※ This issue briefing has been published as a sequel to the ADRN Online Seminar titled “How Grassroot Democracy Contributes to Make Democracy Works.” Sam Yip (Former Hong Kong District Councilor; Spokesperson of the Japan-Hong Kong Democracy Alliance), Irine Hiraswari Gayatri (PhD Candidate at Monash University Gender, Peace and Security Centre; Senior Researcher at BRIN), Khine Win (Executive Director, Sandhi Governance Institute), and Mardi Mapa-Suplido (Chairperson, INCITEGov) presented their respective country cases. For more details of the event, please follow this link.   Democracy’s authority and legitimacy relies on people’s participation. In modern democracies, representatives elected by the people are the main actors in political processes, as society has been more complex and policies have become increasingly specialized. Nevertheless, people’s direct participation is an essential part of democratic governance, especially at the local level. This direct democracy includes referendums, recalls, petitions, as well as participatory planning and budgeting. Moreover, active approaches such as mobilizing civil society organizations (CSOs) or protesting can be considered “grassroots democracy.” The word “grassroots” is mostly used as a metaphor for ‘sub-national level’ or ‘marginalized sectors,’ but citizens’ direct and collective actions for bringing about political change and improving democracy are not confined to a certain region or group.   Citizens in several Asian countries have struggled to resist against authoritarian regimes and establish democratic constitutions and governments. Movements against dictatorship, military regimes, or the suppression of fundamental rights are still ongoing in some regions. In addition, people under democratic regimes continue spontaneous actions to oversee officials, ensure and solidify civil rights, and push politicians to implement policies and budgets in favor of citizens’ common interests. This article will cover cases from four Asian countries, demonstrating how grassroots democracy efforts have incited more democratic and participatory regimes.   Case Study #1: Hong Kong   2014 Hong Kong protests emerged to resist Beijing’s decision to change the electoral systеm for electing the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Admіnistrative Region. Protesters were concerned that the Chinese Communist Party might pre-screen the candidates to be more cooperative with Beijing. In a political movement called the “Umbrella Movement,” the protestors used umbrellas to defend against sprinklers and pepper gas from the police. This movement took place in three main regions in Hong Kong: Admiralty, Mong Kok, and Causeway.   One of the key points, and later reason for contention, of the Umbrella Movement is that it was a grassroots movement with an organized, internal hierarchy. Student groups led the overall movement. Other leading groups, led by scholars and activists, organized the “Occupy Central” movement, aiming for civil disobedience through a sit-in protest. Participants from self-organized groups provided barricades and supply bases for the protestors. In this hierarchical structure, participants acted mostly within their roles. However, there were conflicts between the leaders and self-organized participants, as only the latter had the manpower and resources for the movement. This conflict is one of the reasons that the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (ELAB) Movement in 2019 was considered a leaderless movement.   During the Anti-ELAB Movement in 2019, the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) organized most assemblies and peaceful rallies, but its decisions were not extended to participants in the front lines of protests. A volunteer group gathered information regarding police movement from the participants and created a real-time map visualization to help participants decide whether to move forward or retreat.   In 2020, COVID-19 restrictions and the enactment of the National Security Law (NSL) caused complications with the democracy movement in Hong Kong. The NSL stipulates that those convicted of sedition to disunite or overthrow the nation can be punished with a three-year sentence. Its enactment led to over 200,000 citizens leaving Hong Kong. Diaspora groups headed to Europe, the United States, Canada, Taiwan, and Japan. They established organizations for protest and policy advocacy.   In terms of the global context, Hong Kong democratic movement activists are seeking international solidarity and support. For example, cooperation with regions such as Taiwan, Uyghur, and Tibet, which have been suppressed by the CCP, could provoke worldwide concern. Moreover, activists have built networks with citizens in Thailand and Myanmar struggling for human rights and democracy, commonly known as the “Milk-Tea Alliance.” Hong Kong citizens who moved to Japan established the “Japan-Hong Kong Democracy Alliance” and have tried to direct the Japanese people’s attention to Hong Kong. Considering the lack of attention to political issues in Japan, the Alliance employs “Art Activism” and expresses their message through art. For example, martial artist and actor Bruce Lee became an artistic symbol of the Hong Kong democratic movement. His quote “Be water” served as a slogan for protestors, implying that the protestors ought to be as ‘voluntary and flexible’ as the flow of water.   Hong Kong’s case demonstrates that despite brutal suppression, citizens’ movement can find avenues for international solidarity. Beyond spoken solidarity, the crucial next step is to connect worldwide attention and support to practical actions, such as sanctions or trade restrictions against the authoritarian regime.   Case Study #2: Indonesia   In 1998, Indonesian people protested President Suharto’s despotic government. The protests, primarily led by students, resulted in the collapse of the regime. However, this movement was contextualized by complex political and economic dynamics. In the late 1990s, several Asian countries suffered from the financial crisis, including Indonesia. Indonesia’s economic crisis peaked from mid-1997 to 1998, contributing to impending unrest.   The military regime under Suharto had ruled for 30 years, but it ultimately failed to prevent or deal responsibly with the economic crisis. Students pointed out the government’s lack of action and responsibility and responded with protests in major cities. Successive demonstrations in Yogyakarta and Jakarta from May 8 to 9, 1998, resulted in fatalities and therefore increased tensions between the students and the military. On May 12, four students were killed, and eighteen students were injured during the peaceful demonstration at Trisakti University in Jakarta. This incident was later referred to as the “Trisakti Tragedy.”   The memorial ceremony the following morning quickly escalated into riots in Jakarta and the surrounding cities. Nationally, peaceful demonstrations continued during this time. Suharto announced he would not run for the next elections but refused to resign immediately. Citizens countered with a massive nationwide protest and students held a sit-in strike at the Jakarta Parliament building. Consequently, Suharto announced his resignation from the presidency on May 21. Students’ active participation and sacrifice at the forefront were crucial to the downfall of the authoritarian regime, but their role extended beyond a specific moment in 1997-98. In fact, students have struggled for democracy against the military regime for nearly three decades.   Major political reforms in 1998 established a democratic order in contemporary Indonesian society, institutionalizing the political process of the parliamentary systеm and discovering future democratic leaders. After democratization, Indonesia emerged as a regional leader in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, promoting political freedom and increasing economic prosperity. However, government institutions face challenges in controlling corruption and safeguarding civil rights. Therefore, grassroots democratic movements in Indonesia have been focusing their efforts on confronting corruption and protecting civil rights. CSOs have been involved in various programs aiming to reduce poverty, encourage government accountability, and build democratic resilience, which students are also participating. For example, there have been collective actions pushing for the establishment of the Human Rights Commission and the formulation of human rights norms, along with the enhancement of human rights information systеms for more practical policies. Additionally, there have been initiatives to support minority groups such as women, disabled, and Indigenous communities to encourage and increase their influence in the decision-making process.   Thus, Indonesia’s grassroots democracy movements have transformed into more organized, specialized, and continuous movements with program-based approaches in the last few decades. Simultaneously, each sector of grassroots democracy seeks inter-sectoral cooperation, as their agendas are linked under aspirations of democracy and human rights.   Case Study #3: Myanmar   Myanmar’s modern history is filled with the darkness of military dictatorship and persistent efforts from civil society to restore democracy. Since Ne Win staged a coup and seized power in 1962, citizens have continued their resistance through strikes and uprisings. The Saffron Revolution in 2007 and the Spring Revolution in 2021 can be understood from this historical perspective.   People’s aversion to military rule and struggle to live full and free lives triggered multiple protests throughout Myanmar’s modern history. In the case of the Saffron Revolution, the government’s decision to increase the price of petroleum directly sparked a nationwide uprising. When monks protested in Pakokku, a town in northern Myanmar, and were arrested in conflicts with the military, the monks displayed their social influence. As most of the populations are Buddhists, monks showed their willingness to act and led the movement.   Following the military coup in 2021, young people, mostly associated with student unions, initiated protests through a Civil Disobedience Movement against the military junta. However, during this period, protestors recognized the limitations of nonviolent actions through civil disobedience and thus organized the people’s defense forces (PDF) to combat the military. However, there is more to strategy evolution than just using armament. Protest movements extended from major cities to rural parts of Myanmar and even gained traction online. The junta’s intense surveillance and punishment against resistors made consistent protests difficult. However, digital platforms have provided useful venues to reveal the true situations of people and garner their online solidarity.   Citizens in pursuit of democracy in Myanmar continue the hard fight against the military’s crackdown. The annual report of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) published in August 2023 presents evidence of serious war crimes committed against the people of Myanmar by the junta, including indiscriminate attacks and mass executions.[1] Millions of people have fled Myanmar, mostly seeking refuge in Thailand. Those who successfully escaped the military regime are trying to draw global attention and gather advocacy groups to the situation in Myanmar. However, considerable global public attention has shifted to Ukraine or other countries facing democratic crises. The current situation surrounding Myanmar requires domestic momentum and international solidarity in order to press the military regime to restore democracy.   Case Study #4: The Philippines   The Philippines has a history of civil disobedience against authoritarianism. A series of democratic movements resisting election fraud, commonly known as the “EDSA Revolution” or “People Power Revolution,” led to the resignation of then-dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986. The democratic movements in the Philippines were part of the wave of democratization in other parts of Asia such as Taiwan and South Korea.   Following democratization, a new Philippine Constitution implemented in 1987 emphasizes the importance of participatory civil society in promoting democratic governance. In response, NGO workers continue pushing for collaboration with the government to call for political reforms. Activists seek to establish institutions that open access for marginalized communities to participate in decision-making processes.   President Duterte’s tenure from 2016 to 2022 was a challenging period for activists and their efforts. They had to contend not only with strong leadership but also with public fascination towards it. This provided CSOs with an opportunity to recognize the significance of social media marketing and network expansion to influence people’s political opinions. During this period, a democracy watchdog organization called Tindig Pilipinas (“Stand up Philippines”) and women’s groups exposed human rights violations and the erosion of the rule of law under Duterte’s regime.   Throughout the concurrent national and local elections period in 2022, the minority and underrepresented groups united to encourage people’s meaningful participation in the elections. They fostered active participation in political elections, candidates’ forums, electoral watchdog groups, and so forth. These groups included Bangsamoro, an autonomous region with a Muslim majority located on Mindanao Island, as well as youth, women, urban poor, young professionals, development NGOs, and overseas Filipinos.   Despite their efforts to establish more democratic governance, they faced setbacks and the authoritative rule continued under President Bongbong Marcos. Along with the continuation of an oppressive government, civil society is facing disinformation and emerging trends in social media as the new battlefronts of democracy. In these circumstances, CSOs strive to enhance their ability to open spaces for citizens to empower themselves as a political force.   Conclusion   The cases of these four Asian countries suggest several principles for enhancing grassroots democracy in the region. Social media, one of the new battlefronts between democracy and counterpressure, has the potential to be used to promote citizens’ participation. It has served as a means of communication to organize protesters, such as a real-time mapping in Hong Kong with police action information and G-Talk messenger used among Myanmar’s protest leaders to spread information and rendezvous for protests. Furthermore, it is possible for citizens worldwide to express their support and advocacy for democratic movements via social media. The Milk Tea Alliance shows a new way to build solidarity that originated online.   Effective resistance against anti-democratic powers must include more than just actions at the grassroots level. Grassroots movements can create impacts during the critical junctures and lead to political change. However, many fail to bring sustainable change since they are essentially temporal mobilization. Grassroots movements need representing CSOs and other forms of institutional backups such as media support to reflect their demands to policies. CSOs in Indonesia and the Philippines, which intervene in policy-making processes and elections, demonstrate that grassroots democracy may and ought to evolve into institutionalized actions for the efficacy and sustainability of the movement.   On a global level, solidarity is not only a matter of individual citizens’ efforts but also requires pro-democracy governments’ cooperation. ASEAN merely took symbolic actions, like banning Myanmar from meetings and stood by meekly. Following the military coup in Myanmar, Japan and South Korea had joined the western democracies in sanctioning the military junta. But, pro-democracy governments have failed so far to push the military to restore democracy. Civil societies of pro-democracy countries should press their government to act firmly against the violation of human rights in Myanmar. Every grassroots struggle for democratization should matter to both pro-democracy governments and global civil society. ■     [1] United Nations. 2023. “Press Release: War crimes by Myanmar military are more frequent and brazen – Myanmar Mechanism Annual Report.” August 8. https://iimm.un.org/press-release-war-crimes-by-myanmar-military-are-more-frequent-and-brazen-myanmar-mechanism-annual-report/ (Accessed August 18, 2023)     ■ Dr. Sri Nuryanti is an acting Director of Regional Research and Innovation Policy, The Indonesian National Research and Innovation Agency. She is former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007-2012 whom which successfully conducting the Parliamentary election and Presidential Election 2009, as well as local elections 2007-2012. She is actively participating in various academic activities at national level as well as in international level. She currently serves as Secretary General of APPRA (Asia Pacific Peace Research Association) and executive council member of IPRA (International Peace Research Association).   ■ Hansu Park is a Research Associate at the East Asia Institute.     ■ Typeset by Sandi Khine, Intern, and Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

