.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the fifth publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay and Mr. Kaustuv Chakrabarti of the Participatory Research in Asia study the populist phenomenon in India and its impact on Indian politics. They note that this movement, contrary to other cases of populism around the world, refers to "virtually any policy that is redistributive in nature... particularly when a policy is announced before impending elections." With this condition, Dr. Bandyopadhyay and Mr. Chakrabarti argue that populist decisions "can become more responsible and at the same time more irresponsible." The authors conclude that in order to bring an end to irresponsible and fiscally concerning decisions, civil society needs to "engage with the citizens" to "counter majoritarian populism."     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   In recent times we see populism all around us, but its precise definition remains elusive. From a democratic point of view, the ambivalence is already apparent in the term “populism.” Its root is the Latin word populus (the people), which exhibits a clear link with the democratic idea. Where there is democracy, in other words, there is always populism. On the other hand, the suffix “ism” signals an ideological potentiation in contrast to the moderate character of today’s democracies. By exaggerating the democratic element and mobilizing it against the constraints introduced into democratic systems by constitutional principles, populism moves at least potentially into the proximity of opponents of the system.   History and the Rise of Populism in India Since the late nineteenth century, populism has played a vital role in different phases of Indian history, particularly in mobilizing emergent groups and bringing about different movements and civil society initiatives. Populism has co-existed with several different ideological strands, and yet influenced a range of policies with its discourses and mobilization.   Populist Measures in India India is an example that proves economic liberalization can co-exist with populist politics and that populism can be used as an ideological framework within which the political contradictions that follow from economic change can be managed. The capaciousness of populism allows for a range of interests, some of them conflicting, to be acknowledged in both symbolic and practical ways.   Case Study 1: Guaranteeing Wage Employment in Rural India The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is a social security measure that guarantees the “right to work” to Indian rural citizens. The scheme provides a legal guarantee for at least one hundred days of employment in every financial year to the adult members of any rural household willing to do public works-related unskilled manual labor at the statutory minimum wage.   Case Study 2: Providing Subsidized Cooked Food in Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu’s political history for the past four decades has been characterized by a slew of populist measures. The laundry list of freebies handed out by the late Jayalalithaa included the waiver of all farm loans, free laptops for Class X and XII students, free cell phones for all ration card holders, and government reimbursement of education loans.   Case Study 3: Free Laptops to the Students of Uttar Pradesh (UP) With nearly 200 million people, UP remains the most populous Indian state. It ranks sixteenth among the seventeen Indian states according to the 2015 Human Development report. According to Sen and Ray, UP continues to be counted among the BIMARU states while others, such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, have come out of it. The crisis in education is especially apparent in the four BIMARU states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh – with 445.1 million of India’s population of 1.2 billion and some of the lowest literacy rates in the country, according to the 2011 Census.   Case Study 4: Demonetization The issue of corruption has long been a feature of the BJP’s electoral mobilization against the Congress. An opinion poll of 19,000 respondents conducted in mid-2013 found that 69 percent of respondents thought that the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was corrupt and that corruption had increased under the UPA’s rule, while only 23 percent thought that corruption had increased under the NDA government. Seeking to capitalize on these perceptions, a key theme in the BJP’s election manifesto was a populist narrative on corruption, according to which a “lack of openness in government and lack of people’s participation had led to concentration of power in a few hands and lack of transparency breeding corruption and nepotism on a massive scale.” Corruption was also “a manifestation of poor governance” and “reflects the bad intentions of those sitting in power.”   Impact of Populist Measures on Democratic Governance Democratic governance is the range of processes through which a society in pursuit of justice, equality, welfare, and environmental protection reaches a consensus on and implements regulations, human rights, laws, policies, and social structures. In this sense, democratic governance brings to the fore the question of how a society organizes itself to ensure equality of opportunity and equity (social and economic justice) for all citizens.   Positive Implications of Populist Measures One of the most important aspects of MGNREGS is that villagers can rightfully demand employment. The authority is responsible for providing employment in response to demand or providing an employment allowance in the cases where it has failed to meet the employment demand. According to Alam and Alam, it has made a dent in poverty by increasing employment opportunities. During the first year of implementation (2006-2007), in 200 districts, 21 million households were employed and 905 million person days were generated. In 2016-2017, in 686 districts 51 million households were provided employment and 2.35 billion person days were generated. In 2017-2018, 51 million households have been provided employment and 2.3 billion  person days have been generated across the country.   Negative Implications of Populist Measures Despite many positive outcomes of the MGNREGA, it has been criticized for its poor implementation and leakages. Under the MGNREGA, which was promulgated in 2005, each household is guaranteed 100 days of work every year. On average, each household received only forty-five days of work over the last decade – less than half the guarantee. The IHDS-II surveys report that up to 70 percent of interested poor households did not receive any MGNREGA work between 2004-2005 and 2011-2012. Unemployment allowance has rarely been paid.   Conclusion Populism does not oppose the democratic system per se; on the contrary, the democratic system needs its support and tools (e.g. elections). As analyzed in this paper, not all forms of populism are necessarily corrosive to democracy. In an unequal society where politics are governed by the interests of the political elite, populism plays an important role in balancing power by introducing citizen participation.     Author’s Biography   Kaustuv Chakrabarti is a senior program officer at PRIA. Currently, Kaustuv works on the issues of civic space, multi-stakeholder partnerships, South-South Cooperation, and building CSO capacities. He has been passionately engaged with PRIA’s work on civic space both at the Asian and South Asian level.  He co-authored Civic space under Siege: experiences from South Asia; the “State of Democracy: India” report, and the synthesis report on “Civic Space in Asia: Emerging Issues and Policy Lessons from Six Asian Countries 2018.” He has a Master’s degree in globalization and development from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex.   Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a pioneer CSO, working on participation, democratic governance and civil society development for more than three decades. He has twenty-five years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSOs. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a PhD in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India.  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the sixth publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Thawilwadeee Bureekul, Ms. Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Ms. Nuchaprapar Moksart of the King Prajadhipok's Institute explore the populist phenomena in Thailand. According to the authors, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (in 2001) has been instrumental in establishing populism through policy within Thai politics since the adoption of the 1997 Constitution. Despite the military coups that ensued the Thaksin administration, policy populism continued to provide benefits to the poor and help maintain public trust in the government. However, the authors argue that this kind of populism calls for a "checks and balances by non-governmental organizations [...] to ensure accountability in the implementation process." Given that redistributive policies have the potential of fiscal mismanagement and corruption, they suggest that the "function of laws and regulations should be considered" and the new measures following the 2017 Constitution be strictly enforced.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   Before the Asian 1997 financial crisis and the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, Thailand had endured a great number of fluctuations in its political development. The coming of the TRT party and Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 paved the way for the establishment of new politics in Thailand. The Thaksin administration created a new form of political campaign under the implementation of populist policies to increase public trust in government and improve national well-being such as the thirty baht healthcare scheme, community village funds, agrarian debt relief, One Tambon One Product (OTOP), and so on.   Literature Review Historically, academic definitions of populism have differed and people have often defined  populism in loose terms referencing “people,” leaders who have the power of provocation (especially political leaders), and “catch-all politics.” In addition, the term has also been used as a label for new unclassified groups, which have often refused to refer to themselves as “populists.”   Context of Thailand Populism has been employed in Thailand for many decades, but in the past covered only some aspects of political and economic activity, unlike the universal practice of the Thaksin Shinawatra administration. For example, monetary policy under Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj in 1975 helped people by providing a budget to develop livelihoods in local communities, but such moves were not widely regarded at the time as populist. More than twenty years later the 1997 constitution opened the door to public participation in the policy decision making process, and in 2001 the TRT party under Thaksin Shinawatra introduced a national populist agenda to attract Thai voters. The Thaksin political campaign promoted policies such as the thirty baht healthcare scheme, a community fund, an agrarian debt relief scheme, loans for education and more. This political strategy helped him win the election and represented a new kind of politics in Thailand, changing the landscape of the policy making process for all political parties.He used populist policies to alleviate poverty and help impoverished people gain access to social services. As a result of these policies, many people were satisfied with and supported the TRT and Thaksin.   Populism in Four Periods of Government Populism in the Thaksin Shinawatra Period Thaksin became the twenty-third Prime Minister of Thailand on February 17, 2001 and was in power until September 19, 2006. In 2006, his government was overthrown by a military coup d’état following street demonstrations and political conflict. Before forming the government in 2001, Thaksin was well known as a successful business-man. He used political marketing and policy strategy during his five years and 222 days in office, and together with his TRT party launched an array of policies to promote the rural economy and gain popular support from the people, Key examples include the thirty baht healthcare scheme, the agrarian debt relief scheme, and the one million baht village fund. Populism in the Abhisit Vejjajiva Period Elderly Allowance The Elderly Allowance was implemented under the Abhisit administration to promote income security for every elderly person in Thailand. People over the age of sixty receive an allowance starting at 600 baht every month for the rest of their lives, with the exception of civil servants, who benefit from a government pension. The allowance rises to a maximum of 1,000 baht a month according to age. In 2011, more than 3.5 million people registered for the elderly allowance, and approximately 6.75 million seniors have benefited from the policy.   Populism in the Yingluck Shinawatra Period First-time Car Buyer Policy A first-time car buyer policy was implemented between September 16, 2011 and December 31, 2012 under Yingluck Shinawatra’s administration. The aim of the policy was to give low-income citizens an opportunity to buy a new car at a low tax rate. However, the beneficiaries of the first-time car buyer subsidy were not the poor. Instead, the upper income groups, or the Thai middle class, benefited most from the policy. This policy also provided an enormous benefit to automobile companies, which saw increased profits from selling their vehicles.   Populism in the General Prayuth Chan-ocha Period General Prayut Chan-o-cha was the twenty-ninth Prime Minister of Thailand. His government began on August 30, 2014 under the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). His administration played an important role in stimulating the grass roots economy via the Civil State or pracharat project. The government also promoted the twenty-year strategic plan, which is the main project under the NCPO. The details of each of these policies are as follows.   Results of Policy Implementation Success Factors Populism has been the mechanism and approach to alleviating inequality and poverty in Thailand. After Thaksin implemented a populist approach, the public was satisfied with the benefits they received from the policies. Since Thaksin, some populist policies have been created and implemented response to public demand. Healthcare services have been extended to 48 million people, and the adoption of “citizenship rights” means that everyone in the country has equal access to social services and the same rights to welfare. Thus, a number of scholars agree that populism has resulted in an increased quality of life for the Thai people.   Positive and Negative Aspects of Populism Positive Aspects of Populism First, populism has transformed Thai politics from the old election culture of buying support to one of policy competition. Political parties increasingly use populist policies to gain public support and win election. Second, populism has encouraged greater checks on the actions of the government, both through popular movements and through the Parliament.Thirdly, people have become more interested in public policy, resulting in higher rates of voter turnout at elections. Many populist policies offer basic guarantees, e.g. the thirty baht healthcare scheme and accessibility to health care for all, but most of them are political tools as well. Lastly, populism can alleviate inequality, because it can lead to the promotion of aspects of social welfare such as health care, education, old age pensions, and allowances for poor people.   Criticism and Analysis In a group discussion held by King Prajadhipok’s institute on December 12, 2018, experts and academic participants introduced five problems with populist policies. Mechanisms to avoid fiscal mismanagement in the policymaking process and critical recommendations to establish sustainable policies were also part of the group discussion.   Problems with Populist Policies in Thailand Populist policies do not strengthen people’s livelihoods by introducing income distribution, job creation, innovation, or opportunity. Rather, many policies create public reliance on the government as people wait for help rather than engaging in self-reliant behavior. The launch of the 500 baht banknote and the national welfare scheme card under the Prayuth administration are examples of this dependence.   Recommendations to Create Sustainable Policies The Role of Political Parties and Policymakers Political parties should understand the likelihood of successful policy implementation, emphasize the national interest, and be held responsible for the results and consequences of populist policies. Moreover, political parties should not merely emphasize political marketing; instead, all parties should provide opportunities to the public to participate in the policymaking process.   Conclusion and Recommendations In conclusion, populism has been embedded in Thai society for almost two decades. Populism, or prachaniyom, has both positive and negative aspects. It is an approach that can provide benefits to the public, but absent regulation it can result in fiscal problems as well. Even though populism has increased public satisfaction with political parties and established a culture of policy competition, it has also shown that it can have impacts on social economic and politics. First, populist policies interact with the fiscal dimension, and thus policy budgets need to incorporate checks and balances by non-governmental organizations or monetary institutions to ensure accountability in the implementation process. There also needs to be an economic strategy to maintain policies in the long run. Sustainability is a major challenge for the government and the good management of economic mechanisms and economic growth is essential in order to sustain good populist policies in the future.     Author’s Biography Thawilwadee Bureekul is the director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) where she is involved in the planning, management, implementation, and coordination of the Institute’s research projects. In addition to her role at KPI, Dr. Bureekul is a professor at several universities in Thailand, including the Asian Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Burapha University, Mahidol University, and Silpakorn University. She succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and she was granted the “Woman of the Year 2017” award as a result.   Ratchawadee Sangmahamad is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes citizenship, gender, and election studies. She has published books such as Value Culture and Thermometer of Democracy (with Thawilwadee Bureekul), Thai Citizens: Democratic Civic Education (with Thawilwadee Bureekul and Eugenie Mario), and many articles.   Nuchaprapar Moksart is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes social policy and political economy theory. She also writes on socioeconomic issues.

EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No. 10   Abstract Religious organizations have been largely left out of the studies of East Asian democratic transition and consolidation. This paper introduces a conceptual framework for the study of the role of religious organizations in the democratic consolidation of East Asian societies and provides case studies for consideration in Indonesia and Thailand, two countries with young and challenged democracies. The case studies concern how Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, and the unorthodox Santi Asoke Buddhist organization in Thailand, under the lay leadership of former general Chamlong Srimuang, are possible agents for the preservation and deepening of democratic practices as these countries confront forces that threaten their democratic consolidation.   Authors Jacques E. C. Hymans is Assistant Professor of Government at Smith College in Massachusetts, USA. He is the author of The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2006) and articles in the European Journal of International Relations, the Journal of East Asian Studies, Security Studies, and other publications. Hymans received his Ph.D. from the Harvard University Department of Government in 2001. Professor T. J. Cheng is Professor of Govenment Department at College of William and Mary.   He has previously taught at University of California, San Diego, and has been a visiting scholar at University of Tsukuba, Japan and an associate visiting professor at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. His primary interests are in comparative political economy and East Asian development. He has published numerous journal articles and book chapters, co-authored Newly Industrializing East Asia in Transition and co-edited Political Change in Taiwan, Inherited Rivalry, The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific, New Leadership and New Agenda, Religious Organizations and Democracy in Contemporary Asia, and China Under Hu Jintao.  Professor Cheng was Editor-in-Chief of the American Asian Review, a major refereed quarterly on Asian affairs.  He currently edits Taiwan Journal of Democracy and holds Class of 1935 Chair Professorship in Government Department of the College. This paper was submitted to "EAI Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia" supported by the Henry Luce Foundation based in New York. All papers are available only through the online database.     Religious organizations have been largely left out of the studies of East Asian democratic transition and consolidation. The literature concerning democratic change in Asia initially examined the role of the middle class in democratic fermentation, the interaction between the political opposition and the military or the ruling party, and the relevance of labor and capital to the transformation of the political arena. Scholarly attention subsequently has shifted toward institution building, constitutionalism and electoral rules, and economic conditions that may impinge on democratization. The current round of research is directed at how nonreligious social organizations inject issues such as social welfare, environmental protection, gender equity, and minority rights into normal democratic politics and how democratic values are internalized. This paper addresses the role of religious organizations in democratic consolidation in two countries of Southeast Asia, as part of a larger investigation that we are undertaking to introduce important information concerning the roles of religious organizations into the ongoing study of democratic development in East Asia.   Some religious organizations have been instrumental to the transition to democracy in parts of East Asia, while others have either stood in the way of or laid low during the process of democratic change. Our recent study2 advances three arguments to explain why some religious organizations stepped into while others eschewed the politics of democratic transition in Northeast and Southeast Asia. First, religious doctrines did not predetermine whether a religious organization would "go political," as religious doctrines could be and have been flexibly interpreted to permit political activism. Second, the legitimacy formula of an authoritarian regime was a good predictor for politicization of religious organizations in the process of democratic transition. Political suppression and coercion invariably prompted the persecuted religious organizations to embrace the cause of democratic change. In contrast, political cooptation and inclusion typically muted state-sanctified religious organizations in the political realm, an equilibrium that, however, could be upset as democratic opposition became too potent to contain. Third, corporate interests—maintaining the unity and institutional reputation of a religious organization—rather than leadership attributes shaped the choice between embracing or neglecting the cause of democratic transition. In our ten-case study, we found that the political opposition always initiated a united front with a religious organization, but the latter did not always respond. The decision to bless the political opposition and uphold the cause of democratic transition was less a reflection of a religious leader's beliefs and more an imperative of corporate interests. The research that we are currently undertaking is a sequel to our previous study on religious organizations and democratic transition in East Asia. The new research addresses the roles of religious organizations in the consolidation of young democracies in the region. Only those religious organizations previously active in the process of democratic transition will be included in this larger study. They are Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, the noninstitutional Santi Asoke Buddhist organization under the lay leadership of former general Chamlong Srimuang, in Thailand, the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, and prominent Christian churches in South Korea. (Soka Gakkai, a modern, lay Buddhist movement in Japan, also will be included in the broader study as a control case, as will religious organizations that were mute in the past during the process of democratic transition but are now active in normal democratic politics, for example, the Catholic Church in Taiwan.) During the push for democratic change, these religious organizations, at one point or another, were incubators, purveyors, and willing partners of prodemocracy political forces. Retrospectively, acting on behalf of prodemocratic forces was not a strenuous decision to make. When political authoritarianism still prevailed, "going political” and supporting democratic transition could easily be construed as the call of religious duty. Such a decision often could not wait, as the situational imperative for democratization mounted. As the authoritarian regimes have fallen by the wayside, however, the proper relationship between church, mosque, or temple and state inevitably has become a salient issue in the consolidation of East Asia’s fledgling democracies. For religious organizations involved in democratic transition, defining (or redefining) their roles in newly established democratic polities is the order of the day, an assignment that is operationally translated into a choice between "stay on" or "bow out," or as particularly apparent in Southeast Asia, something in between. This is not necessarily a pressing decision—although in Indonesia it has become increasingly so—but certainly the need to reach a resolution is a persistent concern, because if religious organizations do not address their ongoing roles in an established democracy, their political adversaries will. The central thesis of this research is that previously politically "activated" religious organizations in East Asia have tried to depoliticize themselves in the wake of democratic change, but have not completely retreated from the political domain and moved back exclusively into the spiritual realm, an equilibrium that is arguably conducive to democratic consolidation. Detached but not insulated from democratic politics, these religious organizations in East Asia are creating a sort of "strategic depth" that may allow them to influence democratic politics on issues that they deem imperative, at a timing and even under the terms of their choosing. Neither directly and constantly players in democratic politics, nor completely withdrawn from the political arena, these religious organizations monitor, admonish, and if necessary, adjudicate, affording themselves flexibility and, hopefully, from their perspectives, legitimacy in the new political landscape. Some previously muted religious organizations have also learned the art of deliberating over policy issues, without diving into partisan politics. Keeping a distance from the epicenter of democratic politics, religious organizations at least can preempt the critics who would clearly separate Caesar from God. Conversely, by not renouncing all political involvement, they can offer a response to religionists who maintain that religious organizations should be the vanguard of society’s ethical evolution. When other institutions—such as the party system, electoral processes, and the judicial system—fail to function, the public, if only to prevent military intervention, may even entrust religious organizations to unlock political logjams and help the task of securing democratic consolidation...(Continued)    

Introduction   June 25 marked the 50th anniversary of the Emergency in India. On this eventful day, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared Emergency, leading to the partial suspension of the world’s largest democracy for 21 months (1975-1977). While there are number of reasons for the unprecedented decision (Raghavan 2025), the immediate trigger for the Emergency was the Allahabad High Court’s judgment on June 12, 1975, which declared Prime Minister Gandhi’s 1971 election victory as illegal on the grounds of electoral malpractices (Roychowdhury 2018). Although the Supreme Court issued a conditional stay of the Allahabad High Court’s verdict, the judgment indicting her for the alleged electoral fraud provided a significant impetus for the united opposition led by popular Jayaprakash Narayan, or JP, to call for the Prime Minister’s resignation. Maintaining the pressure, JP called for Sampoorna Kranti (total revolution) while provoking the armed forces to overthrow Gandhi’s corrupt government. In response, Gandhi imposed a state of emergency, citing “internal disturbances” (Viswanath 2025). Subsequently, there was an unprecedented and extraordinary consolidation of executive power without no real checks.   Major Fallouts   The proclamation of Emergency was followed by a series of executive and legislative actions. The most significant development was the suspension of fundamental rights, including those enumerated in Article 19 (freedom of expression) and Article 21 (right to life). The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) was enforced to arrest nearly all opposition leaders, including prominent figures such as JP, L.K. Advani, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Jyoti Basu. More than 110,000 people were arrested from all over the country. Fiat bans were imposed on trade unions and civil society organizations, and the authorities arrested the leaders of these groups (Biswas 2025).   The Indian press, which had been quite vocal in its opposition to Gandhi and her policies, was subjected to severest censorship and intimidation. While more than 250 journalists were arrested, as many as 830 daily newspapers faced strict monitoring from officials and were not allowed to publish anything related to Emergency (PIB 2025). It is noteworthy that the government abolished the Press Council of India, a key media watchdog.   The most contentious emergency measure was the population control program spearheaded by Sanjay Gandhi, Gandhi’s elder son and political successor. With the objective of curtailing population growth, Sanjay Gandhi initiated a program of coercive sterilization that targeted populations in northern Indian cities when people were forcibly sterilized by medical squads and police teams. Over a period of two years, more than 11 million individuals were sterilized, with state governments linking access to essential services, including rations, housing, and employment, to sterilization procedures (PIB 2025). Concurrently, he and his cadre of officials and volunteers initiated a substantial “clean-up” initiative under the auspices of urban renewal, which resulted in the demolition of approximately 120,000 slums across the nation. In Delhi alone, some 700,000 people were rendered homeless as a consequence of this urban beautification initiative (Biswas 2025). The incessant demolition of slums by bulldozers was initiated, triggering violent protests in many places and leading to many deaths due to police firings/high handedness.   Collapse of Referee Institutions   Beyond these repressions unleashed on a nationwide scale, Gandhi’s government worked relentlessly to undermine and control key democratic institutions. The transformation of the parliament into a mere rubber stamp institution occurred alongside a striking subjugation of the judiciary. This judicial body, which had previously exhibited signs of autonomy and resilience-illustrated by the Allahabad High Court’s declaration of Prime Minister Gandhi’s election as null and void-found itself effectively neutralized by the prevailing executive pressures. The judges who had formerly exhibited resistance to parliamentary majoritarianism in 1973 - as evidenced by their issuance of the Kesavanand Bharati judgment- adopted a contradictory stance during the Emergency, endorsing the state’s prerogative to suspend fundamental rights, including the right to life as defined under Article 21. With the exception of Justice H.R. Khanna, all judges of the Supreme Court Bench acquiesced to the pressures exerted by the Executive and aligned with the repressive regime (Raj 2025).   Beyond the realm of civil liberties, the nation’s courts across the country failed to discharge their constitutional roles during the state of emergency. Scholars have documented that courts failed to intervene even once in instances of state violations of individual freedom (Jaffrelot and Anil 2021). The judiciary also remained as an external observer during the period of significant constitutional amendments, particularly the 42nd amendment (often referred to as the “Mini Constitution”[1]) This amendment, among its various provisions, revoked the judicial authority to invalidate elections.   