Introduction   The date of December 3, 2025, has been identified as the first anniversary of the event that shocked the world. Precisely one year ago, the incumbent president of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Suk-yeol, declared martial law in an attempt to stage a praetorian coup. The president's attempt to seize power was promptly countered by mass civic resistance and the National Assembly's swift vote to revoke the unconstitutional martial law order. Following a failed attempt and the defection of a faction of the ruling party, the Assembly ultimately approved the impeachment motion against President Yoon.   In the wake of these events, the Constitutional Court engaged in protracted deliberations, while citizens continued to demonstrate in public squares, thereby sustaining what would later come to be known as the "Cheering-Stick and Kisses Revolution." Following an extensive 111-day period of meticulous review, the Court delivered a unanimous ruling that resulted in the president's removal from office. Consequently, the individual who had endeavored to assume an authoritarian role was held accountable through a combination of democratic resistance and constitutional adjudication. The impeachment proceedings led to the second snap presidential election in South Korea in June 2025, which resulted in the victory of Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung. Consequently, legal accountability was followed by political accountability.   The previous year will be recalled as a pivotal moment in the evolution of contemporary Korean democracy. In a statement commemorating the first anniversary of the December 3 martial-law declaration, President Lee Jae-myung remarked that "the Republic of Korea is now writing a chapter of world-historical significance. The "Revolution of Light" exemplified by the Korean people is establishing a new global standard for democracy." He further elaborated, stating, "It is my firm conviction that the Korean people, who have demonstrated an unparalleled capacity for peaceful resolution in the face of a democratic crisis of unmatched proportions in the annals of world history, are unequivocally deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize."[1]   The president, who has been described as authoritarian, has been removed from office, and legal proceedings against him and his collaborators are currently underway. When confronted with an existential threat, the Korean democracy demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for civic mobilization and institutional self-correction.   Nevertheless, a critical question persists: The central question guiding this inquiry is whether the Korean democracy has genuinely overcome the attempted insurrection and achieved full restoration. Notwithstanding the substantial progress achieved in the past year, the path to achieving complete democratic resilience remains arduous, contentious, and unfinished. In the context of the recently established People's Sovereignty Government, South Korea's democratic system is confronted with the extraordinary challenge of legally adjudging a coup attempt that is driven by self-serving interests and subsequently addressing the insurrection that has ensued. It is incumbent upon the government to address the public's demand for a swift resolution to the crisis through democratic procedures and institutions. This is the only way to restore the legitimacy that the previous administration had compromised through its partisan use of state apparatuses. Moreover, the nation is currently grappling with the additional challenge of establishing a democratic majority coalition,[2] a task that remained unaccomplished during the 21st presidential election.   Despite South Korea's demonstrated resilience in recovering from its democratic crisis, the nation is currently grappling with three significant challenges: the rise of far-right extremism, the erosion of constitutionalism, and the escalation of political polarization. It is imperative for South Korea to address these challenges if it is to successfully transition to a stable liberal democracy.   The Far-Right Turn of the People Power Party   A comparison of the outcomes of the previous snap election in May 2017, held in the aftermath of President Park Geun-hye's impeachment, and those of the presidential election in June 2025, which followed the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol, reveals a striking disparity. During the impeachment proceedings against Park, the ruling party experienced a schism over the issue of impeachment, with a faction advocating for reform departing to establish the Bareun Party. An overwhelming majority of political actors and citizens expressed support for the impeachment of a corrupt leader who had privatized powers entrusted to her for public purposes. Consequently, a democratic majority coalition, founded on shared commitments to constitutionalism and democratic norms, came to the fore. This coalition manifested itself in the electoral results, as evidenced by the combined vote share of the pro-impeachment candidates: Moon Jae-in (41.08%) of the Democratic Party, Sim Sang-jung (6.17%) of the Justice Party, Ahn Cheol-soo (21.41%) of the People's Party, and Yoo Seung-min (6.76%) of the Bareun Party. This combined vote share amounted to approximately 75 percent. In contrast, Hong Joon-pyo of the former ruling Liberty Korea Party received only 24.03 percent of the vote.   The advent of a reformist conservative bloc gave rise to the anticipation that Korean democracy would advance toward a novel stage of "ambidextrous democracy," wherein progressives and conservatives—while sharing core democratic principles—would engage in competition over substantive democratic programs.[3] However, the reformist conservative forces were unable to maintain their political viability. During the subsequent five years under the Moon Jae-in administration, Korean democracy experienced a deepening of political polarization—particularly affective polarization—and, in many respects, regressed to the period of the pre-Candlelight uprising.   During the Moon Jae-in government, which adopted the moniker of the "candlelight government," the escalating affective polarization deepened into a severe vitocracy, eventually paving the way for a conservative return to power. Following the anti-impeachment rallies in support of Park Geun-hye, there has been a gradual and notable expansion in the presence of far-right groups. Until the late 2010s, mainstream conservative parties maintained a certain distance from these extremist street movements, whose voices remained marginal. The pivotal moment that signaled a shift in the political landscape was the ascension of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in 2022. The subject's professional background, which includes a tenure as Chief Prosecutor's Office under the administration of Moon Jae-in, has been characterized by an inclination toward authoritarian practices.   The general elections in April 2024 were of critical importance for President Yoon. Significant policy failures, including a sudden surge in medical student enrollment and persistent controversies surrounding his spouse, contributed to the party's substantial electoral losses. They secured a mere 108 seats in the National Assembly, out of a total of 300 seats, indicating a significant decline in their representation. Faced with a parliamentary minority status, Yoon's ruling bloc adopted a stance of intransigence, exercising the veto power against bills proposed by the opposition parties. Conversely, opposition parties on the progressive side impeached cabinet ministers on multiple occasions and reduced the budget allocated for his office. In the midst of a prevailing political stagnancy and social seclusion, President Yoon has adopted a strategy that incorporates the use of extreme narratives, far-right street demonstrations, and right-leaning YouTube content creators to bolster his position. The regime's actions were justified under the rhetoric of resisting "left-wing dictatorship" and defending "liberal democracy." This discursive strategy drew upon long-standing anti-North Korean and anti-communist ideology, which since the 2000s had nurtured both "old" and "new right" groups.   Following the impeachment of Park, a significant number of right-wing groups have undergone a radicalization process, establishing substantial influence on digital platforms. A notable development has been the evolution of certain fundamentalist Christian groups into extremist political organizations, which have established connections with far-right youth communities. The recent coup d'état in South Korea has been interpreted by certain factions as a defensive maneuver against an alleged "opposition legislative dictatorship." These groups have characterized the action as a noble defense of liberal democracy, and they have mobilized mass protests in support of the new regime. Confronted with escalating political crises, the ruling conservatives increasingly relied on these radical forces as a paramilitary base. During his three-year tenure, the conservative party evolved into a form of power-conservatism that was increasingly influenced by extremist elements. This shift was further solidified by the strategic realignment of the party in response to the lessons from Park's downfall, which emphasized the notion that internal division could lead to systemic collapse. In contrast to the 2017 scenario, hardline factions prevailed within the party during the impeachment proceedings, overtly aligning themselves with radical street movements. For instance, the People Power Party's presidential candidate, Kim Moon-soo, explicitly opposed the impeachment of a leader who had staged a pro-regime coup.   South Korea has historically experienced the presence of radical right-wing activism in online spaces, such as Ilbe. These groups, already prone to violent provocations during political crises such as the Sewol Ferry tragedy and the 2016 impeachment rallies, escalated further under Yoon. The riot that occurred at West Seoul Court on January 19, 2025, signified an unparalleled direct attack on a constitutional institution, thereby indicating a substantial rupture. A similar phenomenon to that observed in the United States under Trump was witnessed, marked by the convergence of far-right social movements and conservative parties, leading to an escalation in partisan radicalization. This phenomenon, termed "social movement partyism" by Van Dyke et al. (2024), involves a symbiotic relationship between political parties, which provide structured opportunities, and social movements, which mobilize support through a reciprocal exchange of opportunities and mobilization.   Despite the fact that approximately six months have elapsed since the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung government, the People Power Party has engaged in extra-parliamentary rallies in overt alliance with extremist groups. At these rallies, demonstrators have been heard to recite slogans such as "June 3 rigged election" and "Invalidate Lee Jae-myung's election!" The phrases "Yoon Again" and "eradicate communism" were displayed alongside each other, accompanied by the flags of the political party. The infiltration of the party by politicized religious sects, including the Jun Kwang-hoon faction, Shincheonji, and the Unification Church, has been systematic. Concurrently, far-right activists have been building international ties with counterparts in the United States and beyond. In an address delivered on the first anniversary of the martial law declaration, the leader of the People Power Party attributed the imposition of martial law to the Democratic Party's parliamentary obstruction and "legislative tyranny" (Hani 2025/11/28).[4]   The radicalization of the People Power Party, characterized by its right-wing orientation, has precipitated substantial political ramifications. A recent survey administered by the KNU Democracy Research Center in October 2025 sought to assess respondents' perceptions of a recent violent incident that transpired at the Western District Court. The survey utilized a scale ranging from 0 to 10, with 0 representing a "legitimate act of civic resistance necessary to defend the rule of law" and 10 representing a "violent and anti-constitutional act that undermined the democratic order." The survey's findings indicated that the average rating among all respondents was 6.766. Conversely, the average score among supporters of the People Power Party exhibited a precipitous decline, reaching 5.20. Furthermore, 33.18 percent of the respondents (N = 1,000) expressed agreement with the assertion that the 21st presidential election was tainted by fraud or manipulation. Conversely, among supporters of the People Power Party, the proportion endorsing this view exhibited a marked increase, reaching 63.52 percent. <Figure 1> Attitudes toward the Violent Attack at the Western District Court Source: Survey on Democratic Values and Attitudes (KNU Democracy Research Center, Oct 2025) Note: How would you evaluate the violent protest and breach of the Seoul Western District Court that took place on January 19, 2025?”  Responses were measured on a scale from (1) “a legitimate form of civic resistance undertaken to protect the rule of law” to (10) “a violent and anti-constitutional act that damaged democratic order.”   The viability of attaining substantial democratic resilience is contingent upon the primary opposition party—along with the societal segments aligned with it—abandoning extremist postures and reaffirming their commitment to the fundamental tenets of democratic governance.   Erosion of the Legitimacy of Constitutionalism   Since the advent of democracy, the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) has witnessed three attempts to impeach a sitting president. Across these episodes, democracy and constitutionalism—one rooted in the principle of majority rule and the other in the rule of law—interacted in ways that revealed both tension and mutual reinforcement.   The initial impeachment attempt targeting President Roh Moo-hyun was ultimately rejected by the Constitutional Court. In arriving at this decision, the Court made a clear distinction between political responsibility and legal responsibility, thereby establishing the constitutional criteria for impeachment. In this capacity, it functioned as an institutional counterweight, mediating between democratic legitimacy and legal formalism.   In the case of President Park Geun-hye, although the impeachment process unfolded against the backdrop of mass candlelight demonstrations, the Court did not incorporate the protesters' demands into its legal reasoning. Nevertheless, the court's unanimous ruling effectively translated the democratic legitimacy manifested in the civic mobilization into the domain of constitutionalism.   In contrast to the two earlier cases, the impeachment of President Yoon unfolded under fundamentally different conditions. The attempted self-coup by a sitting president was immediately thwarted by the direct resistance of citizens and the National Assembly's swift decision to nullify the declaration of martial law. Subsequent to this initial development, an escalating confrontation ensued among pro-coup factions, opposition forces, and citizens engaged in unwavering mass resistance. In the face of persistent civic pressure, the National Assembly ultimately passed the articles of impeachment following two rounds of voting.   Upon the case's referral to the Constitutional Court, there was a pronounced polarisation of political elites and public opinion regarding the issue of removing a president who had endeavored to subvert the constitutional order. This dynamic stood in stark contrast to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, in which approximately 75 percent of the public supported her removal and even the ruling party fractured in the face of overwhelming societal consensus. Despite the variability in the precise figures across different surveys, opposition to Yoon's impeachment consistently ranged from 30 to 40 percent.[5]   The protracted impeachment proceedings and the retirement of several justices have led to heightened concerns regarding the politicization of the Constitutional Court's deliberations. The acting head of state's delay in appointing judges, in conjunction with mounting tensions between the National Assembly and an executive branch functioning under provisional leadership following the president's impeachment, has led to an intensification of the prevailing institutional instability.   The case of President Yoon demonstrates that the primary threat to South Korea's stability does not stem from the impeachment proceedings observed in certain Latin American countries. Rather, it originates from the deliberate exploitation of procedural loopholes and institutional ambiguities to impede or manipulate constitutional processes. This dynamic has the effect of intensifying the inherent tension between democracy and constitutionalism, and it poses a significant threat to democratic stability. As delays in the impeachment proceedings persisted, both politicians and members of the public began advocating for the issue to be resolved through a national referendum (Hankyoreh21. 2025/March/21).   During the administration of Yoon Suk-yeol, the exercise of prosecutorial power exhibited a discernible partisan bias, resulting in a series of criminal indictments against Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung. These indictments encompassed charges pertaining to alleged violations of election laws, involvement in the Daejang-dong development scandal, and the purported third-party payment of expenses for a proposed visit to North Korea. The case that exerted the most significant influence on the presidential race was the public-official election law indictment. Just over a month before the election, the Supreme Court's Grand Bench, without introducing any new evidence, overturned the High Court's acquittal and remanded the case with a finding of guilt. This decision was procedurally unprecedented in both its timing and haste, and it dramatically intensified political uncertainty. Following extensive controversy, the High Court decided to postpone Lee's retrial until after the election, thereby avoiding an escalation of partisan conflict. However, this maneuver precipitated a novel constitutional discourse concerning the scope and import of the non-prosecution privilege guaranteed to the president-elect under Article 84 of the Constitution.   The Supreme Court's unusually expeditious handling of Lee Jae-myung's case—culminating in a remand for conviction under Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae following an expedited referral to the Grand Bench and the retirement of key justices—raised significant concerns regarding procedural irregularities, potential political interference, and the erosion of judicial neutrality. The judiciary's abrupt intervention resulted in a disruption of the delicate balance between democratic electoral processes and the principles of constitutionalism (Diplomat May07/2025).   