.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the fourth publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Ms. Aira Azhari and Mr. Faiz Abdul Halim of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs discuss the Malaysian populist phenomenon and its role in bringing the current Pakatan Harapan (PH) government into power. They caution that the now-opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) may "adopt the successful platforms from right-wing political parties in Europe and the U.S." and provide a "more populist stance that may combine political Islam and Malay nativist sentiments." Given that the definition of populism has been "inconsistent" in Malaysian politics, they also suggest and conclude that further research is needed as to how the "'people' come to adopt these views and whether there is any factual basis for said views."     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   With the recent rise of populist leaders and parties across Europe, the United States, and the Philippines, many of whom have won the vote to rule, there has been a surge of scholarly and public interest in the topic of populism and its impacts on democracy and liberal values. This discussion has begun to spill over into Malaysia. Parallels are being drawn between the nativist rhetoric of popular right-wing European parties and the ethno-nationalist and religious rhetoric spouted by members of the now former ruling party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). There are also concerns over the potential socioeconomic and political impact and the feasibility of allegedly “populist” promises made by the now ruling Pakatan Harapan (PH) government on the campaign trail.      Definition of Populism The definition of populism varies and there is no wholly agreed-upon definition due to the diversity of the political and socioeconomic environments in which populism can arise. Some scholars define populism as “a set of shortsighted macroeconomic policies adopted for electoral purposes that end up generating more harm than good.”  This definition, referred to as the socioeconomic definition of populism, it has lost support amongst most social sciences, though it is still often used by the media, politicians, and policymakers as a pejorative.   The Malaysian Discourse on Populism The definition of populism has been fairly inconsistent within the Malaysian political discourse, despite its fairly frequent usage within the media and among some academics. For instance, in the most notable writing on populism in Malaysia, Autocrats vs The People: Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia by Anne Munro-Kua, the term “authoritarian populism,” a term first coined by Stuart Hall, “depicts politics as a struggle between ‘the people’ and some combination of malevolent, racialized and/or unfairly advantaged ‘others’ at home or abroad or both. It justifies interventions in the name of ‘taking back control’ in favor of ‘the people’.”   What Socioeconomic and Political Issues Resonate with the Malaysian Public? As populism is not a substantive ideological stance, what constitutes as populist in Malaysia generally varies from other countries, though there may be similarities. In Malaysian politics, populist issues might center on controversial topics regarding ethnicity, religion, education, cost of living, immigration, political corruption, repressive laws, the Constitution, and taxation to name a few. Moreover, who are or would “the people” be defined as in Malaysia, and what would their “general will” be?   Why Were these Issues Considered Populist in Malaysia?  While public opinion surveys provide some insight into what popular issues the Malaysian public is concerned about, it is important to account for how and why the former political elite responded to (or ignored) these issues. Populism brings controversial issues back to the forefront of the public political discourse, issues that the elites are largely uncomfortable discussing. In the case of Malaysia, which has been referred to as a competitive authoritarian regime— a hybrid regime where competitive regular elections are practiced but where the ruling party has unfair and advantageous access to state mechanisms and institutions (such as the media) which are frequently used to hinder or attack the opposition, the elites tend to apply repressive laws to censor discussion of sensitive and “uncomfortable” issues and silence opposition towards the regime.   Current Trends in Populism in Malaysia Pakatan Harapan’s GE14 manifesto: Buku Harapan (Book of Hope)  There are several elements of populism within PH’s Buku Harapan, despite the fact that it contains only two mentions of the term “elite,” both of which are found in a paragraph which describes UMNO and the BN’s manipulation of “racial politics” to ensure that the political elite remained in power. The manifesto also makes it clear that it aims to cleanse Malaysia of “corruption, malfeasance and kleptocracy,” citing the 1MDB case as the primary example.    One Year on – has PH Kept True to its Promises? At the time of writing, the PH government will have been in power for almost a year. There is a need to assess how successful they have been in implementing their promises. The most notable success has been the zero-rating of the GST and the reintroduction of the Sales and Services Tax (SST) in its place. The government clearly made this move a priority for its administration, knowing full well that any indication otherwise would trigger a backlash from the public and risk losing its hard-won support. As a result of this policy, there was an initial sharp drop in prices, and the lower prices were enjoyed during the tax holiday before going up again on September 1, 2018, when the SST came into place. Malaysians have begun to realize that lowering the cost of living does not simply entail removing an unpopular consumption tax, but requires deeper structural reforms to tackle problems such as stagnant wages and changing consumer habits. The GST is a good example of how populist economic promises do little to serve the rakyat’s interest in the long term.   