Beyond judges, even ministers, civil servants, and prominent media figures who are supposed to defend and protect the constitution chose to align with the regime and its repressive actions. A significant segment of the elites and prominent business leaders, including JRD Tata, endorsed emergency measures, perceiving them as a means of reestablishing “order and discipline” in the nation. They cited several accomplishments, including the increased reliability of train schedules, the enhancement of industrial productivity, the curtailment of inflation and price increases, among other achievements (India Today June/25/2019). To summarize, despite the stringent measures and pervasive violations of rights, the state of emergency garnered significant support from various segments of society, including prominent members of the elites.   India'sFirst Constitutional Dictatorship   While numerous analysts have linked the Emergency to Gandhi’s perceived insecurity and the escalating political unrest, which were fueled by external forces (Raghavan 2025), many constitutional provisions enabled her. Her government did not establish a precedent by setting aside the constitution. Rather, she employed existing constitutional mechanisms to suspend freedoms, censor the press, and pressure key institutions to fall in line. This is the precise reason why scholars Jaffrelot and Anil designated Emergency as India’s First Constitutional Dictatorship. Gyan Prakash, a distinguished historian specialized in emergency management, has characterized the phenomenon as “the lawful suspension of law” (Ahmad 2025). For instance, the government invoked the provisions of Article 352 of the Constitution, which allowed such a power in the context of “internal disturbance” (Viswanath 2025).   In a similar manner, detention of thousands of political opponents and critics was carried out under the provision of the MISA and other associated legislations. Following the legal challenge to MISA in the courts, she employed the tactic of a brute parliamentary majority to swiftly amend the constitution (39th Amendment), thereby placing the provision under the Ninth Schedule, a section of the constitution which could not be challenged in courts (Viswanath 2025). To summarize, as Jaffrelot and Anil accurately noted “eager to project the Emergency as a democratic endeavor, Mrs. Gandhi chose to amend its provisions to recast Indian political life. Here constitutional dictatorship therefore retained features of parliamentary democracy, including the continuation of parliamentary sessions, and some mainstay of rule of law, including relative autonomy of the Supreme Court…” (Jaffrelot and Anil 2021).   Post-Emergency Restoration and Democratic Renewal   Following a 21-month period of state repression, Prime Minister Gandhi’s decision to revoke the Emergency in January 1977 and call for general elections in early March came as a surprise to many observers. Despite the implementation of stringent measures and state overreach that effectively stifled opposition parties and key institutions, the withdrawal of the Emergency and the subsequent restoration of the rule of law and freedom furnished a pivotal opportunity for these stakeholders of democracy to reclaim their voice.   A notable outcome of the dissolution of the Emergency was the unification of previously fragmented opposition groups through a collaborative effort that launched a coordinated campaign to challenge the longstanding dominance of Gandhi’s party, which had held power since 1951. The opposition groups swiftly organized the Janata Party (a conglomerate of Bharatiya Lok Dal, Jana Sangh, the Congress-O, and socialists among others) which eventually won the 1977 electoral proceedings. Gandhi faced significant reprisals as a consequence of the excess that occurred during the period of the Emergency. The Janata government, which was in power for a relatively brief period (collapsed in 1979 due to internal rebellions), was notable for being the first non-Congress government at the Centre to enjoy a period of relative success. This success laid the foundation for the rise of regional and identity-based parties, such as the peasant-proprietors belonging to the middle castes or OBCs (Other Backward Classes) as they are popularly known. The emergence of regional parties as primary competitors to the Congress Party was marked by a deepening of regionalism and federal engagement, thereby introducing novel voices to the Indian democratic process (Yadav 2020).   Beyond the unprecedented resurgence of opposition, the most critical contribution to post-Emergency democratic recovery was made by the judiciary. In the period of the Emergency, the higher courts yielded to executive pressures and exerted considerable effort to salvage their tarnished reputation. The most immediate and noteworthy judicial response was to rectify the damage it had done in the Habeas Corpus case (which suspended the right to life during the Emergency). In addition, the Supreme Court bench declared the Forty-Second Amendment unconstitutional which had previously excluded judicial review from the scope of constitutional amendments (Minerva Mills case).   In the subsequent decades, the courts initiated an era of judicial activism by employing Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in a creative manner. This approach led to a substantial reduction in state excesses across various domains while concurrently enhancing the legitimacy of the judiciary. However, a significant shift in the relationship between the judiciary and the executive branch occurred in the Three Judges case. Prior to this development, the appointment of senior judges was typically conducted by the executive branch. In response to this practice, the judiciary established a Collegium Systern, which entailed the selection of new judges for the higher judiciary by a group of senior judges. This was justified as a measure to insulate the higher judiciary from potential interference by the executive branch (Sahoo 2023).   The press, which had previously been subject to severe censorship and state repression, finally found its footing following the dissolution of the Emergency in January 1977. The new Janata government, which assumed power in March 1977, established the Shah Commission to investigate the Emergency’s transgressions against journalists. It also repealed regulatory restrictions and implemented numerous measures to encourage a robust press. In the wake of state repressions, numerous media outlets and prominent journalists established new outlets, promoted investigative reporting, and expanded the scope of independent journalism (Kapoor 2015). The period from 1989 to 2014, during which a series of coalition governments were in power at the national level, played a significant role in the further expansion of media freedom. In summary, the period following the Emergency witnessed a notable resurgence of freedom, driven primarily by the assertive actions of the press and civil society. This resurgence coincided with the shift in power from Delhi to state capitals, a transition that coincided with the rise of regional political parties and ethnic leaders.   The Legacy of the Emergency on Indian Politics   Despite the passage of half a century, the memories of the excesses during the Emergency remain vivid. Indeed, in an effort to relive the bitter legacies of the current central government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the same BJP-led government recently declared June 25 to be “Samvidhaan Hatya Divas” (Constitution Murder Day). Throughout the course of 2025, a series of nationwide programs have been announced to observe the completion of fifty years of National Emergency (The Times of India July/12/2024). A number of regional parties and civil society organizations have collaborated with the ruling party to educate and raise the awareness among their core supporters. This assertion was met with fierce opposition from the Congress Party, who viewed it as a deliberate strategy by the BJP to mask its authoritarian practices. The Congress Party and its associates have initiated a series of events and outreaches across the country, naming it “Undeclared Emergency@11”, through which they have launched a scathing attack against Prime Minister Modi and his ruling BJP (The New Indian Express June/25/2025).   A close examination of the political discourse reveals a market resemblance between the leadership of Prime Minister Modi and that of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi Beyond the intense political slugfest between the ruling party and the Congress-led opposition, Modi’s 11 years in power - marked by a leadership style bearing notable similarities to that of Indira Gandhi (The Print June/25/2018) - have reignited memories of the Emergency among a significant segment of the informed public. Analysts contend that the two back-to-back electoral landslides for the BJP under PM Modi in 2014 and 2019, which marked the conclusion of 25 years of coalition governments (1989-2014), signaled a return to single party dominance and a robust central government. This development, they contend, has revived authoritarian tendencies reminiscent of the Indira Gandhi era.   As with Gandhi’s constitutional despotism, Modi has employed similar tactics, manipulating constitutional and legal provisions to target prominent opposition figures, dissenters, journalists, civil society organizations, and groups, as well as individuals who voice criticism of the regime and its policies. The government has weaponized state institutions such as the Enforcement Directorate (ED), Income Tax Department (IT) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to engage in harassment and coercion of key political targets (Tiwary 2022). Key constitutional provisions such as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) and the UAPA (anti-terrorism law), as well as the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act or FCRA (leading to cancellation of licenses of NGOs to raise funds) have been employed to silence dissent and instill pervasive sense of fear among critics and political rivals. (Chowdhury 2024; Sahoo 2024).   A particularly egregious situation is that of media freedom, as evidenced by its dismal ranking of 151 out of 180 according to the recent World Press Freedom Index. The government has adopted a combination of incentives and coercions to manipulate the mainstream media (print, television, and social media outlets) to serve as instruments to enhance the Prime Minister’s image and disseminate false narratives that support the government. Similar trajectory can be observed in the case of key democratic institutions, including the courts, the Election Commission, and anti-corruption bodies, among others. According to analysts, the judiciary, which had previously asserted its autonomy following its unprecedented acquiescence during the Emergency, has been compelled to operate as an “executive court” claim that judiciary which had reasserted its autonomy after its unprecedented climb down during the Emergency has been made to act like an “executive court” (Bhatia 2022).   Despite the significant democratic regression and evident societal and political polarization that have transpired over the past 11 years, it is imperative to recognize that the governance of Modi does not align with the precedent set by the Emergency period under Gandhi’s leadership. Although the Emergency resulted in a near-total shutdown of constitutional mechanisms, the suspension of civil liberties, the imprisonment of an entire opposition, and the unleashing of street terror through arbitrary population control measures, democratic and constitutional spaces persist under Modi. In this context, opposition figures and jailed journalists retain the ability to petition the courts for redress. In a similar vein, within the electoral domain, despite the pervasive influence of the BJP, the electoral process remains largely free and fair, allowing for the possibility of victory for any contender. It is noteworthy that the BJP was unsuccessful in securing a majority in the 2024 elections, despite the substantial advantages it possessed in terms of party organization, financial resources, and propaganda efforts.   This assertion underscores the notion that India’s democratic systern, despite its present deficiencies, has demonstrated a notable degree of resilience. Despite his considerable centralization of power and popularity, it is highly improbable that Modi would choose the Emergency path for a variety of reasons. Among them is the fact that his own party leaders and core supporters would almost certainly disapprove of such a course of action. Importantly, the backlashes particularly the shock electoral defeat of Gandhi in 1977 owing to her Emergency excesses still remain a major reminder for the political leaders not to walk that path again.   The recollections of the Emergency years remain vivid in the collective memory and the broader society continues to observe them with keen interest. This assertion is substantiated by the 2024 national elections, wherein the authoritarian style of the Modi government and its implications for democratic institutions became a pivotal component of the opposition’s electoral discourse. A vigorous “Save the Constitution” campaign orchestrated by opposition parties and civil society groups was found to have a substantial impact on the electoral performance of the BJP, particularly in the heartland states. This campaign ultimately contributed to the party’s inability to secure a majority in the lower house (Raveendran 2024). In summary, the phenomenon of the Emergency memories (and the fear) persists in serving as a significant impediment to India’s authoritarian shift under the leadership of Modi.   Lessons for Democracies   India’s 1975 emergency episode offers valuable insights for both nascent and established democracies grappling with the challenges of hype-polarization and democratic regression in the current era. First, the transition of a democratic nation to an autocratic regime may not necessitate the implementation of emergency laws. The phenomenon of autocratization, as evidenced by India’s contemporary trajectories, can be achieved through a gradual erosion of democratic norms facilitated by institutional and legal manipulations. This requires the cultivation of a vigilant citizenry - distinct from the cheerleading spirit often seen in “Emergency Years”- as well as a free press and active institutions.   