EAI launched the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) in November 2013 to conduct research related to democratic governance and human rights promotion in Asia. EAI serves as a representative of domestic think tanks and leads the organization of regional think tanks in Asia. It is responsible for supporting and managing research related to democracy at associated research institutes. ADRN was established to analyze threats to democracy in Asia and to promote discussions and practical research projects that could contribute to the consolidation of democracy in the region. Aimed at presenting policies based on research, ADRN examines threats and challenges to democracy by identifying and studying practical agendas for developing regional democracy in Asia. The network includes 22 major think tanks from 14 Asian countries including Taiwan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines, as well as South Korea’s EAI. 

Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Russia’s Partial Mobilization: Issues Pertaining Russian Migrants in Mongolia

Introduction   On September 21, 2022, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation signed a decree enacting the announcement of partial mobilization in the country. The Kremlin took into account its citizens’ potential evasion from partial mobilization, leading to the State Duma of the Russian Federation amend the Criminal Code the day before the signing of the decree. The amendment added articles outlining severe punishment for voluntary surrender, desertion from the military service and conscription, and criminal liability of up to 15 years in prison for looting during wartime.   However, these amendments to the Criminal Code became the basis for mass exodus of military-aged men fleeing the country. As such, these citizens are forced to seek asylum in the countries they migrate to, as they would potentially face severe criminal charges if they return to their homeland. Currently, an estimated 1,400,000 Russian citizens have fled to neighboring countries.   Situation of Russians in Mongolia   Since the announcement of partial mobilization on September 21, 2022, Russian citizens have been entering Mongolia through the border port of Altanbulag town in Selenge Province and Borshoo in Uvs Province. Russians who crossed the border of Mongolia have two options; either stay in the country until the Russia-Ukrainian crisis subsides or pass through our territory. Russian citizens can transit from Ulaanbaatar to the former Soviet Union countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Serbia, which has friendly relations with Russia; countries like Vietnam, Thailand and South Korea, where free tourist entries have reopened; or Israel, which has a large number of Russian immigrants. However, the Russian citizens who have arrived in Mongolia tend to be mainly Buryat, Kalmyk, Tuvan or Mongolian, with a small number of Yakut and Slavic ethnic groups.   So far, it is known that they have only used the Telegram platform since their arrival in the country. These platforms are primarily used to search for jobs and apartments such as “Mongolia/Adaptation 03” (7638 members), “Apartments for rent in Mongolia” (1457 members), “Job vacancies in Mongolia for Russians” (1101 members), “Apartments for rent in Mongolia” (207 members), “Buryatia-Mongolia chat” (430 members), “Jobs in Mongolia” (2562 members) and “Housing in Mongolia” (704 members). Most of these group chats showYo a little sign of them transiting to other countries. Subsequently, Russian citizens who crossed the Mongolia border have interest in applying for a temporary stay of another 30 days in Mongolia or further, working without a visa or permit until the Russia-Ukrainian crisis subsides.   On October 3, 2022, N. Uuganbayar, Chief of the Immigration Agency of Mongolia responded to the question of a www.news.mn agency journalist regarding Russian citizens in Mongolia, “…under the given circumstances, if they apply for a temporary residence in Mongolia, a decision was made to grant them temporary residence permits upon review and verification of applications and until the crisis and conflict in their country subside…Of course, there will be another layer of inspection carried out before granting a residence permit. In case there is a request for temporary residence submitted, a permit will be issued based on an inspection of the citizen's request following a detailed process” [1] .   This allows more opportunities for the Russian citizens to bring in their friends and families to Mongolia, increasing the migration flow of Russian citizens fleeing to the country. This process has already begun as the citizens have begun to bring their families and children following their arrival. Furthermore, they are even less interested in returning to their homeland following the Speaker of the State Duma V. Volodin’s speech. [2]   Pursuant to Article 27.5 of the Law on the "Legal Status of Foreign Nationals", foreign nationals in Mongolia can apply for a residence permit in Mongolia for private purposes at the state administrative agency in charge of foreign citizens within 21 days after the first day of arrival in the country. Moreover, citizens and entities that provide accommodation to foreign citizens must register them with the state administrative agency in charge of foreign citizens within 48 hours, which can be completed online (see Article 24.4 of the Law). However, the implementation of the latter provision is disregarded by many entities.   The Russian migrants have organized voluntary charity campaigns and activities in Ulaanbaatar to adapt to Mongolian society and to make a positive impression on the public. Additionally, many of the local NGOs have been taking initiatives to provide assistance to Russian citizens in Mongolia. For instance, civic movements such as "No Double Standard", "Ethnic Mongolian Central Association", and "Urban Citizens' Forum" joined their forces and launched an initiative to help out ethnic Mongolian clans from Russia submitting their recommendations to the Government of Mongolia. [3]   Current development and concerns   Media sources report that 22,540 Russian citizens entered Mongolia, of which 85 percent have left the country as of mid-October. [4] In other words, 3,465 Russian citizens remained in the country. The unofficial reports indicate that most of the Russian citizens traveled to visa-free countries such as Kazakhstan, the Republic of Turkey, Uzbekistan, Georgia, in addition to the European Union countries, Thailand, and South Korea, whereas only a few of them returned to Russia.   For example, the graph below shows the number of Russian citizens who have entered and exited the border ports of Mongolia from September 21, 2022 to October 19, 2022. (Blue-entered, yellow-exited) Gender ratio of Russian citizens, who entered and exited the country   Blue-men, yellow-women The fact that there is no wide gap in the gender ratio implies that the Russian citizens might have entered, exited, or stayed in the country with their families. The remaining Russian citizens may seek residence (assuming they do not wish to return) in the following ways, such as:   - temporary residence; - request for political asylum; - intermarriage (can be fake); - migrate to rural areas (Darhan, Erdenet, Dornod, Khentii); - make an investment; - unauthorized employment; - apply for immigration; - commit an offense or a crime.   Although Russian citizens migrating to Mongolia share common features including youth and an avoidance of military conscription, their behaviors are different depending on the economic conscientious, cultural, and educational backgrounds. As a result, offenses and criminal acts of disrupting public order may occur in the capital city of Mongolia, even in rural areas. Up to this point, an incident occurred in late September 2022, where a drunken Russian citizen struck Mongolian citizen with a hammer whom he met at the border point and killed him in his home. [5] It can be presumed that he might have committed this crime intentionally in order to remain in Mongolia, even if it means a prison for him. The causation for this crime appears convicning, since the perpetrator called the police himself.   Apart from the mentioned incidence, there are currently no criminal records or news update involving migrating Russian citizens. Since Russia has been removed from SWIFT international payment network, the migrants in Mongolia are likely to carry cash with them. Most local banks require a temporary residence card when opening an account for a foreign citizen, which presents new challenge for them. The news about rent increases of residential buildings also strains these migrants in need of housing. Migration to rural areas is possible in this situation. In particular, those from Russian city Ulan-Ude could migrate to the eastern provinces in search of their relatives.   Conclusion   Mongolians are concerned about the fact that the country's "natural neighbor", Russia, has irrevocably established its strict authoritarian regime and brutally invaded Ukraine, which strives to become a democratic country like ours. This incident challenges the solidity of democratic values in Mongolia as an upholder of human rights and freedom.   It can be seen that in most of the cases, Mongolia's position regarding the Russian Federation and its pursuit of war on the international stage has been an abstention. [6] Although local citizens are aware of only the Mongolian two neighbor policy and that it should be taken with utmost care and cautiousness, civil society organizations in particular have been critical of the government's position.   Mongolian NGOs have been paying close attention to issues related to the Russian migrants. For instance, the Mongolian National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MNCCI) conducted a survey among the Russian migrants in Mongolia from October 10-25, 2022, and attracted the government’s attention on this issue. [7] The report outlined that 28.8 percent of the Russian migrants were in the country on tourism, 21.2 percent evaded the drafting of the Russia-Ukrainian conflict, 18.3 percent were seeking employment and 12 percent stated that their purpose was to study in the country. About 98 of them are now located in Ulaanbaatar. The survey also showed that 28.3 percent responding that they plan to stay for more than a month, 28.5 percent plan to reside in Mongolia permanently, and 34 percent were uncertain about their plan of stay. In addition, 82.6 percent of the migrants expressed their willingness to extend their visas whereas approximately 90 percent hoped to be employed in Mongolia.   When asked about the most pressing challenges and difficulties they encountered in Mongolia, 30.5 percent of the survey respondents specified that finding employment and earning income have been challenging as companies pay high taxes for employing a foreign citizen, while 16.2 percent mentioned the difficulties of finding affordable accommodation to rent, given high prices of renting an apartment. Subsequently, 13.8 percent pointed out the problems of language barrier and 20.5 percent the difficulties of obtaining a residence permit and extending their visas.   All of these present the necessity for the Mongolian government to direct its attention to the following issues:   - Mongolia’s announcement on the issuance of temporary residence permits was a right course of action to increase the flow of Russian migrants. The decision was made to issue them temporary residence permits in Mongolia until the war related crisis and conflict in Russia are resolved. [8] - Although Russian citizens are passing through our country to transit to other countries, it should make necessary arrangements to show support to the remaining migratory citizens who are inclined to stay in Mongolia for a longer period of time. - Actively involve Mongolian NGOs, such as MNCCI, and collaborate with the administrative agencies to recruit and provide employment opportunities as well as create a favorable environment for those who want to live and work in Mongolia. - Be considerate of the language barrier that hinders potential employment opportunities and resolve it by providing financial support to organizations, which expressed their interests in offering accelerated language training. [9] - Mongolia needs to be recognized internationally as a country that upholds democracy, human rights, and freedom by taking flexible approaches in the cases of Russian migrants’ visa violations in Mongolia, issue temporary residence permits in a simplified manner, and not discriminate them in social interactions. - Since the migrants who entered and stayed in our country are mostly from remote regions of Russia, it is crucial for NGOs and civil movements to provide them with all kinds of humanitarian assistance to socialize them and offer training to raise awareness on democracy, human rights and freedom. ■   References   А.САЙХАНБАЯР. 2022." Дайжин ирсэн иргэдэд Монгол Улс хүмүүнлэг хандах хэрэгтэй (Mongolia should treat the migrants humanely)." News.MN, September 29,2022. https://news.mn/r/2592759/.   А.САЙХАНБАЯР.2022.“Богино хугацаанд хэлний бэлтгэлд хамрагдах Орос иргэд нэмэгдсэн(Russian citizens added to short-term language preparation.)” News.MN. October 4, 2022. https://news.mn/r/2593779/.   А.Тэнгис. 2022. “Толгойг нь алхаар цохин гэмтээжээ (He was hit on the head with a hammer, severely injured).”Daily News, September 26, 2022. http://dailynews.mn/?p=13119.   Istomin, Sergey. 2022. “В Госдуме объяснили слова Володина о списках покинувших страну на фоне СВО (The State Duma explained volodin's words about the lists of those who left the country against the background of the SVO).” Lenta.ru., September 28, 2022. http://lenta.ru/news/2022/09/28/obbb/.   Mongol Chamber. 2022. “Монгол Улсад ирсэн ОХУ-ын жуулчдад тулгарч буй бэрхшээл, дэмNжлэг судалгааны тайлан(Report on problems and supports of tourists from Russia).” November 11, 2022. www.mongolchamber.mn/a/1144.   Г.ӨЛЗИЙХУТАГ. 2022. “ОХУ цэргийн дайчилгаа зарласнаас хойш сар орчмын хугацаанд 22,540 орос иргэн Монголд орж ирснээс 85% нь гарч явжээ (About a month after Russia announced its military mobilization, 22,540 Russian citizens entered Mongolia, of which 85% have left the country).” Ikon, October 21, 2022. https://ikon.mn/n/2pbb.   ГИХГ.2022. "ОХУ-ын иргэдэд Монгол Улсад түр оршин суух үнэмлэх олгоно(Temporary residence permits will be granted to the Russia citizens in Mongolia).” News.MN, October 3, 2022. https://news.mn/r/2593481.   UN News. 2022. “Ukraine: UN General Assembly demands Russia reverse course on ‘attempted illegal annexation.” October 12, 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129492.     [1] ГИХГ.2022. "ОХУ-ын иргэдэд Монгол Улсад түр оршин суух үнэмлэх олгоно(Temporary residence permits will be granted to the Russia citizens in Mongolia).” News.MN. 2022.10.03. [2] Sergey Istomin. 2022. “В Госдуме объяснили слова Володина о списках покинувших страну на фоне СВО(The State Duma explained volodin's words about the lists of those who left the country against the background of the SVO).”Lenta.ru.2022.09.28. [3] А.САЙХАНБАЯР. 2022." Дайжин ирсэн иргэдэд Монгол Улс хүмүүнлэг хандах хэрэгтэй (Mongolia should treat the migrants humanely)." News.MN. 2022.09.29. [4] Г.ӨЛЗИЙХУТАГ. 2022. “ОХУ цэргийн дайчилгаа зарласнаас хойш сар орчмын хугацаанд 22,540 орос иргэн Монголд орж ирснээс 85% нь гарч явжээ (About a month after Russia announced its military mobilization, 22,540 Russian citizens entered Mongolia, of which 85% have left the country).”Ikon. 2022.10.21. [5] А.Тэнгис. 2022. “Толгойг нь алхаар цохин гэмтээжээ (He was hit on the head with a hammer, severely injured).”Daily News. 2022.09.26 [6] UN News. 2022. “Ukraine: UN General Assembly demands Russia reverse course on ‘attempted illegal annexation.”2022.10.12. [7] Mongol Chamber. 2022. “Монгол Улсад ирсэн ОХУ-ын жуулчдад тулгарч буй бэрхшээл, дэмжлэг судалгааны тайлан(Report on problems and supports of tourists from Russia).”2022.11.11. [8] А.САЙХАНБАЯР. 2022.“Богино хугацаанд хэлний бэлтгэлд хамрагдах Орос иргэд нэмэгдсэн(Russian citizens added to short-term language preparation.)”, News.MN. 2022.10.04 [9] Ibid.     ■ Bazarvaani Ariunbayar is the CEO of the Academy of Political Education and the project manager of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mongolia. He holds a Master of Arts in Political Science, Graduate School of Arts and Science, National University of Mongolia.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek,Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Ariunbayar Bazarvaani 2022-11-24Views : 56590
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] A Congruous Multilateral Security Framework? Searching for an Asian Democratic Partnerships

