his decision: "Unless dissolved earlier pursuant to this Constitution, the term of the House of Representatives shall be five years."  He also stated that the internal disagreement prevented swift and effective decisions from being made regarding development. President Bidya Devi Bhandari also did not question nor call into discussion the seemingly significant political move of the incumbent. It was also found that the recommendation was made based on Oli's misinterpretation of the constitutional provision. Therefore, many opinion-makers and newspaper outlets termed the move to dissolve the parliament as "a coup orchestrated by premier Oli."   As the legitimacy crisis ensued, politicians from the same faction began to ban together against Oli. They questioned the excess of power Oli had in making party decisions and pointed out how he and his government were unable to fulfill any of his promises. His poor performance during the global pandemic and several UML-related political scandals added to the distrust of Oli. These factors, along with the dissolution of the parliament, shattered Oli's much-touted slogan of prosperity. Three senior leaders also asked for his resignation his authoritarian characteristics.   The Voice of the People is Heard as the Parliament is Reinstated   The dissolution pushed Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda, Madhav Kumar Nepal, and Jhala Nath Khanal, members of the UML rival faction, to take to the streets. They called for a street movement and organized huge protests in the capital city and other parts of the country. The civil society movement called Nagarik Aandolan, took to the streets of Kathmandu as they believed that the dissolution of the parliament was unconstitutional and undemocratic. The protestors also stated that President Bhandari was a rubber stamp for the Oli government as she supported and approved every undemocratic decision he made. An editorial of a mainstream daily pointed out that the collusion between President Bhandari and Prime Minister Oli was equally problematic: "President Bhandari has thrown the legitimacy of the revered Office of the President—along with whatever little legitimacy she had—to the trash pile of politics[1]." As there was news of unusual interaction between PM Oli and Chief Justice Cholendra Sumsher Rana before the dissolution of the parliament was declared, many voiced skepticism on the Supreme Court. Though all parties and groups protesting against the dissolution formally stated that they were hopeful about the Supreme Court correcting the wrong move of Oli and Bhandari, very few believed that the verdict by the court would restore the parliament. Civil society members, retired chief justices, lawyers, intellectuals, the majority of opinion-makers, and mainstream media consistently spoke against the move while maintaining hope in the Supreme Court. The issue of dissolution was not merely a legal question but also a question of how to maintain the faith of the people in parliamentary democracy as 13 writ petitions were filed against Oli’s House dissolution.  Two months of uncertainty followed the dissolution of the Parliament. Sporadic protests were organized in different parts of the country and, a huge section of Nepali people supported the movement protesting dissolution. Chief Justice Cholendra Shumsher Rana made a verdict that overturned PM Oli's decision to dissolve the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court found that the decision to dissolve the Parliament was unconstitutional a there was a possibility to form a new government under Article 76 (7). Though members of the Constitutional Bench unanimously agreed to give the verdict against the dissolution, insiders of the Supreme Court say that Chief Justice Cholendra tried hard to support PM Oli's decision of dissolving the House of Representatives.   After the Verdict: the Political Expectations and Reality   It was expected that PM Oli would resign from his post after the verdict overturned his decision to dissolve the parliament. This would have brought the politics back on its normal track. However, Oli did not resign and formally welcomed the Supreme Court's verdict. He stated that he would reinstate the house but also stated that he never regretted his original decision as it was right and democratic. It is interesting to note that the main opposition party Nepali Congress (NC) did not directly or strongly call for Oli’s resignation even though it had previously maintained that Oli's move was unconstitutional. Insiders of the party privately mentioned to journalists that, Party Chairperson Sher Bahadur Deuba is an ally of Oli and that he doesn't want Oli to resign right now. As India is backing Oli, Deuba did not want to make India unhappy by not cooperating. According to these party insiders, Deuba believes that India will play a significant role in the upcoming general assembly of the Nepali Congress. As he is vying for the post of Chairperson, people believe that he wanted India to back him up to win the party election. The other opposition in the parliament, Janata Samajvadi Party (JaSaPa), led by Mahantha Thakur, did not call for Oli's resignation after the verdict. Even though the two top leaders of the party—Baburam Bhattarai and Upendra Yadav—have been very vocal against Oli's authoritarian impulses, the faction led by Mahantha Thakur and Rajendra Mahata, have been saying that the present crisis is the result of an intra-party feud in the communist party. Instead of asking for the resignation of PM Oli and collaborating with NC and Maoist Center to oust Oli from the post, they took this opportunity to bargain with Oli to fulfill some of their longstanding demands such as resolving court cases filed against their cadres who had participated in the Madhesh Movement. According to party insiders, if JaSaPa succeeds in freeing the jailed leaders and cadres, it would help them placate their constituency. To finish his full term, PM Oli promised to fulfill everything that was demanded. From the two cases mentioned above, it can be said that the old game of parliamentary politics that was present when the NCP was first amalgamated has returned. By rule of the same game, Oli is trying to win the support of NC and JaSaPa parliamentarians. The Kathmandu Post editorial on the ongoing crisis paints a clear picture of this disorderly situation, "The citizens’ quest until the end of February was about saving democracy from the authoritarian tendencies of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. After the reinstatement of Parliament, however, it is all about saving that very democracy from parliamentary politics."[2] It should also be noted that although the Parliament has been reinstated, the government has not given it any agenda. Adding to the stalemate, the government announced the end of the ongoing parliamentary session without even informing the Speaker of the House. In other words, even though the parliament was reinstated, the Supreme Court's verdict has not ended the political crisis. Therefore, politics has not returned to normalcy to prioritize the well-being and rights of the people.■     [1] “Democracy Undoing.” The Kathmandu Post, December 20, 2020. https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2020/12/20/democracy-s-undoing [2] “Turning the Tide.” The Kathmandu Post, March 10, 2021. https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2021/03/10/turning-the-tide-1615382336     Pradip Pariyar is Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation. Mr. Pradip Pariyar is an alumnus of American University and Tribhuvan University. He specializes in youth empowerment, peace building and capacity building of media professionals. As the elected president of the Association of Youth Organizations Nepal (AYON), he worked closely with government of Nepal to initiate a youth-responsive budget. He was a member of the government task force that developed Youth Vision 2025: a 10-year national youth development policy. He has trained thousands of youths globally on leadership, peace building, and conflict-sensitive journalism. He founded the Nepal Youth Forum to focus on policy advocacy, awareness, and youth empowerment. In 2011, Mr. Pariyar was selected as a youth fellow by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. He received ‘Asia’s 21 Young Leaders Award’ in 2018 by Asia Society. Mr. Pariyar also serves as the chairperson of the Nepal Policy Center, a youth-led think tank. In 2015, he received the Youth Leadership Award from the Nepali Government’s Ministry of Youth and Sports for his decade-long contribution to youth leadership development across Nepal. Traveling throughout the length and breadth of Nepal, Mr. Pariyar witnessed diverse cultures and had encounters with his socially offended country people have invigorated his dream fuelled by the unholy dogma of casteism. He dreams of a just Nepal; a cohesive society where an individual’s potential, competence, edification and hard slog define a person rather than his/her status.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Pradip Pariyar 2021-04-27Views : 39840
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] No Better Way to Promote Human Rights and Peace on the Korean Peninsula? Propaganda Leaflet Dropping and the South Korean Government’s Leafleting Ban

[Editor’s note] Anti-North Korea leaflets that are flown across the inter-Korean border to North Korea have consistently been a topic of controversy. While South Korean activists deem the practice crucial for promoting human rights in North Korea, North Korea has vocally criticized the act in fear that the leaflets could delegitimize its regime. Following a series of psychological warfare acts of propaganda leaflet dropping, the South Korean National Assembly passed a bill prohibiting the act of sending anti-North Korea leaflets. This was done in hopes of alleviating rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula and inducing North Korea into opening up for more dialogue and contact among the two Koreas. However, Youngsoo Yu, professor at the University of North Korean Studies, provides commentary critical of the government’s decision, claiming that the government has not only acted against the principles and values shared by the international community, but was also mistaken in prioritizing political purposes over the defense of human rights. Additionally, South Korea has not taken the appropriate measures to improve human rights conditions in North Korea. Moving forward, he claims that it is crucial for South Korea to work together with the international community and revamp its strategies to promote greater engagement with the hermit kingdom.   1. An old problem in a new context   Late last year, the South Korean National Assembly passed a bill prohibiting the act of flying anti-North Korea leaflets across the inter-Korean border. The legislation, which came amid months of domestic controversy over seeking peace through “disgraceful submission” to the North, now brought strong criticism from the international community that the ban could undermine the right to freedom of expression in South Korea and the North Korean people’s right to know. Propaganda leaflet dropping, together with loudspeaker and radio broadcasts, has been used by both South and North Korea since the Korean War as a means of psychological warfare. In the past, particularly during the Cold War, the two Koreas put considerable effort into propaganda activities toward each other for the purpose of advocating the superiority of their own system and even overthrowing the opposing regime.  In 2000, when the first, historic inter-Korean summit took place, loudspeaker broadcasts ceased and it was agreed at the subsequent lower-level negotiations to stop the exchange of antagonistic words. Hence, propaganda leaflet dropping by the South Korean government ended and the magnitude and frequency of North Korean leafleting was seriously reduced. Loudspeaker broadcasts have repeatedly stopped and resumed since 2000. Propaganda leaflets, however, continued to be sent toward North Korea. Civic groups including North Korean defector organizations and Christian activist organizations began to send not only propaganda leaflets but also rice, dollar bills, movies and TV shows on USB drives, and Bibles. According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of Unification, from 2008 to mid-2020 leaflet balloons were sent more than 100 times by civic groups, attempting to drop about 20,000,000 leaflets in total. The North Korean authorities are extremely sensitive about propaganda leaflets because the leaflets contain criticism of their leader and information that they want to withhold from their people. The North Korean authorities have demanded that the ROK government keep civic groups from sending leaflets if it wants to improve inter-Korean relations. Sending leaflets has led to clashes between the two Koreas. In October 2014, North Korean border troops fired at balloons from South Korea prompting the South Koreans to return fire, which was enough to startle border residents into applying for a court injunction to halt leafleting. In June 2020, Kim Yo-Jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, threatened military action over the leaflets and subsequently carried out her threat by blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office. The responses of the South Korean public diverged: one side asserted that peace and safety should be prioritized, while the other argued that North Korea’s deed was egregious and it was the North that had ruined the peace. What was worse, safety concerns, human rights issues, and anti-North Korea sentiment were all mixed up.   2. What did the ROK government do wrong exactly?   