Second, a robust executive supported by a substantial legislative majority - as evidenced in contemporary India and the United States - poses a grave threat to the democratic systern, even in the presence of robust independent institutions and resilient civil society. A robust systern of checks and balances is imperative; said systern must be driven by an autonomous judiciary and a strong political opposition.   Third, it has the potential to seriously jeopardize years of democratic gains if the phenomenon of personality cult is not addressed. A leader’s tendency to centralize power, their unquestionable authority, and their evident impatience with democratic norms and procedures poses a grave threat to the very foundation of democracy. This underscores the importance of a robust systern of checks and balances and constant vigilance by the citizenry. ■   References Biswas, Soutik. 2025. “Indira Gandhi’s Emergency: When India’s Democracy was put on pause”, BBC, June 25. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn0gnvq72lko   Bhatia, Gautam. 2022. “The Executive (‘s) Court: Notes on Justice Khanwilkar’s Legacy”, Constitutional Law and Philosophy. https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2022/07/29/the-executives-court-notes-on-the-legacy-of-justice-a-m-khanwilkar   Chowdhury, Debashish Roy. 2024. “Narendra Modi’s War on Civil Society on Cusp”, Toda Peace Institute. May 24.https://toda.org/assets/files/resources/policy-briefs/t-pb-191_war-on-civil-society_roy-chowdhury.pdf   Prabhash K Dutta. 2019. “Left, right and centre who supported Emergency, called it festival of discipline”, India Today, 25 June.https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/left-right-and-centre-who-supported-emergency-called-it-festival-of-discipline-1555769-2019-06-25   Jaffrelot, Christophe and Anil, Pratinav. 2021. India’s First Dictatorship, London: C. Hurst & Co. publishers   Kapoor, Coomi. 2015, The Emergency: A Personal History, Delhi: India Viking   Majumdar, Kunal. 2025. “Why the rise of ‘godi media’ is a disaster for Indian democracy and economic growth”, Scroll, January 14.https://scroll.in/article/1077310/why-the-rise-of-godi-media-is-a-disaster-for-indian-democracy-and-economic-growth   Press Information Bureau (PIB). “The Emergency in India”, 24 June, 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/FactsheetDetails.aspx?Id=149224   Raj, Kaleeswaram. 2025. “How the Emergency left India’s Judiciary Bruised”, Hindustan Time, 24 June.https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/how-the-emergency-left-india-s-judiciary-bruised-101750778076048.html   Raghavan, Srinath. 2025. Indira Gandhi and the Years that Transformed India, Delhi: Penguin Random House.   Raveendran, Rehnamol. 2024. “Saving Constitution is the 2024 Mandate”, Deccan Herald. June 4.https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/saving-constitution-is-the-2024-mandate-3052420   Roychowdhury, Adrija. 2018. “Four Reasons why Indira Gandhi Declared Emergency”, ,The Indian Express. June 25.https://indianexpress.com/article/research/four-reasons-why-indira-gandhi-declared-the-emergency-5232397/   Sahoo, Niranjan. 2023. “Ensuring Horizontal Accountability in India: The Role of Judiciary”, ADRN Issue Brief.http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?idx=317   _____, Niranjan. 2024. “Recent Defamation Case and Mounting State Onslaughts against Political Opposition in India”, ADRN Issue Brief.https://www.eai.or.kr/new/en/etc/search_view.asp?intSeq=21933&board=eng_issuebriefing   The New Indian Express, “Undeclared Emergency@11: The Congress hits back at Modi Government”, June 25.https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Jun/25/undeclared-emergency11-congress-hits-back-at-modi-government   The Times of India, 2024. “Government declares June 25 as Samvidhaan Hatya Diwas”. July 12.https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/govt-declares-june-25-as-samvidhaan-hatya-diwas-read-what-the-notification-said/articleshow/111690114.cms   The Print, 2018. “There is striking similarities between Narendra Modi and Indira Gandhi battling their inner demons”, 25 June.https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/there-is-striking-similarity-between-indira-gandhi-narendra-modi-battling-their-inner-demons/74619/   Viswanath, Apurva, “How Indira Gandhi used the Constitution to subvert democracy”, The Indian Express, June 25.https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-history/how-indira-gandhi-used-the-constitution-to-subvert-democracy-10086543/   Yadav, Yogendra. 2020. Making Sense of Indian Democracy. Permanent Black/Ashoka University   Zeeshan, Ahmad. 2025. “Democracy in Retreat, Comparing Emergency with Modi’s India”, The Wire. June 25.https://thewire.in/politics/democracy-in-retreat-comparing-the-emergency-with-modis-india     [1] Bhatia, Gautam. 2022. “The Executive (‘s) Court: Notes on Justice Khanwilkar’s Legacy”, Constitutional Law and Philosophy.https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2022/07/29/the-executives-court-notes-on-the-legacy-of-justice-a-m-khanwilkar     ■ Niranjan Sahoo is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.     ■ Edited by Jaehyun Im, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 0746 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Snap Election Following Impeachment of President Yoon   On December 3, 2024, then President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law, a move widely condemned as unconstitutional and reminiscent of an authoritarian past. This unprecedented act plunged the country into a constitutional crisis and led the National Assembly to pass his impeachment motion on December 14. The Constitutional Court upheld this decision and removed Yoon from office on April 4, 2025. As a result, an early presidential election was held on June 3, 2025, marking the second occurrence of such case since Korea’s democratic transition in 1987.   This election served not only as a regular democratic process but also as a referendum on the abuse of power by a sitting president. It tested the resilience of Korea’s democratic institutions and the political maturity of its citizens. Despite the severity of Yoon’s actions, the electorate remained deeply divided, illustrating that ideological and partisan loyalties continue to run strong. The events leading to this early election raised fundamental questions about the scope and limits of executive authority in Korea’s constitutional framework. Moreover, it reinvigorated public discourse about the role of checks and balances, civilian control of the military, and democratic accountability in the face of authoritarian threats.   Exceptionally High Voter Turnout and What It Reveals   The 2025 election recorded a turnout of 79.4%, the highest since the 1997 election that marked Korea’s first democratic power transition. This figure is 2.3 percentage points higher than the previous election held in 2022 (Lee 2025). The remarkable levels of participation reflect not only the gravity of the political moment but also the intensity of partisan mobilization. For many citizens, this was not a routine election—it was a critical moment to defend or redefine democratic norms. For others, this snap election may be perceived as a pivotal moment of partisan confrontation--a zero-sum struggle to safeguard in-group interests amid an intensely polarized political environment in South Korea.   Notably, the highest turnout rates were recorded in Gwangju (83.9%) and South Jeolla (83.6%), strongholds of the Democratic Party. Conversely, Daegu and North Gyeongsang—traditional conservative bastions—registered the lowest early voting rates but compensated with high turnout on election day, with Daegu exceeding 80%. This phenomenon suggests a strategic calculation among conservative voters to avoid early voting, possibly influenced by coordinated messaging from right-wing media and political actors (Kim 2025).   This disparity can be partly attributed to the growing distrust among far-right conservatives concerning the early voting process, fueled by conspiracy theories about electoral fraud. These dynamics highlight the interplay between political polarization and institutional legitimacy. However, the high voter turnout does not necessarily imply the presence of a political consensus; instead, it underscores the intensely contested and high-stakes nature of electoral competition in a polarized society. Voter mobilization on both sides was driven not only by policy preferences but also by existential fears about the possibility of the opposing camp seizing power (Lee 2013; Muñoz and Meguid 2021).   The Nature of the Campaign: Polarization, Negativity, and Strategic Blunders   The election was precipitated by an emergency political crisis, rather than the customary expiration of a presidential term, resulting in a shortage of time for political parties and candidates to engage in serious policy development, research, or public consultation. As a result, the campaign season was marked by a stark absence of detailed policy proposals or forward-looking visions for governance. Instead, it descended into a battlefield of accusations, personal attacks, and ideological posturing.   Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung positioned the election as a referendum on democracy itself, casting the People Power Party (PPP) as complicit in the failed authoritarian turn under former President Yoon. His narrative emphasized the moral urgency and the civic duty, portraying support for his candidacy as a vote to preserve constitutional order and civil liberties. This moral framing proved galvanizing for his base, yet it offered little to clarify how he would address Korea’s pressing policy dilemmas if elected.   In contrast, the PPP tried to deflect attention away from its association with Yoon’s unconstitutional actions, by focusing its campaign on Lee’s legal entanglements—ranging from allegations of corruption to past admіnistrative decisions. Rather than presenting original policy proposals or a forward-looking vision to address the pressing political, social, and economic challenges, the party’s electoral strategy appeared to be primarily focused on discrediting the opposition candidate—emphasizing his alleged unfitness for office and reinforcing a negative personal image.   The situation was further complicated by a last-minute and poorly managed unification attempt between PPP candidate Kim Moon-soo and former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, which created confusion within conservative ranks. The attempt was perceived as a top-down imposition rather than a consensus-based move, and it alienated both party elites and grassroots supporters. Kim’s sustained alignment with pro-Yoon factions within the PPP hindered his credibility among moderate and undecided voters, pushing many of them toward alternative conservative voices such as Reform Party candidate Lee Jun-seok.   Perhaps most damaging was the failure of all major candidates to meaningfully address the country’s long-term structural challenges. Korea faces deepening economic inequality, particularly among younger generations who struggle with stagnant wages, insecure employment, and a housing market out of reach for most. Additionally, the country is confronting a demographic time bomb due to ultra-low fertility rates, as well as persistent regional inequalities that fuel feelings of alienation in non-metropolitan areas. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain unresolved, and yet inter-Korean policy received scant attention during the campaign.   Despite these urgent issues, the campaign was overwhelmed by moralistic language, symbolic battles, and appeals to fear. Voters were rarely given the opportunity to evaluate competing solutions to concrete problems. This lack of substantive debate further eroded public trust in Korea’s party systеm (Lee 2025). A notable trend among younger voters is a growing perception that party politics has become performative, tribalistic, and divorced from the everyday realities of jobs, education, housing, and mental health. The 2025 campaign, rather than reinvigorating democratic deliberation, reinforced a sense of cynicism and alienation among a generation that was already skeptical of institutional politics.   Electoral Outcomes: Deep Ideological Polarization and Fragmented Conservatism   Lee Jae-myung secured 17.28 million votes (49.42%), setting a new record for the highest number of votes ever received by a Korean presidential candidate (Lee 2025). Yet, despite this remarkable achievement, he fell short of an outright majority, a symbolic reminder of the deeply fractured nature of Korean politics. His vote total exceeded that of any previous candidate, surpassing even the highly contentious 2022 race. However, the result also underscored a structural limitation: the near impossibility of achieving broad-based consensus in an era of entrenched polarization.   Kim Moon-soo, representing the People Power Party (PPP), received 41.15% of the vote, maintaining the PPP’s core base despite recent scandals and internal disunity. Meanwhile, Lee Jun-seok of the Reform Party captured 8.34%, a striking outcome for a third-party candidate, particularly within a systеm that has historically marginalized minor contenders. Lee Jun-seok’s performance reflects growing disaffection with the two-party systеm, particularly among young and moderate conservative voters who feel politically disoriented.   The results highlight the fragmented and ideologically fluid state of Korea’s conservative electorate. Despite securing a substantial share of the vote, the PPP failed to unify the broader right-leaning base, allowing space for insurgent conservative alternatives to gain traction. At the same time, Lee Jae-myung—despite adopting a centrist conservative message and presenting himself as a moderate choice in the wake of a constitutional crisis—was unable to secure support from more than half the electorate. This dual outcome underscores both the limitations of ideological repositioning and the enduring nature of Korea’s political polarization, where loyalty to ideological or regional affiliations often outweighs institutional accountability or democratic norms.   