Election Overview   The presidential and legislative elections took place in Taiwan on January 13, 2024. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP or so-called the green camp) selected Vice President Lai Ching-te as their candidate, who also serves as the party chairman. The opposing Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT or so-called the blue camp) nominated the incumbent mayor of New Taipei, Hou Yu-ih, for the presidential candidacy. The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP or so-called the white camp) chose its leader, former Taipei City mayor Ko Wen-je, as the presidential candidate. Despite initial plans for a joint campaign team between KMT and TPP, a final agreement was not reached. Lai’s victory marked a historic moment, representing the first time since the introduction of direct elections in 1996 that a party has won more than two consecutive presidential terms. Lai secured the presidency with 40% of the votes, followed by Hou with 34%, and Ko with 26%.   Lai Ching-te and Hou Yu-yi are political figures within traditional political parties, lacking individual charisma, especially Hou Yu-yi, the former police-in-chief. Ko Wen-je, on the other hand, is a candidate with populist characteristics, appearing as a political outsider at the national level, free from the burden of past ruling records, providing an option beyond the blue-green divide. His interactive style sometimes resembles that of an internet celebrity, using straightforward language to comment on issues or point out social and political problems, in many cases without proposing feasible solutions to these problems. Young people prefer Ko’s relaxed, somewhat sarcastic way of communication.   The other part of the general election is the legislative election. DPP gained 51 seats out of 113 seats and lose its majority in the parliament. KMT won 52 seats and become the largest party. TPP gained eight seats. The result makes the new DPP government a minority government.   Nuanced Differences of Assurances and Identity Defenses between DPP and KMT   The issue of unification or independence is Taiwan’s most significant political divide. On one end of the spectrum, there is a leaning towards pursuing Taiwan’s independence, strengthening Taiwanese identity, and reducing economic and trade relations with China. On the other end, there is a leaning towards reunification, maintaining Greater China identity along with Taiwan identity, and strengthening economic and trade ties with China. Among the three main presidential candidates, considering their stance on independence or reunification on a spectrum from left to the right, the DPP is on the left, the People First Party (PFP) is in the center, and the KMT is on the right. Despite the difference, all three parties fall within the central area of the political spectrum, favoring the status quo.   As a small country, Taiwan always has to consider the attitudes of larger nations. In past presidential elections, there have always been four assurances—two external and two internal. In this election, it is particularly evident. Firstly, the DPP assures the United States that if elected, they will not change the Republic of China’s official name and amend the constitution, meaning they will not pursue Taiwan independence. To some extent, this assurance is also directed towards the Beijing government, as advocating immediate constitutional reforms would escalate cross-strait tensions, which is not helping their election prospects. The DPP’s assurance is also aimed at reassuring the domestic center and light-blue voters, making them feel secure enough to vote for the party. On the other hand, the KMT assures the U.S. that if in power, Taiwan will still maintain close alliance with the U.S., will stand on the side of democracy camp, and will not engage in any political negotiations with China, including the issue of reunification. The KMT’s assurance is also targeted at the domestic center and light-green voters, reassuring them and gaining their support.   Alongside these assurances, the two major political parties also have two things to defend. The DPP advocates for the defense of Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy, while the KMT seeks to defend the Republic of China. The two defenses are rooted in political identity. While the KMT also emphasizes a pro-American stance and strengthening defense, their advocacy for expanding economic and trade ties with China raises concerns among pro-DPP citizens. Although the DPP does not call for changes to the Republic of China’s constitution and the name of a country, it in the past few years push through some measures that de-Sinicize in history and culture terms, raising concerns among pan-blue supporters. To a large extent, these defense objectives are presented to mobilize voters from their respective electoral bases, as these core supporters are more sensitive to these issues.   China Threats and Election Interventions   Over the past few years, China’s threats towards Taiwan have reached a new height, employing a combination of political influence and military intimidation. Diplomatically, China coerced and enticed several countries to sever official ties with Taiwan. Militarily, there have been frequent incidents of military aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait. In two cases, China also deployed warships and aircraft to cruise around Taiwan, effectively imposing a blockade through military drills. Additionally, there has been a continuous increase in threatening rhetoric toward Taiwan. These actions have triggered a backlash among the majority of people in Taiwan.   In terms of election interference, China has employed both direct and indirect methods to influence Taiwan’s elections in recent years. Apart from official intimidation, China spreads misinformation through various channels. False news is disseminated on social media, often shared by Taiwanese netizens, aiming to discredit political parties critical of China and Taiwan’s democratic allies. Even after the elections, there are rumors of election frauds originated from abroad. While mainstream media is less prone to disseminating fake news, it proliferates extensively on social media platforms.   External forces also interfere in elections by inviting neighborhood representatives and residents and civil organization staffs to travel to China, often with different degree of local treatments (Central Broadcasting Station 2023-12-04). Another method is attempting to buy Taiwan’s journalists off and publishing fake opinion polls, which lack clear information of conducting organization, sampling processes, and demographic information. China money also flow to a legislative candidate, a source of Political donations forbidden by law.   The Exploitation of China Threats   In recent years, candidates often elevated the stakes of the general elections to choices involving the survival of democracy, sovereignty, or the country. Against the backdrop of China’s rising threat of force over Taiwan, it provided an opportunity for the ruling party to exploit the threat. During the election campaign, DPP candidate cast himself as the defender of Taiwan’s sovereignty and claimed that if the opposition candidate was elected, Taiwan would surrender to China, democracy would collapse, and Taiwan’s sovereignty would be weakened. In fact, the DPP responds to numerous criticisms of its domestic policies by diverting them to the interference of China such as the spread of fake news. The victory of the DPP in this election is undoubtedly influenced by the ongoing threat from China, coupled with the ruling party’s exploitation of the existential threats. However, the DPP received only 40% of the vote, indicating that the rhetoric of existential threat may not resonate strongly with the majority of Taiwanese voters. Some voters may prefer more dialogues with China, reducing the miscalculation and risk of military confrontation.   In this election, young people did not support the DPP as strongly as in previous elections. This time, the absence of events like the reviewing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement and the protest against Hong Kong extradition bill, which intensified anti-China sentiments in previous elections, contributed to a reduced emphasis on cross-strait issues. The relatively calm atmosphere in the few months leading up to the election diminished the incentive to prioritize cross-strait issues. More importantly, young people in general did not want further deterioration of cross-strait relations, especially considering the potential military conflict and the mandatory military service requirement for young males, posing a threat to their lives and property. Many of them shift their votes from DPP to TPP this time (Wang 2024).   On the other side, KMT also exploited the China threat by presenting the election as a choice between war and peace. They claimed the DPP-nominated candidate Lai Ching-te’s pro-Taiwan independence stance and confrontational approach is conducive to escalating conflict and the young people under this condition are forced to go to the battlefield. Lai Ching-te has clarified several times that he will not change the Republic of China’s official name and amend the constitution.   The second type of exploiting threat concerns instructing supposedly neutral government agencies to intervene for political gain. By strategically elevating the significance of the election, the government provides itself with a justification for its actions. This situation can undermine the level playing field and erode public trust. For example, several days before the election, China launched a satellite that passed high above the sky of Taiwan. The Defense Ministry issued an air raid alert, stating that it was a Chinese missile test (Central News Agency 2024-01-09). This misinformation contributed to a heightened sense of national security threat and potentially boosted support for the ruling party. The more frequent government interventions involve instructing law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute political opponents and citizens for spreading fake news and aiding China’s infiltration before the election.   In the past few years, Taiwan has passed the Social Order Maintenance Act to tackle fake news and the Anti-Infiltration Act to counter Chinese influence in elections and politics. While China is known for engaging in cognitive warfare and infiltration, DPP also exploited this threat. Regarding fake news, criticizing the government or commenting on government policies may be deemed as cognitive warfare, leading to potential legal consequences and creating a chilling effect (Wu 2023). Regarding the infiltration, the DPP government instructed the law-enforcement agencies before the election to investigate dozens of neighborhood representatives who recruit residents to visit China and received some local treatments. Many neighborhood representatives utilize subsidized travel to garner electoral support from residents (Kung 2019). Additionally, the Ministry of Justice proposed enhanced scrutiny of new immigrants from China to counter foreign influence, sparking controversy due to its targeted focus on a specific group.   No Substantial Policy Differences on Economy   This election has focused primarily on issues related to national defense, security, and sovereignty, with limited discussion on other public policy issues. The issue of sovereignty is largely rooted in political identity and can consolidate support from core supporters effectively. Meanwhile, many urgent socio-economic issues in Taiwan, such as the potential bankruptcy of labor pension scheme, severe demographic challenges, global warming, labor shortages, and fiscal costs of energy subsidy, have not received sufficient attention and discussion. Instead, the three candidates and the media have primarily focused on attacking opponents about their minor flaws in real estate holdings.   The three candidates did have proposed some policies dealing with these critical issues, but there has been a lack of in-depth discussion and sufficient public attentions. Moreover, the three candidates often avoid addressing the root cause of the problems by proposing measures that could harm the interests of certain groups. For example, concerning the mounting deficits in the labor pension scheme, all three candidates shy away from discussing the possibility of increasing payments by laborers. Instead, they promise to continue to use government budget to cover deficits.   In terms of actual policies, the three sets of candidates show no significant differences in the areas of industrial, labor, education, housing, and health policies. On the energy issue, the KMT and TPP favor the continued use of nuclear energy, while the DPP aims to phase out nuclear energy as soon as possible. The most significant divergence in political positions among candidates lies in cross-strait relationship.   Regarding cross-strait relations, candidates all advocate for a close Taiwan-American alliance, increasing Taiwan’s defense deterrence, and engaging in dialogue with the mainland on the basis of equality and dignity. The U.S. academic and media do not expect to see any significant changes in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations if any of the three candidates is elected. All candidates have visited the U.S., met with scholars from universities and think tanks, and held discussions with American officials, ensuring a clear understanding of their positions on the relationships.   The concept of “equality and dignity”, however, is interpreted differently by the three parties. Hou You-yi accepts a “One China with different interpretations (Republic of China and People’s Republic of China)” framework. He also rejects Taiwan independence and warn against the risk of war. Like his predecessors, Lai Ching-te does not accept “One China,” stating that it is equivalent to “one country, two systеms.” The KMT accused Lai Ching-te’s position of pro-Taiwan independence of inducing military conflicts, while Lai Ching-te saw the KMT’s policy as surrender. Ko Wen-je’s stance is more ambiguous. Additionally, in terms of cross-strait economic relations, Lai Ching-te emphasizes the strong linkage between economic and national security, and that Taiwan should reduce reliance on Chinese while strengthen economic ties with its democratic allies. The KMT, on the other hand, favor building stronger economic ties with mainland China. Overall, compared with KMT’s past presidential candidates, the new KMT candidate moves towards a stronger emphasis on democratic institutions and Taiwan’s sovereignty, expressing distrust towards the Beijing government.   Conclusion   The main theme of the general election is about the China threat and the exploitation of the threat. The former concerns the survival of the democracy and the latter concerns the potential degradation of democracy. With all candidates endorsing a strong Taiwan-American alliance, emphasizing Taiwan’s defense capabilities, and advocating for the maintenance of the status quo, there should be less concern regarding the survival of democracy. However, it remains crucial to carefully monitor interferences and maintain close collaboration with allies. On the other hand, the exploitation of the existential threat, through dominating the election with threats and influencing ostensibly neutral government agencies for political gains, raises concerns about the functioning of democracy. Balancing national security needs with the preservation of democratic principles is an essential task the new government has to face.   For the future executive and legislative relationship, the new president will face a situation of minority government. The new government can choose to cooperate selectively with different parties to secure a majority, but compromises on policies will be inevitable. It will be challenging to pursue significant pro-independence policies, as both blue and white camps are ideologically less inclined towards independence, let alone constitutional amendments which would require approval from over three-quarters of legislators. However, on bills related to socioeconomic issues, with the exception of cross-strait relationships, collaboration between different parties is still possible. This pattern can be seen from past experiences during the DPP president Chen Shui-bian admіnistration (2000-2008), which is also a divided government. ■     References   Central Broadcasting Station. 2023. “China Invite Neighborhood Representatives, Prosecutors have acquired intelligence and are currently conducting investigations.” [中國招待北市里長涉介選 檢方掌握情資偵辦中] December 4. https://www.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2188599 (Accessed January 28, 2024)   Central News Agency. 2024. “Wrong Translation of National Missile Raid Alert Department of Defense Apologize.” [國家級警報衛星誤譯成飛彈 國防部致歉] January 9. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202401095003.aspx (Accessed January 28, 2024)   Kung, William. 2019. “Neighborhood Representative: How China Factor Penetrate Taiwan’s Local Communities” [從「雙棲里長」到「里長組黨」，中國因素如何深入台灣選舉基層？] The Reporter. December 13. https://www.twreporter.org/a/2020-election-chief-of-village-party-united-front-china (Accessed January 28, 2024)   Wang, Austin Horng-En. 2024. “2024 Presidential Election: The Two Major Parties that Are Trapped, the Third Option Rises with Concern.” [王宏恩／2024總統大選：走不出去的兩大黨、崛起但有隱憂的第三選擇]. The Reporter. January 14. https://www.twreporter.org/a/2024-election-wang-austin-horng-en-view (Accessed January 28, 2024)   Wu, Chin-en. 2023. “Taiwan’s Civic Space Threatened by Chinese Misinformation and the Government’s Worrisome Legislative Responses.” ADRN Issue Briefing. February 10. http://adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?idx=294 (Accessed January 28, 2024)       ■ Chin-en Wu is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Foreign Aid and Support for Democracy   As of 2022, South Korea provides Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounting to 2.79 billion USD, 0.17% of its gross national income, ranking 16th among the donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which includes 30 countries. Since joining the DAC in 2010, South Korea’s ODA has been steadily increasing. The successful transition from a recipient to a donor country is a significant achievement globally. However, in the context of South Korea’s high status in liberal democracy, its level of support for democratic governance is relatively low.   