Digital Platforms’ Impact on Southeast Asia   The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as part of Southeast Asia has its digital economy and digital society objectives detailed in the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 (ADM 2025) and has over the years built a regulatory framework. For example, in 2016, at the Asian Telecommunications and Information Technology Ministers Meeting, the Framework on Personal Data Protection was adopted to “strengthen the protection of personal data in ASEAN.”   ASEAN has also changed how it deals with Internet governance, choosing to address it as a digital and digitization issue rather than just a matter involving info-communication technologies. To enable this, ASEAN expanded the scope of its ASEAN Telecommunications and Information Technology Ministers Meeting (TELMIN) to become the ASEAN Digital Ministers Meeting (ADGMIN) in October 2019.   In 2021, as the digital economy continued to expand in the region, the ADGMIN adopted the ASEAN Data Management Framework to establish common frameworks and appropriate data protection measures. Going forward it has also considered developing regional guidelines beyond the scope of Internet governance, such as those for artificial intelligence (AI) governance and ethics.   This briefing examines how ASEAN member states, despite their diversity and different levels of digital transformation, are working towards implementing policy measures to regulate digital platforms on a national and regional basis for social and economic stability. However, while improving governance for cybersecurity cooperation and content regulation, these policies should also enable progress on innovation and freedom of expression.   Market Dominance and Competitiveness   The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated tech innovation in specific sectors like in high tech agriculture, healthcare, and teaching. However, concerns have also arisen over the power and influence of digital platform companies in terms of their market dominance and ability to influence public sentiments.   In Singapore, policy initiatives, research and development (R&D) investments and regulations boosted innovations in these sectors and the city-state attracted leading start-ups to these sectors. In Indonesia, innovative connections between mobile telecommunications companies and medical providers established remote healthcare platforms. For example, an Indonesian telemedicine company Halodoc, connected patients to doctors across the country even during the peak of the pandemic.   Other digital platform companies in the region such as Grab, Gojek and Bukalapak could innovate as they have inherent strengths in their business models for expansion. These include first, network effects, as more users engage with the platform, it becomes more attractive to potential new users triggering a reinforcing cycle of growth. Second, expansion of digital technologies facilitates the establishment of interactive networks and matching effects. Third, ability to accelerate innovation and contributions of third parties by opening the digital platform to external innovators to concentrate on maximizing value across the entire business ecosystеm.   Digital Fraud and Trust   The expansion of digitalization also created increased incidences of Cybercrimes. In 2023, several news reports alluded to Southeast Asia’s vulnerability to digital fraud. For example, a global study found that victims in Singapore lost on average the most money to online fraud, with identity theft being the most common. In Thailand, a hacker demanded a ransom from the government by threatening to leak the personal data of 55 million citizens. In response, Southeast Asian governments are implementing national digital IDs as their top priority to protect their citizens.   As of 2022, eight of 10 ASEAN members have implemented or are planning to implement digital ID programs. For example, in recent years, the Singapore government has been fighting against online fraudsters, with the Singapore Police Force (SPF) reporting 31,728 fraud cases in 2022, a 32.6 percent surge from the previous year.   Despite these regulations, it is possible to drive innovation using regulatory sandboxes such as in Singapore. Within the regulatory sandbox, policies used to govern that specific sector could be suspended to enable experimentation in innovative development. These regulatory sandboxes also allow regulators to interact with the corporate sector to understand challenges and emerging trends. For example, trust and adequate cyber security measures are required to unlock the full potential of Southeast Asia’s Digital Financial Ecosystеm and implement more equitable social initiatives.   As a trade and business hub, the Singapore authorities are digitizing trade and commerce procedures. Given its economic profile, with 75 percent of the economy in the Services sector, Singapore is working towards compliance with the European Union (EU) Digital Services Agreement (DSA) that is intended to modernize the existing e-commerce directives and address illegal content, transparent advertising, and disinformation. It aims to create a safer and more transparent online environment for users.   Given the varying levels of digital development in the financial ecosystеms within ASEAN, Singapore as a financial hub would be able to lead ASEAN in the digital financial area. The Singapore authorities have also taken several measures to ensure its cybersecurity framework is up to international standards. Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) is also in line with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legislations, and it has signed several digital agreements with the EU such as the EU-Singapore Digital Partnership.   Digital Platforms and Social Media Networks   While digital financial scams are being tackled in various ways in Southeast Asia, the rise in digitalization has also grown in tandem with the proliferation of fake news. The Southeast region is home to millions of avid smartphone users. It is estimated that 68 percent of the region’s total population are social media users and young people between 16-24 years old spend, on average, more than 10 hours per day on the internet. This makes the region a perfect breeding ground for fake news. The social media landscape in Southeast Asia is also complex due to varying levels of digital literacy, lack of capacity to govern and the rising influence of global tech firms.   ASEAN governments have shown greater willingness to regulate digital platforms to ensure that interests of foreign tech firms align with their own economic and political interests. For example, Indonesia, with 265 million people and a demographically young population, has the world’s third largest group of Facebook users and the second largest pool of TikTok users. Indonesia has introduced new rules requiring digital platform companies to hand over data and comply with government content moderation orders. Since September 2023, Indonesia has also banned e-commerce transactions on its social media.   Other government agencies such as the Vietnamese Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) have issued a directive to create mechanisms and tools on platforms to ensure the safety of Vietnamese users such as implementing solutions and tools to process and remove information that violates the law. The owners of digital platforms must ensure information security and protect consumers’ personal information.   Various Southeast Asian governments have acted against fake news. For example, in 2019, Singapore implemented the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) or commonly known as the Fake News Law. Further, in November 2023, Singapore’s parliament passed the Online Safety (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill, which empowers the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) to deal with harmful online content accessible to Singapore users, regardless of where the content is hosted or initiated. Social media sites will be required to block access to harmful content within hours. Failure to comply, the IMDA could issue a direction to Internet access service providers to block access by users in Singapore. This is important because there have been cases of self-radicalization through social media.   Other ASEAN countries have similar laws: First, in Indonesia, the Minister of Communication and Information Technology introduced Ministerial Regulation 5 (MR5) on Private Electronic Systеm Operators, which requires all companies providing online services, businesses, and platforms in the country to comply with content removal orders within 24 hours. Second, Vietnam has plans to introduce laws that require social media networks to remove “illegal content and services” within 24 hours and active “illegal live streams” within three hours. Content that harms national security interests must be blocked immediately. Data from Vietnam’s Communications Ministry showed that in the first quarter of 2022, Facebook’s compliance rate was at 90 percent, Google at 93 percent, and TikTok at 73 percent. Third, in Thailand, social networks and users must grapple with strict “lese-majeste” laws in the criminal code and Computer Crime Act (CCA).   Digital Platform Content Regulation   In 2023, the ASEAN published their ASEAN Guideline on Management of Government Information in Combating Fake News and Disinformation in the Media (2023) to provide guidelines for its members. However, this only addressed fake news and disinformation and does not include the control of harmful online content, which may conflict with freedom of expression issues.   However, concerns over curbing freedom of expression on digital platforms were being addressed by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). In December 2023, the AICHR hosted a regional consultation in Jakarta on freedom of opinion and expression in ASEAN. The consultation is part of the AICHR Five-Year Work Plan 2021-2025 and was organized by AICHR Indonesia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia.   The consultation recommended the following to realize ASEAN as a region free from hate speech, fake news, and disinformation:   First, the AICHR encourages ASEAN, Member States, and corporate sectors to consider the views of children in formulating policies governing digital transformation and human rights in a digital world.   Second, the AICHR ensures that universal human rights principles and norms, such as inclusivity, accountability, transparency, safety, non-discrimination, and intersectionality are followed when it comes to artificial intelligence regulations.   Third, AICHR and ASEAN were to protect and amplify the spaces where civil society and other stakeholders can be heard, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as people with disabilities, the elderly, and those living in rural areas, among others, and to recognize their autonomy in deciding when and how to participate, for instance by providing interpreters, translators, and sign language.   Fourth, ASEAN to establish a Regional Task Force for Digital Rights and Cybersecurity to monitor digital rights violations, cybersecurity breaches, online harassment, including technology-facilitated gender-based violence, and to develop referral mechanisms for transboundary cases to prevent and address gender-based violence.   Parliamentarian Actions   Depending on the systеm of governance, parliamentary representatives across the region in the context of regulatory measures could do the following against fake news:   First, adopt laws and budgets to accelerate the building of infrastructure, especially in underserved populations, and to allow diversity in Internet service providers to encourage competition and fair and affordable pricing and connectivity speeds.   Second, ensure any legal framework referring to Internet shutdowns is in line with international human rights law and meets the requirements of legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality.   Third, ensure that all restrictions aimed at tackling disinformation and hate speech comply with international human rights law and standards.   Fourth, when possible, collaborate and engage with independent fact-checking organizations to combat disinformation. Support empowerment and education programs for Internet users to capacitate them in identifying false information.   As shown by Indonesia’s actions within the AICHR framework due to the diversity of its population profile and experience in governance of diverse cultures and regions, it would be the ideal member to lead ASEAN on access and promotion of online expression and democracy.   Conclusion   On a national and regional basis, regulators are managing various digital platform providers. In the economic sphere, their domination of the market was curtailed to enable other smaller companies to benefit from digitalization. In the social public sphere, the digital platforms face contesting demands from stakeholders in different markets over their control of the online public sphere.   Digital platform companies, in obeying the law of the various jurisdictions they operate, might conflict with their corporate values on issues such as human rights and free speech, including the protection of their users’ fundamental rights to express themselves on these platforms. However, they must also contend with those who deliberately create and circulate harmful content and propaganda that sow confusion and social discord.   While it is important to regulate digital platforms, digital platforms should also be able to collaborate with institutional regulators for antitrust, consumer protection and data privacy challenges. For example, on social media platforms, regulators are interacting with Meta (Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp), X (formerly twitter) and TikTok. Using digital IDs is one-way regulators use to build trust on digital platforms.   Alternatively, establishing an independent third-party oversight board or international arbitration council in each jurisdiction can also be useful for discussing and evaluating content moderation dilemmas and adjudicating complaints or grievances from users or governments. Even in the strictest mode, digital platform companies could be placed in a regulatory sandbox for policymakers to evaluate their actions but also enabling them to innovate and evolve.   While the standard of the EU on digital regulation may be the ideal example, in Southeast Asia’s context given the varying levels of digitalization, infrastructure development and diverse national regulations, the region would have to navigate its own pathway to regulate social media and other websites. ■   References   Acclime. 2023. “Thailand’s Royal Decree on digital platforms.” November 6. https://thailand.acclime.com/news/royal-decree-digital-platforms/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20Royal%20Decree,is%20made%20to%20the%20digital (Accessed May 31, 2024)   ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights. 2022. “Promoting Internet Freedoms in Southeast Asia: Toolkit for Parliamentarians.” https://aseanmp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Toolkit-for-Parliamentarians-on-Internet-Freedoms.pdf (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Association of Southeast Asian Nations: ASEAN. 2023. “Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA): ASEAN to leap forward its digital economy and unlock US$2 Tn by 2023.” August 19. https://asean.org/asean-defa-study-projects-digital-economy-leap-to-us2tn-by-2030/ (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Denson, Hannah. 2024. “The parts within the whole: Understanding Southeast Asian economies.” The Interpreter. March 1. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/parts-within-whole-understanding-southeast-asia-s-economies (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Entrust. 2024. “Secure, seamless, and inclusive: How governments can accelerate digital IDs adoption.” GovInsider. January 8. https://govinsider.asia/intl-en/article/secure-seamless-and-inclusive-how-governments-can-accelerate-digital-ids-adoption (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Eugene, Tan E Guang, and Helena Yixin Huang. 2024. “Internet Governance: Priority Issues for ASEAN.” RSIS Commentary No. 019-9. February 9. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/internet-governance-priority-issues-for-asean/ (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Infocomm Media Development Authority: IMDA. 2018. “Digital Economy Framework for Action.” May 21. https://www.imda.gov.sg/-/media/imda/files/sg-digital/sgd-framework-for-action.pdf (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Leong, Pauline. 2022. “Tech giants grapple with content moderation in South-east Asia.” The Straits Times. July 29. http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/tech-giants-grapple-with-content-moderation-in-south-east-asia (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Martinus, Melinda. 2023. “Can ASEAN Mitigate Fake News in Southeast Asia?” ASEAN Focus Issue 2/2022. https://fulcrum.sg/aseanfocus/af-can-asean-mitigate-fake-news-in-southeast-asia/ (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Norton Rose Fulbright. 2023. “Digital Services Act.” https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-sg/knowledge/publications/e1e7805d/digital-services-act (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Rasjid, Arsjad. 2023. “The ASEAN Region is the World’s Economic dark horse. Here’s why.” World Economic Forum. August 22. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/08/asean-economic-growth/ (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Reuters. 2024. “Indonesia issue regulations requiring digital platforms to pay media for content.” February 20. https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/indonesia-issues-regulations-requiring-digital-platforms-pay-media-content-2024-02-20/ (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Ruehl, Mercedes. 2024. “How Singapore became Asia’s go-to hub for start-ups.” Financial Times. April 4. https://www.ft.com/content/6e67b720-2397-423c-b1cc-765faa774d66 (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Teng, Rachel. 2023. “Singapore government taps on TikTok to counter rising scams through edutainment.” GovInsider. October 3. https://govinsider.asia/intl-en/article/singapore-government-taps-on-tiktok-to-counter-rising-scams-through-edutainment (Accessed May 31, 2024)   Tham, Davina, and Vanessa Lim. 2022. “Singapore passes law requiring social media sites to block harmful content ‘within hours.’” Channel News Asia. November 9. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/social-media-sites-block-access-harmful-content-within-hours-under-new-law-passed-parliament-3057041 (Accessed May 31, 2024)     ■ Dr. Faizal Bin Yahya is Senior Research Fellow in the Governance and Economy Department of the Institute of Policy Studies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

