Sri Lanka, Asia’s oldest democracy, is at a critical inflection point in its history. The island nation of 22 million people is facing unprecedented economic and political crises. Sri Lanka is currently engulfed with massive anger and intensifying street protests over the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government’s bungling of the economy that has triggered a near-collapse. The spontaneous protests, which started in early March with small numbers engaged in candlelight marches, soon intensified and transformed into massive, nationwide agitation against the ruling Rajapaksa clan and their misdeeds. With popular slogans like “Go Home Gota” and “Go Home Rajapaksas,” the protestors, comprising students, teachers, doctors, women, and people from every walk of life, poured onto the streets against the Rajapaksa government. When the supporters of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa launched gruesome attacks on protestors on March 9, it led to a spontaneous and massive counter-attack from the protestors, resulting in the death of a ruling party MP and several civilian deaths. [1] To quell the rapidly spreading violent unrest, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa persuaded his elder brother and Prime Minister Rajapaksa to resign from their posts. The continued unrest, which resulted in angry protestors attacking properties owned by ruling party leaders and burning down the ancestral home of the Rajapaksas in Hambantota city, prompted the former Prime Minister to flee along with his family to the naval base for safety. [2] The island nation seems to be on the cusp of an Arab Spring. [3]   The country is under its second emergency within a month, and protests show no sign of abating. President Gotabaya in the meantime has reconstituted a bipartisan government with the surprise induction of the opposition leader Ranil Wickemesinghe as the new Prime Minister to steer the country toward a safer horizon. Yet, with the economic crisis persisting as fuel and other essential commodities run out of stock (resulting in a 13-hour power cut) due to the balance payment crisis and protestors still at large on the streets demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya, it is difficult to see how the current crisis will pan out.   What led to Sri Lanka’s Economic Collapse?   What has really driven this relatively prosperous island nation (which incidentally had achieved upper-middle income status) to this mess? The most immediate factors that took the country into financial crisis are the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Starting in early 2020, the pandemic hugely affected island nation’s main revenue earning sector: tourism. Millions of people have lost their livelihoods as tourist footfalls were reduced dramatically over the past two years, resulting in an overall loss of as much as 12% of the country’s economic output. [4] In addition, the pandemic negatively impacted other key revenue earning sectors including the garment industry and tea exports while also squeezing earnings from remittances. [5] Thus, the country’s fragile economy, already reeling from the shock of the Easter Sunday bombings in 2019, [6] became further exposed through these pandemic-related impacts. As the pandemic began to recede in early 2022, there were some signs of economic revival. However, the Russian attack on Ukraine led to a surge in global fuel and food prices. [7] This further impacted the country’s already precarious balance of payment situation, forcing the leadership to scramble for foreign aid to meet its immediate needs. With the country in no position to arrange foreign exchanges, it has cut down on essential imports including fuel, food items, and medicines. This has led to essential fuels like petrol running out of stock in addition to frequent power cuts, long queues for gas stations, and a shortage in many shops of essential goods, medicines, and other basic items. The crisis is so deep that despite immediate support from countries like India and China, Colombo defaulted on all of its external debt on April 12 while seeking an urgent bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).   Deeper Structural Factors behind the Economic Crisis   While the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine greatly exposed Sri Lanka’s economic fragility bringing the country to its worst economic crisis since the 1930s, the crisis in fact has deeper structural roots and can be traced back to the first Rajapaksa government (2005-2014). [9] In the aftermath of its historic victory over the Tamil Tigers in 2009, the Mahinda Rajapaksa government embarked on ambitious infrastructure projects. On the heels of the global financial crisis, the government tapped easily available loans from China to build big-ticket infrastructure projects like Hambantota sea port, Mattala Rajapaksa Airport, and Colombo Port City. While the infrastructure push helped the non-tradable sectors such as construction and real estate and provided temporary growth, several mega-infrastructure projects such as the Hambantota port and Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport emerged as poor investment choices as they earned little foreign exchange for the island nation. [10] In the meantime, Sri Lanka rapidly became one of the most indebted nations, with commercial debt (largely taken from Chinese sources) shooting up from a mere 7% in 2006 to a mammoth 55% in 2019. [11] International sovereign bonds increased as much as 38% (excluding another 10% held by China) by early 2019, while successive governments paid little or no heed to the monstrous level of debt accumulation. With foreign exchange earnings from exports remaining poor (partly due to the Easter Sunday bombings in 2019 hugely impacting the country’s key sector of tourism), the government heavily relied on selling bonds to maintain its foreign exchange reserves. However, with the pandemic squeezing economic activities and much of capital markets, bond markets suffered heavily, further eroding the country’s financial stability.   Populist Policies   The economic mismanagement was furthered by a number of populist policies before and during the pandemic. As soon as the Rajapaksas won the 2019 polls, the first major economic decision they took was to make deep tax cuts despite experts warning that such cuts would badly hit government revenue. [12] The Sinhala-nationalist government followed this with a sudden decision to switch to organic farming in the country without consulting any agriculture experts. [13] In the middle of the pandemic in 2021, the Rajapaksa government embarked on an ambitious roll out of this program by imposing a ban on the import of synthetic fertilizers while forcing 2 million farmers to make the change to organic farming. The outcome of this ill-conceived and populist decision was a drastic fall in the output of staples such as rice and tea. For instance, rice production fell by as much as 20% in the first six months of the program, forcing the country to import USD $450 million worth of rice from international markets while the domestic prices of this national staple surged nearly 50%. [14] The fertilizer ban had devastating effects on tea crops as well, which was the nation’s main source of foreign exchange.   While the government partially removed the ban on export crops such as tea and rubber, the pre-ban momentum has been difficult to achieve. Faced with rising inflation, soaring prices, and massive protests from angry farmers, the government finally reversed its decision on organic farming and associated measures, but with few positive outcomes. From being proudly dubbed an “upper middle income country” a few years ago, more than half a million people have fallen back into grinding poverty. The Rajapaksas’ brazen and populist decisions were aptly summed up by Foreign Policy, which said, “The farrago of magical thinking, technocratic hubris, ideological delusion, self-dealing, and sheer shortsightedness that produced the crisis in Sri Lanka implicates both the country’s political leadership and advocates of so-called sustainable agriculture: the former for seizing on the organic agriculture pledge as a shortsighted measure to slash fertilizer subsidies and imports and the latter for suggesting that such a transformation of the nation’s agricultural sector could ever possibly succeed.” [15]   Nepotism and Corruption   Experts link nepotism to the current economic and political crises facing Sri Lanka. [16] Average Sri Lankans blame the economic mess on the corrupt, wasteful, and oligarchic rule of the Rajapaksa family. As many as six members of the family were holding key portfolios in the government. [17] While Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the third of the brothers, is holding the post of president, the elder brother Mahinda Rajapaksa held the post of prime minister until March 9. Brother Basil Rajapaksa held the key ministry of finance, and Mahinda’s son Namal was Minister of Sport and Youth. While the family’s iron grip over politics began during the civil war years (2005), their real grip on Sri Lanka began in 2010, when Mahinda Rajapaksa was re-elected with a greater majority. Following his re-election, Mahinda not only appointed his brothers and relatives into key positions, he also aggressively solicited investments from China to build many vanity projects in his hometown at great cost to the state exchequer. [18] While the Rajapaksas lost power in 2015 in the face of charges of corruption and nepotism, they won a massive mandate in 2019 against the backdrop of the Easter bombings.   When Gotabaya became President, he appointed his elder brother Mahinda as prime minister. Four other members of his family were allotted key ministries, giving the family a complete hold on Sri Lankan politics. With few checks on their power, the family is at the root of many of the brazen decisions that have accentuated the present economic crisis. For instance, the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which opened in 2013, is being mocked as “the world’s emptiest airport.” [19] Even the decisions to opt for organic farming and to initially not seek an IMF bailout were made purely by the Rajapaksas. Recently, President Gotabaya accepted that these mistakes had led to the current economic turmoil. [20] In other words, family rule and unchecked power and impunity have greatly aided the current mess in the island nation.   Where Does Sri Lanka Go from Here?   Can Sri Lanka weather the crisis without any major political earthquakes? Will the appointment of five-time Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe bring an end to the continuing political unrest? What is the future of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and the Rajapaksa family? Will this protest movement facilitate a more tolerant and inclusive democracy in Sri Lanka? At this point, it is very difficult to predict what direction that Asia’s oldest democracy will take. However, there are a few things that appear certain. First, the persistent nationwide protests despite the resignation of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa are likely to bring an end to the long grip of the Rajapaksa family on political power in Sri Lanka. While President Gotabaya is valiantly fighting to hold onto power, he may not have much longer considering the fragile economic situation and ongoing, widespread protests. Such a development may be a good thing for Sri Lankan democracy, as it would create an opening for new political actors in the democratic process. Second, the continuing political unrest may bring an end to the executive presidency and restoration of the 19th Constitutional Amendment, which debarred the president from dismissing the prime minister at his discretion. [21] These are the top demands of the protest movement, and the current dispensation led by Gotabaya is open to these measures. Incidentally, before he was forced to resign, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa had proposed a 21st constitutional amendment repealing the 20th Amendment to the Constitution and reviving the key clauses of the 19th Amendment. [22] This amendment would put an end to the much-abused executive presidency and revive the powers of parliament, which would be an important milestone for Sri Lankan democracy. [23]   Third, the crisis has brought new hope of solidarity and inclusion among minorities such as Tamils, Muslims, and Christians with the Sinhala majority. In a pragmatic show, alienated minorities have joined hands with the Sinhala majority to throw out the Sinhala-nationalist government that has assiduously thrived on polarization and minority alienation. The protest site that Mahinda Rajapaksa’s supporters tried to destroy, “GotaGoGama,” has aptly been called the “secular shrine of democracy” by noted political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda. [24] The protest site continues to be visited by thousands of people cutting across all faiths and ethnicities to express their solidarity in support of democracy and inclusion. Many powerful Buddhist monks are openly showing solidarity with Muslims and Christian minorities. In short, the crisis portends well for Sri Lanka’s secular and multi-cultural future.   Finally, the crisis offers a rare chance for Sri Lanka to re-assess its excessive dependency on China and expand and deepen its engagement with key democracies in Asia and the West. As has been stated earlier, Sri Lanka’s current economic crisis has a long Chinese shadow. The Rajapaksas have aggressively solicited Chinese involvement in the island nation’s economic and political matters with grave consequences. However, now that the country is in deep financial trouble, China has been less dexterous and taken a more hard-nosed approach toward debt repayments, showing little sensitivity to the suffering of ordinary people. [25] In contrast, Asian democracies like India and Japan, which have been subjected to discriminatory policies particularly under the Rajapaksas’ rein, have shown greater sensitivity and alacrity in providing financial and material assistance. For instance, India was quick to open two lines of credit of USD $1.5 billion each for food, medicine, and other essential goods and has provided USD $2 billion in deferred payments from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to India’s Central Bank. [26] This critical geopolitical juncture in which both China and the Rajapaksas face increasing scrutiny from a united opposition and the masses is an opportune time for New Delhi and Washington to fill the void and steer the island nation away from Chinese influence [27] . With the pendulum swinging away from China, Sri Lanka must be encouraged to turn to the international community and multilateral institutions to recover from the current crisis. ■     [1] [6] Nisha Arunatillake, https://www.ips.lk/talkingeconomics/2020/04/03/easter-attacks-in-2019-vs-covid-19-outbreak-of-2020-what-lies-ahead-for-sri-lanka/ [7] Gerry Shih, “How war in Ukraine turned Sri Lanka’s economic crisis into calamity,” April 17, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/17/sri-lanka-crisis-default-ukraine/ [8] Mujib Mashal, NYT, 17 May 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/17/world/asia/sri-lanka-fuel-economic-crisis.html [9] S.D. Muni, The roots of Sri Lanka’s economic and political turmoil, The Hindustan Times, April 9, 2022. https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/the-roots-of-sri-lanka-s-economic-and-political-turmoil-101649428821069.html [10] Dushni Weerakoon, “Sri Lanka on the Brink: How the Pandemic and war in Ukraine led to Economic Collapse,” Foreign Affairs, April 14, 2022.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/sri-lanka/2022-04-14/sr [11] Devaka Gunawardena and Ahilan Kadirgamar, “The Political Economy of the Crisis in Sri Lanka,” Economic and Political Weekly, April 30, 2022. https://www.epw.in/journal/2022/18/perspectives/p [12] Ted Nordhaus and Saloni Shah, Foreign Policy, March 5, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/05/sri-lanka-organic-farming-crisis/ [13] Ibid [14] Ibid [15] Dilrukshi Handunnetti, "The Fall of the House of Rajapaksas: How Unbridled Nepotism let Sri Lanka Down," The Wire, May 10, 2022,[25] Ibid [26] C. Raja Mohan, Across South Asia, US and India Pushback against China, Foreign Policy, April 6, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/06/us-india-china-sri-lanka-south-asia-geopolitics/     ■ Niranjan Sahoo is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek , Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