There is no clear definition of ‘democracy aid,’ but it generally refers to aid used to advocate and support democracy. Given that democracy aid could be perceived as interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries, it is not prominently emphasized in development assistance where poverty alleviation and socio-economic development are the primary goals. The DAC aims to promote development cooperation and related policies, targeting Sustainable Development 2030, which includes inclusive and sustainable economic development, progress in national and international equality, poverty eradication, and improving living conditions in developing countries. It establishes a standard of assistance policy in various fields such as development, trade, industry, environment, gender equality, anti-corruption, and strengthening civil society. In essence, the DAC does not explicitly state that spreading democracy is the purpose of ODA (OECD n.d.).   South Korea’s Framework Act on International Development Cooperation also stipulates the purpose of itself to “enhance the appropriateness of policies for international development cooperation and the efficiency of the implementation thereof, and effectively achieve the policy objectives of international development cooperation by providing for basic matters concerning international development cooperation, thus contributing to the co-prosperity of humanity and to world peace.” This law outlines the principles of international development cooperation, such as “respect for all the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; support for the self-help efforts and abilities of developing countries; respect for the necessity of development of developing countries; increase in sharing of development experiences; and mutual harmony with the international community and promotion of cooperation therewith,” but there is no mention of linking ODA to democracy (OECD 2005; Korea Legislation Research Institute n.d.).   The longstanding question of whether aid is effective has primarily focused on its economic development impact, with donor countries’ aid being centered around national capacity building and institutional development (Riddell 2007). The Paris Declaration of 2005 outlines five principles for aid effectiveness, including ownership by developing countries, alignment of strategies, harmonization between donor countries, managing for results, and mutual accountability, all aimed at the socio-economic development impact of aid. Among the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that form the foundation of the current aid systеm, the only one related to democracy advocacy is the 16th goal, which focuses on peace, justice, and strong (inclusive) institutions.   The principle of ‘Do No Harm,’ that humanitarian aid in conflict situations such as civil wars, conflicts, or disasters should not have negative consequences, should be prudential when applied to democracy aid. This principle was established due to concerns that aid interventions could unintentionally aggravate political conflicts within recipient countries or hinder nation-building processes. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) emphasizes the Do No Harm principle in ethical aspects such as fairness, neutrality, transparency, and accountability (UNHCR 2019). OECD recommends that donor countries, when providing aid, should have sufficient knowledge of local political dynamics and historical backgrounds, and focus on inclusive political processes, national integrity, constructive state-society relations, and enhancing national capabilities.[1] Namely, assistance supporting inclusive nation-building and politically neutral to local dynamics focuses on nation-building and social integration rather than democracy support.   However, there is a growing trend of advocating for democracy support, which was previously not prominently emphasized, integrating with geopolitical interests. While aid from donor countries has evolved to be more demand-driven, the interests of donor countries are also increasingly influencing aid policies (Lancaster 2007; Haan 2009). Donor countries also have prioritized securing security and economic interests or diplomatic influence over democracy advocacy. Some proponents of democracy have criticized Western donor countries for neglecting democratic values and human rights in their overseas aid. Especially in the case of the United States, the leading donor country in terms of aid volume, security and diplomatic cooperation have been the main drivers of its aid policies. With the Biden admіnistration viewing the international landscape as the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism, there is a growing voice advocating for stronger incorporation of democracy support into U.S. diplomatic policies (Task Force on US Strategy 2021).   Compared to his predecessors, President Biden has been keen on integrating democracy to his foreign policy, holding the inaugural Summit for Democracy in December 2021. U.S. efforts to promote global democracy intensified with the Ukraine war that began with Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Under the ‘Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal,’ the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is supporting independent media, anti-corruption efforts, supporting democratic reformists, technological advancements for democracy, and protection of elections and inclusive political processes (White House 2022). Samantha Power, the Admіnistrator of USAID, argues that the right path against authoritarianism is to integrate democracy support, away from the relatively value-neutral development assistance practices with limited focus on individual rights advocacy, into all economic programs (Power 2023).[2] Another opinion appears that if there is a voluntary resistance movement by citizens against authoritarianism, it should not be strictly bound by the principle of non-interference. Instead, support for democracy from outside, in line with internationally recognized human rights advocacy, should be available. For this purpose, one argues that a norm asserting the “right to (democratic) assistance” needs to be established (Merriman, Quirk, and Jain 2023).   There is also criticism of connecting democracy support to geopolitical interests. Some argue that the primary focus should be on supporting individual rights, such as the rights of minority groups and political freedom of journalists and opposition figures, rather than using democracy support as a tool for development or geopolitical objectives (Pepinsky 2021). This argument aligns with the traditional logic of staying consistent in democracy support without tying it to the security or economic interests of donor countries. While there are differences in views on why democracy support is essential, there is agreement on the need to increase support for the protection and promotion of democracy.   The admіnistration of President Yoon Suk Yeol in South Korea is integrating universal values such as freedom, human rights, and the rule of law into its foreign policy. As part of this, during the second Summit for Democracy Indo-Pacific Regional Meeting, President Yoon promised to launch development cooperation projects worth 100 million US dollars over the next three years in areas that can contribute to advancing democracy, such as e-government, digital technology capacity building, transparency, and anti-corruption, for Indo-Pacific countries. Following this announcement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened a meeting in May to increase its aid budget for 2024 to 3.4 trillion won (approximately 2.6 billion US dollar), a 29.3% increase from the previous year (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2023). However, the focus of aid announced during the summit was primarily on technical support and strengthening the government capacity of developing countries, raising questions about how much it would genuinely contribute to democracy support.   As democracy retreats globally and authoritarianism rises, support for active democracy aid from Western donor countries has strengthened. The South Korean government, which actively advocates for liberal democracy in its foreign policy, also wishes to share this approach. Given these trends, it is essential for South Korea to discuss which areas development assistance need to be expanded, which countries are better to be focused to assist democratic governance, and what would be more effective aid implementation methods for democracy.   Areas of Democracy Aid That South Korea Should Expand   According to the OECD report, the governance and civil society support areas of the DAC are divided into state building and democracy promotion. The former consists of public policy and admіnistrative management, public finance management, decentralization and support for local government, anti-corruption organization and institution support, tax increase, public acquisition, legal and judicial development, and macroeconomic policies. The latter is composed of democratic participation and civil society support, legislature and parties, free flow of media and information, human rights, institutions and organizations for gender equality, elimination of violence against women and girls, and promoting orderly, safe, and responsible immigration and migration. Based on the OECD report analyzing aid provided by all donor countries to 124 recipient countries between 2010 and 2019, 73% of governance aid was used to state building and 27% to democracy promotion, and this ratio remained consistent annually.[3]   For South Korea’s aid, democracy support is realized through grant aid. According to the 12 activity areas listed on Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)’s website, the areas related to democracy are governance and peace, gender equality, and human rights. Among them, the mid-term strategy for the core governance and peace area focuses on ‘participatory and inclusive democracy.’ Programs suggested for achieving this goal include support for inclusive elections and legislative activities, as well as expanding the foundation of participatory democracy. The remaining areas focus on community and social integration, safety and just judicial and security systеms, and responsible and efficient admіnistrative systеms (KOICA n.d.). Support in the peace and governance sectors accounted for 15% to 18% of total aid from 2016 to 2019, with 81% of this being for governance and 19% for peace-related aid. Governance aid mainly went to admіnistrative systеms (62%), judicial and security systеms (19%), and legislative support (5%). Most of KOICA’s governance aid was used for admіnistrative systеm improvement and invited training (Kim 2021). The problem is that strengthening judicial, security, or admіnistrative institutions is more aligned with nation-building rather than democracy promotion. South Korea’s categorization of nation-building aid under governance seems to reflect its historical experience of modernization through a development or admіnistrative state model.   Adhering strictly to the narrow definition of democracy aid, KOICA’s support areas include elections and legislative activities, participatory democracy, and gender equality. The Association of World Election Bodies (A-WEB), initiated and funded by the National Election Commission of South Korea, has been involved in democratic election support and exchange among the world’s election management bodies. However, its operations are limited due to reduced funding from the Korean government. Given South Korea’s leadership in international election management bodies, improving A-WEB’s legal and financial status can enhance its role in democracy aid. Considering South Korea’s active citizen participation, programmatic initiatives tailored to partner countries can be also developed. In particular, methods such as participatory budgeting or digital petition can foster citizen’s political participation in partner countries.   Media freedom support in aid programs has been regarded important to democratic governance. But Korean aid agencies have never been active in this area, possibly due to South Korea’s government-centric aid approach and concerns about meddling in domestic politics. Still, with South Korea’s diverse independent media landscape, leveraging its capabilities for free media support is essential. Collaborating with Western civil entities or multilateral organizations that support independent media might be beneficial. The support for migrants and displaced persons is also gaining attentions from democracy aid. As South Korea becomes more necessary to accept immigration, international aid can help find a momentum of domestic governance reforms. For gender equality which is one of major social achievement of South Korea, promoting women’s rights through education and employment can be a strong point of Korean democracy aid.   To sum up, South Korea’s governance aid is focusing on admіnistrative institutions, whereas democracy assistance is relatively weak. Given that civil society empowerment and media freedom are crucial for recipient countries’ democratic governance, aid on these fields should be supplemented.   South Korea to Focus Its Democracy Aid in the New Democracies   Despite the consensus among DAC donor countries that aid should support good governance, their aid in practice does not differentiate based on the political systеms of recipient countries. A recent OECD report analyzed how ODA was provided according to regime types between 2010 and 2019. During this period, when considering all ODA donor countries, both DAC members and non-members, the total aid to authoritarian regimes increased from 64% of the total ODA in 2010 to 79% in 2019, a 15%-point rise. Within authoritarian regimes, aid to closed autocracies that do not even hold direct elections increased by 178%, while aid to those with non-democratic elections increased by 41%.[4] This increase is attributed to the rise in the number of authoritarian countries from 68 to 75 during the decade and a 19-fold increase in humanitarian aid to these regimes. The crises in Syria and Yemen since 2015 highlight the dilemma of increasing support for authoritarian regimes due to humanitarian causes. Moreover, during this period, emerging donor countries such as Turkey, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia substantially increased their support to authoritarian regimes, without adhering to the principles of human rights or democratic governance since they are not DAC members.   Given that ODA primarily aims at poverty alleviation and economic development, it might seem understandable that the total aid does not consider the political systеms of recipient countries. Then, what about aid aimed at improving governance? The report indicates that governance aid increased from 65% to 73% of the total ODA between 2010 and 2019. But this is mainly due to a 150% increase in aid to closed autocracies. It implies that governance aid also has been made regardless of the regime type. Even when focusing solely on governance aid for promoting democracy (i.e. excluding nation building from the total governance aid), the situation does not change significantly. Within democracy promotion aid, support for civil society and civic participation consistently dominate, with election support decreasing but rights and women’s support increasing. However, even democratic aid often appears to have been provided without much consideration for the political nature of the recipient countries. For instance, the five donor committee member countries – the US, EU, Sweden, UK, and Germany – which collectively accounted for 70% of all democratic participation and civil society aid, did not significantly differentiate their aid based on regime type. Between 2010 and 2019, democratic promotion aid to closed autocracies increased by 72%, with countries like Somalia, Jordan, South Sudan, China, Morocco, and Syria being the major recipients.   From this trend, it can be inferred that even though aid is labeled as democratic, it continues for various reasons in authoritarian regimes without genuine democratic outcomes. However, it is essential to note that just because democratic aid was provided irrespective of the regime type does not mean there were no democratic effects. Recent empirical studies suggest that democratic aid does promote democratization. Research comparing ODA from OECD countries between 2002-2012 found positive democratization effects in terms of electoral democracy, core civil society, and civic freedom levels. The primary argument is that, unless posing a threat to the regime, governance promotion aid, rather than strengthening state capacity, has a more significant impact on areas where there is a democratic deficit (Lührmann et al. 2018). Another study analyzing EU democratic aid support between 2002-2018 found that EU’s democratic aid to 126 recipient countries led to a 0.01 increase in the V-Dem electoral democracy indicator, with each dollar of democratic aid per capita resulting in a 0.009 increase in the indicator two years later (Gafuri 2022). A study on Sweden’s democratic promotion aid over 25 years suggests that while the overall impact might be minimal, there is a significant democratic support effect when recipient countries are on a democratization trajectory. Therefore, reducing aid prior to a level of democratic consolidation is not advisable, and it is recommended to focus on essential areas for consolidation such as human rights, participation, civil society strengthening, and free press (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2020). Recent reports by Cheeseman and Desrosiers also emphasize that while aid should not be abruptly halted to autocracies, if prioritized, it should be directed towards countries where democracy is gradually deteriorating. The primary recommendation is to consistently engage with recipient countries in a manner that prioritizes principles, ensuring that security or economic considerations do not undermine democracy. (Cheeseman and Desrosiers 2023).   In a nutshell, still supporting authoritarian regimes for humanitarian and other reasons, donor countries do not concentrate their governance aid to young democracies. If they want to see the democratization effect of governance aid, new democracies in their democratization process will be more promising. Hence, it is necessary for donors to expect long term gradual democratization effects of governance aid and focus support on specific areas democratizing countries require.   Diversify Aid Implementation Mechanisms through Partnerships with Civil Society Organizations and Like-minded Donors   The majority of South Korea’s foreign aid is based on inter-governmental contracts with recipient countries. Foreign aid disbursed through partnerships with non-governmental civil organizations still remains at around 4%. This is significantly different from the Western donor countries’ approach of channeling support for civil societies in recipient countries through non-governmental routes.   