In the Philippines, political alliances are often driven by personalistic ties and mutual benefits rather than ideological alignment. The alliance between President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and Vice-President Sara Z. Duterte-Carpio exemplifies this, with both camps leveraging their regional strongholds and familial legacies to maintain political dominance.   Heralded in 2022 as the “Uniteam,” the Marcos-Duterte tandem epitomized the strategic coalition-building often necessary in a fragmented political environment characterized by strong regional identities and political dynasties. This coalition can be analyzed through the lens of maximizing electoral prospects and consolidating power. The Marcos-Duterte alliance was a very strategic merger of the North (Ilocos Region) and the South (Davao Region), aimed at securing a broad electoral mandate.   The unusual strength of their tandem in 2022 stands now in stark contrast with the recent and increasing tensions between the Marcos and Duterte camps. Not only does this breakdown present an important case study in the fragility of political alliances, but also, more importantly, it will have significant implications for governance and economic stability in the Philippines.   Marriage of Convenience   The historical context of the Marcos-Duterte alliance is crucial for understanding its current state of disarray.   The Marcos family’s triumphant return to power in 2022 marked a significant moment in Philippine political history (Buan 2022a). Following their ouster in February 1987 during the People Power Revolution, the Marcoses embarked on a long campaign of political rehabilitation, using a combination of authoritarian nostalgia for the purported “golden age” of the Marcos regime, as well as extensive disinformation campaigns to regain public support, aided by a strong social media machinery (Punongbayan 2023).   In contrast, Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency (2016-2022) was characterized by a populist appeal and authoritarian governance style, which deeply resonated with a significant segment of the Filipino population. Duterte’s high approval ratings until the end of his term (Mateo 2022)—despite his controversial war on drugs, widespread human rights abuses, and botched response to the COVID-19 pandemic—underscored a deep-seated appeal of strongman politics in the Philippines.   The formation of the Marcos-Duterte alliance can be understood as a marriage of convenience. For Marcos, aligning with the Dutertes provided access to the latter’s strong voter base in the South, bolstering his electoral prospects. For Sara Duterte, a national position ensured the continuation of her family’s political influence and offered protection against potential legal repercussions from her father’s admіnistration, especially in the wake of the war on drugs. The benefits for both sides were clear.   Another thing that unites Marcos and Duterte is that both are children of past presidents who have used undeniably authoritarian styles of governance. Interestingly, opinion polls show that Filipinos, on the surface, have a consistent desire for democracy. Data from the Social Weather Stations, a polling firm, showed that 89% of adult Filipino respondents in 2022 were “satisfied” with democracy. Tellingly, 60% said that they “always prefer democracy” and a sizable 26% said they “sometimes prefer authoritarianism” (Macasero 2023). These findings highlight a complex relationship between Filipinos’ democratic aspirations and their tolerance for authoritarian measures. This duality suggests that many Filipinos prioritize effective governance and stability over democratic norms and processes.   Growing Rift   The inherent tensions in the Marcos-Duterte alliance were evident from the outset. The divergence in their political ambitions and governance styles created a fragile coalition, susceptible to internal conflicts and external pressures. Such alliances formed out of convenience rather than ideological alignment are prone to fragmentation.   Just a few days after emerging victorious in the May 2022 polls, Marcos announced that Sara Duterte would be appointed as the education secretary (Buan 2022b). This was quite baffling, because Duterte never announced that she wanted such a post, nor was she an educator to begin with. By all indications, she was ill-fit for the job. Previously, Duterte indicated that she wanted the defense portfolio instead.   Another telling event was the denial of confidential funds to Sara Duterte’s Office of the Vice President (OVP) (de Leon 2023). In 2022, Duterte was able to obtain PHP 125 million (equivalent to USD 2.175 million) worth of usually unaudited confidential funds for the Office of the Vice President. In 2023, she was able to secure an additional PHP 500 million (equivalent to USD 8.7 million) for the same office. For 2024, she aimed for confidential funds for the OVP and the Department of Education. But after severe public backlash, the House of Representatives (led by Speaker Martin Romualdez, President Marcos’ cousin) dropped confidential funds including those in Duterte’s agencies. Eventually, Duterte let go of her budget request.   Another source of tension is the ongoing investigations of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the Duterte-era war on drugs (Buan and Bolledo 2024). Although Marcos insists that he does not recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC on Philippine soil, the imminent arrests of Rodrigo Duterte and co-conspirators in the drug war is a trump card Marcos can conveniently use to get back at the increasingly critical Dutertes. (Incidentally, Vice President Sara Duterte was implicated as one of the people being investigated by the ICC.)   Fast-forward to January 2024, President Marcos launched the “Bagong Pilipinas” (New Philippines) slogan, which was met with skepticism and resistance from the Duterte camp. Sara Duterte attended this event briefly, but later flew to Davao City where a “prayer rally” was organized by her father’s supporters. In that event, former president Rodrigo Duterte, his son Baste (currently the mayor of Davao City), and other allies heavily lambasted the Marcos admіnistration. This marked the first significant public display of the rift between the two camps. (Interestingly, President Marcos’ sister, Senator Imee, also attended the Davao rally.)   The subsequent exchange of derogatory remarks between Bongbong Marcos and Rodrigo Duterte further escalated tensions. This public spat highlights the power struggle between both leaders as they seek to assert their dominance and legitimacy in the eyes of their supporters.   Yet another source of cracks concerns foreign policy, specifically on the West Philippine Sea (WPS). To many people’s surprise, President Marcos has adopted a more assertive stance in defending the Philippines’ territorial claims against China’s incursions, strengthening alliances with Western powers and emphasizing international maritime law (Tomacruz 2022). This marks a departure from Rodrigo Duterte’s pro-China approach, which prioritized economic engagement over territorial disputes. Duterte’s “gentleman’s agreement” with Chinese President Xi Jinping aimed to maintain the status quo in the WPS, but has recently faced criticism for undermining Philippine sovereignty.   Vice President Sara Duterte’s deafening silence on the WPS reflects her alignment with her father’s China-friendly policy (Magsambol 2024b). Marcos, meanwhile, expressed horror at the concessions made by the previous admіnistration, indicating a strategic reorientation towards a more balanced and assertive foreign policy (de Leon 2024b). This divergence highlights a broader ideological and strategic rift within the Philippine leadership, with Marcos favoring traditional security alliances and Sara Duterte maintaining a pragmatic engagement with China for economic gains.   This foreign policy split has significant implications for the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning and domestic politics. A unified stance is crucial for national security and economic stability, and the current discord may weaken the country’s international position and create uncertainty among allies and investors. Navigating this complex landscape requires balancing national security interests, economic benefits, and public sentiment. In addition, this foreign policy discord further tests the already tenuous ties of the once-strong Uniteam.   Distractions   The worsening breakdown of the Marcos-Duterte alliance will have profound implications for governance in the Philippines. The infighting undermines the stability and predictability essential for good governance. The use of populist rhetoric and personalistic attacks also detracts from substantive policy debates, eroding the quality of governance discourse.   Amid the political tensions, statistics point to a weakening of the economy on many fronts. Economic growth in the first quarter of 2024 was weaker than expected, owing to slower spending by private households, investors, and the government itself (Rivas 2024b). Inflation is within target, coming down significantly from a 14-year high in January 2023. However, sky-high prices are one reason for the slower growth of consumption spending. The dire spell of El Niño in 2024 has also jacked up rice prices, a significant contributor to food inflation (Rivas 2024a).   The Philippines also faces many other economic risks besides slower growth and stubborn inflation. For instance, the country’s astonishing 90% learning poverty rate (World Bank 2022), if unabated, is set to drag down the future productivity of the labor force, and also the country’s growth rate in coming decades. The Marcos admіnistration’s pseudo-sovereign wealth fund, called the Maharlika Investment Fund, is also posing risks to the banking sector by, for example, taking away capital from state-owned banks—and even the central bank itself (Abrenica et al. 2023).   On top of all these, the Marcos admіnistration and its allies in Congress are also aggressively pushing for amendments to the 1987 Constitution, specifically amendments to provisions restricting foreign investments in select sectors, namely higher education, advertising, and public services. However, analysts warn that lawmakers may be pushing for amendments in contravention of the legal procedures allowed by the Constitution itself. Economists, including those at the University of the Philippines, have also warned that there’s very weak empirical evidence in support of economic charter change, insofar as it is being painted by proponents as a means of attracting foreign investments and boosting the economy (Monsod et al. 2024).   It is against these pressing economic challenges that the Marcos-Duterte feud is happening. There is a strong case to be made that the Philippine government (and the Filipino people) will do better to focus their time and energies on these issues rather than petty politics.   Future Prospects   Looking ahead, the prospects for the Marcos-Duterte alliance and Philippine governance are uncertain. The midterm elections in May 2025 will be a crucial test of the resilience of both camps and the broader systеm of governance, and will further distract away from social and economic issues that otherwise demand urgent attention. Early polls also show that Vice President Duterte is among the top choices for the presidency in the 2028 polls (Magsambol 2024a).   Political actors and pro-democracy forces must navigate the complex landscape of regionalism and populism to foster a more stable and inclusive governance framework. The challenge for pro-democracy groups in particular lies in presenting a compelling alternative to the Marcos-Duterte narrative. This involves not only articulating a clear vision for effective governance but also mastering the tools of modern political communication, including social media, to engage and mobilize a diverse electorate.   Belatedly, key opposition figures (who faced defeats in previous elections as they ran for national posts) have realized the importance of mastering social media—something that both Marcos and Duterte camps mastered years ago. This involves cultivating relatable personas that exude positive energies, and not being too antagonistic of government—the kind of content that garners views and likes in the internet age and the so-called attention economy. Whether their efforts will work remains to be seen in the 2025 midterm polls.   Recent turn of events may provide some hope. Amid their feuding, President Marcos and Vice President Duterte’s popularity ratings have taken a hit (de Leon 2024a). From September to December 2024, Marcos’ trust rating dropped by 16 percentage points (a whopping 32 points in Mindanao), while Duterte’s also dropped by 7 points nationwide. Both their approval ratings have also dropped.   This means that the majority of Filipinos continue to trust and approve of Marcos and Duterte. However, there may be indications that Filipinos are growing weary of the ongoing political tug-of-war. Pro-democracy forces will want to take note of this sentiment and effectively respond. But how?   Pro-democracy forces must first focus on building a broad and inclusive coalition to challenge the entrenched political dynasties of Marcos and Duterte. This involves uniting opposition groups, civil society organizations, and grassroots movements under a common platform dedicated to transparent governance, social justice, and economic reforms. Organizations like Akbayan and the International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance (INCITEGov) are already serving this purpose. But more groups need to step up and coalesce.   Next, leveraging digital and social media platforms is crucial. The opposition needs to adopt similar strategies as their rivals to disseminate their message, counter misinformation, and engage with younger (Gen Z) voters. Creating compelling content and establishing a network of digital volunteers can help sustain an active online presence and compete effectively. Here, pro-democracy forces will want to reconnect with the mass of young volunteers who helped in the 2022 campaign of Leni Robredo, the opposition’s presidential candidate. That “Kakampink” movement (a blend of “Kakampi,” which means ally in Tagalog, and “pink,” the color of Robredo’s election campaign) inspired a boom in volunteerism never before seen in Philippine electoral politics. However, the challenge is to reignite the spark and inspire that group into action once more, after many were pained and disenchanted by Robredo’s defeat.   