The vote of no confidence that led to the ouster of Imran Khan marks another major event in Pakistan’s political and constitutional history. This has also considerably transformed the country’s political landscape. This is the first time that the country’s national parliament has voted out its leader since Pakistan’s de facto restoration of democracy in 2008. This move left a notorious parliamentary record — the premature conclusion of the prime minister’s rule.   Historical perspective   This is not the first time a vote of no confidence was initiated in Pakistan’s National Assembly. Nonetheless, this was the only successful one. The practice was first initiated in 1957 against then prime minister I.I Chundrigar, who resigned before the vote could take place. The vote of no confidence has also been moved against former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Shaukat Aziz, both of whom survived the vote. There have also been many cases of no confidence and the defection of parliamentarians from within a ruling party in Pakistan’s provincial assemblies; the latest was the ouster of Balochistan’s former chief minister Jam Kamal Khan, who was then replaced by Abdul Qudoos Bizenjo last year.   These votes of no confidence have a tendency to result in major constitutional crises, allowing un-elected state institutions to step in and intervene both during and following the process. What differentiates Khan’s ouster from its precedents is that by the time he faced the vote, relative constitutional safety for the parliament had been in place following the 18th amendment as well as the elimination of Article 58-2B.   Khan tried measures which earlier prime ministers might have pulled off: get the vote rejected through a ruling by the speaker, immediately dissolve the assembly, and announce fresh elections. With constitutional firewalls in place, the Supreme Court stepped in and declared all these actions to be contrary to the Constitution.   New Crises   Following the success of the no confidence vote against Khan and the election of Shehbaz Sharif as Pakistan’s new prime minister, a variety of new crises have started to take shape. First, a war of narratives pertaining to the emergence and execution of this vote have unfolded. Khan’s argues that a foreign country conspired against him, the opposition abetted this adventure, and state institutions failed to come to his rescue – he claims that the only closure to this crisis lies in fresh elections. Even though the National Security Committee confirmed that there was no evidence of an alleged foreign conspiracy and the Supreme Court also declared Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)’s actions of rejecting the motion and dissolving the national assembly unconstitutional, there have been a series of massive rallies and processions where the PTI continues to call for fresh elections.   The new government, however, says that Khan lost the trust of the House as his government failed on socio-economic fronts. Inflation has skyrocketed, pushing the public to look for alternatives. The PTI has now pinned its hopes on mobilizing the masses to demand fresh elections. They believe that they can come back with a two-thirds majority, something largely unprecedented in Pakistan’s history. They believe that this would be possible, provided that the public perceives this as a conspiracy. The protests on the streets of Lahore and Karachi included slogans against the establishment, especially Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa. This was the first time such open criticism against the establishment took place on the streets of Pakistan’s urban centers since General Musharraf’s rule.   But does the PTI actually think that such support will help its cause? It might betrue that the PTI’s conspiracy narrative has grained traction among people, but to believe that this will result in a landslide electoral victory seems highly farfetched. Indeed, the PTI has managed to re-mobilize their urban middle-class support base, but there is little evidence to suggest that their narrative serves to expand this base, especially in areas where they did not have political presence earlier. This is also coupled with the fact that key allies and electables, who allowed the PTI to form a government despite having a low number of seats in the Punjab, defected and allied with the opposition parties to make PML-N’s Hamza Shehbaz, the chief minister of Punjab. 25 defected members of the PTI have now been deseated by the election commission following the Supreme Court’s verdict on defection.   Despite this, Khan’s position on re-election remains firm; he recently said in a TV interview that he would prefer sitting in the opposition until he has a two-thirds majority in the parliament. The issue of a fresh election is dented by two major aspects of the current electoral landscape. First, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has already stated on record that they are currently not in a position to conduct fresh elections because of the pending delimitation following the new census and the merger of tribal districts into Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. Given that the issue of delimitation will persist until October 2022, it seems unlikely that fresh general elections will be conducted within this year. Furthermore, a case against the PTI for allegedly accepting foreign funding has come close to a conclusion at the ECP. There is a looming possibility that the PTI, as a party, might be disqualified if the ECP confirms evidence of foreign funding. This decision would severely dent the PTI’s narrative and will inevitably impact the execution and outcomes of the next general elections.   There has also been talk regarding emerging cracks within the establishment following the failure of the so-called hybrid regime. Despite the PTI’s failures on the economic front, Khan was able to establish major campaigns in terms of Pakistan’s foreign policy following his tirades against Islamophobia and Pakistan’s involvement pre- and post-U.S.’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some view that General Bajwa lost his trust in Khan, which is why he mobilized the opposition against him. Supporters of the PTI supporters have also used this narrative in their protests. However, some also view that the PTI continues to enjoy the support of some factions within the establishment, particularly those led by General Faiz Hameed, Pakistan’s former Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence. Even Khan recently said in a podcast that his decision to give an extension in the tenure of his Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (DG ISI) was something that did not sit well with his opponents.   Regardless of how this war of narratives will end, the new government, despite its recent victory, stands at a crossroads. It now has to try and maintain control over a setup that they have alleged, has been considerably destroyed by Khan’s policies and, while they are at it, try and deliver on various fronts so that they do not lose the public’s trust before the next elections. For example, as soon as the new cabinet was sworn in, the government faced a major challenge in terms of fuel prices. The PTI’s deals with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) included an increase in fuel prices. Since the PTI had maintained fuel prices through large subsidies, the new government now bears the cost of $12 million per day to keep fuel prices where they are.   Finance Minister Miftah Ismail has tweeted that the talks with the IMF are underway in a positive manner and hoped that the economic situation in the country would improve soon. Government is seeking the revival of the stalled $6 billion loan programme, for which the finance minister will also travel to Doha on May 24 to participate in the final round of negotiations. Nonetheless, it may remain stuck between the devil and the deep sea. It is left with two choices – to maintain fuel prices and keep the subsidies, not risking any public outcry by, or to let go of fuel subsidies to relieve massive pressure on the economy, causing fuel prices to increase substantially. In the latter case, the government will receive massive uproar from the public, which may cause a massive PR failure.   Elite War Detached from People’s Life   For Pakistan’s masses, the crisis plays out in an entirely different way. For an average Pakistani citizen, what does this crisis mean? Surely, they must make a choice in the next elections, but what’s more to it? Did their lives transform for the better under the PTI’s rule? Is there any hope for a better future under either Khan’s or Sharif’s rule?   It hasn’t yet been a quarter since the vote of no confidence against Khan succeeded in the parliament and the Pakistani public is already facing electricity outages, rise in inflation. It is the people that will have to bear the eventual brunt arising from the government’s decision on May 24th; both in the case of rising fuel prices or in the case of a rise in inflation due to massive fuel subsidies. Speaking entirely in these terms, it seems as if the entirety of this vote of no confidence and its outcomes do not mean anything more than an elite infighting within Pakistan’s power echelons, which have no utility for the masses other than a constant political drama taking majority of the airtime on mainstream media.   The main reason behind this massive lag between what happens in power centres and at its margins is that no political force, until now, has emerged with a clear-cut plan regarding how to solve the major fault lines that have come to define Pakistan’s crisis of inequality and deprivation. There has been a historical tension between the center and disproportionately developed federating units. Pakistan’s economy has largely remained anti-people and drenched in IMF’s structural programs. Inflation has hit a historic high while wages have remained as they were. On top of it, levels of danger consequent of dissent have also remained at an inhumane level. Cases of enforced disappearances have continued and speaking truth to power still poses an existential threat. In this context, what difference would it make if the PTI is replaced by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML)-N or the Pakistan Peoples Party loses power to PML-Q? The PTI leadership has carefully constructed a narrative over how and why their government was ousted by a foreign hand. But they are unlikely to claim that that they deserve a two-third majority in a fresh election because they are actually able to deliver what the people mandated through their vote. Similarly, the earlier opposition and the new government also do not seem to have a radical plan of action to rid Pakistan of the fundamental ills that pose a threat to the dignity of the people.   Their best bet is to remain functional until the next election, whenever they are conducted. The recent vote of no confidence has led to a clear infight between Pakistan’s major power sharers; be it the establishment or political parties. But, as history suggests, the dispossessed people of Pakistan has always been the consistent victims in this fight for power regardless of the victor.■     ■ Haider Kaleem is the manager of the Nigar Ahmad Research and Advocacy Fund at the South Asia Partnership - Pakistan. After studying Journalism at the Beaconhouse National University, he has worked as a reporter and producer in various leading print and digital media outlets in Pakistan as well as a Researcher at the Institute of Development Studies (UK) with a focus on human rights, political movements, judiciary, gender-based violence, local governance, and development.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

As the May 2022 election approaches in the Philippines, many fear that, as Borja and Hecita recently put it in another ARDN briefing, the results will mark “a critical juncture in the history of Southeast Asia’s oldest democracy.” [1] Polls indicate significant leads for presidential aspirant Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr and vice presidential candidate Sara Duterte, a tandem many view as a threat to the legacy of the 1986 “People Power” revolution and liberal democracy in the country. Observers worry that civil society, the press, political opposition, and human rights protections will face further rollbacks, after the tumultuous term of current-President Rodrigo Duterte.   Religious leaders and networks were one part of the People Power coalition that brought down the Marcos dictatorship during democracy’s global “third wave.” The Roman Catholic Church, representing roughly 4 in 5 Filipinos, was central to this effort, and recent statements resemble the advocacy for democratic institutions in that period. Prominent Catholic leaders like Lingayen-Dagupan Archbishop Socrates Villegas have declared that the church “cannot be neutral when we talk about good or evil.” [2] However, while this role as moral defender of democracy remains important, there may be limits on religion’s role in preserving liberal democracy in 2022 and beyond. Changes in both the religious and political landscapes present new challenges to religious leaders hoping to serve again as democracy’s guarantors.   Religion and Philippine Politics from People Power to Daang Matuwid   In the three decades after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos’s regime in 1986, a rough consensus emerged over the political role of religion, and especially the Catholic Church, in Philippine politics. The post-authoritarian constitution announced the separation of church and state to be “inviolable,” [3] but courts clarified that this would be a form of “benevolent secularism” which preserved extensive room for what sociologist José Casanova calls “public religion.” [4] Various government programs, from public health to education to disaster relief and response, involve close partnership with religious organizations, and religious leaders enjoy what Grzymała-Busse and Slater have termed “institutional access” to local and national politicians, the ability to influence policy informally via direct ties to elected officials and career civil servants. [5] Cory Aquino owed a portion of her political rise to Manila’s Cardinal Sin in 1986, and her son, Bengino ‘Noynoy’ Aquino III, appointed clergy to his cabinet after his election roughly twenty-five years later.   When it comes to election season, this benevolent secularism is most visible in the close collaboration between religious networks and organizations working to strengthen electoral integrity. Domestic citizen election observation was tied to religious networks even in the last years of the authoritarian period, with the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) deeply embedded in religious networks, particularly tied to prominent Catholic institutions of higher education and business associations. [6] Since that time, NAMFREL and the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) have continued to mobilize hundreds of thousands of local poll watchers, both in Catholic parishes and via other Christian and Muslim networks. Religious organizations are regular participants in good governance coalitions in partnership with organizations like the Legal Network for Truthful Elections (LENTE), and at times via programs tied to particular religious orders, such as the Jesuits’ Simbahang Lingkod ng Bayan apostolate. Combatting online disinformation, a major challenge in the Philippines and abroad, has become a new priority for many religious leaders in public statements during this campaign. [7]   Limits of Religious Influence?   This recent history may make it seem that religious networks are key guarantors of Philippine democracy during this troubled election season. To an extent this is true. Domestic citizen election monitoring will again take place in large part through religious mobilization, and various religious leaders have issued statements calling for morally upright candidates to serve the nation. But these initiatives are taking place in a new Philippines, changed both religiously and politically since the mythologized days of 1986.   Religiously, while the Philippines remains known (inaccurately) [8] as “Asia’s only Catholic country,” the past several decades have seen pluralization of religious leadership that has challenged coordination in favor of liberal democracy. Some of this has taken place outside of the Catholic majority, as various evangelical and Pentecostal Christian communities have taken on prominent roles through gleaming megachurches and extensive media presences. [9] Even within the Catholic majority, pluralization is a reality. The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) may speak for the bishops as a group, but individual members of the clergy at times adopt their own stances, for instance the 500 men and women religious who formally endorsed candidate Leni Robredo in February 2022. [10] The lay founder of the Catholic charismatic El Shaddai movement, which claims several million members, in contrast endorsed Marcos and Duterte in the same week. [11]   Politically, this pluralization has led some to question the political heft of religious elites. Even before the controversial Duterte presidency, many Catholic leaders were surprised when Noynoy Aquino prioritized a Reproductive Health Law that the CBCP long opposed. He pressed it through the legislature, and clergy denouncing those they dubbed Team Patay [Team Death] in the subsequent election seemed to have little effect. [12] Duterte has an even more contentious relationship with the CBCP. As his campaign surged in 2016, the then-CBCP president denounced candidates showing “indifference if not dislike and disregard for the Church,” speaking of Duterte in all but name. [13] Yet Duterte romped to victory. His signature “war on drugs” has left thousands dead and attracted further condemnation from many religious leaders. While congregations have provided localized protection, the campaign continued and Duterte’s popularity remained largely intact. [14] He lobbed populist attacks at “hypocritical” religious critics throughout his tenure, and in the process garnered support from smaller but politically significant religious denominations like the Iglesia ni Cristo. [15]   Doubts about religious influence, especially from the country’s Catholic bishops, have played out on the 2022 campaign trail. Without naming the Marcos candidacy directly, the CBCP’s pre-election pastoral letter in February 2022 denounced “radical distortions in the history of Martial Law,” and called on Filipinos to “stand up for truth.” [16] Some individual bishops, and more clergy, have appeared in public with pro-Robredo groups. But the ultimate effect remains unclear. In keeping with precedent, the CBCP will not endorse a particular candidate, and some bishops have even warned clergy against using the pulpit for endorsements. [17] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Marcos camp has complained that Catholic clergy are ”meddling” in politics, while happily receiving the endorsement from other religious leaders. But even another prominent candidate, Manila Mayor Francisco ‘Isko’ Moreno, has claimed to be ‘offended’ that churches might be used to directly rally voters for a particular candidate. [18] This seems a long way from Cardinal Sin’s call for protesters to rally in the streets against the Marcos dictatorship.   