※ This article was first published by the CFR.   Introduction   The foreign policy of any state is formulated by calculating national interest and normative ideals. If national interest is based on tangible economic and security gains, normative ideals are often understood as universal and transformative values. However, this distinction is often blurred in reality, as normative choices are made in the context of long-term national interest. Furthermore, a state’s normative alignment can change due to ideologically different new governments or contentious domestic challenges. The worst-case scenario occurs when a strong state withdraws from leadership of a normative coalition of like-minded states. Like-minded states tend to disperse when they lose their leader; the decline of the Community of Democracies after the United States’s neglect is such a case. States fail to pursue consistent foreign policy because normative politics are in flux domestically and internationally.   Despite this complexity, a strong power can exercise normative foreign policy more effectively than a weaker power, as it can employ both hard and soft power. The United States played such an enforcement role during the post–Cold War unipolar world. A newly emerging strong state, such as China, can challenge an existing norm or establish a new norm. What about middle powers? Lacking unilaterally exercisable power, middle powers frequently champion multilateral rules and norms that can protect their interests from great power coercion. Professor Andrew Cooper characterizes a middle power as normatively more virtuous and trustworthy in the global order and describes its preferred diplomacy as pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, embracing compromise positions in international disputes, and adopting the notions of “good international citizenship” (Cooper et al. 1993, 116). The government of former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak pursued middle powermanship under the Global Korea slogan, emphasized value-based international contributions by expanding foreign aid, and hosted the Group of Twenty (G20) and other global meetings.   Now, the Yoon Suk Yeol government has scaled up its middle-power ambitions to those of being a global pivotal state by highlighting South Korea’s international contributions and values-based diplomacy (Yoon 2022a). Like the Lee government, the Yoon government is building its proactive multilateral diplomacy while deepening its long-standing alliance with the United States. But the U.S.-China relationship has changed significantly between the Lee and Yoon governments: geopolitical competition between the United States and China has intensified during the intervening fifteen years, expanding beyond the economic and military spheres to include technology and ideology. Under U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping, an ideological narrative dividing the world between democracies and autocracies has set in. The Russian war in Ukraine has caused Western European countries to merge democratic unity and collective security. In Northeast Asia, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities now threaten not only South Korea but also the faraway United States. Facing all these high-risk challenges, the Yoon government has tightened military and economic ties with the United States.   The two countries’ shared democratic values and liberal norms have emerged as a crucial component of deepening bilateral ties. This normative alignment has invited criticism from Beijing, but the Yoon government has so far not rolled back its advocacy for those values—although it has carefully dubbed them as “universal values” rather than liberal or democratic values. The national confidence gained by globally successful popular Korean culture and deteriorating public opinion against China have helped fuel this value assertiveness.   Summary of the CFR Workshop   The Council on Foreign Relations held a virtual workshop on June 26, 2023, on “U.S.-South Korea Policy Coordination Toward China on Democratic Values and Human Rights.” The workshop’s core takeaways included the following:   ㆍ Leadership change has made South Korea reflect values in its foreign policy and expand “contributive diplomacy” for collective goods in the region and the world. South Korea’s recent values-based diplomacy has been shaped by President Yoon Suk-yeol himself. Yoon has emphasized individual freedom, human rights, and the rule of law as universal values. Obviously, those values are better kept in democracies than autocracies. But, by framing them as universal, Yoon has avoided wading into the ideological divide between democracy and autocracy and allowed himself to engage illiberal democracies. His speeches at his inauguration, the UN General Assembly, and the U.S. Congress all point out that threats to freedom and human rights can be checked when people are united to confront them. In the two main strategy reports on the Indo-Pacific and national security released by Yoon’s administration, those universal values are championed to preserve the peace and prosperity of the region and South Korea itself by strengthening rules-based order. Both reports are based on the vision of South Korea as a global pivotal state, under which leadership in multilateral diplomacy is sought. More official development assistance, humanitarian support, and peace-keeping activities are regarded as instruments of achieving this leadership.   ㆍ Several concrete actions have been taken demonstrating the Yoon government’s commitment to values-based diplomacy. South Korea joined the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) voting to check China’s human rights violation against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang in June 2022. Although this vote did not receive enough support to be adopted a resolution, it was an important move to bring China’s treatment of Uyghurs into the UN framework. South Korean governments have historically avoided condemning China’s human rights violations in international organizations like the United Nations; the Yoon government’s vote in favor reveals values-based diplomacy in action. At the same time, the Yoon government has also taken a more assertive position on North Korea’s human rights issues in the United Nations, cosponsoring two resolutions, one by the General Assembly and the other by the HRC. The Yoon government also hosted the Summit for Democracy Indo-Pacific Regional Meeting on March 30, 2023. President Yoon pledged to implement $100 million over the next three years.   Common values and partnership for rules-based order have been also called for as the basis of improving sour relations with Japan. Facing domestic opposition over forced labor compensation issues and other thorny historical conflicts, overturning the bilateral relations with Japan was a difficult task for Yoon. However, the Yoon government managed to push bilateral deals to cooperate with Japan. Responding to the security challenge posed by North Korean nuclear and missile threats is the primary reason for this rapprochement. At the same time, improving South Korea-Japan bilateral ties has been regarded as crucial for trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan to build the rules-based liberal order in the region. Yoon’s diplomatic overtures have expanded to Europe, including his participation in NATO Summit and humanitarian support for Ukraine and forthcoming reconstruction aid after the war is over.   ㆍ U.S. leadership should support the values-based diplomacy of the Yoon government consistently and reciprocate with material benefits to win South Korean domestic public support. South Koreans regard the United States as a favorable and trustworthy partner that shares their values. On the other hand, China has been losing its appeal due to coercive diplomacy and perceived China-centered cultural hegemony. However, this state cannot be permanent. Domestically, Yoon’s approach to China is facing attacks from his opposition, who claim that his position is contributing to an unprecedented trade deficit with China and hurting the economy. Therefore, U.S. leadership needs to provide material benefits that can quiet this vein of criticism.   Furthermore, severe partisanship in American politics makes it difficult to predict the next U.S. government’s position on values-based diplomacy. As in the past, South Korea relies on support and joint action from the United States. If the United States wants South Korea to continue to champion values-based diplomacy, U.S. institutions—including official entities working on democracy assistance and civil society organizations—should deeply engage their counterparts inside South Korea. This should not be a difficult task: bipartisan congressional support for South Korea’s values-based diplomacy is strong. Last, but not least, to sustain South Korea’s values-based diplomacy, the United States should allow South Korea room to engage China on universal values.   Presidential Discourse and Basic Foreign Policy Tenets   South Korea’s new diplomacy is the result of government and presidential change. President Yoon Suk-yeol has indicated since his election campaign that he would more explicitly align South Korea with the United States. Those remarks implied that, if elected, he would reject the so-called strategic ambiguity previously used to balance Seoul’s relationships with Washington and Beijing (Gallo 2021). Yoon’s explicit alignment with the United States seems to be based on personal belief, though couched in the language of universal, not U.S., values. Compared to previous South Korean presidents, Yoon is rather unique in using the word freedom in his speeches. In his inaugural NATO, UN General Assembly, and U.S. state visit speeches, President Yoon emphasized freedom as the most important universal value to be protected individually and collectively. Three speeches reveal his thinking on freedom as a political value:   ㆍ In his inaugural speech on May 9, 2022, Yoon revealed his philosophy of freedom. To overcome external and internal crises, he said, “Belief in shared values is paramount … And the most important core value is freedom.” He went on, saying that, “Human history shows that when political and economic freedom reigns supreme, that is where prosperity and abundance flourished. When prosperity and economic freedom flourishes, that is when freedom reaches even the darkest corners. Freedom is a universal value. Every citizen and every member of society must be able to enjoy freedom. If one’s freedom is infringed upon or left uncorrected, this is an assault on everyone’s freedom … everyone must be guaranteed the right to receive quality education and everyone must be granted the freedom to access and experience various cultural activities” (Yoon 2022b).   ㆍ In his UN General Assembly speech titled “Freedom and Solidarity: Answers to the Watershed Moment,” Yoon’s belief in freedom as an individual right to escape poverty and receive quality education led him to support global health funds. He introduced his speech by highlighting human rights violations globally and appealed for solidarity for freedom and commitment to norms consolidated within the UN framework. “Today, the global community is yet again witnessing freedom and peace of its citizens put in jeopardy,” he said. “Attempts to alter the status quo by force endanger the lives of innocent people; nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction pose increasing threats to humanity; pervasive violations of human rights leave millions of children deprived of their future. Such threats to freedom and peace must be overcome through solidarity and fearless commitment to the framework of universal global norms consolidated over the years within the UN framework” (Yoon 2022c).   ㆍ In his April 23, 2023, address to the joint meeting of the U.S. Congress commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, titled “Alliance of Freedom, Alliance of Action,” Yoon said that “[t]ogether with the U.S., Korea will play the role as a ‘compass for freedom.’ It will safeguard and broaden the freedom of citizens of the world” (Yoon 2023).   In addition to Yoon’s speeches, two reports released during the past half year detail the direction of the Yoon government’s foreign policy. South Korea’s overriding national interests—security, prosperity, and a heightened international profile—are described as better served by advocating for universal values and cooperating with like-minded states. Both reports emphasize the benefits of harmonizing normative values and the national interest, a strategy referred to as contributive diplomacy.   ㆍ The Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in December 2022, argues that the region’s peace and prosperity are better preserved when those values are kept. The report says that as a trade-dependent democracy, South Korea’s next leap forward relies on a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region and that South Korea will remain committed to promoting freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. International cooperation to promote the rule of law and human rights is noted as one of nine core lines of the Yoon government’s Indo-Pacific strategy.   ㆍ The National Security Strategy, released in June 2023, proclaims that “as a global pivotal state grounded in the spirit of freedom and solidarity, the Republic of Korea endeavors to actively address the rapidly evolving security environment. … Undoubtedly, pursuing freedom will continue to present us with even more opportunities, while maintaining solidarity will pave the way for an even greater future. Therefore, we commit to joining hands with the international community to safeguard universal values, such as freedom, human rights, and the rule of law, and to uphold the international order based on rules and principles.” In the section titled Defending Liberal Democracy and Contributing to Global Prosperity, advancing leadership in multilateral diplomacy to uphold a rules-based international order is prioritized. Expanding official development assistance and peacekeeping operations are mentioned as its tools. Supporting the realization of humanitarian values is described as one of major points of international development assistance. Continuing the provision of humanitarian support to war-stricken Ukrainians is pointed out as an example.   Actions Taken to Promote Liberal Norms   The Yoon government was vocal at the United Nations in condemning human rights violations by China and North Korea. The Yoon government also supported Biden’s democracy agenda by cohosting the second Summit for Democracy. During its efforts to normalize bilateral relations with Japan, the Yoon government emphasized shared values within the Korea-Japan partnership. Some of the notable actions taken by the Yoon government in its values-based diplomacy include the following:   ㆍ Joining UN voting to check China’s human rights violations. In October 2022, the forty-seven-member UN Human Rights Council voted on a resolution to hold a debate the following year on alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China. This highly debated resolution was rejected by a narrow margin of nineteen votes against to seventeen in favor, with eleven abstentions. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Michele Taylor noted that evidence of human rights violations in China’s Xinjiang province was recorded in a previous UN report and that it was crucial to hold a debate in a neutral forum. The report, issued on August 31, 2022, by former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, documents credible evidence of torture or other ill-treatment against the Uyghur minority and states that the violations could constitute crimes against humanity (Schlein 2022). However, the United States was unable to secure enough swing states to keep the issue on the UN agenda (Wintour 2022). South Korea’s vote against China is a clear departure from previous South Korean governments that had avoided condemning China’s human rights violations in the United Nations.   ㆍ Becoming assertive on North Korea’s human right issues. The Yoon government cosponsored a UNHRC resolution (Kim 2023), adopted on April 4, 2023, denouncing North Korea’s gross human rights violations, a break from the Moon Jae-in government’s five years of muted criticism (BBC News Korea 2022). This followed South Korea’s cosponsoring of the UN General Assembly’s resolution on North Korea’s human rights violations that was adopted on November 15, 2022. Previous progressive governments in South Korea had been less vocal about North Korea’s human right issues in the United Nations due to their priority on improving inter-Korean relations.   ㆍ Hosting the Summit for Democracy. The South Korean government hosted the ministerial Indo-Pacific Regional Meeting of the second Summit for Democracy, titled “Challenges and Progress in Addressing Corruption,” in Seoul on March 30, 2023 (MOFA 2023). The participating Indo-Pacific countries adopted the Seoul Declaration on Challenges and Progress in Addressing Corruption, reaffirming the importance of promoting democracy and the need to combat corruption. President Yoon called the meeting an opportunity to affirm the willingness to implement the Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, and attached great significance to Indo-Pacific countries reaffirming their commitment to protect democracy. He also stated that to repay the international community for its support for South Korea’s democratization, South Korea would implement development cooperation projects worth $100 million over the next three years in areas such as the e-government framework, digital transformation, strengthening technological capabilities, transparency, and anti-corruption efforts. The “democracy promotion for future generations,” a 1.5 track youth forum, will also be carried out by South Korea to contribute to shared values. Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin stated that the international community should utilize the Summit of Democracy as an opportunity to cooperatively protect democratic principles and stressed South Korea as a living testament to the truth that democracy remains the most effective means to freedom, peace, and prosperity.   ㆍ Embracing Japan as a partner for rules-based order. Regardless of ideological differences between progressives and conservatives, all South Korean leaders have emphasized their commitment to preserving the rules-based order. The May 21, 2021, Biden-Moon joint statement stated that the two countries “oppose all activities that undermine, destabilize, or threaten the rules-based international order and commit to maintaining an inclusive, free, and open Indo-Pacific” (The White House 2021). The freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea and beyond was included, and the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait was emphasized. A year later, less than two weeks after President Yoon’s inauguration, the May 21, 2022, Biden-Yoon Joint Statement envisioned a “heightened role in advancing freedom, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond,” and noted their respect for international law including freedom of navigation, overflight, and other lawful use of the seas, including in the South China Sea (The White House 2022). In this sense, both Moon and Yoon showed the same support for the standing rules-based order. However, the fundamental difference between Moon and Yoon is their contrasting positions on diplomacy toward Japan. In his 2022 Liberation Day speech, Yoon stated that Japan is Korea’s partner as they face common threats to the freedom of global citizens, and that the two countries can move to resolve their historical problems by collaborating on shared universal values (Lee 2022). Despite strong criticism from the opposition party, Yoon initiated a de facto resolution for the dispute over wartime conscripted labor that has historically strained Korea-Japan relations.   