Grassroots organizing and community engagement will also remain vital. Pro-democracy forces should reach out to marginalized communities to understand their concerns and incorporate their voices into the political discourse. Focusing on issues such as inflation, stagnant wages, underemployment, poverty, healthcare, education, and livelihoods can build a strong support base among neglected voters. Investing in voter education and advocacy is also essential to ensure a well-informed electorate. Campaigns to raise awareness about democratic participation and the significance of voting for candidates who prioritize the public good can empower voters and encourage active civic participation. Through these concerted efforts, pro-democracy forces can challenge the Marcos-Duterte alliance and pave the way for more transparent, accountable, and effective governance in the Philippines.   Challenging political dynasties like Marcos and Duterte will be difficult, but not impossible. Strengthening civil society and encouraging civic engagement can empower citizens to support candidates based on merit rather than personality. But this needs to be complemented by stringent anti-dynasty laws (already embedded in the 1987 Constitution, but not acted upon by lawmakers), robust campaign finance regulations, and greater transparency.   In conclusion, the Marcos-Duterte alliance offers a stark lesson in the volatility of political coalitions built on convenience rather than principle. As the Philippines faces significant economic and social challenges, the nation’s leaders must move beyond petty rivalries and focus on delivering stable, effective governance. The upcoming midterm elections will be a crucial test of resilience for both camps, but also a potential turning point for the country’s political future. It is imperative for pro-democracy forces to seize this moment, mobilize the disenchanted electorate, and champion a vision of governance that prioritizes national interest over personal vendettas. Only by doing so can the Philippines hope to navigate its way out of this political quagmire and build a more prosperous, democratic future for all Filipinos. ■   References   Abrenica, Ma. Joy V., Luzeta C. Adorna, Patricia T. Coseteng, Emmanuel S. de Dios, Marian S. de los Angeles, Noel B. Del Castillo, Benjamin A. Endriga, Laarni C. Escresa, Jonna P. Estudillo, Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista, Aleli D. Kraft, Alice A. Lee, Adrian R. Mendoza, Ernesto M. Pernia, Jan Carlo B. Punongbayan, Renato E. Reside Jr., Anthony G. Sabarillo, Orville Jose C. Solon, Gerard P. Suanes, Elizabeth Tan, and Mariel Jances Nhayin P. Yamashita. 2023. “Maharlika Investment Fund: Still Beyond Repair.” University of the Philippines School of Economics Discussion Papers 2023-02. https://econ.upd.edu.ph/dp/index.php/dp/article/view/1551/1035 (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Buan, Lian. 2022a. “36 years after ousting Marcos, Filipinos elect son as president.” Rappler. May 10. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/ferdinand-bongbong-marcos-jr-wins-president-philippines-may-2022/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   ______. 2022b. “Sara Duterte will be education secretary – Marcos Jr.” Rappler. May 11. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/marcos-jr-says-sara-duterte-education-secretary/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Buan, Lian, and Jairo Bolledo. 2024. “ICC case exposes Duterte’s desperation, Marcos’ indecisiveness.” Rappler. February 2024. https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/icc-exposes-duterte-desperation-marcos-indecisiveness/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   De Leon, Dwight. 2023. “Caving in to pressure, House to strip Duterte-led OVP, DepEd of confidential funds.” Rappler. September 27. https://www.rappler.com/nation/house-strips-deped-ovp-duterte-confidential-funds-september-2023/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   ______. 2024a. “Marcos’ trust rating in Mindanao drops by 32 points in March, says Pulse Asia.” Rappler. April 2. https://www.rappler.com/philippines/marcos-jr-trust-rating-pulse-asia-survey-march-2024/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   ______. 2024b. “Marcos ‘horrified’ by Duterte’s alleged gentleman’s agreement with China on West PH Sea.” Rappler. April 10. https://www.rappler.com/philippines/marcos-horrified-alleged-duterte-gentleman-agreement-china-sea-dispute/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Macasero, Ryan. 2023. “89% of Filipinos satisfied with how democracy works – SWS.” Rappler. February 8. https://www.rappler.com/nation/filipinos-satisfied-how-demoracy-works-sws-survey-january-december-2022/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Magsambol, Bonz. 2024a. “Raffy Tulfo, Sara Duterte top Pulse Asia’s 2028 presidential survey.” Rappler. April 2. https://www.rappler.com/philippines/results-pulse-asia-2028-presidential-vice-presidential-survey-march-2024/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   ______. 2024b. “Sara Duterte on continued China bullying: No comment.” Rappler. April 8. https://www.rappler.com/philippines/sara-duterte-response-continued-china-bullying-no-comment-april-8-2024/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Mateo, Janvic. 2022. “Duterte satisfaction rating high until term’s end – SWS.” The Philippine Star. July 15. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/07/15/2195508/duterte-satisfaction-rating-high-until-terms-end-sws (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Monsod, Toby C., Aleli D. Kraft, Cielo Magno, Jan Carlo Punongbayan, Orville Jose C. Solon, Elizabeth Tan, Agustin L. Arcenas, Florian Alburo, and Emmanuel S. de Dios. 2024. “How to change a constitution by hand-waving (Or, the unbearable lightness of evidence in support of lifting foreign ownership restrictions).” University of the Philippines School of Economics Discussion Paper 2023-02. https://econ.upd.edu.ph/dp/index.php/dp/article/view/1552/1037 (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Punongbayan, Jan Carlo. 2023. “[ANALYSIS] Undoing ‘false nostalgia’ about the Marcos years.” Rappler. February 24. https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/analysis-undoing-false-nostalgia-marcos-dictatorship/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Rivas, Ralf. 2024a. “Inflation hits poor households, areas outside Metro Manila harder in April 2024.” Rappler. May 7. https://www.rappler.com/business/inflation-rate-philippines-april-2024/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   ______. 2024b. “Philippine economy grows by 5.7% in Q1 2024, below expectations.” Rappler. May 9. https://www.rappler.com/business/gross-domestic-product-philippines-q1-2024/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   Tomacruz, Sofia. 2022. “In turnaround, Marcos pledges to uphold Hague ruling.” Rappler. May 26. https://www.rappler.com/nation/marcos-jr-pledges-uphold-hague-ruling-west-philippine-sea/ (Accessed May 17, 2024)   World Bank. 2022. “Philippines: Learning Poverty Brief.” https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099000207152223103/pdf/IDU002b5536c0db4104ec3087d809906ec2eae56.pdf (Accessed May 17, 2024)     ■ Jan Carlo B. Punongbayan, Ph.D., is an assistant professor at the University of the Philippines School of Economics and the author of False Nostalgia: The Marcos “Golden Age” Myths and How to Debunk Them.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Introduction   India’s 2024 national election is billed to be the biggest election in history. The mammoth exercise which involves the participation of 986 million voters and more than 600 political parties will last 44 days before the results are announced on June 4. It is also billed to be the most expensive elections in the world (Pradhan 2024), overtaking the United States elections. The noteworthy fact about this mega exercise is that nearly the entire process will be conducted through Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs). A staggering 5.5 million EVMs will be used to conduct this mammoth exercise spanning over two months (Business Standard 2024-03-16). Further, the 2024 national elections will determine who gets to occupy the Lok Sabha or Lower House of the Parliament. The party or a coalition of parties that gets a majority in the LoK Sabha will get to nominate its Prime Minister and run the government for next five years.   State of Play   Prime Minister Narendra Modi representing the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is seeking the rare third term to office in mid-June. It may be mentioned that overcoming a three decades of coalition jinx the BJP under his leadership won a landslide election in 2014. His party again swept the national elections in 2019 with 303 seats and the coalition National Development Alliance (NDA) which won 352 Lok Sabha seats (out of 543 seats). This time around, PM Modi is seeking the mandate based on his government’s all-round performances on producing stronger economic growth, delivering on welfare promises and bringing down the poverty rate (PIB 2024). His main slogan for 2024 polls is “Viksit Bharat” or a developed India by 2047. The party’s strong performances in recent state polls (winning three key heartland states — Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan) and having governments in as many as 12 states (also four coalition governments) gives Modi’s government a huge advantage over the opposition (Al Jazeera 2023-12-05). What is more important is PM Modi’s high popularity among voters even after spending two terms in office makes this election a no contest (Mogul 2024).   The key challenger to PM Modi and his party comes from a coalition of roughly two dozen political parties, many of which having suffered or being systеmatically targeted by the ruling BJP government. The opposition bloc named INDIA (India National Developmental Inclusive Alliance) is principally steered by the main opposition Indian National Congress (INC). The united opposition bloc which was formed with a lot of optimism to put up a collective fight against the BJP juggernaut continues to struggle despite initial promises among key state parties. Since its formation on July 18, 2023, two key leaders Nitish Kumar of Janata Dal United (Bihar) and Mamata Banerjee of Trinamool Congress (from a key opposition ruled state of West Bengal) have left the INDIA coalition in the mid-way. Notwithstanding the setbacks, the opposition alliance led by INC has made visible progress in seat sharing with regional partners and rallying national support to stop the BJP led NDA coalition to win the third consecutive election. However, unlike the ruling party which has deep pockets and massive organizational strength, the INDIA bloc is struggling with resources and coherence in campaign narratives. This makes the contest a David versus Goliath kind of fight.   Key Election Issues   While there are numerous issues or expectations brought out by voters during the course of elections, key concerns are over stagnating income, price rise, lack of jobs, corruption, unchecked spread of misinformation, and growing inequality among others.   Unemployment and Inflation   Among the major issues in the national election is the rising unemployment and high inflation. A recent pre-poll survey carried out by the well-known CSDS found unemployment and inflation are the top most complaints among most voters (The Hindu 2024-04-11). While the Indian economy continues to grow at an impressive pace in recent years, it is not adding up many jobs. The recent International Labour Organization (ILO) India Employment Report painted a bleak future as far as jobs are concerned (ILO 2024). The report noted that “In 2022, the share of unemployed youth in the total unemployed population was 82.9%.” Further, among the unemployed, the proportion of educated youth, particularly those with secondary level education or higher, has nearly doubled to 65.7% from 35.2% in the 2000s. No wonder, the 2024 national poll is witnessing competitive promises by political parties on job creation. The main opposition INC in its manifesto Nyay Patra has promised bring the Right to Apprenticeship Act thereby ensuring a one-year apprenticeship to every degree holder or graduate (below the age of 25) with a stipend of INR 1 lakh (one hundred thousand) a year apart from filling up 3 million vacancies in various central government departments. Not to be left out in the race, the ruling BJP’s manifesto called Sankalp Patra has promised to create millions of jobs for youth and new schemes for women (Kumar 2024).   Welfare Populism   A key pillar of PM Modi’s consecutive victories is his government’s track record of delivering welfare goods to broad swathes of citizens across the country. Public distribution of key welfare goods such as gas cylinders, electricity connections, toilets, DBT (direct benefits transfer) under New Welfarism has helped the Modi government to create a robust vote bank. For instance, data from recent surveys (in particular National Family Health Survey 2019-21) found an impressive rise in household goods and services particularly electricity, flushed toilets, gas connection, etc (Vaishnav 2023). No wonder, PM Modi has doubled down on welfare schemes (calling Modi Ki Guarantee) in the recently released party manifesto (Hindustan Times 2024-04-14). The ruling BJP’s election manifesto has listed a wide array of welfare schemes. Not to be lagging behind the ruling party, the opposition particularly the Congress Party has promised an array of attractive welfare schemes to entice the voters. The party which recently unveiled a 46-page manifesto has promised to provide universal healthcare, free education until Class XII, launch an employment scheme for urban poor and so on. Regional parties too have announced numerous welfare schemes from free rations and education to attract voters. In short, with competitive populism taking the center-stage of the campaign strategy of every party, it is raining freebies/welfare schemes in the 2024 polls.   Misinformation and Election Integrity   A key issue in the national election is the alarming rise in fake news, misinformation and disinformation heavily distorting voters’ choices. While fake news and disinformation were already major challenges in the 2019 polls, the major uptick in disruptive technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfakes, suggests that the scales and intensities of these challenges will greatly vary in 2024. As it stands, India is the global capital of disinformation (Sahoo 2024), and with increasing access to internet and cheap internet data, the 2024 election is speculated to be on very shaky ground as far as disinformation and electoral integrity are concerned. While most political parties and candidates have shown great alacrity to aggressively deploy digital and social media tools in their campaigns, the Election Commission of India has issued guidelines as well as warnings to parties and tech platforms to desist from spreading mis-and disinformation (The Hindu 2024-03-20). One has to wait and watch how the bodies like the Election Commission would manage the daunting challenges of disinformation (growing deployment of AI and deep fakes) and hate messages during the course of an important election so as to protect the integrity of elections and make it free and fair.   Level Playing Field for All?   One of the running themes of 2024 elections is ruling party’s disproportionate advantages (in terms of well-oiled party machineries, money, institutional arbitrage, etc.) and lack of a level playing field for the opposition parties (Punwani 2023; Financial Times 2024-04-16). With the ruling party using every instrument of state to target and marginalize the key opposition parties and their top leaders, there are growing concerns including some major western governments (such as Germany and the United States) about the fairness of the electoral processes (The Hindu 2024-03-27). Since coming to office in 2014, the Modi government has weaponized federal investigative agencies such as the Enforcement Directorate (ED), Income Tax and Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) against key opposition figures. As per the investigative media report, a total of 130 political leaders have been probed (questioned, raided and arrested) by the ED alone. Out of them, a staggering 115 (95%) are opposition figures (Tiwary 2022). The most alarming trend is the arrest of Mr. Arvind Kejriwal, Chief Minister of Delhi and Hemant Soren, Chief Minister of Jharkhand by ED on unproven charges in the middle of national elections.   