Article 2 of the Framework Act on International Development Cooperation defines international development cooperation as “concessional and non-concessional development cooperation directly or indirectly provided to developing countries (hereinafter referred to as “bilateral development cooperation”) and multilateral development cooperation provided through international organizations by the State, local governments or public institutions for the development and welfare of developing countries.” In this act, the international organizations mean organizations that South Korea financially contributes or cooperates among development-related international organizations (including non-governmental organizations) determined by the OECD DAC. Therefore, based on this provision, joint projects can be pursued through non-governmental international organizations. With this legal feasibility, Korean government needs to diversify its aid implementation to a more innovative mechanisms involving domestic and international non-governmental organizations and civil partnerships.   One can also consider ways to further activate multi-bilateral assistance. Multi-bilateral assistance is a systеm where funds are entrusted to international organizations for implementation with specifying the purposes, distinguished from multilateral aid where international organizations have decision-making authority. This approach allows donor countries to leverage the experience and expertise of international organizations while avoiding political sensitivities compared to inter-governmental aid. Donor countries including South Korea have utilized UN agencies in need of urgent relief aid during disaster or dispute of fragile states (Cho et al. 2015). Utilizing this approach for democratic aid could help leverage the specialized expertise of international organizations dedicated to democracy support while adhering to the principle of non-interference in the politics of recipient countries. Partnerships can be arranged with the like-minded donors as well. Sharing the common goals, democratic donor countries can scale up development assistance by cutting admіnistrative costs of aid recipient countries and also producing synergistic effects between them.   Conclusion   South Korea is a representative donor state that has achieved both economic development and democratization. However, regarding aid supporting democracy in aid partnership countries, Korea has been passive, lacking clear principles and norms. At a time when democracy is receding globally, there is an urgent need to establish a framework for democratic aid. This article suggests that while it may not be feasible to drastically change Korea’s existing aid policies focused on economic and social development, it is imperative to urgently establish a democratic aid framework. Specifically, first, increase support for democracy in areas such as election support, citizen participation, and free press, moving beyond traditional government capacity building or technical assistance aid. Second, focus on emerging democracies that lie between authoritarianism and consolidated democracies when selecting recipient countries. Third, through partnerships with domestic and international civil organizations and collaborations with democratic donor countries sharing the same values, execute aid more directly to the civil society and media in aid recipient countries. The starting point for these reforms is to align the aid classification systеms with DAC donor countries while designing programs tailored to Korea’s circumstances. Contribution diplomacy through aid should be complemented by assisting democratic governance more proactively. Without democratic governance, sustainable development and stable peace are challenging to achieve. ■     [1] The OECD report claims that elections excluding specific groups are undesirable to be held early, and raising expectations from civil society is neither helpful to address conflict situations. Since providing service through civil society organizations only builds another public sector to fragile states, the report suggests that distributing aid resources by the state sector is more desirable. OECD 2010. [2] USAID classifies its activities into 13 areas, and “Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance” is one of them. https://www.usaid.gov/democracy [3] This data does not include multilateral aid toward international organizations, which possesses 70% of total ODA amount. Regarding the regime classification method for democracy diversity research, refer to Lührmann et al. 2018. [4] Most of the increase in ODA financing to closed autocracies were classified as multilateral aids in public sectors. 34% of them were invested in humanitarian aid, 29% to social infrastructure and service, 14% to economic infrastructure and service, and 7% to supplies and program support.     References   Cheeseman, Nic, and Marie-Eve Desrosiers. 2023. “How (Not) to Engage with Authoritarian States.” Westminster Democracy Foundation. https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/how_not_to_engage_with_authoritarian_states_wfd_cheeseman_desrosiers_2023.pdf   Cho, Hyunju, Eunmi Kim, and Heon Joo Jung. 2015. “An Exploratory Analysis of South Korea’s Multi-Bilateral Official Development Assistance.” (in Korean) Journal of International Politics 20, 2: 35-65.   Gafuri, Adea. 2022. “Can Democracy Aid Improve Democracy” The European Union’s Democracy Assistance 2002-2018.” Democratization 29, 5: 777-797.   Haan, Arjan de. 2009. How the Aid Industry Works: An Introduction to International Development. Kumarian Press.   Kim, Tae Kyoon. 2021. “An Implication of South Korea’s Democracy Support Experience as a Global Narrative” (in Korean). EAI Issue Briefing. https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=20830&board=kor_issuebriefing   KOICA. n.d. “KOICA’s Governance Mid-Term Strategy 2021-2025.” https://www.koica.go.kr/koica_en/3416/subview.do   Korea Legislation Research Institute. N.d. “Framework Act on International Development Cooperation.” https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=54777&lang=ENG   Lancaster, Carol. 2007. Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. University of Chicago Press.   Lührmann, Anna, Kelly McMann, and Carolien van Ham. 2018. “Democracy Aid Effectiveness: Variation Across Regime Types.” V-Dem Institute Working Paper. https://v-dem.net/media/publications/v-dem_working_paper_2018_40_revised.pdf   Lührmann, Anna, Marcus Tannenberg and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2018. “Tannenberg and Lindberg, Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes.” Politics and Governance 6, 1: 60-77.   Merriman, Hardy, Patrick Quirk, and Ash Jain. 2023. “Fostering a Fourth Democratic Wave: A Playbook for Countering the Authoritarian Threat.” March 28. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/scowcroft-center-for-strategy-and-security/global-strategy-initiative/democratic-order-initiative/fostering-a-fourth-democratic-wave/   Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2023. “2023 Grant Aid Committee Is Held.” (in Korean) May 3. https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373628   Niño-Zarazúa, Miguel, Rachel M. Gisselquist, Ana Horigoshi, Melissa Samarin, and Kunal Sen. 2020. “Effects of Swedish and International Democracy Aid.” https://www.oecd.org/derec/sweden/Effects-of-Swedish-and-international-democracy-aid.pdf   OECD. 2005. “The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Five Principles for Smart Aid.” https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827300.pdf   ______. 2010. Do no Harm: International Support for Statebuilding. https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/do%20no%20harm.pdf   ______. n.d. “DAC Standards.” https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-instruments-and-standards.htm   Pepinsky, Thomas. 2021. “Biden’s Summit for Democracy should focus on rights, not economics and geopolitics.” November 22. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bidens-summit-for-democracy-should-focus-on-rights-not-economics-and-geopolitics/   Power, Samantha. 2023. “How Democracy Can Win: The Right Way to Counter Autocracy.” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2023.   Riddell, Roger C. 2007. Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press.   Task Force on US Strategy. 2021. “Reversing the Tide: Towards a New US Strategy to Support Democracy and Counter Authoritarianism.” https://freedomhouse.org/democracy-task-force/special-report/2021/reversing-the-tide   UNHCR. 2019. “Emergency Handbook: Humanitarian Principles.” https://emergency.unhcr.org/protection/protection-principles/humanitarian-principles   White House. 2022. “Fact Sheet: Summit for Democracy: Progress in the Year of Action.” November 29. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/29/fact-sheet-summit-for-democracy-progress-in-the-year-of-action/       ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute and the Representative of the Asia Democracy Research Network.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Re-emergence of Dynastic Politics in Indonesia   While being recognized as a “reluctant global statesman” (Wee 2022), President Joko Widodo is known for his pace in advancing Indonesia’s infrastructure development and his popularity ratings have been high. However, the stability of Indonesian democracy recently faces a threat from the growing symptom of political dynasties, a recurring political feature in Southeast Asia including Indonesia.   Political dynasty in Indonesia refers to the phenomenon where political power or political positions are passed down from generation to generation within one family or lineage. Establishing a political dynasty is often considered a political strategy to gain and maintain power. By using family power and influence, politicians can build strong support networks. In theory, political dynasty has both positive and negative connotations. Positive connotations can occur if the generation holding power is proven competent; however, this may happen when the institutional structure, for instance, a political party, is weak. On the other hand, negative connotations arise when the dynastic systеm is used to maintain power within a family without paying attention to leadership quality. Nevertheless, the case in Indonesia involving President Jokowi’s son in the 2024 election as a Vice President candidate has yielded more negative responses.   Several fundamental variables could lead to the establishment of political dynasties. One of these reasons is the desire for personal or family power. Furthermore, there are structured collectives formed by mutual consensus and a feeling of cohesion, leading to the emergence of group leaders and participants. This is made possible by a multi-party democratic systеm. Moreover, the collaboration between leaders and businesses requires certain conditions to combine the power of financial resources with the power of political personalities. Ultimately, there is a propensity to “assign onuses” between the government and influential individuals with money, which often results in corruption.   Political dynasties in Indonesia are often a source of criticism because they can hinder meritocracy, where leaders are selected based on qualifications and achievements, not family relationships. In Indonesia, political dynasties and political oligarchy potentially obstruct the renewal of political leadership. This environment concentrates power within families, limiting opportunities for other parties and undermining bureaucracy and government accountability due to corruption and misconduct.   Despite the intense debate and criticism, political dynasties have increasingly been recognized in Indonesia since the post-Soeharto period (Aspinall and As’ad 2016). The political legacy of the first President Sukarno has been passed down to his daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who became the fifth President and is currently the leader of the incumbent party. Sukarno’s granddaughter, Puan Maharani, serves as the speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR). Similarly, descendants of other former presidents, Soeharto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, have also been involved in political activities, building upon their ancestors’ legacies.   Political dynasties can emerge in various political systеms, including autocratic and monarchical ones, where power is often inherited within royal families (Ved 2013). This phenomenon is not exclusive to Indonesia; it is prevalent in Western civilizations and cultures. Similar trends are observable in European nations and, notably, in American politics (Hess 2016). In addition, political dynasties, also known in South and Southeast Asia, play a part in Indonesia and the Philippines’ politics (Teng 2023).   In Indonesia, dynastic politics remains a pervasive issue, with family members of regional leaders occupying positions of power at various levels. Several tribes in Indonesia have a tradition of dynastic leadership, where certain families or lineages hold leadership. Leadership or certain positions can be inherited based on genealogical ties.   Political dynasties are not limited to the central level of national government. This phenomenon also extends to the regional level, where regional heads, governors or regents are often filled by family members closely related to the previous official.   Thanks to the massive use of the internet, the public has become more aware that the practice has become somewhat a “standard feature” since the political reforms in 1998, particularly with the release of Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government, which regulates the first regional elections for the Governor, Deputy Governor, Regent, and Mayor have been conducted (Simandjuntak 2021). Notable instances include Ratu Atut Chosyiyah in Banten Province, Muhammad Ma’mun Ibnu Fuad in Bangkalan, East Java Province, and Mohammad Yasin Limpo in South Sulawesi, where family members assumed vital positions (Simandjuntak 2021; Ulum 2013; Kenawas 2015; Vice June/28/2018). The influence of dynastic politics extends to legislative elections, limiting opportunities for other parties to secure regional representative positions.   During Jokowi’s presidency, the recent involvement of his sons, Kaesang Pangarep- recently appointed as the Chief of the Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI), and Gibran Rakabuming Raka, drew attention to the issue (The Jakarta Post February/06/2023; Wahyu 2023). Kaesang’s sudden rise in the political party, added to Gibran’s endorsement as a vice-presidential running mate for the 2024 election, raised concerns among intellectuals and activists supporting a fair democratization and an independent court systеm (Suhenda 2023; The Jakarta Post n.d.).   Politicization of the Constitutional Court   Accessing the Constitutional Court portal led to the discovery of an insightful article shedding light on this issue. The most egregious feature of the notorious case involving the first son of the Indonesian President was the blatant politicization of the legal systеm in the Constitutional Court, established in 2003. Historically, within the context of Indonesia’s “Reformasi”, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia was founded to uphold the supremacy of the 1945 Constitution. It is a judicial body responsible for organizing court procedures to ensure law enforcement and order. The Constitutional Court of Indonesia has four powers and one duty as stipulated by Article 24C (1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution. Four authorities of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia are conducting examinations at the first and appellate levels. The Court’s rulings are conclusive in reviewing the legislation for its conformity with the Constitution, resolving conflicts regarding the jurisdiction of state institutions established by the Constitution, determining the dissolution of political parties, and settling disputes arising from the outcome of general elections. The primary responsibility of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia is to provide decisions based on the Constitution, taking precedence over the opinions of the House of People’s Representatives in cases involving allegations of misconduct by the President and/or Vice President (Butt 2018). Jimly Asshiddiqie claims that the Indonesian Constitutional Court is responsible for enforcing the four powers mentioned earlier and one responsibility stated in the Constitution.   Following the Constitutional Court’s approval of lawsuit No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 challenging Article 169 letter q of Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, Gibran participated in the General Election for President and Vice President. The amended provision reads: “Enter into or hold regional head elections or be at least 40 years old (forty years) after that” (Iqrimah 2023).   Gibran’s potential to run as a vice presidential candidate in the 2024 presidential election is widely perceived to have been facilitated by the decision rendered by the Constitutional Court. Gibran was widely speculated to be a vice presidential candidate before the Constitutional Court’s decision. Gibran was formally declared a vice presidential candidate on the evening of October 22, 2023, after the consensus reached by the general chairmen of the political parties affiliated with the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM) in Jakarta.   The Honorary Council of the Constitutional Court (MKMK) convened a preliminary examination hearing to scrutinize complaints of purported infringements of the code of ethics and behavioral norms for constitutional judges. The hearing was conducted in two parts, with the first session including the Indonesian Advocate Movement (Perekat Nusantara) and the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP). Perekat Nusantara and KIPP disclosed that Chief Constitutional Court Justice Anwar Usman had a familial connection with the President of the Republic of Indonesia. The Petitioner in Case Number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 sought to guarantee Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s eligibility to compete in the presidential/vice-presidential election. The Reporting Party alleges that the Reported Party has breached the standards of independence, impartiality, and integrity as outlined in the code of ethics governing the conduct of constitutional judges. The Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP) has asserted that the Reported Party had vested interests and ethical responsibilities about the election, and there were compelling accusations of interference in the poll organizers and admіnistration (Salam 2023). During the second session, the MKMK received evidence from many individuals and organisations, such as the Election Concern Advocacy Team, Legal Aid Institute, “Barisan Volunteers on the Road to Change”, Roynal Christian Pasaribu, R. Jourda, and Marthen Y. Siwab (Pujianti 2023).   