First, the ROK government has not done as much as it could to avoid violating the principles and values shared by the international community. As an advanced democracy, South Korea, both the government and the people, should have appreciated how much effort and sacrifice have been made for humanity to achieve the current level of respect and protection of fundamental human rights, including the right to freedom of expression, and carefully considered the concerns of the international community. A government cannot be too careful when attempting to restrict the right to freedom of expression, including for reasons of protection of national security and respect of the rights or reputations of others. The ROK government should not have decided to halt the leafleting based solely on its own judgment. It should have consulted with the international community, that is, international organizations, domestic and external human rights experts, and other governments if necessary in the spirit of international human rights cooperation. Second, the ROK government can hardly escape the accusation that it has switched its human rights policies for political purposes. Whereas it had once made clear that “there were no legal grounds for stopping the launches (of leaflets), out of respect for the Constitutional value of freedom of expression,” the ROK government, now only six years later, defends the leaflet ban on the grounds that “freedom of expression is not absolute and can be limited.” How could a constitutional democratic government reverse its decision on the Constitutional value of the freedom to leaflet so easily? The earlier decision may have turned out to be wrong, or circumstances may have changed, of course. But nonetheless, the ROK government, as a continuous constitutional government, should have provided a persuasive explanation as to why it had to reconsider and overturn the previous decision and articulated principles and standards to guide future decisions. Third, the ROK government has not taken steady steps to promote human rights in North Korea. This has caused misgivings among the international community, misunderstanding among its own people, and disregard from Pyongyang about its commitment to human rights promotion in North Korea, including the North Korean people’s right to know. In 2019 and 2020, the ROK government declined to co-sponsor the North Korea Human Rights Resolution submitted to the United Nations General Assembly’s Third Committee despite putting its name on the list of co-sponsoring countries for 11 years from 2008 to 2018. Earlier in 2003, 2005, and 2007 the ROK government abstained or did not participate in votes at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Assembly’s Third Committee. When looking at the inconsistent behavior of the ROK government, foreign observers feel that it is ignoring human rights violations committed by the North Korean authorities, while some South Korean people believe that their human rights policies toward the North ought invariably to be subject to political considerations, and North Korean authorities may have the impression that they have the ROK government in their palm.   3. What does the ROK government intend to do?   With all the criticism, the ROK government wants to ban leafleting by civic groups. Why? The safety of border residents is not the only reason. The ROK government is anxious to attract Pyongyang to the negotiation table and ultimately bind North Korea to a path of engagement in the hope that human rights in North Korea will improve as the two Koreas build peace and prosperity on the basis of reconciliation and cooperation. Once North Korea opens up, there will be comprehensive development projects in North Korea pursued by the South, neighboring countries and more. In addition, human rights projects as well as humanitarian assistance for the North Korean people will be made easier while peace will be strengthened within North Korea as well as between the two Koreas. All of these will contribute to the promotion of civil and political rights in North Korea. This idea of making progress through increasing contact and cooperation and creating appropriate conditions was briefly but clearly introduced in the “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea” submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council. The Commission Of Inquiry report recommends that “people-to-people dialogue and contact” should be increased and strengthened in as many sectors and ways as possible, specifically highlighting culture, science, sports, and business. The report further lists exchanges of young people, women’s groups, professional organizations, and development of sister city relationships. Favorable conditions for planning overall development, including in the realm of human rights, will follow the “re-establishment of transport and communication links” between the Koreas and increased opportunities for North Korean people “to exchange information and be exposed to experiences outside their home country.” According to the logic of the ROK government, this will lead to improvements in not only the North Korean people’s right to know but their other rights as well. Academic research adds value to the grand design of the ROK government. Studies conducted over the last twenty years suggest that political changes for human rights improvement, or socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices, can be achieved through the work of transnational human rights networks of both domestic and international actors who promote shared values, principled ideas, and norms. North Korean domestic groups who are well aware of international norms and standards and able to envision and pursue political, social, and economic development of their own country, and are willing to work with the international community, can play a crucial role in the sustainable long-term advancement of human rights. Thus, it is essential to help create and develop such domestic groups in North Korea through engagement and cooperation.   4. What should be done going forward?   As the ROK government itself emphasizes, it is the North Korean authorities and people who can make a change. It is important to help them understand the values, ideas and norms shared by international society. It is not force but rather persuasion that will guide them to where human rights are respected and protected. Without South Korea’s commitment to international human rights norms, however, its bright ideas and plans may collapse like a house built on sand. There can be no concessions or compromise on basic principles because North Korea must be guided to follow the principles. Thus, the ROK government has to make its commitment clear and strong, formulate and implement consistent human rights policies in inter-Korean relations as well as in international society, and work with the international community to advance human rights in North Korea. States, international organizations, and civil society organizations in the international community should engage in opening up the country in a more practical manner. They are responsible for not only addressing human rights violations but also assisting states in building their own capacity to protect the human rights of their own people. They also share the task of providing opportunities for North Koreans to know about the outer world and for more people to know about the human rights situation in North Korea. In doing so, the international community will come to clearly understand the situations, problems, and remedies for North Korean human rights and be ready to work out a comprehensive plan for development, peace, and human rights on the Korean Peninsula. It is not the time to continue the controversy over the old-fashioned propaganda leaflets and the undue criminalization of leafleting. Rather, we must now discuss and articulate strategies for engaging North Korea anew. All of the stakeholders have to go back to fundamentals. South Korean civic groups should work with the international community to cleverly promote the right of North Koreans to know. The ROK government should try to persuade civic groups and domestic constituencies and reach a consensus. The international community needs to pay more attention to the actual life of North Koreans, help them overcome the present difficulties, and move forward for a better future. ■     Youngsoo Yu is an Assistant Professor in International Politics and Security at the University of North Korean Studies (UNKS). He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Binghamton University. He is an active analyst on issues surrounding human rights violations whose works have been published in leading academic journals including the Journal of International and Area Studies, Journal of East and West Studies, and the Korean Journal of International Studies. His most recent articles include The 2019 Hong Kong Protests and (Re)actions of the Chinese Government, Flashpoints that do not Ignite? Nonviolence and the 2016-2017 South Korean Impeachment Protest and Implementing the Networked Approach: Regional Human Rights Education in Asia and Sustainable Social Infrastructures.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Youngsoo Yu 2021-03-18Views : 13840
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Strengthening the presidency, weakening democracy: A brief analysis of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka

[Editor’s note] The enactment of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka (20A), a reversal of its precedent 19A at large, is a worrisome development hinting at the potential demise of democratic values. The new constitution bolsters the power of the executive president while undermining the power of all other institutions, virtually tearing down the system of checks and balances. Verité Research, a Sri Lankan ADRN member, outlines how the enactment of 20A marks a backtracking for Sri Lanka in its road towards democracy. It asserts that not only has 20A repealed the efforts of 19A to democratize and depoliticize governance, but has also obscured the transparency of the government and eliminated its accountability.   On 22 October 2020, the Twentieth Amendment (20A) to the Constitution of Sri Lanka was enacted.[1] The 20A reversed much of the reforms introduced by the preceding Nineteenth Amendment (19A) to the Constitution, with the primary effect of the 20A being the consolidation of power in the office of the executive president. This article explores the 20A and is divided into two main sections. Firstly, it will briefly set out the background to the passage of the 20A. Second, the features of the 20A will be discussed in respect of their implications on governance and the constitution.   I. Background to the passage of the 20A The passage of the 19A: Yahapalanaya on the rise The 19A was passed in April 2015 by the then Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) - United National Party (UNP) coalition government (Yahapalanaya government).[2] The 19A sought to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment (18A), which was notable for hyper-strengthening the office of the executive president and removing key checks and balances.[3] The 19A introduced several reforms to the constitution, with the expectations of democratising and depoliticising governance.[4] Some of these reforms included: re-introducing the Constitutional Council (CC) to approve the president’s appointments and removals of high-ranking officials and members of independent commissions; restricting the immunity of the president by allowing Fundamental Rights applications to be filed against decisions of the president; and limiting the number of cabinet ministers that can be appointed and the number of ministerial portfolios that can be held by the president.[5] The undoing of the 19A: Yahapalanaya in disarray The Yahapalanaya coalition soon began to disintegrate, as reports of disagreements between the former President Maithripala Sirisena led-SLFP faction and the former Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe led-UNP faction began to regularly surface.[6] These disagreements culminated in the 2018 ‘constitutional coup’, where President Sirisena sought to remove Prime Minister Wickramasinghe from the post of prime minister and prematurely dissolve parliament.[7] This plunged Sri Lanka into a two-month long constitutional impasse, where the 19A was sharply criticised as having created an unworkable governance structure.