ㆍ Engaging Europe through liberal values. Yoon’s rules-based order expands to Europe. At the June 29, 2022, NATO summit, Yoon, the first Korean leader to attend a NATO summit as an observer, said, “[a]s a new structure of competitions and conflicts is taking shape, there is also a movement that denies the universal values that we have been protecting.” Voice of America quoted an anonymous South Korean official who stated that Yoon was referring to the Ukraine war, and like most countries, raised concerns about Russia’s and China’s respective responsibility (Shin 2022). Ten months later, Yoon condemned Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in the Biden-Yoon joint statement and clearly implied that the “global comprehensive strategic alliance” between the United States and South Korea is equally applied to the war in Europe as the alliance rooted in shared values. The South Korean government has offered $100 million worth of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine so far.   Recommendations for Sustaining the South Korean Government’s Value Diplomacy   The South Korean government under Yoon has pursued value diplomacy to an unprecedented degree. If this policy shift is to continue, three factors should be considered: the backlash to South Korea’s relations with China, domestic politics inside South Korea, and potential political changes in U.S. leadership.   ㆍ China has been criticizing the United States’ formation of smaller coalitions as weakening the United Nations. In response to the U.S. narrative of democracy vs. autocracy, China has pushed a counternarrative arguing that its political structure is a different, better-functioning form of democracy. When South Korea hosted the second Summit for Democracy, China criticized South Korea as championing U.S. ideology rather than universal values as Yoon claimed. As conflicts mount between South Korea and China, economic retaliation and icy diplomatic relations could grow, similar to China’s 2016 economic retaliation over South Korea’s deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in Sangju. To make South Korea’s democracy diplomacy sustainable, narratives of universal values need to include China as a partner in certain areas. It will be very challenging for South Korea to address China’s human rights violations and, at the same time, engage China in commonly valued areas such as youth and women’s rights. South Korea should consider cooperating with European democracies and international organizations as it tries to adapt its values diplomacy to China.   ㆍ According to a 2022 survey by the East Asia Institute, China is disliked and mistrusted, and about twice as many Koreans answered that South Korea should take a tougher position against China’s human rights violations. When asked which country was more favorable, 56.7 percent of South Koreans answered the United States while only 10.9 percent answered China. The United States is also ten times more trusted than China, as 85.1 percent of South Koreans answered that they trust the United States while only 8.2 percent answered that they trust China. This clear preference for the United States over China is also demonstrated in value alignment: 86.1 percent agreed that a strong U.S.-South Korea alliance is natural as both countries share values and orientations. When asked if South Korea should take a similar stance as other democratic countries in taking a tougher position against China’s human rights violations, 60.7 percent answered yes while 27.5 percent didn’t feel the need.   ㆍ However, economic concerns are likely to influence South Korean attitudes. South Korea has been facing economic difficulties including an unprecedented trade deficit with China. South Korea’s post-pandemic economic growth still relies on the Chinese market. Opponents of Yoon’s values diplomacy argue that it is likely to hurt South Korea’s economic interests by provoking China. Korean businesses are now building bigger factories in the United States for a stable supply chain, which is expected to decrease South Korea’s trade dependence on China. During this transitional period, Yoon should counter the economic loss argument at home. In this aspect, whether the Biden administration can extend subsidies to Korean firms operating battery factories in the United States or exempt Korean semiconductor manufacturers in China from restrictions will be important issues for Yoon to secure domestic support for values diplomacy.   ㆍ The Yoon government’s values diplomacy dovetails with South Korea’s alliance with the United States and the Biden administration’s adoption of diplomacy supporting democracy. This means that a possible government change in the United States—and consequently weaker support for democracies abroad—could dampen Yoon’s initiative in advocating universal values and contributing to democracy assistance. Therefore, regardless of new leadership following the U.S. presidential election in 2024, bipartisan recognition of Yoon’s initiative and accompanying support will be desirable.   Conclusion   Amid the intensifying ideological competition between the United States and China, the Yoon government has aligned with the United States normatively, risking souring relations with China. President Yoon’s consistent messages of commitment to freedom and human rights have been articulated through a series of speeches and accompanying major national reports on foreign policy. Several concrete actions, such as joining the UN Human Rights Council, voting against China, and hosting the Summit for Democracy, have followed. Reversing diplomacy toward Japan and supporting Ukraine with noncombatant support have followed the logic of democratic cooperation. In order for the Yoon government’s values diplomacy to sustain, engaging China in common interests and cultural values, securing economic gains from values diplomacy, and consistent U.S. democracy diplomacy will be critical. ■   References     BBC News Korea. 2022. “북한인권: 유엔, 북한 인권결의안 채택… 한국 또 공동제안국 불참.” April 2. https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-60964381 Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgott, Kim R. Nossal. 1993. Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. University of British Columbia Press: 1-118.   Gallo, William. 2021. “S. Korean Conservatives Vow to Get Tougher on China.” Voice of America. November 23. https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korean-conservatives-vow-to-get-tougher-on-china-/6324216.html   Kim, Soo-yeon. 2023. “UNHRC adopts resolution on N. Korea’s human rights.” Yonhap News Agency. April 4. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230404010851320   Lee, Haye-ah. 2022. “Full text of Yoon’s Liberation Day speech.” Yonhap News Agency. August 15. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220815001600315   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. 2022. “우크라이나 추가 인도적 지원 결정.” Press Release. June 21. https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=372432   ____________________________________________________. 2023. “Indo-Pacific Regional Meeting of 2nd Summit for Democracy Takes Place.” Press Releases. April 10. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322175&page=1   Office of National Security. 2023. “The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration’s National Security Straegy: Global Pivotal State for Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity.” June 8. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_25772/view.do?seq=16&page=1   Schlein, Lisa. 2022. “UN Council Rejects Uyghur Resolution on China by Narrow Margin.” Voice of America. October 6. https://www.voanews.com/a/6778903.html   Shin, Hyonhee. 2022. “South Korea’s Yoon warns at NATO summit of threat to ‘universal values.’” Reuters. June 30. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-warns-nato-summit-threat-universal-values-2022-06-30/   The Government of the Republic of Korea. 2022. “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Propserous Indo-Pacific Region.” December 28. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133   The White House. 2021. “U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement.” Statements and Releases. May 21. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/   _______________. 2022. “United States-Republic of Kore Leaders’ Joint Statement.” Statements and Releases. May 21. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/#:~:text=President%20Yoon%20and%20President%20Biden%20reaffirm%20their%20commitment%20to%20maintain,South%20China%20Sea%20and%20beyond   Wintour, Patrick. 2022. “UN vote to ignore human rights abuses in China leaves west in dead end.” The Guardian. October 6. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/06/un-vote-ignore-human-rights-abuses-china-leaves-west-dead-end   Yoon, Suk Yeol. 2022a. “South Korea Needs to Step Up.” Foreign Affairs. February 8. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2022-02-08/south-korea-needs-step   ______________. 2022b. “Inaugural Address by President Yoon Suk Yeol.” Office of the President of the Republic of Korea. May 10. https://eng.president.go.kr/speeches/kJDwcanX   ______________. 2022c. “Freedom and Solidarity: Answers to the Watershed Moment.” Office of the President of the Republic of Korea. September 20. https://eng.president.go.kr/speeches/qY7JzqeX   ______________. 2023. “Alliance of Freedom, Alliance in Action.” Office of the President Republic of Korea. April 27. https://eng.president.go.kr/speeches/dZfAH6rj     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute and the Representative of the Asia Democracy Research Network.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park , Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

※ This issue briefing has been published as a sequel to the ADRN-International IDEA Joint Online Seminar, titled "Climate Change and Democracy.” Joo-Cheong Tham (Professor, Melbourne Law School) spoke about the major findings of the recently-published “Climate Change and Democracy: Insights from Asia and the Pacific” report by the International IDEA, while Niranjan Sahoo (Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation), Marlea P. Munez (President, Women’s Initiaitves for Society, Culture, and Environment), and Tsuji Yuichiro (Professor, Meiji University) presented their respective country cases. For more details of the event, please follow this link.   Asia is the most populous and one of the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world. Long coastline, vast low lying areas comprising many small island nations make it highly susceptible to climate change such as rising sea level and extreme weather events like floods, landslides. For many critics, democracies' response to climate change is much impeded due to their slow decision-making process and short-termism governed by electoral compulsions. Some analysts go as far as to claim that authoritarianism is needed to tackle the crisis more effectively.   However, close examination of different governance structure's climate actions strongly supports that democracies are inherently better at handling climate crisis compared to authoritarian regimes. This article explores the multifaceted impact of climate change to democracy and delves into the case studies of India, the Philippines, and Japan to identify strengths as well as areas of improvement that democracies should consider to establish meaningful climate actions.   Climate Change: A Risk and an Opportunity for Democracy     Climate change not only threatens the natural environment but also undermines the very fabric of democracy. The perils it poses to democratic societies encompass food insecurity, deepening inequality, societal instability, the erosion of democratic values, and threats to the integrity of free and fair elections. The prevalence of short-term thinking, the capture of policies by vested interests, self-referential decision-making, and the weakening of multilateralism all hinder the concerted and efficient efforts required to address the urgent climate crisis at hand.   Nevertheless, research proves that democracy centrally matters in addressing climate change (Tham et al. 2023). Democratic governance plays a pivotal role in shaping climate action and responding to the threats that arise from climate crisis to democratic framework. However, the following circumstances also matter: the level of climate vulnerability; the extent of state capacity and resources; the dependence on international funding; and the structure of the economy, specifically the significance of climate-vulnerable industries and fossil fuel industries.   There are both threats to and from the state regarding the implementation of efficient climate actions. Threats to the state manifest as conflicts arising from escalating food and land scarcity, while threats from the state stem from top-down decision-making processes. As extreme weather events like floods, droughts, and bushfires become increasingly prevalent, the climate crisis is inevitably rising to the top of the political agenda. Politics will have to grapple with these calamities, leading to an amplified role for the government in managing these emergencies.   The extreme danger that climate change poses to democracy also includes opportunities to improve the quality of democracy. It includes the “democratic planning state,” which stipulates that states can plan for the future in a democratic way (Tham et al. 2023, 27). Additionally, fostering an ethos of solidarity that embraces broad inclusivity and intergenerational collaboration, encompassing solidarity between nature and humans, is essential. Revitalized multilateralism and the promotion of fair and inclusive politics, ensuring a just transition, are also of utmost importance.   In the context where the deep nexus between democratic actors and vested interest groups has been somewhat neglected, there should be more innovations in the democratic planning state. Additionally, policy recommendations encompass revitalizing multilateralism, drawing valuable insights from communities most vulnerable to climate change, and establishing effective democratic mechanisms as the basis for international funding allocation. These measures will enable a path toward more inclusive, accountable, and effective democratic responses to the climate challenges.   Case Study #1: India     Climate change debates are increasingly taking the center stage in India’s policy circles. This is largely because of India’s growing vulnerabilities to climate change events. The world’s largest democracy faces most acute challenges from the vagaries of climate change. There are climate refugees and migrants without economic support to sustain their lives.   While the Indian Constitution has evolved to cover issues relating to environmental protection and sustainable development, comprehensive action against the climate crisis is still hindered due to an absence of overarching national institution and national legislation specifically dealing with the challenges of climate change.   At the federal level, India’s Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change is the most central organization that mobilizes national response and coordinates statutory bodies on the environment. However, its climate response continues to remain centralized and top-down under successive governments at the centre. A noteworthy feature of India’s climate response is that the higher judiciary has been particularly acclaimed for taking hundreds of litigations and cases that shaped the cumulative national response to climate change and environmental protection.   Meanwhile, real actions have also been taking place at the sub-national level. State governments have been building regional partnerships, investing in climate mitigation strategies, and launching green initiatives. Meanwhile, at the local level, the governing bodies are increasingly instituting climate-friendly policies and civil societies are putting great effort into bringing climate change initiatives to the mainstream. Numerous activists have been at the forefront of innovative environmental movements, and many pioneering civil society organizations are carrying out advocacy work to reframe global debate on climate change.   The major challenges to India’s democracy are political short-termism that is exacerbated by hesitancy and incrementalism, competitive populism, and low state capacity. In particular, India’s competitive federal structure means the sub-national governments and adversarial politics block a coherent national response. Furthermore, under-funding and limited empowerment of vital institutions mean many of India’s areas that are fragile to climate change risks remain extremely vulnerable to frequent climate disasters.   Nevertheless, there is still hope that India’s democracy will be able to respond to climate change. India’s democratic institutions are paying closer attention to climate threats and they are increasingly becoming key electoral issues. Deliberative aspects of democracy led to the National Action Plan of Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008. India has also expanded its reliance on renewable energy since COP 21 and increasing multilateral efforts such as the Solar Alliance in 2015 and the 2020 Roadmap that is in collaboration with the U.K.   Case study #2: The Philippines     In the Philippines, the discourse surrounding climate change and democracy revolves around the role of natural resources. During the martial law period, there was widespread exploitation of these resources, resulting in significant degradation and a decline in productivity in many regions. The post-martial law era witnessed a concerted effort to democratize access to and management of natural resources.   Climate governance in the Philippines traces its origin back to the implementation of the Bill of Rights, which upholds the rights to life and rights to equal protection under the law. Furthermore, the Constitution recognizes the economic, social, and cultural rights of indigenous cultural communities. The Indigenous Peoples' Act establishes democratic principles that grant them rights to their lands and outlines procedures for land management.   To effectively address climate change, the Philippine government has established a structured approach. The Climate Change Action was reformed to the Task Force on Climate Change, and the Climate Change Commission has been positioned directly under the Office of the President, highlighting its significance. Additionally, a dedicated group was created to focus on adaptation and mitigation efforts. At the national level, the Philippines embraces participatory approaches to planning, involving government bodies, NGOs, and diverse communities in the consultation process for national frameworks and strategies. This inclusive approach ensures that different perspectives are considered in the pursuit of effective climate governance.   