The Indo-Pacific is currently witnessing growing attention from major powers that have immense strategic and economic stakes in the region. The rise of intense geopolitical competition in the region has given rise to a ‘democracy vs autocracy’ narrative and raised several questions about the future of democratic unity in the Indo-Pacific. In response to Chinese projects like the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), which represent Beijing’s growing political and military influence, Western and democratic Asian powers (like India and Japan) have sought to build a ‘democratic axis’ via issues-based networks and institutions. These platforms represent the ideological contestation between autocratic closed systems and democratic nations. In a diverse Asia however, where the universality of democratic norms may be contested, these initiatives are controversial as it is viewed as Western players` attempts to impose a certain set of ideas.   In this context, questions persist about how suitable the Asian landscape would be for Western institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is rooted in norms of liberal democracy (Lucarelli 2002). Could exclusively regional multilaterals like the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), which has not been fully effective due to its burden of diversity and consensus building, be the answer? Or is there a newer alternative middle path? Can the diverse Asian (and Asia-Pacific) region find the ways to foster democratic partnerships? In what ways can lessons from the ongoing war in Europe be translated into proactive measures in the Indo-Pacific? Will the creation of an Asian government-led democratic axis resolve or complicate the richly diverse Indo-Pacific geopolitics?   Ukraine War and Asia: New Challenges to Democratic Unity   Across the past few years, threats to democracy and the democratic way of life have surfaced all over the world, through both conventional and unconventional tactics of assault. The rise of the minilateral and multilaterals, primarily driven by democratic and authoritarian states, only complicates the ideological facets of such rivalry. China’s assertive actions along maritime and land borders have long created security tensions in Asia, especially for powers like Japan and India. However, more recently, it is the Russia-Ukraine war that has sent strong ripples over Asia, especially as tensions between China and Taiwan have escalated after Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August, causing fears of a Moscow-like “special operation” action by Beijing vis-à-vis Taipei (Blumenthal 2022).   Russian-Ukraine war projects a lot of threat on the future of multilateralism and democracy. As Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), Yevheniia Filipenko warned that actions by Russia threaten the “future of multilateralism and global security” especially if violations go unaddressed and business with Moscow continues instead of focusing on a united push in isolating Russia (Schein 2022). Importantly, the world itself is presently split on how to respond to Russia. This split in opinions of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine is amply evident in Asia too. A sizable number of states (such as India) have shown that they are unwilling (or unable) to censure Moscow or ban it from multilateral institutions. China also has officially stated its support for Russia`s participation in international affairs with the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Putin at the SCO showing a continuation of China’s restrained balance vis-à-vis Ukraine (Time 2022).   Further, the war in Ukraine has brought to the forefront questions of territorial integrity and democracy and pitted them against notions of aggressive expansion and authoritarianism. The inability of the UN to effectively respond to Russia`s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the increasing inefficiency of international multilateral institutions in handling the world’s diplomatic, security, and socioeconomic concerns (Dossani 2022). It has caused Asian states to question the efficacy of such liberal democratic institutions and platforms and made it apparent that 21st century challenges, particularly those pertaining to national security, require new solutions. One such alternative path is the creation of smaller minilateral arrangements, like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad; the core group comprises Australia, India, Japan, and the US), which brings together like-minded democratic states with shared objectives and imperatives and mutual trust – akin to a democratic axis.   Furthermore, the war in Ukraine has set a precedent for major conflicts elsewhere wherein protection of sovereignty and upholding of democracy are critical facets. The South and East China Seas, India-China border dispute as well as India-Pakistan border, tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and Northeast Asian peace architecture with a focus on the Korean Peninsula all emerge as impressionable conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region. Such fears evoke a sense of déjà vu from 2015, when Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the slow response by the US and Europe set precedents that allowed for the growth of a stronger Russia (Boot 2015). In Asia today, any precedence of such a nature bodes national security threats for democratic states like Japan, India, and South Korea. The Ukraine crisis is an example of how an autocratic power can undermine the international liberal order and violate the inherent democratic principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. It has, therefore, highlighted the need for Asian democratic states to band together. The need for strengthening an Asian democracy (including some semi-democratic countries) alignment hence becomes all the more critical. Whether such a democratic axis emerges via creation of a new Regional Cooperation and Integration (RCI) institution or a minilateral format that is more flexible and effective remains to be seen.   Rise of the Indo-Pacific and Its Democratic Dimension   The rise in authoritarian models in Asia—China’s global revisionist agenda and dismal human rights’ record; the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan; North Korean regime’s focus on nuclear ambitions; and the Military Junta-sponsored violence in Myanmar—has accelerated regional distress to an all-time high. Simultaneously, regional institutions like ASEAN with their insistence on non-interference in domestic affairs and consensus-building have been unsuccessful in reigning in the undesirable ramifications of such decline (Ebbighausen 2017). The near-constant threat of limited war erupting in South Asia, South China Sea, or East Asia amid China’s military interventions after years of peaceful rise has necessitated a renewed focus on constructive security engagements that can deal with both the threat perception as well as the growing developmental and humanitarian needs.   Among the US-led initiatives, the resurgent Quad with its wide-ranging ambit, and the nascent “Quad Plus” format that represents an amalgam of “like-minded” states with Western and Eastern sensibilities, have the potential to develop into a broader, comprehensive multilateral security framework dealing with shared challenges while pursuing its ultimate aim of a free and open Indo-Pacific (Panda, 2022). However, autocratic states (particularly China) have criticized the Quad and its variants as efforts by democratic Western nations to impose their values in Asia and heighten regional tensions by creating a precursor to an Indo-Pacific NATO, that would be modeled on the trans-Atlantic institution.   Yet, criticisms about Quad evolving as a possible “Asian NATO” – based on the failure of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was created in 1954 to counter communist expansionism and modeled on NATO – are unfounded (Nairn, 1968; Choong and Seah, 2022). Firstly, unlike SEATO, the Quad has its origins as a humanitarian assistance grouping that is still evolving into a “plurilateral” mechanism beyond the China-centric agenda (AIR 2022). Born from the disaster assistance to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Quad is still focused on delivering public goods in the region (Duggal 2022). In this context, it is foremost a grouping rooted in democratic values than defense considerations. Secondly, the Quad format is inherently an Indo-Pacific phenomenon, dominated by regional powers with its extension set to include more regional states. Even Quad members have shown some differences in responding to the Russian war in Ukraine, this has not caused any significant cracks in responding to regional challenges. The Quad’s focus on non-traditional security challenges – including climate change, disaster relief, and quality infrastructure to name a few – has allowed it to grow as a collaborative democratic grouping. Thirdly, the presence of India, which has still not relinquished entirely its non-aligned past, would hardly encourage the transformation into a military alliance, at least under normal conditions (Panda 2021).   Nonetheless, the Quad’s perception as an anti-China tool has not yet allowed it to gain pan-Asian acceptance. Though ASEAN centrality and outlook is an integral part of the Quad’s “spirit,” an absence of ASEAN-Quad interaction, besides Vietnam participating in the COVID pandemic-related Plus meetings, has fueled speculations of unease (Kwek 2021; Stromseth 2021; White House 2021a). Simultaneously, the introduction of minilaterals like the Australia-United Kingdom (UK)-United States (US) (AUKUS) has put under scrutiny the democratic nature of Indo-Pacific groupings.   Thus, if the Quad has not been welcomed by many Asian states as a core platform for democratic unity, , the search for a befitting and effective democratic partnership, as a way to strengthen the regional security architecture, is urgent and ongoing.   An Alternative: Need for New Plurilateral Democratic Partnerships   At present, since multilateral bodies in Asia and the Indo-Pacific remain non-bound to overtures that categorically and systematically strengthen the liberal international order, the ideation of a new plurilateral body for democratic unity allowing for economic and judicial sanctions can be envisioned.   Such a new RCI institution in the region should, most importantly, be driven by Asian states. Asian middle power democratic countries, with strong and proactive foreign policies, such as Japan, can take a leading role here. India’s current foreign policy approach of non-alliance may limit the leadership role it can take in such a venture. Nevertheless, India remains a critical part of the regional liberal construct and key force in any potential democratic partnership or a grouping . Without India, the power of the proposed institution would not reach its true potential, especially as Delhi has accepted asymmetric and non-reciprocal benefits in dealing with smaller states. Hence, if the RCI is built as an organization with a mandate to work towards maintaining of peace, and not an alliance centric entity, ensuring the role of India can be possible.   Expanding on notions of democratic unity, with ASEAN as a regional anchor, such a new organization can take on a guiding role in the Asia and Indo-Pacific region especially vis-à-vis threats to national security. Mobilizing solidarity with nations in peril will require a collaboration approach to cooperative security; for instance, human rights abuses in Myanmar can be a cause for intervention based on humanitarian grounds. Such interventions, unlike those of the West, do not have to involve sending of troops. Rather, united multilateral sanctions in the economic and military domain can guide the RCI while allowing it to emerge as a strong backbone supporting the reinvigoration of existing bodies, especially underperforming or almost-defunct organizations in South Asia such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) (Ghate 2011). ASEAN can profit from a more assertive RCI that frees it from the perils of changing its own mandate while allowing ASEAN stronger support to implement the rules-based order in the region.   The starting point for the creation of such an RCI would be based on smaller dialogues; its expansion should be left to gradual growth. Even as common values of democracy and adherence to rules-based systems remain core principles of each state-actor, differences in approaches and history adversely affect the development of multilateralism in the region.   Nonetheless, as US President Joe Biden articulated in the 2021 Summit of Democracy, the defense of democracy has emerged as the “defining challenge” of the 21st century (White House 2021b). Hence, even as Asia struggles with regional integration and growing authoritarianism, it is important for leading democratic economies like Japan, India, and South Korea, which are at a crucial juncture vis-à-vis regional and global ambitions, to spearhead an Asian counter against unilateral changes in the region’s status quo (e.g., China’s reunification goals). This will promote an Asian-led democratization process, instill confidence in these middle powers as responsible governance providers, and push forward the multipolar wheels of regional integration.   Mobilizing a Democratic Asia   How democratic Asia can be mobilized to build democratic unity in the Indo-Pacific is the foremost important question. There is no doubt that Asia’s relationship with democracy is exceedingly complex. However, as geopolitical competition in the region takes shape of a democracy-versus-authoritarianism dynamic, it is vital for influential middle power democracies to come together over their shared values and imperatives.   Although support for democracy and democratic values remains high in the Asian populations, there is immense dissatisfaction over trends like elite corruption and inequality, racial and ethnic tensions, and increasingly restricted space for civil society (Ford and Hass, 2021). This has provided greater space for authoritarian states, especially China, to expand its regional footprint and promote its alternative world views. For example, Beijing’s export of its highly autocratic digital surveillance tools and policy playbooks have made it easier for states in the region to make illiberalism more acceptable and restrict space for civil rights and liberties in their own countries (Ford and Hass, 2021). Under such circumstances, the most pressing challenge for regional democracies is to come together and demonstrate the corrective features and positives of democracies and democratic global governance. Regular discussions and exchanges between like-minded democracies through an RCI will be vital in this regard; they can help democratic states guard themselves against the tendency toward complacency and implement appropriate checks and balances to help governments protect against attempts by authoritarian states to exploit their vulnerabilities. Such regular exchanges can form the starting point for democratic states to devise micro and macro political reform that can be immensely consequential for reinforcing global governance driven by democratic values.   Earlier in 2020, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson proposed the formation of a Group of 10 Democracies (or D-10) that better reflects the democratic world of today with the inclusion of Asian states of India, Australia, and South Korea (in addition to the G-7 economies). Although the proposal has all but disintegrated, it brought forth an important idea for the need of a summit of democracies aimed at standing as a stalwart against rising trends of authoritarianism. Such a model can come about in the Indo-Pacific, with forums (or RCIs) established for such a purpose. Importantly, by virtue of being region-centric, and therefore driven by Asian democracies rather than Western ones, such a forum will be able to better represent the Asian voice. The foremost aim of such a forum will be to reinforce the resilience of smaller democratic states so as to ensure autocratic forces do not gain a stronghold in the region.■   References   AIR. 2022. “Quad Is Most Prominent Plurilateral Platform to Address Contemporary Challenges and Opportunities in Indo-Pacific, Says EAM Jaishankar.” https://newsonair.com/2022/08/19/quad-is-most-prominent-plurilateral-platform-to-address-contemporary-challenges-and-opportunities-in-indo-pacific-says-eam-jaishankar/ Amer, Ramses. 1999. “Conflict Management and Constructive Engagement in ASEAN’s Expansion.” Third World Quarterly: 20(5): 1031-48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993610 Blumenthal, Dan. 2022. "Beijing Could Run Russia’s Playbook on Taiwan." Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/18/taiwan-ukraine-beijing-russia-invasion/ Boot, Max. 2015. "Inaction in Ukraine Sets a Dangerous Precedent.” Hoover Institution. https://www.hoover.org/research/inaction-ukraine-sets-dangerous-precedent Choong, William, and Sharon Seah. 2022. “Broadening the Quad’s Appeal in the Indo-Pacific.” East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/06/15/broadening-the-quads-appeal-in-the-indo-pacific/ Dossani, Rafiq. 2022. "Is There a Future for Multilateralism?" RAND. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/04/is-there-a-future-for-multilateralism.html Duggal, Mahima. 2022. Quad 4.0? To Securitize or Not to Securitize, Focus Asia Paper. Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, August 2022. https://www.isdp.eu/publication/quad-4-0-to-securitize-or-not-to-securitize/. Ebbighausen, Rodion. 2017. “The ASEAN Way: Where Is It Leading?” DW, https://www.dw.com/en/the-asean-way-where-is-it-leading/a-39998187 Ford, Lindsey W. and Ryan Hass. 2021. “Democracy in Asia.” Brookings, January 22, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-in-asia/. Ghate, Prabhu. 2011. "The Institutions of Regionalism in South Asia—Do Institutions Matter?" Asian Development Bank. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/rcs-south-asia-2011-2015-oth-01.pdf Kwek, Ivy. 2021. “The Quad’s Uneasy Place in Southeast Asia.” The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/quad-s-uneasy-place-southeast-asia Lucarelli, Sonia. 2022. “Peace and Democracy: The Rediscovered Link – The EU, NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities.” NATO. https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/00-02/lucarelli%27s.pdf. Mudiam, Prithvi Ram. 2012. “Regionalism in Europe and Asia in the Twenty-First Century: A Comparative Appraisal.” World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues. 16(3): 12–21. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48504936 Nairn, Ronald C. 1968. “SEATO: A Critique.” Pacific Affairs. 41(1): 5-18. https://doi.org/10.2307/2754715 Panda, Jagannath. 2021. “The Elusive Quest for an ‘Asian NATO.’” Strategic Analysis 45(1): 57-66. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1867365. Panda, Jagannath. 2022, “How the Quad Can Become More than an Anti-China Grouping.” The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/how-the-quad-can-become-more-than-an-anti-china-grouping-7934017/ Schein, Lisa. 2022. "Russian Aggression in Ukraine Threatens Future of Multilateralism." VOA. https://www.voanews.com/a/russian-aggression-in-ukraine-threatens-future-of-multilateralism/6714976.html Stromseth, Jonathan. 2021. “ASEAN and the Quad: Strategic Impasse or Avenue for Cooperation?” Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/23/asean-and-the-quad-strategic-impasse-or-avenue-for-cooperation/ Time. 2022. "Vladimir Putin Meets Xi Jinping on the Sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit.” https://time.com/6214080/putin-xi-meeting-sco/ White House, The. 2021a. “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: ‘The Spirit of the Quad.’” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/ White House, The. 2021b. "Summit for Democracy Summary of Proceedings.” https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/23/summit-for-democracy-summary-of-proceedings/     ■ Jagannath Panda is the Head of Stockholm Centre for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA) at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden. He is also a Senior Fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies; and Director for Europe-Asia Research Cooperation for the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS), Japan.   ■ This paper was presented as a draft at the Forum 2000 and ADRN joint forum at Prague on 1st September 2022.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Jagannath Panda 2022-10-17Views : 11754