The request for an arrest warrant for former President Yoon Suk-yeol, issued in the aftermath of the December 3 martial law crisis and his subsequent impeachment, generated unprecedented political and legal repercussions. The special prosecutor asserted the necessity of compulsory measures on the grounds of grave offenses—including the mobilization of military forces for an alleged insurrectionary purpose and multiple counts of abuse of authority—whereas Yoon categorically rejected the allegations as "political persecution" and refused to comply with summonses. During the substantive proceedings, the court and the special prosecutor diverged markedly in their assessment of evidentiary credibility, the legal threshold for establishing insurrectionary intent, and the permissible scope of coercive investigative measures. This divergence led to an intensification of debates over procedural legitimacy and judicial neutrality. Yoon's refusal to submit to arrest, in conjunction with the interpretive disjunction between the bench and the special prosecutor, exposed a pronounced fissure between the imperatives of legal accountability and the logic of political self-justification. This ultimately placed the foundations of the rule of law in South Korean democracy under severe strain. Ultimately, the court granted the special prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant, citing the gravity of the offenses as well as the risks of evidence destruction and flight.   Furthermore, the release of Yoon Suk-yeol by Judge Ji Gui-yeon's panel, issued through an expedited and procedurally irregular route, exacerbated public apprehension that the judiciary was selectively intervening in politically sensitive cases. Despite being detained again on a separate charge, which mirrors the controversies surrounding the Supreme Court's remand decision in the Lee Jae-myung case, the ruling intensified concerns over political bias within the judiciary, the strategic manipulation of procedural discretion, and the consequent erosion of institutional neutrality and democratic legitimacy.   As the impeachment process and the subsequent judicial proceedings became increasingly politicized, the procedural legitimacy of constitutionalism was eroded. Judicial outcomes were selectively interpreted and accepted according to the interests of competing political camps, thereby reinforcing a form of partisan, outcome-oriented legitimacy at the expense of constitutional norms.   The Intensification of Affective Polarization and the Erosion of Democratic Foundations   The 2017 presidential election was marked by a Democratic majority coalition that sought to impeach Park, while the 2025 election was defined by a deepening divide between those who favored and those who opposed impeachment. The People Power Party candidate, Kim Moon-soo, openly opposed the impeachment of a president who had attempted a pro-regime coup under martial law. Nevertheless, Kim Moon-soo captured 41.2 percent of the vote, falling 8.27 percentage points behind the winning candidate, Lee Jae-myung. Throughout the campaign, public opinion polls consistently demonstrated that between 30 and 40 percent of respondents expressed opposition to impeachment, thereby underscoring a profoundly entrenched division in Korean society. The 2025 presidential election transpired in the context of pronounced affective polarization. According to Gallup Korea's post-election survey (Daily Opinion No. 624), the most frequently cited reason for supporting Kim Moon-soo was his 'morality/integrity' (33 percent). However, the second most prevalent rationale, with a nearly equivalent magnitude, was the simple 'dislike of Lee Jae-myung' (30 percent).   Despite the occurrence of the impeachment and the subsequent inauguration of President Lee Jae-myung, the situation did not demonstrate any signs of improvement. As previously mentioned, the former ruling party, which has since transformed into the primary opposition, has experienced a marked shift in its ideological orientation, with a notable rise in the influence of far-right forces. Despite facing legal and political ramifications, including impeachment and electoral defeat, the People Power Party has not exhibited a substantial shift in its ideological stance. Concurrently, despite the fact that the ruling Democratic Party—in conjunction with pro-Democratic minor parties—represents an overwhelming bloc of approximately 180 seats, there has been no indication of an effort to establish a comprehensive pro-democratic coalition that would encompass components of the People Power Party or the Reform Party. Instead of pursuing the establishment of a broader democratic alliance, the government has persisted in issuing warnings concerning the possible dissolution of political parties implicated in the insurrection. Moreover, the ruling Democratic Party is implementing a stringent policy of profoundly restructuring the prosecutor's office and the judiciary. This approach contrasts with President Lee's own more circumspect stance on these matters.   The increasing radicalization of the opposition, particularly among far-right groups, in conjunction with the inability of the ruling party to establish a comprehensive democratic coalition, has resulted in a pronounced escalation of affective polarization within the societal structure. This deepening affective divide is eroding the civic foundations of democratic governance.   Firstly, there was significant divergence in attitudes regarding the declaration of emergency martial law on December 3. According to the survey results reported in KNU 2025, the average rating given by respondents was 7.144 on a scale ranging from 0, indicating a legitimate exercise of the president's constitutional authority, to 10, denoting an unconstitutional and illegal act that violated democratic principles. However, the average score among People Power Party supporters decreased significantly to 4.59, in contrast to the 8.575 recorded among Democratic Party supporters.   Secondly, attitudes toward the Constitutional Court's impeachment ruling exhibited a similar pattern. The mean rating among all respondents was 6.91 on a scale ranging from 0, indicating a decision deemed 'very wrong,' to 10, indicating a decision deemed 'very appropriate.' However, among supporters of the People Power Party, the average value decreased significantly to 3.84. Furthermore, approximately half of the supporters of the People Power Party (46.37%) have indicated that they do not accept the Constitutional Court's decision regarding impeachment. In contrast, only 17.9 percent of all respondents expressed non-acceptance, while the corresponding figure among supporters of the Democratic Party was just 4.08 percent.   Secondly, attitudes toward the Constitutional Court's impeachment ruling exhibited a similar pattern. The mean rating among all respondents was 6.91 on a scale ranging from 0, indicating a decision deemed 'very wrong,' to 10, indicating a decision deemed 'very appropriate.' However, among supporters of the People Power Party, the average value decreased significantly to 3.84. Furthermore, approximately half of the supporters of the People Power Party (46.37%) have indicated that they do not accept the Constitutional Court's decision regarding impeachment. In contrast, only 17.9 percent of all respondents expressed non-acceptance, while the corresponding figure among supporters of the Democratic Party was just 4.08 percent.   In moments of democratic crisis, the formation of a sustained pro-democratic majority coalition is imperative for ensuring democratic resilience. In the context of acute political polarization, particularly affective polarization, the mobilization of partisans, even in the name of democratic restoration, carries a risk of provoking counter-mobilization and further entrenching division.   Concluding Remarks   The notion of democratic recovery cannot be equated with the electoral removal of an authoritarian incumbent. Even in times of crisis, the social consensus that underpins the democratic system must remain sufficiently robust to withstand authoritarian erosion and to convert crisis into opportunity for higher-level democratic renewal. The transformation of Korean democracy's episodic resilience into stable institutional strength necessitates the forging of a broad, durable, and principled pro-democratic coalition.   It is imperative to recognize that the South Korean context necessitates not only a comprehensive political and legal reckoning concerning a failed authoritarian leader, but also the deliberate establishment of a pro-democratic majority coalition firmly grounded in shared democratic principles. It is imperative to recognize that such a coalition does not equate to merely amassing a legislative supermajority. On the one hand, an overwhelming parliamentary dominance enables the ruling bloc to legislate policy unilaterally by isolating an increasingly radicalized opposition. On the other hand, an overwhelming parliamentary dominance may impede the formation of a broader democratic coalition and risk reducing democracy to one-sided majoritarianism. Institutionalizing democratic resilience, therefore, necessitates traversing the "narrow corridor": the separation of extremist factions from mainstream political actors, the reinforcement of the universal legitimacy of constitutionalism, and the establishment of a cross-partisan pro-democratic majority coalition that extends beyond any immediate electoral configuration.■   References   Feldman, Benjamin, and Jennifer McCoy. “Bet on Big-Tent Opposition Electoral Coalitions to Defeat Democratic Backsliding.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 27, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/bet-on-big-tent-opposition-electoral-coalitions-to-defeat-democratic-backsliding?lang=en   Gallup Korea. 2025. 21st Presidential Election Post-Election Survey (Daily Opinion No. 624). Seoul: Gallup Korea. [in Korean]   Hankyoreh21. “Article on Proposals for a National Referendum Regarding the Impeachment / Constitutional Crisis.” March 21, 2025. [in Korean]   KNU Democracy Research Center. 2025.10. 2025 KNU Democracy Survey. Daegu: Kyungpook National University. [in Korean]   Moonhwailbo. “Article on People Power Party Legislators’ Views on the Causes of the December 3 Martial-Law Crisis.” December 1, 2025. [in Korean]   O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.   Schmitter, Philippe C., and Nadja Sika. 2014. “Democratization in the Middle East and North Africa: A More Ambidextrous Process?” Journal of Democracy 25(4): 74–85.   The Diplomat. “How a Supreme Court Ruling Upended South Korea’s Presidential Election.” May 7, 2025.   Van Dyke, Nella, Kyle Dodson, Paul D. Almeida, and José Novoa. 2024. “Social Movement Partyism and Congressional Opposition to Certifying the 2020 Presidential Election Results in the United States.” American Behavioral Scientist 68(13): 1761–1781. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642241267933   [1]https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148955771&pWise=sub&pWiseSub=C1   [2]Recent comparative studies demonstrate that opposition forces are most likely to defeat a backsliding incumbent when they construct an early, broad, pre-electoral, cross-ideological big-tent coalition during the intermediate stage of democratic erosion—a finding that, in the Korean context, highlights the imperative of assembling a timely prodemocratic majority before crises such as the December 3 martial-law attempt and the polarized 21st presidential election further tilt the institutional playing field beyond repair (Feldman and McCoy 2024). When a crisis unfolds amid intense political polarization, assembling a post-partisan, broad-based pro-democratic majority coalition becomes all the more essential to avert further deterioration and to facilitate democratic restoration.   [3]This concept is an adaptation of Schmitter’s idea that democratization, on the one hand, triggers a universal set of norms, events, processes, and symbols, while, on the other hand, it constitutes a much more particularistic process of ‘realistic’ adaptation to the structural and historical conditions of individual countries (Schmitter and Sika 2016).   [4]Similarly, in a survey conducted of People Power Party legislators on the first anniversary of the martial-law crisis, only 48.2 percent of respondents—86 participants out of 107 legislators contacted, with 30 refusing to be interviewed—identified President Yoon’s misguided decisions as the primary cause of the emergency declaration. A further 37.5 percent reported that the Democratic Party was responsible, aligning with President Yoon’s justificatory framing. (Moonhwailbo 2025/12/01).   [5]For instance, Gallup Korea reported that opposition to impeachment increased from 21 percent in the second week of December 2024 to 32 percent by the second week of January 2025, marking a notable rise over a one-month period (Korean Gallup Daily Opinion 608).     ■ Woojin Kang is the Professor at Kyungpook National University.     ■ Edited by Jaehyun Im, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 0746 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Introduction The Gen Z movement in Nepal represents a unique phenomenon, as it is potentially the first grassroots movement to evolve entirely online before manifesting in physical demonstrations. The term ‘groundswell’ is traditionally used to describe significant political protests that result in a shift in government, a concept that has lost its relevance in the public consciousness. Nepal’s groundswell on September 8, 2025, was distinctive in that it did not generate a significant number of visitors, even in comparison to its previous events. Two antecedent mass movements in recent decades, Janadolan (people’s movement) 1 and II, witnessed mass mobilization on the streets across the country, and the antecedents to the groundswell were observable by the public. The monarchist polities experienced a gradual decline in their political relevance over time. The shift was marked by Janandolan I in 1990 which transformed the king’s role, reducing his power as a constitutional monarch and transferring sovereignty to the people. Subsequent to the events surrounding Janandolan II in 2006, the constituent assembly proceeded to abolish the monarchy in its entirety. Conversely, the Gen Z movement in 2025 witnessed a marked decline in the number of protestors on the ground, with an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 participants, predominantly from Gen Z, dispersed across the nation. The most significant demonstration occurred in the capital city of Kathmandu, where a substantial number of young individuals converged to march towards the Parliament building on the 8th of September. From their perspective, Parliament was a venue for minior political machinations that exerted minimal influences on the lives and livelihoods of individuals beyond the precincts of the hall, including their own. The protests were manifestations of profound disenchantment, indifference, or even hostility to the charade of traditional parties, who were engaged in a game of musical chairs in the form of multi-party coalitions that had been in office for a significant portion of the period since 1990. Nepal had held six general elections, yet thirty-two prime ministers had served; many had held multiple stints in Baluwatar.  Moment of Zeitgeist? In order to capture the essence of this movement, one must look beyond the footfall at Maitighar Mandala - the designated protest zone. The zone is located a stone’s throw away from Singha Durbar (the seat of the government) and the Supreme Court, and three kilometers away from Parliament. The scale of the September 8 protests was comparatively modest in relation to the magnitude of earlier mass movements observed in Nepal. The demographic of Generation Z, constituting approximately 30 percent of the total population, did not exist at the time of the nation’s 49 day-long Janandolan I in 1990. The movement, which amassed over 200,000 participants, effectively terminated a 29-year prohibition on the formation of political parties. However, this shift in policy was accompanied by a significant loss of life, with the movement resulting in the death of 50 individuals[1],[2]. Janandolan II mobilized a significant segment of the population, numbering over 500,000 individuals, who converged on the streets for a duration of 20 days. This mobilization culminated in the complete abolition of the monarchy and the loss of 25 lives[3].  In contrast, the 2025 September 8 movement originated from a generation that was digitally connected and had been expressing discontent online for an extended period prior to convening in person. The group’s influence stemmed not from its numerical superiority but from the rapid conversion of public exasperation into tangible political ramifications, precipitated by the imposition of a social media ban. The groundswell movement that emerged in September exhibited characteristics analogous to those of Janandolan I and II, particularly with respect to its alignment with Nepal’s historical precedent of challenging the ruling elite from a grassroots perspective. However, it should be noted that there were significant differences in numerous other aspects. In contrast to the preceding mass movements, which were preceded by months of rallies, this time the street anger led to the collapse of the polity in forty-eight short hours. Subsequently, Prime Minister KP Oli vacated his office a day after the commencement of the mass protests that took place outside Parliament.   Writ on the Wall In recent years, a generation with a high level of digital connectivity has been expressing its political dissent against the ruling class online. As a result, numerous groups and individuals have come together across the country organically, both on- and offline. In contemporary society, social media has emerged as a pivotal public sphere. The indications of this phenomenon have been evident for an extended period, particularly among younger demographics. The political class, which was approaching to the twilight of its career, exhibited a striking lack of awareness regarding the prevailing sentiments of rage among the populace. The sequence of events that transpired following the initial peaceful protest, which occurred on a Monday, culminated in the dissolution of a multi-party government within two days[4]. The incident resulted in the tragic loss of 76 young lives. In comparison, Sri Lanka’s uprising in March 2025 lasted 25 days before forcing change; Bangladesh’s, in July 2024, stretched over 240 days. The ‘Gen Z protests’ in Nepal were brief yet significant. The study demonstrated the capacity of a technologically adept generation to rapidly transform feelings of exasperation into significant occurrences. To comprehend the accelerated nature of these events, it is imperative to examine their genesis within the digital public sphere. A considerable number of young Nepalis, a significant proportion of whom were still in school or college and a considerable number of whom resided outside of Nepal, begun to express their frustrations through social media. In recent years, social media platforms have emerged as the predominant political sphere through which young Nepalis and other demographic groups congregate to formulate opinions and contest prevailing narratives. A recent study revealed that at least 76 percent of Nepalis possess a smartphone[5], and at least 48 percent maintain a social media identity[6]. The consumption pattern of news has undergone a complete metamorphosis, and the very concept of what constitutes news has been redefined. A 2024 media survey revealed that 62 percent of Nepalis obtain news through Facebook, while only approximately 5 percent do so through newspapers[7]. This shift away from ‘traditional media’ is a significant factor in the shaping of Nepal’s behavioral revolution. The coordination of calls to action on Instagram and Reddit, along with the initiation of virtual debates on X (formerly Twitter) began to demonstrate a shift in the control over the political narrative and story-telling. It became evident that the traditional media was no longer the sole source of reflection for the prevailing public sentiment. In this regard, the protests in Nepal by Gen Z participants were characterized by a relatively modest turnout. It has been posited that the protests would not have escalated into a public demonstration had the government not imposed a prohibition on multiple social media platforms for a period of five days just before September 8. The prohibition merely expedited the unavoidable: if not that week, the youth would have arguably found their way to the streets in due course.  