However, the performance of democracy in the Philippines has been disappointing. For democracy to work, concrete sets of actions that address the country's specific vulnerabilities are required. The paramount importance lies in crafting rules and laws that are practical and yield tangible results, rather than simply aiming for widespread community consensus. The key is to actively encourage all stakeholders to participate in the implementation of climate actions, as their engagement is vital to achieving meaningful progress.   When considering the ongoing debate between authoritarianism and democracy in effectively addressing the climate crisis, democracies continue to hold an advantage. The democratic framework enables greater public participation, fostering transparency and accountability by allowing individuals to demand due diligence. Democracy also nurtures an environment conducive to innovation and diversity, facilitating the development of novel approaches to combat the climate crisis. Furthermore, democracy upholds the principles of respect for others and recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples.   Case Study #3: Japan     Japan’s energy self-sufficiency is low as Japan relies on fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and LNG that are imported from overseas. In fact, Japan is dependent on other countries for nearly 85% of its energy resources. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has further affected Japan’s energy policy. Japan aims to increase the usage of power generation methods such as renewable energy and nuclear power to 59% in 2030. This will increase the energy self-sufficiency ratio to 30% by 2030.   One obstacle for Japan's implementation of climate actions is that the government’s policy process has been heavily influenced by interest groups such as the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren). Keidanren, in particular, has a significant impact on Japan’s political processes and supports policies that maintain thermal power plants. This is an obstacle to democracy as interest groups exerting strong influences on the government can impact policy decisions. If a powerful interest group comes into play, the representatives in parliament will lean toward satisfying its needs over all else.   Another significant challenge for Japan's democracy lies in the lack of sufficient public discourse regarding the public's willingness to bear the risks associated with government policies. In a democracy, “popular sovereignty” implies that the public assumes the risks resulting from their choices, while the government bears the responsibility of explaining policy decisions. Unfortunately, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has shown reluctance in being held accountable for policies that directly impact the lives of the public, and has failed to engage the entire nation in comprehensive deliberative discussions.   Japan maintains government accountability through parliamentary politics, where the government elucidates its fundamental national policies and each faction has the chance to pose “representative” questions to the prime minister or ministers. However, in practice, opposition parties sometimes fail to effectively engage in demanding explanations from the government regarding the risks associated with energy policies. In essence, it is imperative that Japan's energy policy becomes a subject of public concern, which can subsequently foster greater government accountability in addressing potential future risks.   Conclusion     In short, it is evident that democratic societies face challenges in effectively responding to the escalating threats of climate change. However, the presence of short-termism driven by competitive party politics, cumbersome and sluggish decision-making processes, and the intertwining of business interests with politics are impeding the adoption of bold and timely policy responses from key democratic nations in Asia.   Despite the flaws in their responses, it is still reasonable to conclude that democracies, with their inherent openness and well-established checks and accountability, are significantly better equipped than authoritarian regimes to address the intricate challenges posed by climate change. Authoritarianism lacks the necessary safeguards against abuse and often conceals key decision-making processes. It is crucial to recognize that climate change is an inter-generational and moral problem. Its holistic nature necessitates a comprehensive approach, making democracy naturally more suitable to effectively tackle these issues. ■   Reference   Tham, Joo-Cheong et al. 2023. "Climate Change and Democracy: Insights from Asia and the Pacific.” International IDEA. June: 1-239. https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2023.25     ■ Niranjan Sahoo, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation's Governance and Politics Initiative. ■ Jisoo Park is a Research Associate at the East Asia Institute.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

Australia has benefitted from the international rules-based order for more than 70 years. The vision of a region governed by democratic norms, international rules and robust multilateral engagement has not only supported Australia’s economic and social progress (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 2017, 12), but helped to form Australia’s understanding of its place in the world and its identity as an international actor. As the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper states “Australia does not define its national identity by race or religion, but by shared values, including political, economic and religious freedom, liberal democracy, the rule of law, racial and gender equality and mutual respect.” (DFAT 2017, 11). Indeed, these liberal democratic principles shared with the United States are key to the trust and mutual understanding that underwrites the US-Australian alliance and growing cooperation with Korea and other democracies as Australia seeks to navigate complex twenty-first century challenges (Wong 2023).   Key among the challenges is China’s growing influence, military build-up and attempts to ‘rewrite the rules’ in Australia’s near region. Strategic competition between the United States and China is increasingly a contest of alternative narratives and visions for how the Indo Pacific region should operate. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, in a speech to the National Press Club in April 2023, made this geopolitical dynamic unmistakably clear, stating: “strategic competition is not merely about who is top dog, who is ahead in the race, or who holds strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific. It’s actually about the character of the region. It’s about the rules and norms that underpin our security and prosperity, that ensure our access with an open and inclusive region, and that manage competition responsibly” (Wong 2023).   The ideological dimension of China’s aspirations for unchallenged regional primacy, and its illiberal and coercive behaviour both domestically and throughout the region, stand contrary to the agreed upon norms and regional character that Australia favours. At home, China’s behaviour has included the repression and jailing of dissidents, extensive censorship of media, and widespread human rights violations in Xinjiang. Such domestic actions are increasingly congruous with China’s engagement in the region, where its efforts to undermine democratic norms include economic coercion, bribery, and escalating territorial disputes with its neighbours.   Canberra has itself faced extensive pressure from China to undermine Australia’s sovereignty and commitment to democracy– most notably detailed in Beijing’s sharing of 14 grievances with Australia in 2020 (Kearlsey 2020a, 2020b). As a well-developed democracy allied with the United States, Australia has remained resolute in the face of such pressure (Department of Home Affairs 2023). Beyond its shores, however, Canberra is increasingly concerned about China’s efforts in the region, which features far less robust democratic rules and norms. Among Australia’s top concerns is the way these actions may disrupt regional stability, exacerbate geopolitical tensions (Wong 2023), as well as compromise states’ sovereignty — their ability to disagree, be self-determined and exercise choice. China’s actions and the resilience of these regional democracies will ultimately have significant impacts on Australia’s own national security.   The Complexities of Middle Power   While the use of the term is contested (Abbondanza 2022; Carr 2014), recognising Australia’s status as a “middle power” and its close though qualitatively different relationship with both the United States and China is essential to understanding the Australian approach to supporting a democratic order in the Indo Pacific. Australia may be ideologically aligned with the United States about the challenges that China’s ambitions present to the international rules-based order; but, as a middle power, the extent to which Australia alone can rebuff Beijing’s illiberal behaviour, both domestically and in the region, and withstand the potential consequences of such action, is limited.   That is not to say Australia’s commitment to standing up for a democratically led order in the region is weakly held, or that Australia will merely follow in the footsteps of other, more powerful, regional players. On the contrary, Australia has often pursued its interest in a rules-based Indo Pacific without prompting and at considerable expense. This was no more evident than Australia’s experience of Chinese economic coercion following its call for an inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus in May 2020. Rather, Australia’s middle power status means its pursuit of democratic standards involve more difficult strategic calculations.   For Australia, like many other nations in the Indo Pacific, China is an indispensable trading partner and maintaining positive and cooperative engagement with China is a strategic necessity. Nearly 30 percent of Australia’s two-way trade in goods and services, totalling A$287 billion in 2022, is with China alone (DFAT 2022), and China represents the number one destination for many of Australia’s top exports, including coal, iron ore, wine and petroleum gas (Interesse 2023). A stable relationship with China is therefore vital to Australia’s interests and certainly informs how Australia has and will negotiate disparities in the two major powers’ competing visions for the character of the region.   Beijing’s willingness to weaponise economic relations was evident in the massive embargo imposed on Australian exports of wheat, wine, coal and other products in response to the Australian government’s call for an international investigation of the origins of the COVID pandemic. Both Coalition and Labor governments refused to bend to Beijing’s pressure campaign, diversifying its market of effected exports to partners with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and India doubling their purchase of Australian goods since 2019 (Uren 2023). Yet, Australia’s perception of risk in its relationship with China extend beyond trade and include considerations like cybersecurity, foreign investment and interference in the politics (Packham 2018) and have led Australia to strengthen security ties with the United States and others through AUKUS and the Quad. While wearing the fallout in economic relations from China well, Canberra remains careful about which fights it will pick with Beijing. As clarified by Foreign Minister Wong’s speech, the government’s policy on China is to “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must, manage our differences wisely, and above all else, engage in and vigorously pursue our own national interest” (Wong 2023).   Beyond resisting and rebuking China’s illiberal trade behaviours, Australia’s pursuit of its national interest in such a contested geopolitical environment will require Australia to have, according to Minister Wong, “a response of unprecedented coordination and ambition in [its] statecraft” (Wong 2023) and for Australian policymakers to view diplomatic strategy as needing as much vigour and sophistication as traditional deterrence and security strategies. The Albanese government’s increased diplomatic efforts have seen it ramp up Australia’s bilateral diplomatic engagement in the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia, including the delivery of the largest increase to Australia’s overseas development assistance since 2011–12, and the launch of a parliamentary inquiry in September 2022 to evaluate how Australia might promote democratic institutions and support civil society in the region. The resultant report is expected shortly.   Working Together: Australia's Advantages   Amid new geopolitical imperatives, and this new era of Australian ‘statecraft’, Australia cannot afford complacency, and will need to maximise its existing advantages to support regional democracies and the rules-based order. Like its response to emerging security threats and military developments from Beijing, Australia can similarly overcome some of the complications and limitations of its middle power status by cooperating more closely with likeminded states in pursuit of mutual interests.   When it comes to diplomacy, Australia has a key role to play leading multi-state efforts that bolster democratic resilience in the region. Australia has historically punched above its middle power status and outperformed several of its more militarily- and economically- advanced peers (Lowy Institute 2023). Australia’s development and election assistance is more sizeable than any other in the Pacific Islands region (National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and United States Studies Center (USSC) 2023). The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade leads several sophisticated development programs designed to enhance the economic prosperity of small island states including the Pacific Step Up and Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme (DFAT 2023). And, in its history, has led peace keeping missions in several Pacific Islands and Southeast Asian countries, including in Cambodia, Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands (Bishop 2013). When it comes to multidimensional statecraft, Australia appears to be an overachiever (Piper and Patton 2023).   While committed to advancing democratic norms in its foreign policy, Australia usually takes a more circumspect approach to framing foreign policy around democracy. One example is the current Labor government’s formula for regional strategy. Called a “free and open Indo Pacific” approach by the Biden and Kishida governments, Australia’s closely aligned strategy towards the region goes under the monicker “peaceful and prosperous Indo-Pacific.” In a strategic competition marked by a battle over narratives, this difference is noteworthy in terms of signalling if not substance. Nevertheless, Australia, like Japan and others, implicitly acknowledges that the continuation of US-led liberal values is within regional states’ interests for a peaceful and stable region, and that interconnected democracies do better at averting conflict and maintaining peace. In some respects, Australia’s support for NGOs in the Indo-Pacific both directly and through NGOs such as The Asia Foundation, stands in contrast to Japan and Korea’s approach, which still rely overwhelmingly on seeking approval from host governments to support civil society, even when those governments are authoritarian and hostile to independent civil society. Australia also far outspends other donors on women’s empowerment in the region as a percentage of overall assistance (a new gender strategy is currently under review in DFAT).   The debate about democracy support is often framed in a bipolar construct –often by Beijing, which claims all of Asia shares its scepticism of democracy –and sometimes by Washington, which sometimes lumps Asian democracies in with Western European democracies as occurred in the 2021 Summit for Democracy. In fact, the Indo-Pacific order has strong multipolar dynamics which affords democracies like Australia, Korea or Japan the opportunity to frame democracy more directly in terms of self-strengthening and resilience that will resonate with developing Southeast Asia and the Pacific. This approach would complement and add nuance to the US-led approach and could prove, as Minister Wong said in her speech at the UN General Assembly in 2022, that middle powers are “more than just supporting players in a grand drama of global geopolitics” (Wong 2022).   A Way Forward   As Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report for 2023 portends, freedom in the Asia-Pacific region may have improved slightly in recent times, but the challenge for democracies to uphold and defend their democracies against corruption, human rights violations and pressure from authoritarian regimes persists unabated (Freedom House 2023). There are three areas for regional cooperation where Australia has advantages and aligns with its policy orientation on democracy support that are worth further consideration.   The first is the expansion of development finance and infrastructure initiatives. While Beijing advances development finance and infrastructure programs, like the Belt and Road Initiative, that are seen to pose a security risk to Australian interests, Australia and other like-minded democracies can work together to provide alternatives by establishing the architecture for transparent and fair development programs. Australia’s middle power status and experience in the region allows it to have a unique role in this regard. As Penny Wong said in her press club speech, “we want Australia to be a partner of choice for the countries of our region. Partners, not patriarchs.” Many existing arrangements, including the Quad and the Blue Dot Network – the trilateral partnership between Japan, Australia and the United States – are attempting to establish these mechanisms as credible alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In combination with a continued focus on enhancing the development aid budgets of each allied nation, these allied efforts will ultimately bolster democratic outcomes and help defend against the malign efforts of economic exploitation of vulnerable developing states.   