Conclusion: Changing Currents of Populism in post-GE14 Malaysia? Following Pakatan Harapan’s surprise victory in the fourteenth general elections, their first hundred days in government saw the “zeroization” of the GST and its eventual replacement with the SST. As of now, the government has focused on dealing with the 1MDB scandal and prosecuting figures associated with the scandal, renegotiating project contracts and attempting to slowly reform institutions. However, they have also rolled back or delayed some popular promises such as the promise to abolish tolls, though it is still too early to see where PH’s numerous promises will head in the coming years. Now that they are in power, PH’s populist language has changed somewhat whereby current government ministers talk about how the challenges currently faced by the government are linked and said to be caused by the failings of the BN.      Author’s Biography   Aira Azhari is Senior Researcher in Democracy and Governance at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), a public policy research organization based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. She holds a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Liverpool, UK and a Master of Laws (Public International Law) from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has provided analysis on political and economic issues to Malaysian and international press, including Channel News Asia and the BBC.   Faiz Abdul Halim was an Assistant Researcher under the Democracy and Governance Unit at IDEAS. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science from the International Islamic University of Malaysia.  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the third publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Francisco A. Magno of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance explores the populist phenomenon in the Philippines. In his paper, Dr. Magno argues that weak democratic institutions and the “wide disparity between what is envisioned under the democratic Constitution and the actual exercise of democracy” have created an environment that allows populism to thrive. He states that because these institutions, including political parties, have transformed into tools for politicians to use, “personality-oriented elections are routinized and become the norm.” Thus, Dr. Magno argues that more needs to be done to provide mechanisms for citizens to participate in the governing process and concludes that “a rules-based system is nurtured through interdependent civic and knowledge practices and institutions.”     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   Populism is not a novel event but a periodic one. It is a type of direct democracy that emerges when people sense that they are pushed to the margins by mainstream politics. Riding on the back of political discontent, populism gains traction and thrives amid an atmosphere of divisiveness cultivated by identity-driven politics. It focuses blame on certain domestic groups, countries, and international organizations for the ills of the nation. Populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology that delineates society into two homogeneous and adversarial groups – the pure people versus the corrupt elite.  It insists that politics should express la volonté générale or the general will of the people.   Institutional Lens An institutional theoretical lens is appropriate to assess the role of weak institutions in fostering the rise of a populist leadership that promised to make up for the ineffectual performance of previous regimes. In this regard, institutions are framed in terms of enduring rules and organized practices embedded in structures of meaning and resources. These constitutive rules and practices stipulate appropriate behavior for specific actors under given circumstances. In this regard, structures of meaning provide the explanation and justification of behavioral codes while structures of resources foster capabilities for action.   From Mayor to President Unlike the other presidential candidates who made their marks on the national scene before seeking the highest office of the land, Duterte spent most of his political career as a local government official. As mayor, Duterte dramatically transformed Davao from being a cradle of insurgency during the martial law years into a progressive urban center in the post-EDSA period. He installed security outposts surrounding the city where militias had to surrender their weapons. He imposed a smoking ban in public places, ordained curfew hours, and enforced road speed limits. The Davao City Investment Code was passed and business processes and licensing systems were streamlined to ease the regulatory cost of doing business. The influx of investment was accompanied by the proliferation of high-rise condominiums and shopping malls in the city. In 2014, Davao’s economy grew by 9.4 percent, outpacing the growth rate of other urban hubs.   The Populist Appeal A survey of thirty-eight nations conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2017 indicates that unrestricted executive power has a substantial number of adherents. In twenty countries, a quarter or more of those polled preferred an arrangement in which a strong leader can make decisions without interference from the legislature and judiciary. This political trajectory is evident in countries where executives have extended or consolidated their power in recent years, such as the Philippines, Russia, and Turkey. The overpowering executive demonstrates a weakening of the system of checks and balance that is inherent in representative democracy. In the case of the Philippines, the survey finds that half of the population is favorably inclined towards strongman rule.   