The Trigger Moment The initial impetus for the Gen Z movement was the incident on September 6, in which a vehicle carrying a provincial minister from the ruling Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), also Prime Minister Oli’s party, collided with eleven-year-old Usha Sunuwar and rapidly proceeded towards Oli’s party convention held in the outskirts of Kathmandu[8]. The video documentation of the incident rapidly disseminated, becoming a symbol of the apathetic ruling class.  The episode is reminiscent of a seminal moment in Tunisia on December 17, 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor, set himself afire after dousing himself in paint thinner. This act was a response to the harassment he had endured at the hands of police in Sidi Bouzid, an agrarian city grappling with pervasive poverty. This series of events led to the Tunisian Revolution, which ultimately led to the resignation of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Within a year, the movement had spread to Egypt, where President Hosni Mubarak resigned in February 2011. It subsequently spread to Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Rest as they say is history. The potential historical significance of Nepal’s Gen Z protests, and the subsequent impact on the nation, remains to be ascertained. Although the CPN-UML consented to cover the treatment expenses for Usha, who fortunately did not sustain major injuries, Oli asserted that the social media footage of the incident was being utilized as a pretext to politicize the matter and his convention’[9]. As would be expected, the most salient evidence of the growing public resentment was found in the reactions on social media, which far surpassed those on traditional media outlets. The platform swiftly became inundated with comments such as “If the leaders are unable to rectify the situation, the responsibility falls upon us.” “This is not a request — it is a warning.” “If blood must flow, let it flow. If fire must burn, let it burn – Nepal’s voice will not be silenced.” “We must expose NepoKid, expose corruption, and expose politicians”. “The people have endured a protracted period of subjugation, but the time of the people’s rise is at hand.” “The assertion that corruption will fall and the nation will speak is one that merits rigorous examination[10].”  A Misunderstood Generation In the same week as the hit-and-run incident, social media users in Nepal began documenting their leader’s foreign trips, their children’s expensive schooling abroad, and their luxury lifestyles on TikTok and Instagram using the hashtag #PoliticiansNepoBabyNepal[11]. The government’s attempt to ban social media occurred only days after this trend gained widespread attention, thereby corroborating the public’s perception that the political class feared the young generation’s retribution. This initial displeasure rapidly escalated into a storm. In response, social media users began to post comments such as “Indonesia did it. The Philippines did it. Bangladesh did it. Now it’s Nepal’s turn!” and “It's not about social media anymore... It's about the corrupt system that we have... So please, tomorrow's agenda shouldn't be ‘Unbanning social media’; rather, it should be to change the corrupt system that we have”[12].  By the time the online movement have gained significant traction, mass protests erupted in Kathmandu and in other cities, including Itahari, Narayanghat, and Butwal, located outside Kathmandu. The members of Gen Z were witnessing these events in real time and exhibited a notable degree of defiance. The youth in question had become disillusioned with the constant admonishments from their parents and society at large that the status quo was immutable. Indeed, members of Gen Z have chosen to adopt a proactive stance in their pursuit of social transformation. They possessed minimal sentimental value regarding the reiteration of historical events by party officials who were inclined to laud the merits of the 1990 and 2006 mass movements. Nonetheless, the indications of a transition had already emerged well in advance of September 8. Traditional media outlets faced challenges in assessing the sentiments of younger Nepalis during the 2022 Kathmandu mayoral election, and significantly underestimated the popularity of independent candidate “Balen Shah”. Media outlets persisted in their focus on the established parties, namely the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML, which were represented by the candidates. However, the results of the election were quite unexpected. Balen, a 32-year-old candidate, obtained a landslide victory, thus defying the prevailing notion that the ethnic divide would play a significant role in the election’s outcome. This outcome was particularly surprising given the initial vote count, which indicated a strong lead for Balen in the fast-growing outskirts of the city. In contrast, the traditional parties were expected to dominate the “core” area of the city, where voter turnout was typically higher.  This assertion is demonstrably false. The ascendance of Balen, a multifaceted individual who concurrently serves as a wrapper and structural engineer, was discernible to the younger demographic of voters. However, neither the conventional media outlets nor the political establishment recognized this as an indication of a broader underlying trend. However, due to an inability to perceive the rapid transformation of Nepali society, they remained entrenched in their respective silos, existing in a state of para-reality that was both disconnected from the actualities and expectations of the youth demographic and the older generation.  Notably, a significant segment of the latter population swiftly adopted the spirit of Gen Z, albeit with a discernible degree of skepticism. Individuals who can articulate their concerns ion a coherent manner on social media platforms such as TikTok, YouTube or Instagram, for instance, have the potential to rapidly amass a substantial following. This has given rise to a public sphere that is both faster and more open in nature. As a result, traditional institutions are finding it challenging to either comprehend, control, or keep tab of this new environment. The sequence of events that transpired in the days leading up to and following September 8 unfolded with remarkable rapidity.   Discord Parliament On September 9, a significant portion of Nepal’s public infrastructure was destroyed, including buildings associated with all three branches of government (Singha Durbar, the Supreme Court, and the Parliament). This occurred in response to the killing of 19 young protesters the previous day. At approximately 12 a.m., when the army was mobilized to address escalating levels of violence, the Chief of Army Staff Ashok Sigdel convened with members of Gen Z at the Army Headquarters. The army articulated its position, asserting that the responsibility for establishing an interim government would fall upon Gen Z. This assertion was accompanied by the assertion that this generation had been the catalyst for a transformation in the movement, which subsequently gave rise to violent protests[13] and further political developments.  According to various sources, the Nepal Army played a vital role in preventing a complete breakdown of law and order in the aftermath of the police shooting on September 8 and the subsequent day. The army constituted the sole remaining public institution of authority. The public demonstrated sufficient confidence in the organization to grant its commandos the initial priority of securing the boundary walls of ministerial quarters in Bhainsepati, situated across the Bagmati River in Lalitpur.  Concurrently, Gen Z members returned to digital spaces in an attempt to comprehend the present moment, a gesture that was met with astonishment by the Nepali public and, to a certain extent, by themselves. A Discord group chat comprising over 100,000 participants conducted a vote on potential leadership and selected former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as their preferred prime minister[14]. These discussions were not organized by activists or media elites; Gen Z had not even appointed a leader or leaders. These entities materialized inherently from the collective consciousness of young Nepalis within and outside the nation, a phenomenon precipitated by a pervasive sentiment of marginalization experienced by this demographic in the context of both the political establishment and prevailing media narratives. Nepal’s experience is indicative of a broader global pattern. This phenomenon of youth-led activism was not unique to Nepal; similar movements have already emerged in Mongolia in July 2025, Indonesia in August, and Madagascar soon after. Bangladesh had witnessed student protests a few months earlier. However, none of these movements have demonstrated a comparable degree of sustained digital growth to that observed in Nepal. A collective examination of these cases indicates that individuals from diverse age groups are adopting novel organizational methods, frequently by observing each other online rather than adhering to conventional ideological frameworks.  This global resonance was further exemplified in October by the appearance of Nepal’s flag during youth-led demonstrations in Tbilisi following the Gen Z protests in Nepal[15]. A Georgian protestor was observed holding Nepal’s flag during an act of civil disobedience. The Nepalese Gen Z movement has emerged as a symbol of resistance for the younger demographic. This generation, characterized by its technological prowess and social awareness, has the potential to compel the stagnant political establishment to alter its course and heed their demands, provided they maintain organizational cohesion and perseverance. This phenomenon signifies a paradigm shift, as it demonstrates that contemporary protest movements are no longer confined to physical demonstrations. Instead, they have evolved into a series of online interactions, characterized by the dissemination of symbols and narratives, which serve to establish connections between disparate movements. These movements, while seemingly disparate, are unified by a shared objective: the pursuit of accountability and reform.  Nationalism in the Digital Age: Linking Villages to Diaspora Within the context of Nepal, this juncture gave rise to a novel form of civic confidence. The phenomenon under discussion was not confined to a specific language or cultural group. During a live television interview, a television presenter urged a Gen Z representative, who was speaking in a blend of Nepali and English, to adhere strictly to Nepali so that it would be more comprehensive to a broader audience. The response exhibited by the prominent television anchor was emblematic of a traditional, conventional response: in this space, individuals from diverse linguistic, geographic, and class backgrounds were able to find a safe space to express themselves in their own ways. The movement’s strength derived from its heterogeneity rather than from a fixed set of demands, the influence of leaders, or the persuasive efforts of the media. In light of the aforementioned factors, it is imperative to acknowledge the heterogeneity inherent within the Gen Z movement. The subjects of this study hold a wide array of political views, ranging from royalism to leftism. Their backgrounds are similarly diverse, encompassing fields such as heritage conservation, as well as various forms of influencer activities, including fashion, automobiles, food, travel, lifestyle, health, and finance. Intriguingly, a segment of Gen Z has expressed discontent with the rapid emergence of factions within the Gen Z movement. A significant number of individuals have expressed a preference for returning to their respective villages as opposed to engaging in centralized activism in Kathmandu[16]. The participants in this study hail from various districts, including Panchthar, Bardiya, and Baglung, and are not familiar with the location of Durbar Marg, a fashionable and exclusive neighborhood in Kathmandu. They are even less aware of the rationale behind the convening of Gen Z gatherings in this particular locale[17]. To the subjects of this study, their villages are more immediate and intimate, and the movement has yet to reach their home. However, a unifying theme emerges from their experiences: the perception of a nation where opportunities are perceived to have been subverted by elite political figures and a network of crony capitalism, resulting in pervasive policy corruption and pronounced instances of nepotism. In 2025, Nepal ranked 107th on the Corruption Perception Index, indicating a perceived level of corruption within the nation’s government and public sectors[18].  A Fine Balance In this context, on 12 September, the transition government under Sushila Karki, Nepal’s first-ever female prime minister, announced that the next election will take place on March 5, 2025. In 2017 and 2022, the electoral process was initiated with approximately three months of preparatory measures, followed by a one-month period dedicated to the tabulation of votes. The voting process took place in late November, within the announcement of the results occurring by mid-December. Conversely, the forthcoming election on March 5, 2026, affords the government and the Election Commission a considerably more constrained timeframe for preparations, party registrations, candidate nominations, and ballot printing and transporting them to distant booths, some of which are situated in remote regions of the Himalayan mountains.  Preliminary data on voter registration indicates that the upcoming election may be influenced by an unusually youthful electorate. Following the reopening of registration on September 26, a total of 64,000 new voters has registered. A significant proportion of the electorate will be first-time voters, either because they have recently attained the age of 18 or have previously abstained from the franchise. This surge in interest can be attributed to a resurgence of political engagement in the aftermath of the uprising. Nevertheless, skepticism regarding the efficacy of these measures persists. The efficacy of the vote in engendering substantive changes remains a subject of considerable skepticism. Some observers express concerns that newcomers may encounter challenges in navigating the complex bureaucratic structures. The salient question is not the number of new voters who join the rolls, but whether they will find a compelling reason to cast their ballots, particularly if the groundswell diminishes by the time of Election Day. Participation is contingent upon the participant’s confidence in the system’s ability to accurately record their voices.  Nepali’s diaspora, comprising over two million citizens residing abroad, constitutes a significant political constituency[19]. The population of Nepalese in Australia constitutes approximately one percent of the nation’s total population[20]. The 12,000 Nepali students constitute the most rapidly expanding international student population in the United States[21]. India, in particular, has emerged as a primary destination, hosting between 2.5 and 5 million Nepalis. The majority of labor migration occurs outside of India, the Gulf and Malaysia. Within the geographical confines of East Asia, Japan stands as the sole nation where Nepali students constitute the second-largest international student demographic. A comparative analysis of the demographic data reveals that the Nepali diaspora is more sizable than he Indian diaspora[22]. Even in Portugal and South Korea, Nepalis have been able to maintain robust transnational connections.  According to recent demographic data, more than 56 percent of Nepali households include at least one family member who has relocated for professional or educational purpose[23]. On average, over 2,000 Nepalis depart from Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu on a daily basis, seeking superior educational and employment prospects[24]. This dispersion gives rise to critical questions regarding the representation of the Nepali diaspora in the upcoming March elections. It is imperative to ascertain the mechanism that will empower this politically significant segment to exercise their right. The implications of this phenomenon are significant, as the diaspora contributes not only financially through remittances but also exerts an increasing influence on the public discourse and the expectations of governance in their countries of origin. Nepal must also decide whether to hold elections under the current rules or first implement constitutional reforms, especially for diaspora voting. Given that over 40 percent of the electorate resides abroad, excluding them could potentially lead to a shift in governance that lacks legitimacy. Electoral reforms, on the one hand, may necessitate delays of up to one month or more in the scheduling of elections. However, they can also ensure a more expansive political representation, a crucial element in periods of political transition. There is a contentious debate within the Nepali community regarding the electoral participation of Nepali citizens residing abroad. Proponents of this position contend that a genuine democratic process must encompass all Nepalis, irrespective of their geographical location. In contrast, opponents of this stance argue that the electoral rights of Nepali citizens living overseas should not be granted. The dilemma encapsulates the tension between urgency and legitimacy, between stabilizing governance and creating a system that genuinely reflects the national sentiment. The government could undoubtedly implement substantial measures to facilitate the registration and participation of Nepali citizens residing abroad in the electoral process for the first time. This would entail the translation of the initial commitments of the Gen Z revolution. These measures are poised to play a pivotal role in consolidating the institutional framework and ensuring the timely execution of an early election.■ References [1]Global Nonviolent Action Database. n.d. “Nepalese Force King to Accept Democratic Reform, ‘Jana Andolan’ (People’s Movement), 1990.”https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/nepalese-force-king-accept-democratic-reform-jana-andolan-peoples-movement-1990#:~:text=These%20protests%20escalated%20from%20the,country%20had%20in%20the%201950s  [2]The Guardian. 2020.03.26. “From the Archive: April 9, 1990: Nepal King Bows to Protests.” , March 26, 2020.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/09/nepal-king-birendra-democracy-1990.  [3]Routledge, Paul. 2010. Nineteen Days in April: Urban Protest and Democracy in Nepal. Urban Studies 47(6): 1279–1299. [4]Akhilesh Upadhyay. 2025.09.09. “Why The Old Regime in Nepal Had to Exit.” Hindustan Times., September 9, 2025.https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/why-the-old-regime-in-nepal-had-to-exit-101757439071547.html  [5]República. 2023.03.25. “Over 73 Percent of Nepalis Use Smartphones.”, March 25, 2023.https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/over-73-percent-of-nepalis-use-smartphones-1#:~:text=KATHMANDU%2C%20March%2025:%20Mobile%20phone,the%20general%20public%20in%20Nepal.