Second, and relatedly, Australia can redouble its efforts in economic development and women’s political and economic empowerment. Evident in the impetus for Australia’s economic programs in the Pacific, Australia’s foreign policy recognises the linkages between economic development and regional stability. It similarly expects women’s empowerment to multiply the effect of positive foreign policy outcomes and engagement. The research on this relationship is instructive. For example, research by the Council on Foreign Relations has found that when women’s representation in parliament improves by just five per cent, a country is almost five times less likely to respond to crises with violence (Robinson and James 2023), and that women’s involvement in peace negotiations makes them significantly longer lasting and less likely to fail (Council on Foreign Relations n.d.). DFAT’s Pacific Women Lead program, which has A$170 million budgeted over five years from 2021–26 to fund and partner with civil society organisations that advance women’s equality, is but one example of Australia’s engagement in this space. Australia, using the models established in its Pacific Step Up and Labour Mobility Scheme, can lead the charge of regional partners collaborating on their efforts.   Finally, Australia can work with other states towards the development of tools for overcoming corruption. As the 2023 Sunnylands Statement on Enhancing Democratic Partnership states, “tackling internal and transnational corruption [is] … a key opportunity for democracy advocates to demonstrate collaboratively that democracy delivers better governance and economic results for citizens” (NED and USSC 2023). Australia strongly upholds the values of openness, transparency and accountability and is recognised for doing so. It is therefore well placed to champion international standards on anti-corruption with other regional states. Working with other nations in the region, this might look like the establishment of an anti-corruption watchdog and accountability mechanisms that monitor trends of corruption and best approaches to holding leaders and agency accountable. For one thing, Australia could lead the charge developing policy approaches that might and resourcing the data collection and intel needed to prosecute and investigate instances of corruption in vulnerable states.   Reference   Abbondanza, Gabriele. 2022. “Whither the Indo-Pacific? Middle power strategies from Australia, South Korea and Indonesia.” International Affairs 98, no. 2 (March 7): 403–421. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab231   Carr, Andrew. 2014. “Is Australia a Middle Power?” Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/is-australia-a-middle-power/   Bishop, Julie. 2013. “Strengthening democracy throughout the Asia Pacific.” Minister for Foreign Affairs. November 5. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/julie-bishop/media-release/strengthening-democracy-throughout-asia-pacific   Council on Foreign Relations. n.d. “Including Women at the Peace Table Produces Better Outcomes.” https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes   Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2017. 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: 1-122. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.pdf   _________________________________. 2022. “Trade and investment.” China country brief. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china-country-brief#:~:text=sister%2Dcity%20relationships.-,Trade%20and%20investment,our%20trade%20with%20the%20world   _________________________________. n.d. “Economic Prosperity in the Pacific.” https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/economic-prosperity-in-the-pacific   Freedom House. 2023. “NEW REPORT: Freedom in the Asia-Pacific Region Improved Slightly in 2022,” June 14. https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-freedom-asia-pacific-region-improved-slightly-2022   Interesse, Giulia. 2023. “China-Australia Trade Relations Growing Stronger.” China Briefing. February 6. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-australia-trade-relations-growing-stronger/   Kearsley, Jonathan. 2020. “China Shows Official List of Reasons for Anger with Australia.” 9News. November 18. https://www.9news.com.au/national/china-australia-tensions-beijing-government-grievance-list-with-canberra/adc10554-e4e9-4a19-970e-81949501a1ad   Kearsley, Jonathan (@jekearsley). 2020. “This is the list of 14 grievances China has with Australia. From banning Huawei from 5G, to calling for COVID inquiry and speaking out on Xinjiang and Hong Kong.” Twitter, November 18, 2020, 6:01pm. https://twitter.com/jekearsley/status/1328986579629613057?s=20   Lowy Institute. 2023. “Australia - Lowy Institute Asia Power Index.” https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/australia/   National Endowment for Democracy and United States Studies Center. 2023. “Sunnylands Joint Statement.” United States Stud Center. April 5. https://www.ussc.edu.au/research/the-sunnylands-initiative/sunnylands-joint-statement   Packham, Colin. 2018. “Australia amends proposed foreign interference law to offer protections for journalists - minister.” Reuters. February 8. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-australia-politics-foreign-idUKKBN1FR3BI   Piper, Hugh and Susannah Patton. 2023. “Taking Australian Statecraft from good to great.” Lowy Institute. March 13. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/taking-australian-statecraft-good-great   Robinson, Linda and Noël James. 2023. Council on Foreign Relations. “Women’s Power Index.” https://www.cfr.org/article/womens-power-index   Uren, David. 2023. “Why China’s Coercion of Australia Failed.” The Strategist. April 26. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-chinas-coercion-of-australia-failed/   Wong, Penny. 2023. “National Press Club Address, Australian interests in a regional balance of power.” Presented at the National Press Club Address, Australia. April 17. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-press-club-address-australian-interests-regional-balance-power   ___________. 2022. “National Statement to the UN General Assembly, New York.” Presented at the UN General Assembly, New York. September 23. https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-statement-un-general-assembly-new-york     ■ Michael J. Green is a Professor and CEO of the US Studies Centre in Sydney. ■ Victoria Cooper is a Research Editor at the US Studies Centre in Sydney.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]    

Introduction The 2023 general election in Thailand marks a critical juncture in the country’s trajectory, carrying significant implications for the prevailing ideological divisions and electoral dynamics that have defined its political landscape for over two decades. The progressive Move Forward Party (MFP) emerged as the largest bloc, capturing 151 seats in the 500-member House of Representatives, closely followed by the Thaksin Shinawatra-aligned Pheu Thai Party with 141 seats. In contrast, parties associated with the military generals involved in the May 2014 coup suffered substantial losses, with the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) and the United Thai Nation Party (UTN) securing only 40 and 36 seats, respectively.[1]   The resounding victory of the MFP not only represents a clear rejection of Thailand’s deeply entrenched conservative status quo but also signifies a determination to bring about a broader transformation in Thai politics. This transformation is currently unfolding across two distinct dimensions:(1) a departure from traditional political divisions rooted in urban-rural disparities, giving way to new generational and ideological cleavages centered around reforming the structural foundations of Thailand’s established political order; and (2) a decline in the influence of money politics, patronage networks, and political dynasties, as social media and social movements take center stage, becoming the driving mechanisms behind party-building and campaigning. Despite ongoing challenges that cast a shadow over the prospect of the MFP in forming a viable governing coalition, these developments underscore the far-reaching impact that the MFP’s dramatic rise has already brought to the political landscape in Thailand.   Shifting Landscape   The election held on May 14, 2023 was initially anticipated to be another chapter in the power struggle between the Shinawatra family and the conservative establishment in Thailand. This struggle began with the ousting of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in the 2006 coup d’état, leading to a prolonged period of political turmoil marked by color-coded street protests, crackdowns, government changes, and another military takeover in 2014 by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha.   In the post-coup general election of 2019 that was held on a deeply uneven playing field, Prayut emerged as the prime minister with backing from the military-aligned PPRP and coalition partners including the Democrat Party, the Bhumjaithai Party, and other smaller parties. The prime minister also enjoyed support of the NCPO-appointed Senate, which was empowered to jointly select the prime minister alongside the 500-member House of Representatives for the initial five years of Parliament. Referee institutions such as the Election Commission and Constitutional Court, operating under the influence of the NCPO, played a decisive role in shaping the election outcome by dissolving political parties and determining the party-list allocation method, ultimately securing a narrow majority for the pro-military coalition (Ricks 2019).   Over the course of four years, public dissatisfaction with the Prayut administration has grown due to its failure to effectively navigate the economic challenges posed by the Covid-19 crisis and its crackdowns on pro-democracy activists. The mounting difficulties facing Prayut’s leadership were further amplified by internal conflicts between him and General Prawit Wongsuwan, his brother-in-arms, deputy prime minister, and leader of the PPRP. The uncertainties surrounding the PPRP’s allegiance to Prayut eventually pushed him to sever ties with the party and join the UTN, a splinter party, in order to run as its candidate for prime minister in the 2023 elections.   The stage appeared set for a strong comeback by the Pheu Thai Party, which pledged to win the election by a landslide. It projected to secure as many as 310 seats and put forward Thaksin’s youngest daughter, Paetongtarn, as one of its prime ministerial candidates (The Bangkok Post 2023). However, contrary to expectations, it was the MFP that emerged victorious, overcoming the challenges posed by a new electoral sys-tem that removed the advantages previously enjoyed by its predecessor, the Future Forward Party (FFP), in terms of winning party-list seats. Ultimately, the political landscape was ripe for change, and this change took an unprecedented direction, with the MFP leading the way.   The Emergence of Generational and Ideological Divides   To a certain extent, the impressive victory of the MFP can be interpreted as an indication that the blueprint, which had consistently delivered successive election victories for Pheu Thai since 2001, is no longer as effective as it once was. Pheu Thai has long established itself as a party dedicated to advocating for the interests of the rural majority, a segment of society that has historically experienced political exclusion and economic marginalization within a sys-tem dominated by patronage-ridden politicians and a hyper-centralized bureaucracy accountable solely to itself (Tejapira 2006). In the context of unequal power dynamics and economic disparities between the rural poor and the affluent elites based in Bangkok, Pheu Thai and Thaksin pledged to bridge these divides by establishing a direct connection with its grassroots supporters through policies that have been labeled as populist (Pongsudhirak 2023). These policies include notable initiatives such as the introduction of the 30-baht universal healthcare program during the Thai Rak Thai (TRT)-led government and the controversial rice-pledging scheme implemented under Pheu Thai in 2011.   In the run-up to the 2023 general election, Pheu Thai reaffirmed its commitment to its longstanding tradition of crafting policies that directly benefit the economic well-being of the people. One of the policy initiatives at the forefront of its campaign was the ambitious promise to distribute 10,000 baht to all Thai citizens above the age of 16 through a digital wallet. Building on a sense of nostalgia, the party adopted the slogan “Think Big, Act Smart, For All Thais,” reminiscent of the TRT’s original slogan, and reassembled its team of policy architects, advisors, and leaders from the TRT era. These carefully orchestrated efforts aimed to project a sense of continuity and bolster Pheu Thai’s credibility, particularly in the realm of economic management. However, these efforts no longer guaranteed election victories. The desire for change in Thailand’s 2023 election extended beyond economic concerns, indicating a deeper shift in public sentiment.   The dissolution of the FFP and the subsequent crackdowns on pro-democracy activists advocating for monarchy reform from 2020 to 2022 have served as a wake-up call for a significant portion of Thai society, revealing the structural barriers that hinder meaningful participation in the democratic process (Unno 2022). This awareness is particularly strong among first-time and younger voters who grew up under a regime that sys-tematically stifled freedom of expression, suppressed the power of elected representatives, and prioritized the interests of oligarchic elites over broader societal welfare.   The MFP adeptly tapped into the prevailing disillusionment and deep yearning for structural change among these voters. With its pledge to reduce the military’s influence and amend Article 112, the lèse-majesté law, the party took a resolute stance in challenging the traditional centers of power in Thailand. Additionally, the MFP distinguished itself by refusing to form a coalition government with parties associated with the generals involved in the May 2014 coup. This set the MFP apart from Pheu Thai, which struggled to adopt a decisive or convincing stance from the beginning. As a result, the MFP secured the mandate of 14 million voters out of 41 million in the popular vote. This reflects a burgeoning yet substantial political base that is coalescing around issues that transcend the traditional urban-rural divisions. Such divisions have historically culminated in vicious cycle of power struggles between forces allied with Thaksin and those representing the conservative establishment. A broader aspiration for a more inclusive and accountable political sys-tem – a vision that the MFP has come to represent – now constitutes the new paradigm.   New Electoral Dynamics in the Age of Social Media and Social Movements   In addition to bringing an end to Pheu Thai’s winning streak and giving rise to new ideological divisions, the MFP’s remarkable success in toppling established factions and influential political dynasties poses an intriguing puzzle. The party successfully ousted entrenched families like the Asavahames in Samut Prakan, the Khunpluems in Chon Buri, and the Pitutechas in Rayong. In Thailand, constituency elections, especially outside Bangkok, have traditionally been dominated by candidates associated with political dynasties or factions that wield control over local patronage networks. These networks consist of local government officials, elected representatives, and community leaders who mobilize support for candidates by campaigning door-to-door, attending communal events, and offering personal favors or material benefits in return for votes (Chattharakul 2011). It is widely recognized that only large and well-funded parties can effectively sustain these candidate-network structures.   In contrast, the MFP has charted a different course by openly rejecting traditional campaign tactics. Yet, the party has successfully garnered support not only from urban voters, who often base their decisions on party labels and policies, but also from rural voters. These rural voters have long been characterized as either clients of patronage networks or beneficiaries of populist policies (Kongkirati 2012). The MFP’s success in gaining traction among these segments of the population is a significant achievement, challenging prevailing assumptions and narratives concerning rural voting behavior, as outlined in Anek Laothamatas’ influential work, “A Tale of Two Democracies” (Laothamatas 1996). This shift signifies not only a change in voter sentiments but also the emergence of new electoral dynamics that blur conventional urban-rural divisions.   This transformation can be attributed to two key factors: (1) the MFP’s reliance on social media as a campaigning strategy and (2) its connection to social movements that generate momentum in support of the party’s ideology. First, The MFP embraced a robust digital strategy to connect with and mobilize supporters. Leveraging platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and TikTok, the party effectively disseminated its message, engaged with the public, and organized campaign rallies. This approach allowed the MFP to circumvent traditional vote-canvassing networks and build its own network of “organic” vote canvassers. These canvassers voluntarily and actively created content for the party online, engaged with its activities, and interacted with its candidates. Offline, these followers function as a reserve army of rally attendees, mobilizing quickly to fill MFP rallies, documenting the events, and taking selfies with the party’s candidates. Mostly through the efforts of the party’s followers rather than its candidates or campaign teams, the party successfully established a strong presence both in the digital realm and in the physical world, with the influence of social media shaping real-world dynamics in profound ways.   Furthermore, by aligning itself with the pro-democracy social movements, the MFP has formed alliances with existing networks and communities of activists across the country that have become increasingly vocal since 2020, particularly in their calls for unprecedented reforms concerning the role of the Thai monarchy (Lertchoosakul 2023). Recognizing the shifting political landscape, the MFP transformed itself into a full-fledged movement-based party, adapting to new political realities and filling the vacuum that existed between the demands voiced by youth activists and the realm of parliamentary politics.   