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Elite Polarization in South Korea: Evidence from a Natural Language Processing Model

Introduction   Although South Korea achieved economic development and democracy in a short period of time, Koreans’ evaluation of their own politics has been negative. Koreans are particularly concerned about what they perceive as a growing polarization between liberal and conservative political parties. Indeed, this perception has been verified by previous studies, which have shown that South Korea’s two major political parties are now characterized by high levels of internal ideological homogeneity and have increasingly diverged from one another over time. [1] In this way, the South Korean situation meets the definition of political polarization, which can be defined as loss of the capacity for inter-party dialogue and compromise and the recurrence of hostile confrontations and deadlock. [2]   Since roll call data were released from the second half of the 16th National Assembly, scholars have studied political polarization within the National Assembly using the Nominal Three-Step Estimation (NOMINATE) method. [3] However, this approach only measures the outcome of votes on bills, not how polarization arises and affects the legislative process in detail. We can analyze the polarization between the two camps by analyzing the speeches of political elites in the National Assembly. Politicians imbue message into language and actively utilize it in their political activities to stimulate the imagination and emotions in the service of forming an ideological or conceptual system.   Among the languages of politicians, the subcommittee meeting minutes reflect the active, competitive use of language in the legislative process because these minutes show how politicians from across the political spectrum use language to gain advantages in debates over bills. We can focus primarily on the second subcommittee of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee because it examines the wording of all bills that have been reviewed by other committees. Natural language processing (NLP) model learns the political language of 20-years’ worth of whole subcommittee meeting minutes except for the second subcommittee of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, and it examines the minutes of the second subcommittee of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee from the 17th to 20th National Assembly. In this way, we can quantify changes in political polarization over time.   The classification model of the NLP technique using bidirectional encoder representations from the transformers (BERT) model learns sentences and words belonging to the two classes, and the trained model classifies the target text and measures its accuracy. [4] The logic of text classification is as follows. Text classification refers to the process of receiving a sentence (or word) as input and classifying where the sentence belongs between pre-trained (defined) classes. That is, in advance, by classifying the sentences or words to be learned into binary (conservative vs liberal), the NLP model learns through the learning process (training process), and the target text is input and classified. The degree of this accuracy is the result of measuring the polarization of political language.   Elite Polarization from the 17th Assembly to the 20th Assembly   Figure 1 shows that there is a trend toward increasing political polarization. Although polarization remained relatively steady between 2004 and the early 2010s, and even decreased between 2011 and 2014, it rebounded during the first half of 2014 and has risen sharply and remained high since late 2016. This means that the more polarizing the language used in meeting minutes, the more polarized politics becomes.     . Figure 1. Political polarization, 2004–2020   Figure 2 displays changes in political polarization between 2004 and 2020, by National Assembly. The figure indicates that the average degree of polarization was similar in the 17th (0.4953) and the 18th (0.485) National Assembly. Polarization waxed and waned during the 17th National Assembly; while it rose sharply in April of 2010, and it then trended downward for the rest of the 18th National Assembly. The average degree of polarization during the 19th National Assembly was 0.3265; it rose during April and May of 2014 and then began to decline. Polarization was most severe during the 20th National Assembly, in which the average degree of polarization was 0.7043. The data indicate that polarization rapidly escalated in February and March 2009, April 2010, June 2013, May 2014, and November 2016. Although it usually decreased after these escalations, polarization has remained very high since 2016.   (a) 17th National Assembly (2004–2008) (b) 18th National Assembly (2008–2012) (c) 19th National Assembly (2012–2016) (d) 20th National Assembly (2016–2020) Figure 2. Political polarization, 2004–2020, by National Assembly   From a data-intuitive perspective, the rise and fall may be attributed to the noise in the data. However, remaining high should be interpreted in a different context. This finding implies that polarization is becoming more intense over time rather than returning to normal or exhibiting the wax and wane pattern of previous National Assemblies. Given that this model captures wider political differences beyond particular legislation, this study interprets pre-2016 cycles in polarization as reflecting regular politics and debate. It also considers the high level of post-2016 polarization as a growth of a more enduring set of ideological differences between ruling and opposing parties.   There may be several reasons behind the post-2016 polarization increase, but the impeachment of President Park undeniably looms the largest among them. After President Moon Jae-in was elected following the impeachment, his administration promoted investigations which framed the previous two conservative administrations (Park Geun-hye administration and Lee Myung-bak administration) as corrupt and untrustworthy. These included the creation of a special committee to confiscate the illegitimate proceeds earned by former president Park Geun-hye. The Moon Jae-in administration’s core and public focus on correcting the mistakes and injustices of previous governments formed by the opposition party has had a lingering and polarizing effect on Korean political discourse. Although these policies nominally aimed to restore and improve South Korean democracy, they have instead made Korean politics so polarized that party politics became nearly impossible. There have been no joint efforts between the two parties to create an inclusive, good-faith, post-impeachment regime in the public interest, and this has led to a culture of slander and personal attacks.   Unfortunately, the politicians who made up a large part of the conservative party opposed or denied the impeachment, and ironically disparaged and rejected the democratically constituted Moon Jae-in administration. On the other hand, the faction that led the impeachment regarded the opposition faction only as an object of reform and did not accept it as an object of cooperation, driving parliamentary politics into a hostile confrontation. Following the impeachment, Park’s party – the People’s Power Party – conducted political activities outside of parliament, such as the Taegeukgi street rallies. These rallies turned violent and, in turn, damaged the legislative process and the prospect for effective parliamentary politics. Conflicts between two factions persisted throughout the 20th National Assembly, and the findings above can be interpreted as reflecting the language of conflict in the process of legislation.   Implications   The findings demonstrate that political polarization in South Korea has been fluctuating since the 17th National Assembly. Polarization in South Korean society is not a recent phenomenon; however, as of the second half of 2016, political polarization rose sharply, and has remained high throughout the 20th National Assembly.   Political polarization (elite polarization) presents important implications regarding the role of the legislature. A certain level of tension between political parties according to the ideological position is a natural phenomenon in modern politics and is also necessary for better policy formulation. However, if political polarization is extreme and persists for a long period of time, it would have a negative impact on the society as a whole. Under extreme political polarization, compromise becomes difficult because the polarized political language, or political polarization itself, will nearly eradicate the common ground among options favored by each political faction. As a result, bills closely related to the lives of the citizens bearing little ideological nature (bills for people’s livelihood) may not be properly reviewed, with the possibility of deadlock in the process of legislative deliberation and last-resort negotiation. As a result, the quantity and quality of bills passed may decrease, adversely affecting people’s lives. Indeed, the 20th National Assembly has had the lowest bill passage rate of any National Assembly, at approximately 36%. Furthermore, political polarization could undermine other important functions of the National Assembly, such as confirmation hearings.   Above all, the polarization of elite politics reduces the scope of consensus between the opposing factions , making it difficult to legislate policies that the majority of the society can support. As a result, each political faction maintains a policy geared only toward its supporters, which could divide society as a whole and cause political polarization across society. In a polarized political environment, citizens tend to view their society as characterized by a dichotomy of good and evil and regard others as enemies to overthrow rather than partners for coexistence. Political polarization throughout society will in turn intensify the polarization of elite politics, resulting in a vicious cycle of political polarization.   Can we change the trend of deepening elite polarization in Korean politics and restore the politics of dialogue and compromise? If political leadership plays a role, politics of dialogue and coexistence would be possible. It is more necessary than ever to reform the party system and lead dialogue and communication in order to overcome elite polarization and restore productive politics. As formerly stated, politicians imbue meaning into language and actively utilize it in their political activities to stimulate the imagination and emotions in the service of forming an ideological or conceptual system. Therefore, political polarization can be alleviated through more dialogue between parties. ■       [1] Ka, Sang Joon (가상준). 2014. “한국국회는 양극화되고 있는가?” [Has the Korean National Assembly been polarized?] 의정논총 [Journal of Parliamentary Research] 9 (2): 247–272; Park, Yun-Hee, Min-Su Kim, Won-ho Park, Shin-Goo Kang, and Bon Sang Koo (박윤희 김민수 박원호 강신구 구본상). 2016. “제20대 국회의원선거 당선자 및 후보자의 이념성향과 정책태도” [Ideology and Policy Positions of the Candidates and the Elects in the 20th Korean National Assembly Election]. 의정연구 [Korea Journal of Legislative Studies] 22 (3): 117–158. [2] McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge: MIT Press. [3] Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 29 (2): 357–384; Jeon, Jin-Young (전진영). 2006. “국회의원의 갈등적 투표행태 분석: 제16대 국회 전자표결을 중심으로” [A Study of Members’ Conflictual Voting Behavior in the 16th Korean National Assembly]. 한국정치학회보 [Korean Political Science Review] 40 (1): 47–70.; Lee, Kap-Yun, and Hyeon-Woo Lee (이갑윤 이현우). 2008. “이념투표의 영향력 분석: 이념의 구성, 측정 그리고 의미” [A Study of Influence of Ideological Voting: Scope, Measurement and Meaning of Ideology]. 현대정치연구 [Journal of Contemporary Politics] 1 (1): 137–166.; Lee, Nae Young, and Hojun Lee. 2015. “Party Polarization in the South Korea National Assembly: An Analysis of Roll-Call Votes in the 16–18th National Assembly.” Journal of Parliamentary Research 10 (2): 25–54.; [4] Devlin, Jacob, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee, and Kristina Toutanova. 2019. “BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding.” Proceedings of the NAACL-HLT 2019, June 2–7, 2019, Minneapolis, Minnesota.     ■ Seungwoo Han is a Adjunct Lecturer at the Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey and a Consultant at the Social Protection & Jobs Global Practice World Bank.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]

Seungwoo Han 2022-10-12Views : 13905
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] State of Minority Rights in Asia: Trends from India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Mongolia and Thailand

True measure of a democracy is how it treats its minorities. It is democratic system alone that retains the “self-correcting” and “self-improving” mechanism to ensure minority communities enjoy equal freedom and opportunities. Minorities make critical contributions to the richness and diversity of society, and that states which take appropriate measures to recognize and promote minority rights are more likely to remain tolerant and stable. [1] Given this, nearly all democratic nations have either codified certain basic rights or have ensured some protection mechanisms for the minorities in their constitutions or national legislations. Many follow the rules and conventions established under the United Nations and other intergovernmental institutions. While this may be the case, the rights and privileges of minorities are rarely honoured in practice even in many established democracies. While there have been visible progress in the status of minority groups since the 1960s largely due to global civil liberties movements, support lend by scores of international human rights organisations, civil society organisations, courts and alert media, over last decade there have been a growing trend of attacks on minorities, open assault on their constitutional and legal rights. Growing polarization and majoritarianism in many countries including some of the most diverse democracies not only depriving minorities their basic constitutional and human rights, they are also creating perpetual divides in the social spheres. In short, nearly every major region of the world is witnessing alarming erosion in the status of minorities.   Given its growing importance to the future and stability of democracy, Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) undertook five country case studies (India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand and Mongolia) from Asia to understand the dynamics and key trends with regards to the status of minorities. The case studies explored major questions: How has this evolved during the years (e.g., from discrimination to legislation)? What are the constitutional, legal and administrative mechanisms for protection of minorities and their rights in your country? What are the key challenges in protecting minorities in your country? What should be done to ensure the protection of minority rights?   Legal and constitutional provisions to protect minorities   A necessary precondition to ensure the rights of minorities is having certain basic legal and constitutional provisions. Of course, this varies from country to country. For instance, the Indian constitution provides a long list of provisions in the forms of fundamental rights, institutional commitments both from the executive and judicial branches to enable minorities and disadvantaged populations enjoy equal rights and opportunities. [2] While Article 25 of the constitution provides the right to “freely profess, practice and propagate religion, Article 29 ensures cultural and educational rights of minority groups. Similarly, Bangladesh has several crucial provisions in the constitution and administrative spheres to ensure the protection of minority groups particularly the religious minorities. For example, Article 41 of the constitution ensures the rights of religious minorities by allowing them the right to practice and promote religious beliefs. Further provisions of Article 41guarantees each individual’s right to refuse to practice a religion, or to be compelled to be educated in a religion other than their own. [3]   Nepal and Mongolia have much weaker provisions to ensure adequate protection for minority groups. While the Nepalese constitution under its fundamental rights allows minorities educational and cultural freedoms, the amended Civil Service Act 2049 (1993 AD) in 2007 offers affirmative action (reservation policy) to ensure proportional representation of minorities particularly Dalit (oppressed from the Hindu religion), indigenous communities, women among others. [4] In Mongolia, the rights of ethnic minorities are guaranteed under the Constitution of Mongolia (1992) which states “no person may be discriminated on the basis of ethnic origin, language, race, age, sex, social origin or status, poverty, occupation or post, religion, opinion, or education”. Similarly, the 1992 constitution allows ethnic minorities to practice their own culture and use their own language, guaranteeing “the right of national minorities of other tongues to use their native languages in education and communication and in the pursuit of cultural, artistic, and scientific activities”. [5] Mongolia however does not have any specially recognized constitutional provisions or legislations safeguarding the rights of religious minorities or indigenous communities.   