Impacts and Implications   So where does this leave the likely role for religious organizations, particularly the Catholic majority, in stabilizing democracy in the Philippines? And what comparative lessons might this hold for the troubled future of democracy in other corners of Asia and beyond? Three stand out. All operate quite differently than directly calling supporters into the streets in the latest installment of People Power.   First, religious influence is local. While headlines naturally gravitate to declarations from national clerical leaders, the political influence of religion is strongest where it crosses levels of analysis, from local to national to even international networks. In research on the Philippine drug war, for instance, coauthors and I find strong localized effects of religious congregations in protecting communities from violence, even though, at the national level, the drug war raged throughout Duterte’s term. [19] This is precisely why domestic citizen observation efforts, both in the Philippines and elsewhere, are so commonly tied to grassroots religious infrastructure. [20] Religion’s ability to strengthen democratic institutions should be strongest when initiatives draw on these sorts of dense localized networks.   Second, speaking out in defense of democracy may strengthen religious authority, but also introduce internal division. Research from a variety of scholars has demonstrated that religious involvement in politics can generate backlash when religious leaders are seen to be looking out for narrow self-interest rather than the common good of society. [21] However, advocating for free and fair elections may represent a form of public religion that actually rebuilds the moral authority of religious leaders. In recently collected data, for example, coauthors and I find that criticizing human rights abuses associated with the Philippines’ drug war strengthened the moral authority of religious leaders in the minds of Catholic Filipinos. Revitalized advocacy in defense of democracy could plausibly have a similar effect. With that said, our data also indicates some resistance to these interventions among some non-Catholic Filipinos.   Third, on a less optimistic note, religion is not immune from the forces challenging democratic consolidation. Religion, especially in combination with conspiratorial beliefs, has become a central factor predicting support for illiberal political violence in the United States. [22] In the Philippines, illiberal forces have rallied under the banner of a populism that features a heavy dose of anti-elite politics. Because organized religion, especially the Catholic Church, is closely tied to broader patterns of political and economic authority in the country, these anti-elite attacks have fallen squarely on religious leaders as well. This helps explain why Duterte has paid limited political cost for rhetoric attacking clergy in one of Asia’s more devout countries. [23] Pope Francis seems aware of this challenge, particularly when encouraging global bishops to be “shepherds with the smell of the sheep.” [24]   Religion was not the sole cause of third wave transitions to democracy in places like the Philippines, although it did play an essential role. As democratic institutions face challenges in the Philippines and beyond, religious leaders and networks retain capacity to play a part in strengthening elections and civil liberties. However, they must respond to a new political reality in which myths of the 1980s provide incomplete guidance.■     [1] Borja, Anthony L. and Ian J. Hecita. 2022. “The 2022 Philippine Elections Primer: A Democratic Citizenship Perspective.” ADRN Issue Briefing March 4. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?at=view&idx=236 [2] Esmaquel II, Paterno R. 2022. “‘Church cannot be neutral about good or evil’ – Archbishop Villegas.” Rappler March 5. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/video-catholic-church-cannot-be-neutral-good-evil-archbishop-soc-villegas/ [3] https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Philippines_1987?lang=en [4] On benevolent secularism, see Buckley, David T. Faithful to Secularism: The Religious Politics of Democracy in Ireland, Senegal, and the Philippines. Religion, Culture, and Public Life. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016. For Casanova’s work, see Casanova, José. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. [5] For application of this concept to the Philippines, see Grzymala-Busse, Anna, and Dan Slater. "Making Godly Nations: Church-State Pathways in Poland and the Philippines." Comparative Politics 50, no. 4 (2018): 545-64. [6] See for example Youngblood, Robert L. Marcos against the Church : Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990; Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. "Mapping the Movement: Namfrel in Six Philippine Cities." South East Asia Research 7, no. 2 (1999): 189-214. [7] Moses, Paul. 2018. “Fake News, Murder & the Philippine Bishops.” Commonweal Feburary 13. https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/fake-news-murder-philippine-bishops [8] In purely demographic terms, Timor-Leste is more overwhelmingly Catholic than the Philippines. The Philippines contains significant religious minorities, particularly Muslim and non-Catholic Christian denominations. [9] See for example Cornelio, Jayeel Serrano. "Jesus Is Lord: The Indigenization of Megachurch Christianity in the Philippines." In Pentecostal Megachurches in Southeast Asia, 127-55: ISEAS Publishing, 2018. [10] Dagle, Robbin M. 2022. “More than 500 priests, nuns endorse Robredo for president .” Rappler Feburary 15. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/priests-nuns-endorse-robredo-for-president-2022/ [11] https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1554734/velardes-endorsement-of-marcos-jr-personal-not-representative-of-whole-el-shaddai-says-bacani [12] Dionisio, Eleanor R. "Catholic Partisanship in the 2013 Elections: `Churchifying` Democracy or Democratizing the Church?". Philippine Sociological Review 62 (2014): 11-40. [13] Buckley, David T. 2016. “Can the Catholic Church work with the Philippines’ new president?” America: The Jesuit Review of Faith & Culture June 23. https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/dutertes-tough-talk [14] Brooke, Steven, David T Buckley, Clarissa C David, and Ronald U Mendoza. "Religious Protection from Populist Violence: The Catholic Church and the Philippine Drug War." American Journal of Political Science Forthcoming (2021). [15] The Philippine Star. 2016. “It`s Duterte-Marcos for Iglesia ni Cristo.” May 5. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/05/05/1580114/its-duterte-marcos-iglesia-ni-cristo [16] David, Pablo Virgilio S. 2022. “The Truth Will Set You Free (John 8:32).” Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines Feburary 25. https://cbcpnews.net/cbcpnews/the-truth-will-set-you-free-john-832/ [17] Lalu, Gabriel Pabico. 2022. “Cebu archbishop to priests: Don’t use pulpit to campaign for poll bets .” Inquirer Feburary 11. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1553577/cebu-archbishop-to-priests-dont-use-pulpit-to-campaign-for-poll-bets [18] Gonzales, Cathrine. 2022. “Isko Moreno tells candidates: Don’t use Catholic church for campaign rallies.” Inquirer March 05. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1563846/isko-moreno-tells-candidates-dont-use-catholic-church-for-campaign-rallies [19] Brooke, Steven, David T Buckley, Clarissa C David, and Ronald U Mendoza. 2021. “Religious Protection from Populist Violence: The Catholic Church and the Philippine Drug War.” American Journal of Political Science. [20] Montevecchio, Caesar. 2019. “CENCO Statement on Elections.” Catholic Peacebuilding Network January 07. https://cpn.nd.edu/news-events/news/cenco-statement-on-elections/ [21] Grzymała-Busse, Anna. 2015. Nations under God : How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hout, M. and C. S. Fischer. 2002. “Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations.” American Sociological Review 67: 165-90. [22] Armaly, Miles T, David T Buckley, and Adam M Enders. 2022. “Christian Nationalism and Political Violence: Victimhood, Racial Identity, Conspiracy, and Support for the Capitol Attacks.” Political Behavior: 1-24. [23] For more on religion, anti-elitism and populism, see David T. Buckley, Steven Brooke and Bryce Kleinsteuber, “How Populists Engage Religion: Mechanisms and Evidence from the Philippines,” Democratization, Forthcoming. [24] Gomes, Robin. 2021. “Pope to priests: Be "shepherds with `the smell of the sheep.” Vatican News June 7. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2021-06/pope-francis-priests-students-church-louis-french.html     ■ David T. Buckley is Associate Professor of Political Science, and Paul Weber Endowed Chair in Politics, Science & Religion at the University of Louisville, where he serves as the Interim Director of the Center for Asian Democracy.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Political “division” is a natural phenomenon in a democracy in which individuals and groups express their opinions freely and coalesce their interests to press politicians. However, “polarization” is a bimodal division of the public into two opposite sides surrounding identity, values, or issues. Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer define polarization as “a process of simplifying politics by presenting either-or-choices to the public, thus consolidating the political field into opposing, increasingly immovable blocs.” [1] They argue that polarization becomes pernicious or harmful for democracy by dividing the electorate into two mutually distrustful camps. Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue maintain that polarization “weakens respect for democratic norms, corrodes basic legislative processes, undermines the nonpartisan stature of the judiciary, and fuels public disaffection-intolerance-violence. [2]   The American public has been studied frequently as a typical case of increasing political polarization. According to the Pew Research Center, [3] between 1994 and 2014, the overall share of Americans who express consistently conservative or consistently liberal opinions on a 10-item scale of political values has doubled from 10% to 21%. Additionally, the ideological overlap between Democrats and Republicans has been reduced as Democrats moved further to the left and Republicans moved further to the right. This development of “ideological silos” in the political attitudes of Americans is accompanied by the increasing antipathy against the opposing party; in 2014, 27% of Democrats saw the Republican Party as a threat to the nation’s well-being while 36% of Republicans saw the Democratic Party as a threat to the nation’s well-being. Moreover, politics got so personal that 63% of consistently conservative and 49% of consistently liberal stated that most of their closest friends share the same political view. People on either end of the ideological spectrum tend to be more politically active and more partisan tied to a political party of their choice. When the public is divided into “us and them” and develops antipathy or even hatred for each other, mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance, two fundamental norms that Levitsky and Ziblatt argue in their book How Democracies Die are a part of a functioning democracy, [4] are endangered.   The emergence of political polarization encompasses existing socio-political cleavages and political entrepreneurs use such cleavages for their political gains. McCoy and Somer [5] studied 11 country cases including the U.S. and concluded that pernicious polarization is not attributable to any specific underlying social or political cleavages. Rather, they argue, it arises when political entrepreneurs pursue their objectives by using polarizing strategies. These strategies include mobilizing voters with divisive and demonizing discourse and exploiting existing grievances.   When we take a theoretical perspective of agency matters over cleavage structure, we need to identify two things. The first is identifying whether mobilizing capability and influence of polarizing agencies are symmetrical or asymmetrical. When opposing political elites reciprocate with similar tactics, a tit-for-tat mobilization is likely to develop an immobile political deadlock. On the other hand, if an opposing camp is sidelined due to its incapability of mobilizing its supporters, the other majoritarian camp can infringe the rights of an opposing camp and bend the rule of law. The second is examining whether political polarization essentially remains to be a tug of war among power elites or political polarization is deeper with vertical alignment between elites and masses in each camp. The latter case can be found in countries where formative social rifts have been placed a long time ago or populist leaders develop affective ties with people. While the ultimate driver of polarization is likely to be politicians and political parties, individuals or groups, aided by their own SNS influence or upward fandom mobilization, are increasing their roles in political polarization. Based on the ADRN webinar on political polarization in India, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, [6] this brief provides a snapshot comparative report on the roots, agencies, and features of political polarization.   India: Polarization Based on the Hindu Nationalism Led by BJP and Modi   India is a case of asymmetrical populist polarization. The two powerful agencies are Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Modi had risen to power in 2001 when he became the Chief Minister of Gujarat state in western India and used his Gujarat development model as a success story. Aided by Modi’s populism, the BJP, a right-wing party formed in 1980, has expanded its power. Currently, the BJP makes up 56 percent of the Parliament of India while the major opposition party Indian National Congress (INC) makes up less than 10 percent.   The super majoritarian BJP electoral power and the popular leadership of Modi illustrate the effectiveness of their mobilization strategy in utilizing Hindu nationalism. Niranjan Sahoo, a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, writes that the primary source of political and societal polarization in the country has been a fundamental question of nationhood, and adds that this poses an existential threat to pluralist democracy in India. [7] The question of should India be a secular country or a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation) has great national identity driven discursive power that can divide the public into binary camps. Given that more than three-quarters of the population is Hindu, Hindu nationalism dominates other cleavage markers such as caste differences. However, this religious national identity could have been managed in the past through the boundary of plural democracy. The rise of caustic polarization using Hindu nationalism became conspicuous after the BJP won a landslide victory in the general election of 2014. Under the ferocious frame of national vs. anti-national, the BJP further expanded its seats in the 2019 election as the liberals and seculars were pushed to the defensive and as the middle ground was started to disappear. The Indian case shows how the question of nationhood based on the dominant religious identity develops a strong bond between populist politicians and people within a dominant camp.   