&text=10:45%20PM-,KATHMANDU%2C%20March%2025:%20Mobile%20phone%20access%20has%20reached%2073.2%20percent,percent%20in%20Far%20West%20province  [6]Simon Kemp. 2025.03.03. “Digital 2025: Nepal.” DataReportalhttps://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2025-nepal  [7]Nepali Times. 2024.12.27. “What Do Nepalis Think of the Media?”https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-do-nepalis-think-of-the-media  [8]Akhilesh Upadhyay. 2025.09.09. “Why The Old Regime in Nepal Had to Exit.” Hindustan Times., September 9, 2025.https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/why-the-old-regime-in-nepal-had-to-exit-101757439071547.html  [9]Khabarhub. 2025.06. “Oli Says Accident Used as Pretext to Disrupt UML Statute Convention.” https://english.khabarhub.com/2025/06/494589/  [10]TikTok (@routineofnepalbanda). n.d. “TikTok Video.”https://www.tiktok.com/@routineofnepalbanda/video/7546919622512102664  [11]The Kathmandu Post.2025.09.06.“‘Nepo Kid’ Trend Sparks Anti-Corruption Campaign in Nepal.” September 6, 2025.https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/09/06/nepo-kid-trend-sparks-anti-corruption-campaign-in-nepal  [12]TikTok (@nepal.360). n.d. “TikTok Video.” https://www.tiktok.com/@nepal.360/video/7546847567410220309  [13]Tulsi Rauniyar. 2025.11.04. “The Inside Story of How Gen Z Toppled Nepal’s Leader and Chose a New One on Discord.”WIRED.https://www.wired.com/story/nepal-discord-gen-z-protests-vote-prime-minister-election/  [14]Pranav Baskar. 2025.09.11. “Nepal’s Social Media Ban Backfires as Politics Moves to a Chat Room.” The New York Times.https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/11/world/asia/nepal-protest-genz-discord.html  [15]Ujjwal Satyal. 2025.11.10. “Nepali Flag Spotted in Georgia Protest — Nepal’s Gen Z Movement Echoes Globally.” República.https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/nepali-flag-spotted-in-georgia-protest-nepals-gen-z-movement-echoes-globall-89-80.html#:~:text=POLITICS%2C%20International-,Nepali%20flag%20spotted%20in%20Georgia%20protest%20%2D%20Nepal%27s%20Gen%20Z%20movement,and%20the%20government%27s%20authoritarian%20drift  [16]Author interview with members of Gen Z United group. 2025.11.05. [17]Author interview with members of Gen Z United group. 2025.11.05. [18]Transparency International. 2024. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2024.”https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024  [19]Amish Raj Mulmi. 2024.01.30. “Nepal’s Youth Are Leaving the Country in Droves.” ORF Online.https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/nepals-youth-are-leaving-the-country-in-droves  [20]Department of Home Affairs (Australia). n.d. “Nepal: Country Profile.”https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/statistics/country-profiles/profiles/nepal  [21]Arun R. Joshi, Vibhav Pradhan, and Ruzel Shrestha. 2024.12. “Nepali Migrant Dreams in the American Landscape.” Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS).https://iids.org.np/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/3db0ec190a628bf3e5d52daed49bfc1a.pdf  [22]Nikkei Asia. 2025.03.14. “Japan Foreign Population Grows Twice as Fast as Expected on Worker Influx.”https://asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/japan-immigration/japan-foreign-population-grows-twice-as-fast-as-expected-on-worker-influx  [23]NRB Working Paper (Report 53). 2021. “Impact of Remittances on Rural Poverty in Nepal: Evidence from Cross-Section Data.” [24]Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation. 2025.02.24. “From Pre-Departure to Return: Understanding Labor Migration Dynamics in Nepal.”https://www.helvetas.org/en/switzerland/how-you-can-help/follow-us/blog/understanding-labor-migration-dynamics-in-nepal#:~:text=With%20over%202%2C000%20people%20leaving,most%20remittance%2Ddependent%20nations%20globally    ■ Akhilesh Upadhyay is a Senior Research Fellow at Institute for Integated Development Studies.   ■ Edited by Jaehyun Im, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 0746 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Introduction In July and August of 2024, a student-led movement in Bangladesh protesting the government's job quota systern escalated into a nationwide uprising. The protest was fueled by widespread public dissatisfaction with the ruling Awami League (AL) government's handling of economic hardship, corruption, and political repression. The Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, who was once regarded as a democratic exemplar[1], has been characterized as a dictator due to her adrninistration’s execution of three farcical elections, the suppression of freedom of expression, and the deterioration of democratic institutions. This has led to the transformation of the nation into an electoral autocracy[2]. The protests escalated into violent confrontations with government forces and AL-activists, resulting in a total of nearly 1,400 fatalities and more than 20,000 injuries. The government’s loss of legitimacy was precipitated by its violent repression of protesting crowds and its perpetration of mass killings. When hundreds of thousands of students initiated a "March to the Prime Minister's House," the army declined to intervene. On August 5, the sixteen-year rule of Sheikh Hasina came to an end with her departure from the country to India. Following the dissolution of the government, an Interim Government was established, characterized by its technocratic and politically inclusive nature. This IG was led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace laureate who is widely recognized for his contributions to financial inclusion, particularly through his initiative known as “the 3-zero theory[3]” (referring to the reduction of carbon emissions, poverty, and unemployment). Dr. Yunus was appointed as the chief advisor to the interim government of Bangladesh. The IG’s establishment was formally initiated on 8 August 2024 with the overarching objective of implementing the three major tasks: ‘Reform, Trial and Election’. At this juncture, a number of reforms had already been initiated in many areas. The establishment of a tribunal against crimes against humanity has been confirmed. The IG has formally announced the designated period for the national election. There is considerable controversy among political parties regarding the optimal timeframe for the upcoming election. Some parties advocate for an immediate election, followed by the implementation of reforms and a trial. In contrast, others argue that prior to the election, reforms should be implemented in the areas deemed most critical. Meanwhile, The IG has reached the one-year mark. Initially, the IG enjoyed significant public support. Nevertheless, the discernible advancement in adrninistrative and systernic reforms remains negligible. Consequently, over time, the public has developed a pervasive sense of doubt and dissatisfaction, largely attributable to the government’s sluggish response. BIGD’s public pulse survey indicated that the optimism, which existed in August 2024, regarding the country’s political future is gradually diminishing. In July 2025, 42% of the respondents felt that the country was heading in the right political direction, compared to 56% in October 2024 and 71% in August 2024[4]. This report will explore and analyze the ongoing situation in Bangladesh with respect to achievement of democratic goals.  The Challenges that the Interim Government (IG) Successfully Overcome In accordance with the objectives of the July 24 uprising, the IG has implemented numerous initiatives to affect positive changes; however, the progression of these initiatives has been inconsistent. The following is a concise synopsis of several notable domains. The IG encountered a state of economic vulnerability at its inception, marked by inflation, diminishing reserves, and a banking sector under strain. Bangladesh's economy was in a precarious state, with foreign exchange reserves at risk of depletion, the taka exhibiting significant devaluation, inflation persisting, and the banking sector grappling with nonperforming loans and chronic mismanagement[5]. In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter and to formulate recommendations, the IG has established an economic white paper committee. This committee comprises prominent economists from across the country. The public has expressed approval of the austerity measures that have been implemented, which entails the cancellation and reduction of public project costs based on their significance[6]. In response to IG’s request, expatriates have increased their use of formal remittance channels[7]. These measures were widely acknowledged for their role in stabilizing the economy. Immediately after the interim government’s assumption of office, the calamitous flood situation transpired in the southern and northern regions of the country, resulting in substantial destruction to crop production. The disaster affected over 5.8 million people individuals, with more than 500,000 seeking refuge in temporary shelters. This event exemplifies the collaborative efforts of government entities, private organizations, civil society and individuals in providing assistance to those affected by the flood. The government's efforts were supplemented by community-led initiatives[8]. This was a significant development that rapidly garnered public confidence in the IG. National dialogues were initiated with the participation of civil society and experts on pertinent issues. The formation of approximately fifteen reform committees has been observed, with the stated objective of facilitating discussions and decision-making process concerning a wide range of issues, including electoral systerns, anti-corruption measures, judicial independence, law enforcement, public health, labor policies, press freedom, women’s affairs and decentralization. Each of the aforementioned committees initiated a series of several discussions, and some of them conducted public opinion surveys and sought the input of experts’ opinion. Ultimately, they submitted a report to the IG. All of the aforementioned reports have been published on the government website and are accessible to the public[9]. However, following the attainment of independence, various commissions have been established and subsequently disbanded, and a substantial volume of reports has accumulated on the desks of the heads of state. Nevertheless, the nation has remained stagnant due to the lack of a comprehensive and sincere commitment to implementation. It is imperative that these commitments be addressed prior to the election, and that the formulation of potential recommendations commence immediately. IG has established a tribunal for crimes to address crimes against humanity by amending the existing law on International Crimes Tribunal (ICT). The court’s establishment during the AL government was a response to public demands for the punishment of war criminals. A second phase of proceedings was initiated in 2024 before the ICT to address alleged crimes against humanity during the protests that transpired in July and August of 2024. The tribunal has already issued three arrest warrants for Hasina and other accused parties[10].  The Key Challenges Facing the Interim Government (IG) The collapse of the Sheikh Hasina government precipitated a significant rise in public concern regarding the state of law and order. The adrninistration and police exhibited a marked lack of organization, as many officials sought refuge or adopted clandestine identities, driven by the apprehension of impeding public outrage in response to past abuses. In the aftermath of the disorder, local youth organized themselves into defense squads in response to the looting of property by miscreants. Meanwhile, the Army assumed temporary responsibility for the security of police stations. The escalation of criminal activity, including clashes, extortion, robbery, and terrorism, culminated in the initiation of “Operation Devil Hunt” by the Army, which resulted in the arrest of over 30,000 individuals engaged in criminal activity. Nevertheless, the IG has been the subject of criticism for its alleged failure to prevent mob justice, whereby incensed crowds retaliate against accused individuals without the benefit of a fair trial, thereby weakening the foundation of the justice systern. Furthermore, mob violence was directed at national symbols underscoring the gravity to the situation. The Dhanmondi 32 area was demolished, sculptures commemorating the Liberation War were destroyed, and approximately 2,000 teachers were forced to resign due to mounting pressure from mobs. The severity of the attacks has escalated, as evidence by an incident in August 2024, when AL supporters set fire to an Army vehicle in Gopalganj. Subsequently, during a National Citizen Party rally in the same location, armed Awami League activists initiated an attack with weapons and improvised explosive devices, effectively overpowering the police and setting fire to vehicles, thereby posing a threat to NCP leaders. Eventually, the reinforcements were able to successfully disperse the attackers, resulting in four fatalities and 50 injuries. According to the most recent report by Human Rights Watch, the interim government has employed arbitrary detention as a tool to target perceived political opponents and has yet to implement systernic reforms to ensure the protection of human rights. The IG is currently grappling with a series of significant challenges, including a worrisome escalation in mob violence, political violence, and the harassment of journalists by political parties and other non-state actors, such as religious hardliners who are antagonistic towards women’s rights and LGBT individuals. The members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the most popular party, who anticipate holding power in the next electoral cycle, began most heinous crimes that the AL members had been doing, viz. extortion, rent-seeking, illegal possession, physical force. According to Ain-o-Salish Kendra (ASK), 329 of the 349 incidents of political violence that resulted in 87 fatalities and 3,929 injuries were linked to BNP and its affiliated organizations[11]. During this period, BNP has initiated disciplinary proceedings against 5000 of its leaders and activists for a variety of infractions[12]. Nevertheless, the situation remains uncontrolled, and it has had a deleterious effect on the country’s law and order situation. Following the dissolution of the AL-government, the police force exhibited a notable lack of capacity, which was subsequently exploited by religious minorities, particularly the Hindus and Ahmadis, who were subjected to violence by mobs. The acts of violence encompassed physical assault, property theft, and acts of vandalism against Hindu temples and Mazars in various regions the country. On 19 August 2024, the leaders of the minority groups reported during a press conference in Dhaka that there had been 2010 incidents of communal violence during that period[13]. The issue was marred by a significant circulation of disinformation through Indian television, newspapers, and social media. The dissemination of false information was initiated and perpetuated by prominent BJP leaders and members of the government of India. In a statement delivered to the nation’s lawmakers, India’s Foreign Minister Mr. Jaisankar articulated the nation’s profound disapproval of what it has characterized as a "systernatic pattern of desecration". This condemnation followed the recent series of attacks on religious minority communities and temples in Bangladesh. In regard to recent events in India, certain international communities have also expressed censure of the Interim Government. A considerable amount of disinformation disseminated by the Indian media was subsequently debunked by news scanners[14]. The nine fatalities that transpired during the period of unrest have been attributed to political retribution, rather than predominantly influenced by religious or communal motivations[15]. The provisional adrninistration has enacted a temporary ban on the Awami League, the political party founded in 1949 and responsible for significant political movements in East Pakistan, including the Bangladesh Liberation War. The aforementioned ban on Awami League will remain effect until the party leaders have faced trial for abuses committed during their 15-year rule. In October 2024, the Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL), the student wing of the AL was banned. BCL has gained notoriety for its alleged involvement in egregious criminal activities, including torture, murder, rape in the campuses and outsides. A debate has emerged among scholars regarding the potential prohibition of AL and BCL. Human Rights organizations have characterized the incident as a violation of fundamental rights. The HRW reported that there is widespread anger against the Awami League for the numerous abuses committed during Hasina’s rule. Those accused of perpetrating crimes under Hasina’s adrninistration must be subjected to appropriate legal proceedings. However, the imposition of a ban on a political party constitutes an excessive restriction on fundamental freedoms, reminiscent of the previous government’s abusive clampdown on political opponents. The Awami League, with its historical affiliation with the nation and its leadership role in the independence struggle, cannot be readily legislated out of existence, despite its eventual transition to an authoritarian regime. The IG has been encountered a notable degree of non-cooperation from its proximate neighbor. The overthrow of Sheikh Hasina was not initiated by a military coup or adrninistrative conspiracy; rather, it was the result of a mass movement. Nevertheless, India has provided refuge to Hasina and numerous AL-leaders. The IG made an urgent appeal to India, urging the cessation of alleged anti-Bangladesh activities perpetrated by members of the AL from exile[16]. Bangladesh, being the closest neighbor, is dependent on India for a multitude of goods, including food stuffs and daily necessities. Following the termination of the relationship between Sheikh Hasina and India, India abruptly ceased the provision of commodities and imposed a prohibition on the transshipment of Bangladeshi garments to Europe and America via their port[17]. Months later, a new prohibition was imposed on seven export items using their land ports[18]. Moreover, the restrictions imposed have also affected Bangladeshi individuals seeking medical care or visiting relatives residing in the country. Furthermore, the ongoing tensions in border regions have been attributed to the forcible displacement of Muslim populations into Bangladesh[19][20]. The government of Bangladesh formally requested that the government of India extradite the former Prime Minister to face trial. However, India has not yet responded to this request in the seven months since it was made[21]. In order to establish peace in the country and in the region, it is essential that the leaders of two nations cooperate each other.  