The dissatisfaction with using the Constitutional Court as a platform for unfair politics led to responses such as the “Juanda Declaration 2023: Reform Returns to Zero Point.” (Priyasmoro 2023) This declaration, endorsed by 326 prominent Indonesian personalities, including academics, religious leaders, former ministers, and cultural icons, voiced concerns about the prevalence of political dynasties during the Jokowi period. These individuals represent various fields, encompassing education, human rights, the environment, and health, highlighting the widespread discontent with Indonesian politics.   Conclusion   Political dynasties will foster political oligarchies and a climate that could be more conducive to efforts to regenerate political leadership, where power is only held or controlled by people who are related or come from the same family, without providing opportunities for other parties to participate. Also, dynastic politics will harm bureaucratic and government accountability because they tend to be greedy and prone to corruption and corruption practices.   The politicization of the Constitutional Court for the acquirement of power is deemed to be opposed by Indonesian society. The historical need for change primarily drove the establishment of the Constitutional Court. In a democratic nation, the judicial systеm upholds the Constitution’s integrity, ensuring law enforcement authorities’ independent and impartial conduct. Before the 2024 General Election, the state of national political practice is becoming more concerning, as shown in the present situation. On the one hand, there are indications of legal manipulation that disregards conscientious politics. Conversely, there are signs of a profound dilemma over principles and moral standards inside society and governmental officials.   Jokowi is Indonesia’s first president, not from a political or military elite family. This was regarded as a positive sign of the country’s democratization. Unfortunately, his family is now considered to be reversing Indonesia’s democratic course. ■   References   Aspinall, Edward, and Muhammad Uhaib As’ad. 2016. “Understanding family politics: Successes and failures of political dynasties in regional Indonesia.” South East Asia Research 24, 3: 420-435.   Butt, Simon. 2018. “The Indonesian Constitutional Court: Implying Rights from the ‘Rule of Law’.” In R. Dixon and A. Stone (Eds.) The Invisible Constitution in Comparative Perspective (Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy, pp. 298-319). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI:10.1017/9781108277914.010   Eddyono, Luthfi Widagdo. 2018. “The Constitutional Court and Consolidation of Democracy in Indonesia.” Jurnal Konstitusi 15, 1: 1-26.   Hess, Stephen. 2016. America’s Political Dynasties: From Adams to Clinton. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.   Iqrimah, Ani Nur. 2023. “Kronologi Terpilihnya Gibran Rakabuming Raka Jadi Cawapres Prabowo.” (In Indonesian) Berita Satu. October 23. https://www.beritasatu.com/bersatu-kawal-pemilu/1073494/kronologi-terpilihnya-gibran-rakabuming-raka-jadi-cawapres-prabowo   Kasuya, Yuko, and Benjamin Reilly. 2023. “The shift to consensus democracy and limits of institutional design in Asia.” The Pacific Review 36, 4: 844-870. DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2035426   Kenawas, Yoes C. 2015. “The Rise of Political Dynasties in a Democratic Society.” EDGS Working Paper. May 16. https://www.edgs.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/the-rise-of-political-dynasties-in-a-democratic-society.pdf   ______. 2023. “The irony of Indonesia’s democracy: The rise of dynastic politics in the post-Suharto era.” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 8, 3: 748-764.   Priyasmoro, Muhammad Radityo. 2023. “Kritik Putusan MK,Maklumat Juanda: Reformasi Kembali Ke Titik Nol.” Liputan6. October 17. https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/5425315/kritik-putusan-mk-maklumat-juanda-reformasi-kembali-ke-titik-nol   Pujianti, Sri. 2023. “Para Pelapor Sampaikan Alasan dan Bukti Dugaan Pelanggaran Kode Etik Hakim Konstitusi.” The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia. November 1. https://www.mkri.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=19736&menu=2   Querubin, Pablo. 2016. “Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 11, 2: 151-181.   Richburg, Keith B. 2023. “Southeast Asian dynasties are rising again. That’s troubling news.” The Washington Post. November 28. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/28/southeast-asia-political-dynasties-rise/   Salam, Hidayat. 2023. “Pelapor Anwar Usman Pertanyakan Sidang Etik yang Bergulir Cepat.” Kompas. November 1. https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2023/11/01/pemohon-pertanyakan-sidang-etik-anwar-usman-sangat-cepat   Simandjuntak, Deasy. 2021. “Direct Elections, Patronage and the Failure of Party Cadre-ship: Dynastic Politics in Indonesia.” Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. July 21. https://th.boell.org/en/2021/07/21/dynastic-politics-indonesia   Suhenda, Dio. 2023. “Kaesang takes over PSI leadership days after joining the party.” The Jakarta Post. September 25. https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/09/25/kaesang-takes-over-psi-leadership-days-after-joining-the-party.html   Teehankee, Julio C, Paul Chambers, and Christian Echle. 2023. “Introduction: Political dynasties in Asia.” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 8, 3: 661-670.   Teng, Carla. 2023. “Asia’s Political dynasties: Philippines.” Asia Media Centre. May 24. https://www.asiamediacentre.org.nz/features/asias-political-dynasties-philippines/   The Conversation. 2023. “Terjebak dinasti politik: apa dampaknya dan bagaimana partai bisa lepas dari jerat ini?” October 17. https://theconversation.com/terjebak-dinasti-politik-apa-dampaknya-dan-bagaimana-partai-bisa-lepas-dari-jerat-ini-215778   The Jakarta Post. 2023. “Analysis: Jokowi political dynasty: Kaesang hints at political ambitions.” February 6. https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2023/02/06/analysis-jokowi-political-dynasty-kaesang-hints-at-political-ambitions.html   ______. n.d. “Candidate profile: Gibran Rakabuming Raka.” https://www.thejakartapost.com/indonesia/2023/12/01/candidate-profile-gibran-rakabuming-raka.html   Ulum, Wasi’ul. 2013. “Atut Dynasty Gains Power Using Regional Budget.” Tempo.co. October 22. https://en.tempo.co/read/523809/atut-dynasty-gains-power-using-regional-budget   Ved, Mahendra. 2013. “Political dynasties face a tough time across Asia. East Asia Forum. March 30. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/30/political-dynasties-face-a-tough-time-across-asia/   Vice. 2018. “One of Indonesia’s Most-Powerful Political Dynasties Just Lost in South Sulawesi.” June 28. https://www.vice.com/en/article/nekp8q/one-of-indonesias-most-powerful-political-dynasties-just-lost-in-south-sulawesi   Wahyu, Yohan. 2023. “Gibran dan Polemik Dinasti Politik.” (in Indonesian) Kompas. October 23. https://www.kompas.id/baca/riset/2023/10/23/gibran-dan-polemik-dinasti-politik?open_from=Search_Result_Page   Wee, Sui-Lee. 2022. “Once Inward-Looking, Joko Widodo Casts Himself as a Global Statesman.” The New York Times. November 13. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/13/world/asia/indonesia-joko-widodo-g20.html       ■ Irine Hiraswari Gayatri, Ph.D., is a Senior Researcher of Research Centre for Politics at the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN).     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

※ This Issue Briefing is the summary of the Asia and the Pacific region in the Global State of Democracy 2023 by the International IDEA (https://www.idea.int/gsod/2023/).   International IDEA’s annual Global State of Democracy report shows that across every region of the world, democracy has continued to contract, with declines in at least one indicator of democratic performance in half of all countries assessed in the report. But after five consecutive years of more countries experiencing declines in their democratic quality than improvements, the data shows that this trend may have, in Asia and the Pacific, largely paused after five years of steady declines in most indicators.   These findings are based on the Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices), International IDEA’s quantitative dataset of democratic performance launched in 2015 and containing data from 1975 to the present. The indices measure democratic trends at the national, regional and global levels across a broad range of different categories of democracy and include data for 174 countries across the globe, 35 of which are in Asia and the Pacific. In lieu of a single democracy score, the GSoD Indices measure four main categories of democracy – Representation, Rights, Rule of Law, and Participation - which are based on 157 individual indicators from 20 diverse sources: expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures. Each of these four measures is comprised of several of the 17 factors, as seen in Figure 1 below.   This data show that in every region of the world, democracy has continued to contract, with declines in at least one indicator of democratic performance in half of the countries covered by the GSoD Indices. But it is in Asia and the Pacific where the trend is most ambiguous and least severe. When we look at five and one year statistically significant trends in the data for the region what we see in 2022 is not continued decline but mostly scores plateauing after years of declines.   Whether or not this is “good” news for a given country largely depends on where it stood before the widespread declines of recent years began. At one extreme, we see countries with firmly established democratic institutions like Australia, Japan and South Korea continuing to perform well across the GSoD Indices while at the other authoritarian regimes in Laos, China, North Korea and Turkmenistan occupy the lower rungs of the global rankings in each of the GSoD’s four core measures of democracy. The vast majority of the diverse Asia and the Pacific region lies somewhere between these two poles. To reflect the diversity of Asian democracies, this text will work through the major trends at the country-level according to the GSoD Indices four main categories of democracy, and then close with short reflections on two broader trends and accompanying courses of action to ensure the region’s future remains democratic.   Figure 1. The Global State of Democracy conceptual framework       Representation   The GSoD’s first core measure of democracy is representation, or the quality of representative government in a country. Malaysia made significant improvements in this measure over the last five years due to improvements in Credible Elections and Free Political Parties, which can be credited in part to the convincing defeat of the long-powerful United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in November 2022 elections, which had clung to power in the face of persistent and wide-ranging corruption allegations (Bersih 2022; Lee 2022; Wee 2022). The Maldives was the other country to make major improvements in Representation due to gains in the measures of Effective Parliament, Credible Elections, Elected Government and Free Political Parties.   Two countries scheduled to have general elections in early 2024, however, saw five-year significant declines. India’s decline in Representation was tied to reports that the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party benefited from unequal treatment by Facebook and used hate speech during campaigns in the 2019 general election (Purnell and Horwitz 2020; Safi 2019; Tiwary 2022; Chakrabarty 2023). Bangladesh saw a significant decline in Elected Government over a failure to improve since the much-criticized 2018 general elections (The Wire August/10/2018; Siddiqui and Paul 2019; HRW 2018). Arrests of opposition figures there began as early as 2022, and a steady escalation of protests, violence, and polarization has also been documented in International IDEA’s monthly-updated qualitative dataset, the Democracy Tracker (International IDEA 2023; Hasnat and Mashal 2022).   Rights   The respect for human rights, and especially the civil and political rights measured under Civil Liberties in the GSoD dataset, continues to be an area of concern and decline across Asia and the Pacific that runs contrary to the broader trend of stability. India, Maldives, the Philippines and Sri Lanka are all mid-performing countries that saw significant declines over the last five years. The regional average for Civil Liberties continues to be well below the world’s, and most people in Asia and the Pacific live in a country that has seen a significant decline in this score in the last five years. Examples of what this looks like on the ground abound. Amnesty International was forced to close its doors in India in 2020. Sri Lanka responded to hundreds of days of mass protests that forced the president’s resignation by introducing laws to restrict the freedoms of association and assembly (Amnesty International n.d.) (HRW 2022). Declines in Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Expression are also occurring across the region and affecting even high performing democracies like Australia, as seen in the figure below:   Figure 2. Variations in Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press for Selected Countries 2017–2022       These declines take place during a time of historic changes in how media is consumed and shared across Asia and the Pacific, where internet penetration rose from 48 to 64 percent between 2017 and 2022. This growth has not been universally enjoyed and has, depending on local political contexts, amplified, reduced, or simply altered pre-existing social inequalities. (ITU 2023; Setiawan, Pape and Beschorner 2022). The introduction and broad uptake of new digital technologies and forms of media are proving to be neither an inherently democratic or autocratic force, but a space for political contestation between domestic and foreign forces (Sinpeng 2020; Farrell 2022).   Rule of Law   This year’s Global State of Democracy report included for the first time a score specifically dedicated to the Rule of Law. As visible in the graphic below, these scores vary widely between subregions, with Oceania and East Asia performing strongly and Central Asia the lowest. Across the region, it has fallen to institutions like anti-corruption bureaus and the judiciary to push back against executive overreach in the region as weak parliaments have proven incapable of providing a first round of defence.   Figure 3. Distribution of Rule of Law scores by subregion 2022 (median scores for subregions annotated)       One of the key issues of contention in courts has been LGBTQIA+ and women’s rights. A Hong Kong court removed the requirement of sex-reassignment surgery prior to legal gender recognition, a South Korean court recognizing the rights of same-sex couples to social benefits, and an Indian court legalized abortion regardless of marital status (Lau 2023; Pandey 2022; Yoon 2023). The judiciary has also been one of the few countervailing institutions pushing back against the decline in Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press. In an otherwise tumultuous year in Pakistan, a colonial-era law criminalizing criticism of the government was struck down by a Lahore court (Al Jazeera March/30/2023). A Filipino tax court also cleared Nobel laureate Maria Ressa of multiple politically-motivated tax evasion charges – a decision hailed globally as a win for press freedom and the rule of law (OHCHR 2023a).   Participation   Participation, or the measure of mass participation in democracy through elections and organization, is a strong point for most of the region, with most countries scoring at mid-range or high-performing levels. The sole exception is Central Asia, which is also the lowest-performing subregion globally, reflecting how entrenched its autocratic elite are and the dearth of countervailing institutions to check their authority.   More broadly across Asia and the Pacific, it is mass public participation – above all, in elections – that have acted as the most powerful countervailing force against autocracy and entrenched elites in the region in recent years. This was visible in Malaysia in 2022 when lowering the voting age to 18 from 21 and introducing automatic voter registration led to three million more voters participating than in the previous 2018 election and firmly removed the corruption-tainted UMNO from power (Fernandez Gibaja 2022; International IDEA n.d.). The expanded electorate worked in concert with the nation’s anti-corruption commission, which obtained a conviction of former prime minister and UMNO president Najib Razak for corruption for his role in the country’s 1MDB scandal (Latiff 2023).   However, significant public mobilization is not always a guarantor of democratic progress. The 2014 coup d’état in Thailand has been met by growing youth engagement, varied forms of activism and civic engagement. Like Malaysia’s, the May 2023 election in Thailand also saw the highest voter turnout in the country’s history, which contributed to the historic first-place finish of the progressive Move Forward Party at the expense of more established parties (International IDEA 2023). Unlike Malaysia, the country’s political establishment prevailed when the military-appointed Senate blocked Move Forward’s efforts to assemble a ruling coalition. In August 2023, a Pheu Thai-led coalition viewed by the military as more amenable successfully built a governing coalition without Move Forward (Nikkei Asia August/15/2023).   Where do we go from here?   What can be done to stem declines and reverse the democratic declines of the last five years? One area that activists, democracy assistance providers, and donors should focus on is scaling up technical and financial assistance to independent media and advocating for robust legal protections for journalists. A free press is a core component of any democracy, but in 2022 and 2023, governments in Bangladesh and Kyrgyzstan instituted bans on popular media outlets, a Pakistani court strengthened the country’s blasphemy laws, and the South Korean government took action against a major media outlet and cut funding for public broadcasting in retaliation for perceived unfavourable coverage (Imanaliyeva 2023; Masood 2023; OHCHR 2023b; Daily Star February/21/2023) (CIVICUS 2022; RSF 2022). This is a long-term trend – as of 2022, Freedom of the Press had regressed to 2001 levels, far down from the region’s historical peak in 2012, as seen in Figure 4 below.   