Even more concerning is the IT department has frozen the accounts of main opposition INC and has sought recovery of INR 100 crore (1 billion) over allegations of discrepancies. While there may be basis for such action, such measures in the middle of general elections hugely impact the ability of the opposition to put up a decent campaign and avail a fighting chance against the BJP behemoth. Fact of the matter is that many opposition parties, particularly INC, are precariously placed in terms of party finances. This is in contrast to the ruling party, which sits on a cash pile and enjoys huge institutional and organizational advantages over the opposition. On the top of this, the ruling party is leaving no instrument to deny opposition parties a level playing in the elections. Where and whenever possible, the ruling party has aggressively engineered defection in opposition ruled states (sometimes bringing down governments) and co-opted key leaders from opposition. Many such acts have been facilitated by selective deployment of state agencies such as ED, IT and CBI (Tiwary 2022).   To conclude, the national election in decades is seen as a one-sided contest as the Modi government has gone overdrive to disallow the opposition a fighting chance (Ellis-Petersen 2024). This has prompted the INDIA alliance to launch the “Save Democracy” movement in the country.   A Predictable Outcome?   While predicting election outcomes is a hazardous business in a complex and politically diverse polity like India, the results in this round appear predictable. All recent pre-poll surveys strongly suggest an easy victory for Prime Minister Modi’s party. Riding on personal popularity of Modi, the BJP led NDA coalition set to sweep the polls across all regions except probably the south. The largest opinion poll by India Today has projected 335 seats for the ruling NDA, while the opposition INDIA bloc is likely to secure 160 seats (Bhattacharya 2024). However, sensing visible disunity among the opposition coalition and continued high popularity of PM Modi even after two-terms in office, the ruling BJP has been eyeing to cross 400 seats in Lok Sabha (out of 543 seats).   Although victory for the BJP looks certain, the incumbent party is leaving nothing to chance given the course of elections can often change and the party’s electoral limits in the southern and eastern regions. This is precisely why the ruling party is going all out to woo every known leader from the opposition ranks and is using every instrument of the state to undermine the campaigns of rival parties. Notably, the party has also gone aggressive in recruiting social media influencers, celebrities and media moguls in its bid for third term (NDTV 2024).   Conclusion   With nearly one billion eligible voters and ever-increasing participation of women and the most marginalized sections of the populations in the elections, this once-in-five-year electoral exercise remains a great success story of democratization in a very diverse country with large impoverished populations. It is no wonder that due to its sheer democratic weight, India’s national election and the unfolding electoral processes are being intensely watched from all over the world. Yet, the manner in which the election is shaping (particularly the denial of a fair chance to the opposition and the weakening of vital democratic institutions), India’s democracy appears to be heading into uncharted territory. Another overwhelming victory for the right-wing BJP, coupled with a weak and fragmented opposition, means India risks further descent into illiberalism and democratic backsliding. ■     References   Al Jazeera. 2023. “Four reasons why Modi’s BJP swept key India regional elections.” December 5. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/5/four-reasons-why-modis-bjp-won-key-regional-elections-in-india (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Bhattacharya, Devika, 2024. “Modi 3.0 is Mood of the Nation, survey predicts 335 seats for NDA.” India Today. February 8. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/mood-of-the-nation-2024-lok-sabha-elections-pm-modi-nda-win-likely-india-alliance-congress-important-issues-2499457-2024-02-08 (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Bloomberg. 2024. “India’s Opposition targeted by Tax Agency before polls.” February 16. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-16/indian-tax-office-has-frozen-accounts-claims-opposition-party?sref=NDAgb47j (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Business Standard. 2024. “General Election 2024: Here’s what it will take to elect 18th Lok Sabha.” March 16. https://www.business-standard.com/elections/lok-sabha-election/general-election-2024-here-s-what-it-will-take-to-elect-18th-lok-sabha-124031600364_1.html (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Ellis-Petersen, Hannah. 2024. “BJP v democracy’: India’s opposition alliance cries foul as election nears.” The Guardian. April 9. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/09/bjp-versus-democracy-india-opposition-alliance-cries-foul-as-election-nears (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Financial Times. 2024. “Is India’s BJP the world’s most ruthlessly efficient political party?” April 16. https://www.ft.com/content/d5a1dfaa-ecfb-45c5-b60d-458f89228ea3 (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Hindustan Times. 2024. “‘Modi ki Guarantee’: What does BJP manifesto promise women, youths and farmers?” April 14. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/modi-ki-guarantee-for-lok-sabha-election-2024-free-ration-for-5-years-mudra-loan-limit-to-rs-20-lakh-bjp-manifesto-101713073724356.html (Accessed April 18, 2024)   International Labour Organization: ILO. 2024. “India Employment Report 2024.” https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-new_delhi/documents/publication/wcms_921154.pdf (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Kumar, Nishant. 2024. “BJP manifesto 2024 promises policy continuity. What does it mean for the Indian stock market?” Mint. April 16. https://www.livemint.com/market/stock-market-news/bjp-manifesto-2024-promises-policy-continuity-what-does-it-mean-for-the-indian-stock-market-11713267737084.html (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Mogul, Rhea. 2024. “Narendra Modi: India’s popular but controversial leader seeking a transformative third term.” CNN. April 16. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/15/india/modi-profile-india-election-intl-hnk-dst/index.html (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Nath, Damini. 2024. “After Opposition alleges ‘match-fixing’ in LS polls, former CECs: ‘I-T, ED actions can disrupt level playing field.” The Indian Express. April 1. https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/lok-sabha-polls-match-fixing-it-ed-actions-former-cecs-9244203/ (Accessed April 18, 2024)   NDTV. 2024. “BJP Turns To Influencers, Youtubers To Reach Young Voters Ahead Of Polls.” April 10. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/bjp-turns-to-influencers-youtubers-to-reach-young-voters-ahead-of-polls-5411309 (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Pradhan, Bbhudatta. 2024. “India’s election set to be the world’s most expensive at more than $ 14 billion.” The National News. February 21. https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/2024/02/21/india-election-bjp-modi-campaign-finances-cost/ (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Press Information Bureau: PIB. 2024. “24.82 crore Indians escape Multidimensional Poverty in 9 years.” January 15. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1996271#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20Discussion%20Paper,reduction%20of%2017.89%20percentage%20points (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Punwani, Jyoti. 2023. “A huge wall of money separated BJP from I.N.D.I.A.” Deccan Herald. July 26. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/a-huge-wall-of-money-separates-bjp-from-india-1240820.html (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Sahoo, Niranjan, 2024. “How Disinformation Erodes the World’s Largest Democracy.” Institute for Global Governance Research, Hitotsubashi University, Issue Briefing No. 53. February 26. https://ggr.hias.hit-u.ac.jp/en/2024/02/26/how-disinformation-erodes-the-worlds-largest-democracy/ (Accessed April 18, 2024)   The Hindu. 2024a. “Lokniti-CSDS 2024 pre-poll survey | Jobs, inflation key issues in 2024 Lok Sabha elections.” April 11. https://www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha/lokniti-csds-2024-pre-poll-survey-jobs-inflation-key-issues-in-2024-lok-sabha-elections/article68051581.ece (Accessed April 18, 2024)   ______. 2024b. “Social media influencers on EC radar, but telling opinion apart from paid content is a challenge.” March 20. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/social-media-influencers-on-ec-radar-but-telling-opinion-apart-from-paid-content-is-a-challenge/article67972709.ece (Accessed April 18, 2024)   ______. 2024c. “U.S. encourages ‘fair, transparent’ trial for Arvind Kejriwal.” March 27. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/us-encourages-fair-transparent-process-for-arrested-indian-opposition-figure/article67994842.ece (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Tiwary, Deeptiman. 2022. “Since 2014, 4-fold jump in ED cases against politicians; 95% are from Opposition.” The Indian Express. September 21. https://indianexpress.com/article/express-exclusive/since-2014-4-fold-jump-in-ed-cases-against-politicians-95-per-cent-are-from-opposition-8163060/ (Accessed April 18, 2024)   Vaishnav, Milan. 2023. “Decoding India’s 2024 Election Contest.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 7. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/07/decoding-india-s-2024-election-contest-pub-91178 (Accessed April 18, 2024)        ■ Niranjan Sahoo, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

The third iteration of the Summit for Democracy (S4D) in Seoul from March 18 to 20 was an improvement on several elements of previous versions of S4D but still inherited some of the challenges. With this third summit in the rearview mirror, it is a good moment to take stock of the concrete impact of the summit itself and the goals of the S4D process in the future. We argue that the S4D has significant shortcomings but still has added value moving forward if the format can be adjusted in a more pragmatic direction.   Review of the Third Summit for Democracy   South Korea taking on the role of host was significant in the evolution of the summit from its origins in the Biden admіnistration. Of course, the US government was still very much involved as the founder of S4D but the South Korean stamp on the event was unmistakable. The desire to host was widely interpreted as based on the current government’s foreign policy upholding democratic values and global cooperation. South Korea’s unique legacy of successful home-grown democratization accompanied by rapid economic development is clearly appealing to the Global South. The timing, ahead of its general elections on April 10 amidst increasing political polarization at home, added an element of precautious summit preparation that contributed to rather weak general interest inside the country.   The summit, focused on ‘future generations’, took place over 3 days: Day 1 ministerial in Seoul, Day 2 with civil society and youth engagement and Day 3 for leaders online. A whole series of side events were also organized both in the lead up to the summit and during the 3 days in Seoul.   Despite the fact that the summit was dedicated to future generations, the lure of discussing technology, especially AI, was too strong to ignore. The Day 1 ministerial, featuring speeches from over 30 ministers (from foreign ministers to ministers of the interior) from all around the globe, was short on youth and long on tech. The South Korean government chose the Tech and Democracy theme from the list of 16 themes linked to the previously established ‘cohorts’ created after the first Summit for Democracy. There was no shortage of voices – from government, civil society and industry – calling for much better coordination and a regulatory approach to ensuring better oversight of technology as an urgent priority. Generative AI was central to the agenda due to the profound impact it is having on political and socio-economic life, but this probably detracted from a broader focus on the future of democracy beyond the digital sphere.   The sheer number of events on day 2 underscored the appeal of S4D to so many organizations, governments and activists. About 800 people, including more than two hundred youth from Korea, participated in the Day 2 Summit. And while 52 sessions were certainly too much for one day, there was something for everyone on the agenda including multiple sessions on the political participation of young people, disinformation, digital tools and the information environment. It was perhaps notable that only one session addressed climate change and the link with democracy. In general, this was a major improvement over previous editions of S4D in that space was given to those who wanted to take it, and credit should be given to the Korean government for taking this route. Yet, at the same time, it also resulted in a fragmentation of the collective experience of a summit. In future, it would be more effective if both days were streamlined or merged in order to better link ministers and government with civil society and youth.   Day 2 was organized by four organizations working together - the Community of Democracies, International IDEA, the Open Government Partnership and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – that created another layer of management that allowed for ownership beyond the host government. Importantly, day 2 created a clear space for the various thematic ‘cohorts’ – an innovation created between the first summit in 2021 and the second in 2023 – that was missing during the last summit in 2023. It also created space for governments who were not prepared to host or co-host the summit itself to still organize sessions on priority topics.   Day 3 featured short statements by national leaders and was co-hosted by the governments of South Korea, Kenya and Denmark. The day took place online and was wrapped up by a Chair’s summary that highlighted some of the key thematic focus areas dealt with over the course of the 3 days. Apart from a few genuinely new announcements, leaders mostly reaffirmed support for democracy without delving into new commitments at home or abroad.   Reflection Points on S4D So Far   Taking a step back from the 3 days in Seoul, four things stand out for S4D more generally. First, it is clear that the summit continues to mobilize those that care about democratic governance around the world and creates an opportunity for them to meet, network and discuss priorities. That is something of real value to many governments and activists but in a crowded field of events focused on rights and governance – like the OGP summit, RightsCon, Forum2000 or the Copenhagen Democracy Summit – it still needs to demonstrate that its original promise of serving as an overarching forum that can mobilize globally and deliver locally remains a realistic ambition. Therefore, while the summit covered a lot of issues, it is hard to pull out the key message on the state of democracy or, more importantly, what the top priorities are for responding to the challenges of weakening global democracy.   Second, the added value of S4D was originally the explicit focus on international cooperation on democracy and sending a political message about that cooperation. Yet, the summit has lost the political force that made it exciting at the beginning, evolving in a more technocratic direction over time. That political force was not there at S4D2 or in Seoul, perhaps because the preparatory process had much more energy than developing and implementing commitment of participating countries.   