Figure 1. Regional Voting Patterns in South Korea: The Geographic East–West Divide *Source: https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-06-04/national/politics/President-makes-up-ground-in-conservative-strongholds-but-regional-partisanship-holds-firm-results-show/2322971   Lee’s performance in Busan—where he won 40.14% of the vote—was especially noteworthy. This marks the highest-ever support for a Democratic candidate in the city, which has historically leaned heavily conservative (Oh 2025). This result suggests a gradual erosion of rigid regional voting patterns, particularly among younger and urban voters who may be more responsive to policy content and national leadership issues than to traditional party loyalty. However, this trend of regional softening is far from uniform. Lee received more than 80% of the vote in Gwangju and South Jeolla Province, consistent with the Democratic Party’s historical dominance in the Honam region. In stark contrast, he garnered a mere 25.52% in North Gyeongsang, the conservative stronghold of the PPP and former President Yoon. Kim Moon-soo garnered less than 10% in most of Honam, reaffirming the still potent influence of regional identity and political memory. Despite highlighting his origins in North Gyeongsang Province as a strategy to appeal to local voters, Lee Jae-myung failed to translate that regional affiliation into significant electoral gains in what remains a core base for the conservative bloc.   Thus, while the political landscape of Korea is undergoing gradual transformation, especially in urbanized regions and among younger voters, regionalism remains a powerful determinant of electoral behavior. It not only shapes vote distributions but also conditions political discourse, candidate selection, and party strategy. Addressing the roots of this cleavage will require sustained efforts in regional development, historical reconciliation, and political inclusion—none of which can be resolved in a single election cycle.   Socio-Demographic Cleavages: Generational, Gender, and Class Divides in Korean Politics   Recent Korean elections have exposed growing divides in voter behavior that extend beyond the familiar lines of ideology and region. In particular, the rise of generational and gender-based cleavages has been a noteworthy development in Korean elections since the 2000s (Park 2020). In the 2025 South Korean presidential election, this pattern was once again clearly evident. Traditional regional cleavages accompanied by pronounced generational divides and, notably, gender-based cleavages emerged most prominently among younger voters in their 20s and 30s.   Generational divides were especially pronounced. Voters in their 40s and 50s—often referred to as the “86 generation” (those who born in the 1960s, entered university in the 1980s and led the pro-democracy movement) and Generation X—overwhelmingly supported Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung. Exit polls showed over 70% of these cohorts backing Lee, reinforcing their consistent alignment with center-left politics in recent electoral cycles. This generational loyalty reflects not only ideological identification but also formative political experiences shaped by Korea’s authoritarian past and democratization struggles.   Figure 2. Vote Share by Age and Gender (Exit Poll)   *Source: Exit Poll by South Korea’s Three Major Broadcasters (KBS, MBC, SBS)   In sharp contrast, Lee significantly underperformed among voters over 70, a demographic that traditionally supports conservative candidates. He garnered only 34% in this demographic, which remains one of the most reliable voting blocs for the PPP. Meanwhile, among voters in their 20s and 30s, the picture was more fragmented. Lee’s support hovered in the mid-40% range, while the Reform Party candidate Lee Jun-seok made notable inroads, especially among younger male. Exit polls revealed that Lee Jun-seok outpaced both major party candidates among male voters in their 20s, demonstrating a growing segment of the electorate that is both disillusioned with traditional parties and attracted to outsider, anti-establishment voices.   The gender divide within this younger cohort was particularly striking. Whereas young men gravitated toward Lee Jun-seok, young women tended to favor Lee Jae-myung, with support levels for the Democratic candidate in the high 50s. This emerging gender polarization appears to reflect broader societal tensions surrounding feminism, male identity, labor competition, and perceptions of victimhood. Recent studies suggest that this gender conflict among younger generations is less the result of deep-seated social divisions and more a product of political mobilization around selective, highly salient issues. While certain topics—such as the abolition of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family—have become politically charged, other gender-related debates remain more peripheral (Koo 2023). If this pattern of gendered divergence persists, it could mature into a full-fledged structural cleavage in Korean politics.   Simultaneously, the 2025 election revealed increasing signs of class-based voting, particularly in urban centers such as Seoul. While Korean electoral politics has historically downplayed class identity—often subsumed under regional or ideological banners—recent socio-economic trends have elevated material concerns. While the Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung secured a commanding lead over his rivals in most parts of Seoul, conservative candidate Kim Moon-soo maintained a strong presence in affluent neighborhoods such as Gangnam, Seocho, Songpa, and Yongsan, where the PPP’s base among the property-owning elites held firm. These districts have seen explosive real estate appreciation, and their residents tend to favor policies that preserve asset values and limit redistributive taxation.   Figure 3. 2025 Presidential Election Results in Seoul by District: Lee Jae-myung (Blue) vs. Kim Moon-soo (Red)     In contrast, Mapo, Seongdong, and Gwangjin—districts known as the ‘Han River belt,’ where conservative support had increased in recent years amid soaring housing prices—shifted in favor of Lee Jae-myung. These neighborhoods are inhabited by younger, upwardly mobile professionals who have been increasingly affected by housing unaffordability, rising education costs, and job insecurity. Their political preferences appear to be shifting in response to perceived failures of market-centered policies to deliver equitable opportunities.   Figure 4. Wealth-Based Variation in 2025 Presidential Voting in the Seoul Metropolitan Area     The East Asia Institute (EAI), in collaboration with Hankook Research, conducted an online survey of 1,509 voters nationwide immediately after the 2025 presidential election. In the Seoul metropolitan area, where real estate prices are the highest in South Korea, the survey revealed a clear wealth-based voting pattern: support for conservative PPP candidate Kim Moon-soo rose steadily with voters’ asset levels. In Seoul, conservative support surpassed that of Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung once assets exceeded KRW 900 million (equivalent to 6,600 USD), reaching 75% among those with assets above KRW 1.5 billion, the highest asset level in this survey. A similar trend appeared in Incheon and Gyeonggi, where Kim’s support increased beyond KRW 700 million in assets, while Lee’s support gradually declined. These findings suggest that the surge in real estate prices during the Moon Jae-in admіnistration contributed to a more pronounced asset-driven voting tendency in the 2025 election.   When considered collectively, these socio-demographic divides—generational, gendered, and class-based—paint a complex portrait of Korean democracy in transition. The challenge for political leadership moving forward will be to craft inclusive narratives and policies that bridge these divides rather than exploit them. Failure to do so may accelerate voter fragmentation, erode democratic legitimacy, and intensify the crisis of political representation.   Democratic Backsliding and the Path Forward   This election was not merely about leadership change; it was about the survival of the democratic systеm. Former President Yoon’s actions led independent international research organizations such as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and Varieties of Democracy(V-Dem) to downgrade Korea’s status from “full democracy” to “flawed democracy” (EIU 2025; V-Dem Institute 2025).   Lee Jae-myung now faces the dual challenge of restoring Korea’s democratic reputation and governing a polarized nation. Unlike his predecessor, Lee benefits from a favorable legislative environment. His party currently holds 167 seats, with smaller leftist parties often voting in alignment with the DP. In contrast, the main opposition PPP controls only 107 seats. The supermajority position of the ruling party in the National Assembly provides a rare opportunity for the Lee government to implement substantial institutional reforms. Nevertheless, this dynamic gives rise to concerns regarding the maintenance of effective mechanisms for checks and balances on executive power backed by such a dominant ruling party.   Against this backdrop, the urgency of reversing democratic backsliding has become increasingly salient. To strengthen the foundations of institutional democracy, his admіnistration must prioritize judicial independence and ensure effective parliamentary oversight. Equally important is fostering active engagement with civil society, which can help rebuild trust between the state and its citizens. A primary imperative would be to mitigate confrontational politics that pit one group against another. South Korean society is currently experiencing intense affective polarization between progressive and conservative camps, posing a threat to democracy. The impeachment of two former conservative presidents has further deepened the political divide. Recent research in comparative politics — including studies on U.S. politics — warns that unchecked political polarization may trigger democratic backsliding.   As political scientists Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, restoring norms of institutional forbearance and mutual tolerance is essential to the sustenance of a healthy democratic culture in Korea. Complementing these efforts, medium-term reforms—such as improving electoral systеms, enhancing transparency in party financing, and promoting media pluralism—will be crucial for reinforcing democratic resilience over time.   Lee has signaled his intent to form an inclusive admіnistration and emphasized national unity. If he succeeds in governing with transparency and consensus, a credible path toward reclaiming Korea’s democratic standing will be established. However, his admіnistration must also resist the temptation of revenge politics and focus on building durable democratic norms. A successful presidency will require more than mere popular legitimacy—it will require restraint, vision, and institutional renewal.   Conclusion: A Cautious Hope for Democratic Renewal   The 2025 presidential election exposed the deep fissures within Korean society—ideological, regional, generational, and gender-based. Yet, it also demonstrated the resilience of democratic institutions and civic commitment to democracy, as voters countered authoritarian regression and reaffirmed democratic values.   Lee Jae-myung’s mandate is both powerful and fragile. He enters office with historic vote totals but also a divided electorate. The future trajectory of Korean democracy, whether it moves toward renewal or further fragmentation, is contingent upon the manner in which the current admіnistration exercises governance, implements institutional reforms, and engages the public. The road ahead is uncertain, but the direction is not predetermined. Korea now stands at a democratic crossroads—one that demands wisdom, restraint, and political courage. Democratic renewal will not be achieved overnight, but the 2025 election has opened a window of possibility— one that both the world and Korea’s own citizens will be watching with hope and vigilance. ■   References   Economist Intelligence Unit: EIU. 2025. “Democracy in Asia in 2024, and the outlook for 2025.” March 26. https://www.eiu.com/n/democracy-in-asia-in-2024-and-the-outlook-for-2025/ (Accessed June 7, 2025)   Kim, Kyu-tae. 2025. “Both conservatives and progressives rallied—voter turnout hits 79.4%, the highest in 28 years (in Korean).” The JoongAng Ilbo. June 3. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25341084 (Accessed June 7, 2025)   Koo, Bon-sang. 2023. “Gender Conflict and Mobilization of bias in Korean Society (in Korean).” Journal of Contemporary Political Studies 16, 2: 51-97.   Lee, Jae Mook. 2013. “Elite Polarization and Mass Political Engagement: Information, Alienation, and Mobilization.” Journal of International and Area Studies 20, 1: 89-109.   Lee, Sanghyun. 2025. “Lawsuits, accusations and criticisms… presidential candidates only fueled polarization and hatred (in Korean).” Maeil Business Newspaper. May 31. https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/11331727 (Accessed June 7, 2025)   Lee, Yeon-woo. 2025. “Voter turnout hits 79.4%, highest in 28 years.” The Korea Times. June 3. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/20250603/south-korean-presidential-election-voter-turnout-hits-794-highest-in-28-years (Accessed June 7, 2025)   Lee, Yu-mi. 2025. “President Lee Wins 17.28 Million Votes, Setting All-Time Record in Korean Election History (in Korean).” Yonhap News. June 4. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250604019551001 (Accessed June 7, 2025)   Muñoz, Maria Murias, and Bonnie M. Meguid. 2021. “Does party polarization mobilize or de-mobilize voters? The answer depends on where voters stand.” Electoral Studies 70: 1-10.   Oh, Soo-hee. 2025. “[Lee Jae-myung Admіnistration] “Surpassed 40%”: Highest-Ever Vote Share in Busan for a Democratic Presidential Candidate (in Korean).” Yonhap News. June 4. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250604015900051 (Accessed June 7, 2025)   Park, Sun-kyoung. 2020. “Generational Gap in Gender, or Gender Gap in Generation? An Analysis of Ideology and Policy Attitude of Young Female (in Korean).” Korean Party Studies Review 19, 2: 5-36.   V-Dem Institute. 2025. “Democracy Report 2025: 25 Years of Autocratization - Democracy Trumped?” https://www.v-dem.net/publications/democracy-reports/ (Accessed June 7, 2025)     ■ Jae-Mook Lee is a Professor of the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS).     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