In a demonstration of solidarity, the MFP took action by bailing out detained activists and integrating them into its ranks, effectively giving them a platform to advocate for their causes and translating their agendas into tangible policies and legislative action. The party has been at the forefront of addressing a wide range of issues raised by the youth activists, including LGBTQ rights, anti-monopoly measures, and conscription reforms. By incorporating these agendas, the MFP not only draws strength from the movements but also serves as a vehicle for institutionalizing their goals and aspirations.   This symbiotic relationship between the pro-democracy social movements and MFP holds great significance within the context of Thai politics, where parties that oppose established powers are vulnerable to dissolution at the hands of courts—a pattern known as the judicialization of politics or lawfare (McCargo 2014). However, by firmly anchoring itself in social movements, which are often perceived as transient or short-lived, the MFP has established firm roots that enable the party to withstand legal challenges. This strategic alignment has not only broadened the MFP’s support base but has also contributed to its longevity and solidified its position as a driving force for transformative change in Thai politics. In turn, this alignment allows for the continuation of the movements’ ideological agendas within the framework of an established political entity, ensuring that voices and aspirations of the movements remain influential in shaping the policies and actions of the government.   Conclusion   The rise of the MFP in Thailand reflects a long-fomenting potential to transform Thai politics, moving away from old ideological fault lines and political dynamics. This transformation is marked by a commitment to engage in structural reforms of institutions previously deemed untouchable and the adoption of new avenues for political participation and citizen engagement, such as social media and social movements. However, the realization of this transformative potential remains contingent upon the MFP’s capacity and commitment to translate the momentum that propelled it to victory into tangible action, as well as the willingness of entrenched actors within the conservative establishment to adapt and embrace change. While the stage is set for a new era of Thai democracy, the ultimate outcome and lasting impact of this transformation remain to be seen.   Reference     Chattharakul, Anyarat. 2010. “Thai Electoral Campaigning: Vote-Canvassing Networks and Hybrid Voting.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, 4: 67–95.   Kongkirati, Prajak, ed. 2012. การเมืองว่าด้วยการเลือกตั้ง : วาทกรรม อำนาจ และพลวัตชนบทไทย [Electoral Politics: The Discourse of Power and the Dynamics in Rural Thailand]. Bangkok, Thailand: Faadiawkan Press.   Laothamatas, Anek. 1996. “A Tale of Two Democracies: Conflicting Perceptions of Elections and Democracy in Thailand.” In The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, ed. R.H. Taylor, 201-223. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.   Lertchoosakul, Kanokrat. 2023. “The May 2023 Elections and the Triumph of Thai Youth Social Movements.” Critical Asian Studies 54, 4. https://doi.org/10.52698/IMCJ3733   McCargo, Duncan. 2014. “Competing Notions of Judicialization in Thailand.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 36, 3: 417–441.   Pongsudhirak, Thitinan. 2023. “The Tide of History Shifts in Thai Politics.” Bangkok Post. https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2583539/the-tide-of-history-shifts-in-thai-politics   Ricks, Jacob I. 2019. “Thailand’s 2019 Vote: The General’s Election.” Pacific Affairs 92, 3: 443–457.   Sattaburuth, Aekarach and Mongkol Bangprapa. 2023. “Pheu Thai Ups Stakes in Race.” Bangkok Post. https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2532015/pheu-thai-ups-stakes-in-race   Tejapira, Kasian. 2006. “Toppling Thaksin.” New Left Review 2, 39: 5–37.   Unno, Anusorn. 2022. “‘Reform, Not Abolition’: The ‘Thai Youth Movement’ and Its Demands for Reform of the Monarchy.” ISEAS Perspective 2022, 3: 1-11.     [1] For information on the results of the May 2023 general election in Thailand, see the official website of the Office of the Election Commission at www.ectreport.com     ■ Napon Jatusripitak is a Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Postdoctoral Fellow at Chulalongkorn University.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]    

Former PM Imran Khan’s Arrest and the Political Turmoil in Pakistan   Participatory political cultures and genuine democratic norms are nurtured only when democratic processes have been rigorously and uninterruptedly practiced over a significant period (Pavone 2014). The primary cause for the unsuccessful democratization of Pakistan’s social and political structure stems from the persistent interference of the military establishment in the country’s political sphere. This is not only marked by multiple martial laws throughout the country’s history, but also the ceaseless interference by the military even during democratic governments (Altaf 2019, 4). The current political crisis haunting the country can also be seen against the backdrop of this historical problem.   On May 9, 2023, party workers of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) stormed various government and military establishments after its Chairman, Imran Khan, was arrested by the rangers who apprehended him at the Islamabad High Court (The Express Tribune 2023). This arrest had long been anticipated, as various attempts by the government to arrest him from his residency in Lahore were averted by the party workers, resulting in numerous clashes and even deaths. In a show of unwavering support, Khan’s supporters united, proclaiming that the former Prime Minister was their “red line” (Qarar and Gurmani 2022). A state of intense disorder and chaos ensued following the arrest of Khan.   The Aftermath of Arrest   The May 9 attacks were unprecedented. The General Headquarters (Pakistan Army) was attacked and vandalized, and the residency of Lahore’s corps commander was stormed and everything of value was taken away by people before the building was torched (The Express Tribune 2023). For the next few days, images circulated on social media showing people with food, vases, and even peacocks that had been kept in the house. Consequently, Khan was granted bail by the court and his arrest was termed unconstitutional (Arab News 2023). This also resulted in an unprecedented criticism of the military on social media as well as on the streets – it seemed as if the people in Punjab were finally recognizing what those from the periphery had long been trying to draw attention to. A score of people came forward expressing their readiness to confront the military, whom they believed was the prime suspect that removed Khan from power through a vote of no confidence (Baloch and Ellis-Petterson 2023).   But this apparent show of power that had momentarily positioned PTI advantageously during the crackdown soon started to crumble. The military retaliated in the following days—cases were registered in almost every district in Punjab, various members of the party leadership were arrested, and party workers’ homes were ransacked by security forces. In the span of a few days, hundreds belonging to PTI were either detained or forcefully disappeared. This included the majority of PTI’s local leadership, as well as notable pro-PTI journalists and influencers like Imran Riaz Khan, Orya Maqbool Khan, and Khadija Shah (IFJ 2023; Daily Pakistan Global 2023). They were charged with being the masterminds behind the May 9 attacks (Daily Pakistan Global 2023). Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif referred to these attacks as Pakistan’s “Capitol Hill moment” and called for the perpetrators to be punished the same way the US government dealt with the stormers of the Capitol Hill (The Express Tribune 2023).   In the last few days, many notable members of the PTI leadership have been released, only to head straight to a press club and announce that they were either leaving PTI or politics altogether. Shireen Mazari, former Human Rights Minister, Fawad Chaudhary, former Information Minister, Jamshed Cheema, Mussarat Jamshed Cheema, Malaika Bukhari, Asad Umer, Fiaz-ul-Hassan Chauhan, among others, have announced their resignations thus far, with more names anticipated to follow suit. There have also been reports that these individuals were coerced into announcing their resignations through a cycle of repeated arrests. Security forces kept re-arresting them after they were granted bail in a particular case. Shireen Mazari, for instance, experienced this cycle of arrest and release four times (Hussain 2023). The message was clear: give up or we will continue to find new charges to keep you behind bars.   It was also announced during this time that the arsonists and abettors of May 9 attacks will be tried in military courts (Geo News 2023), which many lawyers and human rights activists have termed as unconstitutional and undemocratic. The impact of these military court trials will likely be most severe for party workers, who will not have the chance to clear their names by publicly announcing their retirement from politics in a press conference. They will face trial without significant support from their own party; nearly the entire PTI leadership, including Khan, has condemned the attacks and asserted their lack of involvement (Business Recorder 2023).   The crackdown against PTI seems to be the latest attempt by the military establishment to dismantle a political party, albeit this time targeting a party they had previously helped come into power. During Khan’s regime, Pakistan saw a similar crackdown on dissenters, including women, religious and ethnic minorities, human rights activists, and students. His regime was characterized as a ‘hybrid’ one, where the military would enjoy a sizable political role, supported by a civilian government (IFJ 2023).   In his book, Pakistan’s Hybrid Regime: Growing Democratization, or Increased Authoritarianism, Ian Talbot provides a comprehensive analysis of post-Musharraf Pakistan. Hybrid regimes combine both democratic and authoritarian elements. Pakistan has experienced periodic military interventions and direct military rule. However, since 2009, instead of outright military coups, multi-party elections have been held alongside the presence of military retaining reserved powers, particularly in the domains of security and foreign policy (Talbot 2021, 141). The same relationship was observed during the PTI’s alliance with the military in 2018.   According to PTI’s own narrative, when Khan and the military leadership disagreed on the governance of the country, the military allegedly orchestrated PTI’s allies in the parliament to switch sides and join the opposition. Subsequently, through a vote of no confidence, Khan’s government was ousted from power.   Many of the PTI leaders who left the party before or after the state crackdown against the party post-9 May protests, have joined another “king’s” party: the “Istikam-e-Pakistan Party” (IPP) (Adnan 2023). IPP is a newly launched political party, led by two former close aides of Imran Khan, Jahangir Khan Tareen and Abdul Aleem Khan.     First as Farce, Then as Tragedy   This crisis is a continuation of a tainted chapter in Pakistan’s history, where the military helps build a civilian facade for its hegemony and discards it once it becomes a nuisance. However, this time, the civilian leadership has attempted to fight back. Regardless of the outcome of this crisis, Pakistan’s democratic order will remain dysfunctional until the power to form or dismiss political regimes is taken away from generals and entrusted to the people of the country.   This lesson stands as the most significant takeaway from the Pakistan’s own history. The country’s democratic journey formally started around twenty-three years after its inception, when the first general elections were held in 1970. The Awami Muslim League (AML) in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujeeb, emerged as the most popular political party of the country. However, its mandate was rejected, leading to the tragic events of the Fall of Dhaka in 1971, where the majority of the country chose to separate itself from the minority (Altaf 2019, 2).   The breakthrough in reviving democracy in what remained of Pakistan was the formulation of the 1973 constitution under the left-leaning populist leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Although the constitution of 1973 clearly stated under its Article 6 that any individual guilty of abrogating the constitution would face death penalty, it could not prevent military interventions. Soon, democracy faced another blow with Zia’s martial law, which was preceded by the highly controversial and infamous execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the architect of the same constitution. Zia’s ten-year military rule (from 1977 to 1988) once again relegated democracy into the ‘waiting room of history’ (Altaf 2019, 26).   A decade later, in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf declared an emergency and assumed total control as Chief Martial Law government. Under mounting pressure from democratic forces within and outside the country, Musharraf’s dictatorship ended in 2008, leading to the calling of general elections (Altaf 2019, 49). The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won the elections and formed the federal government under the presidency of Asif Ali Zardari (now Co-Chairman of the party).   The return to democracy saw landmark constitutional reforms that took place during 2008 to 2013. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the incorporation of the idea of decentralization and devolution of power between center and federating units (provinces) in the 18th amendment marked a major step forward in achieving the ideals of a federation and democracy. Another value-adding development for a sustainable democracy was the signing of the charter of democracy between the two most popular and rival mainstream parties, the PML (N) and PPP. For the first time in Pakistan’s political history, an elected government completed a full five-year term and conducted the next general elections without any interruptions.   In the 2013 general elections, the PML (N) emerged as the majority, and Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister of Pakistan for the third time. This was followed by a smooth transition of power from one democratic party to the other. However, the tradition of peacefully transferring power among varying political parties did not last long. During the second half of Sharif’s tenure, he was disqualified from serving as Prime Minister while facing opposition from the military-backed forces of PTI. Following his disqualification, some of his thoughts on his removal bore an uncanny resemblance to Khan’s. As a result, in the 2018 general elections, PTI won majority seats and, through the inclusion of independent candidates and coalition with religious parties, formed the government at the national level as well as in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (Hashim 2018).   Upon assuming power, Imran Khan, the cricketer turned politician and now a former Prime Minister, took swift actions against the opposition parties accused of corruption charges. Apart from raids, arrests, and convictions of opposition parties (mainly carried out under the pretext of corruption charges), PTI also suppressed critical voices raised in favor of the marginalized and powerless. At the beginning, Imran Khan as a Prime Minister reassured that his government and military were on the same page (The Economic Times 2018), emphasizing that the military did not exert excessive influence over the civilian administration. He claimed to have built efficient and effective civil-military relations. However, upon completing the third year of his term in office, Khan faced Pakistan’s historical democratic tragedy of failing to complete the five-year term (IFJ 2023).   In 2020, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), a coalition of major opposition parties, emerged as a united front against the ruling PTI government. Despite the Prime Minister’s own brother being removed from power not long ago, the current government has taken a leading role in cracking down on the PTI and openly supporting military trials of its leaders. On 10 April, 2022, the coalition successfully ousted Khan through a no-confidence motion, after which the PDM formed its own government with the opposition leader Shehbaz Sharif as the country’s prime minister. This surely would not have been possible without both the open and tacit support of the military for the PDM (Chaudhry 2023). Recognizing the military’s significant influence in shaping and dismantling governments in Pakistan, prominent figures in the PDM, including Nawaz Sharif, Shahbaz Sharif, and Asif Ali Zardari, took maximum benefit of the situation and presented themselves as experienced and the only viable alternative in the absence of PTI.   The Gloomy Prospect of Democracy in Pakistan   All of this is happening at a time when Pakistan grapples with a historic devaluation of the Pakistani rupee, rising inflation, unemployment, and the cost of living. These economic challenges have further eroded public confidence in the government’s ability to effectively manage the economy (Profit by Pakistan Today 2023).   Amidst the political chaos within the country, the PDM government lacks popular support, while the most prominent party in the country appears to be facing a rapid decline. The most concerning element is the fact that political polarization has reached new heights, both within the state and in society at large. State institutions themselves also seem to be divided based on their political affiliations.   In order to restore balance in the existing imbalance in the state apparatus, it is crucial to recognize that the fault in Pakistan’s democracy resides in the veto power of the military in the political arena. Given the historical dominance of Pakistan’s military as an “over-developed” institution, it is clear that the its role poses a structural obstacle to the functioning of Pakistan’s democracy. Structural reforms are therefore necessary to curtail the military’s influence and align it with the constitutional framework of Pakistan.   Furthermore, it is imperative that political parties stop negotiating with the military establishment for their own vested interests. Instead, they should realize their own significance, strength, and central role in fostering a functional democracy. They should build a bare-minimum consensus and uphold their integrity by ensuring that the military does not sit in the driving seat of the democratic process.   