Other than the constitutional and legal provisions, the countries in focus have numerous state policies and institutional forms to deal with the rights and privileges of minorities. India for instance has most elaborate list of welfare provisions, central and state schemes in the forms of scholarships, free coaching, loans, skills program, state subsidies for minority run institutions for the welfare of minorities. In addition, India has established a statutory body called Minority Commission both at the federal and state levels to safeguard the rights of minorities. Bangladesh and Nepal too have put in place state-led schemes and provisions and administrative and statutory mechanisms (i.e. Human Right Commission) at multiple levels to strengthen the opportunities for minorities and disadvantage groups. The current Bangladesh government has been making efforts to recruit more and more minorities into government departments apart from state-wide initiatives to make majority community aware and sensitive about other religions. A noteworthy feature of Bangladesh’s approach to minority rights is the proactive role played by vibrant civil society organizations. Whereas, Mongolia has been allocating state resources for the educational progress of minority groups, although it does not have any specialized programmes targeting these sections.   Progress in Minority Rights: A Mixed Bag   While there are impressive list of constitutional, legal and state-led provisions to protect minority rights in all the countries under study, the implementation records are patchy and uninspiring. This is very much evident from the educational, socio-economic and political positions of minority communities in these countries. The most striking examples can be found in the cases of India and Bangladesh. While the minority Muslims constitute more than 14 percent of population (more than 210 millions), their representation in the elite civil services, particularly the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service, was a mere 3 percent and 4 percent, respectively. Further, Muslims are precariously positioned on most key socio-economic and educational indicators compared to other religious groups such as Hindus, Christians and Sikhs. Even the historically oppressed Scheduled Castes (belonging to the Hindu religion) have moved up on several crucial indicators compared to India’s Muslims. Much worse is Muslim political representation, which has seen a sharp decline in recent years, particularly with the rise of right-wing, pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party. However, the plights of Muslims and other religious minorities such as Christians are far more severe in matter of religious freedom. With right-wing forces in power, the country is alive to daily hatreds, discrimination, attacks and vilification of minority groups particularly Muslims by the fringe groups associated with the ruling dispensation. This has warranted the UNHRC chief to call for cessation of attacks against minorities in the country. [6]   Like India, Bangladesh too has significantly failed to protect the religious and ethnic minorities particularly Hindus who continue to face increasing attacks (religious festivals in particular) and discrimination under a political regime that strongly advocates secular politics. Not only are religious and ethnic minorities comprising of 10 percent of total populations rank lower than the national average in every indicator of human development, they face severe social, economic and political discrimination, increasingly losing their ancestral land to Bengali settlers or to land grabbing by vested groups with close links with establishment or political parties in power. What has worsened the conditions and safety of minorities is rising religious extremism especially the Jamaat-e-Islam and majoritarian mobs which have unleashed brutal attacks on Hindu minority, on their religious places, festivals and properties despite state committing to their protection.   In the case of Nepal, the oppressed Dalit community are at the receiving end of upper caste politics and institutionalized discrimination and state neglect. While Dalits are near about 14 percent of population and reservation policy in place for many years, only 2 percent of them find themselves in elite civil service. They are grossly underrepresented in Federal Cabinet, House of representatives and provincial parliaments. Neither do they find adequate representation in local bodies in the positions of mayors and district heads.   As far as Mongolia is concerned, it neither has any positive news regarding ethnic and religious minorities and their participation in key spheres of state. Compared to majority Khalkas (84.5%), ethnic minorities such as Kazakhs (around 100,000 or 4%), Tuvas (around 70,000) and Tsaatans (roughly 1300 population) are placed at the bottom of human development pyramid. What is more concerning is minorities are struggling to preserve their language, culture, customs and religion in a society and polity that is overwhelmingly dominated by the majority Khalkas. While Mongolia is not witnessing serious erosion of minority rights in terms of religious or ethnic attacks from majority community or any state sponsored discrimination, minority groups suffer from state apathy and low penetration of institutions and initiatives.   To cut the long story short, a combination of poor allocation of state resources, weak state capacity, lack of political will, democratic politics which thrives in anti-minoritism and majoritarian impulses, and importantly apathy of independent institutions have all contributed to precarious situation with regards to minority rights in the above mentioned countries. This trend is further accentuated due to lack of coherent and sustained pressure from the global human rights bodies and inter-governmental organizations.   A Ray of Hope from Thailand   Amidst bleak scenario with regards to minority rights and their future, Thailand offers some positive hope. The case study of the LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer) community in Thailand by Jirayudh Sinthuphan and Thanchanok Ruendhawil illustrating their long struggle to find legal and constitutional right to marriage offers lot of hope for other societies in Asia and elsewhere. Although homosexuality and transgenderism have had a long presence in Thai society where lesbian, gay, bisexual transgender individuals enjoyed relatively higher freedom to express their identities and lead normal life than their compatriots elsewhere in Asia, they still face institutionalized discrimination, particularly the right to marriage. With the formation of Thai LGBTQ community in 2012, a visible progress has been made in terms of advocacy and constitutional recognition of their rights. After a decade long struggle and persistent advocacy, on 15 June 2022, both the Civil Partnership Bill, proposed by the government, and the Marriage Equality Bill ,proposed by the opposition party, passed the first reading by the parliament along with another draft of the Civil Partnership Bill proposed by the Democrat Party and the cabinet initiated Civil and Commercial Code reform. While this is a big step forward on marriage equality for LGBTQ, there are still many bottlenecks (i.e. surrogacy law, conservative heterosexual majoritarianism) to its actual realization. While this would require further struggle, a lot has been achieved as far as inclusion and equal rights are concerned for these vulnerable minorities.   Conclusion   A quick snapshot of five country case studies clearly illustrate significant erosion of the rights of minority communities. While there are major variances, many key parameters of violation of the rights, failures to enforce codified rights and privileges and majoritarian politics thriving on anti-minoritism and identity politics are common threads that run across most of these states. A combination of weak institutional capacity, thin spread of resources, and apathy or inefficiency of constitutional independent institutions such as judiciary have made constitutional and legal rights and privileges guaranteed to minorities remain on paper only. While civil society, media, and human rights organisations offer some resistance to this trend, they are no match to the sweeping majoritarianism and politics of polarization which thrive on anti-minoritism and exclusion. ■   Reference   Anam, Shaheen 2022. “Protection of Minority Rights in Bangladesh requires stronger commitment”, ADRN Working Paper. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/en/pub/view.asp?intSeq=21328&board=eng_workingpaper&keyword_option=&keyword=&more= Pariyar, Pradip, 2022. ‘The Protection of Dalit Rights in Nepal: Status and Way Forward, ADRN Working Paper. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/en/pub/view.asp?intSeq=21316&board=eng_workingpaper Sahoo, Niranjan, 2022. The Majoritarian Challenge to Minority Rights in India: Case of Muslims, ADRN working paper. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/en/pub/view.asp?intSeq=21355&board=eng_workingpaper&keyword_option=&keyword=&more= Sinthuphan, Jirayudh and Reundhawil ,Thanchanok, 2022. “Fighting for Love: A Battle for Equal Marriage Rights in Thailand”, ADRN Working Paper. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/en/project/view.asp?intSeq=21314&board=eng_workingpaper Tuya, Ukhnaa and Ganbat, Damba, 2022. “Protection of Minority Rights in Mongolia”, ADRN Working Paper. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=5&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Multimedia&code=&at=view&idx=257 United Nations Human Rights Commissioner, 2012. “Promoting and Protecting Minority Rights: A Guide for Minority Rights Advocates”. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/HR-PUB-12-07_en.pdf Aljazeera, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/7/un-rights-chief-warns-against-harassment-of-muslims-in-india     [1] United Nations Human Rights Commissioner, “Promoting and Protecting Minority Rights: A Guide for Minority Rights Advocates”, 2012. [2] See Niranjan Sahoo, 2022. The Majoritarian Challenge to Minority Rights in India: Case of Muslims, ADRN working paper. [3] Shaheen Anam, 2022. “Protection of Minority Rights in Bangladesh requires stronger commitment”, ADRN Working Paper. [4] Pradip Pariyar, 2022. ‘The Protection of Dalit Rights in Nepal: Status and Way Forward, ADRN Working Paper. [5] Ukhnaa Tuya and Damba Ganbat, 2022. “Protection of Minority Rights in Mongolia”, ADRN Working Paper. [6] Aljazeera, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/7/un-rights-chief-warns-against-harassment-of-muslims-in-india. [7] Jirayudh Sinthuphan and Thanchanok Reundhawil, 2022. “Fighting for Love: A Battle for Equal Marriage Rights in Thailand”, ADRN Working Paper.     ■ Niranjan Sahoo is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department/Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Niranjan Sahoo 2022-09-20Views : 19959
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Direct Democracy: Changing Contexts and Trends in Asia

Introduction   Direct democracy includes people’s initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites where citizens vote on specific policies instead of electing candidates. Some scholars limit the scope of direct democracy to mechanisms where secret balloting is conducted. [1] However, others acknowledge citizen assemblies and public participation in government planning and budgeting as equally important forms of direct democracy. [2][3][4]    In a new set of studies conducted under the Asia Democracy Research Network, the broader view of direct democracy—one that encompasses both referendums, recall votes for elected officials, and citizen participation in the budget process—was used to examine the nature and characteristics of direct democracy in seven Asian nations. Each country study explored existing direct democracy mechanisms and the contexts that shaped their emergence. The key mechanisms identified in the studies were referendums, recall of public officials, and people’s initiatives. The various authors examined the claims for or against these mechanisms, and identified the actors, demographics, and levels of government involved in their implementation. They also explored the effectiveness of direct democracy mechanisms in fostering reform and improving the overall quality of democracy. Finally, they provided overviews of the new trends, including the use of digital technology, that are emerging in the exercise of direct democracy.   Referendums, Recalls, and Petitions   The evolution of direct democracy in Asia can be better understood by looking at the underlying historical context. For instance, the rise of vote-based direct democratic mechanisms can be linked to the international surge of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s. [5] The Philippines provides an interesting case of instituting direct democracy mechanisms after the removal of an authoritarian government in 1986, as I discuss in my own paper, “Direct Democracy in the Philippines.” [6] In the Philippines, a new Constitution providing the framework for democratic governance was passed in 1987. Among its key provisions was the people’s initiative, which is one of the modes for amending the Constitution. A people’s initiative requires a petition of at least twelve percent of the total voters registered under the Commission on Elections, among which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent of that district’s registered voters.   The Philippine Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989 is an enabling act allowing voters to directly initiate the passage of new laws and to call for national and local referendums. The 2019 plebiscite on Bangsamoro autonomy and the 2021 referendum on the partition of the Palawan province are two recent examples of Philippine direct democracy. These exercises were undertaken to obtain consent from local residents to create a new region, in the case of the Bangsamoro plebiscite, and to get the people’s approval to divide a province, in the case of the Palawan referendum.   The people’s initiative is a mechanism that allows voters to petition the Philippine government to place new policy proposals on the ballot. One such example is the 2014 People's Initiative Against Pork Barrel (PIAP). In a 2013 political scandal, legislators and officials from national agencies were implicated in the misuse of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), a lump-sum discretionary fund allocated to each member of Congress to make spending decisions on priority government projects. The alleged corruption triggered the One Million People’s March and other protest actions. Under the 2014 PIAP's proposed Pork Barrel Abolition Act, all budgets submitted to Congress would contain only itemized appropriations, except funds for relief and rescue operations during disasters and funds for intelligence work and security. However, this citizen-led initiative did not succeed, as it failed to collect the required number of signatures from voters.   In Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Arithat Bunthueng’s paper, “Direct Democracy in Thailand,” they discuss how the referendum has been used in Thailand to get the people’s approval on changes to the Constitution, including those made in 2007 and the most recent revisions drafted in 2016. [7] Issues surrounding the Constitution were not fully discussed prior to the 2016 referendum, as the military government curtailed debates and stifled any form of opposition against the proposed charter. When the referendum was held, 61 percent of voters chose to ratify the new Constitution. Under the new constitution, which was officially promulgated in 2017, the prime minister does not need to be an elected member of the House, and would be chosen by the full Parliament, including the 250 members of the Senate who are appointed by the military. That said, the current constitution also provides for a system of people’s initiatives to recommend legislation and recall elected officials. Under this institutional arrangement, at least 10,000 signatures are needed to petition the House of Representatives to deliberate on proposed policies, as well as to propose local ordinances or to remove local officials. On the other hand, no less than 50,000 voter signatures are necessary to propose amendments to the Constitution.   Referendums have become a political mechanism and no longer reflect the will of the public in Thailand. There is no way to guarantee that a referendum initiated by the people is held. Though people’s initiatives have increased in popularity, few bills pass through Parliament and become law, since any budget-related bills must be endorsed by the Prime Minister. The recall mechanism is frequently used, but as a political tool to foster authoritarian control rather than to promote democracy, or as a way for the legislature to remove people from political office in the aftermath of a coup d’état. The first such instance was the recall of a member of the Human Rights Commission by a resolution of the newly formed National Legislative Assembly following the military coup in 2006. Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was also recalled by the National Legislative Assembly, which was established after the 2014 coup.   