Recommended Actions for the Interim Government (IG) to Overcome Immediate Challenges “State reform” is a comprehensive agenda, encompassing changes to laws, institutions, and functions across governance, elections, the judiciary, bureaucracy, citizens’ empowerment, freedom of expression, and civil and political rights. However, the ambitious reform initiative launched by the interim government is unlikely to be fully realized within the confines of a constrained mandate and timeframe. In light of the prevailing circumstances, it is incumbent upon the government to prioritize and implement reforms deemed to be of the utmost importance prior to the upcoming elections. It is imperative to prioritize the implementation of fundamental reforms to ensure the autonomy, impartiality, and inclusivity of forthcoming electoral processes. While there are some issues that require attention, they are more general in nature and must be addressed for the benefit of national cohesion and the general interest. The national consensus commission has finally drafted ‘The July Charter’ which is a ‘new political settlement’ in Bangladesh, being developed by consultation with over thirty political parties, with the exception of the Awami League. The significant accomplishment is that the political parties have reached a consensus on 84 proposals, which are projected to implement satisfactory reforms to the constitution, state structure, parliament, elections, and the judiciary. However, there is a divergence of opinions regarding the implementation of these proposals. The commission is currently engaged in ongoing dialogues with constitutional experts. Conversely, the most glaring oversight in this regard pertains to the conspicuous neglect of the issue concerning the reform of political parties. The initiation of internal reforms by political parties would facilitate the attainment of substantial progress on salient issues, including the enhancement of women’s representation in parliament, the delineation of distinct roles between the party president and the prime minister, and the establishment of a more robust separation of powers. Within the exception of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the other political parties-including Jamat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP)-are in support of the proportional representation (PR) systern. It has been asserted that the prevailing electoral systern has demonstrated deficiencies in its capacity to adequately represent the interest of the public. Conversely, the BNP has chosen not to endorse the PR systern. The application of PR systern in the Upper house of Parliament has the potential to serve as a contentious issue during negotiations with political parties. The National Citizen Party (NCP) has advocated for the establishment of a new constitution and the formation of a Constitutional Assembly. The NCP asserts that elections to such an assembly represent the sole viable solution to the prevailing political crisis. The statement further asserts the imperative of Constituent Assembly elections in safeguarding democratic principles and honoring the sacrifices made by the populace. The aforementioned points are expected to be resolved in a timely manner, as they have garnered the attention of constitutional experts. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Awami League government, social media platforms have become a vehicle for discrediting the Liberation War of 1971 and the role of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. While his governance from 1972–1975 was the subject of considerable criticism, his central contribution to the independence movement is indisputable. As was the case in India with Mahatma Gandhi and Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Pakistan, recognizing Bangabandhu as a unifying national icon is vital for maintaining cohesion. In the context of this transition, it is incumbent upon the Interim Government to ensure that vested interests do not manipulate history for narrow, short-term gains. Bangabandhu’s legacy merits transcending partisan politics and ideology. According to the most recent report by Human Rights Watch, the interim government has employed arbitrary detention as a tool to target perceived political opponents and has yet to implement systernic reforms to ensure the protection of human rights. The IG is currently grappling with a series of significant challenges, including a worrisome escalation in mob violence, political violence, and the harassment of journalists by political parties and other non-state actors, such as religious hardliners who are antagonistic towards women’s rights and LGBT individuals. The upcoming election in Bangladesh is viewed as a critical juncture for the nation’s democratic and stabilized future. Nevertheless, the general public continues to repose a significant degree of trust in Professor Mohammad Yunus and his government. A recent survey adrninistered by BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD) revealed that 70 percent of respondents expressed confidence in the fairness, freedom, and impartiality of the upcoming national election under the IG[22]. Concurrently, the IG and political parties have nearly reached a consensus on the July National Charter, which is a ‘new political settlement’ on how the country’s institutions are to be reformed to establish democracy and good governance where equality, human dignity, and social justice are ensured for all. ■ References [1] Shuva Das. 2024.04.04.“Sheikh Hasina’s Rule in Bangladesh: The Road to Authoritarianism”, Oxford Political Review. https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2025/04/04/sheikh-hasinas-rule-in-bangladesh-the-road-to-authoritarianism  [2] Omar Zahid. 2024.07.29.”Has Bangladesh Become a One-Party ‘Electoral Autocracy?’”, The Global Policy Institute. https://gpilondon.com/publications/bangladesh-electoral-autocracy  [3] Yunus Centre. 2017.11.02."A World of Three Zeros” https://www.muhammadyunus.org/post/1671/a-world-of-three-zeros  [4] BRAC Institute of Governance and Development.2025.07.”Pulse Survey July 2025” https://bigd.bracu.ac.bd/the-foundation-project_about/pulse-survey-july-2025/  [5] Abul Kashem. 2025.08.08.”Economy saved from brink”, The Business Standard. https://www.tbsnews.net/economy/economy-saved-brink-1207151  [6] Dr Moazzem.2025.03.22.” Interim govt curbing extra projects and overseeing costs, reducing public investment”, Centre For Policy Dialogue. https://cpd.org.bd/interim-govt-curbing-extra-projects-and-overseeing-costs-reducing-public-investment/  [7] United News of Bangladesh.2025.07.12.” Reforms, higher incentives push remittances to $30b”, New Age. https://www.newagebd.net/post/economy/269877/reforms-higher-incentives-push-remittances-to-30b#google_vignette  [8] DW News.2024.08.27” How is the new interim government dealing with the devastating floods in Bangladesh?”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y-vNWOOqCJg  [9] অডিটর জেনারেলের কার্যালয়, বাংলাদেশ 2025.07.09 “সংস্কার কমিশনের প্রতিবেদন।”. https://cao.gov.bd/site/files/7dcbcf43-344b-4aa3-8c95-dde73b542cde/Report-of-Reform-Commissions  [10] Hannah Ellis-Petersen.2025.07.10.”Bangladesh’s ousted Sheikh Hasina charged with crimes against humanity.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/10/bangladesh-ousted-sheikh-hasina-charged-with-crimes-against-humanity  [11] Sajjad Hossain.2025.07.13.“BNP struggles in rein in the rogues.” The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/bnp-struggles-rein-the-rogues-3938161  [12] Daily Observer.2025.07.05.”BNP has taken action against 5,000 party activists for misdeeds: Rizvi” https://www.observerbd.com/news/532787  [13] The Daily Star.2024.09.09.”2,010 communal attacks in Bangladesh since August 4 to 20: Oikyo Parishad” https://www.thedailystar.net/news/news/2010-communal-attacks-bangladesh-august-4-20-oikyo-parishad-3706731  [14] BSS.2024.12.11.” Rumour Scanner: 72% of accounts spreading anti-Bangladesh misinformation located in India” Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/367788/rumour-scanner-72%25-accounts-spreading  [15] Aaqib Md Shatil.2024.10.30.” Claims of sectarian motives in nine Hindu deaths falter under scrutiny” Netra News. https://netra.news/2024/little-evidence-of-communal-motives-in-9-hindu-mens-deaths/  [16] Snehamoy Chakraborty.2025.08.21.” Bangladesh interim govt accuses India of sheltering Awami League, Delhi denies charge.”The Telegraph online. https://www.telegraphindia.com/west-bengal/bangladesh-interim-govt-accuses-india-of-sheltering-awami-league-delhi-denies-charge-prnt/cid/2118945#goog_rewarded  [17] The Economic Times.2025.04.10.” India terminates transshipment facility for Bangladesh; move may benefit apparel cos competing against Dhaka”. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-terminates-transshipment-facility-for-bangladesh-move-may-benefit-apparel-cos-competing-against-dhaka/articleshow/120137518.cms  [18] The Business Standard. 2025.05.17.” India halts import of Bangladeshi garments, processed foods via land ports”. https://www.tbsnews.net/economy/india-now-restricts-land-port-imports-garments-fruits-and-other-select-items-bangladesh  [19] Human Rights Watch.2025.07.23.” India: Hundreds of Muslims Unlawfully Expelled to Bangladesh” https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/23/india-hundreds-of-muslims-unlawfully-expelled-to-bangladesh  [20] Hannah Ellis-Petersen and Shaikh Azizur Rahman. 2025.06.19.” India illegally deporting Muslim citizens at gunpoint to Bangladesh, say rights groups” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/jun/19/india-deporting-indians-muslim-citizens-bangladesh-say-rights-groups-border  [21] BSS News.2025.08.04.” Dhaka yet to receive India’s response on Hasina’s extradition: Touhid” https://www.bssnews.net/news-flash/298853  [22] Brac Institute of governance & development.2025.”Pulse Survey July 2025” https://bigd.bracu.ac.bd/the-foundation-project_about/pulse-survey-july-2025/    ■ Ziaul Karim is the Senior Coordinator in Manusher Jonno Foundation.   ■ Edited by Jaehyun Im, Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 0746 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

On March 31, 2023, EAI invited Maria Ressa, the CEO of Rappler and 2021 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, to share her insights on improving media freedom in Asia and fighting disinformation on social media. Ressa assesses the current status of press freedom in the Philippines and remaining obstacles. She warns that disinformation disseminated by social media algorithms exploit the way that users behave and think. Finally, Ressa urges the global audience to seek changes in the information ecosystem to defeat political polarization and radicalization caused by the uncontrolled spread of fake news.       ■ Sook Jong Lee: Hello everyone, it is a great opportunity to have Maria Ressa with us today. She is a well-known journalist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who is working very actively not only inside the Philippines but also internationally. Maria, thank you very much for your time.   ■ Maria Ressa: I'm so glad that it worked. It's good to be here. Thank you for having me.     I. Level of Media Freedom in the Philippines After the Duterte Government   ■ Sook Jong Lee: You faced 10 times of arrest warrant during the Duterte government. Since the Philippines has a new president now, Bongbong Marcos, the son of the former president, I would like to ask if media freedom has improved.   ■ Maria Ressa: I've been asked this a lot, and I will say immediately, “Yes.”   This January, I had four tax evasion charges that could have put me in prison for 34 years. Rappler was also charged with ridiculous criminal tax evasion. After four years and two months, three justices of the Court of Tax Appeals threw it out, and we were acquitted. And when you read the verdict, you actually realize, “How did these even make their way to the court?” The independent judiciary is slowly coming up, which means that the checks and balances are slowly kicking back in. So that's a first step. The last administration used a tactic of harassment and intimidation to make journalists voluntarily give up their rights, which many have called it the “chilling effect.” I would call it “Siberia.” We lived in “Siberia” during that time period and there were costs for standing up to power.   It is still pretty early, but President Bongbong Marcos, the only son and the namesake of Ferdinand Marcos who was accused of stealing 10 billion US Dollars in 1986, has spent more of his first 100 days traveling outside the Philippines. He cares what the rest of the world thinks, and he also seeks to vindicate his family name. I hope that he listens and continues to focus on the economy like his father did. This is a difficult time for the post-COVID world. While the Philippines growth rate is significantly better than the West, whether or not this translates into real policies helping our people is a challenge ahead.   We were so low in the past that everything is in a slight improvement.     II. Duterte’s Legacy of Media Repression and the Philippine’s Way Forward   ■ Sook Jong Lee: Friends in the Philippines were talking about the possible backlash under the new President, since he may try to legitimize his father's legacy and the authoritarian period of your country. What is your opinion on this view?   ■ Maria Ressa: This is happening in almost every country around the world. We are testing history.   With the rise of the far right and with lies spreading faster than facts through social media, it makes every part of history debatable. The facts are debatable.   Everything that we see on social media has two algorithms working: the first is Facebook’s “friends of friends” algorithm, which essentially polarized us. We saw this happen in the Philippines in 2016 when Duterte was elected. If you were pro-Duterte, you moved further right. If you're anti-Duterte, you moved further left. This is what happened in the United States, in Hungary, and in Brazil.   [The second algorithm is] the recommendation engine in YouTube and Facebook, where if you click on a video on SNS, the recommendation engine brings something more extremist. So there's a polarization and downward radicalization. [Both] are embedded in our society, and civil society groups used tactics like name and shame to determine what “right” is. But when lies are rewarded, the world turns upside down and this becomes debatable.   Your question becomes more complicated for Marcos in this information ecosystem. In terms of actions, because the bar was set so low by the previous administration, we now see a little bit of a professional governance from the new President. He shows up and he doesn't curse. Policy is clearer and the appointments are clearer. This administration does listen to the public backlash for bad policy; however, despite the fact that we've suffered from the weaponization of the law, I'm also of the same mind that we need to be fair and look at the actions today and not necessarily the past. Was he a tax evader? Did he fail to pay his taxes? It's ironic because he now encourages Filipinos to pay their taxes.   So, it's very confusing – where is the moral high ground? At the same time, this is where I become slightly pragmatic. As a journalist in Rappler, my task is to hold power to account. We will give you the context of this. Both India's Prime Minister Modi and the Philippines President Marcos could not travel to the United States. But when they were democratically elected by their people, they could travel. A lot of these things go away. And they were overwhelmingly elected. So we need to stay vigilant and we need to keep doing the stories.   Rappler and I still have three criminal cases against us. There's a 5th tax evasion charge, cyber libel case, and securities case connected to foreign control. We have to be optimistic; otherwise, it can be debilitating.   III. Solutions to Political Polarization Caused by SNS Disinformation   ■ Sook Jong Lee: You mentioned about many different perspectives about the history, and it is happening in Korea too about its colonial, the authoritarian period. It is dividing our civil society, not to mention our politicians. We also have not only newspapers, but also YouTube and social media that make us difficult to see whether there is truth or if the divided society can compromise or come up with a consensus about historical interpretations. In this kind of environment, what will be a good advice to control information and encourage the divided politics to come up with a more constructive common ground?   ■ Maria Ressa: First of all, I always felt that Korea was in a better place. When we go back to Milan Kundera's quote, “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.”   The design of social media today turns a lie into a fact—a lie told a million times becomes a fact. As I said in the Nobel lecture, this has now become an individual battle for integrity, for facts, and for values.   This is why it's great that Korea not only just held the regional meeting of the Second Summit for Democracy, but also will be holding the next Summit. It is good that the Third Summit for Democracy is coming to Asia-Pacific where, according to the latest V-Dem report, it has seen the worst decline of the quality of our democracies globally. The rest of the world has gone back to 1986 levels. In Asia-Pacific, we're at 1978 levels.   So, what's the solution? First, because of the culture of Korea, traditional news organizations still have significant power. They're losing business control and their business model is dying quickly. It's interesting that in Korea, Google is not number one, and Naver is. But Korean news organizations have given up too much power and relationships to Naver. We should not be fighting downstream; we have to fight upstream. So the long-term solution is education.   The medium-term solution is legislation, and short-term is the awareness that we are being insidiously manipulated by social media. Our biology, our emotions are being used against us. And on social media, according to an MIT study from 2018, lies spread at least 6 times faster than facts. The fact that [these lies] incite hate, fear, and tribalism, is part of the reason we're so polarized. They appeal to the worst of human nature, of society, and the impact is not just at the individual level, but sociologically at the group level.   We behave differently in groups. In my book, I talked about the Milgram Shock Experiment, in which there were test subjects behind the screen and participants were told to keep giving longer and longer electric shocks to the subjects and watch as they more and more. With authority, the participants continued to give electric shocks. When we're in groups and when authority gives us permission to be our worst selves, we do it. This is where, some of the warnings from Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny, such as “Don't follow the group,” come into play. That’s the second level.   The third level is emergent human behavior of our evolution as a species. This is addictive. Our young generation have higher levels of depression and sleeplessness. One of Meta’s own internal reports, which was one of the 10,000+ documents released by the whistleblower, Frances Haugen, actually showed that young teenager girls on Instagram have increased levels of eating disorders. The impacts and harm [of social media] are very clear aside from killing democracy—more than that is the rise of fascism.   IV. Freedom of Speech vs. Gatekeeping?   ■ Sook Jong Lee: Today, we have ongoing debates about social media and its horrible disinformation effect. But as a journalist, when you face the conflicting principles, namely freedom of expression and protection of privacy and human dignity, how do you reconcile these?   ■ Maria Ressa: It is false to say that they collide because this is not a freedom of speech issue. It is actually a “gatekeeping” issue. News organizations were supposed to be the gatekeepers to the public sphere, and readers were able to hold [the media] accountable. If they distributed or echoed a lie, they could be sued.   