EAI launched the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) in November 2013 to conduct research related to democratic governance and human rights promotion in Asia. EAI serves as a representative of domestic think tanks and leads the organization of regional think tanks in Asia. It is responsible for supporting and managing research related to democracy at associated research institutes. ADRN was established to analyze threats to democracy in Asia and to promote discussions and practical research projects that could contribute to the consolidation of democracy in the region. Aimed at presenting policies based on research, ADRN examines threats and challenges to democracy by identifying and studying practical agendas for developing regional democracy in Asia. The network includes 22 major think tanks from 14 Asian countries including Taiwan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines, as well as South Korea’s EAI. 

Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Sustained Confidence in Democracy Despite War in the Middle East

The Israel-Hamas war that broke out on October 7, 2023, marks a watershed moment in the Middle East. Prior to the war, although the region experienced persistent conflicts, they were largely isolated and not interconnected. For instance, during the Syrian civil war, while Western countries and Saudi Arabia supported the Syrian opposition, and Russia, Turkey, and Iran backed the Assad regime, the conflict was not directly connected to the Israel-Palestine conflict or significantly tied to the U.S.-Iran tensions over the nuclear issue. Similarly, the civil war in Yemen, despite being a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, did not escalate into a full-scale interstate war between the two countries. In other words, although various conflicts in the Middle East may be linked, these conflicts have largely been contained and shown little sign of escalating into a full-scale regional war.   However, four characteristics of the Israel-Hamas war have fundamentally changed these dynamics. Firstly, Israel was the victim of Hamas’s terrorist attacks, resulting in casualties among citizens from more than 40 countries worldwide. This granted Israel unequivocal legitimacy for self-defense. Secondly, after launching the attacks, Hamas adopted a strategy of prolonged guerrilla warfare, operating covertly throughout Gaza. This strategy aimed to provoke retaliatory strikes from Israel to garner international sympathy and support. Thirdly, the international community has predominantly regarded the Israel-Hamas war as an extension of the protracted Israel-Palestine conflict. This perspective posits that the assault and indiscriminate killing perpetrated by Hamas cannot be solely defined as acts of terrorism. Instead, it should be seen as a reaction to the unbearable human rights violations that Palestinians have suffered due to Israel’s continuous expansion of settlements. This perspective has significantly exonerated Hamas from the moral accountability typically associated with acts of terrorism. Fourthly, as the Israel’s retaliatory attacks in the Gaza Strip are causing a series of killings of innocent civilians including children, the international community has mobilized in support of human rights and humanitarian intervention, with the aim of accusing the Israeli government. United Nation has issued several statements calling for a ceasefire, while South Africa has initiated proceedings at the International Criminal Court, charging Israeli leaders with genocide. The Israel-Palestine conflict has resulted in a schism between the governments and people of the world.   The conflict between Israel and Hamas intensified rapidly following Israel’s official declaration of war against Hamas. It spread from northern Gaza to the entire Strip, resulting in a significant number of Palestinian casualties and triggering a severe humanitarian crisis. Later, the conflict spilled over into southern Lebanon, where Israel and Hezbollah engaged in combat. During this period, Israel conducted targeted assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders, including operations in Iran and Lebanon. In response, Iran and Hezbollah launched retaliatory missile strikes against Israel. Meanwhile, the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen launched missile strikes against Israel, leading to further retaliatory attacks by Israel. The widening scope of these conflicts underscores the far-reaching impacts of the Israel-Hamas war. Beyond the Israel-Palestine issue, it has escalated into a regional security crisis. This has given rise to concerns about the potential for a third world war and prompted profound questions about democracy in the Middle East.   Excessive Moral Mobilization and Its Paradox   In hindsight, neither Israel nor Hamas truly cared about the human rights of Gaza residents or innocent Israeli citizens. Both parties seek to establish themselves as morally justified while portraying the other party as malevolent and blaming it for the conflict. Nonetheless, neither party’s actions can be justified even by the most minimal moral standards. Hamas intentionally created the crisis, initiating terrorist attacks followed by provocative celebrations. From the outset, the Netanyahu government decided to exploit the opportunity to escalate the war, aiming to eradicate all existential threats to Israel, including Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis. Nonetheless, the ongoing Israel-Hamas War is distinguished by excessive moral mobilization and a conscious effort to secure moral legitimacy on the global stage.   Despite widespread global disagreements regarding the moral standing of the parties involved in the Israel-Hamas conflict, there is a general consensus that both sides have resorted to unjust means to win this argument over justice. Therefore, a salient paradox emerges; those in the Middle East understand that the ongoing conflict is not about choosing between good and evil, nor is it about who is right or wrong. Rather, it is about emotional blackmail that forces people to pick a side, despite neither option being justifiable. Given their experience of numerous conflicts and witnessing the ebb and flow of the Middle East peace process since the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, people in the Middle East are capable of distinguishing between their aspirations for democracy and the events of the ongoing conflict. This indicates that neither Hamas nor Israel could effectively manipulate people’s sympathies to dampen their longing for a more peaceful and democratic Middle East in the future.   Table 1. Democratic Support and Perceived Security Threat Before and After the Israel-Hamas War   Country Democratic Support Security Threat Before After Before After Jordan 72% 73% 85% 84% Lebanon 57% 48%* 72% 88%* Mauritania 54% 57% 87% 77%* Morocco 57% 63%* 60% 68%* Tunisia 66% 67% 82% 88%*   Note: Mean percentages are reported for the numbers before the conflict. Level of significance: *p ≤ 0.05. Source: Arab Barometer   The latest survey by Arab Barometer, the most authoritative public opinion research project in the Middle East, reveals this reality. This study examines survey waves conducted after the Arab Spring, analyzing the level of public support for democracy across five Arab countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Table 1 presents the responses to two survey questions. The first inquiry pertains to the concept of democratic support. In this section, we report the percentage of respondents who selected the statement “Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government” over the other less supportive statements. The second measures the perception of security threats. In this section, we report the percentage of respondents who perceive the “Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories” as a critical threat to national security interests. The findings indicate that a majority of countries, with the exceptions of Jordan and Mauritania, perceived a greater security threat after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war. Conversely, Lebanon showed a notable decline in democratic support, with a 9 percent reduction. This suggests that despite heightened tensions due to the conflict and potential emotional sympathies with Palestinians stemming from shared ethnic ties, the moral appeals from both sides have not affected people’s pursuit of democracy. This enduring aspiration for freedom and democracy continues to drive the democratization movement in the region, a momentum that originated with the Arab Spring and undiminished by the ongoing conflict.   Polarized Effects Brought by American Influence   Although the United States does not officially support Israel’s escalation of the conflict, its unwavering and unconditional support for Israel’s actions—framed as self-defense against threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran—has significantly undermined American credibility in the Middle East. The implicit endorsement of Israel’s military operations against Hamas have intensified skepticism regarding the U.S. intentions in the region. As illustrated in Table 2, regarding the question of U.S. perception, with the exception of Morocco, all other countries show a significant decrease in favorability ratings, leading to an already low positive rating plummet further to between 22% and 35%.   Table 2. U.S. Favorability Before and After the Israel-Hamas War   Country Before After Jordan 43% 26%* Lebanon 33% 28%* Mauritania 51% 35%* Morocco 66% 76%* Tunisia 36% 22%*   Note: Mean percentages are reported for the numbers before the conflict. Level of significance: *p ≤ 0.05. Source: Arab Barometer   What are the implications of the sharp decline in U.S. favorability following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas War? One consequence is the exploitation of anti-American sentiment for political gain by the established order and Islamist opposition forces. For example, Lebanon presents a distinct case due to its pluralistic society, where the long-term tension between Hezbollah and the U.S. has aggravated the polarization and political instability between the pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. factions. In Morocco, the polarization between the establishment and the Islamist opposition is centered on their attitudes toward the U.S. and the religious mobilization of the opposition. The political mobilization of the Islamist opposition continues to deepen anti-U.S. sentiment, which is likely to exploit this opportunity to challenge the current establishment in the next election.   In addition, in Mauritania, the geographical distance and the absence of a mobilized Islamist political organization result in the Israel-Hamas war not being strongly linked to anti-U.S. views. Consequently, Islamists continue to support the democratic systеm. In Tunisia, the close relationship between the establishment and the Islamist democratic party Ennahda has made it less probable that anti-U.S. sentiment is employed as a political instrument for the purpose of engaging in power competition. Finally, while Jordan is geographically adjacent to Israel and Palestine, its political dynamics differ significantly from Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. Jordan supports a moderate interpretation of Islam and maintains closer ties with the U.S., which serves to prevent a stark polarization of political values between anti-U.S. and pro-U.S. camps within the country.   Conclusion   In conclusion, the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has not diminished support for democracy in the Middle East; however, it has affected perceptions of American influence in the region and increased the likelihood that anti-American sentiment is exploited for political mobilization. The precise impact of this phenomenon varies depending on the specific domestic political dynamics. However, it is probable that individuals will reinforce their existing views on democracy, thereby increasing polarization. This may intensify the existing tensions between those who advocate for democratization and those who oppose it, potentially eroding the foundations of democratic legitimacy. For those who support U.S. involvement in the Middle East, the threat of Islamist extremism has reinforced their democratic conviction. Conversely, for those who view U.S. involvement as an embodiment of injustice, the conflict has undermined their confidence in U.S. credibility and has reduced democratic support to its lowest point.   Looking ahead, many of the region’s democratic proponents—aside from leftist groups—are rooted in Islamist movements that are opposed to autocratic rulers. However, the deterioration of democratic values caused by the Israel-Hamas conflict could further shift popular support toward the Islamist narrative, which attacks the liberal democratic systеm represented by the U.S. This is likely to result in a scenario where pro-democracy Islamist groups could pivot toward establishing a new authoritarian regime, even if the current autocrats are overthrown. This outcome portends a worst-case scenario of the impact of the Israel-Hamas conflict on future prospects for democratization in the Middle East. It is imperative that greater attention be focused on the promotion of democratic values and institutions in the context of the political polarization associated with perceptions of American influence on the conflict.   The present conclusion is based exclusively on data from a limited number of countries. Consequently, a more comprehensive analysis is required should additional data from other countries in the region become available. However, the latest Freedom House report indicates that the United Arab Emirates and Iran have suppressed mobilization around the Palestine issue, whereas Jordan, Kuwait, and Iraq have not done so. This difference stems from the former group’s reliance on depoliticized governance strategies and their capacity to suppress dissent. In contrast, countries in the latter group, particularly Jordan and Kuwait, permit only limited mobilization on Palestine-related issues to strengthen their Islamic legitimacy without directly challenging the regime. Given its status as a weak state, Iraq is unable to regulate mobilization but employs the Palestine issue as a means of redirecting public focus and bolstering its legitimacy. As for Yemen, the conflict has further intensified tensions between the Tehran-backed Houthi group and the militant government supported by Saudi Arabia.   It can be observed that both Israel and Hamas are employing moral mobilization for their own political purposes in relation to the conflict. Furthermore, this tactic is also being utilized by ruling governments and opposition groups across the Middle East. This has the effect of reinforcing existing positions and entrenched views. Nevertheless, the deliberate and disproportionate political mobilization has not undermined the heightened democratic awareness and aspirations among Middle Eastern populations following the Arab Spring. However, in the long term, it may erode faith in democracy, particularly given the likelihood that the U.S. unconditional support for Israel will become a key pretext for future political mobilization. Ultimately, the foreign policy of the Trump admіnistration on the Israel-Hamas war in its second term will have a significant impact on the trajectory of the conflict and the broader democratization process in the Middle East. ■   References   Arab Barometer. 2024. “Arab Barometer Wave VIII” (September 2023 – July 2024). https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-viii/ (Accessed November 22, 2024)   Freedom House. 2024. “Freedom in the World 2024: The Mounting Damage of Flawed Elections and Armed Conflict” (February 2024). https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2024/mounting-damage-flawed-elections-and-armed-conflict (Accessed November 22, 2024)     ■ Min-Hua Huang is a Chair and Professor in the Department of Political Science at the National Taiwan University.   ■ Seng-Yee Sin is a Master of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at the National Taiwan University.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Min-Hua Huang 2025-04-01Views : 642
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Japanese Voters Punished the Ruling LDP in the 2024 General Election Amid Political Party Corruption