In the paper “Examining Direct Democracy in Indonesia,” Devi Darmawan and Sri Nuryanti explain that the referendum was authorized as a means of amending the 1945 Constitution under Law Number 5/1985. [8] However, this rule is no longer valid, having been revoked in 1999. A notable example of a referendum being conducted in Indonesia was when the residents of East Timor, which was annexed by Indonesia under the Soeharto presidency during the New Order period, were asked whether they wanted to remain a province of Indonesia or become an independent state. The referendum was held following a United Nations (UN) resolution calling for the right to self-determination of the East Timorese people. The economic crisis and political reforms in Indonesia facilitated the government's decision to hold the May 1998 referendum under UN supervision.   In the Verité Research paper, “Promoting Democracy through Direct Public Engagement: The Sri Lankan Experience,” the authors discuss the origins of Sri Lanka’s Westminster parliamentary structure, which was introduced in 1944. [9] The institutions established under this structure were governed by Commonwealth parliamentary traditions, in addition to the constitution that was in effect at the time. Through these traditions, citizens can directly engage in government through instruments including Private Member Bills, Public Petitions, and Parliamentary Questions. However, there are challenges to accessing and being able to meaningfully use these mechanisms. In Sri Lanka, a referendum enables people to directly vote to approve or reject a law or proposal. Articles 85 and 86 of the Constitution empower the President to ask the people to provide consent on any bill through a referendum. However, there has been only one referendum in the country, held in December 1982 when President J.R. Jayawardena proposed extending the term of the existing Parliament for six years without conducting elections. The referendum passed with 54.6 percent of voters approving the proposal, thereby extending the term of the current Parliament for a further six years, through 1989.   In “Direct Democracy’s History and Trends in Mongolia,” Tamir Chultemsuren explains that Article 24 of the 1992 Constitution of Mongolia contains the provision on people’s referendums, while the 1995 Law on People’s Referendums specifies that the authority to initiate a national referendum belongs to the President and the Parliament (though approval by one third of its members). [10] The law has several drawbacks, including the restrictions on citizens’ rights to initiate a referendum. It lacks clarity on the preconditions for holding a referendum, and imposes limits on successive referendums, since the cost of organizing a referendum is equivalent to that of a general election. Since the law’s enactment, not a single referendum has been held in the country. In 2016, the Law on People’s Referendums was amended to make it consistent with the Law on General Elections, which incorporated automated election tools into election procedures.   In Malaysia, though there are no legal mechanisms for holding referendums and filing petitions to recall public officials, direct democracy is carried out through non-institutional means. In his paper, “Malaysia’s Ongoing Tussle with Democracy,” Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim describes how citizen initiatives have been launched through online platforms. For example, a petition called #LetakJawatanTajuddin (‘#TajuddinResign’) was started on change.org following a Light Rail Transit (LRT) collision in 2021. [11] The move sought to remove Dato' Sri Tajuddin Abdul Rahman as Chairman of Prasarana, the public transport company operating the LRT. The petition garnered over 100,000 signatures. Although the government did not formally respond to the petition, Dato' Sri Tajuddin was terminated from the position two days after the train crash.   Participatory Planning and Budgeting   Aside from referendums, recall of public officials, and people’s initiatives on policy reform, citizen participation in planning and budgeting, especially at the sub-national level, has become an important feature of direct democracy in Asia. In his paper, “Can Online Citizen Participation Strengthen Direct, Deliberative and Participatory Democracy in India?”, Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay highlights how the emergence of local governance institutions in the early 1990s created significant spaces for public participation in decision-making related to local development. [11] The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, enacted in 1992, made provisions for Gram Sabha (assemblies of all the eligible voters within the territories of Gram Panchayats) and Ward Committees (committees of elected or nominated members in municipal wards with a population of more than 300,000). The acts detailed the functions of Gram Sabha and Ward Committees, respectively, including participation in planning and monitoring of all local development work. Despite being the only institutionalized space for direct participation, however, the experience of implementing Gram Sabha has been mixed. The efficacy of Ward Committees has been even more disappointing, as most state governments and municipalities have not formed or activated these committees.   In the absence of an institutionalized space for public participation in policy planning and monitoring, several civil society organizations and citizen associations have used social accountability and promoted public participation by engaging in participatory data gathering and analysis, sharing findings with public authorities and the media, and negotiating with public institutions responsible for the implementation of programs and policies. Tools used have included Citizen Report Cards, Community Score Cards, and Social Audits. Such initiatives have helped citizens amplify their voices, but fall short of institutionalization and still struggle to scale up public participation. In cases where Social Audits have been institutionalized, for example in the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), implementation has fallen far short of expectations due to the lackadaisical attitude of public institutions and insufficient capacity of local governments.   In the past two decades, Philippine civil society organizations (CSOs) have become critical players in ensuring the integrity of public service delivery. Formal and informal spaces for citizen participation are now available for issues related to public financial management. With the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Philippines developed a decentralized system of government, which incorporated concepts like devolution, funding of local government units (LGUs), and citizen participation. Local development councils in every province, city, municipality, and barangay determine the use of the local development fund, which represents 20 percent of the Internal Revenue Allotment from the national government. As mandated by the law, a quarter of the seats in these councils and other local special bodies (LSBs) are occupied by CSO representatives.   In certain LGUs in the Philippines, such as Naga City, Quezon City, Cagayan de Oro City, and Dumaguete City, the passage of local ordinances led to the creation of People’s Councils, which appoint CSO representatives to LSBs of the city government. In these LGUs, the representation of CSOs in the LSBs usually surpasses the 25 percent minimum requirement under the Local Government Code. The CSO representatives can observe, vote, and participate in the deliberation, prioritization, implementation, and evaluation of city government projects, activities, and programs. They can propose legislation, participate, and vote at the committee level of the elected city legislative council, and act as the people's representatives in the exercise of their right to information on matters of public concern, allowing them access to official records and documents. However, these practices are not standard across the Philippines; CSO participation in many LGUs is nominal and pursued only as a matter of compliance. For participatory planning and budgeting to work well, the Philippines needs to enhance CSO participation in local planning and budgeting through capacity building measures and the development of partnerships with knowledge institutions that will help in data analysis and policy research.   In the case of Thailand, participatory budgeting was first discussed in the Thai National Economic and Social Development Plan for 2008–2012. Section 2 of the Ministry of the Interior’s participatory planning and budgeting strategy emphasized the importance of strengthening local communities through the people's budget. At the sub-national level, there are local governments implementing participatory budgeting, such as the Amnat Charoen Provincial Administrative Organization, the Yala Municipality, the Yala Province, the Ko Kha Subdistrict Municipality, and the Lampang Province.   In Indonesia, various non-government organizations provide technical assistance and training at the local level (province, municipality, or village) on planning and budgeting issues. This became especially significant as the national goverment implemented Village Law No. 6/2014 to accelerate poverty alleviation in the country. The Indonesian government allocates funds to all villages in Indonesia through this program, which has been in effect since 2015. Under the law, villages have the authority to manage their own resources for development purposes. This program has had concrete results, such as the construction of various basic infrastructural amenities in many villages. However, the number of cases of misuse of village funds by village heads shows that there are still serious governance problems relating to program implementation and accountability. In many cases, problems resulted from the ineffective participation of local residents in program implementation.   In Malaysia, there is an increasing presence of CSOs at government-hosted stakeholder engagement events. Such consultations, either through high-level face-to-face meetings or town hall dialogues, have become more widespread in recent years as the government acknowledges the importance of citizen participation in both nation-building and policymaking. Furthermore, government officials can no longer afford to discount strategic partners or casually dismiss their demands, as doing so would severely hurt their reputation and, consequently, their electability, particularly in city-centric and ethnically mixed seats.   Digital Technology and Online Engagement   The use of digital technology and online engagement platforms as direct democratic mechanisms has garnered significant attention in Asia. In India, several governmental initiatives have tried to leverage technology to consult the public when planning and monitoring policies. For example, Mobile Vaani is a mobile voice media platform created by Gram Vaani. It has a unique model enabling people to call a designated number from their basic analog mobile phone and register their complaints/ grievances in their local dialect. The Gram Vaani team monitors the platform and publishes relevant inputs from the people. People can also listen to other people’s recordings, enabling two-way communication. Hence, the platform serves to disseminate information on various issues, including health, education, etc., field the concerns of the people, and communicate these concerns with relevant authorities.   Another example of digital support for direct democracy in India is Jandarpan, an initiative of the Samarthan Centre for Development Support, which has been working to enable participatory governance in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh since 1995. The Jandarpan platform was developed during the pandemic to facilitate migrant workers’ access to benefits from public programs. Jandarpan supported migrants who were stuck without any resources during the lockdown. Returning migrants faced multiple challenges in accessing services and entitlements, such as rations, pensions, or livelihoods, from the state government. Toll-free helpline numbers for migrant workers were not always functional. Samarthan decided to develop the interface to streamline communication between citizens and their local administration. In the beginning, they had limited program integration, incorporating only ration access (under the Public Distribution System) and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), but they expanded the platform over time. The primary function of the platform is to redress the grievances of citizens who are not receiving the benefits to which they are entitled. The platform mediates between the government and citizens, providing support to citizens in filing their complaints online to help overcome the digital access and literacy gap. The platform also allows administrators to see emerging trends in citizen complaints, which can influence policy planning and implementation.   In Malaysia, the role of social media has evolved to fill the gap in political literacy. Since the twelfth general election of Malaysia (2008), social media has taken center stage. Whenever elections are coming up, infographics begin to pop up all over platforms like Twitter and Facebook on topics ranging from how to register to vote to the proper way to cast a ballot. Social media has also helped to boost movements like Wednesday Vote (Undi Rabu) and Let’s Go Home to Vote (Jom Pulang Undi), which were devised by netizens and CSOs to encourage Malaysian citizens to get out and vote. Many first-time voters gained basic knowledge regarding the state of national politics, voting, and voters’ rights from these platforms. However, this type of discourse does not permeate all social media platforms, and is primarily found on Twitter and Instagram, which are dominated by the “woke” left-wing population. Meanwhile, Facebook and WhatsApp, which are dominated by political fundamentalists, are often used to spread right-wing, race-based propaganda, rather than providing educational material on the fundamentals of voting and the importance of each vote, regardless of candidate.   In Thailand, social media and websites like www.change.org have become tools to send signals to the government, especially on important national issues. Citizens and NGOs in Indonesia also use digital technology to access information and ensure accountability in cooperation with open government partnership programs. In Mongolia, the E-Governance program introduced 25 types of e-services. Since 2013, a call center known as “11-11” has provided a platform for citizens to provide their feedback. The service was expanded in 2019 to become the Government Public Communication Center, which receives feedback and provides referrals to relevant government agencies.   The deployment of civic technology in the Philippines helps to enhance citizen participation in monitoring public service delivery. For example, Development LIVE (or DevLIVE) is a mobile application developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that has been adopted by the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) as an online platform for collecting citizen feedback on the quality of local infrastructure projects under the Assistance to Disadvantaged Municipalities (ADM) and Assistance to Municipalities (AM) Programs. Through DevLIVE, citizens can monitor and submit observations on specific DILG projects. The feedback structure is pre-programmed, tracking variables related to citizen satisfaction with project visibility, functionality, quality, accessibility, timeliness, relevance, and maintenance. [13]   Conclusion   Key direct democracy mechanisms, such as referendums, recall of public officials, and people’s initiatives, are formally entrenched in the legal systems of the majority of Asian countries examined in the studies conducted by this ADRN research group. However, these mechanisms have not been widely applied in practice. Many initiatives at the national level have faltered, though a few cases of successful implementation were seen at the sub-national level. While the principle of democratic governance is extolled in the Constitutional provisions authorizing these direct democratic mechanisms, there are still significant challenges to ensuring that referendums, recall of public officials, and petitions are actually effectively used to promote democracy.   There are encouraging trends among the studies, such as the emergence of formal and informal governance avenues for integrating citizen participation in local planning and budgeting, as well as the utilization of digital platforms to foster social accountability. However, there is still a need to enhance the quality of citizen engagement, as direct democratic mechanisms currently tend to yield less than meaningful results due to the token nature of civil society participation. There is a tendency for officials elected under the dominant representative democratic system to look down on the mandate of non-elected stakeholders in the policymaking process. This dilutes the effectiveness of direct democracy, which is supposed to amplify the voices of those excluded in candidate-focused voting processes. As such, moving forward, it will be important to consider the role of both representative democratic and direct democratic mechanisms in efforts to foster values, institutional frameworks, and practices that genuinely support democracy in Asian countries. ■   References   Altman, David, and Clemente T. Sánchez. 2021. "Citizens at the Polls Direct Democracy in the World, 2020." Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 17 (2). http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/publication/journal/027-048_David_Altman.pdf.   Bandyopadhyay, Kaustuv Kanti. 2022. “Can Online Public Participation Strengthen Direct, Deliberative, and Participatory Democracy in India?” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=25.   Bureekul, Thawilwadee, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Arithat Buntheung. 2022. “Direct Democracy in Thailand.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=252.   Cabannes, Yves. 2015. "The impact of participatory budgeting on basic services: municipal practices and evidence from the field." Environment and Urbanization, 27(1), 257-284. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247815572297.   Chultemsuren, Tamir. 2022. “Direct Democracy’s History and Trends in Mongolia.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=263.   Darmawan, Devi, and Sri Nuryanti. 2022. “Examining Direct Democracy in Indonesia.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=2&sn=s1&st=&acode=Reports&code=001001&at=view&idx=250.   Guce-Medina, Czarina. 2019. “Development LIVE (DevLIVE): Toward a Citizen Participation-Focused Civic Technology for Local Governance in the Philippines.” Department of Interior and Local Government and United Nations Development Programme. https://www.academia.edu/41055066/Development_LIVE_DevLIVE_Toward_a_Citizen_Participation_Focused_Civic_Technology_for_Local_Governance_in_the_Philippines.   Halim, Halmie Azrie Abdul. 2022. “Malaysia’s Ongoing Tussle With Democracy.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=253.   Kersting, Norbert, and Max Grömping. 2022. “Direct democracy integrity and the 2017 constitutional referendum in Turkey: a new research instrument.” European Political Science 21, 2: 216-236. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-020-00309-3.   Magno, Francisco A. 2022. “Direct Democracy in the Philippines.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=261.   Marquetti, Adalmir, Carlos E. Schonerwald da Silva, and Al Campbell. 2012. "Participatory economic democracy in action: Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, 1989–2004." Review of Radical Political Economics, 44(1), 62-81. https://doi.org/10.1177/0486613411418055.   Rubin, Marilyn Marks, and Carol Ebdon. 2020. "Participatory budgeting: direct democracy in action." Chinese Public Administration Review, 11(1), 1-5. https://doi.org/10.22140/cpar.v11i1.246.   Verité Research Legal Research Team. 2022. “Promoting Democracy through Direct Public Engagement: The Sri Lankan Experience.” Asia Democracy Research Network. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&sp=%26sp%5B%5D%3D1%26sp%5B%5D%3D2%26sp%5B%5D%3D3&pn=1&st=&acode=Reports&code=&at=view&idx=264.     [1] David Altman and Clemente T. Sánchez. 2021. "Citizens at the Polls Direct Democracy in the World, 2020." Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 17(2). [2] Adalmir Marquetti, Carlos E. Schonerwald da Silva, and Al Campbell. 2012. "Participatory economic democracy in action: Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, 1989–2004." Review of Radical Political Economics, 44(1), 62-81. [3] Yves Cabannes. 2015. "The impact of participatory budgeting on basic services: municipal practices and evidence from the field." Environment and Urbanization, 27(1), 257-284. [4] Marilyn Marks Rubin and Carol Ebdon. 2020. "Participatory budgeting: direct democracy in action." Chinese Public Administration Review, 11(1), 1-5. [5] Norbert Kersting and Max Grömping. 2022. “Direct democracy integrity and the 2017 constitutional referendum in Turkey: a new research instrument.” European Political Science, 21(2), 216-236. [6] Francisco A. Magno. 2022. “Direct Democracy in the Philippines.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [7] Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Arithat Buntheung. 2022. “Direct Democracy in Thailand.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [8] Devi Darmawan and Sri Nuryanti. 2022. “Examining Direct Democracy in Indonesia.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [9] Verité Research Legal Research Team. 2022. “Promoting Democracy through Direct Public Engagement: The Sri Lankan Experience.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [10] Tamir Chultemsuren. 2022. “Direct Democracy’s History and Trends in Mongolia.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [11] Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim. 2022. “Malaysia’s Ongoing Tussle With Democracy.” Asia Democracy Research Network. [12] Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay. 2022. “Can Online Public Participation Strengthen Direct, Deliberative, and Participatory Democracy in India?” Asia Democracy Research Network.     ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Francisco A. Magno 2022-08-18Views : 19733
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Responding to the Looming Food Crisis and Managing Political Stability in Indonesia

Introduction   A new wave of food insecurity is predicted to hit many countries, including Indonesia. This looming food crisis can be attributed not only to the war in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic, which have disrupted the global food supply chain, but also to other conflicts, natural disasters, climate change, and unsustainable agricultural practices that have threatened the global food system for some time. The global food price index began to rise in September 2020, peaking in March 2022 (Food and Agricultural Organization, 2022). As of July 2022, the index was still about 40 percent higher than the 2014-2016 average.   When food prices soar, like during the global food crisis of 2007-2008, there is immense domestic political pressure for food-exporting countries to ban the export of agricultural and food commodities. Although export bans do not necessarily lower prices, as evidenced by Indonesia’s recent palm oil export ban (Wihardja and Patunru, 2022), they usually have adverse repercussions in other parts of the food system, such as raising global prices, especially if the ban is imposed by a major producer and exporter of the food commodity, causing farmers’ incomes to plummet, and disincentivizing future planting and harvesting.   At the same time, the World Trade Organization (WTO), which governs the international trade system, has tools to limit protectionism around imports, but lacks effective mechanisms limiting governments’ ability to ban exports (Barret, 2022). Given that since export bans can amplify panic and engender full-blown crises, this has created an unnecessary and dangerous loophole in the global food system. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, food is increasingly being used as a diplomatic weapon (Schiffling and Kanellos, 2022). As of late May, 10 percent of world calories were under export restriction by at least 23 countries, including Indonesia.   The war in Ukraine has also caused energy prices to soar, particularly oil and gas. Gas is the raw material used to produce urea fertilizer, a key input for the food production system. Similarly, oil is a key input for the global logistics and trade system. After the war in Ukraine broke out in February 2022, the threat of a global food crisis has become apparent, in part because of the skyrocketing input costs of food crop production.   Examples from other countries show that increasing food prices combined with a weak social protection system led to an increased risk of political instability. For example, the global food crisis of 2007-2008 triggered domestic political unrest and civil wars in about four dozen countries, including Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen (Barret, 2022). Fortunately, the impact of the global food crisis on the Indonesian economy was not quite as significant, as the rice production remained normal due to favorable weather. Management of rice stock and price stabilization policies were quite effective, so there was not a significant price surge during the crisis. In part because food prices had remained relatively stable under his leadership, President Yudhoyono was reelected for a second term in the General Election of 2009.   Indonesia’s food prices are already high to begin with in comparison with its neighbors in the region. Between 2012 and 2020, rice prices in Indonesia were, on average, more than double those in Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand, and about 25 percent higher than those in the Philippines (World Bank, 2020a). Moreover, there are weaknesses and gaps in Indonesia’s social protection system (World Bank, 2020b). For example, the current system is unable to update the social registry used for targeting social assistance programs (DTKS) with newly impoverished households (households that fall into poverty as a result of sudden-onset shocks, such as COVID-19 or natural disasters) because the on-demand window/application, which allows households to self-register for assistance, is limited. Social assistance coverage is also biased in favor of poor households with children and against the elderly and disabled.   Amidst the ongoing fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, the high inflation rate, which has doubled between March and June of this year, will test whether the Jokowi administration can manage high inflation, especially on food, and maintain political stability. With the presidential election coming in 2024, a prolonged increase in food prices may undermine his party’s chances for reelection. This article analyzes how Indonesia is trying to respond to the looming food crisis to maintain political stability.   The Global Food Economy   The disruptions in the global food supply chain that have emerged since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic have been compounded by geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. In June 2022, the price of wheat[1] reached a record high of US$ 650 per ton, more than three times the average price in 2019. Fortunately, global rice prices, which had been high since the onset of the pandemic, have started to stabilize. Rice production performance in Thailand and Vietnam is quite good, and has contributed to the stabilization of global rice prices. In Indonesia, rice production in 2021 showed signs of recovery, although the harvested area dropped drastically from 10.66 million hectares in 2020 to 10.41 million hectares in 2021, a decrease of 245,000 hectares (2.35 percent).   Vegetable oil prices have also increased in the wake of the food crisis and the global economic crisis. The global price of vegetable oil peaked during the global food crisis of 2007-2008, the period of high commodity prices in 2011, and the COVID-19 pandemic. [2]   As the domestic retail price of cooking oil soared uncontrollably, in April 2022, Indonesia gave in to political pressure to ban exports of crude palm oil (CPO) and its derivative products in order to secure domestic supply. Around the same time, India also prohibited exporting wheat and sugar to secure supplies for its domestic needs. Malaysia banned the export of live chickens to Singapore. In the case of Indonesia, the blanket palm oil export ban caused Indonesia to lose export earnings but did not reduce domestic prices. Moreover, even though the export ban was soon lifted, by May 2022, the effects of the export ban on upstream palm oil farmers were deleterious. The price of fresh fruit bunches (the raw material used in palm oil mills)has remained at a record low of Rp 600 per kilogram since mid-June 2022, which has significantly reduced the incomes of smallholder palm oil farmers.   The threat of a global food crisis has also resulted from the increasing prices of production inputs—primarily fertilizers, but also energy. Farmers are the most severely affected. The war in Ukraine has caused global fertilizer prices to soar, as both Russia and Ukraine are major producers of gas used in fertilizer production. The price of urea in the global market had already increased before the war from about US$ 400 in September 2021 to nearly US$ 1,000 per ton in November 2021 due to an increase in international oil prices. The price of non-subsidized urea fertilizer in Indonesia rose from Rp 7,000 per kilogram in January 2022 to over Rp 10,000 per kilogram in February 2022, making it very expensive for the Indonesian government to offer the subsidized price of only Rp 2,250 per kilogram. Farmers in Indonesia and other countries have had to bear the burden of surging food and agricultural production input costs. Inflation at the producer level, as measured by the producer price index (PPI), has been much higher than inflation at the consumer level (CPI), suggesting farmers have been unable to pass high input costs on to consumers.   Indonesia’s Policy Response   First, since early 2020, Indonesia has introduced policy initiatives to boost food production and productivity through both land expansion and intensification strategies. Indonesia developed food estates outside Java in Central Kalimantan, North Sumatra, East Nusa Tenggara, etcetera. 100,000 hectares of land have been allocated for agriculture in the districts of Kapuas, Pulang Pisau, and Gunung Mas in Central Kalimantan. There, rice, maize, cassava, horticulture crops, and estate crops are cultivated primarily by smallholder farmers and some state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A number of smallholder farmers were also involved in the expansion of food estates in the district of Humbang Hasundutan in North Sumatra, focusing mostly on shallots, chilis, potatoes, and some garlic. New agricultural land was also opened in the district of Central Sumba in East Nusa Tenggara to cultivate rice, maize and sorghum.   Unfortunately, after two years, the food estates have not significantly contributed to Indonesian food production and food security. Problems with acidic soil, low fertility and peat land conversion need to be resolved in a more systematic way for the initiative to meaningfully increase food production and security. Converting forests and peatlands into agricultural land for food production has a high risk of causing sustainability issues, especially if water management and drainage systems disturb natural water storage and peat dome systems. Moreover, new agricultural lands generally take some time to start to be productive. Therefore, we cannot expect to see immediate production increase and productivity gains.   Second, intensification strategies have been implemented in existing food production operations, primarily for rice, maize and horticulture crops. Integrated pest management and more equal distribution and utilization of chemical fertilizers, pesticide and herbicides among smallholder farmers have been promoted across all production centers. Intensification through the use of high-yielding varieties and drought and flood-resistant varieties is necessary to increase food production, and will be an essential element of the adaptation strategy for climate change in the years to come. In the last two years, such intensification strategies have shown positive results, though they still need to be monitored continuously. Data from the Central Agency of Statistics (BPS) shows that rice production in 2021 was recorded at 54.4 million tons of milled dry grain (GKG), the equivalent of 31.4 million tons of rice, which was higher than the 30 million tons of rice consumption. Rice productivity in 2021 was recorded at 5.2 tons per hectare, an increase of 1.96 percent from 2020. By April 2022, rice production had already reached 13.5 million tons, almost half of 2021’s annual figure (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2022).   Third, the government has also transformed its approach to the food system by considering both on-farm and off-farm activities, namely production, processing, distribution, trade, and consumption. This more comprehensive approach aims to achieve improved food security, social welfare, and environmental welfare outcomes in general. In this context, food security includes the dimensions of food availability, food accessibility, and food utilization. Food sustainability entails positive food system outcomes for: (1) social welfare, which includes employment, income levels, human capital, social capital, and political capital, and (2) environmental health, which includes stocks and flows within ecosystems, ecosystem services, natural capital, etcetera. In 2021, the Government of Indonesia’s Presidential Regulation 66/2021 established a National Food Agency (NFA) that will govern the three important dimensions of food security—availability, accessibility and utilization. Together with other government agencies/ministries and state-owned enterprises, NFA is responsible for maintaining adequate food availability, managing food buffer stock, and diversifying food consumption for a healthier and more balanced diet while promoting the consumption of local foods (see also Wihardja and Negara, 2022).   Fourth, the government is working to ensure a sustainable and resilient food system (SRFS) that can provide a healthy and balanced diet. Pursuing SRFS is also highly compatible with poverty alleviation, sustainable natural resource management, ecosystem conservation, and climate change mitigation and adaptation. Food production through chemical fertilizers, excessive pesticides, and the conversion of natural forests into super-intensive agricultural zones is not sustainable. SFRS will be able to restore degraded land and ecosystems back to their natural state, resulting in higher productivity. For example, this can be done through the development of organic agriculture and the combined, balanced use of organic and chemical fertilizers.   Fifth, the government is working to improve the effectiveness of the Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfer program (BLT) and social assistance programs like the Family Hope Program (PKH) and Non-Cash Food Assistance (BPNT) in both urban and remote rural areas. This effort is combined with initiatives to mentor and empower farmers in precision agriculture, digitize food value chains, and support ABGC quadruple helix cooperation (academics, business, government, and civil society), innovation ecosystems and the integration of more inclusive research and development (R&D) strategies.   Regional and Global Food Trade and Cooperation   Very few countries are capable of being both fully self-sufficient and food secure. Indonesia is no exception. Food imports in Indonesia have increased in both amount and share of total goods imports, rising from US$ 11.5 billion (8.4 percent) in 2010 to US$ 22.6 billion (11.5 percent) in 2021 (Comtrade, 2022). Although only about one-quarter of food consumed globally is traded internationally, international trade plays a key role in stabilizing food prices in many food-importing countries, as prices are very sensitive to any marginal deficit in the market (Barret, 2022). Indonesia, as a relatively large food-importing country, depends on international trade to manage its food deficit and stabilize prices.   