Right now, the tech companies make more money in surveillance for profit. We didn't even have a name for that business model until 2019, when Shoshana Zuboff wrote The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. This book goes into how these tech companies use machine learning to create models that know us better than we know ourselves. Those models are then scooped up by AI and become the motherload database that is used for microtargeting.   Microtargeting is not the old advertising strategy we know. It knows your weakest moment to a message and sells it. This advertising marketing model is now what is exploited by geopolitical powers. We have seen experiments before, but that exploitation really began in 2014 when Russian disinformation began to target Crimea, America, and even Korea. As they succeeded, they were replicated in different countries around the world. This is a part of the reason that we are seeing illiberal leaders being elected democratically, because if you don't have integrity of facts, you cannot have integrity of elections.   V. Social Media’s Impact on the Global Information Ecosystem   ■ Sook Jong Lee: If we extend this debate to North Korea, where it not only has an illiberal leader but also a totally closed society with people indoctrinated, what would be a good way for the democracies to intervene in the psyche of North Koreans about the freedom and democracy issues? Have you thought about the North Koreans?   ■ Maria Ressa: If you look at the world today, we have several cases. When Russia invaded Ukraine, the world came together, reacted on it, and the ICC came up with an arrest warrant. That's the quickest the world has acted since the World War II. Syria, for example, was very disjointed. People thought that democracy doesn't really need to get nurtured and that it will survive all of these “death by a thousand cuts.” You also have Taiwan, which is engulfed by information operations by mainland China. You have the Koreas, and you see them as different stages of it.   What I'm worried about is that if we don't do anything significant with our information ecosystem, we will wind up like North Korea. When you say North Korea indoctrinates, I say social media is a behavior modification system.   On January 6, 2021, we saw violence on Capitol Hill for the first time. On January 8 of this year, we saw violence in Brazil. One of the aspects that has not been sufficiently researched yet is the role of YouTube, for example, in Brazil, in the United States, in the Philippines, and in South Korea. In a research by the Harvard Belfer Institute, they clustered the algorithms of YouTube on Zika virus, COVID, and also on Jair Bolsonaro. Their results showed that Bolsonaro, a far right figure, was able to be elected because of Youtube algorithms. The contents recommended by the algorithms clustered together the far rights who would never have been able to find each other in the real world. They were too far fringe, but they had common terrorist idea that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. This is what happened—the clustering algorithm of recommendation engines provided a support base.   Did the same clustering algorithm create the violence on January 6, 2021? I go back to Yuri Andropov, a former KGB chairman, who talked about disinformation in a way that democratic countries take seriously. He said, “disinformation is like cocaine—sniff once or twice, it may not change your life. If you use it every day, though, it will make you an addict—a different man.” This is where we are in 2023 after algorithms have exploited us and used our data to change the way we think and the way we act through our emotions.   ■ Sook Jong Lee: Thank you. Do you have any comments for the Asia Democracy Research Network?   ■ Maria Ressa: One last thing I would like to add on the ADRN is that our research will be inadequate unless we get access to big data. The big tech companies have those data over us, and they are frankly the only way we can hold them accountable. It is almost like we are in the dark, tossing spaghetti against the wall when they have the resources and we don’t.   Thank you very much for having me.       ■ Maria Ressa is the founder, CEO, and executive editor of Rappler, the top digital-only news site that is leading the fight for press freedom in the Philippines. In October 2021, Maria was one of two journalists awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of her “efforts to safeguard freedom of expression, which is a precondition for democracy and lasting peace.” Among many other awards for her principled stance, she received the prestigious Golden Pen of Freedom Award, the Knight International Journalism Award, the Gwen Ifill Press Freedom Award, the Shorenstein Journalism Award, the Columbia Journalism Award, and the Sergei Magnitsky Award. Ressa has been a journalist in Asia for more than 30 years, most of them as CNN’s bureau chief in Manila, then Jakarta. In 2005, she took the helm of ABS-CBN News and Current Affairs, and for six years managed more than 1,000 journalists for the largest multi-platform news operation in the Philippines.       ■ Typeset by Jisoo Park, Research Assistant     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn), as a secretariat of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN), invites you to the sixteenth online seminar of the [Democracy Cooperation] series, titled "Protecting Minority Rights in Asia: Pressing Challenges and Emerging Trends."   With some exceptions, most Asian democracies have constitutional and legal frameworks to protect and advance the rights of minorities. A number of democracies have robust affirmative action and institutional mechanisms to ensure minorities enjoy equal freedom with the majority communities. In actual reality, most of these rights and special privileges are on paper. Poor state capacity, lack of implementation along with rising instances of intolerance and majoritarianism continue to pose serious challenge to the rights and identities of religious and ethnic minorities.   In order to examine the status and trends of minority rights protection within Asia, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) has invited speakers from five Asian countries to share their country specific issues and challenges with regards to minorities.   This Online Seminar is a part of ADRN research on “Protection of Minority Rights in Asia."   Time/Date: 19 July 2022 (Tuesday) 15:30 – 17:00 (KST)   Panelists: Shaheen Anam (Executive Director, Manusher Jonno Foundation) Damba Ganbat (Chairman of Board, Academy of Political Education) Pradip Pariyar (Executive Chairperson, Samata Foundation) Jirayudh Sinthuphan (Assistant Professor, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University) Niranjan Sahoo (Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation)     I. Overview   Democratic countries in Asia face unique challenges in protecting minority rights. Each country’s historical background and cultural dynamics deeply influence the nature of inequality, advocacy, and reform within the state. To examine current issues in minority rights protection across Asia, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) hosted a webinar, inviting scholars from five countries to speak about minority rights and protections in their countries. The panel was moderated by Niranjan Sahoo, a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.   II. Case Studies: India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Mongolia, Thailand   India “India’s situation is very dire, and Muslims today are facing unprecedented threats and attacks”   India is a Hindu-majority (80%) nation with large and diverse minorities, including Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Parsis. With boggling diversity, there are 30 major languages and 300 dialects used within the country. The Indian constitution has a pro-minority bias, providing numerous special privileges for minorities, especially linguistic and ethnic minorities. Part ⅩⅣ of the constitution details an elaborate list of provisions protecting minority rights; Article 29 guarantees cultural and educational rights, and Article 25 protects the right to “freely profess, practice and propagate religion (subject to public order and morality).”   Though the Constitution grants various rights, due to weak policing, politicization, and the absence of an effective justice system, these rights are not honored. Projects are not “actively” implemented, and issues arise with resource allocations and spending. In addition to various structural barriers, the rise of majoritarian politics and increased political polarization have posed additional challenges to protecting minority rights.   Religious minorities—among them Muslims—receive no special attention in the constitution, only a “bundle of rights.” With a population of over 200 million (14% of the country’s population), Muslims are the largest religious minority group. However, Muslims currently rank among the lowest in socio-economic indicators. For example, less than 4% of Muslims serve in the police, judiciary, or elite civil services. In present-day India, Muslims are the most marginalized and excluded minority group, even more so than Dalits (those belonging to the “untouchable” caste) and Adivasis (indigenous peoples in India).   A key driver of Muslim marginalization is its long historical background. Prejudice and intolerance have emerged from extreme Hindu-right organizations since the 1950s, and have sharpened since the 1990s, particularly due to the Ram Janabhoomi movement. Polarization has further intensified since 2014, when Prime Minister Modi took power. Hindu Majoritarianism entails historic marginalization of minorities; shrinking political representation; stereotyping, stigmatizing and demonizing of minorities; growing intolerance (e.g. anti-conversation laws, bans on cow slaughters, and “love jihad” theories); and the collapse of inter-community relations and trust. India has taken a constitutional route toward majoritarianism; in recent years, there have been a series of new legislations targeting Muslims. For example, Article 370, which concerned India’s only Muslim-majority state, was abolished. Furthermore, the Citizen Amendment Act, which discriminates against Muslims living in India, was enacted in 2019.   Bangladesh “I feel very strongly…that the majority population has a responsibility to protect the rights of the minority. Unless there are more…people standing up for the rights of minorities, I think that it will be very difficult to address it only through laws and policies”   Bangladesh emerged from its 1971 split with Pakistan as a secular nation with a constitution guaranteeing equal rights for all. Shaheen Anam provided an overview of minority rights in present-day Bangladesh, focusing primarily on issues facing Bangladesh’s Hindu religious minority, who make up less than 10% of the population (as compared to the 90% Muslim majority). In her presentation, Anam explained that, though Bangladesh claims to be a country of religious and ethnic harmony, the constitution does not explicitly recognize minorities or provide separate provisions for their protection. In practice, the constitutional guarantee of equal rights has not been supported by proper policies and structures to uphold said rights.   Religious radicalism has been on the rise in Bangladesh over the last 20 years as a result of increased globalization, international events in Palestine and India, and social media, among other factors. In tandem, attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh have also risen. These attacks are typically not overt physical violence—like murders or riots—but rather land grabs of Hindu-owned property, often by or benefitting local vested interest groups. Over the last several years, social media has consistently been used to spread false news and instigate attacks.   Per Anam, the “most damaging” phenomenon is that the Hindu minority population feel they are not equal citizens, not as a result of state-sponsored oppression, but rather a social and economic problem left inadequately addressed by the state. She argued that, though the government sets up investigation commissions and vows to punish the perpetrators of crimes, it does not do enough to prevent crimes, and the justice process is slow and not impartial. Current mechanisms to improve the conditions of minorities in Bangladesh include the National Human Rights Commission and an elaborate system of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) who monitor and push for better government response. Moving forward, Anam advocated for more open dialogue and initiatives to embrace diversity, including revising educational curricula. Within the justice system, she called for violence to be prosecuted strongly and swiftly. Anam closed her presentation by sharing her conviction that the majority population has a responsibility to protect the rights of the minority. She believes that more people need to stand up for the rights of minorities—meaningful change will be difficult to accomplish through laws and policies alone.   Nepal “Although untouchability was declared illegal more than a decade ago in Nepal, caste-based discrimination persists across the country, with lingering prejudice contributing to…significant violence in Nepali society”   In his presentation, Pradip Pradiyar provided an overview of caste-based discrimination (CBD) and minority rights in Nepal. Despite the abolition of CBD, untouchability continues to be deeply entrenched in Nepalese society. Dalits in Nepal face the worst form of discrimination across social, economic, administrative, religious, and political spheres: Nepal’s lower castes do not enjoy equal access to education or jobs; their skills, labor, and human rights are exploited; they are unable to access decision-making and justice processes; and they are not properly represented in the political system. Cases of rape or murder perpetrated against Dalits are not uncommon, and Dalit women face three-fold, intersectional discrimination due to their class, gender, and caste. Discrimination against Dalits is a deeply important problem in Nepalese society that needs to be discussed, but current conversations are not enough.   Social, economic, and health indicators demonstrate the effects of this discrimination. Dalit literacy rates, life expectancy, mortality rates, immunization rates, and nutritional access all fall below the national average. 42% of Dalits live below the poverty line, in contrast with the national absolute poverty rate of 35%. The discrimination-induced challenges to finding a good job or getting a good education perpetuate a cycle of poverty. These harmful long-term trends are accompanied by ongoing atrocities committed against Dalits. People are being killed in the name of caste; Pariyar highlighted the case of Sundar Harijan, a Dalit man who was wrongfully jailed as a minor, then had his identity switched with someone who had committed a much more serious crime, leading him to serve an extended prison term. Harijan was found hanging in the prison bathroom.   Recent developments regarding the status of Dalits in Nepal are complex. The COVID-19 pandemic raised new problems, and though and Nepal’s constitution serves as a legal instrument protecting Dalit rights, the law has not been implemented, and those responsible for implementation are not knowledgeable about Dalit issues. Pariyar called for the implementation of these fundamental rights to be ensured via direct order, and for the constitution to be further amended to protect Dalit rights. He also highlighted the need for proportional representation of Dalits in politics, especially in local government, as well as in bureaucracy and law enforcement. Pariyar closed by calling for three key measures: first, to raise awareness on Dalit issues; second, to increase Dalit’s access to resources; and finally, to ensure that laws, policies, and programs promoting Dalit rights are actually implemented.   Mongolia “In comparison with…heterogeneous societies, we have fewer problems, but still we have some concerns, mainly related to education…and getting higher education for the minorities”   Damba Gambat, Chairman of the Board at the Mongolia Academy of Political Education (APE), joined the ADRN workshop to present on a paper prepared by Ukhnaa Tuya, his colleague at APE. Gambat first provided an overview of Mongolia’s history, demographics, and cultural dynamics. Mongolia is fairly ethnically homogenous; though it has 24 ethnic groups, many have only minor cultural differences. The Khalkh majority consider themselves to be direct descendants off Genghis Khan, and therefore the benchmark for “standard” Mongolian culture and “official” Mongolian tradition. Khalkh Mongolian is the nation’s official language, the language of government administration and national exams, and is used for instruction in most schools. The Khalks are generally not challenged on these claims, though occasionally ethnic minority groups will push back against their lack of political representation or particular government decisions. Similarly, racial tensions exist, but disputes are almost always resolved peacefully.   The Tsaatan, Tuva, and Kazakh groups, concentrated mostly in the Northwest, are the most culturally distinct. Kazakhs and Tuva speak Turkic languages, rather than Mongolian dialects. Religion also plays into minority distinctions—after the end of one-party communist rule in the 1990s, there was a popular resurgence of Tibetan Buddhism. As of 2020, 50% of Mongolians were Buddhist, and 40% were non-religious. In contrast, 82% of Mongolian Kazakhs practice Islam, and 27% of Tuvans and 60% of Tsaatans practice Shamanism.   The government has been paying increased attention to respecting and protecting the languages and cultural rights of Kazakhs, Tuvas and other minorities. The first democratic constitution of Mongolia guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities to practice their own culture and use their own language “in education and communication and in the pursuit of cultural, artistic, and scientific activities.” The constitution bans discrimination, and the most recent labor and criminal codes also guarantee equality among ethnic groups. However, in the early 2010s, international organizations found that there was a lack of policies addressing challenges to minority interests, such as poverty and unemployment. In his presentation, Gambat highlighted issues surrounding education equality and the lack of native-language education—compared to the national average, fewer Kazakhs, Tsaatans, and Tuvas have access to primary, general, and higher education. As for particular areas of concern, Gambat explained that there are no curricula optimized to support children of ethnic minorities who are learning multiple languages, no mechanisms collecting data specifically to evaluate the academic achievement of minorities, and no programs available to improve the bilingual education skills of teachers catering to these populations, contributing to the lack of access to high quality education for minority groups.   Thailand “Especially in terms of minority rights, Thai law is still dominated…by conservative, heterosexual assumptions”   Over the last century, Thailand has had about 20 constitutions—despite the changes, every version has emphasized protecting human dignity and the peoples’ rights and liberty. On the other hand, Thai law, developed during Southeast Asia’s colonial era as part of an effort to avoid colonization, has not changed significantly; unfortunately, these laws have since prevented human rights development, infringing on gender, linguistic, and ethnic minority rights. Traditionally, crossdressing, gender fluidity and homosexuality were not cultural taboos, but they were criminalized with the introduction of this “modern” colonial legal system. They have since been decriminalized, but the LGBT community is still excluded from basic rights. As such, since 2012, the Thai LGBT community has been fighting for the right to marry, sparking a public debate on minority rights.   