The Drug War After being elected president of the Philippines in May 2016, Duterte delivered on his campaign promise to wage a drug war. He offered bounties for the bodies of drug dealers and guaranteed the police that they would be shielded from prosecution. From 2016 to 2018, around 4,500 people were killed either in police operations or suspected vigilantism. The killings sparked widespread condemnation from the United Nations and other international human rights organizations. Chris Beyrer, Professor of Public Health and Human Rights at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and an expert on the health implications of drug policy, registered his protest that “this is not the rule of law. People are being killed on the accusation or presumption that they are involved in the drug trade: that is a recipe for vigilante violence.” In 2003, a similar policy action was pursued in Thailand through Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s war on drugs where more than 2,400 extra-judicial deaths were registered.   Social Media as a Battlefield Cyberspace has evolved into a battlefield for political engagement and contestation. Aside from official government sites, many cyber-troop teams manage fictitious accounts to cloak their identities and interests. This phenomenon is also depicted as a form of astroturfing where the identity of a sponsor or organization is depicted in terms of grassroots activism (Howard, 2003). In many cases, these fake accounts are bots that refer to bits of code that are programmed to connect with and imitate human users. Media reports indicate that bots have been widely utilized by state actors around the world. These include Argentina, Azerbaijan, Iran, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela, and the Philippines. These bots are usually deployed to inundate social media networks with spam and fake news. However, not all governments make use of this type of automation.   The Rising Tide of Populism Globalization has had mixed effects, producing winners and losers. It has been pointed out that globalization benefited exporters, transnational corporations, international banks, and the professional sectors that thrive in bigger markets. In China, millions of farmers made the transition from farmers to workers in the export-led manufacturing industry. On the other hand, globalization also deepened the rifts that divide capital and labor, urban and rural areas, sunrise and sunset industries, mobile professionals and local producers, and elites and ordinary people (Rodrik 2018).   Erosion of Independent Institutions Populism can use an electoral mandate to decimate independent institutions that are considered bedrocks of liberal democracies like the courts and the free media. Populism might lead to political tribalism, which derails civil discourse and prevents political consensus. The substitution of global democratic norms with authoritarian practices would mean more elections in which the incumbent’s success is a matter of course. It would lead to more media spaces that are flooded by propaganda mouthpieces that sideline the opposition while presenting the ruler as omnipotent, tough, and committed to the welfare of the nation. It would mean state control over the Internet and social media through both censorship and active manipulation that promotes pro-regime messages.   Silencing Critics Critics of the Duterte presidency have been silenced either through detention, removal from office, or the use of public derision. In September 2018, President Duterte said in a speech before the Filipino community in Jordan that detained Senator Leila de Lima is not a prisoner of conscience. He maintained that De Lima is involved in the illegal drug trade and is not politically persecuted. The senator has been detained in the PNP Custodial Center since February 2017 on charges that she benefited from the drug trade in the New Bilibid Prison during her tenure as Justice Secretary under the Aquino administration. De Lima is a staunch critic of Duterte of the President's anti-drug war. She has petitioned a Muntinlupa City court to disqualify thirteen convicts as witnesses in the drug charges she is facing. The inmates do not qualify as witnesses since they have been convicted of drug trafficking, murder, homicide, kidnapping and robbery. De Lima argued that witnesses who are convicted of crimes with moral turpitude violate the law on state witnesses.   Marginalizing the Opposition Using an institutional theoretical lens, this study considered how weak institutions aided the rise of contemporary populism. Institutions are conceived as enduring rules and organized practices located in structures of meaning and resources. Political parties play a crucial role in fostering democratic linkage. They are the agents of representation in contemporary democratic systems. Substantive representation requires consistency between the policy preferences of voters and the policy positions that political parties adopt. In addition, it is also important that political parties listen to their voters with regard to the policy issues they emphasize in democratic societies.   Conclusion Populism has always been around in the Philippines. Its presence is heightened or muted based on the confluence of actors and events that affect the political system. The framers of the 1987 Philippine Constitution sought to establish the foundations of a representative democracy that would bar the return of authoritarianism. Hence, the fundamental law is replete with features to ensure a system of competitive elections; checks and balances among the executive, legislature, and judiciary; respect for civil and political rights; and independent oversight agencies that promote accountability. However, there is a wide disparity between what is envisioned under the democratic Constitution and the actual exercise of democracy. The democratic gap lies in the failure to set up strong institutions to make representation work for the people.     