Figure 4. Freedom of the Press improved from 2001 to 2012, but had returned to 2001 levels in 2022 (each dot represents a country)       A second area of focus should be the slow work of establishing complementary countervailing institutions – those social institutions that, inside and outside of government, that balance the distribution of power and ensure popular control over decision-making. The contrast between Thailand and Malaysia in the Participation section above is a key example of the risks in relying on a sole countervailing institution – in Thailand’s case, elections – instead of an array that provide each other with mutually reinforcing support.   This is not to say the relevant complementary institution of the anti-corruption commission in Malaysia’s case was a cure-all. The once-powerful Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi), working together with capable civil society organizations and a largely free press, was famously able to secure hundreds of high level convictions in the first two decades of the twenty-first century (Buehler 2019; Umam et al. 2020). But it has since been subjected to an elite backlash and seen its independence curtailed (Mulholland and Sanit 2020). Its rise and fall show that anti-corruption commissions can be a core part of a set of high-performing and complementary countervailing institutions – such as well-managed and open elections and a free media – but they cannot be a shortcut to sustainable democracy.   Conclusion   Despite the overall pause in democratic decline in 2022, most countries in Asia and the Pacific are below the global average in key measures of democracy such as Rule of Law and Representation. The growth of restrictions on freedom of speech, censorship of the media, and legal action against investigative media remain a concern across the broad and diverse region. While technocratic and legalistic institutions like the judiciary and anti-corruption commissions have been able to stem to some extent the declines of recent years, they remain institutions that are dependent on political will and are doomed to inefficacy without true independence. Collective efforts will be required across the region to revitalize the core instruments of democracy, such as parliaments, to prevent further democratic decline. ■   References   Al Jazeera. 2023. “Pakistani court strikes down sedition law in win for free speech.” March 30. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/30/pakistani-court-strikes-down-sedition-law-in-win-for-free-speech   Amnesty International n.d. “Protect Our Human Rights Work in India.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/petition/protect-our-human-rights-work-in-india/   Bersih. 2022. “Preliminary Report of the 15th General Election.” December 6. https://bersih.org/2022/12/06/preliminary-report-of-the-15th-general-election/   Buehler, M. 2019. “Indonesia takes a wrong turn in crusade against corruption.” Financial Times. October 2. https://www.ft.com/content/048ecc9c-7819-3553-9ec7-546dd19f09ae   Chakrabarty, Sreeparna. 2023. “Bill introduced to remove CJI from panel to select Election Commissioners.” The Hindu. August 10. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bill-moved-to-remove-cji-from-panel-to-select-election-commissioners/article67180873.ece   CIVICUS. 2022. “Concerns about free expression in South Korea with security law, restrictions on press freedom and anti-north activism.” December 1. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/concerns-about-free-expression-south-korea-security-law-restrictions-press-freedom-and-anti-north-activism/   Daily Star. 2023. “Dainik Dinkal stops publication.” February 21. https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/dainik-dinkal-stops-publication-3253461   Farrell, Maria. 2022. “Your platform is not an ecosystеm.” Crooked Timber. https://crookedtimber.org/2022/12/08/your-platform-is-not-an-ecosystеm/   Fernandez Gibaja, Alberto. 2022. “How young voters are revamping democracy in Malaysia.” International IDEA. November 17. https://www.idea.int/blog/how-young-voters-are-revamping-democracy-malaysia   Hasnat, Saif, and Mujib Mashal. 2022. “Bangladesh Arrests Opposition Leaders as Crackdown Intensifies.” The New York Times. December 9. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/09/world/asia/bangladesh-protests-election.html   Human Rights Watch: HRW. 2018. “Creating Panic: Bangladesh Election Crackdown on Political Opponents and Critics.” December 22. https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/22/creating-panic/bangladesh-election-crackdown-political-opponents-and-critics   ______. 2022. “Sri Lanka: Revoke Sweeping New Order to Restrict Protest.” September 27. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/27/sri-lanka-revoke-sweeping-new-order-restrict-protest   Imanaliyeya, Ayzirek. 2023. “Kyrgyzstan: Court orders closure of RFE/RL’s local affiliate.” Eurasianet. April 27. https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-court-orders-closure-of-rferls-local-affiliate   International IDEA. 2023. “Democracy Tracker: Bangladesh.” https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/bangladesh   ______. 2023. “Democracy Tracker: Thailand – May 2023.” https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/thailand/may-2023   ______. n.d. “Voter Turnout Database: Malaysia.” https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=135&database_theme=293   International Telecommunication Union: ITU. 2023. “Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2023.” https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/facts/default.aspx   Latiff, Rozanna. 2023. “Jailed Malaysian ex-PM Najib loses final bid to review graft conviction.” Reuters. March 31. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/jailed-malaysian-ex-pm-najib-loses-bid-review-graft-conviction-2023-03-31/   Lau, Chris. 2023. “Hong Kong’s landmark transgender ruling: will the rest of Asia now follow suit?” South China Morning Post. February 19. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/lifestyle-culture/article/3210600/hong-kongs-landmark-transgender-ruling-will-rest-asia-now-follow-suit   Lee, Jaehyon. 2022. “Review – The End of UMNO?: Essays on Malaysia’s Dominant Party.” Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia 36. https://kyotoreview.org/book-review/review-the-end-of-umno-essays-on-malaysias-dominant-party/   Masood, Salman. “Pakistan strengthens already harsh laws against blasphemy.” The New York Times. January 21. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/21/world/asia/pakistan-blasphemy-laws.html   Mulholland, Jeremy, and Arbi Sanit. 2020. “The weakening of Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission.” East Asia Forum. January 20. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/01/28/the-weakening-of-indonesias-corruption-eradication-commission/   Nikkei Asia. 2023. “Thailand’s Move Forward ‘will not back’ Pheu Thai’s PM bid.” August 15. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Thai-election/Thailand-s-Move-Forward-will-not-back-Pheu-Thai-s-PM-bid   Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: OHCHR. 2023a. “UN expert welcomes verdict on Maria Ressa’s tax evasion case.” January 19. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/01/un-expert-welcomes-verdict-maria-ressas-tax-evasion-case   ______. 2023b. “Cambodia: UN experts call for reinstatement of Voice of Democracy, say free media critical ahead of elections.” February 20. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/cambodia-un-experts-call-reinstatement-voice-democracy-say-free-media   Pandey, Geeta. 2022. “India abortion: Why Supreme Court ruling is a huge step forward.” BBC. October 1. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-63086321   Purnell, Newley, and Jeff Horwitz. 2020. “Facebook’s Hate-Speech Rules Collide With Indian Politics.” The Wall Street Journal. August 14. https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-hate-speech-india-politics-muslim-hindu-modi-zuckerberg-11597423346   Reporters Without Borders: RSF. 2022. “South Korea: RSF concerned by president’s hostile moves against public media.” December 5. https://rsf.org/en/south-korea-rsf-concerned-president-s-hostile-moves-against-public-media   Safi, Michael. 2019. “India: high-profile candidates banned from election trail over hate speech.” The Guardian. April 15. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/15/indian-party-leaders-banned-from-election-trail-over-hate-speech   Setiawan, Imam, Utz Pape, and Natasha Beschorner. 2022. “How to bridge the gap in Indonesia’s inequality in internet access.” World Bank Blogs. May 13. https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/how-bridge-gap-indonesias-inequality-internet-access   Siddiqui, Zeba, and Ruma Paul. 2019. “Some in Bangladesh election observer group said they regretted involvement.” Reuters. January 29. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-election-observers-exclusi-idUSKCN1PG0MA/   Sinpeng, Aim. 2020. “Digital media, political authoritarianism, and Internet controls in Southeast Asia.” Media, Culture & Society 42, 1: 25-39.   The Wire. 2018. “Centre Moves New Bill on Appointment of Election Commissioners, CJI Excluded From Panel.” August 10. https://thewire.in/government/new-bill-selection-of-election-commissioners   Tiwary, Deeptiman. 2022. “From 60% in UPA to 95% in NDA: A surge in share of Opposition leaders in CBI net.” The Indian Express. September 21. https://indianexpress.com/article/express-exclusive/from-60-per-cent-in-upa-to-95-per-cent-in-nda-a-surge-in-share-of-opposition-leaders-in-cbi-net-express-investigation-8160912/   Umam, Ahmad Khoirul, Gillian Whitehouse, Brian Head, and Mohammed Adil Khan. 2020. “Addressing Corruption in Post-Soeharto Indoneisa: The Role of the Corruption Eradication Commission.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 50, 1: 125-143.   Wee, Sui-Lee. 2022. “Anwar, Opposition Leader for Decades, Is Now Malaysia’s Prime Minister.” The New York Times. November 24. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/24/world/asia/malaysia-elections-prime-minister.html   Yoon, Lina. 2023. “South Korea Court Recognizes Equal Benefits for Same-Sex Couple.” Human Rights Watch. February 22. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/22/south-korea-court-recognizes-equal-benefits-same-sex-couple       ■ Michael Runey is an Adviser in the Democracy Assessment team of Global Programmes at International IDEA, where he contributes in research, analysis, communication, and coordination in support of the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) initiative.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

In 2022, after two years of heated negotiations, European Union (EU) institutions reached an agreement on the final text of the Digital Services Act, the new EU law to tackle illegal content online. “The Digital Services Act will set new global standards. [...] We have finally made sure that what is illegal offline is also illegal online,” said Christel Schaldemose, the lead Member of the European Parliament on the file, after the agreement was reached (European Parliament 2022).   In a nutshell, this reflects the ambitions of EU policymakers for the file to become both a new golden standard for platform regulation in the EU and beyond; and to fulfil its primary goal to tackle illegal content online.   This article will focus on these two aspects: on one hand we will explain how, despite its scope being limited to illegal content, the Digital Services Act can also be effective in addressing online disinformation; and on the other hand we will explore the potential impact of the Digital Services Act beyond the EU, in particular on potential regulatory regimes on disinformation in Asia.   Background: The EU Digital Services Act and the Political Context on Disinformation   The Digital Services Act (DSA) is a recently adopted EU Regulation aiming to address the proliferation of illegal content online. Formally signed into law in 2022, the DSA is currently in force. For some rules, particularly, those addressed at Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) - the deadline to ensure compliance was August 2023, while the remaining rules will be applicable as of February 2024.   The DSA was one of the main milestones within the EU digital policy agenda during the current European Commission’s mandate, alongside the Digital Markets Act - establishing rules to ban certain anti-competitive behaviors online; the Artificial Intelligence Act - introducing risk-based obligations for AI systеms; and broader rules on the governance and re-use of non-personal data.   More specifically, the DSA has put forward a series of rules applicable to different kinds of online intermediaries, differentiated by type and size - with obligations applicable in a cumulative way. Such obligations vary from rules and mechanisms for content moderation applicable to all sorts of online platforms to full-fledged risk assessments conducted only by VLOPs and VLOSEs.   The scope of the DSA is limited to illegal content and does not directly address harmful content online. Content such as bullying, harassment, (non-illegal) hate speech,[1] and online disinformation is therefore outside of the DSA’s scope. The exclusion of harmful content from the DSA was a conscious decision taken by the European Commission to avoid discussions on what would represent harmful content and whether it is reasonable to restrict free speech on something that, per se, is not illegal - with the risk of abuses and censorship by the part of platforms and governments alike.   In this framework, the solutions put forward in the DSA against harmful but lawful content are relatively indirect, as they focus on ensuring platforms are transparent and accountable for the moderation of such content. The EU rulebook is, however, not the only proposed solution in Europe. For example, the UK’s Online Safety Bill proposal has put forward a different approach, trying to set out clear policies on harmful disinformation with the largest audiences and a range of high-risk features (Government of the United Kingdom 2022a). Negotiators involved in the bill subsequently backtracked on the inclusion of harmful content due to the concerns of limiting freedom of expression, thus showing how controversial it is to regulate disinformation through legal measures (Government of the United Kingdom 2022b).   At the same time, the issue of online disinformation is becoming salient in the EU political discussions, especially following the start of the war in Ukraine, the recently re-ignited Israel-Hamas conflict and the upcoming EU elections. In this context, while the DSA does not address disinformation directly, it still contains several rules that aim to increase the transparency and accountability of online platforms. EU member states also have individually adopted different approaches to what should be the subject of content moderation when it comes to disinformation. France and Germany enacted restrictive national laws against election misinformation in 2018 and online hate speech in 2017, respectively. Other European states such as Austria, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Spain have also recently introduced or modified regulations to fight disinformation (Hoboken and Fathaigh 2021).   Recent controversies and court rulings surrounding state fact-checking, new legislation, and online content moderation practices have increased attention on this subject (European Digital Rights 2020; Goujard 2021). In Hungary, for example, the 2020 Enabling Acts makes disseminating fake news a criminal act punishable with up to five years of imprisonment. While these laws have been used to tackle disinformation online, they also serve political purposes, as in some cases, they have been used to silence opposition and criticism of the regimes. Even at the EU institution level, the fight against disinformation has already been used to advocate for social media shutdowns in crises and prompt the removal of disinformation that goes beyond the provisions contained in the DSA (Goujard and Camut 2023; Meyers 2023).   In East Asia, there are many examples of such tension between tackling the spread of fake news and government abuses posing threats to free speech. It is a well-known phenomenon in which the governments themselves are actors spreading disinformation or using regulation against fake news to remove content of political opposition (Ong 2021). In Thailand, the ban on the dissemination of ‘false messages’ during the COVID-19 crisis has drawn criticism for trying to shield the authorities from public backlash of their handling of the pandemic (Reuters 2021). In Myanmar, the military regime has been working on a new cybersecurity law that, among other things, seeks to criminalize the use of VPNs to access banned Western social media platforms (Chau and Oo 2022). In Vietnam, ‘toxic content’ has generally been defined as content that is detrimental to the reputation of the authorities and the ruling Communist Party (Luong 2018). Finally, rights groups in Malaysia have called out its fake news law as a smokescreen to suppress online dissent (Guest 2021).   Given the similar challenges of tackling online disinformation and also preventing abuses by governments against free speech in both Europe and East Asia, it is worth considering how the EU solutions to tackle disinformation in the DSA would work in practice and whether they could truly represent the “global standard” that EU policymakers wish for.   How the Digital Services Act Can Be Effective Against Disinformation   While the DSA does not directly regulate neither harmful content nor, more specifically, disinformation, there are still several provisions that have the potential to have an impact on tackling online disinformation.   First, the DSA contains numerous transparency obligations for online platforms and how they moderate content online. For example, under the DSA more transparency is needed regarding the platforms’ terms and conditions; platforms must issue transparency reports on their moderation activities as well as to provide statements of the reason for the content removed; and VLOPs and VLOSEs will be subject to even broader reporting obligations. It will also be possible for users to file complaints against moderation decisions taken against them.   