Third, the impact of S4D in terms of policy commitments remains marginal and, frankly, deeply disappointing when juxtaposed with the urgent crisis facing democratic politics worldwide. The original focus on commitments during the first summit was a central pillar of S4D but no real mechanism has been identified to drive it forward. This poses a real question for S4D – if it not politically salient and cannot drive policy change, what is its role?   Fourth, the lack of announcement of a fourth summit underscores the fundamental challenge of hosting S4D. The success of the South Korean event was dependent on significant time and funding for the event. Thinking about the role of S4D moving forward must also be accompanied by a realistic vision for the practical elements of the process as well. So, what does this all mean for the future of S4D?   The Future Summit Process   While there was no announcement of a fourth Summit for Democracy, the Seoul Summit did conclude that a Summit process should continue. Most of the discussion of the Summit process was behind the scenes rather than in an open debate. Still, a few the signals about the future come from a combination of the ‘Way Forward’ section of the Chair’s summary and comments by a range of stakeholders most closely involved.   The proposals shared by those key stakeholders for the future Summit process appear to have three main elements. First, it is clear that the Summit process needs to involve leaders. However, the language in the conclusions does not specify a format. Therefore, there is room for creative ideas such as holding a meeting in the margins of the UN General Assembly, adjusting the timing to be less frequent or turning it into a “COP for democracy.”   Second, the conclusions commit to funding the Partners for the Engagement of Civil Society – the Community of Democracies, the Open Government Partnership, International IDEA and the OECD – to act as a secretariat for the new process. This is a critically important step to ensure strong organization of the Summit process regardless of the host government, or even in the absence of a single host country. However, while all four organizations have membership from a range of regions, including outside the ‘Global North’, they will need to do more to be seen as globally representative.   Third, it is likely that the future Summit process will have more open participation than has been the case so far. Some stakeholders spoke about “opt-in” participation, or about relying on civil society or the private sector to represent some countries whose governments are hostile to the democratic renewal agenda. There could also be more weight put on the activities between Summit meetings, not least since participation in any Summit will always have logistical limitations.   Whether by design or not, these steps represent an evolution away from a US-led initiative tied to the Biden Presidency, drawing on lessons from the experience of the three Summits so far. There is more to do to ensure a clear purpose and mandate for the Summit process, but there are signs of an emerging consensus about the role of the Summit process – look for example at the report of this meeting[1] in the UK in the run-up to the Summit.   Taken together, these steps would have the potential to significantly strengthen the process, in three key ways:   ● Governance – a Summit process covering global democratic renewal needs to ensure representation and engagement from all geographic regions and all stakeholders. It also needs a credible decision-making process. Achieving this will be a critical first task for the Secretariat, building on the progress made in the first Summits. They will not be able to do this on their own but can provide clear processes and use their very wide networks to move things in the right direction.   ● Agenda – the potential scope of the democratic renewal agenda is huge, so a lot of thought needs to go into finding the right issues to debate and propose action on. Again, the secretariat will need support from willing governments and others, but a lot has already been learned from the first three Summits that could help the process be much smoother and impactful, including how to collaborate with existing forums working on relevant issues.   ● Effectiveness – the value of the Summit process will come from what happens in between meetings, much as from the Summits themselves. As with many similar global processes, there can be a rich ecosystеm of analysis, debate and initiatives developed in between the Summits. Some of this will need to be reviewed by leaders but a lot can be taken forward in a range of other ways, with leaders meeting to reaffirm the importance of the agenda, profile the key challenges and opportunities, and to support action on a few issues. The secretariat will be key to organizing this work effectively.   Whether in their comments on democracy at a global level, or on the wide range of sectoral issues, there was no doubt that participants identified very significant challenges to democratic governance in the world. However, the Seoul Summit showed how difficult it is to shape a global discussion on such a broad issue. The decision to maintain a summit process was probably the right one, and the commitment to a secretariat is an opportunity to work out a clearer purpose and a stronger format. The success of the process will depend on strong engagement from groups from all regions, and in Asia, South Korea should clearly be playing a leading role. ■     [1] Wilton Park. 2024. “Summit for Democracy – the future: how to sustain international support.” February 9. https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/reports/summit-for-democracy-the-future-how-to-sustain-international-support/ (Accessed March 27, 2024)     ■ Ken Godfrey is the Executive Director of the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD).   ■ Anthony Smith is the Chief Executive of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD).     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

The lead up to Pakistan’s 2024 elections was ridden with political instability. After Imran Khan’s ouster as prime minister in April 2022, a caretaker government significantly delayed holding elections, allowing for the creation of an uneven playing field for Khan’s party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) (Kugelman 2024). Khan’s fall-out with Pakistan’s all-powerful military establishment resulted in the PTI losing support of its allies and suffering rapid defections from party ranks. A series of politically motivated cases were launched against Khan (Reuters 2024-01-31) and he was jailed and disqualified from running for office. PTI’s election symbol (the cricket bat) was taken away following another case on intraparty elections, forcing PTI candidates to compete in the elections without a party affiliation (Bhatti 2024).   Meanwhile, PTI’s primary opposition, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) was anticipated to be the biggest beneficiary of these crackdowns against the PTI. Nawaz Sharif, PML-N chief, had returned to Pakistan after four years in exile; cases of corruption were steadily dismissed and the life-time ban against Sharif was scrapped (Reuters 2024-01-08). The PML-N also allied with Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) to lead an opposition against Khan in the lead up to Khan’s ouster. The stage appeared to be set for the PML-N and PPP to ease their ways back into power.   But on February 8, Pakistanis demonstrated the power of the vote, surprising even the most astute political pundits. Early results showed PML-N candidates suffering and PTI-affiliated (independent) candidates in the lead. These results suggested voter fatigue against the incumbent PML-N, robust support for the PTI, and anger against the military’s persisting involvement in domestic politics.   Delays in elections results and allegations of rampant voter fraud further delegitimized the process and enflamed public sentiments against PML-N. Previously confident in a smooth return to power, the Sharif clan was instead forced to turn to the PPP and Muttahida Qaumi Movement to negotiate a “marriage of convenience” in which a power-sharing arrangement now sees Shahbaz Sharif (Nawaz’s younger brother) as second-time prime minister and PPP chairperson Asif Zardari as second-time president. Khan, meanwhile, remains in jail, with his supporters and PTI candidates still protesting election results.   Civil-Military Relations and the “Same Page” Model   It is impossible to understand these elections without placing them in the context of the evolution of hybrid politics in Pakistan since 2018. From 2008 to 2018, Pakistan’s military accepted competitive multi-party elections that produced coalition governments which then had to negotiate working relationships with the military in order to rule at the center. Since 2018, the military has opted for a different hybrid arrangement in which governments at the center would (i) come to power with the military’s help, (ii) rely on military support against political competition, (iii) govern based on a shared civil-military understanding of the governing agenda, and (iv) accept the military’s steering role in governance. In short, the elected civilian government needed to be on the “same page” with the military in order to rule (Almeida 2019).   The first of these hybrid arrangements was between the PTI and the military. Khan campaigned on an anti-corruption populist platform, and the military, aligned with a section of the Supreme Court, used propaganda, politically motivated cases against competing parties, arrests of opposition party workers, and material and coercive inducements for rival political candidates, to undermine the incumbent PML-N’s electoral prospects and facilitate PTI’s electoral victory (Bajpai and Kureshi 2022). Between 2018 and 2022, the Chief of Army Staff and Prime Minister Khan relied on military-controlled intelligence agencies and anti-corruption agencies to harass, arrest and detain leaders of opposition parties.   Whereas the confluence of executive aggrandizement, populist mobilization, and opposition repression that characterized the PTI’s rise in 2018 resembled the pattern of democratic backsliding recently witnessed in many other countries (Bermeo 2016), the duality of a civilian and military leadership at the helm of the hybrid formation meant that its stability depended on the sustained alignment between civilian and military leadership.   By 2021, differences over foreign policy, governance, and important transfers and postings within the military, led the military to conclude that even if Khan and the military had an ideological affinity, Khan was undermining the army’s institutional interests (Mir and Kureshi 2022). This “fall-out” provided an opening for the PML-N and the PPP to coalesce into an alliance, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), that mounted a successful no-confidence bid against Khan in parliament, with the military’s support.   A new “same-page” hybrid arrangement was established, this time between the military and the coalition of parties brought together by the military and led by the PDM. These parties aligned with the military leadership’s agenda to (i) weaken Khan, (ii) restore ties with international partners, and (iii) secure much-needed international donor funding.   But whereas PTI had lost the military leadership’s support, thanks to a combination of economic hardship due to rampant inflation, the new coalition’s lackluster leadership, and Khan’s relentless campaigning, PTI rebounded in popularity even as it attacked the military for colluding in removing Khan from power. Following PTI protests targeting military installations and bases on May 9 of 2023, the repertoire of repression deployed against PTI resembled the one used against PML-N in 2018, but it was carried out in a more brazen and often more brutal fashion.   When the PDM government’s term ended in 2023, a new caretaker government came to power, comprising handpicked officials who owed their careers to their ties to the military and were willing to secure the military’s interests across all areas of government. During the tenure of the caretaker cabinet, a series of measures were taken to enhance the prosecution of anti-military dissent, secure the military’s own steering role in economic policymaking and other sectors of government, and brutally crackdown on PTI (Sheikh 2023).   Hybrid Politics Continues   PTI’s surprising electoral success and PML-N’s poor performance taught the military two contrasting lessons. First, there were limits to the military’s ability to manipulate public opinion and manage the political landscape. Even as the military remains the most trusted institution in the state, its attempts at political engineering backfired as supporters of Khan were mobilized at least in part by anger at the military’s meddling (Khan 2024b).   Second, in spite of this outcry against military interference, the military was still well-positioned to establish a “same-page” regime. With the PML-N having performed particularly badly, its only path to power lay through brazen military-led manipulation of polling results and the military’s brokerage of a coalition government with PML-N at the helm.   Thus, PML-N is now in power, but its hold on power is entirely dependent upon military manipulation and support, and therefore the party is willing to accede to all the strings that come attached. The PPP has reluctantly joined the coalition at the military’s insistence but refused to take cabinet positions. Instead, it has assumed offices in the presidency and parliament, important offices that allow PPP to avoid taking ownership for the more unpopular decisions the next government will have to make, particularly to secure donor funding. This reveals the vulnerabilities of the new government and its dependency on the military.   The PML-N has made Shahbaz, the party leader who enjoys the closest relationship with the military, Prime Minister. It has also integrated several of the military’s most favored members of the outgoing caretaker set up into the new cabinet and is willing to accept the military’s steering role in multiple spheres of governance. Consequently, Pakistan once again has a government that has come to power thanks to military support in the elections and against the opposition (PTI). It is committed to a common governing agenda with the military, and is willing to integrate the military and its affiliates into governing roles.   Thus, the military has been able to sustain the “same-page” hybrid arrangements it has been experimenting with since 2018, that afford the military an enhanced steering role in governing the state without facing significant political opposition. However, it has come at the cost of growing public anger at the military’s overt manipulation of the political systеm.   “Polycrisis” and Possibilities   A post-elections analysis, set against Pakistan’s ongoing polycrisis, suggests that several challenges lie ahead for the new government, with repercussions for the health of democratic politics in Pakistan.   On the political front, first, is the question of survival. Some speculate that the current coalition government may see an in-house change of leadership, before it even completes its term (Ellis-Petersen 2024). Second, the coalition’s survival also depends upon Khan’s ability to maneuver backchannel negotiations with the military. Should the establishment “fall out” with the Sharifs and PTI’s opposition politics sustain momentum both inside parliament and on the streets, the military may, in time, consider alternative arrangements with PTI. Even if the current coalition completes its term, and opposition from PTI is contained, the country is likely to see entrenched hybrid political arrangements. At its best, this might create a brief period of political stability. At its worst, this “stability” may require greater curbs on constitutional freedoms and human rights.   Pakistan has a thriving civil society, with steadily increasing digital and social media activism, which means that some of the greatest pushback to the military’s encroachment into democratic activity comes from online platforms such as X (former Twitter), YouTube and TikTok. In the days leading up to and following the elections, Pakistani authorities restricted access to these platforms for long durations, even shutting down mobile phones and internet services. As news of voter fraud and electoral rigging spread rampantly across social media in the days after the polls, these platforms became inaccessible (X still remains inaccessible), while police officers detained more critical journalists, and cracked down on opposition protests and PTI leaders across Balochistan, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and even Punjab.   