※ This issue briefing is an excerpt of Asia Democracy Network’s report entitled “The 2024 Democracy Overview” published on May 19, 2025.   Disinformation is becoming an increasingly significant challenge in Asia, with its prevalence expected to intensify in the coming years. This trend is driven by several key factors that contribute to the region’s vulnerability to disinformation and its spread.   First, Asia continues to have a large population of social media users, many of whom operate within closed networks due to privacy concerns, the desire to connect with like-minded users, and other information security considerations. This ecosystеm remains particularly susceptible to the rapid dissemination of disinformation, as information tends to circulate within echo chambers with limited external fact-checking.   Second, the political exploitation of disinformation has been a persistent issue in many Asian countries, with a notable escalation during election periods. Asian countries are especially vulnerable given persistent issues on weak electoral admіnistration and campaign regulations. This pattern is expected to persist and potentially worsen in Asian nations scheduled for elections in 2025 given growing political divides and instability the region is experiencing. Furthermore, foreign electoral interference on social media discourses, particularly from actors such as China and Russia, continues to be a concern as these nations leverage disinformation to advance their geopolitical interests.   Third, the emergence of AI-powered disinformation campaigns in Asia presents a worrying trend. The sophisticated use of artificial intelligence in creating and spreading false narratives poses new challenges to information integrity and democratic processes.   Last, the generally low levels of media literacy among Asian populations exacerbate the issue. Many citizens lack the critical skills necessary to differentiate between reliable information and disinformation, making them more susceptible to manipulation.   However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the rapid proliferation of social media and advancements in AI technology across Asia have also yielded positive outcomes, such as enhanced information accessibility and increased civic engagement. This presents a complex dilemma: stringent regulations aimed at curbing disinformation might inadvertently suppress these beneficial aspects of digital communication. Consequently, finding an effective solution that balances the mitigation of disinformation with the preservation of digital freedoms remains a significant challenge.   Disinformation’s Fertile Ecosystеm   The widespread adoption of social media platforms has led to exceptionally high usage rates of platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp across most Asian countries. A recent study evaluating internet usage in Southeast Asia revealed that adolescents aged 16-24 spend an average of 10 hours per day online (Kemp 2021). This extensive engagement with digital platforms significantly amplifies the risk of exposure to disinformation in the region. In 2023, the Asia-Pacific region accounted for approximately 60% of the global social media user base. With a steady annual growth rate of 2.7%, this region was projected to add over 59 million new users in 2024, surpassing the combined global user growth. The trend of increasing social media subscriptions and usage time is expected to continue into 2025, further exacerbating the potential for disinformation spread (DMFA 2025).   According to DataReportal’s survey of internet users aged 14-64 in the Asia-Pacific region during the fourth quarter of 2023, significant variations in social media usage patterns were observed across different countries (Figure 1). The study, which examined the average daily time spent on social media platforms, revealed that the Philippines led the region in social media engagement. Internet users in the Philippines demonstrated the highest average daily social media usage, spending three hours and 30 minutes per day on these platforms. This finding underscores the substantial role that social media plays in the daily lives of Filipino internet users. Following the Philippines, Indonesia emerged as the second most active country in terms of social media usage. Malaysia and Thailand also exhibited notable levels of engagement, ranking third and fourth respectively in the survey (Statista 2023). The data suggests that social media has become deeply embedded in the daily routines of internet users in these countries, potentially influencing various aspects of social interaction, information dissemination, and consumer behavior.   Figure 1. Average daily time spent using social media in the Asia-Pacific region in the 4th quarter of 2023, by country or territory (in hours and minutes)     Beyond the issues of subscriber numbers and usage time, the network structure of social media platforms presents an additional challenge. Popular social media and messaging apps in Asia such as Facebook, Tiktok, WhatsApp and X (formerly Twitter) predominantly feature closed networks known as “walled gardens.” Information disseminated through these networks tends to resonate strongly, as recipients place greater trust in groups sharing similar perspectives. These “walled gardens” are characterized by restricted user groups, where users primarily connect with individuals holding similar viewpoints. This structure facilitates trust-based information sharing, leading users to place higher confidence in information circulated within their intimate networks. Consequently, this closed network structure creates an environment conducive to the rapid spread of fake news, allowing it to gain credibility without proper verification, thereby increasing vulnerability to the proliferation of false information (Yee 2017). For instance, in the Philippines, disinformation spread by supporters of President Rodrigo Duterte through Facebook pages and groups have been instrumental in shoring up support for the admіnistration’s bloody “war on drugs.”   The Proliferation of Political Disinformation and Foreign Electoral Interference   Political disinformation has emerged as a paramount concern in numerous countries, with its prevalence particularly acute during electoral periods (Kajimoto and Stanley 2018). The extensive utilization of social media platforms by politicians for voter engagement and campaign purposes has led to a significant surge in disinformation targeting sensitive issues such as religion and ethnicity during election seasons. Organized dissemination of false information by cybertroopers has been documented (Iannone 2022). Various political actors and parties have employed digital campaign specialists and engaged entities such as ‘buzzers’ (Indonesia), ‘trolls (Philippines), and ‘IO’ (information operators, Thailand) to propagate manipulated narratives aimed at discrediting political opponents. Some politicians have resorted to exacerbating religious (Indonesia/Thailand) and ethnic tensions (all three countries) within communities in desperate attempts to secure votes. Concurrently, technology platforms, journalists, and fact-checkers are struggling to keep pace with the sophisticated innovations of disinformation architects. Notably, state actors and government legislators in these countries have been implicated not only in failing to mitigate disinformation but also in directly producing political falsehoods. This involvement of official entities in the creation and spread of disinformation presents a significant challenge to information integrity and democratic processes in the region.   Elections in Asia have transcended domestic concerns, evolving into a matter of international significance. Recent evidence has revealed that nations such as Russia, China, and Iran are actively intervening in foreign electoral processes to advance their own geopolitical interests through various means, as a response to the West’s pivot to Asia, and in an effort to assist local allies more sympathetic to their cause. Among these, the dissemination of disinformation has emerged as the most prevalent form of foreign electoral interference. The content of this disinformation is strategically crafted to exacerbate existing societal tensions, targeting fault lines along racial, class, religious, and generational divides. This deliberate amplification of polarization poses a significant threat to democratic institutions and processes. Foreign electoral interference, particularly through disinformation campaigns, represents a complex challenge to the integrity of democratic systеms. These interventions exploit the vulnerabilities inherent in open societies, leveraging digital platforms and social media algorithms to maximize their impact.   According to Wang Chan-Hsi of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, China’s influence operations are increasingly leveraging algorithms on social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok to disseminate a high volume of short videos laden with messaging favorable to the Chinese Communist Party. Researchers from Princeton University have found that this content is finely calibrated to target specific demographics, including elderly voters who may be more susceptible to misinformation and younger viewers whose political identities are not yet fully formed. These sophisticated tactics exploit the algorithmic curation of content on social media platforms, which may exacerbate political polarization by amplifying content consistent with users’ existing beliefs while suppressing contradictory information (McCartney 2024).   AI-driven Disinformation   OpenAI’s recent disclosure of five covert influence campaigns utilizing its artificial intelligence (AI) technologies for deceptive manipulation of public opinion worldwide has brought to light the growing concern over AI’s role in disseminating disinformation, particularly during election periods (Metz 2024). This revelation underscores the potential for AI-generated misinformation to significantly impact voter trust, distort perceptions of candidates and issues, and potentially manipulate electoral outcomes. The increasing sophistication of AI tools has facilitated the production of fake news, deepfakes, and misleading narratives with unprecedented ease. Globally, there has been a 245% year-on-year increase in deepfake incidents, with some Asian-Pacific countries experiencing even more dramatic surges: South Korea (1625%), Indonesia (1550%), and India (280%). This trend is particularly alarming given the numerous elections scheduled for 2024 and 2025 across various nations. Indonesia’s recent experience exemplifies the challenges posed by AI-generated misinformation in electoral contexts (Ng 2024).   Deepfake videos featuring presidential candidate Anies Baswedan speaking fluent Arabic and the late president Suharto endorsing a Golkar Party candidate garnered millions of views. The Indonesian Anti-Defamation Society reported a doubling of AI-related disinformation compared to previous elections (Beltran 2024). The rise of AI presents a complex dilemma for democracies across Asia. Governments and politicians from the Philippines to South Korea are grappling with AI’s dual potential: its capacity to improve voter engagement, streamline campaigns, and enhance election admіnistration, juxtaposed against its ability to propagate misinformation and potentially undermine the integrity of democratic processes.   The Critical Role of Media Literacy in Combating Disinformation   In the contemporary digital landscape, the proliferation of disinformation poses a significant threat to democratic processes and social stability. To effectively address this challenge, the development of robust media literacy capabilities among citizens is paramount. Media literacy, defined as the ability to critically analyze, evaluate, and create media content, serves as a crucial defense mechanism against the spread of false or misleading information.   The importance of media literacy is particularly pronounced in Asian countries, where the rapid digitalization of information ecosystеms has outpaced the development of critical media consumption skills among the general population.   The OECD’s 2021 report “21st-Century Readers: Developing Literacy Skills in a Digital World” provides valuable insights into the media literacy capabilities of students across different countries. This study, released in May 2021, offers a comprehensive assessment of 15-year-old students’ ability to navigate and evaluate digital information, with a particular focus on their capacity to distinguish between facts and opinions. The results of this assessment revealed significant disparities in digital literacy skills among OECD member countries. Notably, South Korean students, despite their generally high performance in reading skills, demonstrated a surprisingly low proficiency in distinguishing facts from opinions. Only 25.6% of Korean students successfully identified factual information from opinions, a figure substantially below the OECD average of 47% (OECD 2021).   To address these challenges, a concerted effort to enhance media literacy education across Asia is imperative. This endeavor should encompass formal education systеms, from primary schools to universities, as well as adult education programs and public awareness campaigns. Curriculum development should focus on critical thinking skills, digital literacy, and the ability to verify information sources (EDUtechtalks 2024). Governments and civil society are taking various measures, including legislation, fact-checking, and media literacy education. However, effective measures have been hampered by concerns about infringements on freedom of expression (Kajimoto and Stanley 2018). ■   References   Beltran, Sam. 2024. “Will AI Enhance or Undermine Asia’s Elections?” South China Morning Post. December 15. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3290710/will-ai-enhance-or-undermine-asias-elections (Accessed December 20, 2024)   Digital Marketing for Asia: DMFA. 2024. “Most Popular Platforms Social Media in APAC in 2025.” https://www.digitalmarketingforasia.com/most-popular-platforms-social-media-in-apac-in-2025/ (Accessed December 20, 2024)   EDUtechtalks. 2024. “Strengthening Media Literacy in Southeast Asia: A Collaborative Effort led by USAID.” February 2. https://edutechtalks.com/strengthening-media-literacy-in-southeast-asia-a-collaborative-effort-led-by-usaid/ (Accessed December 20, 2024)   Kajimoto, Masato, and Samantha Stanley. 2018. Information Disorder in Asia. The Journalism & Media Studies Centre. 1-53.   McCartney, Micah. 2024. “China’s Election Interference in Taiwan Explained.” Newsweek. January 4. https://www.newsweek.com/china-election-interference-taiwan-2024-presidential-legislative-elections-1857622 (Accessed December 20, 2024)   Metz, Cade. 2024. “OpenAI Says Russia and China Used Its A.I. in Covert Campaigns.” New York Times. May 30. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/30/technology/openai-influence-campaigns-report.html (Accessed December 20, 2024)   Ng, Victor. 2024. “Combating deepfake fraud during elections.” CybersecAsia. https://cybersecasia.net/features/combating-deepfake-fraud-during-elections/ (Accessed December 20, 2024)   OECD. 2021. 21st-Century Readers: Developing Literacy Skills in a Digital World. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/21st-century-readers_a83d84cb-en.html (Accessed December 20, 2024)   Statista. 2023. “Average daily time spent using social media in the Asia-Pacific region as of 3rd quarter 2024, by country or territory.” https://www.statista.com/statistics/1128147/apac-daily-time-spent-using-social-media-by-country-or-region/ (Accessed December 20, 2024)   Yee, Andy. 2017. “Post-Truth Politics Fake News in Asia.” Global Asia 12, 2: 67–71.     ■ Sunghack Lim is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Seoul.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