Leadership Change Amid LDP Slush Fund Scandal   On August 14, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida declared that he would not run in the upcoming Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election in September and would resign from his role as prime minister. He stated that the main reason for his decision was to take responsibility for the LDP’s “slush fund” scandal.   The term “slush fund scandal” refers to fraudulent practices surrounding political fundraising parties organized by factions within the LDP. These factions, along with individual legislators, have held fundraising parties by selling party tickets, typically priced around 20,000 yen (equivalent to USD 130), to corporations and individuals. Party tickets serve as a de facto political donation, as event expenses (e.g., food, beverages, and venue costs) are kept minimal, and some purchasers do not attend.   The scandal came to light in November 2022, when the Shimbun Akahata, the official newspaper of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), reported that major purchasers of party tickets from five factions were absent from political fund reports submitted to each prefecture’s election admіnistration commission. In November 2023, it was further revealed that the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Special Investigation Division was pursuing charges related to these political fund issues, which drew considerable attention to the scandal. When political fundraising parties were held, factions required their legislators to sell a specified number of tickets. However, the factions did not disclose ticket sales revenues in political fund reports, nor did legislators report receiving these funds from factions, which constituted a breach of the Political Funds Control Law. In essence, the term “slush funds” refers to the transfer of funds from factions to legislators that is not reported in political fund reports. A total of 85 members from the Abe and Nikai factions received such funds, with the amounts ranging from 40,000 yen (equivalent to USD 260) to 51.54 million yen (equivalent to USD 330,000).[1]     In the LDP presidential election held on September 27, Sanae Takaichi received the highest number of votes, followed by Shigeru Ishiba with the second highest number of votes in the first round. However, as Takaichi were unable to secure a majority, a second-round election was held between Takaichi and Ishiba, resulting in Ishiba’s election as party president.   Lower House Election Results   Ishiba was designated as the new prime minister on October 1. He announced the dissolution of the lower house of parliament a mere eight days after becoming prime minister. Ishiba sought to leverage the high initial approval rating of his cabinet.   The LDP did not nominate 12 legislators who did not report the transfer of funds from their faction in their political fund report (i.e., those who received slush funds) and barred 37 others from running on a proportional representation (PR) list. The lower house employs a mixed electoral systеm comprising single-member districts (SMDs) and PR. This systеm allows candidates to run in both SMD and PR tiers, with those who lose in an SMD still having the opportunity to be elected through a PR list. Legislators who were restricted to running in an SMD were less likely to be reelected.   Nevertheless, this initial move to exclude corrupt politicians soon became tarnished as the election campaign period began on October 15. On October 23, the Shimbun Akahata reported that the LDP headquarters had transferred 20 million yen to the local party branches of candidates who had received slush funds and were not nominated. While these transfers were legal, voters reacted strongly against this de facto support for unnominated candidates. The LDP’s insufficient response to the slush fund scandal further eroded public support for the party.   The results of the October 27 election were striking, with a substantial loss of seats for the ruling LDP and Komeito (see Table 1). The combined total of 215 seats fell short of the 233 seats required for a majority in the 465-seat lower house. In particular, the LDP’s seats dropped from 247 before the election to 191. Among legislators who had accepted slush funds, only four of the twelve who had run as unnominated or independent candidates were elected, while only 14 of the 34 candidates who had run solely in an SMD won a seat.   Komeito also saw its seats reduced from 32 to 24. It is noteworthy that the recently appointed party leader, Keiichi Ishii, who assumed the position on September 28, lost his seat. Additionally, the party was unsuccessful in securing any seats in Osaka Prefecture, a region where it had previously held four seats in the 2012, 2014, 2017, and 2021 elections.   Conversely, certain opposition parties experienced notable gains in their representation. The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) experienced an increase in its seats from 98 to 148, and the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) saw a notable rise in its representation, increasing from 7 to 28 seats. The Japan Innovation Party (JIP) won all 19 seats in Osaka Prefecture but struggled in other prefectures, resulting in a reduction of its total seats from 44 to 38. Meanwhile, the JCP saw a reduction in its seats from 10 to 8. Additionally, new minor parties made notable advances: Reiwa Shinsengumi from 3 to 9 seats, the Sanseito from 1 to 3, and the Conservative Party of Japan (CPJ) from 0 to 3.   Table 1. Number of Seats in the 2024 Lower House Election     Before Election After Election Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 247 191 Komeito 32 24 Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) 98 148 Japan Innovation Party (JIP) 44 38 Democratic Party for the People (DPP) 7 28 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 10 8 Reiwa Shinsengumi 3 9 Sanseito 1 3 Social Democratic Party (SDP) 1 1 Conservative Party of Japan (CDJ) 0 3 Others 22 12 Total 465 465   The outcome of this election demonstrates a significant shift from the party systеm that had prevailed in Japan from 2012 to 2024. Since returning to power in 2012, the LDP had enjoyed a period of one-party dominance compatible to its rule from 1955 to 1993, which was known as the “1955 systеm.” In the 2012, 2014, and 2017 lower house elections, the LDP alone secured over 60% of seats, while the LDP-Komeito coalition consistently held a two-thirds majority, thereby enabling them to override upper house rejections in the lower house (Figure 1). The inability of the LDP, even with Komeito, to retain a majority in the 2024 election signifies the end, at least for now, of the LDP’s 12-year period of dominance since 2012.   Figure 1. Seat Share of the LDP and Komeito   What factors contributed to the LDP’s significant seat losses, while the CDP and the DPP experienced an increase in seats? The primary reason was the defection of the LDP’s supporters. According to an exit poll conducted by Kyodo News (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2024-10-29: p. 7), 31.8% of respondents identified as LDP supporters, representing a notable decline from the 40.4% recorded in the 2021 election. However, this figure was comparable to the 32% recorded in the 2017 election, during which the LDP secured 61.1% of the seats. This indicates that the decline in LDP supporters did not directly lead to the party’s seat losses in 2024. Instead, a distinctive feature of this election was that only 69% of LDP supporters voted for the party in PR, down from 77% in 2021, 82% in 2017, and 79% in 2014. Significantly, in this election, 7% of LDP supporters voted for the CDP in PR, 6% for the DPP, and 4% for the JIP. The defection of LDP supporters played a significant role in the party’s loss of seats.   In other words, the substantial increase in seats for the CDP did not appear to result from an expansion of its own support base. The Kyodo News exit poll indicates that 17.7% of respondents identified as CDP supporters, representing a slight decline from the 18.1% in 2021. However, the proportion of LDP supporters who voted for the CDP in PR increased from 4% in 2021 to 7.1% in 2024. Once again, the defection of LDP supporters—particularly their votes for the CDP—contributed to the CDP’s seat gains.   While the slush fund scandal was a major issue, economic concerns were the primary focus of voters. As indicated by an exit poll conducted by Jiji Press, the most pivotal policy concern for voters was “economic conditions, employment, and wage increases” (35.8%), followed by “pensions, medical care, and elderly care” (17.6%), and “child-rearing and measures for the declining birthrate” (12.9%). “Politics and money and political reforms” ranked fourth (9.2%) (Jiji Press 2024-10-27). Voters’ dissatisfaction with the LDP government’s economic and social security policies were the primary factors contributing to its electoral defeat. Real wages exhibited a decline for 26 consecutive months from April 2022 to May 2024, partly due to inflationary pressures that imposed economic hardship on individuals. Additionally, voters articulated concerns regarding their future prospects in relation to retirement, healthcare, and child-rearing. In conclusion, the LDP’s defeat cannot be attributed solely to the issue of slush funds alone; rather, it can be seen as a response to public dissatisfaction with living conditions and social security policies.   Weakened Minority Government Pursues Political Financing Reforms   In a press conference held on October 28, Prime Minister Ishiba officially stated that the government is not considering a coalition with any political parties other than Komeito at this time. Similarly, Yuichiro Tamaki, a leader of the DPP, which holds policy positions most closely aligned with those of the LDP, also declared at a press conference on October 29 that the party has no intention of joining the LDP and Komeito coalition. As a consequence, the Ishiba government, operating as a minority government, is likely to face significant political challenges. In order for the government to pass budgets and bills, it will require the support of opposition parties. Additionally, a motion of no confidence in the government could be initiated at any time.   Meanwhile, the major opposition parties, including the DPP, the CDP, and the JIP, are facing intense scrutiny from the public regarding the extent and manner of their cooperation or conflict with the Ishiba government. This stance may have an impact on their future level of public support and seat counts. In light of the forthcoming upper house election scheduled for July next year, it seems inevitable that Japanese politics will experience a period of uncertainty and instability in the run-up to the election.   Prime Minister Ishiba has articulated his commitment to address issues pertaining to the intersection of politics and finance. This includes the proposed abolition of policy activity funds, which are currently allocated to legislators by political parties without a requirement for public disclosure of their use. Furthermore, he advocates for the mandatory disclosure and return of the one million yen granted monthly to legislators as policy research funds. The opposition parties have established these strengthened political finance reforms as a prerequisite for their cooperation with the government. In the context of intense public scrutiny, Prime Minister Ishiba will be compelled to navigate negotiations with the LDP, its coalition partner Komeito, and the opposition parties on these pivotal matters, thereby positioning political finance reform as a central item on the political agenda. It remains to be seen whether he will succeed in these political reform endeavors. ■   References   Jiji Press. 2024. “景気・賃上げを重視 投票先判断、年金も優先―出口調査【24衆院選】” (Emphasis on the economy, wage increases, and pensions prior to voting decisions) October 27. https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2024102700809&g=pol (Accessed November 7, 2024)   Nihon Keizai Shimbun. 2024. “石破内閣支持32%、18ポイント減 共同通信世論調査” (Support for Ishiba Cabinet 32%, down 18 points: Kyodo News poll) October 29.     [1] The LDP had six factions: the Abe Faction (96 members as of January 2024), the Aso faction (55), the Kishida faction (46), the Motegi faction (45), the Nikai faction (38), and the Moriyama faction (8). Five factions—excluding the Aso faction—dissolved by ceasing regular meetings, closing offices, and deregistering as political organizations.     ■ Naofumi Fujimura is a Professor at the Graduate School of Law, Kobe University.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Naofumi Fujimura 2025-04-01Views : 2864
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Prospects for Democracy Amidst Two National Elections in Sri Lanka

On September 21, 2024, Sri Lankans participated in a national election to select their Ninth Executive President. The election resulted in the victory of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, marking a shift in the country’s political landscape. In less than two months, on November 14, Sri Lanka will hold another election, this time for the 225 seats in the parliament. The outcome of the election will be revealed in the coming weeks, as will whether President Dissanayake’s party, the National People’s Power (NPP), will secure a majority or whether Sri Lanka’s opposition groups will elect a majority of Members of Parliament (MPs). These two elections hold significant implications in a country that continues to grapple with socio-economic uncertainties.   The September presidential election had several new aspects. The election marked the first national elections since the economic crisis in 2022 and the massive people’s mobilization known as the Aragalaya (the Struggle), which demanded a transformation of the political systеm. Against this background, there was a clear desire among citizens for a change in the political culture and style of governance. The election was a highly competitive one, with an unprecedented 39 candidates vying for the presidency. Furthermore, in contrast to previous electoral campaigns, the economy and corruption were the primary focus of the debates, marking a shift from previous elections where ethno-nationalism and cycles of violence were the central issues. Additionally, the election was notable for its relatively peaceful nature, with few incidents reported during the campaign period and on the election day. This is an important change from previous polls, which were marred by violence. Moreover, a distinctive feature of this election was that the initial tally of votes did not yield a clear majority for any candidate, necessitating a subsequent recount. The second count resulted in Dissanayake from the NPP, a left-wing coalition, being declared the winner with 42% of the vote (Election Commission of Sri Lanka 2024).   The election of President Dissanayake represents a remarkable trajectory for an individual who originated from modest circumstances. The political landscape of Sri Lanka has been historically dominated by prominent elite families with previous presidents having family or professional ties to the country’s long-standing power elites. The election of President Dissanayake represents a rejection of the political elites and the political culture in the island nation, indicative of the demands for change amidst an economic crisis and the massive public mobilization in 2022. The parliamentary election, scheduled for November, has already been affected by this, with several veteran politicians who have held elected office for decades having chosen not to contest the election. This includes three former executive presidents and several other individuals who have previously held cabinet positions. The exit of these individuals and the inclusion of numerous new candidates are a notable shift from previous years, reflecting a growing demand for change.   The Power and Mobilization of the People   In recent years, Sri Lanka has experienced a series of political crises, including a constitutional crisis in 2018 and the Easter Sunday attacks in 2019. These events led to the election of former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa. His tenure was marked by a new level of mismanagement and policy incoherence, which ultimately led to the 2022 economic collapse. The economic crisis resulted in 12-13 power outages daily and a scarcity of essential items, which had a significant impact on the lives and livelihoods of Sri Lankans across the country. This resulted in citizens from all walks of life, representing a diverse range of backgrounds and professions, taking to the streets to demand a change in government, governance, and the political culture. The Aragalaya movement led to the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his government.   The resignation paved the way for the appointment of Ranil Wickremesinghe to serve the remainder of the Gotabaya Rajapaksa presidency. The Wickremesinghe admіnistration took steps to stabilize the economy and address the debt crisis, culminating in an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Subsequent reforms resulted in the implementation of austere fiscal policies and elevated taxation rates, which disproportionately affected the poor and the middle class, leading to a surge in public discontent towards the government. A direct consequence was the intensification of societal polarization, with the affluent remaining largely insulated from the economic turbulence, while poverty and inequality continued to escalate. Coupled with this was a growing sense of frustration with the Wickremesinghe admіnistration for not tackling the governance crisis and the rampant corruption.   In this context, the NPP emerged as a popular force, resonating with the grievances of many and promising a pro-poor government and governance style devoid of corruption, cronyism, and nepotism.   Implications for Democracy in Sri Lanka   The election of President Dissanayake has, once again, opened up spaces for democratic reforms including the abolition of the executive presidency, electoral reform, transparent and accountable governance, among others. Additionally, there are high expectations regarding the fulfillment of other promises made during the presidential campaign, including the delivery of economic relief, governance reforms, and accountability for corruption and violence.   The anticipation of democratic reforms is not a novel phenomenon. Similarly, post-war Sri Lanka observed a comparable opportunity in 2015, when the Yahapalanaya government was elected on the basis of its commitment to good governance. Despite the introduction of certain reforms, such as the enactment of the Right to Information law, the regime was engulfed by political upheaval as seen with the Constitutional Crisis in 2018 and the fallout from the Easter Sunday attacks. The upheaval and uncertainty of this period gave rise to a populist candidate Gotabaya Rajapakse to be elected to office in November 2019. This outcome illuminated significant structural deficiencies in governance, including the entrenchment of patronage, corruption, and cronyism. Additionally, the period was marked by a rise in ethno-nationalism and setbacks in the implementation of reconciliation initiatives. These factors, in conjunction with the subsequent economic crisis, have intensified the hardship experienced by the impoverished and exacerbated existing inequalities, thereby compounding the challenges inherent to a nation riven by profound divisions.   In this context, the NPP has emerged as a significant political force, advocating for change. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a Marxist political party, continues to represent a significant component of the NPP. The party has a history of involvement in political violence during two insurgencies in Sri Lanka in the 1970s and 1980s. The years of violence between the Sri Lankan government forces and the JVP resulted in thousands of deaths, a past legacy that continues to cast a shadow over the party. Dissanayake was a student member of the JVP and subsequently ascended to the position of party leader, being elected to Parliament in 2000 and serving a brief tenure in government in 2004. He has positioned himself as a new figurehead for the JVP and a compelling orator in Sinhala, offering an alternative to many who have been disgruntled with the political elites and the ineffectiveness and corruption of the current governance style. In addition, the NPP is comprised of a heterogeneous group of individuals, including retired officials, academics, activists and artists, many of whom are novices in the realm of elected office. This includes Dr. Harini Amarasuriya, who was appointed Prime Minister in September and is a candidate in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Dr. Amarasuriya and other representatives of a broad coalition that comprises the NPP are portrayed as embodying the change that has been demanded in recent years.   