On top of these transparency obligations, VLOPs and VLOSEs will also be obliged to conduct systеmic risk assessments and take related mitigation measures, including those on fundamental rights and freedom of expression and information, civic discourse, and electoral processes. In compliance with the DSA, these assessments will also be subject to external independent audits.   Rules on data access for researchers complement the increased transparency. Research on social media discourse has been crucial in identifying problems and threats of disinformation. Researchers, however, have faced significant limitations in this work, due to problems with accessing data, as it was the platforms themselves deciding on access or signing voluntary commitments for specific categories of data, for example under the Code of Practice on Disinformation. Under the DSA, however, VLOPs and VLOSEs will be obliged to provide research organizations with the data needed to assess their compliance.   The DSA also strengthens platform obligations regarding recommender systеms as it requires them to explain the main parameters behind them and consider them in risk assessments and risk mitigation measures. Recommender systеms also play an important role in facilitating the spread of disinformation as they decide which content will be displayed to users, often using criteria that are not transparent and unknown to users and researchers alike. Some studies also investigated their tendency to favor more polemic or controversial content such as fake news.   Finally, the DSA also foresees the possibility for VLOPs and VLOSEs to sign voluntary codes of conduct to tackle specific challenges linked with systеmic risks which would be monitored regularly by different authorities in charge including the European Commission and the National Digital Services Coordinators.   Furthermore, the DSA is not the only instrument in EU legislation against disinformation and it works along with soft law solutions such as the EU’s new Code of Practice for Disinformation - which could soon transform into a code of conduct under the DSA. So far, this code has 34 signatories, including platforms, tech companies and civil society organizations. It sets out extensive commitments by platforms and industry to fight disinformation. Some commitments concern a cut of financial incentives for spreading disinformation and expanding fact-checking, among other things.   In parallel, work has also been ongoing to ensure media freedom in the EU with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), containing rules to protect media pluralism and independence in the EU; and transparency of political advertising, with the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising Regulation (TTPA).   By working together, these initiatives are set to bring more transparency and, as a result, more accountability in online content removal, potentially reducing the possibility of abuses and censorship.   Potential Impact of the Digital Services Act beyond Europe and in East Asia   The DSA has been drafted as one of the EU’s top priorities concerning its digital agenda. Therefore, the EU has been betting on the new rules becoming an international golden standard that could push forward beyond the EU. The EU has considered the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) an example of the so-called “Brussels effect” and wishes to replicate its success with platform regulation. Thus, it is very likely that the EU will promote the legislation as a best practice to inspire legislation in other countries, including within East Asia.   It is however unclear whether exporting a piece of legislation in different contexts could represent an effective approach in different geopolitical contexts. As highlighted previously, the DSA is far from an isolated set of rules and works. It operates with the previously mentioned complementary initiatives, including the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the EMFA, the TTPA and even the GDPR. Additional activities such as promoting media literacy and sufficient funding for independent fact checkers also remain relevant to support the DSA framework and will make or break the effectiveness of the DSA against disinformation.   Another issue with exporting the DSA is that governments could misuse replicated provisions to restrict freedom of expression. For example, DSA provisions originally meant for illegal content could be misused to target content such as disinformation as a pretext to silence criticism and opposition. This scenario is not unlikely and has already manifested itself in the EU with Commissioner Thierry Breton’s statements on the Israel-Hamas conflict referred to above, which could risk exacerbating censorship, with the incorrect justification that this solution has already been adopted and effective in the EU.   Finally, even if the DSA rules are replicated in a similar context and with the same scope, they could still be abused. Additionally, it is too early to say whether the proposed solutions will be effective, as the rules have not yet been fully implemented.   On the other hand, two positive elements to consider as potential inspiration from the EU law would be the clear scope limited to illegal content and the increased transparency that will make more data available which could indicate how to deal with this issue further.   Conclusions   With disinformation being a major risk for online civic discourse and free elections, and given the unstable international situation, it is essential to continue monitoring the DSA implementation and draw conclusions from available data. While the DSA model still needs to be proven effective, it might represent a guideline and potential best practice for Asian countries by providing them a possible solution to create a healthier and more democratic online sphere. On the other hand, the EU can also learn from the experience in other countries, especially from the abuse of content regulation laws to make sure the enforcement of the DSA is limited to illegal content and does not interfere with free speech by justifying censorship. ■   References   Chau, Thompson, and Dominic Oo. 2022. “Myanmar renews plans to curb internet usage with VPN ban.” Nikkei Asia. January 21. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-renews-plans-to-curb-internet-usage-with-VPN-ban   European Digital Rights. 2020. “French Avia law declared unconstitutional: what does this teach us at EU level?” June 24. https://edri.org/our-work/french-avia-law-declared-unconstitutional-what-does-this-teach-us-at-eu-level/   European Parliament. 2022. “Digital Services Act: agreement for a transparent and safe online environment.” April 23. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220412IPR27111/digital-services-act-agreement-for-a-transparent-and-safe-online-environment   Goujard, Clothilde. 2021. “German Facebook ruling boosts EU push for stricter content moderation.” Politico. July 29. https://www.politico.eu/article/german-court-tells-facebook-to-reinstate-removed-posts/   Goujard, Clothilde, and Nicolas Camut. 2023. “Social media riot shutdowns possible under EU content law, top official says.” Politico. July 10. https://www.politico.eu/article/social-media-riot-shutdowns-possible-under-eu-content-law-breton-says/   Government of the United Kingdom. 2022a. “Online Safety Bill: supporting documents.” March 17. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-bill-supporting-documents   ______. 2022b. “Overview of expected impact of changes to the Online Safety Bill.” January 18. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-bill-supporting-documents/overview-of-expected-impact-of-changes-to-the-online-safety-bill   Guest, Peter. 2021. “Malaysia’s brand-new “fake news” law is built to silence dissent.” Rest of World. March 15. https://restofworld.org/2021/malaysias-brand-new-fake-news-law-is-built-to-silence-dissent/   Hoboken, Joris van, and Ronan Ó Fathaigh. 2021. “Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for Speech and Privacy.” UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law 6, 1: 9-36.   Luong, Dien. 2018. “Vietnam’s Internet is in trouble.” The Washington Post. February 19. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/19/vietnam-internet/   Meyers, Zach. 2023. “Breton’s megaphone enforcement is no way to tackle disinformation.” Euractiv. October 17. https://www.euractiv.com/section/media/opinion/bretons-megaphone-enforcement-is-no-way-to-tackle-disinformation/   Ong, Jonathan Corpus. 2021. “Where the State is the Biggest Bad Actor and Regulation is a Bad Word.” Social Science Research Council. https://items.ssrc.org/disinformation-democracy-and-conflict-prevention/southeast-asias-disinformation-crisis-where-the-state-is-the-biggest-bad-actor-and-regulation-is-a-bad-word/   Reuters. 2021. “Thailand bans “false messages” amid criticism of handling of coronavirus.” July 30. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-bans-false-messages-amid-criticism-handling-coronavirus-2021-07-30/     [1] Not all hate speech is considered illegal everywhere, as it often depends on national legislation.     ■ Sofia Calabrese is a Digital Policy Manager at European Partnership for Democracy.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Introduction   In a historic decision, the Indian Parliament in a special session recently passed the long-awaited Women Reservation Bill (officially called the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam, 2023). The legislation (106th Constitutional Amendment Act), which received the president’s approval on September 28, establishes a requirement to reserve one-third of the total seats in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Parliament), Vidhan Sabha (state legislative assemblies), and the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (Pathak and Roy 2023). The law will become effective following the completion of the Census in 2026 and the delineation of constituencies, which will be used as the basis for allocating seats to women (Government of India 2023). As per the new legislation, this reservation will remain in effect for a period of 15 years and can be extended by the Parliament. Furthermore, the allocation of seats set aside for women will undergo rotation after each delineation. The new law, when implemented, will increase women Members of Parliament (Lok Sabha) to 181 seats (from the current 82) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (Vidhan Sabha) to as much as 2000 (currently 740).   The passage of the historic women reservation bill is an outcome of 27 years of relentless struggle by women activists and its strong votaries. While the issue of women’s reservation was flagged up in the 1980s, the first serious attempt to get legislation was made in 1996 by the then Congress government. Though unsuccessfully, further attempts were made by a number of governments at the center in 1998, 1999, and in 2008. The most serious attempt to bring legislation was made in 2010 by the then Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. A bill seeking women’s reservation in the Lok Sabha and state legislatures was passed in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in 2010, but it failed to get the approval of the Lok Sabha due to strong opposition from the politicians of heartland states (Rajvanshi 2023). Finally, the bill was successfully steered by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government with near consensus from opposition parties. Of course, it has taken a few decades of consensus building and political awareness and sensitization on gender equality to get this important legislation passed in a large country with strong patriarchal norms and rigid social mores (Manoj C G 2023).   A Long Struggle for Gender Equality   The compelling reason for having more women in parliament and assemblies stemmed from the very low presence of women in politics. For instance, the latest Global Gender Gap Report ranks India 141 out of 185 countries (World Economic Forum 2023). This is clearly evident from the low presence of women in the upper echelons of politics. As per the latest data, women occupy only 15.2 percent of seats in the Lok Sabha and 13.9 percent in the Rajya Sabha (Fleck 2023). In state legislative assemblies or Vidhan Sabhas, the average representation of women is even lower, standing at less than 10 percent (Bhatt 2021; Ramakrishnan et al. 2021). In some states like Nagaland, women representation in assemblies is as low as 3.1 percent. A meager 14 percent representation of women in the national parliament reflects deep-seated structural gender inequality. A major barrier is that very few women get the opportunity to fight elections. For instance, both the national parties, the Congress and the BJP, fielded as low as 54 and 53 women candidates in the 2019 general elections (India Today 2019).   In terms of global and regional comparisons, India’s gender representation looks seriously abysmal. Based on data from IPU Parline, a global resource tracking national parliamentary statistic, as of May 2022, the average proportion of women in these parliaments worldwide stood at 26.2 percent (14 percent for India). Although the Americas, Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa surpassed this global average in terms of women’s representation, regions like Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) fell short on women representation (Ghosh 2022).   However, it is worth noting that even in the laggard Asia and South Asia in particular, India fares worse as far as gender representation in politics is concerned. As per the latest IPU data, in South Asia, Nepal had 33.6 percent female representation, while Bangladesh had 20.9 percent, Pakistan had 20.5 percent, Bhutan had 17.4 percent. Only Sri Lanka had 5.3 percent (IPU 2022). Afghanistan was not included in this study, but data from the World Bank in 2021 indicated that the last parliament in Afghanistan before Taliban takeover had a female representation of 27 percent. Although a number of women have risen to occupy the posts of Chief Ministers (heading state governments) including in some of the politically charged states as Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Rajasthan, they continue to face multiple barriers particularly patriarchal norms, sexism, institutional discrimination, violence, lack of support from facilities among others to compete for political offices (Brechenmacher 2023).   Table 1. Global Average of Women’s Representation in Parliament     Lower chamber and unicameral Upper chamber All chambers Total No. of MPs 37,248 7,062 44,310 Men 27,425 5,255 32,680 Women 9,823 1,807 11,630 Percentage of women 26.4% 25.6% 26.2%   Source: IPU Parline: Global Data on National Parliament (as of May 2022)   Figure 1. Women Representation in Lok Sabha Source: PRS Legislative Research 2023   Table 2. Women’s Representation in Parliament, by Geographical Region   Region Parliamentary representation of women (in percentage) Region Parliamentary representation of women (in percentage) Americas 34.6 Europe 31.1 Caribbean 39.7 Nordic Countries 44.7 North America 38.2 Western Europe 35.2 South America 30.1 Southern Europe 31.1 Central America 29.5 Central and Eastern Europe 24.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 26.0 Asia 20.9 East Africa 32.0 Central Asia 26.1 Southern Africa 31.8 Southeast Asia 21.8 Central Africa 22.5 East Asia 21.8 West Africa 16.9 South Asia 16.7 Middle East and North Africa 16.8 Pacific 20.9 Middle East 17.1 Australia and New Zealand 42.2 North Africa 16.4 Pacific Islands 6.0   Source: IPU Parline: Global Data on National Parliament (as of May 2022)   Impressive Success Stories at the Local Governments   However, India has done quite well in fostering gender equality at the local level. In the 1990s, India ushered a path-breaking decentralized systеm of governance at the local levels (both rural and urban spheres) (Shanker 2014). The passage of historic 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments which aimed at creating opportunities for local-level planning, more effective implementation, and better monitoring of various social and economic development programs across the country included the most transformative provision of reserving one-third of the total seats in local bodies for women (Joshi 2018; Chawla 2021). Recent studies have demonstrated that this law has led to a remarkable increase in the political engagement of women at the grassroots level (Sahoo and Chavaly 2022). Consequently, 20 out of India’s 28 states have subsequently elevated women’s quota to 50 percent of the elected offices of rural local bodies. As a consequence of this, a mammoth 1.45 million elected women representatives have come up at various levels of local governments.   The significant point is that the gender quota at the grassroots level has bolstered the political empowerment of women. A recent report indicates that approximately 44 percent of local government positions in India are now held by women (Joshi 2022). This remarkable achievement places India at the forefront of nations worldwide that are promoting women’s political empowerment at the local level. India surpasses other major countries like France, the UK, Germany, and Japan in this regard and even exceeds the global average of 34.3 percent. Although concerns have been raised in the past about women in reserved seats being potentially manipulated by male politicians, recent studies demonstrate that exposure to public life and participation in leadership skills training programs have facilitated the emergence of numerous competent and capable women leaders in India’s local political landscape (PRIA 1999). The consistent growth of women’s representation in local politics and the development of political agency among women leaders, thanks to the reservation of seats in local government, offer a blueprint for enhancing women’s political engagement in national and state politics. This becomes especially relevant when the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam law is put into practice.   Some Concerns but Hopeful Prospect   While the passage of the women reservation bill is long overdue and likely to open up crucial democratic space for women at the top levels, the path to greater gender equality is still going to be a long struggle. To begin with, there are numerous roadblocks to the new legislation. First, the women’s quota legislation is not going to be implemented with immediate effect. Its implementation is predicated upon the completion and publication of the new Census and the delimitation exercise which is slated to begin in 2026. The real risk to the new legislation is serious uncertainty over the fate of delimitation. It may be recalled that delimitation, which is a major bone of contention between the southern and northern states, has been frozen since 1976. Given the exercise likely to open up fault lines in India’s fragile federal systеm, it is uncertain whether the government will take a call on this. Thus, the delimitation sword hangs on the fate of the reservation bill.   