[8] In April 2019, a serious lapse in national security resulted in the Easter Sunday Attacks. Many opponents of the 19A attributed this set back to inherent issues in the 19A.[9] In particular, the reduced powers of the president under the 19A were pointed out as having compromised national security, bringing security concerns to the forefront of political discourse.[10]   The mandate to repeal the 19A: 2019 presidential election and 2020 general election In this background, Sri Lanka held its presidential election on 16 November 2020. The main contender was the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who served as defence secretary during his brother, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure as president. Gotabaya Rajapaksa ran on the ticket of strengthening national security and stabilising the economy, which he intended on achieving by repealing the 19A.[11] At the election, Rajapaksa secured a clear mandate, having obtained 52.25% of the popular vote and approximately 1.3 million more votes than the next contender; Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya.[12] Immediately after Rajapaksa’s victory, politicians called for fresh parliamentary elections to enable the SLPP to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament to enable the repeal of the 19A.[13] As the COVID-19 pandemic further crippled the economy, the calls to repeal the 19A and create a strong executive who can stabilize the economic and security interests were amplified. These political trends and shifts dominated the media and significantly shaped public discourse on governance.[14] At the parliamentary elections held on 05 August 2020, the Rajapaksa led political alliance secured more than 150 of the 225 seats, thereby obtaining a two-thirds majority.[15] Soon thereafter, repeal of the 19A was called for, and the newly appointed cabinet of ministers appointed a committee to draft a Bill to repeal the 19A.[16]    The replacing of the 19A and passage of the 20A The 20A Bill was published in the Gazette on 28 August 2020 and was subsequently challenged in the Supreme Court.[17] On 20 October 2020, the Speaker formally conveyed to parliament that the Supreme Court had determined that the 20A Bill could be passed by a two-third majority, except for four clauses that required further approval at a referendum.[18] The 20A Bill was debated in parliament on 21 and 22 October 2020. Notably, the final Bill presented to parliament did not contain the four clauses that required approval by a referendum, as determined by the Supreme Court. Despite the opposition vehemently opposing the 20A Bill, a total of 156 parliamentarians voted in favour of the 20A Bill, thereby passing the 20A and effectively replacing the 19A.[19]   II. Features of the 20A and their implications   The 20A has far reaching implications on the constitution and governance of Sri Lanka. The implications of the 20A will be explored in light of six aspects of the constitution: 1) the executive president; 2) the Parliamentary Council; 3) the cabinet of ministers; 4) the parliament; 5) the judiciary; and 6) independent commissions.   The Executive President It is evident that bolstering the office of the executive president was the predominant feature of the 20A. Four key features are analysed in respect of their implications on the executive presidency.   The power to appoint and remove high-ranking officials and independent commissions Under the 20A, the president is required to seek the observations of the Parliamentary Council (PC) before appointing high-ranking officials[20]  and the members of independent commissions.[21] However, the president is not bound by the observations of the PC. Thus, the president is effectively vested with complete discretion when making appointments. This is in contrast to the 19A, where the CC’s approval was necessary before the president could make such appointments. The 20A also vests the president with the power to remove high-ranking officials and members of independent commissions where the constitution or other law does not set a procedure for removal.[22] These offices and commissions embody key institutions, whose independence is vital for democratic governance. Under the 20A, the president has full control in determining the holders and composition of these offices, effectively granting the president the ability to influence several key aspects of governance. Consequently, the independence of these institutions is undermined, and can result in public confidence in these institutions being eroded.   The power to assign ministerial portfolios to himself The 20A also allows the president to ‘assign to himself any subject or function and shall remain in charge of any subject or function not assigned to any Minister’.[23] Thus, the president can assign any ministerial subjects or functions to himself and be vested with extraordinary control over state affairs. Such disproportionate strengthening of a single institution undermines the system of checks and balances in government. This ability of the president to control key ministerial subjects and functions and drive policy decisions at his discretion also undermines the collective independence of the cabinet of ministers. Under the 19A, by contrast, the president did not possess the power to assign ministerial functions and subjects to himself.[24]    The power to dissolve parliament after two and a half years The 20A grants the president the power to dissolve parliament after the lapse of two and half years after its first sitting.[25] By doing so, the president can prematurely call for fresh elections in a bid to secure a more favourable parliamentary composition, which will support his agenda. Such circumstances can significantly undermine the independence and integrity of parliament. Under the 19A, the president had the discretion to dissolve parliament only upon the lapse of four and a half years since its first sitting.[26]   The power to remove the prime minister Sri Lanka’s parliament follows the traditions of the Westminster model, which recognises the prime minister as a key official in conducting parliamentary business on behalf of the government. Under the 20A, the president has the power to unilaterally remove the prime minister from office.[27] This unrestricted power of the president to remove the prime minister severely weakens the independence of the prime minister and, by extension, the integrity of parliament. Consequently, the role of parliament in serving as a check against the president and the executive arm of government is seriously undermined. Under the 19A, the prime minister was removed from office by his resignation or if he ceases to be a member of parliament (MP).[28]   The Parliamentary Council (PC) The PC was introduced to replace the CC. The CC functioned as a check on the discretion of the president by approving appointments/removals made by the president in order to safeguard the independence of government and democratic institutions.[29] The CC was composed of ten members, three of whom were ‘independent members’.[30] The PC, on the other hand, could only make “observations” in respect of the decisions of the president, and the president is not duty bound to comply with the observations of the PC.[31] Accordingly, the president’s discretion in appointing and removing high ranking officers and members of commissions is virtually unrestricted under the 20A. Further, the PC comprises of five MPs.[32]   The Cabinet of Ministers In addition to the president’s ability to assign any subject or function to himself without any limitation, the following change introduced by the 20A has the effect of making the cabinet of ministers further subservient to the president:   The president determines the composition of Cabinet at his discretion The 20A empowers the president to appoint MPs to be cabinet ministers in consultation  with the prime minister only where the president ‘considers such consultation to be necessary’.[33] In effect, the president has full discretion in determining the cabinet of ministers. Thus, cabinet ministers would appear to hold their portfolios at the pleasure of the president, thereby undermining its ability to function independently. The position under the 19A was that the president was obliged to seek the advice of the prime minister when determining and making changes to the composition of the cabinet of ministers.[34]   The Parliament Apart from the power of dissolution of parliament, two further amendments introduced by the 20A have implications on the accountability of parliament:   The passing of ‘urgent’ Bills without public scrutiny The passing of ‘urgent’ Bills without the opportunity for the public to challenge it in the Supreme Court was abolished by the 19A. However, the 20A re-introduced the process to pass such ‘urgent’ Bills. ‘Urgent’ Bills on matters relating to i) national security and ii) disaster management can be directly referred to the Supreme Court for determination within 24 hours (which may be extended by the president for a period not exceeding 72 hours).[35] Thus, laws on the above matters can be passed by parliament, without the public getting an opportunity to voice their concerns regarding the constitutional implications of such laws.   Reduction of minimum period of prior publication of Bills When a Bill is placed on the Order Paper of parliament, the public is given a period of seven days to petition the Supreme Court to challenge its constitutionality.[36] Under the 19A, a Bill was required to be published in the Gazette at least 14 days before it is placed on the Order Paper.[37] The effect of this is that the public would have at least 21 days to petition the Supreme Court.[38] However, the 20A requires that a Bill be published in the Gazette only seven (07) days prior to it being placed on the Order Paper.[39] This amendment effectively reduced the time granted to the public to scrutinize the Bill and petition the Supreme Court from 21 days to 14 days, restricting the already limited time frame available to the public to meaningfully challenge a Bill.   The Judiciary In addition to the unfettered presidential power over judicial appointments to superior courts, two other aspects of the 20A have further implications on the independence of the judiciary:   Changes to the composition of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) The JSC has the constitutional mandate of determining policy in respect of the administration, transfers, promotion and disciplinary action of judicial officers of the lower courts and courts of first instance.[40] Under the 19A, the Chief Justice and the two most senior judges of the Supreme Court constituted the JSC.[41] Thus, the composition of the JSC was pre-determined and could not be directly influenced by the president. Under the 20A, the president directly appoints the other two judges of the JSC at his sole discretion.[42] Therefore, the president can directly affect the composition of the JSC, and thereby influence judicial policy in respect of judicial officers. This has the potential to seriously undermine the independence of the judiciary.   Increasing the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal benches The 20A Bill that was published in the Gazette and reviewed by the Supreme Court did not propose amendments to the composition of apex courts of Sri Lanka. However, as a last-minute committee stage amendment, it was proposed that the bench of the Supreme Court be increased from 10 to 16 judges and the bench of the Court of Appeal be increased from 11 to 19 judges.[43] This amendment was passed along with the 20A. During parliamentary debates, the government claimed it was ‘strengthening’ the capacity of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal through this amendment.[44] However, the appointment of the new judges will now be carried out unilaterally by the president under the 20A. Appointing such a high number of new judges to the apex courts at the discretion of the president can have far-reaching implication in terms of the independence of the judiciary.   Independent Commissions The 20A vests the president with the authority to appoint members of the independent commissions at his sole discretion. Thus, the independence of these commissions is undoubtedly compromised. However, the 20A sought to undermine several of the independent commissions even further.   Abolishing the National Procurement Commission (NProC) and the Audit Service Commission (ASC) The NProC and the ASC were established by the 19A. The NProC had a mandate to formulate procedures and guidelines for all government procurement and to monitor and report on the public procurements.[45] The ASC was empowered to make independent rules and policies in respect of the administration, transfer, promotions, and disciplinary matters of the audit service of Sri Lanka.[46] Both these commissions were established to enhance public accountability and transparency. Nevertheless, both the NProC and the ASC were abolished by the 20A.