The features of Indian polarization are ugly and can be characterized by the growing culture of intolerance and hatred between two camps, simplifying politics to religiosity, weakening federal institutions and the rule of law, stereotyping and demonizing minorities, and impunity for violence against them. Starting from 2015, the lynching incidents of Muslims by Hindu locals became more frequent. Ramesh Thakur writes that the “othering” of India’s Muslims by Hindu bigots has portrayed them as fifth columnists loyal to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Modi and the BJP pushed through a social agenda that steadily marginalized Muslims and promoted Hindus as more equal than others. The 2019 BJP victory emboldened the party to scrap Article 370 of the Constitution which had guaranteed Kashmir’s political autonomy as India’s sole Muslim-majority province. Later, in December 2019, the government passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which was arbitrary in the choice of countries of origin and discriminatory in its selection of religious minorities. This further deepened the Muslim community to feel that they were becoming second-class citizens.   All these cases of democratic backsliding have made India fall in rank in various global democracy indexes. During the ADRN webinar, Niranjan concludes that the liberal parties and civil society groups are weak to depolarize the political and social divide and, if not checked soon, the current religious identity driven polarization might be irreversible.   Philippines: Polarization led by Autocratic Populist with Weaker Party Base   In the Philippines, the current polarization emerged with the election of President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. The once-popular Mayor of Davao City ran a war against drugs upon becoming president. Francisco A. Magno, a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Governance at De La Salle University, writes that Duterte offered bounties for the bodies of drug dealers and guaranteed the police that they would be shielded from prosecution. [8] During the first two years of his presidency, about 4,500 people were killed either in police operations or suspected vigilantism. Massive extrajudicial killings invited criticism and opposition from the liberal press and human rights activists. Duterte's government oppressed free press and tried to silence critics, as in the case of revoking Rappler’s registration papers. Duterte also threatened to abolish the Commission on Human Rights and replace officials of independent bodies who were critical of him.   The party system in the Philippines is fragmented into multiple parties. While being the biggest party, Duterte’s party PDP-Laban has only 20.4 percent of 328 representatives of Congress. However, the incumbent president can control Congress since it is common for elected legislators to jump to the party of the new president after the election. Accordingly, the majority bloc supporting Duterte has 271 congressmen while the minority bloc opposing Duterte has meager 24 congressmen. Under this fluid party system, opposition in the electoral institution can be easily marginalized.   Duterte has relied on social media rather than political parties to mobilize his supporters. Rather than developing institutional ties with interest groups or civil society organizations, he used disinformation tactics filled with fake news and conspiracy theories in order to garner popular support for his policies. The liberal intellectuals and activists of the opposition camp, on the other hand, lack institutional safeguards to protect journalists and media freedom.   The polarizing issue such as a drug war or press freedom is not a deep-rooted social rift as it is not a conflicting identity that divides the public. In this sense, the mobilization of supporters by populist leaders like Duterte remains to be mob-like low politics. Moreover, the president can only serve one 6-year term disallowing a long tenure of an authoritarian populist president. Anthony L. Borja and Ian R. Hecita argue that illiberal tendencies in Filipino politics are sustained since ordinary Filipinos are leader-centric as they give primacy to personal leadership and the executive branch over other institutions. [9]   South Korea: Confrontational Party-Driven Polarization with Lesser Social Rifts   South Korean society has become increasingly divided politically as political polarization is led by two competing major parties. When asked about their ideological leaning, about 40 percent of Koreans answered that they are moderate. According to the EAI South Korean Identity Survey, which is conducted every five years starting from 2005 to 2020, 40 percent identified as moderate in 2005, 43 percent in 2010, 49 percent in 2015, and 43 percent in 2020. People who identified themselves as progressive accounted for 33 percent of the total population, 27.5 percent, 20 percent, and 31 percent respectively in these four surveys. The percentage of people with conservative-leaning ideologies was 27 percent, 30 percent, 30 percent, and 26 percent respectively.   However, in reality, politics is led by those on the far ends of the spectrum rather than by moderates. When the conservatives are in power, far-left groups tend to veto the incumbent president while loyal conservative supporters defend their favored political leaders. On the other hand, when the progressives are in power, the far-right opposes the incumbent president while extreme supporters use all means to defend their leadership. This pattern has repeated each time Korea elects a president. The recent presidential election of May 2022 has shown the full mobilization of two camps during the heated race which resulted in an unprecedented even divide. [10] Both camps engaged in worsening negative campaigns during a tight race. Mudslinging and personal attacks were rampant while serious policy dialogues were short.   Party polarization is a primary engine of South Korea’s political polarization. This is due to South Korea’s electoral system giving two major parties premiums much bigger than partisan voters aligned to either party. Jung Kim, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, argues that electoral strategies of mobilizing voters with strong partisan identities intensified as progressive and conservative voters with ideological leanings are more actively involved in politics in general and elections in particular. [11] The two large parties can conveniently rely on such strategies since median voters are pushed to choose either side. The majority of Korea’s legislative seats, 253 out of 300 seats, are filled by winners in single-member constituencies based on the first-past-the-post rule. As a result, it is difficult for smaller third parties to sustain. Moving to the opposite direction in the ideological spectrum, the ideological distance between politicians of the two major competing parties has become bigger than voters identifying themselves as progressives or conservatives.   The rise of social media is also contributing to the political polarization in South Korea, as in the cases of other divided societies. People who do not trust government or established media tend to seek alternative media outlets to express or listen to extreme views. Many ideologically leaning bigger print media also reinforce opposing views of the two political camps; progressives and conservatives. [12] In addition, some politically oriented civil society organizations join in binary camp politics which aggravates the situation.   This increasing political party-led polarization is pernicious since the mode of politics becomes confrontational and extremely partisan causing the National Parliament to an immobile deadlock. Nevertheless, the ideological divide at the social level is shallow with no clear socio-economic cleavages. As a matter of fact, the difference in the economic policy platform of the two confrontational parties is becoming narrower as the social service and welfare packages are getting thicker in response to the aging population and deprived youth. North Korean issues and the alliance with the U.S. pose some enduring gaps but these are not formative rifts that divide political society in South Korea.   Regional split and generational gap are often regarded as other fault lines together with ideology. Conventionally, the progressive camp has enjoyed strong support from the Southwestern Jeolla provinces (Honam region) while the support of the conservative camp has been based in the Southeastern Gyeongsang provinces (Yeongnam region). But, voters in the Seoul-Incheon metropolitan area, where about half of the population resides, are less tied to regional identity. The cultural and economic inter-generational conflicts also exist, generating different ideological leanings. The older generation is more conservative while the middle-aged, those in their 40s and 50s, are more progressive. Still, generational markers remain secondary reacting to salient contemporary issues rather than a rift dividing politics into two binary camps.   Thailand: Polarization at Elites and People Over Monarchy vs. Democracy   Political polarization in Thailand is severe as it encompasses multiple institutional agencies and is equipped with deep social rifts. In the ADRN polarization webinar, Janjira Sombatpoonsiri explained that the sharp division lies between supporters of royal nationalism and democracy. If Indian polarization is about the national identity, Thailand is divided over the nation’s political system. According to her, royal nationalism underpins Thailand’s political and ideological establishment which associates sovereignty with the monarchy. Supporters of this camp are comprised of the monarchy, the military, their allies in the bureaucracy and private sector, and ordinary people who endorse this ideology. The other camp, which she labeled the “democratic camp,” consists of anti-establishment politicians, pro-democracy activists, academics/students, and ordinary people critical of the establishment.   The political rise of the Shinawartras developed political polarization in Thailand. The anti-establishment camp was in power through Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006) and his sister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011-2014) both of whom were overthrown by the military coup. Their policies for the poor received strong support from rural areas and urban poor. If the establishment camp is comprised of state institutions including the military, the anti-establishment camp relies on its electoral power to mobilize voters. The two competing camps are currently represented in the National Assembly by the pro-military Palang Pracharath Party and the Pheu Thai Party which has 119 and 135 seats respectively. The Future Forward, a new opposition party, has 54 seats.   The two camps could maintain their rather symmetrical party presence due to popular social support. The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) or “Red Shirts,” and the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or “Yellow Shirts” have launched massive protests. The UDD opposed the 2006 military coup and the royalist movement but was deposed after the military coup in 2014. The PAD supported the 2006 coup and accused Thaksin of corruption, abuse of power, and autocratic tendencies.   Sombatpoonsiri argued that during the tit-for-tat mobilization from 2005 to 2014, the palace and the army devised royal nationalism to drive protests against the anti-establishment governments. They used the narratives of social harmony and relied on cyber troopers to spread disinformation about the overthrow attempt by the anti-establishment force. On the other hand, the anti-establishment camp used the narratives of defending democracy and egalitarian measures. It is also notable that the youth-led public protests erupted from July to December 2020 despite pandemic restrictions. The two events were the final straws triggering the 2020 mass protests that led to the dissolution of the Future Forward Party (FFP) and the disappearance of pro-democracy satirist Wanchalerm in July 2020. [13] Now, protestors changed their narratives from changing government to reforming the monarchy. As a result, many middle-class conservatives withdrew their support for the protests, Sombatpoonsiri says, while some royalists started to endorse parts of the anti-establishment discourses.   The outcome of Thailand’s polarization over the past twenty years has been two democratic breakdowns in 2006 and 2014, and the autocratic consolidation by the military rule since 2014. The new constitution in 2016 allowed the military to select 250 seats in the upper house and to stay in power through several clauses. The long-awaited and delayed election happed in March 2019, but it brought more confusion.   Comparison of Four Countries   If we compare the dividing line of the four countries, the cases of India and Thailand are more fundamental as the divide is based on national identity (Hindu nationalism vs. secular pluralism) and political systems (monarchy nationalism vs. popular democracy). Due to the nature of the identity question, the vertical alignment between established politics and civil society within each camp is strong. Accordingly, the confrontation between the two camps is high. However, there are also big differences between the two cases. The two camps in India are asymmetrical as the ruling BJP has great power and strong support from the Hindu majority. The populist prime minister Modi galvanizes the bonding between elites and the mass. On the other hand, in Thailand, the two major confrontational political parties are equally represented in the National Assembly and the two protest movements groups affiliated with each party are both active. The anti-establishment camp could be more dominant if the military did not intervene to oppress it. The less popular monarchy unlike its predecessor and the emerging pro-democracy youth movement can change the equilibrium and this is a new development to keep an eye on.   The cases of the Philippines and South Korea are less severe. The populist president Duterte divided the public through the drug war and the oppression of the free press. This does not lead to a structural cleavage, however, and remains to be pro-and anti-Duterte government. Moreover, the fragmented parties are too weak to build a solid divide between them and the incumbent, and presidency is limited to a single term. The degree of disinformation aimed at the general public is rampant but a liberal segment of civil society can still organize some opposition. On the other hand, political polarization is driven by the ideologically hardening of the two major parties in South Korea. With a single-term presidency, like in the Philippines, the Korean president is likely to be neither an autocrat nor a populist despite his or her bigger executive power. Instead, the power competition between the two major parties, the progressives and conservatives, increased which led to the introduction of a strategy of mobilizing partisan supporters. South Korea’s electoral system allows this complacency since the centrist, or non-partisan voters, are pressed to choose a candidate from either of the two major parties. Policy differences such as the remaining regionalism and generational conflict exist. But, none of these are strong enough to become an equivalent formative social rift.   The impact of political polarization also varies. Naturally, deeper social cleavages based on national identity bring autocracy when the power of two camps is skewed to one side. Some cases of such consequences include the democratic breakdowns by the military coups in Thailand and the democratic erosion denying equal citizenship to the Muslim community in India. The other two cases are less pernicious. The case of democratic backsliding in the Philippines has a better chance to reverse if people work for participatory democracy away from the oligarchic elite rule. The party-driven polarization of South Korea also has a chance to depolarize by changing its electoral system to be more responsive to the moderate electorate. ■     [1] Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer, “Overcoming Polarization,” Journal of Democracy Volume 32, Number 1, January 2021, pp. 6-19. [2] Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue., Introduction in Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization, edited by the same authors. Washington, D.C.L Brookings Institution Press, 2019. [3] Pew Research Center, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” June 12, 2014 report. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ [4] Mutual tolerance is accepting an equal right of rivals to exist, compete for power and govern, while institutional forbearance is restraining from exercising a legal right that could imperil the existing system. P. 102 and p. 106. Steven Letitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2018). [5] Jennifer McCoy and Murat Somer, “Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies.” The Annals of the American Academy, 681, January 2019, pp. 234-271. [6] “Political Polarization in Asia an Its Imact on Democracy,” (webinar, ADRN, Seoul, South Korea, March 25, 2022). [7] Niranjan Sahoo, “Hindu Nationalism and Political Polarization in India,” in Carothers and O’Donohue eds. (2019). [8] Francis Magno, “Contemporary Populism and Democratic Challenges in the Philippines,” in Sook Jong Lee et als. Eds. Populism in Asian Democracies: Features, Structures, and Impacts (Brill: 2021), p.66. [9] Anthony L. Borja and Ian J. Hecita, “The 2022 Philippine Elections Primer: A Democratic Citizenship Perspective.” ADRN Issue Briefing, March 4, 2022. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?at=view&idx=236 [10] Jung Kim, “South Korea’s 2022 Presidential Election: A Vox Populi that is Evenly Divided.” ADRN Issue Briefing, March 2022. [11] The opposition People Power Party’s Yoon Suk-yeol prevailed over the governing Democratic Party’s Lee Jae-myung by a slender margin of a 0.73 percent point–the smallest in the history of the country. Yoon secured 16,394,815 and Lee gained 16,147,738–the largest number of votes obtained by the winner and runner-up, respectively. Jung Kim, “Party Polarization Without Party Sorting in South Korea: The Centrist Voters in Drift,” ADRN Issue Briefings, September 2020, http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=2&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%… [12] Sook Jong Lee, “The Rise of Political Social Media in South Korea: A Focus on Disinformation and Polarization,” in Social Media, Disinformation, and Democracy in Asia: Country Cases, ADRN Special Report, October 2020 [13] Janjira Somatpoonsiri, “From Repression to Revolt: Thailand’s 2020 Protests and the Regional Implications.” GIGA Focus/Asia, Number 1, February 2021. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/repression-revolt-thailand-s-2020-protests-regional-implications.     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Professor of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Ko-rea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department • Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