Second, there is speculation about the nature and contours of the new law and its subsequent rollout. Given the new legislation has not specified the issues of representation of women from the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) that constitutes a sizeable section of the population, there are apprehensions that women from such backward groups might remain deprived from the benefit of the quota law (Dahiya 2023). Also, a number of political parties particularly from Hindi heartland states have also demanded a sub-quota for women from the backward classes and religious minorities (Sinha 2023). Caution needs to be exercised in order to ensure that the quota law does not only benefit political dynasties and urban and economically better-off women. (Agnes 2023).   Third, some analysts fear that women candidates are likely to be nominated by male family members or patrons who ultimately will influence or control their decisions. Thus, there are chances of proxies that would call the shots in parliament and assemblies.   Fourth, the bill does not address the inadequate women representation in the Rajya Sabha as well as State Legislative Councils (upper house of state-level legislatures) which also has elected an extremely low proportion of women as members so far.   Finally, there are strong apprehensions that the new systеm with the rotation of seats every five years is likely to create uncertainty and instability in the electoral process (Agnes 2023). The change of constituencies every five years would negatively impact the continuity and accountability of elected representatives to their constituents.   Notwithstanding these infirmities and some uncertainty over its actual rollout, the new law holds plenty of promise on gender equality and governance which is responsible to women in India. Given many positive outcomes that have emerged due to gender quota at the local levels, many analysts see increased women presence in parliament and state assemblies can make the policy space more sensitive to the needs and aspirations of women. Plus, as seen from the global experience and from India’s own experiment at the local level, having more women in crucial decision-making bodies can lead to increased spending on health, education, sanitation, and developmental schemes that benefit women and children. In short, the new legislation can be a game changer for gender equality in a large country marked by rigid patriarchal norms and social conditions. ■   References   Agnes, Flavia. 2023. “Real commitment to women’s representation will be seen in 2024 Lok Sabha polls.” The Indian Express. September 25. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/womens-reservation-bill-the-inclusion-test-8954328/   Bhatt, Pankhuri. 2021. “Women’s Representation in India’s State Legislative Assemblies.” Samvidhi. July 11. https://www.samvidhi.org/post/women-s-representation-in-india-s-state-legislative-assemblies   Brechenmacher, Saskia. 2023. “India’s New Gender Quota Law Is a Win for Women – Mostly.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. September 26.   Chawla, Akshi. 2021. “A revolution in local politics.” IDR Online. January 22. https://idronline.org/a-revolution-in-local-politics-women-participation/   Dahiya, Himanshi. 2023. “‘Quota within quota’: Understanding Caste Dynamics of Women’s Reservation Bill.” The Quint. September 19. https://www.thequint.com/news/politics/womens-reservation-bill-caste-politics-bjp-congress-bsp-rjd   Fleck, Anna. 2023. “India’s Path Towards Greater Gender Equity in Parliament.” Statista. September 26. https://www.statista.com/chart/30910/share-of-women-in-indias-lower-house-and-upper-house/   Ghosh, Ambar Kumar. 2022. “Women’s Representation in India’s Parliament: Measuring Progress, Analysing Obstacles.” ORF Occasional Paper No. 382.   Government of India. 2023. “The Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023.” September 28. https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2023/249053.pdf   India Today. 2023. “724 women, 4 transgender candidates in fray for 2019 Lok Sabha polls.” May 23. https://www.indiatoday.in/elections/lok-sabha-2019/story/724-women-4-transgender-candidates-in-fray-2019-lok-sabha-1532288-2019-05-22   Inter-Parliamentary Union: IPU. 2022. “Parline – global data on national parliaments.” https://data.ipu.org/women-averages?month=5&year=2022&op=Show+averages&form_build_id=form-8t9vx839F4GPWWbSuGDMqsgQed3R3GlWQbSgtwIS96M&form_id=ipu__women_averages_filter_form   Joshi, Madhu. 2018. “Promoting women in grassroots governance: Strategies that work.” IDR Online. September 26. https://idronline.org/promoting-women-in-grassroots-governance-strategies-that-work/   Joshi, Ritika. 2022. “Data Reveals 44 Percent Of Seats In Local Government In India Are Held By Women.” Shethepeople. August 27. https://www.shethepeople.tv/news/un-women-in-local-government-seats/   Manoj C G. 2023. “Hanging fire for 27 years: How Women Reservation Bill kept lapsing through its tumultuous journey.” The Indian Express. September 19. https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/hanging-fire-for-27-years-how-women-reservation-bill-kept-lapsing-through-its-tumultuous-journey-8945864/   Pathak, Vikas, and Esha Roy. 2023. “Women’s reservation Bill gets Parliament seal.” The Indian Express. September 22. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/womens-bill-gets-parliament-seal-33-per-cent-quota-for-women-in-lok-sabha-state-assemblies-set-to-become-law-8950720/   Participatory Research in Asia: PRIA. 1999. “Women’s Leadership in Panchayati Raj Institutions: An analysis of six states.” https://pria.org/knowledge_resource/1533206139_Women’s%20Leadership%20in%20Panchayati%20Raj%20Institutions.pdf   Rajvanshi, Astha. 2023. “Why India’s Women’s Reservation Bill Is a Major Step Forward.” Time. September 22. https://time.com/6316383/india-womens-reservation-bill/   Ramakrishnan, Anoop, N R Akhi, Manish Kanadje, and Mridhula Raghavan. 2021. “Explained: Share of women, youth in new state Assemblies.” The Indian Express. May 5. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/assembly-elections-benal-tamil-nadu-kerala-share-of-women-youth-in-new-assemblies-7300884/   Sahoo, Niranjan, and Keerthana Chavaly. 2022. “Decentralisation @75: How the third-tier institutions have deepened India’s Democracy?” ORF Expert Speak. August 15. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/decentralisation-75-how-the-third-tier-institutions-have-deepened-indias-democracy/   Shanker, Richa. 2014. “Measurement of Women’s Political Participation at the Local Level: India Experience.” https://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/mexico_nov2014/Session%206%20India%20paper.pdf   Sinha, Shishir. 2023. “Political parties urge passage of women’s reservation Bill in Parliament’s special session.” The Hindu businessline. September 17. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/political-parties-urge-passage-of-womens-reservation-bill-in-parliaments-special-session/article67319025.ece   World Economic Forum. 2023. Global Gender Gap Report 2023. https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2023/       ■ Niranjan Sahoo, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.   ■ Ambar Kumar Ghosh is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

※ This issue briefing has been published as a sequel to the ADRN Online Seminar titled “Democracy and New Generations.” Ian McAllister (Professor, The Australian National University), Woo Chang Kang (Professor, Korea University), Janjira Sombatpoonsiri (Research Fellow, German Institute for Global and Area Studies), and Ganbat Damba (Chairman of the Board, Academy of Political Education) presented the findings from precedent research and country cases. For more details of the event, please follow this link.   As we approach the second quarter of this century, millennials have firmly established themselves as the mainstream of society. The subsequent generation, often referred to as Generation Z, has taken their initial steps into the workforce. This trend is also evident in the political landscape of democratic countries in Asia. As time passes, the proportion of new generations among voters naturally increases, prompting political parties to consider their demands when formulating election strategies and policies.   Several Asian countries underwent democratization during the third wave of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. This wave allowed the new generations in these countries to embrace democracy as an inherent value and norm. As democracy has progressed towards consolidation, it has not only become “the only game in town” but also “the only game in a lifetime” for the new generations. Furthermore, significant advancements in information and communication technologies have opened up new avenues for accessing information and taking into actions for political change. This has led to a widespread belief that younger citizens are generally more pro-democratic compared to their elders.   On the flip side, there are concerns that younger generations are relatively less engaged and apathetic towards politics. These concerns often stem from worrisome indicators such as lower voter turnout and occasionally result in a skeptical outlook on the future of democracy. Therefore, it has been increasingly important to delve into the perspectives of the younger generation on democracy, as well as the factors influencing their attitudes toward politics. This brief article reviews previous research conducted through survey analysis and examine youth participation in the Asian region as a case study.   Youth Demand for Substantive over Procedural Democracy   Young Asians exhibit several distinct attitudes compared to their elderly counterparts. Chu and Welsh (2015) conducted an analysis of the results from the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) and identified a noteworthy trend among Asian youth: their inclination to view democracy as a substantive concept. When asked to select the meaning of democracy from four values, “good governance” was the most frequently chosen, with 31 percent of respondents, followed closely by “social equity” at 28 percent. This suggests that 58 percent of respondents conceived of democracy in substantive terms, while the remainder placed greater emphasis on procedural aspects, namely “norms and procedures” (23 percent) and “freedom and liberty” (21 percent).   While the data also indicates that young generations consider all four principles important, the authors interpreted this as a sign that youth expect tangible outcomes from democratic governance. If democracies perform poorly in addressing issues such as economic recession and corruption, young citizens have the potential to become skeptical about democracy, even if procedural legitimacy remains intact.   A generation gap is also evident when citizens are classified based on their democratic orientation. In countries classified as “free” by the Freedom House Index, the proportion of “critical democrats” who embrace democratic values but are less supportive of their own democracy is relatively higher among younger cohorts. Among Generation Z, the percentage of critical democrats surpasses that of consistent democrats who uphold both democratic values and support for democracy. It is important to note that this correlation is partly contingent on the level of democracy, with the specific country playing a significant role as a variable. Nonetheless, the survey challenges the optimistic belief that youth are inherently more progressive.   Drawing from these indications, the lower enthusiasm of the younger generation toward politics may stem from a sense of inefficacy of their own democracy. This has led to a waning interest in traditional institutions of representative democracy among the new generations. They express less satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in their countries, compared to older age groups. ABS data reveals that they vote less frequently and are less engaged in politics through conventional means, such as joining political parties.   Still Lagging Youth Voting Participation and Electoral Barriers against Young Politicians   In recent years, South Korea has experienced significant dynamics within its democracy, marked by the impeachment of the president in 2017 and the successive change of government. Voter turnout for presidential, general, and local elections has seen improvement as the public felt stronger political efficacy. The youth generation was not an exception. However, their turnout rate is still the lowest among all cohorts. According to the National Election Commission (NEC), the turnout rates for individuals in their 20s and 30s in the 2022 presidential election were 71.0 percent and 70.7 percent, respectively. These figures are notably lower than the overall turnout rate of 77.1 percent and that of individuals in their 60s and 70s, which stood at 87.6 percent and 86.2 percent respectively. This age-related disparity in turnout is even more pronounced in general and local elections, where youth turnout falls further behind that of presidential elections.   This pattern of voter turnout mirrors the typical life cycle of a Korean citizen. Young voters aged 18 and 19 exhibit slightly higher turnout rates than those in their 20s and 30s. However, as young people enter the labor market, their turnout drops, only to recover when they reach their 50s and 60s, before declining again as health issues become a factor in their later years. This similarity suggests that the intense competition for a stable life with employment and housing may discourage young people from engaging in political matters.   Figure 1. Voter Turnout by Age Group and Election Year: South Korean Presidential Elections 2012-2022         South Korean youth are notably underrepresented in the realm of representative democracy. In the 2020 general elections, only 1.5 percent of candidates were in their 20s, and 6.1 percent in their 30s, while nearly half of the candidates were in their 50s. The underrepresentation of youth is even more pronounced among the elected representatives. In the same elections, out of 300 members elected to the National Assembly, only two were under 30, and thirteen were in their 30s. Given that the young voters under 40 constitute about a third of all voters, the gap between the demographic proportion of young voters and their representative proportion among elected politicians is big.   This gap is caused by the higher entry bar in politics against youth. Running for election in South Korea requires candidates to pay a deposit to the NEC with the amount varying based on the level of the election. For example, candidates for legislative elections in the district pay 15 million won, approximately 11 thousand US dollars. Additionally, there are campaign expenses to consider. Parties may cover their candidates’ deposits and campaign costs and the government reimburses these expenses based on the approval rate. Nevertheless, the competition to secure nominations from major parties is fierce, and new generations face challenges in mobilizing support due to their limited recognition and career experience compared to older candidates. These expenses pose significant barriers to youth participation.   Both the government and political parties have recognized the issue of lower youth participation and underrepresentation, and have made efforts to cultivate youth engagement and provide opportunities. Young voters have shown relatively greater fluctuations in their voting choices compared to older generations, who tend to align with conservatives and liberals. This has prompted major parties to focus their election campaigns on youth, pledging more financial support and featuring young politicians on the frontline of the campaign. However, most of these strategies lose momentum after the elections conclude. At the government level, each ministry in the cabinet has begun recruiting youth secretaries and advisory panel groups to incorporate youth voices into the policy-making process. Nevertheless, these entities have limitations due to their ambiguous authorities and lack of representativeness, as they are appointed by government officials rather than elected by young people.   South Korea’s example highlights the challenges in ensuring political opportunities for youth and how these challenges are linked to their lower participation. At the regional level, the participation of Asian youth in legislative bodies has been less active compared to youth in Europe or the Americas. When comparing the lower and single chambers worldwide, the average proportion of parliamentarians under the age of 40 in Asian countries was 16.01 percent, while European and American young parliamentarians accounted for 24.13 percent, respectively (IPU 2021). Ensuring youth representation in political processes is crucial for incorporating their perspectives and achieving sustainable and responsive outcomes (OECD 2021). Addressing the problem of underrepresentation is essential for enhancing the efficacy of democracy, as it contributes to younger citizens’ sense of involvement and revitalizes the sustainability of democratic norms and procedures.   Youth’s Expressive Politics and Potential as Agent of Political Change   Yet, the new generations possess the potential to serve as a driving force for political change. Chu and Welsh observed that the youth can be both disengaged and engaged, depending on the political context. ABS data has revealed that the young Asians are less active in the electoral process and formal methods of participation but have a relatively strong sense of their ability to participate in and influence politics. This self-evaluation is rooted in their characteristics, such as being highly educated, having easy access to sources of information, and actively expressing their thoughts through the internet and social networks. Their potential as a game changer at the critical political juncture is globally observed.   In Asia, youth in Thailand has recently demonstrated their capacity as a game changer. Young advocates for democracy have grappled with the challenges posed by the hybrid regime and have sought to mobilize reformative forces in recent years. The 2019 general election served as a catalyst for their efforts to achieve democratic governance. The Future Forward Party (FFP) embodied the aspirations of the new generation and rose to become the third-most-voted party with over six million votes. However, their political impact was short-lived as the party was dissolved by a ruling from the constitutional court, citing an illegal loan. This decision triggered mass mobilization led by young FFP advocates.   