The 2025 Philippine Election Results and Political Implications   The 2025 Philippine elections on May 12 witnessed its highest midterm voter turnout of 82.2%, with over 57 million Filipinos casting their votes (COMELEC 2025a). The Senate election results reflect a politically diverse yet polarized composition, with five seats going to candidates associated with the Marcos admіnistration, five seats to pro-Duterte allies, and two seats to liberal opposition leaders. Opposition candidates performed better than expected, signaling a potential shift in voter sentiment and a challenge to the dominance of established political dynasties. In the House of Representatives, the ruling Lakas party maintained its dominance with 104 seats. Most significant at the local level was the landslide victory of former President Rodrigo Duterte, who was re-elected as mayor of Davao City. This was notable since he had been charged and detained by the International Criminal Court for extrajudicial killings (ICC 2025).   The 2025 elections have become a pivotal moment revealing a complex and evolving political landscape, marked by the resurgence of political dynasties, challenges to electoral integrity, and significant implications for the country’s democratic trajectory. The electorate’s choices indicate both continued support for established political figures and a growing appetite for reform-oriented leadership, particularly among younger voters. Millennials and Gen Z voters comprised approximately 63% of the voting population. They noticeably distanced themselves from the Marcos and Duterte factions[1], and shifted towards reformist candidates advocating for generational preferences such as environmental justice, food security, and youth empowerment. This was reflected in the win of Akbayan as top party list choice, whose campaign effectively mobilized young voters with a message of progressive reform and social justice that appealed to the younger demographic seeking change in the political landscape (Akbayan Party List 2025).   The election results were also significantly influenced by the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte. In February 2025, the House of Representatives impeached her on charges of corruption and threats against the President (House Journal 2025). This will be followed by a Senate impeachment trial in July, which requires a two-thirds majority (16 votes) for conviction and potential disqualification from future office. This turned the Senate race into a crucial referendum on her political future, yielding varied outcomes for both camps. Currently, neither faction has secured an outright majority.   The elections were conducted with relative logistical success, as polling precincts opened on time, vote-counting machines functioned without widespread malfunction, voter turnout was high, results were transmitted swiftly, and the elections were generally peaceful compared to previous elections. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) demonstrated operational readiness by efficiently deploying technological upgrades with improved cybersecurity safeguards, and civic engagement was evident throughout the process (COMELEC 2025b).   Despite operational successes, significant flaws in democratic integrity have been revealed. Widespread vote buying, online disinformation, entrenched political dynasties, and alleged foreign interference from Chinese-sponsored campaigns compromised the fairness and transparency of the process (ASEAN 2025). These systеmic issues erode the legitimacy of electoral outcomes and fall short of international standards on fairness, transparency, and equal political opportunity. A fragile democracy that is susceptible to elite capture, sectarian interests, fragile party systеms, and transactional politics is observed. The presence of election monitors offered some oversight, but lasting reform is needed to ensure a level playing field as the country moves toward the 2028 presidential race. This briefing outlines the major issues observed and their broader implications.   Democracy Challenges Observed   1. Command and Religious Bloc Voting. The continued influence of command and religious bloc voting, particularly by groups like Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), which reportedly delivered 800,000 to 1.2 million votes (Rappler 2025), poses a serious challenge to democratic integrity. In tight races, these bloc votes can be decisive, not due to a candidate’s merit or platform but rather due to sectarian endorsement. This distorts representation, undermines voter autonomy, and blurs the line between church and state. Religious groups acting as political kingmakers raise ethical and constitutional concerns, especially when lesser-known candidates achieve success primarily through sectarian backing.   2. Entrenched Political Elite, Celebrities and Dynasties. The majority of Senate seats were won by re-electionists, celebrities and scions of political families (Ateneo School of Government 2025). This suggests that achieving victory is a challenging endeavor for independent candidates. New or non-traditional candidates face insurmountable barriers, shrinking the pool of democratic participation. This reinforces the exclusivity of elite politics, overwhelmingly excluding newcomers who lack name recall or political machinery. The dominance of political families creates a de facto aristocracy, where power is transferred through inheritance rather than through democratic competition. This discourages citizen engagement and undermines the principle of equal representation. It greatly limits the democratic space for genuine political competition, marginalizes independent, grassroots or reformist voices, and undermines the ideal of democracy as a level playing field for all.   3. Government Aid and Patronage Politics. Many local candidates relied on patronage networks rooted in dynastic control and clientelist practices to secure votes. These transactions involved the coercive use of state resources, including the withholding of Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) and other national funds from Local Government Units (LGUs) based on political loyalty. Such practices prioritize personal alliances over policy and undermine free and fair elections. The distribution of government aid, or ayuda, was also used as a vote-buying tool. The European Union Election Observation Mission identified vote-buying as a widespread practice, with ayuda being a common method (European Union 2025). COMELEC received over 400 complaints involving the misuse of aid programs for electoral gain (COMELEC 2025c). Despite a government ban on ayuda distribution during the campaign period, enforcement proved difficult, allowing candidates to continue distributing politically motivated giveaways. This highlights the urgent need for stricter rules and enforcement to prevent the politicization of public assistance.   4. Weak Political Party Systеm and Transactional Alliances. Elections were dominated by opportunistic alliances and last-minute defections, largely influenced by survey trends rather than policy or ideological commitments (PCIJ 2025). Politicians often align themselves with the winning side, reflecting a bandwagon culture and weakening party discipline. Candidates were often supported for their personal brands rather than coherent platforms, transforming elections into popularity contests. Vague party identities and the absence of clear, issue-based agendas hindered informed voter choice and diluted political accountability. The ambiguity of party platforms revealed the hollow nature of many political parties, which remained personality-driven and loosely organized. This transactional and numbers-focused politics has sidelined principled leadership and long-term vision, undermining democratic discourse as well as the development of programmatic, issue-based politics.   Electoral Reforms Needed to Strengthen Democracy[2]   To address systеmic weaknesses and reinforce democratic governance in the country, the following key reforms are recommended:   1. Enact Anti-Political Dynasty Legislation: Prevent the monopolization of political power by entrenched families, by enforcing constitutional provisions against political dynasties. Legislative measures should be implemented to curtail the influence of families in electing officials, thereby fostering inclusivity, fair competition, and political diversity. Opening space for new leaders is essential for the revitalization of representative democracy.   2. Enhance Campaign Finance Transparency: Strengthen laws to prevent vote-buying and the illegal funding of campaigns. Implement strict auditing mechanisms, impose meaningful penalties for violations, and ensure public access to campaign finance records to promote transparency and accountability.   3. Reform the Political Party Systеm: Encourage the development of platform-based, values-driven parties by providing public financing tied to programmatic goals. In order to curtail political opportunism, it is advisable to implement anti-turncoat laws that discourage party-switching and incentivize issue-based coalition building to foster ideological coherence and party stability.   4. Empower Civil Society and Promote Civic Education: Strengthen civil society’s involvement in civic education, election monitoring, and voter engagement. Provide NGOs and watchdog groups with adequate resources and legal protections. Initiate a nationwide civic education program in schools and communities to cultivate political literacy, critical thinking, and democratic participation. This program will empower voters with the tools to make independent and informed choices. It is imperative to underscore the significance of ballot secrecy, informed voting, and resistance to disinformation.   5. Combat Disinformation and Promote Digital Literacy: Implement strategies to counter disinformation, including fact-checking initiatives, regulation of political advertising on digital platforms, and penalties for coordinated misinformation campaigns. Invest in digital literacy programs to help citizens critically assess online content and make informed electoral choices.   6. Increase Youth Engagement: Recognize the growing influence of the youth vote. Future campaigns must prioritize issues that resonate with young voters, such as education, employment, mental health, and digital infrastructure, to sustain their democratic participation and trust in institutions.   7. Capitalize on Reformist Momentum: The strong showing of reform-oriented candidates such as Bam Aquino and Kiko Pangilinan signals a renewed public appetite for policy-driven leadership. Their success, along with the impressive performance of independent candidates, reflects a growing willingness among voters to support alternatives outside traditional party structures and entrenched political narratives. Akbayan’s electoral win further underscores this shift, indicating a growing demand for progressive representation focused on social justice, transparency, and the welfare of marginalized communities. This reformist momentum presents a vital opportunity to reshape the political landscape. By supporting individuals who are both principle-oriented and performance-driven to enter public service, the focus can shift from patronage to good governance, accountability, and inclusive leadership.   Conclusion   The 2025 elections underscore the significance of democracy beyond the mere act of voting, emphasizing the need for fair competition, transparency, and accountable institutions. While voter turnout remains robust, the persistent influence of sectarian endorsements, patronage networks, and elite dominance reflects a democracy under strain.   To safeguard democratic integrity, urgent reforms are needed: strengthening political party systеms, upholding secular governance, and dismantling entrenched dynasties. These measures are essential to restore genuine electoral competition and inclusive political participation.   As the nation looks ahead to the 2028 presidential election, these reforms must be prioritized to prevent further erosion of democratic norms and the consolidation of authoritarian populism cloaked in electoral legitimacy. ■   References   Akbayan Party List. 2025. “Official Campaign Report.”   ASEAN. 2025. “Election Integrity Watch Report.” https://asean.org/ (Accessed May 21, 2025)   Ateneo School of Government. 2025. “Election Briefing Paper.” https://www.ateneo.edu/asog (Accessed May 21, 2025)   Commission on Elections: COMELEC. 2025a. “Official Voter Turnout Statistics: May 2025 Midterm Elections.” https://comelec.gov.ph/ (Accessed May 21, 2025)   ______. 2025b. “Post Election Report.” COMELEC Operations Summary. https://comelec.gov.ph/ (Accessed May 21, 2025)   ______. 2025c. “Complaint Records.” https://comelec.gov.ph/ (Accessed May 21, 2025)   European Union. 2025. “EU Election Observation Mission Final Report.” https://www.eeas.europa.eu/_en (Accessed May 21, 2025)   House Journal. 2025. “Record of Impeachment Proceedings against VP Duterte.” https://congress.gov.ph/ (Accessed May 21, 2025)   International Criminal Court: ICC. 2025. “Situation in the Republic of the Philippines in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Rodrigo Roa Duterte.” April 2. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180b295b8.pdf (Accessed May 21, 2025)   Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism: PCIJ. 2025. “Party Politics Analysis.” https://pcij.org/ (Accessed May 21, 2025)   Rappler. 2025. “Rappler & PCIJ Analysis: INC Voting Patterns.” https://www.rappler.com/ (Accessed May 21, 2025)     [1] Pulse Asia & SWS Exit Polls. May 2025.   [2] Policy recommendations adapted from electoral reform proposals by NAMFREL, LENTE, and the Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER), 2024–2025.     ■ Mardi Mapa-Suplido is Chairperson of the International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance (INCITEGov).     