On March 9, 2022, South Korea held a presidential election, in which the opposition People Power Party’s Yoon Suk-yeol prevailed over the governing Democratic Party’s Lee Jae-myung by a slender margin of a 0.73 percent point–the smallest in the history of the country. The only comparable neck-and-neck two-party electoral competition would be the 1997 presidential race that Kim Dae-jung won by a margin of 1.52 percent point. Out of 34,067,853 valid votes cast in the recent election, Yoon secured 16,394,815 and Lee gained 16,147,738–the largest number of votes obtained by the champion and runner-up, respectively, in South Korean history. As a full-scale two-party electoral mobilization, the only comparable in scale would be the 2012 presidential race in which 30,594,621 valid votes were divided between Park Geun-hye with 15,773,128 and Moon Jae-in with 14,692,632. In terms of both the intensity of competition and the immensity of mobilization, consequently, it seems indisputable that the 2022 presidential electoral outcomes[1] are historically unparalleled, reflecting a strong political division between conservatives and progressives. The problem is that it appears that the observed political division between the two camps amounts to ‘negative’ partisan polarization rather than to a ‘positive’ one.   According to a public opinion survey[2] that was conducted by Gallup Korea immediately after the election, the essential ingredients for this unprecedented political division are made less of programmatic differentiation that renders democracy healthy; but instead made more of partisan sorting that renders democracy dysfunctional. On partisan sorting, it is reported that 39 percent of those who voted for Yoon regarded turnover of executive power as the most important approval cause and 17 percent selected disaffection toward the other candidate as the second-most important approval cause while 27 percent of those who voted for Lee regarded disaffection toward the other candidates as the most important approval cause. For voters, affective partisan identity with or against candidates is one of the most critical factors that determines voting choices. As for programmatic differentiation, on the other hand, the survey reveals that only 6 percent of those who voted for Yoon and 13 percent for Lee regarded policy profiles and electoral manifestoes as an important approval cause. For voters, policy-based competition between candidates is one of the least influential factors that affect their voting decision. Essentially, the presidential election outcomes manifest a ‘pernicious[3]’ polarization–the division of society into mutually distrustful ‘Us versus Them’ camps in which political identity becomes a social identity–in the making in South Korea.   The emergent pernicious polarization that transpired through the election poses multi-level challenges to South Korea’s democratic politics in which the incoming president will play a pivotal role in the following: a divided cabinet in which he is required to collaborate with a coalition partner, a divided government in which he is required to cooperate with the opposition party, and a divided public in which he is required to accommodate those who did not vote for him. An evenly divided Vox Populi that is identified in the election calls upon him to be adept at the fine art of centripetal democratic governance. The following shows how much he would be hard-pressed to navigate.   Challenges of the Divided Cabinet   The new president is supposed to form a coalition cabinet with Ahn Cheol-soo’s People Party. Although the People Party has only three seats in the National Assembly, its presidential candidate Ahn sustained 12 percent of popular support[4] primarily from the centrist voters who are not tied to major parties. When Ahn resigned from the race on March 3 to cut an electoral deal with Yoon, Yoon and Lee were virtually tied. Yoon’s pre-electoral coalition with Ahn paid off handsomely. An exit poll[5] that was conducted by major broadcasting stations KBS, MBC, and SBS on the election day compared the voting behavior between the voters in the 2017 and 2022 presidential elections. 25 percent of those who voted for Moon in 2017 cast ballots for Yoon and 72 percent for Lee. 95 percent of those who voted for the conservative candidate Hong Joon-pyo in 2017 cast ballots for Yoon and 4 percent for Lee. 80 percent of those who voted for Ahn in 2017 cast ballots for Yoon and 18 percent for Lee. Yoon kept most votes from the conservative camps while Lee secured votes from the progressive camps albeit with a substantial loss. Collecting ballots from the former Ahn supporters was decisive for Yoon as he received four times more votes than Lee. In other words, the pre-electoral coalition with Ahn turned out vital for Yoon’s victory under the conditions of looming pernicious polarization.   Yoon and Ahn pledged to form a coalition cabinet and combine two parties of their own. Yoon appointed Ahn as chairperson of the presidential transition committee to show the credibility of the coalition. However, the inherent instability in the coming coalition cabinet formation will continue to distress the new president. While Ahn’s electoral influence was indispensable for winning the presidency, his party’s legislative influence is almost nil for passing bills in the National Assembly. The asymmetric bargaining power between the electoral and legislative arena of the People Party poses as a ‘commitment’ problem for Yoon to maintain the pre-electoral contract to make a post-electoral cabinet coalition. Moreover, Yoon’s People Power Party, which holds 106 seats in the legislature, might be disgruntled with disproportional over-representation of the smaller Ahn’s party members in the coming cabinet portfolio allocation process. South Korea’s presidential democracy makes the commitment problem more complicated as the chief executive can unilaterally appoint and dismiss cabinet members, which reduces the credibility of Yoon’s pre-electoral contract from the perspective of Ahn and his party members. To manage the challenges of a divided cabinet, it is critical for Yoon to keep in mind that his triumph was possible not least because of centrist voters who had supported Ahn. While the abandonment of Ahn in the cabinet may have little effect in the legislative area, it will have a great effect on the public’s support for the new president, which will intensify rather than diminish the tendency of pernicious polarization.   Challenges of the Divided Government   Yoon also faces the opposition from Democratic Party as they currently hold the majority equating to 172 seats in the National Assembly for at least the next two years. Under this divided government situation, the new president simply cannot accomplish any of his policy initiatives without acquiring the consent of the Democratic Party. Even worse, Yoon’s power to appoint the prime minister, which is key to maintaining the coalition contract, is subject to the approval of the National Assembly that is controlled by the Democratic Party. In other words, without attaining the cooperation of the Democratic Party, Yoon cannot form his executive cabinet let alone enact his legislative initiatives. In order to avoid the worst-case scenario that is expected to be brought on by the divided government, Yoon needs to solve this ‘coordination’ problem by trying to reach an outcome in which both governing and opposition parties are satisfied.   This is a daunting task for the incoming president, especially during the era of increasing pernicious polarization in which parties view one another as competing camps and engage in a legislative battle where the political stakes attached to victory or defeat are extremely high. According to the exit poll[6], however, there are some vital policy realms in which the two can generate mutually beneficial outcomes. 29 percent of those who voted for Yoon and 31 percent for Lee both agreed that ‘economic growth and creation of jobs’ should be the most important policy agenda that the new president deals with. Also, 23 percent of Yoon supporters and 21 percent of Lee supporters both confirmed that ‘stable management of housing prices and real estate market’ should be the second-most important policy agenda. To put it differently, a solid majority of those who supported Yoon as well as of those who supported Lee considered ‘valence’ issues–programmatic values that are broadly shared in the electorate–the highest priority of legislative deliberation and implementation. Consequently, for Yoon, tackling these valence issues first will become a gateway to a political solution to the coordination problem emanated from a divided government.   In this sense, it is unfortunate to note that Yoon as the president-elect pinpointed the electoral pledge of the ‘abolition of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family’ as one of the highest priority policy agendas. As this is one of the most divisive ‘positional’ issues–programmatic values on which parties differentiate themselves in the electorate–in the presidential election, priming the issue will definitely produce political effects that exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the trend of pernicious polarization. It is noteworthy that the Democratic Party appointed a feminist activist as co-chairperson of the Emergency Response Committee to set a counter-attack on and exploit this divisive issue politically. For the president-elect, this serves as a good reminder[7] of his shaky electoral foundation among the voters under the age of 30 in which he secured 59 percent of votes from the male constituency but only 34 percent from the female constituency, which is an exact mirror image of Lee who gained only 36 percent from male constituency but 58 percent from the female constituency. The post-election ‘culture’ war on gender issues along party lines may become a gateway to political deadlock, causing the failure of policy coordination that makes the divided government unworkable.   Challenges of the Divided Public   The difficulties to maintain a Yoon-Ahn coalition cabinet and to cooperate with the Democratic Party under a divided government will undoubtedly put the new president in an awkward and even frustrating position. This can usher him into the temptation of unilateral actions. In particular, as a political novice with no career in the National Assembly, Yoon may have a deep loathing of time-consuming political logrolling necessary to strike policy compromises in a coalition cabinet with collegial partners and divided government with opposition parties. If this is to become the case, Yoon will become more prone to take the strategy of ‘going public’–the president sells his programs directly to the public with the use of skillful opinion manipulation–to galvanize popular support for his policy agenda. In other words, for a president inflicted with political impasse, the going public strategy may be perceived as his last resort to break through the grave situation.   Unfortunately, for the new president, however, the strategy of going public will certainly be counterproductive in rallying popular support for his policy agenda. It will be persistently imperative for Yoon to recall that he won presidency in an election where 48.56 percent of the electorate voted for him and 47.83 percent voted for the opponent. How this balance is going to change will be tested during the local election that will be held three weeks after his inauguration on May 10. In a partisan landscape in which national electoral support is evenly divided between the conservative and progressive camps, it would be political suicide for a president to take the going public strategy and initiate unilateral action as a way of circumventing the cumbersome bargaining in a coalition cabinet and divided government. Unquestionably, such presidential maneuver will provoke the counter-mobilization from the supporters of the opposite camp, which endangers a spiral of conflict escalation that deepens, rather than lessen, the trend of pernicious polarization.   The discussion has now come full circle back to where it started. The intense two-party competition with extensive partisan mobilization that enabled Yoon to win the presidency now constrains his political options as the new president. The increase of pernicious polarization has made it inevitable for Yoon to accommodate Ahn in the divided cabinet, accommodate the Democratic Party in the divided government and accommodate the progressive voters in the divided public in order to get things done. It is not a coincidence that Yoon received a 53 percent presidential job prospect rating[8]–the lowest among presidents-elect–and Moon received a 43 percent presidential job approval rating[9]–the highest among presidents during their last two months of their term. It appears that effective partisanship, rather than policy performance, determines how voters support political leaders. The fact that Moon is likely to be the most popular outgoing president and Yoon is likely to be the least popular incoming president symbolizes that South Korea’s democracy has entered an era of pernicious polarization. This is why the quality of South Korea’s democracy is critically dependent upon how the new president will respond to these multi-level challenges of a divided cabinet, divided government, and divided public.■     [1] The National Election Commission, Election Statistics System (in Korean), Gwacheon-si, Republic of Korea: 2022.http://info.nec.go.kr/ [2] Gallup Korea Research Institute. The Post 20th Presidential Election Survey (in Korean). March 10, 2022. Distributed by Gallup Korea. https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1278 [3] Murat Somer, Jennifer L. McCoy & Russell E. Luke (2021) Pernicious polarization, autocratization and opposition strategies, Democratization, 28:5, 929-948, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2020.1865316 [4] Gallup Korea Research Institute. Daily Opinion No.485(1st week, March 2022)- Presidential Support Map before Ahn Cheol-soo's Resignation, Image of the Candidates in 7 perspecitves (in Korean). March 2, 2022. Distributed by Gallup Korea https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1275 [5] Jang, Seulki. "[Data M] 2017 Presidential vote, Where is it going this Time? (in Korean)” MBC News. March 9, 2022. https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/2022/nwdesk/article/6348716_35744.html [6] Ku, Kyungha. "[In-depth Exit Survey] ② Progressive Unity Higher than the 19th Presidential Election… Degree of cohesion higher among Conservatives (in Korean).” KBS News. March 9, 2022. https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view.do?ncd=5412124 [7] Kim, Youngeun. "[Graphic] 2022 Presidential Election Exit Survey Result based on Gender and Age (in Korean).” Yonhap News Agency. March 19, 2022. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/GYH20220309000900044 [8] RealMeter. [RealMeter March Second Week (10th-11th) Weekend Trend] Yoon Seok-yeol's Prospect for State Administration. 52.7% positive vs 41.2% negative. (in Korean). March 13, 2022. Distributed by RealMeter http://www.realmeter.net/jbshdifkg8owg897gt28/ [9] Gallup Korea Research Institute. Daily Opinion No.486(March 7, 2022)- Support for Candidates D-2 of the 20th Presidential Election, Views on Politics (in Korean). March 8, 2022. Distributed by Gallup Korea https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=1277     ■ Jung Kim is an associate professor of political science at University of North Korean Studies (UNKS). Currently, he is a visiting professor at Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College of Yonsei University, a regional coordinator of Asia Democracy Research Network, a research member of Social Science Korea Research, “Quality of Government and Varieties of Governance,” an editorial committee member of Asian Perspective and Tamkang Journal of International Affairs, and a policy advisory committee member of Republic of Korea’s Ministry of National Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency. He earned his undergraduate degree in political science from Korea University and graduated from Yale University with his doctoral degree in political science. He has published numerous articles in academic journals, including Asian Perspective, Asian Survey, and Journal of International and Area Studies, and edited volumes, including Adapt, Fragment, Transform: Corporate Restructuring and System Reform in South Korea and Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department · Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