Similarly, other parties and formations have gained prominence in recent years, while older parties such as the United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) have experienced a decline in influence. The Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) was the leading opposition party in the previous parliamentary session. Its leader, Sajith Premadasa, was a presidential candidate in the September election and will also contest the forthcoming November parliamentary election. The Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), the political party of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa and former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, enjoyed considerable popularity among the majority Sinhala community and electing a majority of MPs to the 2020 Parliament. Yet, its association with the Rajapaksa’s and others linked to the economic crisis saw a decline in its popularity, as evidenced by its poor performance in the presidential election. Additionally, this is occurring concurrently with significant internal divisions within minority political parties and the fragmentation of political alliances. Amidst this context, the emergence of the NPP and SJB as key political actors indicates a shift within the established political landscape in Sri Lanka.   The November parliamentary election will serve as the inaugural electoral test for the incumbent President and his party. To usher in reforms and consolidate power, the President should secure a majority in Parliament of over 113 seats. The election of President Dissanayake and the perception of a change from the established political elite have generated considerable enthusiasm among voters. It remains to be seen whether the NPP will be able to maintain this momentum and secure a majority in Parliament. There is a considerable degree of anticipation surrounding the capacity of the new admіnistration to fulfill economic promises and to address the issue of corruption, which constituted a central theme of the presidential campaign. Moreover, the presidential election results demonstrated that the NPP performed well among the majority Sinhala community but poorly in areas representing Tamil and Muslim communities. It remains to be seen whether the NPP will be able to gain the confidence of minority communities across Sri Lanka, particularly in light of the party’s stance on the ethnic issue. President Dissanayake’s comments shortly after taking the oath of office demonstrated his awareness of the multifaceted challenges and the country’s deep divisions (President’s Media Division 2024). However, his ability to address the numerous grievances and unite the nation will be contingent upon various factors, including the composition of the next Cabinet and Parliament, and the presence of political will to implement progressive reforms.   Conclusion   The year 2024 has witnessed a series of elections in Sri Lanka. A new president was elected in September, and the country will see the election of a new parliament in November. Additionally, the year saw a significant ruling from the Supreme Court regarding the right to vote. The court ruled that the delayed local government elections must be held at the earliest possible instance (Soorivagoda 2024). This suggests the potential for another electoral cycle in 2025, which would provide voters with an opportunity to engage with elected officials and political parties and hold them to account.   In light of recent developments, there is a certain degree of optimism regarding the future of democratic processes in Sri Lanka. The preceding government’s rationale for lacking the necessary financial resources to conduct local government elections in 2023 was contested by opposition parties and civil society. The highest judicial authority in the land intervened, emphasizing that the franchise cannot be subordinated to political expediency. Moreover, the recently concluded presidential election was the most peaceful one in recent years, serving as a testament to the cumulative efforts of independent institutions, election monitors, and civil society towards the advancement of free and fair election. It remains to be seen whether this will extend to the parliamentary elections scheduled for November.   Despite these positive developments, Sri Lanka is confronted with multiple challenges. With regard to the economic situation, it remains unclear how the government will address the daily struggles of many citizens, implement the necessary reforms and repay external debt. Another issue is the necessity for governance reforms and addressing of corruption. One significant pledge made by the NPP during the presidential campaign was the abolition of the executive presidency. This demand has been expressed on numerous occasions, including most recently in the Aragalaya. Another challenge confronting the government is how it will proceed in addressing the ethnic issue and questions of reckoning and reconciliation.   The responses to these questions will be dependent on the political resolve of the government and the capacity to form a government in November. A majority of seats in parliament to the NPP could facilitate the promised structural reforms; however, it also raises concerns of potential abuse of power, as evidenced by instances in recent years when governments have enjoyed a majority in parliament. Therefore, it is imperative that a robust opposition emerge, capable of spearheading progressive reforms and providing a vital check and balance on executive action. It is equally important to have independent institutions and a vibrant civil society and media that can monitor and act as an effective check on executive overreach and abuse of power. As evidenced by the experience of Sri Lanka, a vigilant citizenry and public mobilization are essential for ensuring accountability and advancing democratic reforms.   Elections represent a crucial avenue through which citizens can determine the trajectory of their country. In September, Sri Lankans exercised their democratic right to vote for change. The extent to which change will occur is contingent upon a number of variables. In November, the citizenry will be presented with another opportunity to determine and delineate the future direction of Sri Lanka. ■   References   Election Commission of Sri Lanka. 2024. “Presidential Election Results - 2024.” https://results.elections.gov.lk/ (Accessed October 14, 2024)   President’s Media Division. 2024. “Together, Let’s Build Our Nation.” September 23. https://pmd.gov.lk/news/build-our-nation/ (Accessed October 14, 2024)   Sooriyagoda, Lakmar. 2024. “SC orders Election Commission to hold LG polls at earliest possible date.” Daily Mirror. August 22. https://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking-news/SC-orders-Election-Commission-to-hold-LG-polls-at-earliest-possible-date/108-290076 (Accessed October 14, 2024)     ■ Bhavani Fonseka is a senior researcher and lawyer with the Centre for Policy Alternatives based in Colombo, Sri Lanka.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Bhavani Fonseka 2025-04-01Views : 587
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] The Move Forward Party’s Dissolution and Srettha Thavisin’s Dismissal: Judicial Politics Unbridled

Introduction   On August 7, 2024, the Constitutional Court of Thailand unanimously ruled to dissolve the Move Forward Party (MFP) and impose a ten-year prohibition on its executives, including its former leader and prime ministerial candidate, Pita Limjaroenrat. Just one week later, the same court dismissed Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin from office over a serious ethical violation. This article examines the context of these rulings and outlines their broader implications for Thailand. These decisions have contributed to democratic backsliding, not simply by directly undermining elected representatives across the legislative and executive branches, but also by establishing far-reaching legal precedents that further entrench the judiciary’s influence over Thailand’s political landscape. While the grand compromise between Thaksin Shinawatra and key figures in the royal-military conservative establishment appears to remain sufficiently intact to facilitate a smooth transition from Srettha to Paetongtarn Shinawatra as prime minister, the prevailing climate of judicial overreach will likely have the effect of constraining both the current and future governments, specifically in their capacity to carry out meaningful structural reforms.   Move Forward’s Dissolution and Judicial Overreach   The dissolution of the MFP is best understood as an aftershock of the Constitutional Court’s ruling on January 31 (BBC News Thai 2024-01-31). In that decision, the Court found that the MFP and Pita Limjaroenrat had violated Section 49 of the 2017 Constitution, which prohibits any attempt to overthrow the democratic regime with the King as Head of State. This was due to their efforts to amend the lèse majesté law, Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code. This law imposes a sentence of three to fifteen years of imprisonment per count for the crime of defamation, insult, or threats against the king, queen, heir-apparent, or regent.   In its verdict, the Court outlined a series of transgressions committed by the MFP and Pita, commencing with the bill proposed by 44 of its members of parliament to amend Section 112 in 2021. The Court found that the proposal to reclassify lèse majesté offenses—reclassifying them from national security threats to a new category focused solely on offenses related to the monarchy’s revered status—was indicative of an intention to separate the monarchy from Thai nationhood, thereby posing a threat to national security. Additionally, the Court ruled that the establishment of exceptions for honest criticism would inevitably result in the monarchy becoming embroiled in legal proceedings. Additionally, the Court concluded that allowing the Royal Household Bureau to act as the complainant in Section 112 cases would place the monarchy in direct conflict with the public, thereby violating the principle that it should remain above politics.   The Court also ruled that the MFP and Pita’s involvement in advocating for the proposed amendment during the election campaign, as well as their role as bail guarantors for those charged under Section 112, demonstrated an intention to undermine the monarchy. The Court ordered the MFP and Pita to cease all actions that advocate for the repeal of Section 112 and prohibited any further attempts to amend Section 112 through means that contravene the established legislative process. On August 7, citing this ruling, the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the MFP and banned its executives for ten years under Section 92 of the Organic Act on Political Parties B.E. 2560 (2017).   The dissolution of the MFP seemed almost inevitable, given that numerous political parties in Thailand have been dissolved for far less offenses. For instance, the MFP’s predecessor, the Future Forward Party (FFP), was disbanded in 2020 due to its acceptance of an illegal loan from its founder, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit. Both Thai Rak Thai and Palang Prachachon, predecessors of Thaksin Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai Party, were dissolved for electoral fraud in 2006 and 2008, respectively. In most cases, however, the underlying issue was political. These parties opposed the royalist-military establishment, and the legal justifications provided were merely a pretext for their elimination. These moves often backfired, however, as angered supporters mobilized in even greater numbers to support the successors of these parties in subsequent elections.   As a result of the repeated dissolution of parties opposing the establishment, both the successor parties and their supporters have become well-prepared to move forward without resorting to street protests, as they did after the dissolution of the FFP. The MFP’s successor, the People Party, was swiftly organized following its dissolution. In the days following its launch, the party witnessed a rapid influx of new members and amassed over 20 million baht (approximately 600 thousand USD) in donations (Bangkok Post 2024-08-10).   Nevertheless, despite the seamless transition and the pervasive anticipation that the People Party will bounce back even stronger, it is important to acknowledge that the MFP’s dissolution is distinct in its nature from past cases.   The issue is not merely that the court has effectively nullified an opposition party and disenfranchised over 14 million voters who propelled the MFP to victory in the 2023 general elections—after the junta-appointed Senate had already blocked the party from power during the selection of the prime minister in August 2023. Furthermore, the issue does not pertain to the perceived lack of independence of the Constitutional Court, which has been taken for granted given that it is composed of judges endorsed by bodies with members appointed directly or indirectly by the junta. The real concern now is the establishment of new judicial norms and precedents that could further entrench the judiciary’s role in checking the power of elected governments and constraining the scope of possible reforms in the future.   In contrast to its predecessors, the MFP was not merely dissolved; it was made an example for attempting to amend the lèse majesté law through means that the Court deemed to be outside the bounds of legislative due process. The implications of this are twofold. Firstly, it directly affects the separation of powers, as the court has now positioned itself as the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes legitimate legislative due process. Consequently, it has established criteria for amending laws that are not open to public debate but are instead subject to the discretion of court judges.   Secondly, this narrowing of legislative space is accompanied by strict, and possibly selective, enforcement that will serve as a deterrent. It is possible that future parties and lawmakers may avoid proposing amendments or bills that could be construed as undermining the monarchy, for fear of facing legal repercussions similar to those faced by the MFP. One potential consequence is that parliament and political parties may become unable to address issues concerning the monarchy’s role and status or to advance reform agendas, particularly in sensitive areas such as royal assets, budgets, and military control. This is occurring at a time when societal divisions over these matters appear to be intensifying. It is even conceivable that parties may hesitate before offering assistance to protesters facing lèse majesté charges, fearful that they themselves may be subjected to the same treatment the MFP was. Therefore, beyond the visible backsliding of democracy through the dismantling of a party organization lies an even more alarming reality: the systеmic use of judicial mechanisms to overrule the legislative branch, impose red lines that parties dare not cross, and suppress freedom of expression and assembly.   Srettha’s Dismissal and the Resurgence of Moral Politics   Just a week after the Court curtailed the legislative branch by removing the leader of the Opposition, it also dismissed the head of the executive branch. In a ruling on a petition filed by a group of junta-appointed senators, the Court decided by a vote of 5-4 that Srettha Thavisin had breached ethical standards and lacked the integrity required of a minister in his attempt to appoint Pichit Chuenban as the Prime Minister’s Office minister (BBC News Thai 2024-08-14). Pichit, a former lawyer for Thaksin, had previously served six months in jail in 2008 and had been delisted by the Lawyers Council of Thailand for contempt of court due to his involvement in an attempt to bribe Supreme Court officials.   Pichit’s previous imprisonment in 2008 did not automatically disqualify him from a cabinet appointment. This was because he met, and passed a legal review based on, two crucial conditions under Section 160 (6) and (7) of the Constitution: over ten years had passed since his release, and his imprisonment was for contempt of court, not a criminal offence. Nevertheless, the Court determined that Srettha was culpable of knowingly proposing, or should have been aware that he was proposing, an individual who did not meet the moral and ethical standards stipulated in Section 160 (4) and (5) for appointment as a cabinet minister. In doing so, the Court also rejected Srettha’s argument that his limited political experience and legal knowledge excused him from recognizing Pichit’s qualifications or lack thereof, and that issues of integrity and ethical standards should be left to the Constitutional Court’s interpretation. Instead, the Court ruled that public awareness of societal standards is sufficient for the assessment of whether a candidate meets the requisite moral and ethical criteria for office.   Regardless of whether there are valid legal grounds on which to fault Srettha for his nomination of Pichit, the broader issue is that the Court has now asserted itself in defining the moral and ethical standards for public office on behalf of the general public. The Thai judiciary has historically assumed the role of a counter-majoritarian lynchpin, exercising ‘rule by good people’ and intervening in the political process in the name of upholding the rule of law (Tonsakulrungruang 2022). However, its role in interpreting and enforcing moral and ethical norms has expanded beyond its traditional functions, taking on a more direct and assertive form than ever before.   To some extent, the political landscape has already adjusted to the Court’s rhythm and its newly defined authority in ruling on moral and ethical standards. During the formation of the new cabinet under Paetongtarn Shinawatra, three prospective ministers recused themselves to avoid the same fate as Pichit and to spare Paetongtarn from facing similar court allegations for nominating individuals who might potentially be deemed unfit for office.