Author’s Biography Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the second publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Chin-en Wu and Dr. Yun-han Chu, associate research fellow and distinguished research fellow of Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica explore populist movements in Taiwan. In their discussion, Dr. Wu and Dr. Chu analyze Taiwanese populist organizations and the environment that has contributed to their rise. In doing so, they argue that the “bottom-up model” of Taiwan is largely a “rejection” of the pro-mainland establishment and its attempts to “weaken Taiwan’s democracy.” They also add that the movement has room for improvement as they have not yet made “significant contributions to Taiwan’s political and social development.” In conclusion, Dr. Wu and Dr. Chu suggest that a “broad and inclusive definition of ‘the people’ is a better approach for the health of democracy.”     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   During President Ma’s terms, a series of social protests took place in Taiwan. These movements disapproved of the way the KMT was handling cross-strait relations, economic development, social justice, and environmental management. It is widely conceived among civil society organizations that the KMT, domestic big business, and multinational companies constitute a power bloc that rigs the economy and weakens Taiwan's democracy. The direct political results of these anti-establishment social movements were the creation of the White Force (WF) and the New Power Party (NPP). The leaders of both forces are political novices and opinion leaders of the social movements. These two political forces tend to assert a Manichean dualism of the corrupt elite and the pure masses.   Literature Review Mudde and Mudde and Kaltwasser consider populism a thin-centered ideology whose core idea is that a society consists of the pure and common people and the corrupt elite. The populist leaders claim that they represent the general will of the people rather than the special interests of the elite. Because of the thin ideology, populism is compatible with different ideologies and in different historical and geographical economic contexts. Weyland defines populism as a political strategy in which political leaders argue that they directly represent the will of the people. The relationship between the populist leaders and the common people is less institutionalized and more fluid. Thus, political movements that clearly make the distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite and that claim to represent the interests of the ordinary people are often labeled as populist. Moreover, because populism condemns the corruption and ineffectiveness of representative systems, they emphasize the importance of a direct relationship between leaders and the people. Thus, populists endorse many forms of direct democracy.   Populists and Their Demands Who Are the Populists? During President Ma’s terms in office, a series of social protests took place in Taiwan. Civil society organizations (CSOs) disapproved of the ruling KMT elites and their policies. These social movements railed against the coalition of the KMT, big business, and the model of economic development. The KMT government denoted an old regime that is politically, socially, and economically conservative. CSOs and the young generation tend to embrace progressive values and perceive the KMT’s policies as putting too much emphasis on economic growth and paying too little attention to distributive justice and environmental protection. The KMT governed Taiwan for seventy years, except for the short period between 2000 and 2008. Many members of CSOs fought for Taiwan’s democratic transition in the past, and so they do not like the KMT, especially the authoritarian legacy the present-day party inherited, such as the huge party assets and its close relationship with local factions. In addition, CSOs demand open government and greater civic participation in the government decision-making process. Moreover, they are uneasy with the closer economic relationship between Taiwan and China and the official interactions between the two sides. It is perceived that the KMT’s economic policies rely too heavily on the Chinese market. It is widely conceived in civil society that the KMT and big business groups, which invest heavily in China, form a coalition that rigs the economy and even tries to weaken Taiwan's vibrant democracy. The CSOs care about freedom and democracy and have a low level of trust in the KMT government, meaning they worry about the political implications of Taiwan’s economy increasingly relying on the Chinese market. A typical observation is that the big conglomerates monopolize local and cross-strait business, depriving ordinary people and the young generation of economic opportunities.   The Populist Issues and Agendas The social movements focus on a wide variety of social issues, ranging from ecology, distributive justice, human rights protection, judicial reform, and China's encroachment. They are based on many progressive social values or the so-called post-material values, and tend to embrace liberal democratic values. All of these movements disapprove of the way the KMT has handled cross-strait management, economic development, distributive justice, and environmental management. To a different degree, they also declare a Manichean dualism of corrupt elites and pure masses and perceive a failure of representative democracy. They focus individually on one particular social issue while in many cases expressing support for each other. These CSOs are independent and are not officially affiliated with any political party. They undertake a variety of direct actions such as marching, sit-ins, petitions, boycotts, and staging protests against the government and, in some cases, companies.   