Whatever the outcome of this power struggle might be, the common people in the country are not represented in any discussion regarding the country’s future. They are the ones bearing the brunt of record inflation and militarization, with little agency in determining which political force will ultimately govern them once the dust settles. ■   Reference   Adnan, Imran. 2023. “Imran Says ‘King’s Party’ in the Making.” The Express Tribune. May 30. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2419401/imran-says-kings-party-in-the-making   Altaf, Hina. 2019. “History of Military Interventions in Political Affairs in Pakistan.” CUNY Academic Works: 1-65. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3194   Arab News. 2023. “Trial of Civilians in Military Courts ‘Totally Unjustified,’ Pakistan’s Top Rights Body Says.” May 31. https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2313561/pakistan   Baloch, Shah Meer, and Hannah Ellis-Petersen. 2023. “Imran Khan Accuses Pakistan’s Military of Ordering His Arrest.” The Guardian, May 14. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/14/imran-khan-arrest-pakistan-military   Business Recorder. 2023. “May 9 Protest Violence Was Pre-Planned: IK.” May 19. https://www.brecorder.com/news/40242978/may-9-protest-violence-was-pre-planned-ik   Chaudhry, Sana. 2023. “A PM No More: How the Historic Move to Eject Imran Khan through a No-Trust Vote Unfolded.” DAWN.COM, April 8. https://www.dawn.com/news/1744819   Daily Pakistan Global. 2023. “Senior Journalist Orya Maqbool Jan Arrested from House.” Daily Pakistan Global. May 13. https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/13-May-2023/senior-journalist-orya-maqbool-jan-arrested-from-house   __________________. 2023. “US Asks Pakistan to Grant Consular Access to Khadija Shah in Jinnah House Case.” June 7. https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/07-Jun-2023/us-asks-pakistan-to-grant-consular-access-to-khadija-shah-in-jinnah-house-case   Geo News. 2023. “Army Calls for Tightening ‘Noose of Law’ around May 9 ‘Planners, Masterminds.’” June 7. https://www.geo.tv/latest/491762-army-calls-for-tightening-noose-of-law-around-may-9-planners-masterminds   Hashim, Asad. 2018. “Seven Things Pakistan’s Election Results Reveal.” Al Jazeera. July 28. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/28/seven-things-pakistans-election-results-reveal   Hussain, Abid. 2023. “Ex-PM Imran Khan’s PTI Hit by More Resignations in Pakistan.” Al Jazeera. May 24. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/24/ex-pm-imran-khans-pti-hit-by-more-resignations-in-pakistan   International Federation of Journalists. 2023. “Pakistan: Journalists Missing amidst PTI Crackdown / IFJ,” June 1. https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/pakistan-journalists-missing-amidst-pti-crackdown   Pavone, Tommaso. 2014. “Political Culture and Democratic Homeostasis: A Critical Review of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s The Civic Culture.” April 7.   Profit by Pakistan Today. 2023. “PKR Plummets below 300, Making History with Its Record Low Value.” Profit by Pakistan Today. May 11. https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2023/05/11/pkr-plummets-below-300-making-history-with-its-record-low-value/   Qarar, Shakeel and Nadir Gurmani. 2022. “PTI Warns Imran Khan a ‘Red Line’ as Reports of Warrants for His Arrest Make Rounds.” Dawn. August 21. https://www.dawn.com/news/1706015   Talbot, Ian. 2021. “Pakistan’s Hybrid Regime: Growing Democratization, or Increased Authoritarianism?” Routledge Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia: 141-150.   The Economic Times. 2018. “Pakistan Government and Military on Same Page: PM Imran Khan.” December 4. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-government-and-military-on-same-page-pm-imran-khan/articleshow/66938319.cms   The Express Tribune. 2023. “May 9 Riots Were Pakistan’s ‘9/11 Attack’ on Its National Interests: Iqbal.” May 21. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2417867/may-9-riots-were-pakistans-911-attack-on-its-national-interests-iqbal   ______. 2023. “Treat May 9 Culprits like Capitol Hill Attackers: PM.” May 26. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2418758/treat-may-9-culprits-like-capitol-hill-attackers-pm     ■ Haider Kaleem is the manager of the Nigar Ahmad Research and Advocacy Fund at the South Asia Partnership - He also works as a multimedia journalist at one of the leading digital media outlets in Pakistan dedicated to covering the voices from the margins of power. He is an independent development researcher with a focus on movements, judiciary, violence, governance, development, climate change and energy transition.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

In the recent years, the global spotlight has been on the steady deterioration of freedom and democracy in the world’s largest democracy. Many global democracy watchdogs have been reporting on the rise of majoritarianism, worsening status of minorities, shrinking media freedom, and a plummeting civil society in India (Freedom House 2023). However, not many have brought out the rising majoritarian onslaught on political opposition and their increasing marginalization by the current political regime. Some clear signs of this can be seen from the recent episodes in Parliament and beyond, particularly the disqualification of Mr. Rahul Gandhi, a key opposition figure, from his membership in the Lok Sabha over a defamation case.   The Defamation Saga   On 23 March 2023, a local court in Surat, Gujarat sentenced Mr. Rahul Gandhi, the prominent leader of main opposition Congress Party, two years in prison over a defamation case (Gandhi 2023). On 24 March, the Lok Sabha Secretariat issued a notice disqualifying Mr. Gandhi from the membership of lower house. As per the Representation of the People Act of 1951, Section 8(3) (based on 2013 Lily Thomas judgment by the Supreme Court), if a legislator is convicted for two-year or more for an offence, this will lead to disqualification from the House (Khan 2023). The defamation judgment by the lower court, which many analysts find frivolous and excessive (Bhatia 2023), has created massive uproars among opposition parties. They blame the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for weaponising defamation law to unseat a key leader who has been relentlessly questioning Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi on the recent Adani scandal (Tognini and Hyatt 2023).   The circumstances under which Mr. Gandhi’s defamation case proceeded, leading to his subsequent disqualification from the parliamentary membership, reek of political vendetta. Political analysts believe the defamation was largely orchestrated to debar Mr. Gandhi from vociferously criticizing the government and simultaneously sending a strong message to other key opposition figures. Take a look at the trajectories of the defamation case. While campaigning in Karnataka, Mr. Gandhi took an election jibe during the Lok Sabha polls in 2019. Intending to ridicule Prime Minister Modi, he said, “Why do all the thieves, be it Nirav Modi, Lalit Modi or Narendra Modi, have Modi in their names?” (The Hindu 2023a). Mr. Gandhi’s statement during the election campaign became a basis for Mr. Purnesh Modi, a BJP legislator from far off Gujarat, to file a case of criminal defamation against Mr. Gandhi. The BJP lawmaker claimed that Mr. Gandhi had “defamed 130 million living in the whole of India having the surname ‘Modi” (Poddar 2023). Over the next two years, the case progressed at a snail’s pace, given that it is very common for politicians to make such jibes during electioneering. So much so, the local court judge in Surat refused to comply with Purnesh Modi’s request that Gandhi be summoned to the court for a second time. In an unusual move, Mr. Modi approached the Gujarat High Court to indefinitely halt the proceedings of the defamation case. In a curious case, the High Court relented to the plea, and the case was put on hold until 16 February 2023. From nowhere, Mr. Purnesh Modi moved to the Gujarat High Court to unfreeze the petition, citing the availability of “new evidence,” and the court promptly agreed to the plea. With a new judge in charge, the defamation case proceeded very swiftly. As many as seven hearings were recorded in matter of three weeks. On 23 March 2023, the magistrate court judge pronounced the verdict convicting Mr. Gandhi to two years in prison for defaming the reputation of the petitioner and the Modi community in general. The conviction not only denies Rahul Gandhi of parliamentary membership, but it also debars him from contesting 2024 general elections (unless higher courts suspend the conviction).   Mr. Rahul Gandhi’s conviction and his subsequent disqualification has raised plenty of uncomfortable questions, both legal as well political. Legal experts feel that the defamation judgment by the magistrate was “excessive” and suffered from major infirmities. One, the criminal offence of defamation under the Indian Penal Code (Section 499) based on 1860 colonial law is very clear: if references or defamation are made to an indefinite “class” of people, an individual cannot claim that they are a member of that class and have therefore been defamed. As per the case law, the particular person who moves criminal proceedings for defamation has to demonstrate personal harm or injury due to the defamatory statement. Mr. Gandhi was convicted for the remark, “How is the names of all these thieves Modi, Modi, Modi…Nirav Modi, Lalit Modi, Narendra Modi.” None of the three names mentioned filed a complaint. It was filed by Purnesh Modi, a BJP legislator from the Gujarat, who asserted that by virtue of his surname, he, along with all other people bearing the surname “Modi,” were defamed by Mr. Gandhi (Bhatia 2023). Thus, the judgment seems legally unsustainable. Two, the maximum sentence awarded in this case appears to lack a sound legal basis. The defamation law prescribes maximum jail terms of two years, which should be in proportion to the gravity of the offence. Given that the complainant is not directly linked to Mr. Gandhi’s defamatory statement, the sentence seems to be “excessive.” Even if offensive, a generic statement cannot be so grave as to warrant the maximum sentence. Three, the defamation law and several judgments of the Supreme Court have clearly stated that the provision should be applied in rare cases (The Hindu 2023a). The lower court seems to have overlooked these rules and basic reasoning.   Beyond legal infirmities, Gandhi’s defamation episode (the timing and speed) raises lot of political questions. The defamation case, as mentioned earlier, was filed way back in 2019 by someone who was not directly connected with Mr. Gandhi’s statement. Furthermore, after two years of the case going nowhere, the complainant moves to Gujarat High Court to unfreeze the case. Curiously, the court relents to this unusual request. Then, after a year, the case is suddenly revived by the plaintiff, and with a new judge at helm, the case proceeds in an unusual speed, with the lower court recording as many as seven hearings in matter of 20 days. However, the reopening of defamation case seems to have coincided with Mr. Gandhi’s blistering attacks on Prime Minister’s Modi’s alleged links with industrialist Gautam Adani. Analysts feel that the defamation case was reopened to prevent Mr. Gandhi from raising uncomfortable questions on the floor of Parliament (Sharma 2023a). What further strengthens this line of thinking is the fact that in less than 24 hours of the lower court conviction, the Lok Sabha Secretariat issues a disqualification notice to Mr. Gandhi. According toprecedence and existing law (Section 8(4) of the Representation of Peoples’ Act, 1951), disqualifications take effect only after three months have elapsed from the date of any conviction, and the lawmaker fails to obtain a stay order from a superior court. Thus, the entire defamation episode reeks of partisan politics being played to silence the opposition voice. It has been carefully orchestrated not only to prevent Mr. Gandhi from raising uncomfortable questions on the floor of Parliament, but also to deprive him of contesting in the 2024 general elections.   Beyond Defamation: Weaponising State Agencies to Unsettle the Opposition   The Rahul Gandhi episode, which came as a huge shock for many, is not an isolated event. Since 2014, the regime has rarely spared any opportunities to target and weaken opposition parties. On numerous occasions, opposition figures have faced tax raids, been taken for questioning, held in prisons, and endlessly coerced by the state agencies. Let us further explore this.   First, soon after sweeping power in 2014, the BJP government has aggressively pursued cases against opposition leaders, including their regional rivals, using every instrument of the state. From the Enforcement Directorate (ED) to the Income Tax Department (IT) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), every state agency has been deployed to target key opposition leaders and their relatives. While every political dispensation in India, be it provincial level or at the federal sphere, indulge in targeting opposition leaders, the current regime is many miles ahead of them.   The staggering number of raids launched by central agencies against opposition leaders is telling. As per the media report, since 2014, a total of 121 political leaders have been probed (raided, questioned, arrested, etc.) by the ED alone. Of these, as many as 115 (95%) are from the opposition, whereas only 3 politicians from the ruling BJP are in the ED net (Mehra 2023). The number is in sharp contrast to the ED’s record during the Congress-led government between 2004 to 2014. During that period, out of 26 political leaders raided and investigated by the agency, 14 of them (54 per cent) were from Opposition (Tiwary 2022).   Although the ED in the recent years has emerged as government’s most potent weapon against the opposition, the trends are similar when it comes to other agencies, particularly the CBI. What makes the ED an effective tool for the government is the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), a law that has been in existence since 2002 but was recently amended by the BJP government to provide more authority to the investigating agencies, especially the ED. While the stringent bail provisions and sweeping powers of the ED to search, arrest, and attach properties/assets of the accused remain intact, the government has recently expanded the scope of the PMLA to include “politically exposed persons” and “non-governmental organizations (NGOs)”. [1]   As a result, the ED has raided, questioned, arrested and jailed scores of politicians, with a significant majority of them being key opposition figures and their relatives. Not only has the ED raided and questioned scores of opposition leaders, including the senior leaders belonging to the main opposition (such as Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi in relation to the National Herald case), but the agency has also incarcerated a number of political leaders on money laundering charges (Express News Service 2022). Recently, alleging political vendetta by the ruling party, as many as 14 political parties, including the National Congress, petitioned the Supreme Court to curb the weaponisation of state agencies (Tripathi 2023).   Two things stand out in the context of the modus operandi of state agencies. One, while the ED has been pursuing money laundering cases with a missionary zeal, its records in terms of convictions is very low. As of July 2022, despite the ED registering 5,422 cases under the PMLA, only about 23 persons were convicted, which accounts for less than 0.5% (Hindustan Times 2022). Two, the moment any opposition politicians cross over to the ruling party, cases are dropped or probes get slowed by the state agencies. Several of them have been rewarded with ministerial berths in the government and attractive positions within the party (India Today 2023). Furthermore, it is widely alleged that the government has been selectively using state agencies to engineer defections or even bring down opposition-led governments (Sharma and Arunabh 2022). However, what is unprecedented is that opposition leaders are not spared from raids or arrests even during the middle of electioneering, something that no past governments have indulged in (Chauhan 2021).   Beyond the clever weaponisation of state agencies, there are multiple other means through which the ruling party has been trying to undermine and weaken the opposition parties. Lately, the government has been using administrative and procedural arbitrages, leveraging its brute majority in the lower house of Parliament, to limit the effectiveness of opposition parties in raising tough questions or demanding accountability from the executive. With some exceptions, in the last nine years, the treasury bench has consistently and stubbornly avoided to answer opposition demands, even on questions of national security, allegations of corruption, and rising prices. So much so, on number of occasions the government has allowed the complete washout of parliament sessions rather than responding to opposition demand for debate and probes by the joint parliamentary committee (JPC). For instance, recently the entire parliament session was lost as the ruling BJP declined the opposition’s demand for a debate and setting up of a JPC to investigate the alleged link between Prime Minister Modi and controversial billionaire Gautam Adani (The Hindu 2023b). While the entire opposition was hell-bent on their demand for JPC and answer from the Prime Minister, the treasury bench did not make single effort to reach out to a distrust opposition to find a way out. Thus, the Parliament is used less as a forum for debate and scrutiny and more as a mechanism to merely pass laws.[2]   Conclusion   To sum up, while the defamation case against Mr. Gandhi and his subsequent disqualification from the lower house may appear as an extreme case, it is not an isolated one. His case is indicative of a broader pattern in which the ruling party has been relentlessly targeting key opposition figures and their kin in multiple ways. This includes frequent raids by state agencies, exerting pressure on financial resources and political donation channels, engineering defections, and at times bringing down opposition-led governments. In several cases, the ruling party has managed to win over smaller parties and key regional leaders via economic and political incentives and coercive tactics. The ruling dispensation seems to be playing the copybooks of other illiberal democracies, particularly Hungary and Turkey, to weaken and defang the opposition.