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Five years after Beijing imposed the National Security Law (NSL) on Hong Kong, the city’s promised “high degree of autonomy” has been largely dismantled. The year 2025 has witnessed two mutually reinforcing developments that tighten the state’s grip while extending its reach overseas: (1) the escalation of transnational repression through the punitive targeting of exiled activists’ families, and (2) the institutional embedding of mainland jurisdiction inside Hong Kong’s legal order via new subsidiary legislation to the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO). Taken together with the earlier evisceration of electoral competition, these moves complete Hong Kong’s transition from a constrained hybrid regime to an openly authoritarian model governed from Beijing.   This briefing traces the recent changes, analyzes their implications for civil liberties and international human-rights norms, and considers the strategic options that remain for Hong Kong’s democracy movement—both inside the territory and across its rapidly expanding diaspora.   Transnational Repression: The Kwok Case and Beyond   The Hong Kong government's recent tactics targeting the families of exiled pro-democracy figures reveal a deepening pattern of transnational repression. These actions aim to silence dissent that has moved beyond Hong Kong’s borders by subjecting family members to legal harassment and public intimidation.   A prominent example is Anna Kwok, Executive Director of the Washington-based Hong Kong Democracy Council. In July 2023, the Hong Kong authorities issued an arrest warrant for Kwok along with a bounty of one million Hong Kong Dollars (equivalent to 128 thousand USD), alleging violations of the National Security Law (NSL). Although her parents were interrogated by national security police at the time, no formal charges were initially laid.   In April 2025, however, the situation escalated significantly. Her father, Kwok Yin-sang, was arrested and charged under the SNSO, accused of handling her financial matters. Her brother was also detained, though released on bail. This incident marks the first documented instance of family members of exiled activists being prosecuted under Hong Kong’s national security regime (Lam and Chow 2025).   This practice is not isolated. Other prominent exiled activists—including Frances Hui (Lee 2025) and Simon Cheng—have reported similar forms of retaliation. Hui’s parents were reportedly detained and subjected to public humiliation, while Cheng’s relatives were detained for further interrogation. These actions aim to cultivate a climate of fear and isolation among overseas dissidents, thereby implicitly pressuring them to abandon their advocacy work.   International human rights groups have condemned these practices as forms of collective punishment, (Schenkkan and Linzer 2021) which violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights norms. Targeting individuals for the actions of their relatives undermines the rule of law and represents a broader erosion of global human rights protections.   Expansion of Mainland Jurisdiction and the Legalization of Article 55   The legal infrastructure enabling this repression has also been strengthened. In May 2025, subsidiary legislation under the SNSO significantly expanded the powers of the Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS)—a Beijing-controlled body operating in Hong Kong.   The new legislation operationalizes Article 55 of the 2020 National Security Law, which permits the transfer of national security cases from Hong Kong to mainland Chinese jurisdiction. While previously considered a theoretical clause, it has now been institutionalized through domestic legal mechanisms, granting the OSNS the power to compel cooperation from individuals and organizations. Non-compliance with these regulations has been criminalized, carrying penalties of up to seven years in prison and substantial fines (Hong Kong Free Press 2025-05-13).   Furthermore, the legislation criminalizes the disclosure of any information related to OSNS investigations. Lawyers, journalists, and civil society members are now prohibited from revealing whether a case involves Article 55, thus blocking public oversight and transparency.   These measures mark a stark shift from Hong Kong’s common law tradition toward a model resembling mainland Chinese admіnistrative law, prioritizing state control over due process. The legislation undermines constitutional protections enshrined in the Basic Law and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly regarding freedom of expression, judicial independence, and legal transparency.   Most importantly, this legal shift represents a fundamental dismantling of the "One Country, Two Systеms" framework, thereby embedding mainland legal authority into Hong Kong’s domestic institutions and effectively stripping the city of its judicial autonomy.   Options for Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement   Parallel to the legal erosion is the disintegration of Hong Kong’s institutional pro-democracy forces. The disbandment of major democratic parties, including the Democratic Party, reflects a deliberate endeavor to dismantle semi-democratic opposition within the political systеm. This collapse was catalyzed by the 2021 electoral overhaul, orchestrated by Beijing and enforced by the Hong Kong government. The overhaul includes the drastic reduction of the number of directly elected seats in the Legislative Council, introduction of a new vetting process admіnistered by a pro-government committee, and the screening of election candidates to quell all pro-democracy voices. As a result, nearly all pro-democracy candidates have been barred from elections. The remaining figures have either resigned or been disqualified, leaving the Legislative Council devoid of meaningful opposition. The legislature has now become a rubber-stamp body, with policies passed with near-unanimous consent and minimal public consultation. This transformation marks the end of electoral pluralism, rendering elections merely ceremonial and removing any platform for dissent or policy debate. Under this circumstance, both domestic and international strategy are required to sustain Hong Kong’s democratic movement.   Domestic Paths Forward: Quiet Resistance and Civic Resilience   In the face of shrinking civic space and the collapse of formal democratic institutions, it is crucial to persist in the cultivation of non-political civic networks rooted in mutual support, trust, and shared values. These grassroots connections—whether formed through community service, cultural activities, mutual aid, or neighborhood initiatives—can serve as the social fabric that sustains resistance in quiet yet powerful ways. Even without overt political goals, such networks help preserve a sense of solidarity and belonging among those who resist authoritarian control.   Equally important is the continued commitment to citizen journalism. In a context characterized by mounting pressures from censorship and self-censorship in mainstream media, individuals must assume the responsibility of documenting and reporting injustice. By recording incidents of abuse, collecting testimonies, and sharing verified information, citizen journalists help ensure that the truth is not erased. This act of bearing witness functions not only as a form of resistance, but also as an essential means of upholding the principle of a free press, even under repression.   Lastly, it is imperative to recognize the impact of small acts of solidarity with human rights defenders. These actions, such as attending court hearings to show moral support, waving at prison transport vehicles, or writing letters to political prisoners, are imbued with profound symbolic significance. They affirm the dignity of those targeted for their beliefs and remind them—and the world—that they are not forgotten. In times of isolation and fear, such actions provide a sense of optimism, maintain visibility, and resist the state’s attempt to silence and erase dissent.   Collectively, these practices form a quiet but resilient form of resistance, sustaining the values of freedom, truth, and compassion within our communities.   International Engagement and Diaspora Institution-Building   As Hong Kong’s local civic space collapses under the weight of intensified repression and institutional hollowing, international arenas have become increasingly central to the pro-democracy movement’s survival and strategic orientation. For those in exile and for allies around the world, international engagement is not merely a defensive necessity but a proactive opportunity to reshape global understanding, influence democratic discourse, and lay the foundation for long-term resistance. Effective advocacy in this new era involves building narrative, political, and institutional power—each essential to sustaining Hong Kong’s democratic movement beyond its territorial boundaries.   A primary and urgent objective is to challenge the narrative crafted by Hong Kong authorities—that the city has stabilized and “returned to normal” under the National Security Law, and that any residual dissent is dangerous subversion. This storyline aims to reassure the international community, attract investment, and normalize repression. In response, pro-democracy advocates must sustain a campaign of narrative resistance. By sharing verified facts, first-hand accounts, and media commentaries, activists can expose the persistent repression. The aim is not just to correct misinformation but to maintain the visibility and moral urgency of Hong Kong’s democratic struggle. The concept of “normalcy” built on fear and silencing is neither real nor acceptable—and global indifference is a form of complicity.   Beyond the realm of media engagement, there is a growing need to build strategic relationships with civic, academic, and political institutions in host countries. These relationships provide a platform for Hongkongers in exile to contextualize their experiences within broader patterns of democratic backsliding and authoritarian resurgence. Participation in public forums, policy consultations, university lectures, and community events is a means through which exiled Hongkongers can share insights into the gradual and legal loss of freedoms. These losses occur through regulatory changes, electoral manipulation, and the hollowing out of institutions. These engagements allow for the transfer of hard-earned knowledge to democratic societies that may face similar vulnerabilities. They also serve as a cautionary signal, underscoring that the dismantling of civil liberties rarely begins with spectacle; rather, it begins quietly, often with legislation clothed in the language of stability and national interest.   Equally important is the development of independent institutions rooted within the Hong Kong diaspora itself (Klinenberg 2018). These institutions must evolve beyond mere advocacy platforms to become durable ecosystеms for knowledge production, cultural preservation, political education, and mutual support. Think tanks dedicated to human rights and democracy in Asia, advocacy organizations that monitor transnational repression, and cultural centers that preserve Hong Kong’s historical memory all play a role in resisting erasure. By fostering leadership, creating spaces for civic participation, and maintaining intellectual and cultural continuity, these organizations serve as alternative public spheres. Consequently, these organizations furnish Hongkongers in exile not just with the instruments of political action, but also with the affirmation of identity and community needed for long-term engagement.   Moreover, international engagement must be understood not solely as a request for external support, but as a manifestation of global democratic partnership. The Hong Kong movement offers valuable insights, drawing from its experience with authoritarian encroachment through legal and institutional means, to its models of decentralized organizing and civil resistance. Exiles can and should position themselves not as passive recipients of solidarity, but as active contributors to a global democratic ecosystеm. By sharing their insights and forming alliances with like-minded movements, Hongkongers help build transnational resilience against the authoritarian playbook that is being deployed, in varying forms, around the world.   Finally, this work is about shaping the future. The institutions, alliances, and narratives built today lay the groundwork for the eventual restoration of democracy in Hong Kong. While that day may remain distant, the struggle does not pause in exile—it transforms. Diaspora activism functions as a repository of democratic values, a guardian of memory, and a generator of future possibilities. Through patient and strategic international engagement, the Hong Kong movement can maintain its moral clarity, expand its global influence, and ensure that the vision of a free and democratic Hong Kong remains alive—not as a nostalgic ideal, but as an enduring and actionable goal. ■   References   Hong Kong Free Press. 2025. “Hong Kong enacts update to local security law: Up to 7 years jail for disclosing nat. security probe.” May 13. https://hongkongfp.com/2025/05/13/breaking-hong-kong-enacts-article-23-subsidiary-legislation-disclosure-of-nat-sec-probe-punishable-by-up-to-7-years (Accessed May 16, 2025)   Klinenberg, Eric. 2018. Palaces for the People: How Social Infrastructure Can Help Fight Inequality, Polarization, and the Decline of Civic Life. New York: Crown.   Lam, Jeffie, and Fiona Chow. 2025. “Hong Kong fugitive Anna Kwok’s father remanded in custody in assets case.” South China Morning Post. May 2. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3308815/family-hong-kong-fugitive-anna-kwok-charged-handling-her-financial-assets (Accessed May 16, 2025)   Lee, James. 2025. “Hong Kong nat. security police take in parents of wanted US-based activist Frances Hui for questioning.” Hong Kong Free Press. April 10. https://hongkongfp.com/2025/04/10/hong-kong-nat-security-police-take-in-parents-of-wanted-us-based-activist-frances-hui-for-questioning (Accessed May 16, 2025)   Schenkkan, Nate, and Isabel Linzer. 2021. “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression.” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/Complete_FH_TransnationalRepressionReport2021_rev020221.pdf (Accessed May 16, 2025)     ■ Alric Lee is a Co-Founder and Executive Director of Lady Liberty Hong Kong, a Tokyo-based non-profit organization dedicated to promoting democracy, human rights, and the preservation of freedom in Hong Kong.     ■ Edited by Hansu Park, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]