The issues of import and export bans on food and deciding to engage in international food trade are behavioral in nature and are not unrelated to the lack or non-existence of global and regional food cooperation such as global and regional food buffer stock. Fear of impending food shortages, whether real or perceived, tends to trigger countries and households to shift from “just in time” to “just in case” mode, leading to self-fulfilling prophesies as hoarding by countries and households amplifies panic and engenders full-blown crises. But with cooperation, countries and households can resist hoarding or banning exports when there is a hiccup in food supply or prices. Confidence in the international food trade can ride out the storm. Countries are less likely to resort to the food self-reliance approach and more likely to engage in international trade if there are regional or global food stock buffers available and ready to be deployed when disruptions occur in the supply chain, weather, geopolitics, or elsewhere.   Indonesia, as G20 President and ASEAN 2023 Chairman, could help secure open trade during the ongoing global food crisis and make concrete steps towards global and regional food cooperation. Under the G20, Indonesia could build on and strengthen existing mechanisms, such as the Agriculture Market Information System launched during the 2011 G20 Presidency, and coordinate efforts with the UN Crisis Response Group and Global Agriculture and Food Security Program. Through ASEAN, Indonesia could leverage existing mechanisms, including the ASEAN Food Security Reserve Board, the ASEAN Food Security Information System, the ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice Reserve, and the ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) Framework and Strategic Plan of Action on Food Security in the ASEAN Region (SPA-FS) 2021-25.   Areas of contention   It is important that Indonesia’s efforts to increase food security align with its commitment to sustainability and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Agricultural activities are responsible for 19 to 29 percent of total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (World Bank, 2021); agricultural emissions make up the largest proportion of GHG emissions in six out of ten ASEAN economies. Greening unsustainable agricultural practices is crucial for sustainable food security.   Moreover, Indonesia’s food security should also be viewed in the context of the government’s ambitious Crude Palm Oil (CPO)-based biodiesel policy, which could create tensions between energy and food security. The CPO-based biodiesel policy, which stipulates that fossil fuels must be blended with 30 per cent palm oil, is aimed to secure energy, reduce carbon emissions, and reduce Indonesia’s trade deficit. However, a study found that this plan, if followed through 2030, could cut CPO export revenues to a greater extent than it saves on diesel imports, and would infringe on palm oil supply for food, necessitating the expansion of land used for palm oil production by 48 to 76 percent to meet the total demand (Halimatussadiah et al, 2021).   Managing a food crisis is crucial for any democracy to maintain its legitimacy and political stability. Indonesia’s response to the looming food crisis has been comprehensive, ranging from expanding and intensifying food production to expanding and reforming social assistance programs. But the response has also been peppered with populist and fallible policies, such as a temporary blanket export ban on palm oil. Given that food supply chains have already been regionalized or globalized, nationalistic protectionist measures can only backfire. Food supply chains need to be regarded as global public goods. Accordingly, countries around the world should work cooperatively to solve the current food crisis.    Reference   Barrett, Christopher B. 2022. “The Global Food Crisis Shouldn’t Have Come as a Surprise.” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/global-food-crisis-shouldnt-have-come-surprise Badan Pusat Statistik. 2022. “Luas Panen dan Produksi Padi di Indonesia 2021.” https://www.bps.go.id/publication/2022/07/12/c52d5cebe530c363d0ea4198/luas-panen-dan-produksi-padi-di-indonesia-2021.html Comtrade. 2022. UN Comtrade Database. https://comtrade.un.org/ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2022. “World Food Situation – FAO Food Price Index.” https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ Halimatussadiah, A., D. Nainggolan, S.Yui, F.R. Moeis, and A.A. Siregar. 2021. “Progressive biodiesel policy in Indonesia: Does the Government’s economic proposition hold?” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews. Vol.150, 111431 Schiffling, Sarah, and Nikolaos Valantasis Kanellos. 2022. “Food prices: how countries are using the global crisis to gain geopolitical power.” The Conversation. Food prices: how countries are using the global crisis to gain geopolitical power (theconversation.com) Wihardja, Maria Monica, and Siwage Dharma Negara. 2022. “Indonesia’s New Food Agency: No Fast Food Solutions.” Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/indonesias-new-food-agency-no-fast-food-solutions/ Wihardja, Maria Monica, and Arianto Patunru. 2022. “To Ban or Not To Ban? How Indonesia Can Overcome the Global Food Crisis.” Fulcrum. https://fulcrum.sg/contributors/maria-monica-wihardja/ World Bank. 2021. “Climate Smart Agriculture.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climate-smart-agriculture World Bank. 2020a. Indonesia Economic Prospect. December 2020. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/december-2020-indonesia-economic-prospects World Bank. 2020b. Indonesia Economic Prospect. July 2020. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/july-2020-indonesia-economic-prospect     [1] SRW [2] Indonesia’s CPO has always been a serious environmental concern for the European Union, who discriminates against biodiesel products coming from Indonesia’s palm oil. Indonesia currently files a legal case of CPO discrimination by the European Union to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the World Trade Organization.     ■ Bustanul Arifin is a Professor of Agricultural Economics at UNILA, Board of Commissioner and Senior Economist at INDEF. ■ Maria Monica Wihardja is an Economist and Visiting Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Bustanul Arifin 2022-08-17Views : 15425
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Asia: Lessons Learned from Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan

Transitional justice is a government response to past human rights violations (Teitel 2000). Different terms—accountability, truth-seeking, reparations, reconciliation—have been used to refer to transitional justice, and in 2004, it was officially adopted as an international norm with the publication of the UN Secretary General’s report, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies.” However, countries still face a great deal of controversy over how to implement transitional justice and how to resolve the tensions surrounding it.   ADRN’s recent research on transitional justice and reconciliation in Asia explored three country cases: South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. In this issue briefing, I first briefly introduce the relevant human rights violations and transitional justice issues in each case. Then, I explore important similarities between the three cases. Finally, I discuss lessons learned from the three cases and provide concluding remarks.   Human Rights Violations and Transitional Justice   The nature and scope of human rights violations in each country varies. In Sri Lanka, human rights violations primarily occurred during the civil war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. In Taiwan, though the February 28 incident was a civil conflict between the indigenous population and the Kuomintang regime, it was not a civil war per se since no official armed groups representing the indigenous population were involved. In the case of Korea, there was a civil war element, especially during the Korean War, but it would be more accurate to describe that conflict as an interstate war, and furthermore, the war was not the only instance in Korean history of human rights violations occurring. Due to this complex nature, post-Korean War transitional justice efforts have had to address both atrocities that took place during the war and those under repressive authoritarian regimes.   Korea and Taiwan experienced both large-scale massacres during conflicts and systematic human rights violations under repressive authoritarian regimes. Korea had four large-scale massacres: during the Jeju Uprising (1948), during the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion (1948), civilian killings during the Korean War (1950), and during the Gwangju Uprising (1980). Taiwan had one large-scale massacre: the February 28 incident (1948). In addition, civilians in both countries were killed, disappeared, illegally arrested and detained, and tortured under repressive anti-communist authoritarian regimes. In Taiwan, this period has been conceptualized as the White Terror (1949-1987); there is no similar concept in Korea. Moreover, both countries experienced Japanese colonialism, which was marked by political oppression.   In all three countries, varying measures of transitional justice were used to address past atrocities. In Korea, criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, and reparations were the primary methods used. In Taiwan, truth commissions and reparations were widely used, with no notable accountability measures. In Sri Lanka, under pressure from international society, all measures—criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, and reparations—were proposed and adopted. In all three countries, transitional justice projects were also initiated and led by members of civil society.   Important Similarities in Three Cases   1. Complex and Complicated Human Rights Violations   The cases of Korea and Taiwan both show that past instances of human rights violations are not simple. They are multilayered, involving multiple transgressions. For example, in Korea, in addition to four major large-scale massacres, each of Rhee Syngman’s, Park Chung Hee’s, and Chun Doo Hwan’s authoritarian regimes left its own distinct trail of human rights abuses. Taiwan saw at least three types of human rights violations occur during the February 28 incident, the White Terror, and while being subjected to Japanese colonial rule. Some also argue that Taiwan’s indigenous populations have been continuously subjected to human rights violations. In Sri Lanka, civilians were killed by both government agents and insurgents, rendering the transitional justice process even more complex. The existence of diverse human rights violations over a long period of time complicates transitional justice initiatives.   In addition, external forces’ involvement or complicity in human rights violations further complicates transitional justice efforts in these countries. In Korea, some abuses were perpetrated by or occurred under the watch of external forces like Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In Taiwan, human rights violations were committed not only by the Kuomintang regime but also by the Japanese colonial regime. Interestingly, although Japan committed similar abuses in Korea and Taiwan, two countries responded differently. Comfort women and forced labor issues have been at the center of the Korean transitional justice debate, whereas this has not been the case in Taiwan.   2. The Effect of International Politics   Large-scale massacres of civilians in each country mostly occurred within the context of the Cold War. Both the Taiwanese February 28 incident and three of Korea’s four major massacres—during the Jeju Uprising, the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion, and the Korean War—occurred during the early phases of the Cold War. These events were framed as communist challenges to the anti-communist authoritarian regimes. Thus, any attempts to address past abuses or reconcile with victims of these events were framed as “communist instigation”; the label of “communism” was used to obstruct any discourse on transitional justice and reconciliation. It was only after democratization and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s that genuine efforts to address the past ideology-driven atrocities began.   In the case of Sri Lanka, the Cold War provided an important backdrop for the civil war itself. After the peace accord, however, a new dynamic emerged between international politics and the local transitional justice process. The UN, Human Rights Council, and international society constantly pressed Sri Lanka to implement various transitional justice measures; this international pressure interacted with ongoing domestic initiatives to pursue transitional justice. In comparison, there were no such dynamics in Korea or Taiwan. The nature of the tension between international and local agents makes transitional justice in Sri Lanka unique.   3. The Impact of Domestic Politics   Human rights violations and transitional justice initiatives occur within the domestic political context, primarily because perpetrators are typically affiliated with the government, the military, intelligence agencies, or the police. In many cases, perpetrators and their supporters still have a close tie with contemporary political elites and play the role of “spoilers.” Therefore, addressing past atrocities necessarily causes disruptions in the existing political structure. The “politicization” of transitional justice is inevitable. Conservative regimes usually oppose transitional justice while progressive regimes tend to actively pursue these measures.   In all three cases, the “politicization” of transitional justice measures or of past events posed a distinct obstacle to resolving the rights violations. In Sri Lanka, controversy around adopting accountability measures to punish “war heroes” is a clear example of this phenomenon. In Taiwan, examples include the resignation of the Vice Chairperson of the Transitional Justice Commission over his remarks on the local election and the emergence of controversy over the National Chiang Kaishek Memorial. In Korea, backlash against transitional justice efforts has resulted in reduced support for or the abolition of committees and projects. In all three countries, such social controversies have strengthened the opponents of transitional justice and weakened the supporters.   Lessons Learned   1. Culture of Accountability   In all three cases, despite being controversial, some meaningful measures of transitional justice have been adopted and implemented. These measures would have been unimaginable in the past, reflecting “a revolution in accountability” (Sriram 2003), which has also been conceptualized as a “justice cascade” (Lutz and Sikkink 2001). This does not mean, however, that truth, justice, and reconciliation have been achieved in every country. As the social controversies in each country have demonstrated, a “culture of impunity” persists. Nevertheless, the world—even Asia, which has lagged behind on the trend of pursuing accountability for past human rights violations—has undergone transformation.   Impunity for past human rights violations is certainly waning in Asia. With an increasing number of states introducing transitional justice measures, achieving accountability is a more common phenomenon. That being said, accountability is not always realized exclusively through retributive justice. Rather, restorative measures, such as truth commissions and reparations, were used in many cases. Truth commissions and reparations have been enacted in all three countries.   As seen in the Korean case, even after dozens of truth commissions over the past twenty years, truth and reconciliation are still difficult to achieve. This does not mean, however, that no meaningful change has occurred. As a result of transitional justice measures, civil society and the government have changed. In Taiwan and Korea, it is the government which carries out memorialization projects. It is government funds that are allotted as reparations for victims of large-scale massacres like the April 3 incident in Jeju or the February 28 incident in Taiwan. Granting reparations to the victims of past abuses has now become the standard, and many officials, lawmakers, and journalists have internalized accountability as a norm.   2. Transitional Justice as a Process   Transitional justice in Asia is an ongoing process. In all three countries, controversies around transitional justice measures, the revision of laws, or the coexistence of multiple transitional justice initiatives show that transitional justice is not a “one-and-done” process resolving past atrocities. In Korea, even after official investigations concluded, other investigations were later carried out. Similarly, in Taiwan, multiple commissions (e.g., an investigation committee on the February 28 incident, the transitional justice commission, and the commission on ill-gotten assets) were created over a long period of time. Sri Lanka also carried out several transitional justice initiatives to address past atrocities.   As with any other political process, the transitional justice process has its ups and downs, its proponents and its opponents. The overall impact of transitional justice in each country has been somewhat mixed. In Korea, where many transitional justice initiatives have been adopted, scholars generally view the transitional justice process as having had a positive long-term impact. The process as a whole, with all of its moments of forward and backward progress, has helped to consolidate democracy and protect human rights. Even controversies, backfires, and failures have contributed to the overarching narrative in which transitional justice has had an important impact on society. However, in Taiwan and Sri Lanka, a causal relationship between transitional justice and positive outcomes seems less apparent.   