Absorbed into the Existing Political System Both the NPP and the WF participate in elections and remain independent from the main political parties. The strong discontent against the ruling elites during President Ma’s second term contributed to the victory of the DPP, and the growth of the NPP and the WF. The DPP did not nominate candidates in those districts where the NPP nominated candidates, helping them win several seats. The NPP gained 6.11 percent of the votes and five seats from the total of 113 in the 2016 parliamentary elections, quickly becoming the third-largest party in the legislature. The main supporters of the two movements tend to be young people, liberal-minded people, and people who favor Taiwan’s independence or maintaining the status quo. Mayor Ko enjoyed quite high approval ratings in the first half of his term, especially among younger voters, although his approval ratings did decline in the second half. Ko received 57 percent of the vote in the 2014 Taipei mayoral elections, but only received 41 percent in the 2018 elections. Meanwhile, the NPP’s approval rating dropped from 14 percent in 2016 to 6 percent in late 2017.   Causes of the Rise of Populism Economic Reasons The first important underlying cause of the anti-establishment movement is that Taiwan’s economy has passed the high-income threshold. In the wake of globalization, manufacturing companies have moved to developing countries with abundant sources of labor, cheap land, and poor environmental regulations. Globalization benefits the people in developing countries and the skilled workers and elites in wealthy countries. Therefore, the working class and a significant portion of the middle class have “lost confidence in mainstream parties and established institutions.” Given this situation, some politicians have begun to blame developing countries for causing their economic problems. Along with rising globalization and advances in production automation, income inequality and unemployment rates in Taiwan have increased. The household income survey indicates that the country’s Gini coefficient was 0.337 in 2015. This number is roughly equal to those of Japan and South Korea and much lower than those of Hong Kong and Singapore. However, pre-redistribution incomes show that income inequality is becoming a serious problem in Taiwan. Moreover, overtime income inequality has also worsened. The income ratio of the fifth to ninety-fifth percentile was 1:33 in 1998, but rose to an alarming 1:99 in 2014. Compared to other major industrialized countries, Taiwan’s tax rates are relatively low, making it difficult to correct the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity.   Political Issues On the other hand, the KMT still has some lingering authoritarian legacies. First, it still has huge party assets, which unlevels the playing field of elections. In each election, the KMT can easily outspend its rivals by transferring some of the party’s assets to finance the campaign. Next, the KMT tends to nominate candidates who are the children of prominent former government and party leaders. In primaries, the party leaders favor combining registered party member votes and district-wide opinion polling rather than solely relying on the latter. Under this mechanism, the party leaders can easily influence how registered party members vote. In addition, the KMT works comparatively more closely with local factions, and nominates people with criminal records. Related to this, a higher percentage of its candidates or vote brokers are prosecuted in legislative and local elections for vote buying. Finally, the KMT is reluctant to deal with some aspects of the historical interpretation and inheritance of its authoritarian past. These issues include releasing political archives, erasing authoritarian symbols, and addressing its party assets.   The China Factor The Blue-Green divide has been the main theme of Taiwan’s political development since 2000. Both camps fiercely compete to gain control of the state apparatus so that they can control the pace and direction of the cross-strait economic and political relationship. After 2008, President Ma’s administration sought a closer economic relationship with China. His government sequentially introduced direct air, sea, and postal links with mainland China, opened the door to mainland Chinese tourists, lifted the ban on inbound investment by mainland Chinese firms, and loosened the 40 percent cap on mainland-bound investment by listed companies. There is a strong sentiment among the opposition that cross-strait economic integration may eventually aggravate Taiwan’s economic vulnerability, facilitate Beijing’s political infiltration into Taiwanese society, and lead to the erosion of Taiwan’s autonomy. On the political side, President Ma embraced the “One China, Two Interpretations” policy, or the so-called 1992 Consensus. The Pan-Green camp believes the one-China policy constrains Taiwan’s international space. This social divide has historical roots, but the China factor plays a decisive role in aggravating it. The China factor includes the rising political and military power of China and the tightening controls initiated during President Xi’s term. Mainland China policies pursued by President Ma to encourage cross-strait economic integration further exacerbated the social divide.   