Pre-colonial Thai society was androgynous and quite accepting of non-heteronormative behaviors. LGBT identity was considered a private matter and did not concern the state. In the 19th century, the arrival of Western colonialism replaced informal Thai moral concepts of gender with Western understandings of “virtue” and sexualities. By 1917, a person’s gender was officially recognized and associated with their identity at birth, and gender identity and sexuality norms began to emerge. In 1953, private and non-commercial sodomy between consenting adults was decriminalized.   There was no major Thai LGBT advocacy movement in the 1960s and 1970s. This is perhaps, Sinthuphan posits, because the Thai LGBT community enjoyed a comfortable level of social space and freedom, leading to the absence of an LGBT advocacy group or political union. The official LGBT movement started in the 1980s with the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which had been labelled as a homosexual or a “sinner’s” disease. The Rainbow Sky Association of Thailand is one of the oldest LGBT advocacy groups, and has campaigned for equal social protection and legal rights for the LGBT community since the 1990s.   In Thailand, the issue of same-sex marriage rights entered public discourse around 2012. Since the first draft of same-sex marriage legislation was proposed in 2013, there have been several further drafts. The bill, which came to be known as the “Civil Partnership Bill,” as well as a reformed Civil and Commercial Code, have received preliminary approval from Parliament as of March 2022, though a longer process remains before they can be fully passed and implemented.   There are several key challenges to the protection of LGBT rights in Thailand. Conservative and heterosexual majoritarianism among Thai legislators and legal practitioners and resistance to reform are two key areas for improvement. Sinthuphan also argued that the lack of a unified core movement or nationally recognized LGBT coalition poses an obstacle to progress, and finally, closed by asserting that policymakers should separate their personal religious and moral worldviews from their civil rights obligations. ■   III. Speakers and Moderators Biographies   ■ Niranjan Sahoo is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, India. ■ Shaheen Anam is the Executive Director at the Manusher Jonno Foundation in Dhaka, Bangladesh. ■ Damba Ganbat is the Chairman of the Board at the Academy of Political Education in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. ■ Pradip Pariyar is the Executive Chairperson of the Samata Foundation in Patan, Nepal. He is an alumnus of American University and Tribhuvan University. He specializes in youth empowerment, peace building and capacity building of media professionals. ■ Jirayudh Sinthuphan is an assistant professor at the Chulalongkorn University Institute of Asian Studies in Bangkok, Thailand.

  The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn), as a secretariat of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN), invited you to the fifteenth online seminar of the [Democracy Cooperation] series, titled "Exploring Direct, Deliberative, and Participatory Democracy in Asia."     Asian democratic countries are incorporating mechanisms or ideas of direct democracy into their political system, but many still face difficulties in implementing good governance. In order to examine diverse backgrounds and trends of direct democracy within Asia, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) invited speakers from seven Asian countries to speak about their country’s direct democracy trends.   This Online Seminar was held as part of ADRN research on “Ups and Downs of Direct Democracy Trends in Asia.”   ㆍ Time/Date: 25 March 2022 (Friday) 17:00 – 18:30 (KST) ㆍ Panelists:    Mohamed Aaseem (Analyst, Verite Research)    Dolgion Aldar (Consultant and Board Member, Independent Research Institute of Mongolia)    Kaustuv K. Bandyopadhyay (Director, Participatory Research in Asia)    Thawilwadee Bureekul (Director of Research and Development Office, King Prajadhipok’s Institute)    Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim (Researcher, Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs)    Francisco A. Magno (Senior Fellow, Institute of Governance at De La Salle University)    Sri Nuryanti (Researcher, Indonesian National Research and Innovation Agency)         I. Overview   Democratic countries in Asia are incorporating concepts and mechanisms of direct democracy into their political system, but many still face difficulties in implementing good governance. In order to examine the diverse backgrounds and ongoing trends of direct democracy within Asia, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) hosted an ADRN online seminar, inviting scholars from seven Asian countries to speak about their country’s direct democracy trends.   II. Case Studies: Philippines, Mongolia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India   Philippines   “Even though there are mechanisms for direct democracy […], the clear challenge is the persistence of political dynasties…and the continuity of authoritarian populism in the country”   Direct democracy in the Philippines is anchored in its constitution. Article 13 of Section 16 of the constitution emphasizes the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making.   At the center of Philippine direct democracy is a system of initiatives and referendums. For example, a 2019 referendum sought public approval of the Bangsamoro Organic Law and the creation of a new province. Another example is recall elections. There have been instances when a petition made by a certain percentage of voters in a province or local jurisdiction resulted in out-of-cycle recall elections for local mayors.   Local government code also encourages the development of policies for public participation. For example, several local governments have created a local people`s council, adding an additional layer of direct governance to the already-mandated local development councils. People’s councils can observe, vote on, and participate in city government project activities and programs. The people’s council can also designate representatives to all city council committees and suggest and vote on proposed legislation.   A new development in Philippine direct democracy is the use of digital democracy. Mayor Vico Sotto of the city of Pasig is known to actively use digital platforms to gauge public opinion on and get approval for certain policies. For example, new rules on speed limits in Pasig were proposed through online platforms, in what Magno likens to a local online referendum.   Participatory budgeting practices also help to boost accountability. Several mechanisms have been introduced over the past six or seven years (e.g. the Budget Partnership Agreements) to encourage bottom-up budgeting and citizen participatory audits. Village-level residents are also asked to identify budget priorities through a series of workshop assemblies; these priorities are incorporated into the budget of higher levels of government, including national development plans.   Direct democracy requires a combination of government enabling mechanisms and civil society demands. Enabling factors within the Philippines include its democratic political culture after the replacement of authoritarianism in the 1980s; rules and legislation, including local government code and the Philippine constitution; the right to information in the executive branch, the pursuit of open data for citizens, and access to reliable public documents; and ongoing capacity building for government agencies based on public participation.   The Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG) is a law that provides incentives for participatory governance, aiming to ensure transparency, participation, and accountability across all government functions. The Department of the Interior and local governments are now also providing data ongoing infrastructure project, allowing people to monitor the progress of projects online and provide feedback.   On the demand side of direct democracy, one factor is the availability and accessibility of independent media that enables citizens to discuss public issues. For example, a corruption scandal in which government funds were being funneled to fake NGOs was exposed by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, an independent media organization. This prompted an online petition for the government’s anti-graft agency to probe the 10 billion peso scam, and hundreds of thousands to protest.   Moving forward, Magno recommends passing the Freedom of Information Law, legislating participatory budget mechanisms at national and sub-national levels, integrating citizen participation in civic education, promoting open data and conducting analytics for better government planning, and building a database on citizen participation to aid policy reform efforts. He calls for new mechanisms to make the government’s Full Disclosure Policy (FDP) fully operational, incorporating local knowledge stakeholders to create platforms that better bridge government data and policy advocacy. The persistence of political dynasties, which have been successful in representative democracy elections, and the rise of authoritarian populism in the country.   Mongolia   “Mongolia has the key mechanisms allowing for direct democracy…, but the general observation is these laws are not implemented in practice”   There is very limited space for direct democracy in Mongolia, especially as traditionally defined—people voting directly about the issues that interest them. However, using a broader interpretation and examining whether mechanisms exist for citizen participation, there has been progress on the direct democratic front.   Like many other countries in Asia, Mongolia was ruled by an authoritarian regime for 70 years, transitioning out in the 1990s. In that sense, there has been a great deal of democratic progress. Though Mongolia has yet to hold a national referendum and there is not broader national scale participation, key mechanisms exist to allow public participation in various stages of governance, such as planning, budgeting, and monitoring. 2011 legislation established the right to information and transparency, and there are several mechanisms allowing public hearings, petitions, and complaints, as well as mandating the government to respond to these complaints. 2017 legislation introduced deliberative polling.   The first democratic constitution of 1992 set the foundation for direct democracy, recognizing that the people of Mongolia shall directly participate in state affairs. The role of the public evolved further with the Law on Referendum (1995) and a surge of laws in the 2010s which allowed and expanded the role of public participation in governance. However, these laws and mechanisms have not been fully implemented in practice, or are obstructed by other, contradictory laws.   Over the last two decades, the trend has been toward digital transformation and incorporating technology in the state-citizen relationship. This year, the Parliament of Mongolia released a “Digital Parliament” application, and there is a committee dedicated to digitalizing government services. But whether this digital transformation has contributed to people directly voting or indirectly changing policy is unclear. So far, its primary role has been to amplify state-to-citizen communication, and less so the reverse. The hope is for this digital transformation to provide actual decision-making empowerment for the public.   There have been some concerning setbacks for Mongolian direct democracy over the last decade. For example, laws on state secrets significantly restrict the right to information by allowing the government to classify any type of information as a secret. The current parliament also does not have a dedicated standing committee on petitions and complaints, as the existing committee was dissolved and replaced by the digital parliament application. But given the lack of widespread digital access and Mongolia’s “digital divide,” many citizens are unaware that such an application exists.   Mongolia also lacks proponents of direct democracy. In discussions on promoting democracy, few are saying that people need to directly vote and make decisions about key issues. Instead, Mongolian discussion of democracy focuses on representative democracy; there are many ongoing efforts to introduce another constitutional amendment to change the electoral system and fix the parliamentary system.   There are several popular claims against direct democracy. The first is the nationalist objection, which argues that proponents of democracy, especially direct democracy, are “pro-American liberals” who don’t understand the Mongolian culture and context, leading to pushback against democratic movements. Second, as Mongolia is situated between Russia and China, some have voiced the opinion that talking too much about freedom and freedom issues poses a national security concern. In a similar vein, some argue that civil society organizations (CSOs) should be restricted and regulated by the state. Some believe that democracy begets inequality, and will not contribute to the public’s quality of life. Others argue that Mongolia needs to dedicate its energy to developing a long-term vision for prosperity, rather than wasting time making decisions and getting caught up in discussions of accountability. Finally, a popular belief is that the masses are uneducated, and to have them at the helm of the decision-making process is dangerous.   Indonesia   “Direct democratic practice has successfully [allowed] Indonesia to be resilient [to] democratic setbacks”   Indonesia, as a democratic country, has laws that regulate the working implementation of democracy. One such laws stipulates that Indonesia acknowledges the practice of direct democracy. The most prominent forms of direct democracy today in Indonesia are referendums and elections.   Indonesia has implemented direct democracy in the form of referendums; notable examples are the referendum to amend the 1945 Constitution, and the referendum held by the East Timor province to vote on their affiliation to Indonesia. There are two referendum types. Typically, a referendum committee provides a simple question for citizens to directly answer. There are also popular referendums, however, in which citizens make a petition that calls a popular vote over existing legislation. A special committee for hosting referendums determines the timeframe and required signatures for a valid petition (for example, petitions may require signatures from diverse communities to protect minority interests). This form of direct democracy effectively grants the public the option to veto laws adopted by the elected legislature.   The referendum to amend the 1945 Constitution was crucial because the Constitution had never been changed; a 1985 presidential decree had stated such an amendment would only be allowed through a referendum in which 90% of those voting supported the initiative, and the amendment did in fact pass.   Second, in the 1999 referendum held in East Timor, the people of East Timor were asked whether they would like to remain affiliated with Indonesia or become independent. The area had been annexed—forcibly incorporated—into Indonesia in 1975 under the Suharto presidency. Demands were made by European and ASEAN countries for Indonesia to carry out political reforms, and the referendum came as a consequence of UN resolutions calling for the right to self-determination. Out of a total of 438,968 valid votes, 344,580 (78.5%) were pro-independence, while 94,388 (21.5%) supported remaining with Indonesia. Voter participation was very high—98.6% of all registered voters participated in the referendum. The results of the referendum led to the official separation of East Timor from Indonesia.   Though Indonesia used to have indirect elections, direct elections began in 2005. Indonesia directly elects its executives: the President and Vice President, governors, mayors, regents, village heads, and national and local representatives.   Various literature studies have revealed the advantages of direct democracy, but Indonesia’s democratic transition has shown the pathway to consolidation by merging direct elections for president and vice president with those for local governors and regents. The strengthening of direct democratic practices has allowed democratic institutions to ensure the proper functioning of civil society organizations and allowed other interest groups to engage in policy decision-making. Direct democratic practices have allowed Indonesia to remain resilient to democratic setbacks, though it is still necessary to push back against rising populism being used in popular votes to expand power.   Malaysia   “The age of government-knows-all has basically ended”   Malaysia has had a tumultuous relationship with democracy, moving between three different governments within the span of two to three years. Malaysia’s first democratic transition occurred in 2018, shifting the federal government after 60 years under the former ruling coalition (known as the National Front). Unfortunately, the new government did not last long, only managing to stay in power for about a year and a half due to ideological splits and members of the party changing their party affiliation. The Sheraton Move—the political move carried out by the existing government in which the ruling coalition broke up—notably led to a political and constitutional crisis just before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The general election had been invalidated by the politicians themselves, leading to frustration among the voters as, after only one and a half years, a new government rose to power that was, in essence, a coalition of the losers of the previous general election.   As voters become more disillusioned and mistrust towards institutions arose, Malaysia underwent periods of uncertainty in terms of leadership. Seated in this context, conversations have arisen about opportunities to explore other forms of democracy, namely direct/participatory democracy, amongst members of civil society. There is also a need for less state intervention and greater empowerment of CSOs (civil society organizations); whereas Malaysia has historically been a top-down country, movements on the ground are now talking about a bottom-up approach.   The three governments that have held power in Malaysia since 2018 are known as the National Front (Barisan Nasional, or BN), the Pact of Hope (Pakatan Harapan, or PH), and the National Alliance (Perikatan Nasional, or PN). The National Front is the former, long-ruling coalition that stayed in power for six decades. The Pact of Hope government, a coalition based on progressive opposition politics, won the 2018 general elections but was short-lived. Finally, the National Alliance is a coalition comprised of the losers of the previous general election and splinter parties who deserted the previous ruling coalitions. The ambiguous self-collapse of the Pact of Hope movement and the undemocratic rise of the National Alliance have led to a fragile, minority government. Though the government has been forced to sign a memorandum of understanding between the National Alliance and the opposition bloc committing the current government to reform, the memorandum has also faced backlash from supporters of both parties due to the failure to consult the public during its creation.   