A series of massive protests unfolded between 2020 and 2021. Participants voiced their opposition to military rule and called for democratization and constitutional amendments. As the protests reached their peak in October 2020, social media users played a highly active role during the same period. The incumbent government responded to the movement with various and sophisticated repression strategies, including targeted harassment, surveillance of activists, as well as smear campaigns and online stigmatization.   Although the enthusiasm of the new generation expressed through protests has somewhat waned, party politics has continued to provide a platform for young citizens. The Move Forward Party (MFP), established in 2014, emerged as the successor to the dissolved FFP. Led by Pita Limjaroenrat, who is in his early forties, the MFP proposed reformative agendas targeting the military, the incumbent government, and even the monarchy. The party has relied on support from younger generation while striving to persuade the broader electorate to endorse for a better future.   In the 2023 House of Representatives election, the MFP secured 151 out of 500 seats, becoming the largest party in the House of Representatives. However, due to the presence of members nominated by the military government in the Senate, the MFP failed to form a coalition, and Limjaroenrat did not garner sufficient support to become the prime minister. As the institutions that restrict the possibility of regime change further discourage young advocates, the youth in Thailand stand at the crossroads between continued resistance and a sense of despair.   Conclusion   Young citizen’s perceptions, interests, and participation in democracy exhibit distinct characteristics compared to older generations and are sometimes adversely affected by social circumstances. It is essential to differentiate these characteristics from mere indifference or passivity.   Participation through online platforms and mobilization, which younger generations often engage in, can have a significant impact on their countries’ democracies and lead to change. However, it is representative democracy that ultimately determines most of the institutions and policies that affect the lives of future generations. To strengthen the influence of youth, political parties should encourage their younger members to pursue opportunities to run in elections and reflect the young generation’s perspectives into their policies. Additionally, it is crucial to lower the barriers for young politicians to enter the political arena.   The efficacy of democracy for young people cannot be improved solely by increasing the number of young representatives and public officials. It is vital to continually work towards enhancing the performance of democracy in terms of economic opportunities and social justice. Advocates of democracy should remember that the key to sustainable democracy lies in whether politics can effectively address the substantive concerns of the younger generation and deliver better outcomes. ■     References   Chu, Yun-han, and Bridget Welsh. 2015. “Millennials and East Asia’s Democratic Future.” Journal of Democracy 26, 2: 151-164.   Inter-Parliamentary Union: IPU. 2021. “Youth participation in national parliaments.” https://www.ipu.org/youth2021   OECD. 2021. Government at a Glance 2021. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/1c258f55-en     ■ Ganbat Damba is the Chairman of Board at the Academy of Political Education, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. From 1999 to 2010 he worked as an Executive director of the Academy. Since 2009 to 2017 he was an advisor to the President of Mongolia on research and a Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia. Since September, 2017-2021 he was an Ambassador of Mongolia to Federal Republic of Germany. He became Ph.D. in 2002 at the Academy of Science of Mongolia. He has published various articles examining democratization, democratic and authoritarian values, elections, political party development and on principles of foreign and security policy of Mongolia.   ■ Hansu Park is a Research Associate at the East Asia Institute.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

On August 12th, Malaysia held elections in six states, with voters from nearly a third of the country’s population eligible to vote. The results were a rebuke of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s eight-month leadership. The conservative Islamist ethno-nationalist opposition Perikatan Nasional, comprised of the Islamist party PAS and ultra-ethnonationalist Malay party Bersatu led by former prime minister Muhyiddin Yassin, gained 61 seats out of 245 and 49% of the popular vote.   Given the unevenness of Malaysia’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery and the challenges of Anwar’s coalition ‘unity’ government, it is important to note that this coalition comprises his pro-reform Pakatan Harapan, his former political foe, the Malay nationalist United Malays National Organization (UMNO)-dominated Barisan Nasional (BN), and regional parties from Borneo. This alliance came together after the 2022 general election, which resulted in a hung parliament. Anwar’s preoccupation with promoting himself rather than focusing on policy programs made these election results somewhat expected. Little had been done to effectively communicate a cohesive program to the electorate or to shore up the legitimacy of a new friends-and-foes elitist government that holds the majority in parliament but remains unknown to the majority of voters. Instead, Anwar’s government relied on short-term populist initiatives that only served to fuel perceptions of seeking political security rather than leadership confidence in government.   Election Results: Anwar’s Weak Support and Growing Ethnic Divisions   The results show an across-the-board loss of support for Anwar’s unity government in all six states. In the Malay heartland states of Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu, where the Islamist party PAS held power, it emphatically won two-thirds of the seats.   Table 1. 2023 Malaysia State Election Results     Total Seats Anwar's Unity Government Seats Seat Change from 2018 Opposition Perikatan Nasional Seats Seat Change from 2018 Kedah 36 3 -9 33 13 Kelatan 45 2 -5 43 7 Terengganu 32 0 -10 32 10 Negeri Sembilan 36 31 -5 5 5 Penang 40 29 -6 11 10 Selangor 56 34 -11 22 17 Total 245 99 -46 146 61   In the three states on the more multiracial West Coast, Anwar’s government lost ground, losing the two thirds of support that Anwar’s party held as the incumbent state government in Malaysia’s richest state of Selangor.   The drop in seat numbers and the opposition’s gain of almost half the popular vote does not fully capture the ongoing shifts taking place in Malaysian politics. There are major political realignments taking place, including greater political polarization and a narrowing of the space to engage in democratic political reform.   First, the results show that the party that performed the worst was actually Anwar’s ally, UMNO, the Malay nationalist party that governed the country from 1957 through 2018. UMNO lost its power with its leader with its former prime minister Najib Razak mired in the 1MDB kleptocracy scandal. The current UMNO president is Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Anwar’s deputy prime minister and close ally. His corruption charges shockingly dropped after the polls, despite the earlier findings supporting the need for prosecution and weeks of testimony. UMNO had 41 seats going into the state elections and emerged victorious in only 19 of the 108 seats (18%) that it contested. The erosion of support for UMNO started from 2004, but has reached the point that the party is no longer a national party, only holding power in the south and west of the country. With 26 seats in parliament, UMNO’s (and Zahid’s) support is deemed so vital for the Anwar government that he is now not facing criminal charges.   Second, not all of the parties in Anwar’s coalition Pakatan Harapan performed evenly. The Chinese-dominant Democratic Action Party (DAP) won 46 out of 47 seats (98%) it contested, while Anwar’s party Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) only gained 26 out of 59 (44%) seats contested and the progressive Islamist party Amanah won 8 out of 31 seats (26%). Pakatan was able to galvanize most of its traditional base of support, only losing turnout of some supporters. However, with the exception of one seat won marginally in Kelantan, it was not able to gain any electoral ground. The implication is that Anwar’s leadership has not been able to translate into political gains across the coalition, making Pakatan dependent on the support for the DAP.   The reason for this lies with the third feature of the results, a widening ethnic polarization in voting. The unity government relied heavily on the support of Chinese Malaysians, an estimated 96 percent of those that voted and to a lesser extent Indian support at an estimated 87 percent. Meanwhile, the opposition gained a significant share of the majority ethnic group of Malays, estimated 73 percent of those voted. Perikatan’s increase in Malay support came largely from UMNO, where it captured nearly half of the party’s traditional support compared to the result in the 2022 November General Election. In that election, UMNO only managed to capture 26 of the seats out of 222 and 32 percent of the Malay vote. Anwar’s Pakatan relies on non-Malay support, even in its collaboration with UMNO/BN in the 2023 state elections, as shown in the chart below.   Figure 1. Estimated Electoral Support by Ethnicity for Pakatan Harapan Peninsular Malaysia, 2008-2023   The results show that ethnic differences in voting in Malaysia have widened and become more entrenched since 2008. The parties that were the most secure in the state polls are those traditionally on the more ethnic extremes of Malaysian politics, Islamist PAS and the Chinese-dominant DAP. With ethnic polarization in voting, Malaysia’s political realignment has shifted to one of polarized parties as well, with the middle ground hollowed out by UMNO’s political collapse.   Understanding the Results: Losing the Referendum   Explanations of the election results have centered on the campaigns, rise of conservative Islamist forces and shortcomings in Anwar’s leadership.   The Islamist opposition party PAS had made gains in the 2022 General Election, in its collaboration with Muhyiddin’s party Bersatu in a new branded coalition of Perikatan Nasional. PAS was able to build on its stronger social connections from religious schools, provision of social services, business ties and calculated campaign projecting itself as less ‘extreme’ than in the past. It was part of the federal government from 2020 through 2022 and part of a rebranded Malay ethnonationalist coalition, Perikatan Nasional, served to strengthen its electoral outreach.   PAS was able to extend its electoral gains in the state polls. What made PAS even stronger in the state polls was its ability to harness dissatisfaction with the economy, becoming a more acceptable opposition party. What occurred in the state polls was not a rise in conservative forces, but rather a normalization of them. A reliance on social media, calculated use of misinformation and emotional appeals further strengthened the Perikatan opposition.   With a focused campaign, Perikatan Nasional gained most of its support from political erosion of UMNO, a party that has corruption-tainted leadership that refuses to give way and give up access to the spoils of power. The relationship with UMNO president Zahid allows Anwar to hold power, as his coalition did not win its own electoral mandate in 2022. The relationship has also served to delegitimize both UMNO and Pakatan among their traditional core supporters. The electoral impact has been most evident for UMNO in the state results and among Harapan voters, especially with the post-election decision to drop Zahid’s corruption charges.   The results also indicate weaknesses in Anwar’s government. Their campaign for the state polls was ad hoc, lacking coordination and clear messaging, never controlling the political narrative. They underestimated political dissatisfaction. In Selangor, Malaysia’s richest state with PKR-led government, it lost its two-thirds majority. In fact, if it was not for the popularity of state leaders, the results might have been more even worse for Anwar, as the anger against his federal government was palpable.   The main weakness Anwar’s government faced was the weak economy, with high inflation and an uneven recovery from the COVID-19 economic contraction. With uneven competency in Cabinet, there has been a lack of coordinated policy reform, with measures that have been introduced poorly communicated. A focus of the government around Anwar’s persona rather than policy deliverables further undercut support. Anwar continues to have a trust deficit among large shares of the population, shaped by decades of political attacks he endured as a leader in the opposition from 1999.   Perikatan was effective in capitalizing on Anwar’s weaknesses through the campaign, making the election a referendum on him and his leadership.   Dampening Public Aspiration for Democratization Amid Polarization   Conditions were ripe for the opposition to gain ground. Part of this involves the legacy of COVID-19 on the economy and on the youth, who now comprise a large share of the electorate. Electoral reforms implemented in 2022 lowered the voting age to 18 and introduced automatic voter registration, bringing in large number of voters in their 20s and 30s into the electoral roll. Over a third of the electorate is under 30 years of age. Anwar’s government had yet to introduce substantive youth policies or programs where the young can recognize tangible benefits. Another part of this is the prominence of social media in Malaysia campaigns, especially TikTok which is a medium that has proven effective in capitalizing on anger and discontent.   What was striking in the 2023 state polls was a lack of messaging harnessing positive emotions compared to earlier polls. Calls for democratic reform have anchored support for Pakatan for decades, galvanizing voters through five general elections. Promises of hope and meaningful change were missing in these 2023 polls. With the election of pro-reform Pakatan Harapan government then led by Mahathir Mohamad in 2018 and its collapse in 2020, as well as the formation of the Anwar government in 2022 allied with the target of calls for reform, UMNO, the momentum for reform has precipitously slowed. Liberals hoping for meaningful policies to promote rights and inclusion have been repeatedly disappointed. For many Pakatan supporters, their vote was largely one against the opposition, more pragmatic and realistic, rather than one filled with the idealism of the past. This idealism is eroding with a focus on holding power rather than delivering promises to voters, the same voters that voted for reform for over two decades. More Malaysians do not believe that its leaders will deliver the meaningful reforms they voted for.   As such, an important shift is taking place in Malaysian politics; reform as an effective political mobilizer by parties is declining, contributing to the new political realignments and less trust in political parties across the political divide. Contestation over reform – strengthening checks and balances, more competent political institutions, electoral fairness, ethnic inclusion, decentralization and greater freedoms – has long anchored Malaysia’s political divisions, along with differences over race and religion. With reform no longer as prominent, identity politics have become even more salient, cutting into the social fabric of Malaysia’s ethnic relations.   The opposition Perikatan Nasional have positioned themselves to capitalize on this shift by combining race and religion in their messaging, articulating a neo-Malay nationalist agenda blended with political Islam. The opposition’s state polls campaign explicitly attacked the Anwar government for its collaboration with the non-Malay DAP and billed itself as the only legitimate representative for the Malay community. They articulated a more exclusionary Malay-only vision of governance on their campaign in the 2022 General Election, and claimed their opponents as lacking religious credentials. The Anwar government is being attacked for its supposed liberal policies of protecting the LGBTQ communities, allowing concerts and supposedly empowering non-Muslims, part of a heightened racialized culture war that has aimed to strengthen the opposition and put the Anwar government on the defensive.   What has happened, however, is that democratic political reforms are on the defensive in conditions with heightened racialized electoral polarization. Anwar’s government is relying more on its elite relationships, the levers of power against opposition leaders, with many facing legal charges, and is focused on holding power rather than on using power for concrete programs and new initiatives.   The implication is that Malaysia’s window to introduce meaningful democratic political reforms is closing. The 2023 state election results and aftermath, suggest that a government led by a leader who promised progressive reform to gain office is falling short in the delivery of promises and facing less favorable conditions to do so. This is a lesson many countries have learned before, but it nevertheless is a hard one for Malaysians seeking meaningful political change.   As Malaysia celebrates its 60th anniversary as a nation, the August state polls highlight that the challenges for nation-building remain as salient as they did decades ago; improving ethnic relations, reducing polarization, developing substantive policies to address inequalities and promote growth. At the same time, the hope for change and better governance is strong, with an electorate more demanding and confident in its aspirations. Reformasi may not yet be garnering traction among elites, but it continues to remain alive in a society looking for a stronger Malaysia in the years ahead. ■     ■ Bridget Welsh is currently Honorary Research Associate with the University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute Malaysia (UoNARI-M) based in Kuala Lumpur. She is also a Senior Research Associate of the Hu Feng Center for Eats Asia Democratic Studies of National Taiwan University and a Senior Associate Fellow of the Habibie Center. She specializes in Southeast Asian politics, with a focus on Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and Indonesia. She is committed to fostering engagement, mutual understanding and empowerment.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]