February 8 marked the official start of the campaign period for the upcoming 2022 Philippine National Elections. The presidential and vice-presidential elections will take place alongside elections for Congress and local governments on May 9, 2022. During election day, the President and Vice-President are elected separately based on the first-past-the-post voting rule.   The May 9 elections are seen by experts as a critical juncture in the history of Southeast Asia’s oldest democracy. The upcoming democratic contest will look to replace populist strongman President Rodrigo Duterte. While Duterte is facing allegations of massive corruption related to the government’s COVID-19 response and an impending International Criminal Court investigation on his violent war on drugs, he still enjoys a high approval rating. His rating is still the highest compared to other previous outgoing Philippine presidents (CNN Philippines 2022). The President’s high approval will allow him to leverage political support to influence the trajectory of the upcoming elections even though he has been quiet about whom to endorse as his “official” successor (Teehankee 2022).   The 2022 national elections are seen as a decision to salvage or wipe out the 1986 People Power narrative. Observers have noted that the Duterte presidency paved the way for the “start of the end” of the post-Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) People Power Revolution regime. Activists argue that the outgoing President implemented policies that weakened liberal democratic institutions and shrunk civic spaces (Rama 2018). Also, the rise and popularity of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos who was ironically ousted by the 1986 uprising, as the leading contender for the presidency signals how this election serves as a referendum on the EDSA democratization project.   The Contenders   Bongbong Marcos Jr., former Senator and former Governor of Ilocos Norte, has been the consistent frontrunner of the 2022 presidential derby based on recently released polls. Running under the platform for “national unity”, he holds an unapologetic stance on the grave faults of political repression, violence, and mass corruption during his father’s regime. This is tied to the continuous praise of the supposed golden years under the Marcos dictatorship invoking both political nostalgia and vindication among his supporters. He is running beside Vice Presidential candidate, Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte who is the daughter of President Duterte. Mayor Duterte has also a strong showing in recent polls. The Marcos-Duterte team up is perceived as an alliance of strong political dynasts brokered by traditional political machines of ex-presidents and families (Remitio 2021). Voters who elected President Duterte in the previous election are expected to support this tandem albeit that the current President has not endorsed any candidate for president.   Marcos Jr. is currently facing several electoral disqualification petitions filed by citizen groups mostly composed of human rights victims during the Marcos martial law era.[1] While the cases have been recently dismissed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), observers expect that the final resolution of the cases will go the distance and be ruled at higher courts (Patag 2022). Moreover, the Marcos-Duterte ticket has been criticized for not participating in debates and public forums organized by major media organizations (The Straits Times 2022).   Looking to defeat Marcos Jr. is Vice President Maria Leonor “Leni” Robredo. Consistently placing second on recent surveys, Robredo seeks to replicate her 2016 feat when she defeated Marcos Jr. for the vice presidency. The incumbent Vice President is running on a platform of good governance and the restoration of liberal democratic institutions. Her sustained opposition of the Duterte administration and the criticism of the potential comeback of the Marcoses has earned her both the ire of Duterte supporters and increasingly aggressive support from members of her own camp. Former senior government technocrats, civil society organizations, professional associations, and business groups have expressed their support for Robredo (CNN Philippines 2022).   First term City of Manila Mayor Franscisco “Isko” Moreno Domagoso has also joined the presidential derby. Moreno, a former movie/ television actor who was raised in the slums of Manila is pushing to replicate the success of Manila’s social development programs for the whole country. Armed with his long-standing experience in local government, bravado, youth, and populism, the Manila local chief executive’s campaign is focused on achieving public service delivery results albeit having ambivalent positions about controversial political issues related to Duterte and the Marcoses. Recently, a faction of President Duterte’s supporters has expressed their endorsement of Moreno (Domingo 2022).   Incumbent senator and world boxing legend, Emmanuel “Manny” Pacquiao has also sought the presidency. Capitalizing on his rags-to-success story, the senator is running on a pro-poor platform reminiscent of former president Estrada’s brand. Pacquiao’s views on religion and social mores have earned mass criticism from the more liberal sectors and the LGBTQ community, thus marking him as a clear candidate for social conservatives. Yet his vocal opposition to Duterte’s policies including pro-China policies has placed him outside the latter’s circle.   Another hopeful who threw his hat in the ring is incumbent Senator Panfilo “Ping” Lacson. The former police chief renews his old anti-crime and clean government platform. His strong track record in the Senate substantiates his consistent anti-corruption stance while his record as police chief provides the base for a tough stance on crime. However, some critics have dug up his role in human rights violations during the martial law era of the Marcos dictatorship (McCoy 2011).   Branding himself as the genuine alternative is veteran labor union leader Leodegario “Ka Leody” de Guzman. Ka Leody is campaigning for social democratic advocacies ranging from labor rights and social welfare to various forms of economic redistribution through expanded social programs. This is the first time since 1935 that the Philippine Left has a presidential candidate for the national elections.   A backdrop to the May democratic contest is the threat of COVID-19. Although the COMELEC had laid out health and safety guidelines, civil society organizations and other electoral stakeholders have been clamoring for better effective communications and sound risk planning including the implementation of more simulation exercises (NAMFREL 2021). Multistakeholder and inclusive approaches to planning and implementing COVID-19 related policies have also been advocated. Although the Philippines generally exhibits high voter turnouts in every election cycle relative to other democracies, threats and risks of potential COVID-19 surges serve as a real challenge to electoral administration (Hecita et al 2022).   With Marcos Jr. enjoying a formidable leadin all the pre-election surveys conducted since last year, observers have been arguing that there is a need to have a “united opposition” or one candidate to stop the son of the late dictator from winning the presidency (Tomacruz 2022). While there have been informal meetings and talks between the non-Marcos camps, the talks did not eventually result in the endorsement of a “united opposition” candidate (Luna 2022). The supposed disunity of the opposition may suggest the erosion of the old administration-opposition dichotomy that has defined electoral politics in the Philippines. Duterte’s endorsement is still pending and earlier attempts to form a united opposition have broken down into a controversy. This illustrates how the admin-opposition dichotomy has been rendered into both practical irrelevance and a frustrating ideal for the upcoming elections. Contributory to this phenomenon are the fundamental weaknesses of the party system in the country. Political parties in the Philippines are limited to being vehicles of the elite to gain political power rather than having a fundamental role in articulating citizens’ interests and being accountable to the general polity. Elections are seen as a means to access power, private accumulation, and rent-seeking (Hutchcroft 1991). The party system is so weak that even the ruling party that President Duterte belongs to, does not have an official presidential candidate (Cupin 2021). In a strategic move to attract more allies outside the political opposition, Vice President Robredo who is known as a staunch critic of the Duterte administration is running for President as an independent candidate (Manahan 2021).   The 2022 Elections as an Issue of Democratic Citizenship   With surveys showing a small number of undecided voters (Pulse Asia 2021), it appears that the Filipino citizenry has reached a level of political “maturity” if one defines it as the solidification of political values, attitudes, and convictions. Contrary to public discourse, Filipinos are neither apathetic nor immature (lacking any firm conviction) (Borja 2017). Instead, the question shifts to where this maturation is leading (e.g. illiberal outcomes). Nevertheless, public discourse has yet to reflect the shift.   Another defining characteristic of the 2022 National Elections is an aggravation of Duterte’s aggressive politics at the level of citizens. This is tied with both the blossoming of Marcos apologetics and conspiracy theorizing and equally perceived illiberal and elitist tendencies among opposition supporters who are trying to revive the discourse of “bobotante” (stupid voters). Furthermore, it is plausible to argue that the political values underpinning the 2022 National Elections are bound together by nostalgia. On one hand, this nostalgia is for a now-defunct liberal democratic regime. On the other, it is for a supposed golden age that Marcos apologists have defended despite all the facts against it; conjuring conspiracy theories or legalist arguments to justify a once repressed sense of vindictiveness which have been widely circulated via social media such as YouTube and Facebook (Soriano and Gaw 2021). One camp seeks to avenge the collapse of the EDSA regime under the guise of restoration and normalcy. The other seeks to re-assert the legitimacy of a deposed dictator and all their personal attachments to it. Overall, the political moral fibers that have been opened back in 2016 are now in full display and aggravated by a sense of desperation from the camps involved.   What matters is that the question of elections, and democratization in general, is ultimately the question of citizenship. How do Filipinos see themselves as political actors? Will the upcoming elections affect their political identity? If yes, to what extent? If no, then what are the psycho-political conditions that would remain constant? The toxicity of daily social media activities is but the tip of an iceberg since only a minority of the citizenry is active online. Underneath, as have been alluded to earlier, lies illiberal political tendencies tied with disempowerment (Borja 2018).   Filipinos have a clear attachment with representative institutions. However, they don’t usually share other liberal ideals. Consequently, they are leader-centric by giving primacy to personal leadership and the executive branch over institutions and the ideal balance of power, respectively. Many are also intolerant, equating plurality with disorder while approving government regulation over the circulation of ideas in society. Alongside illiberal tendencies are sustained levels of disempowerment among ordinary Filipinos (Borja 2020).Though they are interested in politics and see it as important, they do not see themselves as capable of influencing public affairs after elections. They also deem themselves as incapable of fully understanding politics even if they are exposed to it daily through media. Consequently, they hardly participate in politics other than elections despite their habitual enthusiasm to vote.   Pathways to Democratic Renewal: Going Beyond Elections   The prospects of democratization in the Philippines seem bleak with mass disempowerment and resurgent illiberalism among citizens, and chronic weaknesses among key liberal democratic institutions. Nevertheless, there are prospects for democratic renewal beyond contested institutions like elections and the party system. Specifically, efforts for democratization must invest more in fostering strong democratic citizenship that will enable future generations of citizens to be less reliant on representatives and traditional politicians while being closer to the policy process itself. After the elections, the progressive and democratic forces should not focus on short-term and mid-term opposition to anti-democratic forces. Instead, they must lay the foundations for the expansion and development of democratic citizenship.   Under a general civic education program, two opportune and intertwined areas can contribute much to the aforementioned goal. First is e-governance and the maximization of digital technologies to bring government and public affairs closer to citizens (Roberts and Hernandez 2017). The latter point is important since efforts on e-governance are not necessarily democratic. Second and in relation to the latter point, there must be an expansion of democratic and deliberative spaces at the local level in order to bring citizens inside the government. Both can provide opportunities for citizens to see themselves as effective members of the polity and their local communities without being reduced to mere voters. Moreover, alongside the benefits of harnessing local knowledge and building consensus among constituents, participatory governance can provide spaces for common work and deliberation that can offset the impacts of political intolerance that have pitted citizens against each other. Overall, the prospects of democratic renewal in the Philippines are hinged on increasing the value of one’s citizenship; of making Filipino citizenship substantially democratic. This is because democratic institutions are founded not merely on legislation but on civic habits. Political power can thus be redistributed in favor of ordinary citizens while remaining within legal boundaries (Barber 2003).   To conclude, citizenship lies at the heart of democratization (Schneider and Schmitter 2004). One can speak endlessly about structural, institutional, and systemic reforms. But if talk, thoughts, theory, and practice miss the essence of what democratic politics is, then one misses the entire point of democratization. In the absence of an active citizenry, ability to effectively participate in the policy process, democratization is doomed to fail while paving the way for its own reversal.■   References   Barber, Benjamin. Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Borja, Anthony Laurence. “Tis but a habit in an unconsolidated democracy: Habitual voting, Political alienation and spectatorship.” Theoria, 64:50, (2017): 19-40. Borja, Anthony Laurence. “Intolerant leaders for intolerant citizens: illiberal values in the Philippines.”New Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/intolerant-leaders-intolerant-citizens-il liberal-values-philippines/ Borja, Anthony Laurence. “Political parties for the alienated and disempowered: Partisan Politics in the Philippines and the question of Political Alienation.” Access Bangsamoro. https://accessbangsamoro.ph/2020/08/14/political-parties-for-the-alienated-and-disempowered/ Cupin, Bea. “With no presidential, VP bets, ‘ruling’ PDP-Laban assures local candidates of support.” Rappler, December 1, 2021. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/pdp-laban-assures-local-bets-support-2022-polls/ Domingo, Katrina. “Isko thanks Duterte 'die-hard supporters' backing his presidential bid.” ABS-CBN News, February 10, 2022. https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/02/10/22/isko-thanks-duterte-supporters-backing-his-presl-bid. Hecita, Ian Jayson, Ador Torneo, Aileen Pactao, Jazelle Zerrudo, Randy Cacho. “Philippine Elections in the New Normal: Policy Insights from the Palawan Plebiscite.” Policy Brief. Manila: DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, 2022. https://www.dlsu-jrig.org/policy-briefs. Hutchcroft, Paul, “Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder.” World Politics, 43 (1991): 414-450. Luna, Franco. “Presidential bets 'frustrated' over failed opposition unity talks but still open if invited.” Philstar.com, February 23, 2022. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/01/23/2155824/presidential-bets-frustrated-over-failed-opposition-unity-talks-still-open-if-invited. Accessed February 15, 2022. McCoy, Alfred. “Dark Legacy: Human Rights Under the Marcos Regime” in Memory, Truth Telling and the Pursuit of Justice': A Conference on the Legacies of the Marcos Dictatorship, 129-144. Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila Press. Manahan, Jon. “'Iba na ang laban': Robredo running independent to show openness for alliances.” ABS-CBN News, October 9, 2021. https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/10/08/21/why-robredo-is-running-as-an-independent-candidate. “Marcos to skip Philippine presidential debate as lead widens.” The Straits Times, February 14, 2022. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/marcos-to-skip-philippine-presidential-debate-as-lead-widens. National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections “NAMFREL releases preliminary observations on the 2021 Mock Elections.” NAMFREL Press Release, December 2021. Patag, Kristine Joy. “Petitioners appeal junked disqualification case vs Marcos.” Philstar.com, February 15, 2022. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/02/15/2161016/petitioners-appeal-junked-disqualification-case-vs-marcos. Pulse Asia. “Nationwide Survey on the May 2022 Elections”. Quezon City: Pulse Asia. https://www.pulseasia.ph/january-2022-nationwide-survey-on-the-may-2022-elections/. Rama, Michelina. “Redrawing Battle Lines in the Struggle to for Civic Space: Insights from the Philippines.” In Civic Space: Working Paper Series. Bangkok: FORUM ASIA, 2018. Remitio, Rex. “Political parties of ex-presidents Ramos, Estrada, Arroyo back Marcos-Duterte tandem.” CNN Philippines, November 25, 2022. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/11/25/Political-parties-of-ex-presidents-support-Marcos-Duterte.html Roberts, Tony and Kevin Hernandez. “The techno-centric gaze: incorporating citizen participation technologies into participatory governance processes in the Philippines.” Making All Voices Count Research Report, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. “Robredo wins endorsement of 4 ex-senators, more govt officials.” CNN Philippines, February 21, 2022. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/2/21/Leni-Robredo senators-endorsement.html. Schneider, Carsten and Philippe Schmitter. “Liberalization, transition and consolidation: Measuring the components of democratization.” Democratization Vol. 11, No. 5, (2004): 60-62. Soriano, Cheryl Ruth and Fatima Gaw. “Platforms, alternative influence, and networked political brokerage on YouTube. Convergence.” International Journal of Research to New Media Technologies. (July 2021): https://doi.org/10.1177/13548565211029769. “SWS: Satisfaction with Duterte up in Q4 2021.” CNN Philippines, February 9, 2022. https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/2/9/SWS-Duterte-satisfaction-rating- Q4-2021.html. Teehankee, Julio. “The Philippines in 2021: The Twilight of the Duterte Presidency” Asian Survey. (February 2022): 1-11, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.62.1.12. Tomacruz, Sofia. “Marcos Jr. sustains lead in January 2022 Pulse Asia poll.” Rappler, February 13, 2022. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/ferdinand-bongbong-marcos-jr- sustains-lead-pulse-asia-presidential-survey-january-2022/. Accessed February 20, 2022.     [1] Marcos Jr. is currently facing disqualification cases borne out of failure to file income tax from 1982 to 1985.     ■ Anthony Lawrence Borja is Assistant Professorial Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Development Studies of De La Salle University, Philippines. He is a Ph.D. candidate in the Public Administration program of Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s School of International and Public Affairs. His research publications are in political philosophy, political theory, political psychology, and comparative politics. He is currently conducting research on political illiberalism, political participation, and popular sovereignty. ■ Ian Jayson Hecita is Assistant Professorial Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Development Studies of De La Salle University (DLSU), Philippines. Concurrently, he serves as Lead Policy Research Specialist for the Political Participation for Greater Electoral Integrity program of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. His research works are in open government, local governance, civil society participation, and sustainable development. His current research projects involve electoral governance in health crisis situations and citizenship education.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Vietnam is a developing country with about 75% of people living in a rural area as of 2008 (Vietnam Households Living Standards Survey 2008). Although most Vietnamese people’s livelihood depends on agricultural activities, agricultural income is very volatile. This is partly because agriculture is affected heavily by natural disasters such as typhoons, storms, floods, droughts, landslides, animal and livestock epidemics, plant disease, and insects. According to the World Bank report (2010), natural disasters caused the loss of about 1 to 1.5 percent of annual GDP during the period 1989 – 2008 in Vietnam. Vietnam is also one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change in the world (Dasgupta, et al. 2009). In an agricultural society like Vietnam, men play an important role in cultivation, therefore gender inequality still exists. The World Bank (2011) report shows that gender disparity remained in Vietnam even though there has been significant progress in poverty, wellbeing, employment and livelihoods, and political participation. Gender inequality is also reflected in the aspect of domestic violence. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010) reports that 58 percent of women suffered at least one type of domestic violence: physical, sexual, and emotional. Likewise, Luke et al. (2007) carried out a survey in the Nghe An province that indicated that 37% of wives have experienced physical violence.   Women’s Empowerment Caused by Relative Decline of Men’s Contribution to Household Income   A large body of literature shows that improving the socio-economic status of women can increase their power within households. Allendorf (2007) argues that women’s ownership of land increased their power in household decisions. Panda and Agarwal (2005) find that women with immovable property (land or a house) tend to face a significantly lower risk of marital violence than women without property. In addition, female participation in the labor force increases women's power and gives women more control to allocate the resources within households (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003, Anderson and Eswaran 2009). Women’s participation in microcredit programs is positively associated with women’s empowerment while men’s access to credit has negative impacts on women’s empowerment (Pitt et al. 2006; Hashemi et al. 1996). Women with higher educational levels were found to be more empowered in decision-making processes (Sofia and Pervaiz, 2018; Samarakoon and Parinduri, 2014). The employment of women also positively impacts their participation in decision-making on their own health care, large household purchases, visits to family or relatives, and daily spending (Sofia and Pervaiz, 2018).   These findings suggest that women have more bargaining power within the family when they participate in economically sustaining the household. However, little is known about how the decrease in men’s economic contribution to the family impacts women’s empowerment. In the case of farming-dependent households, natural disasters reduce men’s economic contribution to household income. Natural disasters usually devastate farming conditions so that men who used to be primary breadwinners fall into unemployment or under-employment. The reduction of the male contribution to household income is expected to lead to the loss of power vis-à-vis female members in decision-making processes. Accordingly, one can predict the effect natural disasters has on women’s empowerment through the decreased men’s economic status.   Analysis of the Vietnamese Data   The main objective of this study is to investigate the association between natural disasters and women’s empowerment in rural Vietnam. This study leverages the 2008 and 2010 Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys, and household fixed-effects to establish the causal relationship between natural disasters and women empowerment. The types of natural disasters include floods, droughts, typhoons, landslides, animal/livestock epidemics, plant disease, and insects, which had occurred in a commune in the past three years.   Natural disasters cause rural households to lose income significantly. Table 1 reports the estimated results on household loss by share of farm income. There is strong evidence on the positive impact of the number of natural disasters on the household loss due to natural disasters (Column 1). The number of natural disasters also has significant and positive impacts on household loss for all subsamples (Columns 2 to 4). However, natural disasters have greater impacts on households with a decrease of the household loss by 8.7 percent for households with a low share of farm income, by 10 percent for households with an average share of farm income, and by 14.6 percent for households with a high share of farm income.   Table 1: Impacts of natural disasters on the household loss by share of farm income * p < 0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for characteristics of households such as: household size, education of household head, number of household members of active age (15-55/66), number of girls aged less than 5, number of females aged 15 to 60, number of females aged 60 above, and characteristics of communes such as: dummy variable for bank for social policy, dummy variable for bank for agriculture and rural development, dummy variable for having irrigation facilities, dummy variable for good quality of main irrigation canals, dummy variable for good quality of tertiary canal, dummy variable for good quality of public well, dummy variable for good quality of dike. The regressions also control for household-level fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level.   Table 2 shows that the number of natural disasters is positively associated with women’s empowerment. The results are strong for different measures of women’s empowerment. Specifically, an additional number of natural disasters increases the probability of women’s empowerment on visits to family or relatives by 0.5 percent. The figure is similar for women’s empowerment on daily purchases. Also, an additional number of natural disasters increases the probability of women’s empowerment on contraception by 0.8 percent, on their own health by 0.5 percent, on child schooling by 1 percent, on child health by 0.9 percent, and on having a child by 0.6 percent.   Table 2: Impacts of Natural Disasters on Index and Number of Women Empowerment * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for characteristics of households such as: household size, education of household head, number of household members of active age (15-55/66), number of girls aged less than 5, number of females aged 15 to 60, number of females aged 60 above, and characteristics of communes such as: dummy variable for bank for social policy, dummy variable for bank for agriculture and rural development, dummy variable for having irrigation facilities, dummy variable for good quality of main irrigation canals, dummy variable for good quality of tertiary canal, dummy variable for good quality of public well, dummy variable for good quality of dike. The regressions also control for household-level fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level.   This study also indicates that the number of natural disasters undermines men’s power relative to women’s power due to a fall in agricultural income. In an agricultural society, men’s physical strength plays an essential role in cultivating activities. As such the decrease in agricultural income leads to a fall in men’s power and an increase in women’s power. Likewise, Table 3 provides strong evidence on the positive impact the number of natural disasters has on women’s empowerment in households with a high share of farm income in 2008. There is no evidence of the impact the number of natural disasters has on women’s empowerment in households with a low share of farm income. In a nutshell, female power increases in farming-dependent households when natural disasters hit rural Vietnam.   Table 3: Impacts of Natural Disasters on Women’s Empowerment by Share of Farm Income in 2008 Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions control for characteristics of households such as: household size, education of household head, number of household members of active age (15-55/66), number of girls aged less than 5, number of females aged 15 to 60, number of females aged 60 above, and characteristics of communes such as: dummy variable for bank for social policy, dummy variable for bank for agriculture and rural development, dummy variable for having irrigation facilities, dummy variable for good quality of main irrigation canals, dummy variable for good quality of tertiary canal, dummy variable for good quality of public well, dummy variable for good quality of dike. The regressions also control for household-level fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level.   Conclusion   To draw a solid conclusion, the findings are put into perspective. Natural disasters make most rural households suffer economically. However, there is a silver lining effect in increasing female power vis-à-vis men in the household decision-making. Other negative shocks such as the current COVID-19 pandemic and war also positively change gender inequality. For instance, Alon et al. (2020) find that the economic downturn due to the current COVID-19 pandemic increased gender equality. Child care needs have increased dramatically following the closures of schools and daycare centers. Many fathers have to take main responsibility for child care, which leads to erosion in social norms as to a lopsided distribution of the division of labor in housework and child care between men and women. Shatnawi and Fishback (2018) state that World War II caused a substantial increase in wartime demand and post-war demand for female workers in manufacturing compared with the setting in 1941. How negative shocks and crises change female household power needs to be studied further.    * This issue briefing article is written based on the findings of the article entitled “The impact of natural disasters on women’s empowerment in rural Vietnam”. This article was published in Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 62 (2021), 101-123.   References   Anderson, S. and M. Eswaran (2009). "What determines female autonomy? Evidence from Bangladesh." Journal of Development Economics, 90(2): 179-191. Allendorf, K. (2007). "Do women’s land rights promote empowerment and child health in Nepal?" World development, 35(11): 1975-1988. Alon, M, T., Doepke, M., Rumsey, O, J & Tertilt, M. 2020. The Impact of COVID-19 on Gender Equality. Working Paper 26947, NBER, available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w26947 Dasgupta, S., B. Laplante, S. Murray, and D. Wheeler (2009), Sea-level Rise and Storm Surges: A Comparative Analysis of Impacts in Developing Countries, Washington D.C.: The World Bank. General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010). "Keeping silent is dying’: Results from the National Study on Domestic Violence against Women in Viet Nam." Hashemi, S., Sidney R. Schuler, and Ann P. Riley. 1996. “Rural Credit Programs and Women’s Empowerment in Bangladesh.” World Development, 24(4) :635–53. Luke, N., S. R. Schuler, B. T. T. Mai, P. Vu Thien and T. H. Minh (2007). "Exploring couple attributes and attitudes and marital violence in Vietnam." Violence Against Women, 13(1): 5-27. Panda, P and Agarwal, B. (2005). Marital Violence, Human Development and Women’s Property Status in India. World Development, 33(5), 823-850. Pitt, M. M., Khandker, S. R., and Cartwright, J. 2006. Empowering women through micro finance: Evidence from Bangladesh. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 54(4), 791-831. Quisumbing, A. R. and J. A. Maluccio (2003). "Resources at marriage and intrahousehold allocation: Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 65(3): 283-327. Samarakoon, S & Parinduri, A, R. 2014. Does Education Empower Women? Evidence from Indonesia, World Development, 66, 428-442. Shatnawi, D & Fishback, P. 2018. The Impact of World War II on the Demand for Female Workers in Manufacturing, Journal of Economic History, 78(2), 539-574. Sofia & Pervaiz. 2018. The impact of women’s education and employment on their empowerment: an empirical evidence from household level survey. Quality & Quantity, 52, 2855-2870. World Bank., 2010. Weathering the Storm: Options for Disaster Risk Financing in Vietnam. Washington DC. Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/569191468108554653/pdf/70394-REVISED-Box391475B-PUBLIC-Viet-Nam-Fiscal-Impact-Study.pdf World Bank (2011). Viet Nam Country Gender Assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank.     ■ Trung Xuan Hoang is a research fellow at the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences. He received his Ph.d. in Economics from Deakin University, Australia in 2012. He specializes in applied economics, labor economics, and health economics. His work has been published in leading-refereeing journals such as the Journal of Development Economics, Health Economics, Economic Development and Cultural Change, World Development, and European Review of Agricultural Economics.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Authoritarian legacies have shaped party politics and electoral instability in Asian democracies. The article on the determinants of electoral instability in 19 Asian democracies found that contained electoral competition during the pre-democratic period distorted the formation of free and fair electoral environments after democratic transition.[1] This briefing focuses on how different types of authoritarian regimes before democratic transition influence the development of democratic party systems after transition and over time.   This essay has implications for the current debate on the crisis of representative democracy in Asia. Although highly stabilized electorates may strengthen rather than reduce political polarization, past studies suggest that high levels of electoral volatility can be a major roadblock to democratic consolidation, programmatic representation, political accountability, and good governance.[2] Where volatility is so high that voters feel disillusioned with the existing system and become ambivalent about the “relative merits of the democratic status quo versus strong, decisive, albeit less democratic, leadership,”[3] such disillusionment and ambivalence may pave the way for the electoral success of illiberal politicians, such as Duterte of the Philippines, and the rise in support for anti-political-establishment parties.[4]   Overall Electoral Volatility in Asia, 1948-2017   Original data on all 154 elections in 19 Asian democracies, broadly defined as all democracies in the Asian continent, namely from the regions of East, Southeast, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East, since the end of WWII, were collected and analyzed. To determine which countries and which time periods to include, Polity scores that classify a political regime ranging from 6 to 10 as “democracy” were utilized.   Electoral volatility was measured using Pedersen’s index as it is commonly used in the political science literature and captures “the net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers.”[5] Specifically, it is called total electoral volatility (TEV), as it is calculated by estimating the difference between the vote share of the ith party at a given election (t) and the vote share of the same ith party at the election immediately prior (t-1), whose absolute values are then summed up and divided by 2. Therefore, to measure electoral volatility meaningfully for all occasions, a country is required to hold two elections in a row under “democracy” status and without interruption.   Figure 1 presents the mean volatility since the first democratic elections for 19 countries in Asia. The volatility scores range from 0 to 100 on a continuous scale, with higher scores indicating higher volatility. The average electoral volatility for the whole period in Asia is 18.7 percent. Compared with democracies in other regions, this is higher than the levels obtained in more consolidated Western European democracies but lower than those observed in other newly democratic regions, such as Latin America, Africa, and post-communist Europe. Yet, given that two-thirds of Asian democracies display an average level of 20 percent or higher, most countries in the continent seem to experience enduring systemic electoral instability.   Figure 1. Average Volatility Scores in Asia: East, Southeast, South, Central Asia, and the Middle East Source: Lee and Casal Bértoa (2021)   Further looking into the different sub-regions of Asia, no clear trend is visible thus far across East, Southeast, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East. Within the sub-regions, countries like Japan (East Asia), Israel (Middle East), Sri Lanka (South Asia), Georgia (Central Asia), and Myanmar (Southeast Asia) are all among the most electorally stable, while South Korea (East Asia), Turkey (Middle East), Pakistan (South Asia), Kyrgyzstan (Central Asia), and the Philippines (Southeast Asia) are located at the opposite end of the volatility spectrum.   Over time, however, with an exception of the three most consolidated democracies in the continent (i.e. India, Israel, and Japan) together with Indonesia and Taiwan, in the other continuous Asian democracies, namely East Timor, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Turkey, electoral volatility scores have never been so low as during the current decade. [6]   Authoritarian Legacies as Determinants of Electoral Instability in Asia   In explaining what shapes electoral volatility in Asia, there are two clear reasons as to why the impact of authoritarian legacies is focused on in this study. First, while scholars have significantly contributed to understanding the causes of electoral volatility, they tend to focus on some common and conventional factors explaining electoral stability, such as political institutions and social cleavages, with a few exceptions of recent studies. Second, Asian democracies are ideal to examine the impact of authoritarian legacies, because, in contrast to other regions where all countries had an authoritarian past under military dictatorships, such as Latin America, or experienced the same type of legacy (e.g., communism in Eastern Europe, fascism in Southern Europe) before transition, Asia presents a rich variation in types of authoritarian legacies: communist (e.g., Mongolia), non-communist one-party state (e.g., Taiwan, Malaysia), military (e.g., South Korea, Thailand), personalist (e.g., Philippines, Nepal), and no legacy (e.g., Israel, India). Thus it is expected that this rich variation in authoritarian legacies will help to explain some variation of electoral volatility in Asia.   Recently, some Asian scholars have paid attention to the role of a country’s authoritarian past before democratic transition in shaping electoral stability after democratization.[7] With particular reference to some of the most highly institutionalized party systems in Asia – Taiwan and Malaysia – which have carried with them significant authoritarian legacies, the basic notion is that in these systems, hegemonic parties were dominant in the past. This helps to manage low levels of electoral volatility due to some constraints on competition. However, while contained electoral competition during the pre-democratic period may distort the formation of free and fair electoral environments after democratic transition takes place, this study argues that it may also be true that not all authoritarian regimes are the same.   That is, the detrimental impact of authoritarian legacies on democratic party system development depends on the degree to which they disrupt political development after transition. In countries where strong authoritarian parties existed, the same parties tend to re-emerge after transition because voters already have some attachment to them, and thus the level of electoral instability is expected to be lower. On the other hand, if parties were created by and strongly linked to authoritarian dictators, these artificially created parties to fall apart and electoral volatility is likely to be high after transition. Lastly, in countries where parties were non-existent or simply functioned as an electoral vehicle for military cliques, electoral instability is even higher as voters lack cues or attachment that will help them to make choices in a routinized manner. In sum, even after transition, the existence and re-emergence of hegemonic parties help the democratic system to manage low levels of electoral volatility. Although authoritarian interruption should undermine party system stabilization, certain types of authoritarian legacies were found to be less detrimental to electoral stability than other types.   Impact of the Three Types of Authoritarianism on Post-Transition Electoral Volatility   To estimate electoral volatility varying within and across countries, multivariate statistical models were employed to measure the impact of authoritarian legacies while controlling for various conventional factors proven in the literature to be influential. To present the results intuitively, the effect of authoritarian legacies in different measures after holding all other variables constant was graphically described.   Figure 2 presents two panels. The left panel shows an aggregate impact of pre-transition authoritarianism based on the multivariate analysis, and the right panel displays the effect of its legacy types based on the multivariate analysis. Figure 2 suggests that authoritarian legacies are indeed strong predictors for explaining electoral dynamics in Asian democracies and increase electoral instability in particular. For example, on the left panel, political systems with authoritarian legacies are characterized by 1.9 times higher volatility than those without such a legacy. On the other hand, the right panel shows that authoritarian legacies have a substantively significant as well as nuanced impact on political systems after transition: countries with military legacies show 85 percent higher volatility, while those with personalist authoritarian legacies display 58 percent higher volatility compared to countries without any authoritarian legacy. Countries with party-based authoritarian legacies also show 27 percent higher volatility than those without authoritarian interludes which is, however, not statistically significant.   Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Authoritarian Legacy in Different Measures Notes: Estimation is based on the multivariate regression analysis. A baseline category is “no authoritarian legacy.”   In summary, as shown in the figure above, it can be observed that electoral volatility is lower in countries where political parties could participate in free (even if not always fair) elections or played a monopolistic ideological role (even if under authoritarian conditions — e.g., Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia) than in countries where they presented a functional (simply at the service of the particular dictator or military clique in power) and non-ideological character or they were simply inexistent (e.g., Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, Thailand). In the latter countries, electoral instability has become endemic.   Does this mean that countries with military or personalist authoritarian legacies are doomed to experience eternal instability? There is no way to change the past, but eventually, one can change the institutional design or introduce different economic policies that might help to stabilize electoral competition.   Impact of Authoritarian Legacies in Conjunction with Age of Democracy   Further to these findings, the effect of historical legacies in conjunction with time factors and the extent to which they are influential is examined. Taking into consideration that research on electoral volatility in Asia has emphasized the role of 1) the passage of time and 2) the characteristics of pre-transition regimes in shaping electoral dynamics and party systems,[8] the impact of the interplay between types of authoritarian legacies and age of democracy is further examined. To clearly illustrate how the nature of pre-transition regimes has long-run effects, co-varying with the maturation of democracy in reshaping electoral dynamics, graphical display is once again relied on. The power of this interaction effect is presented as plots in Figure 3.   Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism Type over Age of Democracy Notes: Estimation is based on the multivariate regression analysis. A baseline category is “no authoritarian legacy.”   According to Figure 3, immediately after democratic transition (i.e. at the observed minimum “age of democracy” value), authoritarian legacies have significant effects on volatility, particularly for political systems with military or personalist legacies (2.8 and 2.6 times higher volatility, respectively, vis-à-vis those with no legacy). These effects still last but are less considerable after the passage of the observed mean “age of democracy” value (22 years). Compared to political systems with no authoritarian interlude, those with military legacies show 2 times higher volatility. However, with sufficient maturation of democracy (at the observed maximum value of 67 years), the difference in volatility between countries with no legacy and those with military legacies is no longer statistically significant.   All is not Lost but We Need to Earn It   The findings of this research indicate that there is hope behind the shadow of the authoritarian past, provided that post-transitional leaders manage to keep democracy as “the only game in town.”[9] This is because, following the analyses, it is possible for the routinization in political behavior generated by years of democratic experience to wash away even the worst authoritarian heritage. This is certainly good news for countries like Mongolia or East Timor which, despite years of authoritarianism, can expect a brighter (or more democratic) future. Consequently, by putting democracy at risk, political leaders in countries like India, the Philippines, and, most dramatically, Kyrgyzstan, might have re-started the clock, putting in peril not just democracy but the stabilization of party politics in the near future.   All in all, this analysis shows how history can be a millstone that determines the future of party politics and should not be tossed in the bin during political analysis. However, and more importantly, for the future of electoral politics and democracy in the region, political leaders — if willing to do so — can amend the mistakes of their fathers.      [1] This research is published in the academic journal previously. Don. S Lee and Fernando Casal Bertoa, “On the Causes of Electoral Volatility in Asia since 1948.” Party Politics, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688211046858. [2] For example, Mainwaring, Scott. 2018. Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay and Collapse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [3] Hicken, Allen. 2015. "Party and party system institutionalization in the Philippines (324)." In Allen Hicken and Erik Martínez Kuhonta (eds.) Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies and the Shadows of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [4] Casal Bértoa, Fernando and José Rama. 2020. “Party Decline or Social Transformation? Economic, Institutional and Sociological Change and the Rise of Anti-Political-Establishment Parties in Western Europe.” European Political Science Review 12, no. 4: 503-523. [5] Pedersen, Mogens. 1979. “The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility.” European Journal of Political Research 7, no. 1: 3. [6] Casal Bértoa, Fernando. 2017. “Separation, Divorce or Harakiri? The ‘Crisis’ of Asian Democracies in Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Northeast Asian History 14, no. 2: 76. [7] Hicken, Allen, and Erik Martínez Kuhonta (eds.). 2015. Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies and the Shadows of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [8] Ibid. [9] Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.     ■ Don S. Lee is an Assistant Professor in the School of Governance and the Department of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University (South Korea). Formerly, he held a position as an Assistant Professor and a Leverhulme Trust fellow at the University of Nottingham (United Kingdom). He has published 18 peer-reviewed articles on politics and public administration in Asia, including Comparative Political Studies, Governance, Journal of East Asian Studies, Party Politics, Policy & Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Public Administration, Public Administration Review, Public Management Review, and Regulation & Governance. His book, titled “The President’s Dilemma in Asia,” is under contract (Oxford University Press). ■ Fernando Casal Bértoa is an Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham (United Kingdom). He is co-director of REPRESENT: Research Centre for the Study of Parties and Democracy. Member of the OSCE/ODIHR “Core Group of Political Party Experts”, he is also an International IDEA and Westminster Foundation for Democracy collaborator as well as Venice Commission and United Nations expert. His latest monograph is titled Party System Closure: Party Alliances, Government Alternative, and Democracy in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2021).     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]