[47]   Reducing the mandate of the National Police Commission (NPC) Under the 19A, the NPC was to function as an independent body in charge of the administration of the police service. Thus, the NPC was vested with the authority to determine the appointment, transfer, promotion, dismissal, and disciplinary control of police officers. However, under the 20A, the NPC’s mandate was reduced to merely hearing complaints from the public against police officers. Thus, the police service no longer functions under the oversight of an independent commission.   Conclusion   The above analysis demonstrates how the principal outcome of the 20A was to elevate the office of the executive president to a position of immense power. The 20A achieved this outcome by undermining the independence of other institutions and weakening the system of checks and balances. Consequently, the separation of powers in the Constitution of Sri Lanka and, by extension, the accountability and transparency of government has been significantly diminished by the 20A. These consequences of the 20A can potentially whittle down democratic values and pave the way for espousal of authoritarian practices in Sri Lanka. ■     [1] Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, certified on 29 October 2020, [hereinafter ‘20A Act’]. [2] Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, certified on 15 May 2015, [hereinafter ‘19A Act’]. [3] Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, certified on 09 September 2010. [4] See, Gehan Gunatilleke and Nishan de Mel, The Wins, the Losses and the In-betweens (Verité Research June 2015), at https://www.veriteresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Verit%C3%A9-Research_19th-Amendment-The-Wins-the-Losses-and-the-In-betweens-1.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [5] Other reforms introduced by the 19A included restricting the discretion of the president to dissolve parliament, abolishing the passage of ‘urgent’ Bills without the opportunity for public scrutiny, and establishing independent institutions to regulate and promote transparency in government procurement and public auditing. [6] Hilmy Ahamed, ‘The Farce that is Yahapalayana: Two years on and failing’, Daily FT, 13 January 2017, at http://www.ft.lk/article/591099/The-farce-that-is-Yahapalanaya--Two-years-on-and-failing [last accessed 11 January 2021]; ‘Sri Lanka’s Transition to Nowhere’, International Crisis Group, Asia Report N 286, 16 May 2017, at https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/286-sri-lanka-s-transition-nowhere [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [7] ‘Sri Lankan president suspends parliament after firing prime minister’, Reuters, 27 October 2018, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-politics/sri-lankan-president-suspends-parliament-after-firing-prime-minister-idUSKCN1N107E [last accessed 11 January 2021; Website of Manthri.lk, ‘Extracts from the Parliamentary Hansard concerning the No-confidence motion presented in Parliament on the 14th of November 2018’, at http://www.manthri.lk/en/blog/posts/extracts-from-the-parliamentary-hansard-concerning-the-no-confidence-motion-presented-in-parliament-on-the-14th-of-november-2018 [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [8] A seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court unanimously declared that these actions by President Sirisena were unconstitutional. See Rajavarothiam Sampanthan v. The Attorney General, S.C. (F.R.) No. 351/2018, (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka), Judgement delivered on 13 December 2018, at http://www.supremecourt.lk/images/documents/sc_fr_351_2018.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021] [9] ‘Sirisena demands repealing of 19th Amendment, blames it for political instability’, The Times of India, 23 June 2019, at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/sirisena-demands-repealing-of-19th-amendment-blames-it-for-political-instability/articleshow/69914507.cms [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [10] ‘19A jeopardized national security – PM Rajapaksa’, Ceylon Today, 22 October 2020, at https://ceylontoday.lk/news/19a-jeopardised-national-security-pm-rajapaksa [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [11] Website of the Office of the President, ‘Vistas of Prosperity and Splendor’ (Official Presidential Manifesto of Gotabhaya Rajapaksa), at https://www.presidentsoffice.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/2019/16/Gotabaya_Manifesto_English.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021] p. 09. [12] Website of the Election Commission of Sri Lanka, Presidential Election – 2019 Results, at https://elections.gov.lk/web/wp-content/uploads/election-results/presidential-elections/pre2019/PRE_2019_All_Island_Result.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [13] ‘We are studying 19th Amendment to plan immediate plan of action: Mahinda Rajapaksa’, Lanka Business Online, 17 November 2019, at https://www.lankabusinessonline.com/we-are-studying-19th-amendment-to-plan-immediate-programme-of-action-mahinda-rajapaksa/ [last accessed 11 January 2021]; ‘We need a strong parliament to discard the 19th amendment: President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’, Newsfirst.lk, 29 December 2019, at https://www.newsfirst.lk/2019/12/29/we-need-a-strong-parliament-to-discard-the-19th-amendment-president-gotabaya-rajapaksa/ [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [14] Verité Research, ‘19A in reverse gear’, (23 August 2020), 10 (34) The Media Analysis [last accessed 11 January 2021]; Verité Research, ‘20A: Legitimacy in the balance’, (4 October 2020) 10 (39) The Media Analysis [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [15] Website of the Elections Commission of Sri Lanka, Parliamentary Elections Results 2020, at http://elections.gov.lk/en/elections/PE_RESULTS_2020_E.html [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [16] ‘Government to table 20th amendment by mid-September’, Newswire, 14 August 2020, at http://www.newswire.lk/2020/08/14/government-to-table-20th-amendment-by-mid-september/ [last accessed 11 January 2021]; ‘Education Minister levels criticism over 19th Amendment, says Easter Genocide was its outcome’, LankaNewsWeb, 23 August 2020, https://www.lankanewsweb.net/67-general-news/67142-Education-Minister-levels-criticism-over-19th-Amendment-says-Easter-Genocide-was-its-outcome [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [17] In re The Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, S.C (S.D.) 01/2020, (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka) at http://www.supremecourt.lk/images/documents/sc_sd_01_39_2020.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [18] ibid. [19] Website of Manthri.lk, ‘How did MPs vote for the 20th amendment?’, at http://www.manthri.lk/en/blog/posts/how-did-mps-vote-for-the-20th-amendment [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [20] This includes the offices of Chief Justice, President of the Court of Appeal, the judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman), the Secretary-General of Parliament, the Inspector General of Police, as well as the members of the Election Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Public Service Commission, the Bribery Commission, the National Police Commission, the Finance Commission and the Delimitation Commission. [21] Section 6 [Article 41A(1)], 20A Act. [22] Section 6 [Article 41A(10)], 20A Act. The following offices do not have a prescribed procedure for removal from office: the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman, and the Secretary-General of Parliament, and members of the Public Service Commission, the National Police Commission, and the Finance Commission. [23] Section 7 [Article 44(2)], 20A Act. [24] See, Section 9 [Article 44], 19A Act, which does not provide for the president assigning cabinet functions to himself. [25] Section 12 [Article 70(1)(a)], 20A Act. [26] Section 17 [Article 70(1)], 19A Act. [27] Section 7 [Article 47(2)(a)], 20A Act. [28] Section 9 [Article 46(2)], 19A Act. [29] Section 8 [Article 41B (1) and (5)], 19A Act. [30] Section 8 [Article 41A (1)], 19A Act. See also Articles 41A (4) and (5), for criteria for independent members of the Constitution Council. [31] Section 6 [Article 41A (1)], 20A Act. [32] ibid. See also Proviso, for criteria for members of the Parliamentary Council. [33] Section 7 [Article 44(1)], 20A Act. [34] Section 9 [Article 43(2)], 19A Act. [35] Section 26 [Article 122], 20A Act. [36] Article 121, The Constitution 1978. [37] Section 18 [Article 78(1)], 19A Act. [38] The 21 days is computed on the basis of the 14 days between publication in the Gazette and the Bill being placed on the Order Paper, and the 07 days after the Bill is placed on the Order Paper. [39] Section 13 [Article 78(1)], 20A Act. [40] Article 111H, The Constitution 1978. [41] Section 28 [Article 111D (1)], 19A Act. [42] Section 23 [Article 111D (1)], 20A Act. [43] Section 25 [Article 119] and Section 31 [Article 137], 20A Act. [44] ‘Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) of 22 October 2020’, https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/documents/hansard/1604463391079193.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021], pp. 1834-1838. [45] Section 46 [Article 156C], 19A Act. [46] Section 35 [Article 153C], 19A Act [47] Sections 35 and 56, 20A Act.     Verité Research is a private think tank that provides strategic analysis for Asia. Its main research divisions are economics, politics, law and media. This think tank is a member of the Asia Democracy Research network (ADRN).   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Verite Research 2021-03-11Views : 16151
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] A Critical Juncture for American Democracy

[Editor’s note] It has been less than a month since Joe Biden’s inauguration as the 46th president of the United States. The Biden administration has been swift in addressing the remnants of the former Trump era including a steepened economic downturn, exacerbated racial injustice, and the ongoing COVID-19 –pandemic that has cost the lives of almost half-a-million Americans. In response, the new U.S. administration has sought to coordinate against the nation’s most pressing challenges. According to Paul Pierson, John Gross Endowed Chair of the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley, Biden faces a much deeper challenge than those aforementioned: the political juncture that the U.S. stands over the future of its democracy. Professor Pierson highlights how its institutional features make the U.S. particularly vulnerable to democratic backsliding. By navigating the devolution of the Republican Party and the protracted workings of the country’s political system, he argues that the U.S. must transform itself politically into an institution better capable of addressing challenges of the 21st century in order to retain its democratic leadership in the world.     Although incumbent American presidents rarely lose, Joe Biden’s defeat of Donald Trump – the only president never to reach a 50% approval rating in national polls – was not really unexpected. What was unexpected was just about everything else that happened in the three tumultuous months that followed. The election itself was closer than polls anticipated, leading to political uncertainty. That uncertainty was heightened by the peculiar American institution of the Electoral College, which made the vote in a few closely-fought states, rather than the overall popular vote, decisive. Republicans also did better than expected in elections to Congress. This left control of the legislature in doubt until January, when Democrats narrowly won the two critical Senate elections held in the state of Georgia. Those Georgia elections took place against the backdrop of Trump’s astonishing and baseless efforts to contest the election. He sought to convince his supporters that his defeat was fraudulent, leading to the frightening spectacle of January 6th. A “stop the steal” protest in Washington, D.C., promoted by Trump and many of his supporters, turned its fury on Congress and stormed the capitol. The insurrection left five people dead. It left anxious observers everywhere wondering what had become of the world’s oldest democracy.   Three Crises in American Democracy   Indeed, anxiety about the American political system has been building, with observers of American politics expressing growing concern about the prospect of “democratic backsliding” – a gradual erosion of democratic practices like that seen in Hungary, Poland and Turkey. That path might leave in place some of the trappings of electoral politics, but concentrates true authority in the hands of a single party or political figure. Trump himself clearly aspired to be such a figure, but he has lost his hold on power. His successor, Joseph Biden, is an emphatically traditional figure, and has sought to project a calming presence. Yet the events of January 6th made clear that this is no ordinary transition, and it would be naïve to anticipate a return to ordinary politics. With a razor-thin Democratic majority in Congress – one that most analysts project is likely to last only two years – the need for the Biden administration and its allies to turn things around is urgent. Understanding what might come next requires that we understand what has gone wrong. Some of the challenges bedeviling the United States are shared with other wealthy democracies. Like them, the United States has undergone a disruptive transition from an industrial manufacturing economy to a postindustrial knowledge economy. That transition has tilted opportunity and wealth toward those at the very top. It has concentrated growth in a select group of successful cities, while sucking economic vitality out of rural areas and small towns. Like the U.S., many wealthy democracies are experiencing increased immigration.  