[1] Yet, this did not lead to their replacement with those who demonstrated greater ethical and moral rectitude. Instead, members of their own families were selected.   Ultimately, the Court’s ruling has set a precedent that not only grants it ultimate power to bar politicians from office on grounds of ethical violations—while also serving as the final arbiter in such matters—but also paradoxically accelerates dynastic succession, or the transfer of power within political families. While it is too early to ascertain the full consequences of this ruling, in the short term, it has created a potential avenue for those with ulterior motives to exploit ethical complaints for political ends, at the expense of the rule of law and political stability.   At the time of writing, Paetongtarn Shinawatra is the subject of multiple formal complaints, many of which concern alleged ethical violations. Four complaints relate to the appointment of cabinet ministers who are alleged to have failed to meet the requisite ethical standards. These include Tawee Sodsong, Phumtham Wechayachai, Surapong Piyachote, Chalermchai Sri-on, and Dech-it Khaothong. Another complaint involves her alleged use of a “mini-heart gesture” while wearing a civil service uniform. While some of these allegations may appear implausible, the precedent set by the ruling on Srettha has created a tangible risk that they could, as in Srettha’s case, lead to the dismissal of a prime minister and the downfall of the government.   Conclusion   Beyond the obvious assault on Thai democracy that both cases represent, the dissolution of the MFP and Srettha’s dismissal have paved the way for an already interventionist court to become even more emboldened in shaping political outcomes. Through decisions that are rooted in arbitrary interpretations of legislative due processes and ethical standards, the court has now come to play a central role in defining the boundaries of political contestation and scrutinizing the conduct of office holders. This has undermined the mandate of Thai voters and further eroded democratic checks and balances in Thailand.   The Pheu Thai Party previously declared its intention to address the problems of judicial overreach in cases pertaining to party dissolution and ethical violations, through both piecemeal constitutional amendments and a comprehensive rewrite of the constitution (Thairath 2024-09-21). However, it is unclear whether significant progress will be achieved, given the inherent challenges of the constitutional reform process and the difficulty in building consensus among coalition partners. The power to dissolve political parties has long been a reliable instrument for checking elected forces. It is therefore unlikely that the conservative establishment, which forms part of the alliance that underpins the current coalition government, will relinquish it, especially in the face of reformist threats that have become more pronounced in the aftermath of the pro-democracy reforms in 2020-2021. Meanwhile, ethical violations have emerged as a convenient instrument for undermining political opponents, bypassing traditional channels of political competition, such as elections or policy debates. These developments indicate that judicial politics in Thailand will likely persist, or even intensify, as the key battleground in the broader power struggle between progressive, Thaksin-affiliated, and conservative forces, potentially undermining democracy and the rule of law in the process. ■   References   Bangkok Post. 2024. “People’s Party Gets an Early Boost.” August 10. https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/2845026/peoples-party-gets-an-early-boost (Accessed September 23, 2024)   BBC News Thai. 2024. “สรุปคำวินิจฉัยศาลรัฐธรรมนูญโดยละเอียด ชี้พิธา-ก้าวไกล แก้ ม.112 ‘ล้มล้างการปกครอง’ [Detailed Summary of the Constitutional Court’s Ruling: Pita and Move Forward’s Call to Amend Section 112 Tantamount to Overthrowing the Constitutional Monarchy].” January 31. https://www.bbc.com/thai/articles/cw0rq4x2ke7o (Accessed September 23, 2024)   ______. 2024. “มติศาลรัฐธรรมนูญ 5:4 สั่ง เศรษฐา ทวีสิน พ้นเก้าอี้นายกฯ ส่งผลให้ ครม. ไปทั้งคณะ [Constitutional Court Votes 5:4 to Remove Srettha Thavisin from Premiership, Leading to the Entire Cabinet's Dismissal].” August 14. https://www.bbc.com/thai/articles/c2dg4xx5w0eo (Accessed September 23, 2024)   Thairath. 2024. “ภูมิธรรม เร่งหารือพรรคร่วมรัฐบาล แก้ รธน. รายมาตรา-ทั้งฉบับ ก่อน 27 ก.ย. [Phumtham Urges Coalition Partners to Discuss Constitutional Amendments—Article by Article and Full Rewrite—Before Sept 27].” September 21. https://www.thairath.co.th/news/politic/2815614 (Accessed September 23, 2024)   Tonsakulrungruang, Khemthong. 2022. “Thai Constitutions as a Battle Ground for Political Authority: Barami versus Vox Populi.” In Tom Ginsburg and Benjamin Schonthal, eds. Buddhism and Comparative Constitutional Law, 161–180. Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.     [1] For example, Chada Thaised, who was arrested in 2003 on charges related to the homicide of a former Pheu Thai MP’s secretary (though he was acquitted two years later), withdrew himself from the list proposed by Bhumjaithai and instead nominated his daughter, Sabeeda. Similarly, Thammanat Prompao, former minister of agriculture who was arrested in Australia in 1993 on charges of involvement in a heroin smuggling case, served four years in prison, and subsequently deported upon release. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Akkara Prompao, who currently serves as the deputy minister of agriculture. In 2021, the Constitutional Court dismissed a complaint challenging Thammanat’s fitness for office, ruling that his Australian conviction was not recognized under Thai law. Furthermore, the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP)’s Atthakorn Sirilatthayakorn, the former deputy agriculture minister, was replaced by his father, Itthi, following Pheu Thai’s exclusion of the PPRP and rejection of its nominations.     ■ Napon Jatusripitak is a Visiting Fellow and Acting Coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Napon Jatusripitak 2025-04-01Views : 1006
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] State Brutality, People’s Uprising, and Government Downfall: The Quota Reform Movement in Bangladesh

Introduction   It was the worst example of state brutality against unarmed students that happened in Bangladesh from July 15 to August 5, 2024. Over 300 people, including 32 children, were killed by the state-forces and ruling-party frontiers together (Ethirajan and Ritchie 2024; Mishra 2024). Additionally, more than 20,000 people injured and 11,000 were detained by Police. In order to suppress the student’s legitimate protest demanding “reform of the discriminatory quota systеm in the job”, the government has deployed all its state forces, equipped with deadly weapons, vehicles, helicopters, and applied water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, sound grenades, and others. The party cadres attacked the protesters with guns arms. The government has suspended all social media and internet and declared a nationwide curfew. Furthermore, a shoot-on-sight policy has been declared for quitting the mob. Intelligence picked up students from their home creating block-raid in the area during the nighttime. The detective police abducted the student coordinators and tortured them. The situation bore resemblance to an invasion by occupying forces. As evidenced by numerous reports, Bangladeshi authorities have been committing serious human rights violations with impunity during the recent protests (Corea and Erum 2024).   People from all social classes supported and involved in the movement. The demand for quota reform turns to a demand for justice. With the withdrawal of military support, the 15-year tenure of authoritarian rule by Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina had ended dramatically with her exile to India.   Background of the Quota Reform Movement   The original quota was designed in 1972, immediately after the country’s independence. This quota systеm was designed as an interim arrangement to acknowledge the contributions of the freedom fighters, and no one had any question about that. The issue emerged when the Awami League assumed a second term in office. They allocated 56% of government, semi-government, and autonomous institution jobs to designated groups, leaving the remaining 44% for merit-based placements. The 56% allocation was distributed among various categories: 30% for Freedom Fighters and their descendants, including grandchildren; 10% for women; 10% for districts based on population; 5% for ethnic minorities; and later 1% for people with disabilities. The circular also mentioned that a separate merit list would be established for quota candidates. If any positions remained vacant due to a lack of candidates in a particular district, they would be filled from the central candidates enlisted for quota.   This was not the first instance of student protests against discriminatory hiring practices in the Bangladesh government. Previously, in 2008, 2013, and 2018, protests had been held on the same issue. The protest gained momentum in 2018 as the quota movement. Protests and counter-violence erupted at various public universities. However, when the government’s use of repressive measures failed in quelling the unrest, the PM, in a moment of rage, overstepped her authority and cancelled the entire quota systеm, which had never been a demand of the protesters. Subsequently, a circular was issued by the Cabinet outlining the proposed revisions to the quota systеm.   Anti-Discrimination Student Movement 2024   On June 5, 2024, the High Court (HC) ruled on a writ petition filed by the descendant of a freedom fighter and six others. The HC declared that the 2018 circular was illegal, thereby reinstating the 56% quota for government recruitment. the students immediately initiated a protest movement, and the government appealed the verdict to the Supreme Court, with the initial hearing set for July 4. However, when the court postponed the hearing for another month, the student activists intensified their agitation. On July 6, anti-quota activists launched a nationwide “Bangla Blockade,” which called for road and highway blockades, exam boycotts, and a general student strike. Meanwhile, students persistently requested a dialogue with government representatives. However, the government did not take their proposals seriously.   On July 11, Mr. Obaidul Quader, Member of the Parliament (MP) and the Minister of Road Transport, and the General Secretary of the ruling party, stated that the actions of the anti-quota demonstrators against the Supreme Court were illegal. The Home Minister added, "Students are crossing the limit."   Until this time, the movement remained peaceful although it has spread to nearly all educational institutions, including universities, colleges, Madrashas, and schools in both urban and rural areas. On July 14, PM Hasina held a press conference broadcasted by social and electronic media. The students, teachers, and parents eagerly awaited her response to their demands. Instead, she claimed the matter was within the purview of the Court and mocked the protesters as "Razakars" in her speech, which fuelled student agitation.[1] The protesting students chanted, “Who am I? Who are you? Razakar, Razakar.” “Who said that? Who said that? Autocrat. Autocrat.” “Seeking our right, we became Razakar.”   On July 15, Dhaka University students engaged in a peaceful demonstration to advocate for quota reform, using placards and national flags. Suddenly, they were attacked by the Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL), the student front of the Awami league, armed with rods, sticks, and clubs, with a few even brandishing revolvers. Subsequent to this incident, similar attacks occurred nationwide within hours. The images of BCL assaulting female students, which have been disseminated through media outlets, are unprecedented.   The protests culminated in fatalities on Tuesday, a day after students at Dhaka University faced clashing with police. Violence continued to escalate as police fired tear gas and rubber bullets, and hurled smoke grenades to scatter stone-throwing protesters. On the afternoon of July 16, police fired tear gas and charged with batons at protesters in front of Begum Rokeya University in Rangpur. As the police advanced, protest coordinator Abu Sayed extended his arms in a gesture of defiance. In a seemingly intentional and unjustifiable attack, the police fired directly at his chest. At least two police officers discharged 12-gauge shotguns directly towards him from across the street, a distance of merely 15 meters. Sayed clutched his chest as officers fired at least two more times using birdshot, an ammunition designed for hunting that is extremely dangerous, inaccurate, and unlawful for use in policing protests. The news of his death has incited outrage among protesters nationwide, with many hailing him as a martyr.   On July 18, tensions peaked as the students called for a nationwide shutdown. Police attacked protesters, resulting in the deaths of numerous individuals, primarily young men, and the dissemination of images of the violence across various social media platforms. In an effort to prevent the organization of protesters via online platforms, particularly via Facebook groups, the government initiated a nationwide internet shutdown that night, leaving 170 million people without online access for the next 11 days. The information minister and the ICT minister asserted that the protesters, in association with Zamat-Shibir, an Islamist political party and its student front, had burned the broadband cables, causing internet outage. Additionally, they were accused of vandalizing state establishments and setting fire to the metro rail station, the Setu Bhaban, and the BTV office, among other locations.   Faced with the momentum of the anti-discrimination movement and the de facto shutdown of the entire country, the Supreme Court, with the persuasion of government, decided to advance the hearing. On July 21, the quotas were significantly reduced from 56 to 7 percent, with 5 percent allocated for the relatives of freedom fighters, 2 percent for ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, and people of non-binary genders. However, this was already a belated response, as numerous students and people had been killed, wounded, and arrested in the interim. The demonstrators demanded the implementation of nine specific measures, including the arrest of police officers involved in the shooting incident, the resignation of the ministers, and a public apology from PM. However, the government opted to adopt a more stringent stance. Fourteen foreign missions in Dhaka urged the government to hold law enforcement personnel accountable for their wrongdoings (Dhaka Tribune 2024-07-28).   On July 31, the anti-discrimination student movement observed a “March for Justice” program against the “killings, mass arrests, attacks, cases, and disappearances” linked to the quota reform movement. The government has banned the opposition party Jamaat-e-Islami, and its student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir, blaming that they are involved in the recent unrest and the undermining of the government’s development initiatives (The Daily Star 2024-08-01).   The support of the quota reform movement from civil society is quite visible. From the outset, teachers supported their students. In some instances, journalists, lawyers, professors, artists, and actors are now at the front line of the processions. Some individuals are attempting to retrieve their students from police custody. Lawyers suited a writ against safe custody of the six student coordinators at the Detective Branch (DB) police office. Advocate Z. I. Khan Panna inquired as to the authority by which the police were permitted to check mobile and personal belongings without a warrant. Also, a significant number of immigrants from Bangladesh participated in the demonstrations in support of the students. Notable Bangladeshi and foreign online influencers, including Ayman Sadiq, Salman Muqtadir, Daud Kim, the Deshbhakt, and George Galloway, have articulated their support for the student movement.   On August 1, six organizers were released from DB custody after having been held for three days. Protesters participated in a mass processions and prayed for those who had lost their lives. The organizers refuted the claim that the movement had been postponed, while the they had been in police custody (Daily Observer 2024-08-03).   The movement originated as a protest against quotas but evolved into a broader movement against discrimination, encompassing a nine-point demand. At a certain point, the movement began to focus on a single demand, namely the resignation of the “fascist and killer government.” The student coordinators announced a new program schedule, including a countrywide demonstration non-cooperation movement, and a march to Dhaka and PM’s residence. In response, the government once again blocked internet access, issued a shoot-on-sight order, and imposed a curfew for an unspecified time. Additionally, it declared a forced public holiday from August 5 to August 7. Local civil society and international organizations have expressed fear about the further repressive actions by the government. However, the movement intensified, demonstrated remarkable resilience, and spread across the country.   Meanwhile, on August 4, the first day of the non-cooperation program, 98 people were killed in various locations across the country including Dhaka, due to violent clashes between movement supporters and pro-government activists backed by police. Pictures of the pro-government activists, supported by police, in action with open guns, pistols, and other deadly weapons in many places have been published in newspapers. “This popular uprising was the bloodiest in history. This bloodshed could have been avoided. But Hasina's absolute power was not only covered by corruption, but also blind to the reality. As a result, Hasina has to flee from the state. Her government no longer have public support.” (Daily Manab Zamin 2024-08-06) The protesters said, “We can't go back to university when our friends and fellows are in jail … and hundreds were killed in front of our eyes." (Bali et al. 2024)   On August 5, millions of people disregarded the curfew and open fire, and joined the ‘March to Dhaka’ program from various districts. They started marching to PM’s residence as directed by the movement leaders. Meanwhile, PM Hasina convened a meeting with the heads of all forces and directed them to reinforce the curfew to disperse the crowds from the streets. However, the army chief refuted the PM’s instructions, stating that his generals and troops were no longer willing to open fire on civilians.   