[3]   However, what is not helping the opposition cause is the continued infighting among opposition parties, which the ruling party is using to its advantages. Although the Rahul Gandhi case brought a rare unity among the opposition, it remains to be seen whether this unity will persist until the general election in 2024. In short, India’s democracy looks even weaker with a marginalized opposition, achieved through the machinations of the ruling party.   References   Bhatia, Gautam. 2023. “A disturbing example of the normalization of lawfare.” The Hindu. March 29. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-disturbing-example-of-the-normalisation-of-lawfare/article66672779.ece   Chauhan, Neeraj. 2021. “In election season, the raids are back – against Opposition leaders.” Hindustan Times. April 5. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/in-election-season-the-raids-are-back-against-opposition-leaders-101617609673969.html   Express News Service. 2022. “ED questions Sonia for 6 hours; Rahul, other Congress leaders detained during protest.” The Indian Express. July 27. https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/rahul-other-congress-leaders-detained-during-protest-8053277/   Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World 2023 – India.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2023   Gandhi, Rahul. 2023. “The world’s biggest democracy is becoming less free.” The Economist. May 27. https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/03/27/the-worlds-biggest-democracy-is-becoming-less-free   Hindustan Times. 2022. “Only 23 convicted in 5,422 cases under PMLA till date: Govt to Lok Sabha.” July 26. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/only-23-convicted-in-5-422-cases-under-pmla-till-date-govt-to-lok-sabha-101658774947795.html   India Today. 2023. “From Himanta to Scindia to Azad and now Badal: How Congress has been losing its top leaders.” January 18. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/from-himanta-to-scindia-to-azad-and-now-badal-how-congress-has-been-losing-its-top-leaders-2323291-2023-01-18   Khan, Khadija. 2023. “What is the Lily Thomas SC verdict, which affects Rahul Gandhi’s disqualification case.” The Indian Express. March 24. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-law/what-is-the-lily-thomas-rahul-gandhi-8515037/   Mehra, Ajay K. 2023. “The ED Wasn’t Created to Target the Opposition and Dissenters.” The Wire. January 6. https://thewire.in/politics/enforcement-directorate-target-opposition-dissenters   Öktem, Kerem, and Karabekir Akkoyunlu. 2016. “Exit from democracy: illiberal governance in Turkey and beyond.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, 4: 469-480. https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/4402090/mod_resource/content/1/Oktem%20Akkoyunlu%20(2016)%20Exit%20from%20democracy%20illiberal%20governance%20in%20Turkey%20and%20beyond.pdf   Poddar, Umang. 2023. “Has Rahul Gandhi really defamed all Modis in India? No, say legal experts.” Scroll. March 25. https://scroll.in/article/1046235/has-rahul-gandhi-really-defamed-all-modis-in-india-no-say-legal-experts   PTI News Agency. 2023. “Govt amends anti-money laundering rules, brings ‘politically exposed persons’ under PMLA.” The Indian Express. March 10. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/govt-amends-anti-money-laundering-rules-brings-politically-exposed-persons-under-pmla-8489827/v   Sharma, Ashok. 2023a. “India’s Rahul Gandhi accuses PM Modi of favoring Adani Group.” AP News. March 25. https://apnews.com/article/india-gandhi-modi-adani-89e037a70af49cec743592341d20cea5   Sharma, Pratul. 2023b. “‘Disorder is the new order’: The politics of parliamentary disruption.” The Week. April 6. https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2023/04/06/politics-of-parliamentary-disruption-budget-session-ends-with-low-productivity.html   Sharma, Supriya, and Arunabh Saikia. 2022. “How the Modi government has weaponised the ED to go after India’s Opposition.” Scroll. July 5. https://scroll.in/article/1027571/how-the-modi-government-has-weaponised-the-ed-to-go-after-indias-opposition   The Hindu. 2023a. “Chilling effect: On defamation, free speech and the Rahul Gandhi case.” March 25. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/chilling-effect-the-hindu-editorial-on-defamation-free-speech-and-the-rahul-gandhi-case/article66657495.ece   The Hindu. 2023b. “Opposition, government blame each other for Budget session’s second half washout.” April 6. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/opposition-government-blame-each-other-for-budget-sessions-second-half-washout/article66706764.ece   Tiwary, Deeptiman. 2022. “Since 2014, 4-fold jump in ED cases against politicians; 95% are from Opposition.” The Indian Express. September 21. https://indianexpress.com/article/express-exclusive/since-2014-4-fold-jump-in-ed-cases-against-politicians-95-per-cent-are-from-opposition-8163060/   Tognini, Giacomo, and John Hyatt. 2023. “Gautam Adani’s Odyssey: From A Diamond Sorting Teenager to World’s Second Richest to Fraud Allegations.” Forbes. March 30. https://www.forbes.com/sites/giacomotognini/2023/03/30/gautam-adanis-odyssey-from-a-diamond-sorting-teenager-to-worlds-second-richest-to-fraud-allegations/?sh=4258b74731c5   Tripathi, Ashish. 2023. “SC junks plea by 14 Opposition parties accusing Centre of misusing CBI, ED.” Deccan Herald. April 5. https://www.deccanherald.com/assembly-election-2019/sc-junks-plea-by-14-opposition-parties-accusing-centre-of-misusing-cbi-ed-1206905.html     [1] As per the amended PMLA rules, politically exposed persons are “individuals who have been entrusted with prominent public functions by a foreign country, including the heads of States or Governments, senior politicians, senior government or judicial or military officers, senior executives of state-owned corporations and important political party officials”. See PTI News Agency (2023).   [2] According to think tank PRS Legislaive, “The 17th Lok Sabha may turn out to be the shortest full term Lok Sabha since 1952. Entering the final year of its term, the 17th Lok Sabha has functioned for 230 sitting days so far. Of all the Lok Sabhas that completed the full five-year term, the 16th Lok Sabha had the lowest sitting days (331). With one more year remaining in the term, and 58 average sitting days a year, the 17th Lok Sabha is unlikely to sit for more than 331 days. This could make it the shortest full term Lok Sabha since 1952” (Sharma 2023b).   [3] For an excellent analysis of this, see Öktem and Akkoyunlu (2016).     ■ Niranjan Sahool, PhD, is a Senior Fellow with ORF’s Governance and Politics Initiative. With years of expertise in governance and public policy, he now anchors studies and programmes on democracy, human rights, federalism, electoral reforms (particularly issues related to political funding), and cross-cutting issues of exclusion, insurgencies, affirmative action and inclusion. A recipient of the Asia Fellowship (2009) and a former Sir Ratan Tata Fellow, he currently serves as the South Asia member for the Carnegie Rising Democracies Network, where he debates and writes on democracy, foreign policy, human rights and other related issues.     ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

Digital Technology: A Double-Edged Sword to Democracy   Digital technology was once hailed for its liberating function, setting people free from the authoritarian rule.[1] The Arab Spring, a series of protest movements against authoritarian governments in Arab countries during the early 2010s, revealed people’s reliance on social media and reinforced the belief that new technology could aid democracy. However, authoritarian governments soon began taking advantage of digital technology to strengthen their oppressive rule. Now, social media is also widely believed to contribute to the global spread of populism.   Dual functions of digital technology are not only changing domestic politics but are also increasingly influencing international relations. International relations used to be essentially based on the concept of state sovereignty, in which states are the main actors. However, with the development of digital technology, the face of international relations has become more complex. This is because of the citizen empowerment. The ease with which information can be gathered and disseminated online has enabled individuals to take actions that affect international relations. Open-source intelligence groups such as Bellingcat, which bring together people from diverse backgrounds, can now take on the role of investigative journalism, thereby strengthening the checks on governments that lack transparency. Meanwhile, Social Networking Services (SNS) make it easier to mobilize like-minded individuals, stage protests, and raise calls for freedom. Like the citizen journalists in Myanmar after the coup, people can now use their anonymity to communicate the truth, even when press freedom has been cut off nationally.   On the other hand, the flood of information online has made it difficult for the audience to discern the truth. Authoritarian actors have been spreading disinformation and propaganda to destabilize and polarize democratic societies. Exposure of personal information not only violates privacy, but it is also used for repression. To increase individual surveillance, authoritarian actors and their collaborators have installed backdoors in 5G networks and keystroke-tracking features in social media. Coupled with China's export of surveillance technologies and methods, the accumulation of personal data has been used to deprive individuals of their freedoms. Disinformation is also used to legitimize an illegal war waged by an aggressor state, as seen in the case of the Russian disinformation offensive in the war against Ukraine. Extracted personal data by big tech companies provide foreign agents the cyber weapons of micro-targeting and astroturfing.   Accordingly, there has been a strong call to establish international rules and principles to prevent digital technology from undermining private data and democracy. European Union moved first to regulate the ways to use, process, and store personal data by adopting the General Data Protection Regulation that became effective in 2018.   Japan’s Recent Move for Private Data Protection and Disinformation Regulation   To protect people’s rights from AI surveillance, it is essential to formulate international rules on data access and privacy. To date, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has established rules for cross-border transactions. However, the WTO regulates international trade only on the basis of whether what is transferred is a physical good or a service, and on the geographical origin of the transferred goods or services. Regulations based on these pillars are not conducive to data regulation. There is an urgent need for international rules set by democracies willing to protect people's freedom and privacy.   Under the absence of digital regulations governing the global community, Japan sees the G7 as a useful framework to explore such rules. In 2019, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed the concept of Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT), and after repeated discussions at the G7, an action plan was formulated in 2022 within the G7 framework. This action plan encourages cooperation and knowledge sharing among nations on regulations, [2] and further progress is expected at the G7 meeting in May 2023.   Japan, like other Western countries, has also effectively banned Huawei from its 5G wireless telecommunications network to prohibit technology that may have backdoors installed. However, this is not a governmental regulation but rather an autonomous decision made by major cellphone companies (Softbank, NTT Docomo, and KDDI) to refrain from utilizing Chinese equipment.   The Japanese government has belatedly joined the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative because AI surveillance technologies, such as surveillance cameras and facial recognition, are being used to suppress human rights in East Turkestan and other parts of the world. The Initiative was launched by Australia, Denmark, Norway, and the United States at the first Summit for Democracy in December 2021. Japan decided to join the initiative in conjunction with the Second Summit for Democracy, bringing the number of participating countries to 25, including Japan and South Korea. [3] The goal is to prevent surveillance technology from being transferred to authoritarian countries, such as China and Russia.   Disinformation measures have also accelerated since 2022, although they have lagged behind other countries. Behind this is the fact that the disinformation spread by the Russian government to disrupt countries supporting Ukraine has also flooded Japan, and has had no small impact on the Japanese discursive space. [4]   On April 1, 2022, the Ministry of Defense created the position of Global Strategic Intelligence Officer, whose primary mission is to analyze disinformation, and expanded its cyber unit. [5] The National Security Strategy, developed in December 2022, called for increased efforts to counter disinformation. [6] A decision was made to increase the number of cyber personnel to 4,000 by 2027. [7] In April 2023, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced their joint efforts to counter disinformation, with a focus on analyzing and disseminating accurate information to the public under the Cabinet Secretariat. The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office will be in charge of analyzing disinformation, and the International Public Relations Office of the Prime Minister's Office will be responsible for disseminating accurate information, promoting a comprehensive countermeasure to disinformation.[8]   Private sector initiatives are also progressing in tandem. Based on recommendations previously compiled by the Study Group on Platform Services established by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Safer Internet Association established the Japan Fact-check Center in October 2022. [9] Although Japanese media have had their own fact-checking functions in the past, this is the first organization in Japan dedicated to carrying out fact-checking.   The Need to Create Proactive Narratives   How to adapt digital technology to democracy is expected to be discussed at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023. In the meantime, there are some initiatives that both governments and the private sector should pursue, such as developing counter-narratives.   Disinformation strategically planned and spread by authoritarian actors seeks to manipulate public opinion by distorting the truth. Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Maria Ressa reveals how the Duterte regime has used social media to attack investigative journalism and free media that were critical of tis wrongdoings. [10] In a politically divided society, fake news contribute to polarizing people to two camps of “us versus them.” Misused social media is undermining the functioning of democracy. If this trend is not stopped, many democracies of the world could become extremely unstable with mistrust and violence among people.   Unfortunately, fact-checking alone is not enough to prevent this. There is an undeniable risk that fact-checking can have a backfire effect, reinforcing the beliefs of the sender. Furthermore, while fact-checking is intended to communicate accurate information, it is often too dry to attract public attention. In the online world of social networking, messages must be integrated to feelings and emotions to reach the receptive public. People tend to be interested in narratives that are emotionally charged. According to Maria Ressa, people are not only interested in negative emotions such as anger, but also in positive emotions such as inspiration.   Therefore, it is necessary to form alternative narratives that can counter disinformation narratives. To do this, it would be wise to identify the specific demographic groups that authoritarian actors target to inject disinformation and propaganda, and to formulate effective counter-narratives appealing to those groups. We must be proactive in building and disseminating inspiring pro-democracy narratives to stabilize our national and international communities.       [1] Larry Diamond. 2010. "Liberation Technology." Journal of Democracy, 21, 3: 69-83.   [2] G7 Germany. 2022. "G7 Action Plan for Promoting Data Free Flow with Trust." G7 Digital Ministers' track - Annex 1.   [3] Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State. 2023. “Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative Code of Conduct Released at the Summit for Democracy”. https://www.state.gov/export-controls-and-human-rights-initiative-code-of-conduct-released-at-the-summit-for-democracy/   [4] Maiko Ichihara. 2022. "Impact of Disinformation on Democracy in Asia.”https://www.brookings.edu/research/impact-of-disinformation-on-democracy-in-asia/   [5] Asahi Shimbun. 2022. “Roshia shinko, SNS mo senjo haiburiddo sen [Russia invasion, SNS are also battlefields: hybrid warfare].”   [6] The Cabinet Office. 2022. "National Security Strategy of Japan.” https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf   [7] Nikkei. 2023. “自衛隊、サイバー人材4000人に　「能動的防御」へ拡充 [Self-Defense Forces expand to ``active defense'' to 4,000 cyber personnel].” https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA263WN0W2A221C2000000/   [8] Asahi Shimbun. 2023. "Gijoho, kantei chokuzoku de bunseki he: Shushu wo kyoka shi taigai hasshin [Disinformation to be analyzed under the direct control of the Prime Minister's Office to strengthen collection and dissemination to the outside world].” https://digital.asahi.com/articles/DA3S15611578.html   [9] Japan Fact-check Center. 2022. "JFCについて[About JFC]." https://factcheckcenter.jp/n/n50986dc9216c   [10] Maria Ressa. 2022. How to Stand Up a Dictator: The Fight for Our Future. Harper.       ■ Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and a Visiting Scholar in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is also a co-chair of the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications include: “Universality to Plurality? Values in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberalism: Japan and the International Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017).       ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]