Growing diversity combines with economic disruption in “left behind” areas to create large pools of voters (mostly white, older, less educated, and disproportionately male) who are open to a racialized right-wing populist politics of grievance.  This is a familiar story, applicable in many countries. Yet three interrelated political crises – of the nation’s right-wing party, of its constitutional design, and of its governance – make the situation in the United States especially dangerous.    1. The transformation of the Republican Party   The first crisis concerns the remarkable transformation of the Republican Party. Over the last two and a half decades, the Republican Party has mutated from a traditional conservative party into an extremist party. It is dismissive of climate change, hostile to both the welfare state and the regulatory state, and fiercely committed to huge tax cuts for the rich and corporations—positions that make it an outlier even among conservative parties in rich democracies. Perhaps even more troubling, the party now displays characteristics of what scholars of comparative politics call an “anti-system party”—one that seeks to foment tribalism, distort or discredit elections, and subvert political institutions and norms. All in all, its posture increasingly resembles that of far-right parties like Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party in France, rather than conventional center-right parties like the German Christian Democrats or the British Tories. The anti-system qualities of the contemporary Republican Party flourished under Donald Trump. He and his allies launched attacks on the foundations of democracy—the press, the courts, law enforcement, the political opposition—with virtually no pushback or even complaints from within their party. These norm-exploding stances raised the specter of democratic backsliding of a kind that seemed impossible to imagine in the United States only a few years ago. Yet while Trump gave these anti-democratic and tribalistic expressions new prominence and intensity, it is crucial to recognize that they were less a departure from the recent history of the Republican Party than a hastening of its march down an alarming path. Since at least Newt Gingrich’s House speakership in the 1990s, Republicans in Washington have deployed aggressive strategies designed to disrupt government, delegitimize the party’s opponents, and convince supporters that the alternative to Republican rule was terrifying. Republicans built, became dependent upon, and ultimately lost control to an “outrage machine” built around a formidable right-wing media apparatus and increasingly extreme movement groups like the National Rifle Association and the Christian Right. As the party embraced these efforts, its leading ranks gradually filled with ambitious politicians who accepted this new kind of politics, and recognized the power of the right wing to break them politically if they did not.  Far from vanquishing these forces within the Republican Party, Trump’s defeat seems to have strengthened them. Even after the insurrection of January 6th, a large majority of House Republicans took the astonishing step of voting not to accept the results of several states (and millions of voters) despite the lack of any credible evidence of fraud. Roughly two-thirds of Republican voters say Biden’s victory was illegitimate. With Trump determined to continue exerting influence over the party, there seems to be little appetite among Republican elites to change course. Efforts at compromise are certain to generate reprisals from right-wing media and the party’s electoral base. Given these incentives, there is little reason to anticipate anything other than scorched earth opposition to Biden’s presidency.   2. The Antiquated Constitutional Order   The likelihood that Republicans will oppose Biden tenaciously raises the significance of the second crisis: the nation’s antiquated constitutional order. The increasingly rickety structure of American political institutions contributes both to the worrisome evolution of the Republican Party and to the steadily eroding quality of American governance. Always sluggish, the peculiar structure of American government has left the country more vulnerable to extremism and less and less capable of responding to emerging challenges. One aspect of the problem is an unusually high threshold for passing legislation. National laws must clear four distinct hurdles – approval of the House, the Senate, the President (unless Congress overrides a veto), and acquiescence by the nation’s powerful courts. Each of these hurdles creates a distinct challenge. The difficulties have grown as the two parties are increasingly polarized since no single party is likely to control all four veto points. The result, most of the time, is stalemate – except over small things, or when events absolutely force some kind of cooperative action. The Senate’s “filibuster” rule, which requires most legislation to gain the support of 60 of the 100 senators, makes the problem of gridlock far worse. American institutions have a second worrisome feature: increasingly, they promote minority rule. The U.S. electoral system rewards parties whose supporters are dispersed across large swaths of sparsely populated territory. As the parties have increasingly polarized along geographic lines – Democrats the urban-based party and Republicans based in rural areas, outer suburbs, and small towns, this institutional bias has favored Republicans. They have been able to flout majority sentiment while sustaining, or even expanding, their political power. In recent House elections, Republicans’ share of congressional seats has exceeded their share of the two-party vote by roughly five percent. The Senate, with its huge bonus for people living in low-population states, is far worse. Republicans have represented a majority of voters in the Senate for only two years in the last twenty, but they have had a majority of senators for half that period. Republicans have also lost the popular vote in seven of the past eight presidential elections – a losing streak without precedent in American history. Yet the archaic Electoral College has twice awarded Republicans the presidency even as they lost the popular vote. It almost did so again in 2020. These “minoritarian” advantages compound. Thanks to the skew of the Senate and the Electoral College, Republican-appointed justices now have a 6-3 majority on the nation’s powerful Supreme Court. In the states, Republicans have taken advantage of a similar rural bias to gain disproportionate power over election laws and increase their edge in the House by drawing favorable Congressional district lines. This Constitutional crisis, in short, has fed the partisan one. It has emboldened the Republican Party even as Republicans have moved rightward, heightening the party’s ambivalence about democracy itself. The concept of majority rule has lost legitimacy in the Republican Party. Trump’s campaign never really tried to gain majority support – counting on the Electoral College’s bias to save him. And Trump’s cries of fraud were just more extreme versions of a steady drumbeat (often with strong racial overtones) within the party claiming that Democrats only win elections because of fraud. There is a direct line from years of these allegations to the “stop the steal” insurrection of January 6th. Rather than recoiling from that horrific event, however, Republicans in many states are using the “controversy” about the election as an excuse to advance proposals to make it more difficult for Democrats, and racial minorities in particular, to cast ballots in future elections.   3. Erosion of the Governing Capacity   The crisis of the Republican Party and American institutions is reinforced by a third, less obvious crisis: a staggering erosion of the nation’s governing capacity. Over the past generation, the ability of the United States to harness governmental authority for broad public purposes has been in steep decline. Polarization and gridlock have shackled government. Moreover, this dwindling capacity has emerged even as the need for effective governance in a complex, interdependent world has grown. It was the United States that triggered the “Great Recession” of 2007-2009 by letting its financial regulations wither. As the dangers of climate change have become obvious the United States has been immobilized; it now leads the world in promoting climate denialism and protecting the fossil fuel industry. Once the unquestioned leader in higher education and the promotion of science, the United States has been steadily falling down the global ranks of educational attainment. Perhaps most revealing, the U.S. stands out among rich democracies in trends in life expectancy – a key measure of broad social prosperity. In relative terms the U.S. has been losing ground to other rich democracies for decades. In recent years, the decline became not just relative but absolute. Driven by a rise in what economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton call “deaths of despair” – suicides, drug overdoses and alcohol abuse – life expectancy has actually fallen in the United States since 2014. And given the very poor performance of American government in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, life expectancy is expected to fall even further. All of these trends have fed on one another, creating a kind of doom-loop of growing extremism, poor governance, and skepticism about American democracy. The Democratic Party certainly deserves some of the blame here: both the Clinton and the Obama administrations did too little to address the dislocations caused by trade or the growing geographic divergence in economic outcomes. But the biggest barrier to serious action has been the Republican Party. Effective governance is elusive not because the problems Americans face are insuperable, but because the Republican Party has radicalized in reaction to economic and social trends and the nation’s aging political institutions are poorly equipped to handle an anti-system party with broad support. Indeed, Republican leaders from Newt Gingrich to Mitch McConnell have learned that obstructionist tactics that alienate voters from government are good politics. In the absence of competent government, places left behind by economic and cultural change have proved fertile terrain for fear-mongering by right-wing media and, increasingly, Republican campaigns. And as the GOP has alienated the racial and ethnic minorities that make up a growing share of the electorate, it has found itself drawn to strategies that undermine not just effective governance but also representative democracy itself.   