Should such repression continue, Pakistan may suffer greater democratic backsliding; rather than the post-election “healing” that the incoming leaders had promised (Dawn 2024-02-11). Opposition forces and dissidents – both at the center, and at the peripheries – will be on the receiving end of state-perpetrated violence. In the long run, this can worsen socio-political polarization and pave the way for greater political instability.   Financial hardships and economic grievances are going to be another cause of instability ahead, with inflation soaring at 23 percent and creating a cost-of-living crisis. The country continues to remain dependent on loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which will come with harsh conditions and demands for undertaking difficult and wide-ranging structural reforms (Rana 2023). The negotiations for the next IMF loan are going to take place in the weeks to come and, till then, Pakistan may struggle to repay its debts. The current government will also look to its allies in the Middle East and China for fresh loans (Hussain 2024). Without the support from IMF and friendly states, the new leadership is unlikely to emerge out of this ongoing economic crisis, which can worsen public discontent.   Finally, the coalition’s legitimacy and credibility will be tested by insecurity, resistance, and armed conflict in Pakistan’s peripheries. In Balochistan, a social movement is surging against enforced disappearances. This movement is led primarily by women and families of victims of state violence which has led to widespread local and international condemnation of the state’s counterinsurgency practices (Baloch 2024). Simultaneously, the province grapples with insurgent violence perpetrated by Baloch separatists, as well as internationally connected militant organizations, including the Islamic State. Similarly, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, since 2018, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement has led protests against state and militant violence while the province continues to suffer brutal violence inflicted by armed actors, including the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. The regional connections of these militant groups to neighboring states, including Afghanistan and Iran, indicates a difficult period for Pakistan’s foreign relations ahead (Khan 2024a).   Pakistan’s pathway to democracy lies not just in the government’s ability to politically stabilize the center, but also in its ability to empower its peripheries, emancipate its marginalized populations, and steadily repossess the governing space ceded to the military. The ongoing protests and the current anti-establishment public sentiment provide all civilian actors, especially the mainstream political parties, a rare opportunity to rethink their “complacent reliance upon the military as kingmaker” (Khan 2024b). Whether they capitalize upon this moment in Pakistan’s political history and strive for lasting peace and stability, remains to be seen. ■     References   Almeida, Cyril. 2019. “The Regime.” Dawn. September 15. https://www.dawn.com/news/1505305 (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Baloch, Mahrang. 2024. “A new chapter in the Baloch struggle for justice in Pakistan.” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/2/8/a-new-chapter-in-the-baloch-struggle-for-justice-in-pakistan (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Bajpai, Rochana, and Yasser Kureshi. 2022. “Mechanisms of Democratic Authoritarianism: De-Centring the Executive in South Asia and Beyond.” Democratization 29, 8: 1375-1396.   Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. “On Democratic Backsliding.” Journal of Democracy 27, 1: 5–19.   Bhatti, Haseeb. 2024. “PTI bat-tered, loses iconic electoral symbol as SC restores ECP order.” Dawn. January 13. https://www.dawn.com/news/1805488 (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Dawn. 2024. “Army chief backs efforts towards ‘healing’ alliances.” February 11. https://www.dawn.com/news/1813201 (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Ellis-Petersen, H. 2024. “Election turmoil leaves Pakistan with a weak and unpopular coalition.” The Guardian. February 13. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/13/pakistan-election-imran-khan-military-nawaz-sharif-coalition-government (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Hussain, Khurram. 2024. “What awaits the new PM.” Dawn. February 29. https://www.dawn.com/news/1817918/what-awaits-the-new-pm (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Khan, Abdul Basit. 2024a. “Security challenges for the next Pakistani government.” Arab News. February 19. https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2462686 (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Khan, Sarah. 2024b. “In Pakistan, the Military is Still Running the Show.” Foreign Affairs. March 5. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/pakistan-military-still-running-show (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Kugelman, M. 2024. “Pakistan’s surreal elections.” Time. February 7. https://time.com/6692240/pakistan-election-tragedy-farce/ (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Lodhi, Maleeha. 2024. “Post-election challenges.” Dawn. February 12. https://www.dawn.com/news/1813477 (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Mir, Asfandyar, and Yasser Kureshi. 2022. “Imran Khan Dissolved Pakistan’s Parliament. How Did That Happen?” Washington Post. April 5.   Rana, Shahbaz. 2023. “Pakistan’s existential economic crisis.” United States Institute of Peace. April 6. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/pakistans-existential-economic-crisis (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Reuters. 2024a. “Imran Khan: What are the criminal cases against Pakistan former PM?” January 31. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/main-criminal-cases-against-pakistans-imran-khan-2024-01-31/ (Accessed March 15, 2024)   ______. 2024b. “Pakistan court ruling allows ex-PM Sharif to run for fourth time.” January 8. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-court-scraps-lifetime-election-bans-convicts-2024-01-08 (Accessed March 15, 2024)   Sheikh, Salman Rafi. 2023. “Pakistan Embraces Military Rule without Martial Law.” Himal Southasian. September 29. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/pakistan/pakistan-military-still-running-show?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20240312 (Accessed March 15, 2024)     ■ Zoha Waseem is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, University of Warwick.   ■ Yasser Kureshi is a Departmental Lecturer at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

With voting day now concluded, preliminary results and quick counts indicate a convergence in the outcomes of both the presidential and legislative elections. The Prabowo-Gibran ticket secured victory in the presidential race, prevailing over contenders Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD. Projections suggest that Prabowo-Gibran garnered a vote share of 56-59%, surpassing Anies-Muhaimin’s anticipated vote share of approximately 24-26% and Ganjar-Mahfud’s expected vote share of around 15-17% (Ira 2024). Meanwhile, quick count findings for the legislative elections suggest that eight political parties will secure seats in the national parliament: PDI-P (16.4%), Golkar Party (14.6%), Gerindra Party (13.5%), PKB (10.7%), Nasdem Party (9.9%), PKS (8.4%), Demokrat Party (7.6%), and PAN (7.1%). Notably, despite losing the presidential race, PDI-P emerged as the top vote-getter in the legislative elections, signaling an intriguing divergence in electoral outcomes (Farisa 2024).   While awaiting the official election results from the General Elections Commission (KPU), preliminary projections suggest that incumbent President Joko Widodo (Jokowi)’s successor will emerge victorious in the 2024 election. Prabowo-Gibran, positioned as Jokowi’s successor not only due to Gibran’s familial relationship as Jokowi’s son but also because of their campaign emphasis on Jokowi’s continuity, has secured a resounding victory. Additionally, the combined party support for Prabowo-Gibran exceeds 40% in national parliament electoral results, surpassing both the Anies-Muhaimin’s party coalition, including Nasdem Party, PKB, and PKS, at 29% and the Ganjar-Mahfud’s party support at 16.4%. These outcomes raise concerns regarding the potential perpetuation of democratic regression under the political stewardship of Jokowi’s successor, a trend that several research findings suggest began during the Jokowi administration (Power and Warburton 2020).   Indonesia’s Democratic Regression and the 2024 Election   In recent years, numerous scholars have asserted that democracy in Indonesia is undergoing regression (Aspinall and Warburton 2017; Power and Warburton 2020; Wijayanto, Budiatri and Wiratraman 2022). What is the state of this democratic regression amidst the 2024 elections, and what are the potential ramifications thereafter? This briefing elucidates that this democratic decline is perceived to be exacerbating due to the politicized misuse of legal mechanism, the amplification of dynastic politics, and the massive election violations and frauds. The trajectory of this regression hangs precariously after the election between getting further deterioration towards authoritarianism or serving as a pivotal moment for bolstering civil society and achieving political balance to enhance democracy. Currently, Indonesia is at a crucial juncture that will significantly influence the trajectory of its democratic future.   Up until the 2019 electoral cycle, Indonesian elections have consistently garnered acclaim from diverse scholars and observers (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019; Bland 2019). Despite being among the most intricate electoral processes globally, the previous Indonesian elections were deemed successful. Moreover, amidst widespread critiques of democratic practices in Indonesia, the execution of the elections, up until 2019, garnered commendation for its perceived adherence to principles of competitiveness, fairness, and freedom.   A distinct perspective has seemingly arisen concerning the 2024 elections. The conduct of this electoral event has been underscored by considerable criticism emanating from segments of civil society, encompassing academics and pro-democracy advocates. It is contended that this election has engendered adverse ramifications for democracy in Indonesia, thereby exacerbating its democratic regression. In the 2024 elections, a triad of phenomena emerges as significant threats to democratic integrity: the politicization of legal mechanism, the strengthening of dynastic politics, and the massive election violations and frauds.   The Constitutional Court’s revision of the age threshold for presidential and vice-presidential candidates, previously set at 40 years old in alignment with prior regulations, has catalyzed notable political turbulence, exacerbating democratic regression amidst the 2024 election cycle. This ruling facilitated Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the eldest son of Jokowi, who previously did not meet the eligibility criteria, to emerge as a vice-presidential candidate alongside Prabowo Subianto. Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling after the judicial review, Gibran is eligible for nomination due to his two-year tenure as the mayor of Solo, notwithstanding his age being below 40 years.   This Constitutional Court’s ruling has elicited concerns due to perceived deficiencies in the decision-making process, particularly stemming from its adjudication by the Chief Justice at that time, Anwar Usman, who maintains a familial relationship with Jokowi. The decision-making process was hasty and inconsistent. Initially, this matter fell within the purview of parliament and the government rather than the Constitutional Court. Later, an accord was reached to amend this regulation despite Usman, who harbors a conflict of interest, participating in the decision hearing. These factors primarily contribute to the pervasive entanglement of political interests in this matter (Ulya, Mantalean and Yahya 2023; Ulya and Prabowo 2023). This confluence of legal and political interests is precedented, as evidenced by previous instances such as the enactment of the Job Creation Law and the revision of the Corruption Eradication Committee Law. However, this particular case has garnered considerable attention due to the stature of the Constitutional Court as Indonesia’s highest legal institution, thus accentuating its significance in exacerbating democratic regression.   Furthermore, Gibran’s candidacy, as facilitated by the Constitutional Court’s decision, signifies the entry of President Jokowi’s progeny into the arena of the 2024 presidential election. Despite Gibran’s nascent political career, his emergence sidelined other potential candidates, including Airlangga Hartarto, Chairman of the Golkar Party, and Erick Tohir, Minister of State-Owned Enterprises, who were long speculated to be potential running mates for Prabowo. Additionally, Gibran’s younger brother, Kaesang Pangarep, initiated his political journey by assuming the role of general chairman of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) amidst the 2024 elections. Both individuals, despite their limited political experience, ascended to prominent political positions, undoubtedly influenced by their lineage as sons of President Jokowi. This perpetuates the prevalent trend of dynastic politics, which has increasingly plagued Indonesian politics in recent years, as exemplified by figures such as former presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004). Such dynastic practices exacerbate democratic regression by undermining the recruitment function of political parties and disregarding the meritocratic principles governing political careers.   While elections five years ago were generally commended for their perceived fairness and integrity, the current electoral process, as discovered by investigations conducted by various civil society groups, has been beset by numerous instances of violations and fraud. The voting conducted on February 14 came under criticism due to a multitude of issues, some of which may have also arisen in previous elections, such as vote buying, voter mobilization, problematical vote counting process, among others. However, what distinguishes the 2024 election as particularly problematic compared to previous elections is the compromised impartiality of state instruments. Impartiality emerges as a concern because numerous state officials with conflicts of interest to win elections, due to their positions as electoral candidates, party elites, or relatives of electoral candidates, did not resign. Moreover, the Jokowi government made a new regulation released in 2023 stating that ministers do not need to resign even if they are candidates for the presidential election. Consequently, they possess the potential to exploit state resources for personal political gain during the election. According to investigations conducted by a coalition of civil society comprising 35 organizations and 5 individuals, spanning from November 13, 2023, to January 31, 2024, a total of 121 instances of electoral fraud, mostly related to state’s impartiality, have been documented. The coalition mentions that President Jokowi, in his capacity as head of state, has leveraged his authority to favor his son’s candidacy, thus contravening the principle of conducting democratic elections in an equitable manner (Kontras 2024).   The 2024 election is a pivotal moment in the further regression of democracy in Indonesia. The three issues outlined, without discounting the possibility of additional issues, underscores that elections serve not only as a platform for political leadership succession but also as a potential gateway for the establishment of an authoritarian political regime. These three facets also evoke parallels with the historical implementation of the New Order under Suharto’s authoritarian regime in Indonesia. This historical perspective encompasses the establishment of dynastic politics within the Suharto family, the erosion of legal foundations, and the instrumentalization of state apparatuses to further the political interests of the ruling family and their associates. Since the onset of its regression, Indonesian democracy is currently finding its nadir.   