The sequence of events unfolded rapidly. Hasina resigned and fled to India via an army helicopter. At 4 pm, the Army Chief General Waqar-uz-Zaman delivered an address that an interim government would be formed shortly. He also added that all activities of the country would be continued under the interim government. On August 8, Muhammad Yunus, the economist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, has been sworn in as the head of interim government.   Additional Factors Contributing to the Students Movement   The lack of government’s political prudence in dealing with protesters was a primary reason that sparked widespread movement. The party's central leaders and ministers further exacerbated the situation by humiliating the agitators. Arrogance and intimidations by the Prime Minister had intensified the situation already heightened by long existing political and economic problems.   First of all, over the past 15 years, Bangladesh has witnessed a notable shift towards autocracy. Since 2009, Hasina has been in uninterrupted power, winning her fourth consecutive election in January 2024. During this period, allegations of electoral malpractice have been made, including the misuse of state institutions, vote manipulation, and the extrajudicial killing of opposition activists. The repressive use of legislation, such as the Digital Security Act 2018, suppressed press freedom, civil society, and dissent. Individuals and groups have been subjected to harassment and arrest for their social media activities, with accusations being made that they are associated with Jamaat-Shibir.   Arbitrary arrests by police, often conducted in civilian dress and without official acknowledgment, have become a common occurrence, contributing to widespread fear and resentment among citizens. This further substantiates the assertion that there is a dearth of accountability and transparency within the law enforcement and democratic principles. Corruption is pervasive across sectors, and the government’s failure to prosecute high-profile corruption cases indicates a lack of governance and accountability. The recent leakage of information has implicated numerous high-profile individuals, including former officials, in a series of significant financial scandals. These includes the previous Army Chief, the previous police chief, and even the housekeeper of the Prime Minister who owns four billion taka (equivalent to 35 million USD), and question leakage of public service commission exams. These cases have contributed to a growing sense of public discontent.   Secondly, the deterioration of the Bangladeshi economy over the past decade due to misguided economic policies and corruption will culminate in a future being plundered through the accumulation of uncontrollable debt, suggesting a grim outlook for the country’s youth.   Thirdly, it is estimated that 20-22 million young people enter the labor market each year, yet only a small proportion are able to secure employment. Due to this domestic job shortage, over ten million people work abroad. However, the government has yet to implement any measures to address this issue. Instead, government officials have exploited the unemployment situation to collect bribes and charge excessive costs for work permits.   A fourth factor contributing to the emergence of reform movement was the expression of student grievances against the BCL. The BCL exerts control over university admіnistration, misuses dormitory spaces, promotes a culture of authoritarianism, and even maintains torture cells in the halls. They attacked student protesters even for non-political matters. The BCL has a history of violence, including the murder of Abrar Fahad, a promising student who criticized Indian hegemony on social media. The students were also subjected to physical abuse and intimidation during the Safe Street movement in 2018.   These factors collectively illustrate how the consolidation of power and the dismantling of democratic institutions by the government have resulted in a situation where the nation is increasingly becoming victim to autocratic rule, largely due to the government's unchecked authority.   Conclusion   It is now evident that the government bears sole responsibility for this undesirable and tragic situation. Had the government had promptly recognized that no unjust decision can be justified by wasting time, there would not have been the extensive loss of life, oppression, and destruction? The International Crisis Group states that Hasina “sealed her fate” when she responded to the protests with brutality and arrogance rather than pursuing serious dialogue with the protest leaders. They state that Hasina “pushed Bangladeshis over the edge.” (International Crisis Group 2024) The anti-discrimination student movement achieved its ultimate objective of forcing the resignation of the authoritarian government. This movement has established a new benchmark in the history of mass uprisings, comparable to the 1952 movement to establish Bangla as the state language and the 1990 uprising that led to the fall of the despotic ruler. In its editorial, The Daily Star wrote that “This is a day that will be remembered for generations to come. A day when a 15-year-long authoritarian rule finally came to an end. A day when people truly rose to power, putting aside their differences and uniting in their desire for freedom and a better tomorrow.” (The Daily Star 2024-08-06) The interim government has assumed office, and the nation now expects not only reforms to the recruitment process but also reforms to state institutions and governance structures. ■   References   Bali, Meghna, Bhat Burhan, and Tanbirul Miraj Ripon. 2024. “Bangladesh protests leave bloody memories for the families of those killed.” ABC Australia. August 4. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-04/bangladesh-students-protests-against-government-jobs-quota/104174500 (Accessed August 14, 2024)   Corea, Harindrini, and Nazia Erum. 2024. “What Happened at the ‘Bangla-Blockade’ Quota Reform Protests in Bangladesh?” The Diplomat. July 29. https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/what-happened-at-the-bangla-blockade-quota-reform-protests-in-bangladesh/ (Accessed August 14, 2024)   Daily Manab Zamin. 2024. “Hasina made history by closing her eyes from reality (in Bangladeshi).” August 6. https://mzamin.com/news.php?news=121566 (Accessed August 14, 2024)   Daily Observer. 2024. “We didn’t give statement from DB office willingly: 6 student coordinators.” August 3. https://www.observerbd.com/news.php?id=483385 (Accessed August 14, 2024)   Dhaka Tribune. 2024. “14 foreign missions in Dhaka write to FM.” July 28. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-affairs/352887/14-foreign-missions-in-dhaka-write-to-fm (Accessed August 14, 2024)   Ethirajan, Anbarasan, and Hannah Ritchie. 2024. “What sparked the protests that toppled Bangladesh’s PM?” BBC News. August 6. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq5xye1d285o (Accessed August 14, 2024)   International Crisis Group. 2024. “Bangladesh: The Long Road Ahead.” August 7. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/bangladesh-long-road-ahead (Accessed August 14, 2024)   Mishra, Vibhu. 2024. “UNICEF reports 32 children killed, many injured and detained in Bangladesh protests.” United Nations. August 2. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/08/1152796 (Accessed August 14, 2024)   The Daily Star. 2024. “Government bans Jamaat, Shibir.” Star Digital Report. August 1. https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/government-bans-jamaat-shibir-3667116 (Accessed August 14, 2024)   ______. 2024. “A new dawn rises on Bangladesh.” Editorial. August 6. https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/editorial/news/new-dawn-rises-bangladesh-3670546 (Accessed August 14, 2024)     [1] The Persian word “Razakar” means 'volunteers'. During the liberation war in 1971, Razakar was a para-militia force formed by native Bengalis and Biharies. They assisted the Pak-Army to reach in the localities, to identify and kill the freedom fighters and their families, the writers, poets, journalists, teachers, even individuals who supported the liberation war. They forcibly seized food, livestock, and other resources from local people to supply the army camps. Furthermore, they trafficked girls and women to these camps which underscore the brutality of their actions. For these reasons, the term ‘Razakar’ is a poignant word that is commonly intolerable to the Bangladeshi people.     ■ Md. Ziaul Karim is Coordinator of Governance Program at Manusher Jonno Foundation (MJF), and a Development Activist, involved with different Civil Society initiatives in Bangladesh.   ■ R. Y. Snigdha is a student of Dhaka University.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Md. Ziaul Karim 2025-04-01Views : 3602
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Europe’s Democracy Catch-22

※ This issue briefing is an abridged version of Carnegie Europe’s publication entitled “Europe’s Democracy Catch-22: Is There a Way Out?”, published on July 15, 2024.   The dominant, epoch-making European storyline is now clear: the rise of the far right threatens the European Union (EU)’s future and democracy. This standard view is expressed in countless opinion pieces and political speeches and is now reshaping both national and EU-level politics. Even if the far right did not surge quite as dramatically as widely predicted in either the European Parliament or French parliamentary elections, its growing popularity clearly represents a pressing challenge both at the EU level and in national politics (Ash 2024).   However, the continent’s predicament might be more accurately described as a more subtle and complex conundrum: in the immediate short term, what is good for the EU integration project might not be good for democracy, and vice versa. The EU and national governments have been struggling with this democracy catch-22 for several years now, and the election results make it an even sharper challenge.   The postelection context has been dominated by the debate over whether to engage or isolate the far right—a debate that has been exhaustively covered and unfolding for many years. Yet, the empirical record suggests that neither engaging with the far right nor ostracizing it has worked especially well. Instead, a third approach might help map a way out of the democracy catch-22: a European democracy pact.   Repeat Strategies   In the EU’s fraught postelection maneuvering, many mainstream parties are set largely to follow a familiar script of banding together to contain the new far-right surge. The standard op-eds, articles, and political speeches now advocate more stringent isolation of the far right. This was of course the dominant debate around France’s snap parliamentary election. And at the EU level, despite shifts in public voting patterns and in the European Parliament arithmetic, a familiar coalition of the main center-right, center-left, and centrist parties will continue. Politicians’ priority in ensuring this continuity is to safeguard key areas of cooperation against more EU-critical positions.   Seeking to protect important EU policy initiatives in this way may be a justified imperative, but the implications for democratic pluralism are not entirely benign (Grant et al. 2024). The strategy doubles down on long-standing coalition building aimed at minimizing the influence of EU-critical parties. The risk is that this approach constricts ideological debate and does little to address the underlying reasons why far-right parties are gaining support. Indeed, it is a strategy that almost willfully eschews any fundamental rethink by mainstream pro-EU parties (Youngs 2024).   At the same time, the opposing stance has also gained pertinence. Some parts of the center right have raised the prospect of at least ad hoc cooperation with some parts of the far right. This strategy involves the European polity showing a greater degree of democratic adaptation, probably to the detriment of EU cooperation. Some back this strategy with a claim that the closer the far right gets to having to find practical policy solutions, the more its allure will fade. Yet, the “let them govern” line underplays how much damage the far right might do to both democracy and the EU before its appeal begins to wane—if, indeed, it does (Ganesh 2024).   Hence the democracy catch-22 facing European governments: either show democratic responsiveness and risk short-term damage to the EU or double down on political orthodoxy and risk dampening pluralism. On one side is the danger of incremental de-democratization; on the other is the specter of managerial executive aggrandizement. Bend one way and the EU risks normalizing far-right positions; bend the other way and it frames everything as a battle against the far right in a way that saps democracy’s open-ended pluralism.   A Different Approach   A better way out of the catch-22 would be a European democracy pact. Rather than simply repeat how bad the far-right surge is for the EU, this approach would attempt to engage radical parties expressly to gain their commitment to core democratic values.   Such a pact would constitute a different way forward by separating policy debates from political-systеm issues. The focus on setting democracy redlines would not necessarily entail or require engagement with the far right on particular policy issues. Instead, it would seek consensus on democracy separately from the parties’ policy preferences in specific areas of EU cooperation. The pact would not represent positive engagement that normalizes policy illiberalism but would serve as leverage to protect political-systеm liberalism.   This focus on democracy is desperately needed. Most attention has been on the far right’s challenge to EU integration (Atlantic Council 2024). A strategy is needed specifically to address fears that far-right parties are not just illiberal and reactionary in their policy prescriptions but also likely to show themselves to be increasingly undemocratic. A European democracy pact would invite far-right parties to live up to their claims to be fully democratic and put them to the test on core values of political pluralism.   The pact should not merely list generic principles or replicate existing EU treaty provisions in a way that has no operational relevance. Rather, it should be concrete and detailed enough to hold parties meaningfully to account. The pact should include injunctions against the kinds of subtle democratic erosion that have proliferated in recent years. For example, it should include commitments not to challenge the equality of citizenship rights, not to support laws that criminalize or besmirch civic organizations, not to seek ways of restricting citizen protests, and to support the democratically participative containment of disinformation. It should expressly reject minimal, majoritarian democracy and commit to deeper rights protections, tolerance, and active citizenship.   The objection to such a pact might be that it would give parties’ rhetorically stated democratic commitments unmerited legitimacy because in practice they are all inherently authoritarian. This question is complicated, and there is no one block answer to the question of how democratic the far right is—at least for now.   Far-right parties do not declare in their manifestos that they are antidemocratic; indeed, they insist they are committed to reviving democratic participation. It is necessary to break down their actions and positions into their component parts, many of which are in line with democratic norms, while others are likely to push against the boundaries of liberal democracy. Most likely, far right positions may reduce the overall quality of democracy rather than disassemble democracy wholesale.   This debate involves much speculation about the future still. The far right in Hungary and Poland has already shown itself in office to be antidemocratic, but in other places it has not yet had such clear governing power to show its cards so unequivocally. Where far-right parties elsewhere have been in some kind of formal or informal governing arrangement, their approaches toward democracy have not been conclusive. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has worryingly tightened control over critical media and pushed for executive-strengthening constitutional change while not apparently representing a threat to democracy in any systеmic sense.   Some far-right parties may menace selected liberal rights while proposing forms of direct democracy that may in fact be helpful to democratic quality. These parties’ standard suggestion that democratic accountability needs to be rooted in national democratic processes is not so unreasonable. Of course, the common far-right calls for more responsive citizen-led democracy may well prove entirely disingenuous in many cases. But cooperative policy work on such questions should not be ruled out a priori. It would clearly be ideologically uncomfortable for liberal mainstream parties to accept such reactionary parties as partners in democracy-enhancing innovations, and yet the depth of current political tensions makes such efforts increasingly vital.   The variation in parties’ political-systеm positions calls for some disaggregated EU policy responses. The pro-EU mainstream may rightly push back against many far-right policies, but the dynamics related to democracy require a different approach. The center right’s rightward shift on some policies might be undesirable and highly concerning on many grounds, but it does not necessarily constitute a problem for democracy as such unless it starts to extend outside core liberal parameters. Contrary to a much-heard refrain, shoring up the mainstream center ground is not the same thing as shoring up democracy. A democracy pact could help move the debate beyond the über-dominant and overly blunt debate about whether to engage or isolate the far right (Youngs et al. 2024). It might also help cultivate a more Europeanized political debate about the centrality of democracy and its varied meanings.   