Malaysia has historically practiced a representative/indirect model of democracy in combination with a constitutional monarchy, borrowing from the Westminster Model (an inheritance from the British colonization period). The monarch and royal families also have an internal consultative mechanism. Therefore, Malaysia has a very complex power structures and diverse social makeup. However, the discussion on democracy coming down to the ground level has been very limited, as—of the three branches of government—only the lower house of the Parliament is elected. The remaining positions are filled by appointment. in terms of politics in Malaysia.   Some political science dialogue in Malaysia centers around clientelism and patronage. In Malaysia, members of parliament (MPs) or potential candidates often engage with the public/the local level for political gain by providing citizens with “goodies” or aid and basic necessities to garner votes.   Malaysia, being situated in the center of Southeast Asia, is highly in touch with its surroundings, especially in terms of democracy. Democratic development in Indonesia and the Philippines in particular affect Malaysia, while larger superpowers like China and India—who are also facing challenges in terms of their democratic models—affect Malaysia indirectly as new generations become open to conversations about leadership decisions. In Malaysia, modern discussions of direct democracy are far more advanced than twenty or thirty years ago; whereas earlier generations preferred to pass policy and leadership decisions over to elites and community leaders, younger generations are much more aware and participatory. Technology has also been a major factor in encouraging Malaysian democracy.   Challenges to transitioning to a direct democracy model in Malaysia include getting buy-in from a large portion of rural and semi-urban constituencies—these communities have greater difficulty accessing information and building democratic awareness and tend to prioritize “bread and butter” survival issues, preferring to delegate policymaking and international issues to politicians and local parties. Malaysia also has three rampant, ongoing challenges making discussions about democracy slightly more problematic: race, religion, and corruption. Additionally, the labels ascribed to democracy by conservatives—namely, that democracy, liberty, and human rights are foreign, Western agendas that should be rejected—and the conservative narrative that democracy is a threat to the “social contract” create added difficulty. Finally, though most Malaysians accept that peace and freedom are benefits of democracy and part of the democratic process, there is less focus on principles like good governance and justice. Thus, democratic education needs to be encouraged and advanced, which will take time.   Those who are pro-democracy and support elements of direct democracy in Malaysia often belong to four key groups—those in urban centers, those with a background in activism, those with exposure to multiculturalism, and those belonging to the younger age bracket. People not belonging to these groups tend to want to maintain the status quo, passing policymaking and discussion responsibilities to representatives in lieu of direct involvement. That said, due to social media, there has been growth of civil society organizations supporting deliberation and dissent in public spaces; people are talking about democracy in a robust manner on digital platforms. Malaysia’s volunteer culture is growing. And the current minority government, because it is so weak, has been forced to consult and hold town halls with NGOs; this is an acknowledgement of the societal role of NGOs and CSOs. After the 14th general election, the age of government-knows-all has come to an end; this has been a long process, beginning in 2008 with concerted opposition efforts to create public awareness. These days, rather than bulldozing policies, governments consider opinions from CSOs and community leaders; in many ways, the decision-making process is much more inclusive.   In terms of ongoing efforts in Malaysia, the Better Malaysia Assembly (BMA) is experimenting with a citizen’s assembly similar to that of Ireland and Switzerland; it will be carrying out a pilot project in the state of Johor this coming August. Online petitions (such as change.org) have been very popular, and one CSO (BERSIH – the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections) is working on recall elections. As for open budget transparency, there are initiatives to invite the public to participate in monitoring state budgets.   Finally, there are a few emerging trends in Malaysia. More parties are being created, and there is talk of decentralization. With regards to political literacy, young groups are engaging in efforts to organize a digital parliament. In conclusion, the current government in Malaysia is a weak majority, and the opposition is in disarray. Though this is an opportunity for public involvement by CSOs, the potential for the return of corruption and previous governments (who are more familiar among voters) poses a threat to democracy.     Sri Lanka   “Although Sri Lanka […] allows citizens to directly engage with Parliament, the successful implementation of all of said instruments is contingent on effective implementation and follow-up by parliamentarians”   Democratic government typically takes two forms—direct, in which individual people participate in decision-making, and representative, in which elected representatives formulate policy. The instruments of direct democracy can be divided into formal instruments—like referendums and voter recalls—and alternative instruments, which also allow for citizen involvement but have not traditionally been seen as instruments of direct democracy.   Instruments of direct democracy exist and are relevant within the Sri Lankan context. When Sri Lanka gained its independence in 1948, the Solbury Constitution was already in effect, having been instated in 1944; the government accordingly had a Westminster parliamentary structure. In 1972, the first Republican Constitution came into effect, and was then replaced in 1978 by the second Republican Constitution. Throughout these three systems of governance, the sole formal instrument of direct democracy was the referendum, which was only introduced in the 1978 constitution. However, within the Westminster parliamentary structure, there were instruments that allowed citizens to directly engage in government, namely: private members’ mills, public petitions, and parliamentary questions. Like the referendum, these instruments have direct democratic features.   A referendum, in which people can directly vote on a law or a proposal, is allowed in three cases under the Sri Lankan constitution: if a constitutional amendment proposes changes to entrenched articles in the constitution, or the Supreme Court determines a proposed bill is inconsistent with entrenched articles in the Constitution, it must go to a referendum. Finally, the president can put forward a referendum for citizens’ approval for any matter of public importance. Sri Lanka has only ever held one referendum (in 1982). The Sri Lankan referendum framework has two critical shortcomings that undermine its efficacy as an instrument of deliberative democracy: first, it can only be called by the president, meaning that there is no means for the people to mandate a referendum. Second, it is limited to approving bills and measures that are at the parliamentary level or of national importance; as such, there is no application for local-level measures, preventing communities from directly participating in matters that will affect their day-to-day lives.   Private members’ bills, public petitions, and parliamentary questions enable citizens or groups of citizens to advocate for a parliamentarian’s support; the member can then sponsor the bill, submit the petition to the public petition committee, or submit a question to the government on the citizens’ behalf. However, research has found that over the last 5-6 years, these mechanisms have been inadequately and ineffectively used for direct engagement with the government. Of the 209 private members’ bills presented in Parliament, only 12 were matters of public interest; private members’ bills have predominantly been used to regulate incorporated bodies rather than for direct democratic engagement. 2,401 public petitions were submitted to the Committee by 181 out of 225 parliamentary members, but approximately half of those petitions were submitted by just 10 parliamentarians. Similarly, 2372 questions were raised by parliamentarians, but 56% were raised by just 10 members. These instruments are being used neither extensively, uniformly, nor effectively by Sri Lankan citizens.   There are three key challenges to using these instruments for direct democratic purposes. First, there are not mechanisms to trigger mandatory action by parliamentarians—instruments are only presented to parliament at the will of the member of parliament the citizens have approached. This is a problem similar to that of referendums, where the power to trigger a referendum rests solely with the President and excludes local issues. Second, accountability mechanisms are insufficient; for example, there is no way to track the status of a submitted petition, and no mandate for parliamentarians to regularly report their progress. Parliamentarians can therefore exercise discretion without sufficient checks, undermining the ability of citizens to fully make use of these instruments. Finally, there are systemic and structural issues inhibiting citizens’ access to mechanisms for direct engagement, including lack of women’s representation and inaccessibility of committee and subcommittee proceedings.   Aaseem provides three suggestions for areas for improvement. First, expanding the scope of the referendum: in Sri Lanka, referendums currently can only be called by the president—this could be resolved by adopting a system similar to Switzerland, in which citizens can trigger the introduction of a referendum upon endorsement/signatures from a sufficient portion of the constituency. He also suggests exploring introducing a referendum mechanism for resolving legislative and policy issues at the local level. Suggestions for areas of improvement. Second, the existing formal mechanisms of direct engagement currently have no threshold or trigger point at which they are mandatory for a member of Parliament to implement; he suggests introducing procedures that trigger automatic implementation of formal instruments under specific circumstances, such as a particular number of citizen signatures. Finally, he suggests introducing mechanisms to increase public representatives’ accountability. Though Sri Lanka currently recognizes these formal instruments, successfully using them depends on effective implementation and follow-up by parliamentarians. Aaseem proposes that Sri Lanka explore the systems to monitor how these formal instruments are being used, as well as to raise awareness of the utility of these instruments among the general public.   Thailand   “Referendums have become a political mechanism and no longer reflect the will of the public, […] and recalls seem to be impossible.”   Though Thailand’s Direct Democracy Practice Potential (DDPP) score is quite low, the country’s communication technology revolution spells out interesting possibilities for the future of direct democracy; direct democracy, in combination with technology, may provide unique opportunities for policymakers to acquire deep information from the public that experts cannot provide.   Thailand transitioned from absolute monarchy to constitutional (democratic) monarchy in 1932, but has since undergone thirteen military coups d’état, most recently in 2014. Prior to 1997, several versions of the Constitution allowed referendums for constitutional amendments. The Constitution of 1997, however, marked the beginning of direct democracy in Thailand by establishing an impeachment process and increasing allowances for citizen’s participation through the introduction of legislative initiatives and the addition of referendums for laws—in addition to the previously allowed constitutional amendments—affecting national interests.   There are now four primary mechanisms through which Thai citizens can participate in direct democracy: referendums, recalls, legislative initiatives, and unconventional political participation. Two referendums have been held in Thailand, each with greater than 50% voter turnout and each demonstrating political cleavage between the North/Northeast region and the rest of the country. The first approved the 2007 draft Constitution, and the second approved the 2016 draft Constitution and allowed senators to be included in the vote for Prime Minister. This decision has had a notable effect on Thai politics by forcing representatives in the Lower House to collaborate with the Senate in order to effectively support a Prime Ministerial candidate, a possibility which is more readily accessible to the pro-military party.   Legislative initiatives strengthen direct democracy by providing another mechanism for citizens to exercise their rights. The Constitution of 1997 allowed 50,000 eligible voters to propose laws related to public policy and the rights and liberty of the people. This number was reduced to 10,000 in 2007. Most recently, the 2021 Initiative Process Act has made it easier for citizens to submit legislation by allowing social media to be used for proposing bills virtually to Parliament. However, though citizens have submitted more than 100 bills to date, only a small fraction of them have been enacted into law. In addition to having to pass through Parliament, any bills that require use of the government budget must be approved by the Prime Minister; this requirement has brought many proposed initiatives to a halt.   Thailand has had two recalls—one of a member of the Human Rights Commission (unsuccessful), and one of the Prime Minister (recalled by the National Legislative Assembly). Political movements have also conducted informal recalls as petitions on change.org, which function as a signal to the Thai government. Finally, unconventional political participation (such as participating in demonstrations, protests, and marches) provides another means for Thai citizens to participate in direct democracy, and Thai law supports the right to demonstrate. However, only ~5% of people engage with democracy in this way.   Bureekul highlights a few key problems with Thailand’s existing direct democratic instruments. Referendums, she posits, have now become a political mechanism, and no longer reflect the will of the public. As for legal initiatives, though many bills are proposed, few pass through Parliament because of the Prime Ministerial endorsement requirement for budget-related bills, and the number of people required to support a bill is too high. Furthermore, people are limited by the amount of time they can dedicate to supporting their initiative. However, civil society helps strengthen Thai direct democracy by supporting law initiatives. Democratic action through change.org is popular and functions as an effective signaling mechanism for important issues, but it is not legal. Similarly, the role of unconventional political participation in Thai society is growing, but participating citizens risk violating the law.   As for positive trends in Thailand’s democratic development, there is already considerable public awareness of the lawmaking process. The use of technology—such as social media—not only for democratic education, but as a means in which to participate in direct democracy, will increase the importance of these direct democratic mechanisms. ■   III. Speakers and Moderators Biographies   ■ Mohomed Aaseem graduated with a degree in Industrial Statistics and Mathematical Finance from the University of Colombo and has a Master’s in Development Practice from the University of Peradeniya. Aaseem has worked on a range of assignments covering electoral reform, parliamentary monitoring, transitional justice, ethnic violence and peace-building He also manages databases and provides support in data analysis for Manthri.lk and other web-based platforms at Verité. He is fluent in English, Sinhala and Tamil, and has extensive experience in working with Northern, Eastern and hill country communities.   ■ Dolgion Aldar is a research professional focused on promoting evidence-based policy making in Mongolia. She spent five years as CEO of the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia (IRIM), one of the first organizations to promote independent and third-party research in the country. Under her leadership, IRIM was awarded the Anti-Corruption Agency’s National Annual Award in 2014 and was recognized as Mongolia’s leading non-government policy research institute in 2015. She was featured in the Forbes Mongolia “Class of 2016: 30 under 30,” an annual list of the brightest young leaders and change agents in country. She currently serves as a board member of the Asia-Pacific Evaluation Association and is a member of the Social Well-Being Consortium in Asia and the EvalGender global network. Dolgion holds a master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Manchester, and both a master’s and a bachelor’s degree in Sociology from the National University of Mongolia.   ■ Kaustuv K. Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a pioneer CSO, who has dedicated more than three decades to work on participation, democratic governance, and civil society development. He has twenty-five years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSOs. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a Ph.D. degree in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India.   ■ Thawilwadee Bureekul is the director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) where she is involved in the planning, management, implementation, and coordination of the Institute’s research projects. In addition to her role at KPI, Dr. Bureekul is a professor at several universities in Thailand, including the Asian Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Burapha University, Mahidol University, and Silpakorn University. She succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and she was granted the “Woman of the Year 2018” award, and received the outstanding award on “Rights Projection and Strengthening Gender Equality” in the Year 2022 as a result.   ■ Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim is a researcher for Democracy and Governance at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), a well-known and independent think-tank based in Kuala Lumpur. He was a student activist with the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students (PKPIM) for over fourteen years, and got familiarized to public policy affairs during his internship at IMAN Research. He holds a Bachelor of Arts (Hons) in International Relations from Staffordshire University, UK. He has posited his thoughts on domestic political trends at various online portals, and represented Malaysia for several international youth conferences in Turkey, Thailand and Germany.   ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.   ■ Sri Nuryanti is currently a senior researcher of the research Center for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency. She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007-2012, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007-2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a council member of APPRA (Asia Pacific Peace Research Association) and IPRA (International Peace Research Association). Dr. Sri Nuryanti can be contacted by email at [email protected]