Some Positive Signs for Future Democracy in Indonesia   The political dynamics of the 2024 election also offer promising prospects for the future of democracy. The burgeoning unity among civil society entities, united in their commitment to oversee the electoral process and strengthen democratic institutions in Indonesia, can serve as a pivotal asset in fostering a more robust civil society oversight mechanism for democracy in the years ahead. Moreover, the presence of political parties within the Anies-Muhaimin coalition, advocating for reforms to the Jokowi administration, and PDI-P, which was abandoned by the Jokowi family in the 2024 after previously staunched political allies of Jokowi and his son, could provide a foundation for the establishment of an opposition coalition in parliament aimed at upholding the principles of checks and balances. If civil society maintains and develops its cohesion and an effective political opposition is formed, there remains hope for the advancement of democracy in the future.   The 2024 election, particularly following the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the age requirements for presidential candidates, has catalyzed a pattern of civil society relations to be more cohesive. Pro-democracy entities, which traditionally focused on disparate issues, have coalesced into civil society alliances and coalitions. For instance, the coalition of civil society organizations that filed a lawsuit against Jokowi for electoral fraud and impartiality comprised 35 organizations and 5 individual activists. These entities are not those who only addressed election-related concerns but also issues pertaining to the environment, anti-corruption measures, labor rights, and other pertinent matters (Kontras 2024). Similarly, the documentary “Dirty Vote,” which garnered widespread attention for its discourse on election malpractice, was a collaborative effort involving 23 civil society organizations working across a spectrum of domains, including elections, environmental conservation, anti-corruption endeavors, and journalism (Dirty Vote 2024).   Not only civil society organizations, but the academic movement is also experiencing cohesion. From the end of January until the election day, it has been documented that thousands of academics from over 70 universities have issued public statements critiquing the conduct of the elections and the state of Indonesian democracy (Wijayanto 2024). These academic initiatives align with and synergize with the efforts of activists and civil society organizations. The solidarity and widespread mobilization of civil society are crucial not only for amplifying their influence on public discourse but also for fostering an understanding that the challenges facing democracy are national in scope and necessitate collective action. Hopefully, this pattern of civil society cohesion will persist beyond the election period, resonating more broadly and permeating grassroots levels of society.   In addition to the influence of civil society, the role of political actors in upholding democracy must also be emphasized. Therefore, the presence of a viable political opposition is imperative. Assessing the potential strength of the opposition based on quick count results, it is feasible to form an opposition coalition comprising at least 45% of the parliamentary seats if PDI-P aligns with Nasdem, PKS, and PKB. Should these parties unite in opposition, their collective strength would serve as a potent asset in ensuring effective checks and balances. If realized, this opposition bloc could emerge as the most formidable in the past two decades. Additionally, it is noteworthy that PDI-P, one of potential opposition parties, is the party securing the highest number of seats in the parliament.   The formation of a robust opposition, however, may face challenges due to ongoing political negotiations between Jokowi, the Prabowo-Gibran camp, and these parties. Surya Paloh, the General Chair of Nasdem, reportedly met with Jokowi following election day that possibly explore potential coalition opportunities, while PKB has a track record of consistently supporting the government (Abdurrahman 2024). The configuration of coalitions and oppositions is subject to the political dynamics and lobbies. Therefore, the present juncture is pivotal, and it is hoped that political parties will uphold their commitment to democracy and recognize the significance of having a viable opposition in parliament to mitigate the escalating regression of Indonesian democracy.   Conclusion   The conduct of the 2024 elections has become a critical momentum in shaping the trajectory of Indonesian democracy. Several concerning phenomena during the election, including the misuse of legal frameworks, the strengthening of dynastic politics, and electoral malpractices, pose significant threats to Indonesian democracy. Moreover, the prediction of election outcomes, which saw the victory of Jokowi’s successor, has heightened concerns regarding the potential for further democratic regression. Nevertheless, amidst these challenges, hope remains for the future of Indonesian democracy. The concerted efforts of a unified and solid civil society in the lead-up to the 2024 elections provide a strong foundation for safeguarding democracy in the years ahead. Additionally, the prospect of a formidable political opposition in parliament offers further promise. Looking ahead, it is hoped that both civil society and political actors will demonstrate a steadfast commitment to democracy, ensuring the effective functioning of checks and balances and fostering a deeper understanding of democratic principles at all levels of society. ■     References   Abdurrahman, Sultan. 2024. “Soal Surya Paloh Bertemu Jokowi, Nasdem: Murni Mengharga Undangan Seorang Kepala Negara.” Tempo. February 23. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1836771/soal-surya-paloh-bertemu-jokowi-nasdem-murni-menghargai-undangan-seorang-kepala-negara (Accessed February 23, 2024)   Aspinall, Edward, and Eve Warburton. 2017. “Indonesia: The Dangers of Democratic Regression.” Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR), Volume 129. https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/25891321.pdf (Accessed February 18, 2024)   Aspinall, Edward and Marcus Mietzner. 2019. “Indonesia’s Democratic Paradox.” New Mandala. December 7. https://www.newmandala.org/indonesias-democratic-paradox/ (Accessed February 18, 2024)   Bland, Ben. 2019. “The World’s Most Complicated Single-Day Election is a Feat of Democracy.” The Atlantic. April 15. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/indonesias-elections-are-feat-democracy/587143/ (Accessed February 18, 2024)   Dirty Vote. 2024.“DIRTY VOTE – Full Movie (OFFICIAL).” YouTube. February 11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRgLZ66NCmE (Accessed February 22, 2024)   Farisa, Fitria Chusna. 2023. “Quick Count Litbang Kompas Data 99 Persen: 8 Masuk ke DPR.” Kompas. February 17. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/02/17/09002941/quick-count-litbang-kompas-data-99-persen-8-parpol-masuk-ke-dpr (Accessed February 21, 2024)   Ira, Laili. 2024. “10 Lembaga Survei yang Rilis Prabowo-Gibran Menang Quick Count Pilpres 2024.” Tempo. February 15. https://pemilu.tempo.co/read/1833863/10-lembaga-survei-yang-rilis-prabowo-gibran-menang-quick-count-pilpres-2024 (Accessed February 21, 2024)   Power, Thomas and Eve Warburton (eds.). 2020. Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression? Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.   Ulya, Fika Nurul, Vitorio Mantalean, and Achmad Nasrudin Yahya. 2023. “Saldi Isra Sebut MK Masuk Jebakan Politik Usai Putuskan Usia Capres-Cawapres.” Kompas. October 16. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/10/16/19445651/hakim-saldi-isra-sebut-mk-masuk-jebakan-politik-usai-putuskan-usia-capres (Accessed February 18, 2024)   Ulya, Fika and Dani Prabowo. 2023. “Hakim Konstitusi Arief Hidayat Beberkan Kejanggalan MK Kabulkan Gugatan Usia Capres-Cawapres.” Kompas. October 16. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/10/16/19130891/hakim-konstitusi-arief-hidayat-beberkan-kejanggalan-mk-kabulkan-gugatan-usia?page=all (Accessed February 18, 2024)   Wijayanto, Aisah P. Budiatri, and Herlambang P. Wiratraman (eds.). 2022. Refleksi 100 Ilmuwan Sosial Politik tentang Kemunduran Demokrasi di Indonesia. Jakarta: LP3ES.   Wijayanto. 2024. “Strengthening Democratic Culture.” Kompas. February 22. https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2024/02/21/en-memperkuat-budaya-demokrasi?open_from=English_Page (Accessed February 23, 2024)   Kontras. 2024. “Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil Somasi Presiden Jokowi, Desak Hentikan Keculasan dan Tindakan Nir-Etika Jelang Pencoblosan.” Kontras. February 9. https://kontras.org/2024/02/09/koalisi-masyarakat-sipil-somasi-presiden-jokowi-desak-hentikan-keculasan-dan-tindakan-nir-etika-jelang-pencoblosan/ (Accessed February 20, 2024)       ■ Aisah Putri Budiatri is Researcher in the Research Center for Political Studies, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN).     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Introduction   Digital influence operations have the capacity to shape and undermine public perceptions and opinions in targeted countries. The United States National Intelligence Council found that China, Russia, and Iran prioritize digital influence operations over cyber attacks, underscoring their perceived efficacy (National Intelligence Council 2023). Digital influence operations are variously referred to as cognitive warfare and information warfare. For the purposes of this briefing, the term “digital influence operations” will be used.   This briefing describes the current status of countermeasures employed by major actors in Japan. In Japan, entities such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the National Police Agency, and the National Center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), have been developing their budgets and organizations. However, efforts by the private sector, including fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and academics, still face limitations in terms of human resources and scale and are far from sufficient. In recent years, there have been signs of expansion due to increased support from the Japanese government.   Three challenges impede Japan’s efforts to counter digital influence operations. First, there is a severe shortage of knowledge and human resources. Second, the measures are primarily focused on countering disinformation, improving literacy, and enhancing strategic communication. Lastly, the attacks leveraging domestic polarization in the target country have not been addressed. This issue is not unique to Japan but also prevalent in Europe and the United States.   Key Actors in Japan’s Digital Influence Operations Countermeasures   The European External Action Service’s recently published “2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats” listed Governments and other 17 actors (EEAS 2024). In this briefing, the actors are broadly categorized into governments and government agencies, private companies, Fact-Checking Organizations, Think Tanks, and Universities.   The Japanese government and its agencies play a central role in these activities, while other actors are generally less active.   1. Government and Government Agencies   In Japan, the MOD, the Self-Defense Forces, and other security-related organizations are tasked with addressing foreign threats in digital influence operations, while the MIC handles domestic issues, the MOFA manages strategic communications in diplomacy, and the NISC of Cabinet Secretariat leads and coordinates the entire operation. This delineation of responsibilities is explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy released in 2022, and organization development is underway (Cabinet Secretariat 2022).   Criminal matters are handled by the National Police Agency, while intelligence-related tasks are managed by the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Public Safety, and Foreign Affairs. These division of labor among public institutions are described below.   National Security Organizations: The National Security Strategy clearly states that the Ministry of Defense is to deal with digital influence operations. Inside the Ministry, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) is primarily responsible for this task (DIH n.d.). The DIH is Japan’s largest intelligence organization with more than 2,600 employees (MOD n.d.). According to publicly available documents, the DIH focuses on measures against propaganda and disinformation, including strategic communications. It plans to develop an Artificial Intelligence (AI) admіnsystеm to determine the authenticity of amplified information (MOD n.d.).   Regarding the Self-Defense Forces, notable developments are scarce, except for the JGSDF Training-Evaluation Education Research and Development Command (TERCOM), which has a specialized team for developing new cyber combat systеms (TERCOM 2023). Unlike the U.S. CyberCom, preventive measures such as attacking the source do not seem to be contemplated. Primary measures for dealing with propaganda and disinformation mainly occur after the dissemination of information.   The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC): The MIC has been working on this area since 2018 and has conducted a study group with academic experts and platform companies (MIC 2018). Currently, the Advanced Information Systеms and Software Division spearheads implementation efforts, focusing primarily on countering disinformation. National security is not within its purview due to division of duties.   As for countering disinformation, the focus is on fact-checking and improving literacy, with a plan already in place.   The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA): MOFA addressed this issue within the context of strategic communication, aiming to address misinformation about Japan and promote an accurate and positive image of Japan globally. It could be described as the reputation management agency of the Japanese government, with some tasks outsourced to an Israeli reputation management company (Intelligence Online 2023).   The Cabinet Secretariat: The Cabinet Secretariat has several departments working on this issue, including the Cabinet National Security Secretariat, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, and the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). The NISC will become the department overseeing the entire Japanese government’s response to cyberspace and will play a similar role in Digital Influence Operations (Cabinet Secretariat 2022). In Japan, cyber attacks and digital influence operations have often been considered separately. In reality, they are sometimes linked, and the organizations responsible for the attacks are often the same. This organizational change will improve the systеm by centralizing them under NISC.   Others: The National Police Agency handles criminal cases, while the Public Safety and Foreign Affairs departments handle intelligence cases.   As evident, the majority of the Japanese government’s countermeasures focus on detecting and addressing disinformation. However, digital influence operations encompass a broader spectrum of activities beyond disinformation, including emotional manipulation, support for narratives from other countries, and perception hacking (Myre 2020; Meta 2023). The Japanese government’s response is specialized and narrower compared to other governments like the U.S., which adopt more comprehensive responses from multiple stakeholders. This policy might stem from a lack of knowledge and human resources. For this reason, the government agencies have been engaging private companies that may have knowledge in this area since 2023. Nevertheless, the private sector also faces shortages in expertise and resources. Should the government opt to outsource disinformation countermeasure tasks to private entities, it must develop supervisory and evaluation mechanisms.   2. The Private Sector   Private companies: In Europe and the United State, many cybersecurity, IT, and military companies have departments for digital influence operations and regularly publish reports on their activities. In Japan, few cybersecurity and IT companies engage in such activities, except for foreign-affiliated companies importing reports from their home countries.   