Conclusion   This article has offered a framework for getting beyond a conundrum that paralyzes current political debates: the democracy catch-22. This aim, in turn, encourages a different way of thinking about how the EU might move forward from June’s elections in a way that mitigates fears for democracy.   Many progressive liberals will, of course, feel there should be no exploration of common ground at all with parties that are so regressive on multiple policy issues. The most frequently made postelection argument is that the pro-EU mainstream must now double down on a strategy of combative detachment from the radical right. Rather, the balancing act is for mainstream parties to retain their strong opposition to the far right on crucial policy questions while trying to entice at least parts of it into a democracy protection consensus. This effort might not succeed across the board, but the situation would at least be clarified with regard to those parties that refused to sign a democracy pact, and this distinction would help prepare the ground for tougher policy responses in these cases.   To address the far-right rise, European parties face the choice between, on the one hand, doubling down on defending traditional approaches to EU integration and, on the other hand, exploring new strategies and political formats. The latter might entail some uncomfortable steps, but the gravity of mounting challenges invites a deeper rethink. The policy of reinforced ostracization might be appropriate for many policy issues, but on political-systеm matters, a business-as-usual continuity risks intensifying the very causal factors that underpin the current situation. The European Commission president has promised a Democracy Shield to target external interference (Youngs and Panchulidze 2024); she would do better to focus on internal risks to liberal pluralism and design a European democracy pact. ■   References   Ash, Timothy Garton. 2024. “Wake up! After these elections, Europe is again in danger.” European Council on Foreign Relations Commentary. June 11. https://ecfr.eu/article/wake-up-after-these-elections-europe-is-again-in-danger/ (Accessed July 25, 2024)   Atlantic Council. 2024. “Experts react: How the European Parliament’s right turn is playing out across the continent.” June 10. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-how-the-european-parliaments-right-turn-playing-out-across-the-continent/ (Accessed July 25, 2024)   Ganesh, Janah. 2024. “The last best hope against populism is to expose it to government.” Financial Times. June 11. https://www.ft.com/content/7f9552e3-fba5-4ef9-8858-270a9b976ac5 (Accessed July 25, 2024)   Grant, Charles, Zselyke Csaky, Christina Kessler, Zach Meyers, and Luigi Scazzieri. 2024. “What will the EU election results mean for Europe?” Center for European Reform Insight. June 11. https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/insight_EU_elections_11.6.24.pdf (Accessed July 25, 2024)   Youngs, Richard. 2024. “Why the European Elections Will Test Democracy.” Journal of Democracy Online Exclusive. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/why-the-european-elections-will-test-democracy/ (Accessed July 25, 2024)   Youngs, Richard. eds. 2024. “Europe’s Democracy Blind Spots.” European Democracy Hub. https://europeandemocracyhub.epd.eu/projects/europes-democracy-blind-spots/ (Accessed July 25, 2024)   Youngs, Richard, and Elene Panchulidze. 2024. “A Democracy Shield from Europe?” Encompass. https://encompass-europe.com/comment/a-democracy-shield-for-europe (Accessed July 25, 2024)     ■ Richard Youngs is a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, based at Carnegie Europe.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Richard Youngs 2024-07-26Views : 4050
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Mongolia’s Electoral Reform and the State Great Khural (Parliamentary) Elections

Background of Electoral Reform   Since the transition to a democratic systеm and market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia has held its 9th parliamentary election. In a historic first, the election held on June 28 was carried out under the new electoral systеm. A total of 78 members of parliament (MPs) were elected from 13 majoritarian districts, with an additional 48 MPs elected through proportional representation in a nationwide constituency (General Election Commission of Mongolia 2024). The new parliament consists of 126 seats, in accordance with the amendments to the Constitution introduced in 2023. The election results demonstrated that the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) secured 68 seats, followed by the Democratic Party (DP) with 42 seats, the HUN Party with 8 seats, and both the National Alliance and the Civil Will-Green Party with 4 seats each. It is noteworthy that the MPP won 50 constituency seats and 18 from the party list, thereby ensuring a majority presence in parliament alongside three other parties that surpassed the legal threshold for representation (Oyunchimeg 2024). This distribution of seats underscores the diversity of representation in parliament, reflecting the electorate’s support for multiple political entities and ensuring a legislative body that is balanced and representative of the political spectrum.   Over the past 34 years, various electoral systеms have been employed, including majoritarian voting systеms with single or multiple mandates and mixed systеms that combine majoritarian and proportional representation voting elements. Each systеm has its strengths and weaknesses. However, the criticism from both the public and political parties of the contemporary electoral systеm has resulted in frequent changes to it. Before the new systеm was introduced, the Mongolian parliament had maintained 76 seats since 1990.   The number of seats in the parliament was increased by approximately 40 percent, from 76 to 126. Since 1990, Mongolia’s population has grown from 2.15 million to 3.5 million, an increase of about 40 percent. As a representative institution of the people, there has been significant debate in recent years regarding the potential expansion of the parliamentary seats. The proposed increase in seats has prompted a considerable number of individuals to seek election. In the first democratic election held after new democratic Constitution in 1992, only 293 individuals representing 10 parties and independents ran for the parliament. The 2024 Election saw the largest number of candidates to date, with the highest number of candidacies. A total of 372 individuals from 22 parties and coalitions contested the election through party lists, while 969 candidates ran in constituencies, resulting in a total of 1,341 candidates, marking a record high.   Assessment of New Electoral Systеm Derived from Election Results   The parliamentary elections in Mongolia marked several significant milestones and challenges in the country’s democratic processes. The first notable development is the emergence of smaller parties, which has resulted in the decline of the dominance by the two major parties, namely the MPP and the DP. In addition to the traditional two major parties, a three-party coalition is expected to hold approximately 13 percent of the total seats in the 2024 elections (iKon 2024-06-29). The legislation establishes the electoral threshold at 4 percent for a single party, 5 percent for a two-party coalition, and 7 percent for a coalition of three or more parties. As a result, of the 22 parties that participated in the 2024 elections, three parties and two coalitions met the threshold and secured seats in parliament. The right-wing HUN Party, which had only one seat as a result of the 2020 elections, has emerged as a potential third force in Mongolian politics (Al Jazeera 2024-06-28), while the long-forgotten Civil Will-Green Party has re-emerged as a significant player.   Second is the increased representation of female MPs in the parliament. The composition of the parliament reflects diversity across age, gender, educational background, profession, and disability status. The election of 32 women as MPs represents a significant milestone in gender representation. This increase can be attributed to the implementation of a new law in 2024 that mandated gender parity on party candidate lists, thereby ensuring an equal distribution of 50% female and 50% male candidates. Consequently, the proportion of female members in parliament rose from 17.1 percent in 2020 to 25.4 percent in 2024. Nevertheless, only eight out of 969 female candidates were elected in multi-member constituencies, highlighting the challenges women encounter under majoritarian voting systеms. In contrast, 24 women were elected from the 372 candidates on party lists, resulting in a total of 32 female parliamentarians. Furthermore, for the first time in Mongolian history, a Kazakh woman from the Civil Will-Green Party was elected to parliament, signifying a pivotal advancement in the political representation of ethnic minorities in the country. The increased representation of women in parliament underscores the effectiveness of gender quota-based party lists as the principal instrument for augmenting women’s representation in parliament, thereby contributing to Mongolia’s progress in global gender parity rankings.   A third factor is the entry of new parliamentarians and the expectation that they will provide reform leadership. A review of the composition of the 126 MPs elected in the 2024 parliamentary elections reveals that a significant majority, 80%, are newcomers to parliamentary service (Eaglenews 2024-06-29). This turnover highlights a shift towards new leadership and novel perspectives within Mongolia’s political landscape. Meanwhile, the presence of experienced members such as S. Byambatsogt from the Mongolian People’s Party provides a balance of continuity and institutional knowledge, which serves to offset the influx of new parliamentarians with a more seasoned expertise. This combination of new and veteran MPs illustrates the dynamic evolution and diversity of representation in Mongolia’s parliament.   Notwithstanding these positive outcomes, there are still matters that require improvement. The first issue is the persistently low voter turnout. The voter turnout in Mongolia has exhibited a gradual decline over time, from a peak of 95.6% in 1992 to 69.6% in 2024 (Aliman 2024). While voter turnout consistently exceeded 80% during the initial years of Mongolia’s democratic elections, it has declined below this threshold since 2008, reaching a record low of 67.3% in 2012. Despite a slight recovery in 2016 and 2020, the 2024 turnout indicates a continued downward trend (Statistical Database 2024). Nevertheless, female and younger voters demonstrated greater electoral participation this time. The proportion of female voters who participated in the election was remarkably high at 74.1%, compared to 65.9% of male voters. Among age groups, there was an increase in voter turnout among young adults in their 20s and 30s who were born after the transition to democracy, with approximately 70% participation. Among those in their 30s and 40s, voter turnout exceeded 70%. Overall, while there are challenges in maintaining high overall voter turnout, particularly among older age groups, the active participation of women and young adults in recent elections indicates a promising trajectory for Mongolia’s democratic process.   One factor contributing to the decline in voter turnout is the limited participation of Mongolian citizens living abroad in elections. Currently, approximately 200,000 Mongolians of working age are resident in 34 foreign countries, which represents approximately 10% of all registered voters. In the 2024 election, only around 13,000 of them registered to vote, with about 10,000 ultimately casting their ballots. The primary challenge for Mongolians residing abroad is the necessity to case their votes in person at the Mongolian embassy in the capital city of their host country. This logistical hurdle contributes to lower voter turnout among overseas. Consequently, there has been a growing debate regarding the introduction of online voting from their current places of residence. Such initiatives have the potential to increase voter turnout among expatriates and enhance their engagement in Mongolia’s democratic processes. It is of the utmost importance to address the logistical barriers faced by Mongolian citizens living abroad for promoting broader and more inclusive participation in national elections, thereby strengthening Mongolia’s democratic governance.   Second issue is the significant discrepancy in constituency size. The disparity in the number of voters per mandate across Mongolia’s constituencies has prompted criticism of the current election systеm. In rural districts, the minimum number of voters per mandate is 19,400, while the maximum is 25,100, averaging around 21,400 voters per mandate. In contrast, despite nearly half of Mongolia’s population residing in Ulaanbaatar, the city is divided into 6 constituencies where the number of voters per mandate ranges from 24,700 to 58,500, averaging about 45,500 voters per mandate. This disparity highlights a ratio of nearly 1:2 in the number of voters per mandate between rural areas and the capital city, despite the fact that Ulaanbaatar and rural provinces have approximately equal shares of the population. This discrepancy highlights systеmic challenges in ensuring equal representation and the facilitation of effective electoral participation across Mongolia’s diverse geographical and demographic landscape. It is imperative that these disparities be rectified to guarantee fairness and equity in the electoral process, thereby reinforcing the democratic institutions of Mongolia and ensuring that the voice of all citizens are adequately represented in parliament.   Third issue is the short campaign period, which presents a disadvantage to newcomers. The 2024 parliamentary election campaign officially commenced on June 10 and concluded 17 days later. Members of parliament exclusively distributed their work reports in printed form to the constituencies, and public opinion polls ranking politicians were not published. The total amount of airtime was restricted to 60 minutes, with each party, coalition, and candidate allotted a maximum of five minutes for coverage. In the 2024 election, there were 13 majority districts, a reduction from the 29 previously in existence. This resulted in significant challenges for newcomers to politics in terms of gaining voter recognition within the limited campaign period. As a result, those with prior political experience, as well as those pursuing careers in journalism and the arts, were able to gain a distinct advantage.   Fourth issue is the continued lack of support for disabled voters to exercise their right to vote. According to the National Human Rights Commission’s “Political Participation, Voting, and Electoral Rights Implementation Survey,” 14-16% of disabled individuals require assistance to reach polling stations. In its assessment of polling station accessibility, the Commission found that 55 out of 73% were located on the first floor, while 20 out of 26% were on floors two, three, or in basements. The polling booths on these floors frequently had more than three steps, rendering independent access impossible for disabled citizens. The monitoring of 77 polling stations and portable boxes in nine districts of the capital and 19 provinces revealed a number of violations. These included instances of staff lacking communication skills with individuals who are speech-impaired, as well as insufficient information provided to hearing-impaired voters at polling stations.   Implications of New Electoral Systеm to Mongolian Democracy   For over three decades since the transition to democracy, there has been a consistent and peaceful transfer of government power from one incumbent to another. The 2024 9th parliamentary election served to perpetuate this trend. While no significant electoral irregularities were reported, there were instances of the distribution of financial and material incentives with the intention of influencing voter behavior, as well as instances of attempted vote buying.   Western partners of Mongolia, including the United States, expressed satisfaction with the electoral process, emphasizing the country’s commitment to democratic principles. The United States extended its congratulations to Mongolia on the successful completion of the electoral process and expressed willingness to collaborate with the newly elected members of the State Great Khural and the incoming government (U.S. Department of State 2024).   Despite the positive outcomes of the electoral process, there are concerns that require attention. The International Election Observation Mission conducted by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Parliament reported that while the electoral process was deemed to have been effectively admіnistered, concerns were raised regarding the competitiveness of the electoral contest due to an uneven playing field. While Mongolia’s legal framework for democratic elections was deemed adequate, it is recommended that further alignment with international standards on fundamental rights and freedoms be pursued. The extensive media coverage was nevertheless criticized for biases favoring certain ruling party, potentially limiting voters’ ability to make informed decisions. On election day, while the polling process was generally conducted in a smooth and transparent manner, with accurate reporting of results, shortcomings in the ballot reconciliation and verification procedures at some polling stations were identified. These shortcomings affected the overall integrity of the process.   Conclusions   In the 35 years since the democratic revolution, Mongolia has held 10 parliamentary elections, 8 presidential elections, and 9 local elections.[1] These elections represent a significant outcome and a major achievement of democracy, confirming the peaceful transfer of power to the opposition party through the electoral process as a norm.   