3. Transitional Justice as a Whole-of-Nation Response   In Sri Lanka, both civil society and state actors were involved in the transitional justice process. Within the state, both the legislature and administrative bodies were involved. In Taiwan, transitional justice measures were mostly discussed in the Legislation Yuan. The legislative process, however, did not mark the end of transitional justice measures. In Korea, the legislative, judicial, and executive branches cooperated to bring about meaningful changes for victims. For example, in response to the April 3 Jeju Uprising incident, a special law was enacted by the National Assembly in 1999, and the first investigation commission was created in 2000 under the executive branch. After the commission finished its report and the president issued an official apology, victims filed a series of lawsuits against the state. During these lawsuits, the court sided with the victims and ordered the state to make reparations. In some cases, it was not even the central government, but rather legislative and judicial branches of local and regional governments, that were at the forefront of bringing justice to the victims.   The other important players were civil society actors. There has been a significant contribution from civil society in all three countries. In Korea, civil society actors not only initiated the transitional justice movement but also monitored ongoing government initiatives. It was victims and activists who spent a long time pressing the government to adopt transitional justice measures. In Sri Lanka, a Consultative Task Force (2016), which was a civil society body, worked hard to implement transitional justice measures proposed by the international community. In Taiwan, victims and civil society actors were active as well.   It is challenging to compare the three cases, as each country occupies a very different political context. However, conducting such an analysis shows that there are considerable commonalities, such as the complex nature of human rights violations and the dual impact of domestic and international politics. At the same time, important trends are revealed by comparing the three cases. First, although the culture of impunity is still strong, there is increasing demand for and realization of accountability. Second, transitional justice is an ongoing, imperfect process, and progress is not always direct. Finally, the transitional justice process in each country indicates that responding to past atrocities is a process that involves the entire nation—government, civil society, and civilians.    Reference   Lutz, Ellen, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. “The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America.” Chicago Journal of International Law 2(1): 1-34. Sriram, Chandra Lekha. 2003. “Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses.” American University International Law Review 19(2): 310-429. Teitel, Ruti G. 2000. Transitional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.     ■ Hun Joon Kim is a professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His publications relevant to this field include The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea (2014), Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific (ed. 2014), “Are UN Investigations into Human Rights Violations a Viable Solution? An Assessment of UN Commissions of Inquiry” (2019), and “The Prospect of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructive Understanding (2020).”     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Hun Joon Kim 2022-07-27Views : 17819
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] The Inadequacy of Nepal’s Democracy for Marginalized Peoples

On May 29th, 2022, the government of Nepal announced an annual budget of Rs 1.793 trillion for the 2022-23 fiscal year, highlighting the 'Make in Nepal’ and ‘Made in Nepal’ campaigns as the rising cost of imports increases the country’s economic vulnerability. During the joint session of the Parliament, Finance Minister Janardan Sharma emphasized that the main focus of the budget is to be on inclusive development, inflation control, providing adequate resources to subnational governments, and building a self-reliant economy. However, this financial arrangement does not improve the status of marginalized people—Dalits, war victims, women and girls, and sexual minority groups. This briefing discusses the current status of minority groups who do not enjoy full rights within Nepalese society.   Underrepresentation of Dalits   Nepal has undergone radical political change, particularly after its decade-long Maoist insurgency. Nepal was declared as a nation free from caste-based discrimination and untouchability (CBDU) in the year 2006. The coalition government introduced reservation policies and quotas for the Dalits and other marginalized communities in 2008. The historic CBDU Act was formulated and implemented for the first time in Nepal in 2011. The Nepalese government introduced strategic policies to emancipate Dalits from social, economic and political constructs that excluded them from fundamental human rights and further marginalized them. But the obstructions to achieving social justice and eliminating caste-based discrimination against Dalits have not been reduced as expected. Reports of Dalit students being denied rental accommodations in big cities make it to the news every other day. Dalits employed through affirmative action programs have reported daily humiliation in the workplace. Inter-caste marriages are failing. Discrimination is not as explicit as in the past, but atrocities against Dalits tacitly persist.   In the last 23 months (July/August 2020 through April/May 2022) alone, in addition to numerous cases of physical assault and verbal abuse perpetrated against Dalits, 22 Dalits were murdered, 14 Dalit girls were raped, and 9 Dalits were abetted to commit suicide (Samata Media Monitoring Report). Police belonging to so-called “higher castes” rarely investigate incidents of caste-based discrimination seriously. Most CBD cases are diverted, or the issues are reconciled within the villages themselves.   The second local election of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal took place on May 13, 2022, and the results are now out. Of the 753 local levels of Nepal, Dalit candidates in 124 wards received the lowest support in the 2022 elections.   The 2017 Constitution mandated that if a man is elected as mayor, the deputy mayor must be a woman, and elected ward councils must include women and Dalit women. However, representation of the Dalit community was very poor in this most recent local election. Only three Dalit community members were elected to the position of mayor, accounting for just 1% of the 293 total local levels (Metropolitan, Sub-Metropolitan, and Municipal). This figure has decreased by half from the previous election. Similarly, the number of Dalits elected to deputy positions is also lower than in 2074 BS (2017). This year, there are only eight deputy mayors, as compared with eleven in 2074 BS, comprising only 2.73% of the total deputy chiefs elected. Dalit representation in rural municipality chairperson positions has increased from 1 in the past election to 7 this year. However, this amounts to only 1.52% of the 460 total available seats. Unlike the number of chairpersons, the number of vice chairpersons elected from the Dalit community is less than in the 2074 BS elections. This year, the number has decreased from 16 to 7, 1.52% of the total appointments. In addition, out of 6,743 wards across the country, a total of 148 ward chairpersons have been elected from the Dalit community.   Dalit women were elected to ward member positions in 98.01% of wards. The Local Election Act (2073 BS) made representation of Dalit women mandatory in every ward, but Dalit women remain underrepresented in political parties, and the constitutional mandate for Dalit women’s representation has not been 100% achieved. Similarly, out of 13,486 ward member allocations, only 878 elected ward members (6.51%) were from the Dalit community.   The preamble of the 2072 BS Constitution of Nepal, as well as various other binding documents and provisions, have mandated an inclusive proportional state system based on population. These recent results indicate that the Dalit community has not been able to enjoy the rights they are entitled to; Nepali political parties have not been able to break free from old feudalistic practices. This kind of indifference on the part of political parties has called into question the validity of the democratic process and practices.   Transitional justice for war victims and survivors   The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) were established in 2015 to resolve issues of deaths, disappearances, and disabilities caused during the Maoist insurgency. Progress in this regard has been quite discouraging. Although there have been 60,000 complaints of abuses committed during the 10 years of conflict (1996-2006), most of the issues have not yet been resolved by successive governments. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has heavily criticized the Nepalese government’s failure to comply with its international legal obligations. Independence and impartiality are the major tenets of the settlement process emphasized by the OHCHR. Authorities have prevented cases of violations during the conflict from going to court hearings on the pretext that they will instead be addressed by the transitional justice process. On the contrary, however, a credible transitional justice process has yet to exist.   Rights of marginalized women and girls   Nepal is known for having one of the highest rates of child marriage in Asia. About 33% of girls are married before they turn 18, and 8% marry by age 15. In contrast, 9% of boys marry before the age of 18. Rulings such as the Citizenship Act of 2006 and the 2015 Constitution contain several discriminatory provisions against women. A draft bill to amend the Citizenship Act, first presented to parliament in 2018, retains several discriminatory provisions. A team of three UN human rights experts raised their concerns in September of 2020, writing, “the bill would continue to discriminate systematically against women, regarding their ability to transmit citizenship through marriage and to their children.” Due to these flawed citizenship laws, an estimated 5 million people are forced to live without citizenship and are at risk of statelessness. The issue of lacking national identification is most prevalent in the Madhesh province.   Reported cases of rape have increased sharply. The Nepal police dealt with 2,534 cases of rape in 2020-21, versus 2,144 the previous year, an increase of 18.19%. Similarly, as many as 735 incidents of attempted rape were reported in 2020-21, compared to 687 in 2019-20. This amounts to an increase of 6.99% (The Himalayan News Service, 2021).   Women in Nepal are back-warded, religious, have high regards for family values, and interface with Nepalese society’s traditional patriarchal cultural values and norms. The society is also stratified by a deep-rooted caste system, which was introduced 300 years ago. The economic, cultural, social and political conditions of the women in Nepal are also influenced by this caste system. The issues of Dalit women can be compared to the issues faced by black women in Europe and America and their stories of discriminations. But when a unique component, "caste," is added, the plight of Dalit women is much more severe.   In Nepal, Dalit women have face unique human rights issues when compared with other Nepalese women. Dalit women face multi-pronged discrimination, based on caste, gender, race and poverty. Whereas general women’s issues in Nepal can be understood through the lens of feminism, a special lens is necessary to understand the plight of Dalit women.   Sundar Harijan, a 20-year-old Dalit youth, was found hanging in a bathroom at the Rolpa District Prison on May 18, 2022. He was 17 years old when he was arrested for alleged mobile phone theft on September 2, 2019. The court sentenced him to one year in prison. . His death leaves behind a trail of mystery. Police records show that he was prison time for someone else's crime. His identity was swapped with Bijay Bikram Shah, who was arrested in Nepalgunj on March 7, 2018 on charges of extortion and illegal arms possession. The police caught him with a pistol, five mobile phones, and 15 SIM cards, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. Sundar Harijan’s death in prison raises serious questions about human rights violations in Nepal, particularly for Dalits, one of the most marginalized and excluded communities. According to the Act Relating to Children 2075 (2018), while detained as a minor, Harijan had the right to juvenile prosecution procedure. The court’s verdict to imprison him is unlawful and violates existing legal provisions. The court originally ordered Harijan’s imprisonment through September 3, 2020, with an additional one-month imprisonment if he failed to pay a NPR 10,000 fine. Suspiciously, Sundar Harijan and Bijay Bikram Shah were transferred to Rolpa district prison on November 23, 2020, where their identities were exchanged. The Rolpa district prison received Sundar Harijan as Bijay Bikram Shah. Consequently, Harijane had to spend two more years in the district jail, whereas Shah was released from prison under the false identity of Sundar Harijan on January 12, 2021. Article 36(4) of The Act Relating to Children, 2075 (2018) clearly states, “If a child of sixteen years of age or above but below eighteen years of age commits an offense, the child shall be punished with two-thirds of the punishment that is imposable on the person of legal age pursuant to the prevailing law.”   LGBTQI+ issues   The bill to amend the Citizenship Act also contains a clause that would require transgender people to provide “proof” of their transition to access citizenship documents corresponding to their gender identity. This violates international human rights law and a 2007 Nepal Supreme Court judgment mandating that gender identity be recognized based on “self-feeling” (Nepal Events of 2021, 2022). Though Nepal is one of the forerunners in LGBTQI+ rights in Asia, there is still more needing to be done for the advancement of political and social rights.   Conclusions   We had hoped that with the new constitution, Dalit and marginalized communities could feel ownership not only of the country, but the state. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Sundar Harijan, at 20 years old, was found hanging a few days ago. He was 17 years and three months old when he was arrested for mobile theft. He was sent to prison instead of a juvenile correction center. A month before release, he was sent to another prison, in another district, where he was received as another prisoner from the upper caste, serving jail time for extortion and illegal arms possession. How is this possible?   His story is an example of how the state deliberately mistreats Dalits who already suffer from systemic exclusion. It is an example of impunity deeply rooted in the Nepali justice system.   A few days earlier before his death, Sundar Harijan was excited. He called his brother and asked for some money, telling him he would be released soon. But he is no more, and his dreams have been slain by caste supremacy and flaws in our judicial system.   His mother asks some questions – and I have come here to seek their answers:   1. Why was a minor sent to prison instead of the juvenile correction system?   2. Why was the family not informed about his transfer to another prison?   3. Is it just that the destitute Dalits are forced to serve jail time for other upper caste convicts? Why was Sundar Harijan, a minor, imprisoned for mobile theft, then later swapped with a convict who had been charged with serious crimes?   Over the last two years, I have met many mothers of children who have been killed after being raped, murdered in police custody, and or lynched by mobs. Thousands of mothers who are forced to suffer the ill fate of their children have one question: are Dalits born just to die? Are they not allowed to live with dignity? Killed on the drop of a hat. Killed with the smallest excuse.   The faces of discrimination have changed. But they have not disappeared. Six years ago, Ajit Mijar from Panchkhal in Kavre was murdered because of inter-caste marriage. His body is still in the Teaching Hospital, waiting for justice. Sometimes I wonder – how low is the price of a Dalit life?    References   National Library of medicine. (2021, September). www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8455144/. Retrieved from www.ncbi.nim.nih.gov.com: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8455144/ Nepal Events of 2021. (2022). Retrieved from www.hrw.org: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/nepal Prajwol Neupane, D. B. (2021). Retrieved from www.jogh.org: https://www.jogh.org/documents/2021/jogh-11-03030.pdf Rege, S. (1998). Dalit Women Talk Differently: A Critique of 'Difference' and Towards a Dalit Feminist. Economic and Political Weekly, WS39-WS46. Rousseau, N. (2013). Historical Womanist Theory: Re-Visioning Black Feminist Thought. Race, Gender & Class: Volume 20, Number 3-4, 2013 (191-204), 196. Sharma, R. P. (2016). Democratization and Development in Nepal. Kathmandu: Himalayan Journal of Sociology and Anthropology. The Himalayan News Service. (2021, August 11). Rape cases increased by 18.19pc last fiscal. Kathmandu, Bagmati, Nepal.     ■ Pradip Pariyar is Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation. Mr. Pradip Pariyar is an alumnus of American University and Tribhuvan University. He specializes in youth empowerment, peace building and capacity building of media professionals.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

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