Challenging Prospect for American Democracy   President Biden’s election thus represents a critical moment. Given enough time, Democrats might gain the upper hand, and electoral incentives might force Republicans to repudiate their destabilizing course. The Republican Party is deeply unpopular with rising demographic forces in the country. It has turned to a polarizing and increasingly anti-democratic strategy precisely because the groups at the heart of its coalition know that they are in a race against time. South Carolina Senator Lindsay Graham – once a fierce Trump critic but now, like most in the party, a dutiful follower – once warned “we’re not generating enough angry white guys to stay in business for the long term.” Sadly, the United States does not have time to wait, and the forces that have driven the United States into such a perilous state will not be dispersed easily. To its credit, the Biden administration seems to recognize the urgency, and is moving quickly to use the power at its disposal to address many of the challenges just described. Biden has emphasized that his top priorities are to address the pandemic, the economic downturn, climate change, and racial justice. Yet the antiquated American political system makes serious reform extremely difficult under the best of circumstances, and these are far from the best of circumstances. Biden can anticipate monolithic Republican opposition in Congress and the conservative media. The Senate filibuster will enable Republican senators to block any legislation except a few (albeit important) budgetary measures. Republicans are well aware that relentless legislative obstruction has delivered them political gains in the past. The Democrats’ tiny majority in the Senate also means any disagreement within the party could derail their efforts. Finally, Biden will also face an extremely conservative Supreme Court. Before these judges, even popular and essential reforms passed by any Democratic-controlled Congress would face a highly uncertain fate. These daunting obstacles highlight the precariousness of this moment. The stakes could hardly be higher in what remains the world’s most powerful nation. The United States is at a crossroads. One fork in the road leads to a democratic future, in which the Republican Party must adapt to remain competitive in a multi-racial society, and jettisons its ethno-nationalist appeals for a program that attempts to address the genuine challenges American citizens face. The other fork leads to something like what we have witnessed in Hungary under Victor Orban: further backsliding from democracy, voter suppression, the rigging of electoral districts, harassment of the press, and the use of a partisan judiciary and politicized law enforcement to reward allies and punish enemies. Donald Trump has lost the election, but we likely have not seen the end of his brand of politics. ■     Paul Pierson is the John Gross Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Yale University. He is an active commentator on public affairs, whose writings have appeared in such outlets as The New York Times, The New York Times Magazine, and The Washington Post. He has served on the editorial boards of The American Political Science Review, Perspectives on Politics, and The Annual Review of Political Science. He has also served as Chair of the Berkeley political science department. His research focuses on the fields of American politics and public policy, comparative political economy, and social theory. He is the co-author (with Jacob S. Hacker) of the forthcoming Let Them Eat Tweets: How the Right Rules in an Age of Extreme Inequality. Earlier books include Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer and Abandoned the Middle Class (2010), co-authored by Jacob Hacker, and Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis (2004). He also authored Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment (1994), which won the American Political Science Association's 1995 prize for the best book on American national politics, and “Path Dependence, Increasing Returns and the Study of Politics,” which won the APSA’s prize for the best article in the American Political Science Review in 2000, as well as the Aaron Wildavsky Prize in 2011.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Paul Pierson 2021-02-18Views : 361128
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] A Struggle for Democracy in Divided Thailand

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Notes Since the early 20th century, Thailand’s democratization has often been hindered by the Monarchy’s authoritarian system and its military coups despite advancements in creating a more inclusive and representative government. In this article, Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, assistant professor at the Institute of Asian Studies at Chulalongkorn University, argues that the 2020 youth-led protests represented a turning point in this struggle, as the movement undermined the legitimacy of the established monarchical government. Utilizing new forms of social organization and media outreach, Sombatapoonsiri outlines how protestors articulated their dissatisfaction with the authority’s suppressive rule and increasing socio-economic disparity, and produced an all-encompassing awareness campaign that is helping to reassert the country’s path towards a more democratic future. By navigating Thailand’s historic fluctuation between democratic advancement and monarchical dominance, Sombatopoonsiri warns that future pro-democracy efforts will be met by a pendulum of royalist sentiment, only deepening the divisions of an already politically polarized citizenry.     There are two Thailands. One is defined by the traditional streak that regards the monarchy as the soul of the nation, and the other is characterized by democratic credentials that highlight the “people” as the priority. The clash between these two political orders is age-old, but the youth-led protests last year brought it to a new level. The battleground is both on the streets and on screen.   Polarization-cum-autocratization Thailand’s polarization is underpinned by elite power struggle and bifurcated populace mobilized to support two political orders: royal nationalism and democracy. The struggle dates back to the early 20th century when a group of young bureaucrats introduced the notion of popular sovereignty and replaced Thailand’s then absolute monarchy with constitutional monarchy. However, this democratic aspiration has been short-lived as the military-monarchy nexus resurged to dominate the country’s political landscape, setting the stage for endless military coups and repeated episodes of authoritarianism. In 1973, students-led movements precipitated a democratic breakthrough, only to be reversed in 1976. The spell of authoritarian rule was briefly broken in 1992, following a popular uprising that damaged the credibility of the military and introduced the 1997 constitution that is considered as the most democratic of its kind. Nonetheless, this change did little to challenge the royal nationalist ideology. Meanwhile, royalist elites occupied “reserve domains,” or bastions of nondemocratic political power, that allowed them to constrain an elected government’s control over the passage, implementation, and enforcement of its own policies. This dominance of elite networks was challenged from 2001 onwards, setting the scene for democratic breakdown and polarization. The media tycoon-turned politician, Thaksin Shinawatra, founded the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) that won a landslide victory in the 2001 elections. This was mainly because its platform responded to Thailand’s socio-economic transformations which had been occurring since the 1980s, creating a new clientele for welfare-driven policies. For the economically marginalized population, these policies were seen as a source of not merely social mobility but also social dignity. TRT supporters based their ideational premise on a new sense of being Thai citizens granted with equal rights, rather than regarding them as subjects under royal tutelage. The royalist establishment, however, viewed this tendency as a threat. Not only did Thaksin’s fast-growing popularity begin to rival that of the king but also TRT’s efforts to promote social mobility challenged the hierarchical worldview of Thailand’s establishment, which negates the notion of social equity. In defense of the old world, the palace, army, the courts and allied businesses coalesced to undermine new political forces, which resulted in hardening the anti-establishment sentiment. This ideational conflict also prompted the shift from the elites’ power struggle to the confrontation between popular supporters of the two political visions, plunging Thailand deep into a spiral of toxic polarization. While TRT supporters and pro-democracy activists formed the “red shirt” movement in countering what they deemed as an elite onslaught of electoral democracy, royalist nationalists rallied behind the pro-establishment “yellow shirt” movement to protect national pillars from what they considered as “parliamentarian tyranny.” Red and yellow shirts engaged in the tit-for-tat disruptive demonstrations that at times brought Thailand to a standstill by ousting governments representing their respective antagonists in 2005, 2008, 2009-2010 and 2013-2014. Notably, the outcome of red shirts’ street politics was often decided on the ballot which at times brought to power its favorable party. In contrast, yellow shirts’ mass protests usually set the stage for a judicial intervention or military coup that sought to dismantle red shirts’ power base. It is this relationship between antidemocratic institutional actors such as the Constitution Court and the armed forces, on the one hand, and mass movements, on the other, that broke down Thailand’s democracy and set the country on an autocratic path in 2006 and between 2014 and 2019.   2020 Anti-establishment Movement: Drivers and Characteristics Upon its seizure of power in 2014, the military promised to bring “happiness” to Thailand by restoring order and bringing about reconciliation. Behind the rhetoric, however, was the frantic suppression of dissent and the rearrangement of power dynamics that would concentrate wealth and power to the elites and their allies. Over the course of five-year military rule, cases of human rights violation skyrocketed; corruption and abuse of power were rampant; governance was poor; and income gap between the rich and the poor was unprecedentedly widened. Despite growing criticisms, the regime frequently sustained its rule partly by claiming that its various policies were to defend the imperiled monarchy. As the latter’s political capital remains high in Thai society, this excuse has worked effectively to attract public support and deter the opposition—that is until it has ultimately reached a certain point. The revolt from July to December 2020 signifies this turning point: a crisis of royal legitimacy. Several factors drive the resurgent anti-establishment movement that morphed from the protest against the junta to public defiance of royal power. First, military rule has entrenched the unchecked power of the palace and related institutional actors at the expense of eroding the rule of law. In fact, laws have increasingly been weaponized to quell dissent, and the privileged elites have the ability to uphold their impunity. Second, this development—together with rising economic inequality—has generated widespread grievances and public discussions regarding the role of the monarchy in alleviating citizens’ suffering. While the late King Bhumibhol carried the moral image of royal sacrifices for many Thais, such cannot always be the case in the current reign. This growing reluctance contributes to diluting systemic legitimacy of royal nationalism. Third, thanks to rapid economic and technological changes, Thailand’s younger generation increasingly feels alienated from the old order that the junta represents. In contrast to the youngsters’ socially progressive, politically democratic and culturally open-minded traits, the old guards promote traditional values, top-down rule and nationalism. Ongoing repression and dwindling freedom of expression suffocate the Thai youth. Meanwhile, inequality conducive to the lack of opportunities shapes the dimmed prospect among the youngsters that they will not have a bright future in Thailand. Protest slogans such as “it has to end in our generation” (hai man chob tee run rao) epitomizes this pessimism that if changes do not arrive soon, young people’s future will be doomed. Under these circumstances, two events triggered the 2020 mass mobilization. The first was the dissolution of the Future Forward Party (FFP). The FFP is a good example of a pro-democracy force that fell victim not only to Thailand’s autocratic spell but also to enduring polarization. The party embodies the anti-establishment camp, but is considered to be more vocal than the TRT in terms of its democratic agenda. At times the royalists portray the FFP as advocating for republicanism. But for the younger generation, the FFP reminds them that a better future for Thailand is possible. As such the party attracted 6.3 million votes, out of around 53 million voters in the March 2019 election. Through the constitutional manipulation, the military-backed Palang Pracharat Party (PPP) gained the majority of votes, thus currently leading the ruling coalition. Despite this, the establishment and its supporters feel increasingly threatened by the youthful force the FFP has unleashed. In February 2020, the Constitutional Court disbanded the FFP for obscure reasons, sparking initial student protests across more than 50 university campuses and schools. The second trigger event was the forced disappearance of an exile activist, Wanchalerm Saksatsit, in July 2020. Wanchalerm sought refuge in Cambodia after the 2014 putsch. His anti-establishment activism included online criticisms of the junta and the palace, which led many to suspect a high profile involvement in his disappearance. Soon after the news broke out, social media campaigns called to #abolish112 (the 112 Article being the law punishing offenses of the monarchy). Small gatherings calling for the investigation into the Wanchalerm case escalated into a larger political movement that later demanded not only the resignation of General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the 2014 coup leader and current Prime Minister, but also a democratic amendment to the constitution, especially the abolition of the unelected senate, as well as the reform of deeply politicized monarchy in line with constitutional monarchy. As of December 2020, there have been almost 500 protest events organized across Thailand. Key characteristics of the protests are threefold. First, in terms of organization, these are “networked protests” based on loose coordination between different organizations. Initially led by university students, scattered protests subsequently evolved into the broad-based movement, known as Khana Ratsadorn (People’s Party), comprising for instance high school and university student clubs, labor unions, artists and LGBTQI movements. While sharing the aforementioned goals and co-organizing major protest events, members of the Khana Ratsadorn remained autonomous in holding their own protests at convenient sites and addressing specific grievances. Second, social media has played a vital role in the mobilization. Particularly Twitter hashtags have been created to publicize protest events (e.g. #TagYourFriendsToJoinMob) and fundraise; galvanize ideas for ‘hip’ and ‘cool’ protest activities (e.g. #IdeasForMob); mobilize crowds to the police station or the court in the face of arbitrary arrest of activists; and draw international attention to the protests (e.g. #WhatsInHappeningInThailand). Lastly, witty slogans and the use of urban pop culture distinguish the style of ongoing protests from previous pro- and anti-establishment demonstrations. Protesters’ self-made banners are satirical critiques of ruling elites. Many events were inspired by, for example, a popular Japanese manga, the fiction-turned film Harry Potter and a Thai comedy film. Through these novel protests, many onlookers and international media paid attention to protesters’ demands.   “The Elephant in the Room” and Politicized Polarization By resisting autocracy, protesters addressed the “elephant in the room,” which is the place of the monarchy in democratic politics. This bold move can be traced back to a string digital dissent that sent shockwaves due to its transgression of the taboo. In 2019, Twitter users criticized royal privileges in events such as a road blockade by the royal motorcade (e.g. # RoyalMotorcade) and the shutdown of an island due to a royal visit (e.g. #IslandsShutdown). However, amidst the first wave of student protests in early 2020, the most controversial and viral Twitter hashtag was #whydoweneedaking?, which was repeated 1.2 million times in 24 hours, and trended on Twitter on March 22, 2020. Taking things up a notch, a prominent dissent and exile launched the Facebook Page ironically dubbed “Royalist Marketplace” in which gossips and scandalous images of the royal family were shared among millions of page members. This style of hashtags and online “gossip” continued in offline protests in the form of self-made protest banners that mocked the royal lifestyle outside Thailand, royal discourses, the cultural façade of Thai loyalty to the monarchy, and many other royalist practices. This pushing of the cultural boundary reached the peak in early August when a leading activist delivered a speech demanding a democratic reform of the monarchy. The event was a breakthrough for it inspired protest speeches that openly discussed royal power in Thai politics, a traditionally taboo subject that could potentially place offenders in jail for 15 years or more. While public discussions regarding the monarchy are needed for Thailand’s democratic resurgence, what is deemed as popular contempt toward the sacred institution has provoked reactions from both the elite establishment and royalist citizens, thereby inevitably opening old wounds of polarization. For a long while, royalist groups such as the Rubbish Collection Organization allegedly monitored, reported and at times harassed offenders of the monarchy. In the face of the 2020 revolt, pro-establishment groups diversified their tactics by engaging in online disinformation campaigns. Ultimately the battleground is Twitter where the Thai elites struggle to censor criticisms of the monarchy. In September 2020, hashtags as well as posts favorable to the establishment and unfavorable to protesters were generated and retweeted. According to an expert investigation, tens and thousands of these accounts were inauthentic, behaving like bots. However, many royalists claimed that their accounts were genuine and they were the “silent power.”  Regardless of being created by bots or humans, royalist hashtags such as #WeLoveTheMonarchy gained traction and became Twitter trending superseding anti-establishment hashtags on October 20, 2020. A nascent digital royalist group called “Youngsters Love the Monarchy” (Anuchon rak sathaban kasat) went so far as to organize an online training for royalist Twitter users to improve their hashtagging skills. In parallel with this online contestation, pro-establishment supporters took to the streets and in a few incidents clashed with anti-establishment protesters. There were concerns that the apparently acute conflict between the two sides would again pave the way for military intervention. Here is the paradox for Thailand’s ongoing struggle for democracy that reflects the complex relationship between polarization and autocratization. By openly addressing the royal power—a once taboo subject—the anti-establishment movement has explicitly pointed to one of the root causes of Thailand’s entrenched autocracy which needs to be reformed for the sake of long-term democratization.  Yet in doing so, the movement has also contributed to the further accumulation of royalist support for the palace due to the divisive and polarized nature of the issue. One can argue that hardcore royalist groups described above gained critical traction after protest speeches about the monarchy became more open and regular than before. But at the same time, avoiding open discussions on the royal power is counterproductive to democratic sustainability. Is there a way to address the “elephant in the room” without creating a chance for antidemocratic elites to politicize polarization? This could be a question awaiting all of us in 2021.■     ■ Janjira Sombatpoonsiri is currently a research-oriented assistant professor at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, and an associate at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. Her research has focused on nonviolent activism and social movements in the context of democratization and autocratization, and recently digital repression.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

Janjira Sombatpoonsiri 2021-02-05Views : 14635
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Beyond the US-China Rivalry: Developing a Shared Democratic Vision for the Indo-Pacific

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Notes The United States' leadership for the democratic world was seriously damaged following the violence in the Capitol earlier this month. Now, with a genuine understanding of the existing threat to democracy, the newly inaugurated Biden administration can approach Asian democracies on equal terms to reverse the democratic setbacks that have become visible since the mid-2000s. Although the establishment of democratic coalitions between the US and other democracies is an increasingly debated topic, Sook Jong Lee, Professor of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute, argues that these coalitions should be welcomed in Asia to sustain the regional liberal order.  However, she suggests that the US take a more cautious and nuanced approach when engaging with Asian democracies so that it is not viewed as another rebalancing against China. Professor Lee states that Asian democracies have both the capacity and limitations in participating in the global and regional spaces of governance. For human rights issues and other core democratic values and norms, global institutions such as the United Nations are more appropriate platforms for Asian democracies in forming democratic coalitions. At the regional level, Asian countries desire for US leadership in guaranteeing their protection from China’s economic coercion and in safeguarding fair and transparent rules for all. Asian democracies also have the ability to contribute to global governance by acting as aid donors to many developing countries in the world. The democratic assistance that these countries provide have the potential to generate meaningful impact, especially as it is shifting from conventional infrastructural aids to encompass the Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG-16). Combining these strategies, Asian democracies and the US can establish more durable democratic coalitions.     The lawlessness and violence at the US Capitol on January 6 were no less troubling to the people of democracies around the world than to American citizens. Policy leaders are concerned about the chilling effect of this event on the new Biden Administration’s attempts to restore its leadership of global democracy. Indeed, Hass said the self-made destruction contributes to the decline of US influence and would accelerate the onset of a post-American world.[1] Policy experts are arguing that repairing democracy at home is not incompatible with standing up for democracy abroad and that America needs a democracy summit now more than ever.[2] During the campaign period, Joe Biden expressed his genuine concerns about the global democratic setbacks and called for a summit of democracies.[3] This article supports the democratic coalitions between Asian democracies and the US. American leaders now have moments of their own democracy on which to truly reflect and a chance to engage Asian democracies on equal terms. But the US will need to take a more cautious and nuanced approach to such engagement in order not to be viewed by Asian democracies as merely pursuing another US rebalancing strategy against China.   The Renewal of American Democracy at Home and Abroad Together with collective security and open trade, democracy has been a pillar of the liberal international order which was shaped by American leadership. Democracy has been a source of legitimization of the US primacy in international politics. Both internal and external performances did matter. US demonstrations of the real practice of the core democratic values of individual freedom, minority rights, and the rule of law—often identified as “American values”—America stood as a “beacon of democracy.” But this was not sufficient to persuade others that democracy should be a pillar of the liberal international order. This persuasive power has been bolstered by the US commitment to multilateralism in which it binds itself to international rules and the willingness to restrain its power as one member state of many international organizations. From this perspective, the Trump administration’s “America First” foreign policy and disrespect for democratic values at home and abroad was an aberration in American history. While multilateralism is a way of governing international problems collectively regardless of internal political system, the “liberal” international order colors multilateralism as a specific democratic type that treats individual nations the same way that democracies treat their individual citizens. Therefore, the renewal of democracy must work for individual countries and the international order at the same time.   The Liberal International Order and the China Question in Asia Asia has benefitted from free trade and a decades-long peace with no major wars. Democracy has been considered a form of political modernization to many countries in this region. Strong nationalism has delayed the development of rule binding regionalism, but numerous regional organizations have been formed to respond to shared problems. The presence of the US in Asia has contributed to the post-World War II peace and prosperity of the Asian region. Such peace and prosperity was possible with the US providing security with its hub and spoke alliance system, and absorbing much of exports from the region. This picture has changed with the rise of China. Asian economies are now tied to China through their supply chains and intertwined exports and investment ties. Fiegenbaum and Manning wrote in 2012 that “Economic Asia” and “Security Asia” have been colliding each other in this gradual shift. As Asians provide economic public goods to one another, they say, the US role in this region has ebbed so that Washington has focused only on security rebalancing.[4] The Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” was one of the first US rebalancing strategies to counter the increasing Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the Trump administration, the rebalancing efforts changed the mapping of the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific, covering both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The National Security Strategy of December 2017 recognized the growing competition between free and repressive visions of the future international order as the most consequential challenge.[5] The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report by the Department of Defense released in 2019 articulated four principles of the region’s liberal order—respect for the sovereignty and independence of all nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, free, fair, and reciprocal trade, and adherence to international rules and norms including freedom of navigations and overflight.