The 2024 parliamentary elections reflect both progress and challenges in the country’s democratic development. They underscore the necessity for sustained reforms to reinforce electoral integrity, inclusivity, and representative governance. Following the institutionalization of democracy in Mongolia through the 1992 Constitution, voter turnout was relatively high in most elections. However, a gradual decline in voter participation has been observed. The higher voter turnout in the 1990s was largely due to the novelty effect. This enthusiasm subsequently diminished over time, a trend observed in other newly established democracies. Nevertheless, voter turnout remains high for parliamentary elections, which serves to underscore the significant role that parliament plays within the political systеm of Mongolia. The 2024 parliamentary elections demonstrated that the participation of a minimum of two-thirds of the electorate has become the new norm. However, it is imperative to address the issue of legislation amendments that would facilitate greater voter participation and involvement of those residing abroad in the electoral process.   In previous elections based on a majoritarian systеm, minor parties had a very little chance of securing a seat in parliament. Additionally, the parties expressed opposition to the new electoral laws of 2023, specifically the reduction in the number of electoral districts from 29 to 13 enlarged regional constituencies. Such large electoral districts confirmed their doubts and benefited large parties with extensive resources and networks in rural areas. This resulted in a notable disadvantage for smaller parties and independent candidates in the 2024 parliamentary elections.   The challenges faced by smaller parties, newcomers, and women were primarily due to the increasing relevance of resources in the context of running campaigns, establishing and maintaining rural networks, and covering large electoral districts. In rural areas, the lack of developed infrastructure, vast geographic size, and scattered population required significant financial resources for campaigning. Therefore, with the exception of the two main parties, there was rarely any other political representation beyond the capital city of Ulaanbaatar.   From other side, numerous parties were established as a means of public criticism, only to cease operations shortly thereafter. Researchers have observed that this phenomenon is a consequence of a legislative provision that allows parties to register with minimal obstacles. However, the size of electoral districts and the lack of established rural networks constituted a significant challenge that could not be surmounted. This phenomenon was observed among independent candidates, newcomers, and women who lacked the backing of a major political party.   The previous electoral framework introduced distortions between votes and seats, thereby impeding the development of a balanced and equal-opportunity multi-party political systеm. The new electoral systеm of 2024 offers the prospect of progress in terms of the current establishments’ capacity or willingness to implement genuine reform with a view to improving democratic governance. To date, the multi-party systеm has yet to be fully realized. The main problem is that the electoral systеm has yet to evolve in a manner that ensures transparency, fairness, and inclusivity in the electoral process. ■   References   Al Jazeera. 2024. “Preliminary election results show Mongolian People’s Party in the lead.” June 28. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/28/preliminary-election-results-show-mongolian-peoples-party-in-the-lead (Accessed July 17, 2024)   Aliman, A. 2024. “П.Дэлгэрнаран: МАН 35%, АН 30.1%, ХҮН нам 10.4%, Үндэсний Эвсэл 5.2%, ИЗНН 5%-ийн санал авсан байна [P. Delgernaran: MPP 35%, Democratic Party 30.1%, People’s Party 10.4%, National Coalition 5.2%, CPN 5%].” iKon. June 29. https://ikon.mn/n/36ik (Accessed July 17, 2024)   Eaglenews. 2024. “126 гишүүний 80 нь анх удаа сонгогджээ [80 out of 126 members were elected for the first time].” June 29. https://eagle.mn/r/128264 (Accessed July 17, 2024)   General Election Commission of Mongolia. 2024. https://m-election.mn/en (Accessed July 17, 2024)   iKon. 2024. “Election Results.” June 29. https://ikon.mn/elections/2024 (Accessed July 17, 2024)   National Statistical Commission. 2024. “Statistical Database - Voter Participation.” https://www2.1212.mn/tables.aspx?tbl_id=DT_NSO_0200_003V1&13999001_select_all=0&13999001SingleSelect=_t1&Parties_select_all=0&PartiesSingleSelect=&YearY_select_all=0&YearYSingleSelect=_2020_2016_2012_2008_2004_2000_1996_1992&viewtype= (Accessed July 17, 2024)   Oyunchimeg, SH. 2024. “Ардчилсан парламентын шинэ түүх эхэлж байна! [A new history of the democratic parliamentary begins].” News.mn. July 1. https://news.mn/r/2735325/ (Accessed July 17, 2024)   U.S. Department of State. 2024. “On Mongolia’s Recent Parliamentary Elections.” Press Statement. June 29. https://www.state.gov/on-mongolias-recent-parliamentary-elections/ (Accessed July 17, 2024)     [1] The parliament, formed in 1990 with the first free and multi-party elections, passed the first democratic constitution of 1992.     ■ Ganbat Damba is the Chairman of Board at the Academy of Political Education, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.   ■ Byambakhand Luguusharav is a Ph.D candidate at the University of Humanities of Mongolia.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Ganbat Damba 2024-07-19Views : 2861
Commentary Issue Briefing
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Horizontal Accountability Requires More than Legal Checks and Balances Systеm: Ten Asian Country Cases

Most countries, except closed autocracies, conduct popular elections. However, the quality of global democracy has been deteriorating. One of the most significant illiberal trends is the aggrandizement of executive power led by a popularly elected political leader. Strongmen often bend or simply violate democratic rules by abusing their executive power. The electoral mandate gives them legitimacy, making the efforts to check their executive power difficult. In this context, horizontal accountability based on the checks and balances systеm and oversight institutions is important to prevent the emergence of strongmen. However, horizontal accountability cannot function effectively unless its legal mechanisms are implemented in practice. Ten Asian country cases, presented in previously published ADRN working papers, demonstrated that horizontal accountability perform better when the legislature is not politically captured by the executive power and the judiciary is independent. Oversight institutions also require both political independence and institutional capacity. The electoral accountability of elected elites to voters helps the legislative branch to fulfill its role of constraining the excessive executive power. Independent media and civil society participation always assist both electoral and horizontal accountability.   Trends of Horizontal Accountability   Upon applying the V-Dem horizontal accountability data from 1960 to 2020, we can divide ten selected Asian countries into two groups for the sake of convenience. One group can be defined as having higher accountability, while the other can be defined as having lower accountability. This division is based on the accountability score of recent years. The five countries that scored more than 0.75 in 2022 include South Korea, Taiwan, Nepal, Mongolia, and Thailand. Following their democratic transitions in the late 1980s, South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia exhibited a notable advancement in their horizontal accountability. Nepal, on the other hand, has demonstrated a gradual yet consistent enhancement in its accountability performance, despite occasional fluctuations. Thailand, however, has exhibited an unusually volatile performance largely influenced by the frequent military coups.   Figure 1. Horizontal Accountability of Five Asian Countries Scoring above 0.75 as of 2022     Conversely, the horizontal accountability performance of India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Pakistan has been comparatively lower, with a convergence to a range between 0.5 and 0.75 scores over the past half decade. It is noteworthy that India has experienced a decline during the period of Narendra Modi’s rule since 2014. Rodrigo Duterte’s tenure from 2014 to 2022 also resulted in a notable decline in the horizontal accountability performance of the Philippines. Indonesia also demonstrates a consistent decline over the past decade. Pakistan is the only country in this group that has experienced an upward trajectory in its accountability performance, while its level remains below that of the other countries. The ascendance of a strong man to power tends to weaken horizontal accountability, with an inclination towards the expansion of executive power and a proclivity for violations of the checks and balances principle.   Figure 2. Horizontal Accountability of Five Asian Countries Scoring between 0.5 and 0.75 as of 2022     One of the essential conditions of horizontal accountability is the constitutional framework that establishes a systеm of checks and balances between three branches of government: the executive, legislative, and judicial. The Comparative Constitutions Project assesses the power and judicial independence. Ten countries scored as the below. Higher numbers indicate greater power or independence.   Table 1. Constitutional Power Arrangement (Comparative Constitutions Project Indices)     Executive Power (0-7 points) Legislative Power (mean of the 32 binary elements) Judicial Independence (0-6 point) South Korea 5 0.38 4 Taiwan 2 0.33 4 Mongolia 6 0.33 4 Nepal 3 0.29 6 Thailand 5 0.14 1 Philippine 3 0.33 4 Indonesia 3 0.33 2 India 4 0.19 4 Pakistan 5 0.29 3 Sri Lanka 5 0.19 4   Source: Comparative Constitutions Project 2016)   Among the top five countries whose horizontal accountability scores exceeded 0.75 in the recent V-Dem survey, Thailand stands out as an outlier with markedly limited legislative power and judicial independence. This indicates that Thailand’s horizontal accountability recovery is particularly vulnerable, given that its constitution does not properly provide for the legislative and judicial oversight of the executive branch. At the same time, disparity in authority between the executive and legislative branches does not fully account for the horizontal performance. Taiwan, which has a relatively weaker executive branch, performs relatively well, as do South Korea and Mongolia which have stronger executive branches. A closer examination of the five countries with lower performance reveals that the legislative branches of India and Sri Lanka appear to lack the capacity to effectively check the executive power. On the other hand, the lower judicial independence of Indonesia appears to be a contributing factor to the country’s poor horizontal accountability performance. While legislative power and judicial independence are crucial for checking the increasing aggrandizement of executive power, the constitutional arrangements of these countries do not provide a clear explanation for the observed differences in performance. The presence of a democratic constitution is not in itself a guarantee of democratic practice. Furthermore, horizontal accountability is contingent upon the vertical and diagonal accountability of each country. This ambiguity necessitates a detailed examination of each country’s case.   Factors Contributing to Horizontal Accountability Gap   In most countries, the institutional framework for horizontal accountability has been codified into law. First and foremost, the constitutions of ten countries guarantee the checks and balances among the three powers of the executive, parliament, and judiciary. In a presidential systеm, the legislative body is typically vested with the authority to impeach the president. In addition, institutional mechanisms of ombudsman, anti-corruption, and audit, which are designed to hold public officials accountable, are provided despite differences in the legal limits of their authority. Nevertheless, a senior executive official can effectively circumvent the legislative body’s checks and balances with relative ease.   In Indonesia, a presidential republic, the Corruption Eradication Commission plays a pivotal role in ensuring horizontal accountability. While the Commission does not have direct sanctioning capacity to impose penalties on the President or other public officials, it is able to supervise and investigate allegations of corruption among all state actors and refer cases to the court. However, following the legal amendment, the Commission became accountable to the President as the head of the executive. This position makes it challenging for the Commission to investigate any corruption cases involving the President. The Indonesian President’s power towards the legislature has been also fortified. The Constitution permits the legislative body to restrict the President’s involvement in drafting legislation through the Government Regulation in lieu of Law. However, the President’s party can form a coalition with almost all political parties in the parliament. This ‘fat (gemuk)’ trend, which has been in place since 2004, has allowed the elected president to consolidate control of the government and weaken potential opposition from the legislative body. Furthermore, the Indonesian President can exert influence over oversight agencies by maintaining close ties with their top officials. This was demonstrated by the constitutional court’s decision to allow the then-incumbent president Jokowi’s son to run for vice-presidential election. Devi Darmawan and Sri Nuryanti write that this cartel politics, which prioritizes the interests of a few over those of the masses, has led to the accountability trap and hindered the process of democratization (ADRN 2024a).   Regarding horizontal accountability, India has adopted the systеm of judicial review, drawing primarily on the experiences of the United States. The Supreme Court has the authority to review the actions of the parliament and state legislatures. In the early years of constitutional governance, Niranjan Sahoo notes that the Supreme Court generally adopted a pro-legislature stance (ADRN 2024b). However, the Supreme Court justices subsequently established a framework for the judiciary to engage in conflict with the executive and legislative branches. In the wake of the national emergency in 1975, the judiciary took a series of proactive measures to expand its powers vis-à-vis the legislative and executive branches through creative interpretation of fundamental rights. Since the early 1980s, judicial activism has expanded to making public interest litigations easier. This change opened spaces for public-spirited citizens, human rights attorneys, and civil society. However, the author asserts that the courts overstepped the executive and legislative spheres on multiple occasions. To further enhance the checks on executive interference, the higher judiciary in India has also replaced the executive’s appointment rights with the collegium systеm where the executive leader is required to consult with the judiciary when appointing judges. Since the arrival of the Modi government, the executive branch has reasserted its authority over the judiciary. In addition to the issue of judicial appointments, the executive branch has been able to get individual judges to support its policies, even when these policies violate constitutional principles. The author assesses that courts have largely aligned with the executive’s position and have not fulfilled their constitutional duty of protecting fundamental rights since 2014. Furthermore, the decline in judicial legitimacy has coincided with a surge in corruption scandals.   Pakistan, a parliamentary systеm, is equipped with the horizontal accountability institutions including the National Accountability Bureau, Provincial Anti-Corruption Establishments, the Office of the Auditor General of Pakistan, and Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen. However, accountability works selectively and ineffectively due to the comparative strength of the executive power, compared to a relatively weak legislature. Notwithstanding the legal authority vested in them, parliamentary committees at the national and provincial levels have been notably inactive and ineffective in overseeing the executives. In particular, government-led finance bills are frequently passed without sufficient deliberation within the Public Accounts Committee. Interestingly, the judicial branch in Pakistan undermines accountability due to its increasing influence over the legislature and President. Instead of leveraging its authority and public support to fortify democratic institutions, Muhammad Habib writes that the judiciary has employed its influence to scrutinize, critique, and undermine other branches of government at times (ADRN 2024a). It is a common practice in Pakistan for one constitutional institution to interfere in the affairs of other institutions, which has the effect of creating political chaos in the country. One significant challenge for these state institutions is the separation of powers among themselves. Consequently, it is imperative that inter-institutional dialogues be initiated among the state pillars to reform the current accountability structure. This intricated interweaving of constitutional institutions appears to afford the Establishment—the deep state cooperation of the Pakistan Armed Forces, the Pakistani intelligence community, and other pro-military government officials and civilians—a considerable degree of influence in Pakistan. This is achieved by maintaining its veto power over the democratically elected president.   In Sri Lanka, a semi-presidential republic, variety of horizontal accountability mechanisms are in place. The President can appoint a Commission of Inquiry when it appears that an inquiry should be conducted. Three parliamentary committees, the Committee on Public Accounts, the Committee on Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Public Finance, are responsible for monitoring and evaluating the activities of the executive government, public corporations, and companies in which the government has a financial interest. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption (CIABOC) plays a pivotal role in monitoring the conduct of public officials. The Financial Crimes Investigations Division was established later to include the investigation of money laundering and the unlawful enrichment of both the private and public sectors. Furthermore, the Constitution mandates that the Auditor General audit all government departments, key offices, key commissions, local authorities, public corporations, and companies where the government is the majority shareholder. However, these institutions frequently lack the requisite legal authority and resources to fulfill their designated roles. Nishana Weerasooriya and Shannon Elizabeth Talayaratne analyze that the opaque process of appointment, lack of mandates to investigate corruption cases, and shortage of human resources and budgets are forcing these oversight institutions to become less effective (ADRN 2024a).   The Philippines, a presidential systеm, demonstrates how existing horizontal accountability mechanisms can be easily undermined by a populist authoritarian leader. Following the end of authoritarian rule by Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the 1987 Constitution introduced a set of horizontal accountability mechanisms, particularly strengthening the checks and balances systеm through the strengthening of the legislature and the judiciary. To provide institutional limits on executive authority, oversight agencies were also established to conduct financial audits of government spending, check corruption among public officials, and investigate human rights violations by state actors. However, these constitutional safeguards became dysfunctional during the Duterte Presidency. Francisco A. Magno and Martin Josef E. Vivo show that the Elkins data demonstrate the current constitutional systеm leans more towards the powers of Congress and the independence of the Judiciary over the powers of the Presidency (ADRN 2024b). Nevertheless, the legislative oversight over the executive branch in the implementation of public policies and programs has proven ineffective. The authors posit that Members of Congress are deeply embedded in the patterns of personalism and clientelism towards the incumbent President. Moreover, the Supreme Court is not independent in using judicial power to sanction unlawful decisions by the executive. The oversight agencies including the Office of the Ombudsman, Commission on Audit, and Commission on Human Rights also lack the capacity to hold the executive accountable. The fragmented political parties in the Philippines make it relatively easy for the incumbent President to capture the legislative. Therefore, despite legal arrangements, the horizontal accountability mechanism does not work properly when the authoritarian President titters them together with his allies in the legislature.   Thailand, a constitutional monarchy, stands out as an interesting case. The country has experienced a similar pattern of fluctuations in its V-Dem accountability score. It is evident that the military coups of 1977, 1991, 2006, and 2014 resulted in a sharp decline in horizontal accountability. Once political stability was restored, however, the level of horizontal accountability returned to previous levels, reflecting a general upward trend. This trend indicates that the country’s accountability performance is sustainable, provided that the military does not intervene in politics. Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Arithat Bunthueng maintain that robust systеm of checks and balances, enshrined in the Constitution and other legislation, is a key driver of horizontal accountability (ADRN 2024a). Furthermore, the vibrant civil society and the relatively free press also contributed to Thailand’s ability to maintain relatively high levels of accountability during periods of normal politics. However, the authors contend that oversight institutions such as the Admіnistrative Court and the judiciary were unable to effectively address corruption and consequently lost public trust. In particular, following the last military coup, the Senate was weakened in monitoring the government as the military came to control the Senate, giving it the power to vote for the Prime Minister, alongside members of the House of Representatives. This stipulation permits senators to decline to endorse the election of Pita Limjaroenrat during the 2023 Prime Ministerial election, despite a large majority of the House supporting his candidacy. The transitional Senate established under the 2014 Constitution expired on May 10, 2024. The following Senates was reduced to a 200-member body, without the authority to elect a Prime Minister. The new systеm for electing Senators is more complex and not transparent, which is likely to erode public trust in the legislature.   Mongolia has performed a relatively high level of horizontal accountability. As in other countries, the 1992 Constitution, which was enacted following the country’s democratization, established a systеm of checks and balances. However, Ganbat Damba and Mina Sumaadii explain that there has been a continuous shift in power toward the legislative and the prime minister, which has weakened political parties and the judiciary systеm (ADRN 2024a). For instance, political nomination of judges has risen, and the National Security Council has the authority to remove judges. Moreover, in the existing political environment, oversight agencies have limited capacity and are not free from political interference. The two major oversight agencies are the Mongolian National Audit Office and the Independent Authority Against Corruption of Mongolia. The authors argue that in the Mongolian semi-presidential systеm, where the prime minister has strong power even if a popularly elected President appoints him, the power hierarchy is ambiguous, leading to horizontal accountability chains that are less clear. The Constitution designates the Supreme Court as the highest judicial body. The Judicial General Council is responsible for selecting and nominating judges among the candidates appointed by the President or Parliament. Nevertheless, given the appointment systеm, it is highly disputed whether the judiciary and the prosecutors can be truly independent in the existing systеm. Furthermore, the Law on the Legal Status of Judges, enacted in 2019, allows the National Security Council, comprising the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament, to remove judges. Furthermore, the 2022 constitutional amendment permitted cabinet members to concurrently hold memberships in parliament, and it also expanded the size of the legislature. The authors argue that this amendment introduces a higher risk of power abuse, as cabinet members who are concurrently members of parliament have access to resources and immunity from prosecution. In the context of Mongolia, where systеmic corruption is prevalent, this issue is particularly controversial.   South Korea, a country with a semi-presidential systеm, maintains a distinctive political structure that preserves a prominent presidential role. Political parties are not strongly institutionalized, which makes them vulnerable to the influence of ambitious politicians. Since its democratic transition in 1987, the constitutional arrangement guaranteeing the checks and balances is robust, and other legal mechanisms for audits and anti-corruption allow for the institutional basis of horizontal accountability. However, Jung Kim posits that South Korea’s de facto accountability performance has oscillated between periods of deterioration and restoration (ADRN 2024a). This democratic careening occurs when a liberal president, who prioritizes electoral mandate over constitutional constraints, overreaches toward populist excess, or when a conservative president, who prioritizes constitutional constraints over electoral mandate, overreach toward oligarchical excess. One of the key challenges in horizontal accountability has been the Prosecutive Service. As the nation’s highest law enforcement agency, the prosecutors’ office, nominally under the Ministry of Justice, has the authority to indict elected politicians for corruption. This indictment power, in conjunction with the authority of the Supreme Court, gives the Service the appearance of a semi-judicial body. The impartiality of the Prosecution Service in investigating political scandals has been called into question due to the potential leaning to the interest of the President. Accordingly, the issue of political independence from the executive power has been identified as a paramount reform issue. To close this loophole, the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO) was established in 2021. The head of the CIO is appointed by the President among two candidates recommended by the nomination committee. The committee is composed of the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Court Admіnistration, the President of the Korean Bar Association, and four members - two of whom are recommended by the ruling party and the other by the opposition. As a result of the consensus rule, which has the effect of gridlock, the amended Act now requires the nomination committee to form only five of the seven total possible votes, This effectively removes the veto power of the opposition party. Despite the expectations of those with a higher level of involvement in the process, the understaffed CIO has not been able to avoid the political fallout that has resulted from the harshly divided South Korean politics. Fortunately, the author points out that accountability mechanisms, including those from diagonal sources such as the media and civil society, have so far activated horizontal and vertical ones.   Taiwan also exhibits a lack of horizontal accountability, despite its relatively good performance. Chin-en Wu and Feng-Yu Lee conclude that legislative power is insufficient for holding the executive branch accountable in Taiwan (ADRN 2024a). This is attributed to the uneven distribution of power under the semi-presidential systеm and the single-member district electoral systеm. One clear reason for Taiwan’s lower legislative power score than that of other robust democracies such as Japan and South Korea is that Taiwan’s legislature is subject to dissolution by the president and lacks several crucial powers including investigative authority and the ability to approve ministerial appointments. Still, the practices of filibuster and party caucus negotiation could augment the authority of the legislative branch and serve as potent instrument to ensure the executive branch’s accountability. Additionally, the importance of the judiciary in interpreting the constitution and ensuring its compliance has become increasingly salient in recent years. This is evident in the judiciary’s inclination to prioritize individual rights over the ruling party’s attempt to seek the government’s capability for national security. The significance of the judiciary extends beyond the scope of these cases pertaining to the dissemination of fake news. Upon assuming office in 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government intensified its utilization of the Social Order Maintenance Act to target individuals suspected of disseminating fake news. The police were mandated to bring individuals suspected of spreading disruptive rumors before the courts. This action was sometimes based on information provided by pro-government sources or through proactive monitoring of politically oriented online platforms like specific Facebook pages. The number of cases presented to the court by the police has multiplied since 2019, due to the implementation of this act. However, in terms of the confrontation between civil society and the government, the courts tend to prioritize individual freedoms and make rulings that protect private rights instead of aligning with the ruling party’s position. The authors point out that this discrepancy between rules and actual practices could pose a trade-off between the principle of checks and balances and the governability of the executives. As a potential solution, the authors propose prioritizing the negotiation process regarding sensitive issues related to national identity, while allowing the ruling party to pursue non-identity issues.   Nepal underwent a unique political transition from an absolute monarchy to a federal parliamentary republic in 2008. The 2015 constitution established a fundamental systеm of checks and balances. Nevertheless, the transition has been characterized by political instability, including frequent changes in government and a lack of continuity in policymaking. Tirupati Pariyar writes that this instability has also resulted in a dearth of accountability and transparency, with minimal advancement in addressing corruption and ensuring effective service delivery (ADRN 2024b). With regard to horizontal accountability mechanisms, the author posits that the Parliamentary hearings represent a vital democratic process aimed at holding the executive branch accountable and responsible. This process entails the legislative body scrutinizing the competence, effectiveness, and integrity of individuals recommended by the executive for appointment to key public positions. The second is the Public Account Committee (PAC), which is responsible for checking how the government manages its money and resources. The committee was established in 1960. This is part of the government’s efforts to ensure that all processes are conducted in a fair and transparent manner. The third mechanism pertains to the promotion of judicial independence and accountability, the enhancement of the work culture of judicial personnel, and the implementation of effective monitoring and supervision of court operations. The fourth mechanism is comprised of 13 constitutional commissions. These commissions have been formed with the objective of empowering and protecting the rights of marginalized communities, backward communities, and other disadvantaged groups. The executive, judiciary, and legislative branches are equal in terms of functional independence and autonomy to perform checks and balances. However, the 13 commissions, which can work in close collaboration with civil society to democratize society, have yet to reach the people and check the government. They are limited to their jurisdiction with recommendation power and no executive role. The author writes that while the Constitution provides a robust framework for horizontal accountability, its implementation remains challenging due to the deficiencies of the institutional framework, the lack of transparency, and the prevalence of political interference.   Conclusion   A review of ten country cases indicates that executive aggrandizement is closely related to a horizontal accountability gap. This trend cannot be halted by constitutional arrangements for checks and balances of the three branches of state power. A number of factors contribute to the erosion of power balance. First and foremost, the legislature, the fundamental institution of representative democracy in numerous countries, has lost public confidence. This is due to the perception that it is incapable of representing the public interest and delivering public goods effectively. Elected politicians are frequently perceived as detached, self-serving elites. Consequently, voters are increasingly inclined to support an executive leader who is perceived to communicate more directly with them and address their grievances. In a presidential systеm, the executive leader has the capacity to implement a multitude of distributive policies without the necessity of legislative approval. Moreover, populist executive leaders can utilize social media to form an emotional bond with the public. As evidenced by the cases of the Philippines and Indonesia, numerous minor political parties can be readily co-opted by the dominant political party, thereby neutralizing meaningful legislative opposition.   Secondly, the institutions responsible for monitoring the actions of executive officials are typically government agencies. Therefore, their political independence is susceptible to erosion when engaging with the top political leader and his allies. It is evident that the process of appointing heads of oversight and ombudsman institutions should be designed in a way that prevents the dominance of executive power. These institutions also need to be staffed with enough investigators and adequately funded to fulfill their mission.   Thirdly, the independence of the judiciary is fundamentally important in the enforcement of horizontal accountability. The social intrusion of the courts in Pakistan and India at the expense of legislative or executive power raises the question of how the judicial authority should be demarcated. It is not advisable for courts to become politicized. Concurrently, the resolution of moral and political issues within the legislature is becoming increasingly challenging. In the majority of instances where the executive branch has assumed excessive power, the issue is not the politicization of the judiciary, but rather the lack of judicial independence.   If horizontal accountability is functioning as intended, legal and institutional reforms should be continued in order to close loopholes and introduce stronger mechanisms. Still, it is crucial to acknowledge that political actors, regardless of their position, whether executive officials, legislators, prosecutors, or judges, are influenced by the social and political environment. When such an environment is conducive to accountability and the prevention of abuse of power and corruption, public sector elites will adhere to the principles of accountability. This force limiting excessive power should originate from civil society and the free independent media. Horizontal accountability is an important mechanism for checking the aggrandizement of executive power, but its effectiveness depends on the active involvement of citizens and the media in monitoring the wrong doings of public elites and raising their democratic voices when facing controversial issues. ■   References   Asia Democracy Research Network: ADRN. 2024a. “Horizontal Accountability in Asia: Country Cases (Final Report Ⅰ).” http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?cid=3&idx=353 (Accessed May 3, 2024)   ______. 2024b (forthcoming). “Horizontal Accountability in Asia: Country Cases (Final Report Ⅱ).”   Comparative Constitutions Project. 2016. “Constitution Rankings.” https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ccp-rankings/#indices (Accessed May 3, 2024)     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute and the Representative of the Asia Democracy Research Network.     ■ Typeset by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Sook Jong Lee 2024-06-28Views : 3251