Reputation management companies are the primary entities involved in digital influence operations in Japan, although their actual activities remain largely undisclosed. The government agencies commissioning them do not publicly disclose their contents. Based on the general scope of work of reputation management firms, it is presumed that the private sector targets countering disinformation and supporting strategic communications. Strategic communication entails releasing information or signals to strengthen alliances and reveal the values sought, thereby guiding international relations.   As the Japanese government strengthens its budget and systеms, inquiries and orders from private firms are expected to increase, leading to business expansion in this area.   Fact-Checking Organizations and Think Tanks: Japan hosts two major fact-checking organizations, namely FactCheck Initiative Japan (https://fij.info) and Japan Fact Check Center (https://www.factcheckcenter.jp/). The number of fact-checking organizations and their activities are small compared to those in the countries concerned, and their sphere of influence is still limited. Fact-checking faces scalability challenges due to the vast amount of disinformation that can be easily produced, and the limited dissemination of fact-checking results compared to disinformation. Similar challenges likely confront fact-checking organizations worldwide.   While several think tanks conduct research on digital influence operations, such as the Japan Institute of International Affairs (https://www.jiia.or.jp) and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (https://www.spf.org), their number and scope in this area are quite limited. Most reports are based primarily on the compilation of existing materials and surveys.   Universities: Researchers across various fields, including political science, computational sociology, and media theory, mainly from universities, investigate digital influence operations from their unique perspectives. Some of these researchers receive support from the Japanese government.   Ambitious research projects such as “Recommendations for the Revision of the National Security Strategy” and “Toward a Healthy Platform for Discussion” have brought together researchers and practitioners from diverse fields (ROLES 2022; Toriumi and Yamamoto 2023). The former was published before the revision of the National Security Strategy, covering all national security domains. It was groundbreaking in its reference to digital influence operations measures. Unfortunately, the latter lacks transparency regarding funding sources, raising concerns about potential manipulation of public opinion.   Overall, Japan’s research community in this area is not as extensive as in Europe and the United States. Increased financial support from the Japanese government may revitalize the related research field in the near future.   Problems with Japan’s Digital Influence Operations Measures   Japan’s digital influence operations measures have been sluggish so far. Apart from the MIC, which has actively conducted research and studies, only a few citizen groups, researchers, and private companies, including fact-checking organizations, have been involved. In 2023, the Japanese government decided to address this issue seriously, leading to strengthened budgets and organization, which are beginning to yield positive impacts to private companies and research institutions. Although there is currently a lack of immediate knowledge and human resources, it can be said that Japan has reached a starting point.   Three main problems hinder Japan’s digital influence operations measures. Firstly, a shortage of knowledge and human resources persists as the most significant obstacle. Secondly, the current focus is primarily on countering disinformation, enhancing literacy, and improving strategic communication. The recently released Carnegie report lists 10 measures for addressing digital influence operations, emphasizing the need for multifaceted measures based on portfolios (Bateman and Jackson 2024).   Finally, similar to digital influence operations measures in Europe and the United States, domestic issues are largely neglected. Foreign digital influence operations often exacerbate domestic polarization in the target country, necessitating interrelated domestic and foreign countermeasures. For example, QAnon, one of the most known conspiracy groups, occasionally coordinated with Russia and China (Kayali and Scott 2022; Soufan Center 2021; Butler and Martin 2022; Graziosi 2022).   Focusing solely on foreign interference fails to address the reality of the threat in two ways. First, the number of countries conducting domestic digital influence operations is greater than the number of countries conducting foreign interference (Martin et al. 2020; Meta 2022; Bradshaw et al. 2020). Domestic digital influence operations pose a more serious threat to democracy. Second, foreign interference often exploits domestic polarization in the target country. In other words, they exploit pre-existing domestic problems in the target country. In terms of protecting democracy, the effectiveness of digital influence operations measures will be limited if they fail to consider the linkage between domestic conditions and external interventions. According to the United States National Intelligence Council, China, Russia, and Iran are primarily exploiting domestic polarization in the United States (National Intelligence Council 2022). Both domestic and foreign interference countermeasures against digital influence operations are essential.   State involvement in digital influence operations is depicted below (Nyst and Monaco 2018; Ichida 2018; Woolley 2023). Currently, Europe, the United States, and Japan address only two of the four patterns. The unaddressed third and fourth patterns, which involve government incitement and support, are particularly challenging to tackle, especially when exploiting domestic polarization.   Pattern 1. Government Execution: The government or its affiliated organizations directly execute the operation.   Pattern 2. Government Support and Coordination: The government devises the plan but delegates implementation to external parties.   Pattern 3. Government Incitement and Support: The government instigates online users to attack individuals and organizations critical of the government to manipulate public opinion, posing the most significant danger.   Pattern 4. Government Approval and Support: The government fosters an atmosphere conducive to attacks through name-calling and criticism.   However, unlike other situations, the Japanese government has a potential advantage in addressing the last problem. Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) established a team called T2 for online public relations activities after losing power to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009 (Koguchi 2016). Supported by IT and PR companies, T2’s activities resembled contemporary reputation management efforts. This suggests that the Japanese government has a background in conducting domestic digital influence operations. By publicizing its activities, engaging in public debate, and establishing transparency, the government can build a democratic defense posture. ■     References   Bateman, Jon, and Dean Jackson. 2024. “Countering Disinformation Effectively: An Evidence-Based Policy Guide.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. January 31. https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/01/31/countering-disinformation-effectively-evidence-based-policy-guide-pub-91476 (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Bradshaw, Samantha, Hannah Bailey, and Philip N. Howard. 2021. “Industrialized Disinformation: 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation.” Oxford University Programme on Democracy & Technology. https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/industrialized-disinformation/ (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Butler, Josh, and Sarah Martin. 2022. “Australian online anti-vaccine groups switch to Putin praise and Ukraine conspiracies.” The Guardian. March 1. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/mar/02/australias-anti-vaccine-groups-switch-focus-to-putin-praise-and-ukraine-conspiracies (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Cabinet Secretariat. 2022. “National Security Strategy of Japan (Provisional Translation)” December 2022. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Defense Intelligence Headquarters: DIH. n.d. “情報本部の任務・活動.” https://www.mod.go.jp/dih/company.html (Accessed February 8, 2024)   European External Action Service: EEAS. 2024. “2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats.” January 23. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2nd-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Graziosi, Graig. 2022. “Anti-vax conspiracy theorists in US turning to antisemitic pro-Putin propaganda, report says.” The Independent. March 2. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/putin-propaganda-usa-conspiracy-theorist-b2027230.html (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Ichida, Kazuki. 2018. 『フェイクニュース　新しい戦略的戦争兵器』. Tokyo: Kadokawa Shinsho.   Intelligence Online. 2023. “Japan turns to Israel’s 9500 Group to counter Chinese Fukushima disinformation.” September 12. https://www.intelligenceonline.com/corporate-intelligence/2023/09/12/japan-turns-to-israel-s-9500-group-to-counter-chinese-fukushima-disinformation,110042325-art (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Kayali, Laura, and Mark Scott. 2022. “Anti-vax conspiracy groups lean into pro-Kremlin propaganda in Ukraine.” POLITICO. March 17. https://www.politico.eu/article/antivax-conspiracy-lean-pro-kremlin-propaganda-ukraine/ (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Koguchi, Hidehiko. 2016. 『情報参謀』. Tokyo: Kodansha.   Martin, Diego A. Jacob N. Shapiro, and Julia G. Ilhardt. 2020. “Online Political Influence Efforts Dataset.” Princeton University Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. Last Updated May 11, 2023. https://esoc.princeton.edu/publications/trends-online-influence-efforts (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Meta. 2022. “Recapping Our 2022 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Enforcements, Meta.” December 15. https://about.fb.com/news/2022/12/metas-2022-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-enforcements/ (Accessed February 8, 2024)   ______. 2023. “THIRD QUARTER Adversarial Threat Report.” November 3. https://transparency.fb.com/ja-jp/metasecurity/threat-reporting/ (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications: MIC. 2018. “プラットフォームサービスに関する研究会 (Study Group on Platform Services)”. https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/kenkyu/platform_service/index.html (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Ministry of Defense: MOD. n.d. “Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the Cognitive Dimension.” https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/infowarfare/index.html (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Myre, Greg. 2020. “A ‘Perception Hack’: When Public Reaction Exceeds The Actual Hack.” NPR. November 1. https://www.npr.org/2020/11/01/929101685/a-perception-hack-when-public-reaction-exceeds-the-actual-hack (Accessed February 8, 2024)   National Intelligence Council. 2022. “Foreign Threats to the 2022 US Elections” December 23. https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Declassified-ICA-Foreign-Threats-to-the-2022-US-Elections-Dec2023.pdf (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Nyst, Carly, and Nicholas Monaco. 2018. “State-Sponsored Trolling.” July 19. Institute for the Future. https://legacy.iftf.org/statesponsoredtrolling/ (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies: ROLES. 2022. “国家安全保障戦略改訂に向けた提言(Recommendations for the Revision of the National Security Strategy).” October 31. https://roles.rcast.u-tokyo.ac.jp/publication/20221031 (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Soufan Center. 2021. “Quantifying The Q Conspiracy: A Data-Driven Approach to Understanding the Threat Posed by QAnon.” April 21. https://thesoufancenter.org/research/quantifying-the-q-conspiracy-a-data-driven-approach-to-understanding-the-threat-posed-by-qanon/ (Accessed February 8, 2024)   TERCOM (陸上自衛隊の新たな戦い方検討チーム). 2023. “陸上自衛隊の新たな戦い方コンセプトについて” October 3. https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/tercom/img/file2320.pdf (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Thomas, Elise. 2022. “QAnon goes to China – via Russia”, Institute for Strategic Dialogue. March 23. https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/qanon-goes-to-china-via-russia/ (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Toriumi, Fujio, and Tatsuhiko Yamamoto. 2023. “KGRI Working Papers No.1 健全な⾔論プラットフォームに向けて ver2.0 (Toward a Healthy Platform for Discussion).” May 2023. https://www.kgri.keio.ac.jp/docs/S0120230529.pdf (Accessed February 8, 2024)   Woolley, Samuel. 2023. Manufacturing Consensus: Understanding Propaganda in the Era of Automation and Anonymity. New Haven: Yale University Press.       ■ Kazuki Ichida is a Visiting Researcher at Cyber Security Research Institute, Meiji University.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

I. The Sunnylands Initiative   The Sunnylands Initiative was established in January 2020 to advance a vision for cooperation on strengthening democratic governance in the Indo-Pacific region. Recognizing the absence of a regional infrastructure to defend freedom, human rights, democratic resilience, and the rule of law, leaders from the region have gathered in Anaheim, CA, Odawara, Japan, and Sydney, Australia, with the firm belief that sustained support of democratic norms and values is crucial to a robust and stable rules-based international order.   The inaugural convening in Sunnylands, California in January 2020, engaged in a closed strategic dialogue on supporting and strengthening democratic norms with a particular focus on regional democracy and female empowerment. The participants endorsed the "Sunnylands Principles on Enhancing Democratic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific Region." The subsequent Sunnylands Initiative in Odawara, Japan in August 2022, created a platform for participants to discuss and develop concrete strategies for defending and advancing democratic governance and human rights in the Indo-Pacific region. The participants signed the "Odawara Statement" to highlight the urgent need for democratic solidarity across the region. During the third convening in Sydney, Australia in April 2023, thought leaders and experts reaffirmed their steadfast commitment to the Sunnylands Principles and endorsed the "Sydney Statement" that outlined concrete action plans aimed at establishing an Indo-Pacific governance structure rooted in universal democratic values.     II. Sunnylands Special Convening in Seoul   The East Asia Institute, in collaboration with the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), hosted a Special Convening of the Sunnylands Initiative in Seoul. Thought leaders from across the Indo-Pacific region convened with a renewed commitment to support the vision outlined in the Sunnylands Principles. The 36 preeminent opinion leaders and key stakeholders from Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Samoa, Thailand, and the United States gathered on February 1-2 with a clear goal of providing policy recommendations to the South Korean government in the run-up to the third Summit for Democracy.     During the two-day convening, the group discussed:   - The state of democracy in the Indo-Pacific - Recommendations for South Korea’s democratic leadership - Progress of the ongoing and new working groups on partnering for democracy, democracy advocates at risk, anti-corruption, as well as technology and democracy - Pathways for strengthening foreign aid for democracy support - Opportunities to advance democracy through ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral commitment - Ways to strengthen democratic partnership with South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands   The Sunnylands Initiative Seoul Joint Statement outlines three key suggestions made by the participants to South Korea: (1) creation of a Korean democracy-support institution, (2) diversification of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for democracy assistance, and (3) establishment of a regional democracy coalition.   To read the Seoul Joint Statement, click HERE.     ■ Copyedited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate     For Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]