[6] In the same year, the State Department’s A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision leaned away from military cooperation and towards diplomatic and economic cooperation on issues such as trade, infrastructure, energy, and the digital economy.[7] Over the last few years, the US-China rivalry has come to focus on trade and technology, adding to the complexity of geopolitical competition. The region’s US allies have been pushed to choose between the US, a security patron, and China, the number one economic partner. The controversies surrounding the responsibility for the initial coronavirus outbreak in 2020 have worsened their diplomatic relations and derailed their trade negotiations. There have been voices of doubting the decoupling efforts of the Trump administration. William Burns, Biden’s nominee for CIA Director, called for the reinvention of American foreign policy between retrenchment and restoration. He said that the US and Chinese economies are too entangled to decouple and that the US would benefit more from shaping an environment in which China can rise together with the allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific who worry about China’s ascendance.[8] Similarly, Lake said that establishing boundaries between the US and Chinese spheres of influence is fraught, and boundary disputes are open to diplomacy and the effective management of international organizations.[9] Now, democratic Asian allies of the region are cautiously watching how the new Biden administration will reformulate the Indo-Pacific vision within his vision of democracy. The Community of Democracies was formed as an intergovernmental coalition in 2000 under US leadership, and high-level delegations from 106 countries signed the Warsaw Declaration Toward a Community of Democracies.[10] This attempt to forge a democracy coalition as one layer of the balancing China strategy appears new. Is this idea of mobilizing “Democratic Asia” going to work? The answer is conditionally “yes” when combined with a cautious and wise approach.   More Feasible Democratic Coalitions between the US and Asian Democracies Policy experts are advising the new administration about the right size for this proposed summit of democracies. Campbell, who will oversee Indo-Pacific affairs on the White House National Security Council, and Doshi have suggested democracy coalitions such as the D-10 proposed by the United Kingdom (the G-7 democracies plus Australia, India, and South Korea) on the problems of trade, technology, supply chains, and standards, and human rights coalitions among states that are criticizing China’s internment camps in Xinjiang and its assault on Hong Kong’s autonomy.[11] Others recommend taking a moderately big-tent approach, with a threshold to merit an invitation, and pursuing a broader agenda of democratic inclusiveness in addition to the suggested agenda items of anti-corruption digital technologies, fighting corruption, defending against authoritarianism, and advancing human rights.[12] The size issue of democratic coalitions is secondary. What is important is how to frame the agenda so that Asian democracies are willing to participate and capable of achieving shared goals. There seem to be three types of democratic coalitions in which Asian democracies might be willing to engage. The first is bolstering existing democratic norms and rules in global governance. China is accelerating its efforts to pursue its national interests in global governance. Hart and Johnson identified six key categories of these efforts: shaping multilateral action, disrupting international legal regimes, shifting international norms, co-opting international organizations, creating new international institutions, and building a China-centric platform for international cooperation.[13] Nadege emphasized that it is “discourse power”—the ability to exert influence over the formulations and ideas that underpin the international order—at which China aims intellectually.[14] China has long been criticizing the existing order as both Western-biased and unfair, and has spent the last decade attempting to sell the China model to developing countries as an alternative. Asian democracies, which share a similar history and culture, are better positioned than the West to point out the successes of Asian economies with democracy. Asian democracies can play a role in forming voting coalitions in response to China’s efforts to dilute or bend the core democratic norms and principles in global governance.  Asian democracies can better contribute to democratic norm preservation in a global rather than regional space. Logically, the United Nations is the most appropriate place for these countries to find their role in forming a bridge between Western democracies and developing countries. Plurilateral semi-governmental democratic coalitions where Asian democracies participate with Western democracies can be also useful. For example, in the “Democracies 10” where foreign ministries have convened since 2014, Australia, Japan, and South Korea are members together with Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union.[15] The British Prime Minister’s idea of expanding G7 to G10 by adding Australia, India, and South Korea proposed during the June summit this year will reportedly dovetail with Biden’s interest in promoting democracy as superior to authoritarianism.[16] The second is developing effective regional coalitions to prevent China’s economic coercion. Asian countries want the US to make greater efforts to protect them from Chinese coercive diplomacy by using its economic influence. Individual Asian countries become helpless when facing conflicts with China since their trade and supply chains are tied to China. When South Korea introduced a missile defense system from the US in 2016, China retaliated by restricting Korean business inside China and stopping Chinese tourism to South Korea, which damaged Korea’s economy. Recently, Australia is facing similar retaliation from China. The WTO is too distant and complex to be able to effectively counter this kind of economic coercion. The US and Asian countries need to develop mechanisms to address this kind of pressure from China by collective means, whether they employ naming and shaming statements or mobilize more tangible countermeasures. Lastly but not least, Asian democracies are supporting good governance through Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other private development assistance efforts. The aid from Asian donors like Japan and South Korea used to be characterized as “developmental” or “commercial” among Lancaster’s four ideal type models of development assistance policies; diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian, and commercial.[17]But, their conventional focus on infrastructure and education is diversifying to include assistance in public administrative capacity and, more recently, programs aligned with Sustainable Development Goal No. 16 on peace, justice, and inclusive institutions.[18] The remaining issue is that these development assistance efforts by Asian democracies are carried out bilaterally with recipient countries and involve few global partnerships with other donors. The formation of aid partnerships among Asian donors, together with American or European donors, can scale up support for democracy in the region.   Conclusions Asian democracies such as Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea, together with India despite its disappointing recent democratic performance, are willing to participate in US-led democratic coalitions. These countries share genuine concerns for the regional and global setbacks of democracy since the mid-2000s. Rising populism, polarized politics, and digital authoritarianism all matter. Asian democracies also share a sense of importance regarding the bolstering of democratic values and norms in regional politics since both their own democratic governance and the region’s public good hinge upon the liberal Asian order continuing to prevail. If renewed US efforts to build democratic coalitions are narrowly couched as another strategy to rebalance China, however, Asian allies and partners will be less willing to participate or remain passive after they join. Democratic Asia is likely to be more dynamic when the goal is framed in universal terms in which China issues are integrated. Asian democracies can take a more active role in assisting democracy by proffering aid and other material capacities. A coordinated approach in scaling up the amounts of development assistance and building common aid framework principles is likely to boost this role. On the other hand, Asian countries are afraid of China’s coercive economic policies and want the US to take initiative in providing certain practical mechanisms in response. With regard to human rights issues and other core norms and rules of democracy, many Asian democracies are likely to prefer global governance venues, especially the United Nations. Existing or newly attempted plurilateral democratic coalitions are also worthy of pursuit in highlighting the values and norms of liberal democracy. If these mixed approaches are used at the same time, the coalitions between the US and Asian democracies can work.■   [1] Richard Haass, “Present at the Destruction: Trump’s Final Act Has Accelerated the Onset of a Post-American World,” Foreign Affairs, January 11, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-11/present-destruction, accessed on January 14, 2021. [2] Thomas Wright, “The US must now repair democracy at home and abroad,” January 11, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/11/the-us-must-now-repair-democracy-at-home-and-abroad/; Frances Z. Brown, Thomas Carothers, and Alex Pascal, “America Needs a Democracy Summit More than Ever,” Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2021, America Needs a Democracy Summit More Than Ever  | Foreign Affairs. [3] Joe Biden, “Democracy at the Age of Authoritarianism,” Speech at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit, June 22, 2018. https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/speech-by-joe-biden/. [4] Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert Manning, “A Tale of Two Asias,” Foreign Policy October 31, 2012. ihttps://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/31/tale-of-two-asias-pub-49859.  [5] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. [6] Department of Defense, United States. 2019. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6111634-DOD-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-JUNE-2019. [7] Department of State, United States. 2019. A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. https://www.state.gov/a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-advancing-a-shared-vision/. [8] William Burns, “The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy,” The Atlantic, July 14, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/united-states-needs-new-foreign-policy/614110/. [9] David Lake, “Whither the Liberal International Order? Authority, Hierarchy, and Institutional Change,” Ethics & International Affairs, Winter 2020. [10] https://community-democracies.org/values/organization/. [11] Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How American Can Shore Up Asian Order: A Strategy Restoring Balance and Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs January 12, 2021, How America Can Shore Up Asian Order | Foreign Affairs. [12] Frances Z. Brown, Thomas Carothers, and Alex Pascal, “America Needs a Democracy Summit More than Ever,” Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2021, America Needs a Democracy Summit More Than Ever  | Foreign Affairs. [13] Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnson, Mapping China’s Global Ambitions, Center for American Progress, February 2019. Mapping China's Global Governance Ambitions. [14] Nadege Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order, National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2020. China's vision for a new world order. [15] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/scowcroft-center-for-strategy-and-security/global-strategy-initiative/democratic-order-initiative/d-10-strategy-forum/. [16] The Guardian, “UK plans early G7 virtual meeting and presses ahead with switch to D10,” January 15, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/15/uk-plans-early-g7-virtual-meeting-and-presses-ahead-with-switch-to-d10. [17] Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. [18]  Korea International Cooperation Agency, http://www.koica.go.kr/koica_en/8003/subview.do; Japan International Cooperation Agency, “JICA’s Position Paper on SDG: Goal 16.” https://www.jica.go.jp/aboutoda/sdgs/ku57pq00002e2b2a-att/goal16_e.pdf.     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Professor of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Ko-rea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

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