The Influence of Populism upon Democracy Contributions of the Populist Movement As the literature has shown, the main threat of the top-down model of populist movements is that political leaders endorse democracy but not liberal democracy. The political elite tend to distrust representative democracy and the idea of checks and balances. In contrast, Taiwan’s populism is formed by autonomous civil society organizations which have launched several social movements. These movements have over time given rise to new political forces: the White Force and the NPP. As a bottom-up model of populism, Taiwan’s populism does not pose a threat to liberal democracy. All parties in Taiwan firmly believe in the superiority of democracy and embrace democratic principles. The KMT, the DPP, the WF, and the NPP have no intention of interrupting existing democratic norms. Both the NPP and the WF were absorbed into the existing political system by participating in elections and following democratic rules. At the individual level, as discussed above, popular support for liberal democracy in Taiwan is very high compared to other East Asian countries. Most populist supporters in Taiwan are liberal value holders and more likely to believe in the superiority of democracy. It is the threat from a closer KMT-Beijing relationship that sparks their fears. This movement in part aims to protect Taiwan’s democracy by forcing the government not to make deals with the communist regime and to pass the Supervision Act to regulate future trade negotiations. Those who strongly believe in liberal democratic values tend to feel the threat most forcibly. They ask for direct democracy and strong supervision of the government. In addition, a liberal orientation is also associated with a greater emphasis on equality and environmental protection. The populist issues essentially are associated with protecting and deepening democracy, so this movement is unlikely to damage democracy.   Potential Negative Influence This populist movement, however, also has some potential negative impacts on the functioning and governance of Taiwan’s democracy. These impacts include interference with the functioning of representative democracy, constraints on the profession of technocrats, and the oversimplification of certain problems, which we will discuss in turn. Because the newly revisited referendum law lowers the quorum requirement, ten referendum cases were voted upon in the 2018 local elections. This number is simply too high for people to understand, digest, and ultimately make decisions on. Moreover, such cases are proposed, deliberated, and voted upon within just two months. The current practice of direct democracy does not allow thorough social deliberation as can be seen in some matured democracies. Taiwan is a divided society with different national identities and views of the cross-strait political and economic relationship. Referendum questions often carry a dichotomous message and provide less room for compromise. For these identity-related issues, it might be better to deliberate and make compromises in representative institutions. Finally, the amended referendum law removes the power of the referendum reviewing committee, making it unable to check whether an initiative violates the constitution or confirm that its wording is understandable. The current referendum practice is an interesting experiment, but the institution needs to be carefully modified.   Conclusion Taiwan features a bottom-up model of populism. Taiwan’s populist movement is organized by autonomous civil society organizations. This movement has given rise to new political forces, the White Force and the New Power Party. The movement rejects the KMT’s handling of cross-strait management, economic development, distributive justice, and environmental management. It is widely believed among civil society that the KMT, domestic big business, and Taiwanese companies that invest heavily in China form a coalition that has rigged the economy and is trying to weaken Taiwan's democracy. Civil society organizations have staged several large-scale protests and were able to successfully block several government policies. As a bottom-up model, this movement has helped introduce several political reforms to level the political playing field and increase civic participation in decision making. In addition, a unique feature of Taiwan’s populism is that this movement in large part stems from fears over a close economic relationship between a small democracy and a great authoritarian power. Some of those who feel the threat most strongly are those who are liberal-minded. They seek to protect Taiwan’s democracy by forcing the government not to make any deals with a communist government. Popular support for liberal democracy is also high in Taiwan. The source of the populist movement and its bottom-up characteristics mean that this movement is unlikely to influence the stability of the country’s democracy. Instead, this movement has in the past few years made significant contributions to Taiwan’s political and social development. This populist movement, however, also has some potential negative impacts on the functioning and governance of democracy. These related issues include the functioning of representative democracy, technocratic governance, and oversimplification of the true problems.     Author’s Biography   Chin-en Wu is the associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Michigan. His main research interest includes the impact of economic development on political regime dynamics and how regime type influences economic performance. Yun-han Chu is Distinguished Research Fellow of Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University. He serves concurrently as president of Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. Professor Chu received his Ph. D. in political science from the University of Minnesota and joined the faculty of National Taiwan University in 1987.  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note To start ADRN special working paper series on populism in Asia, EAI is publishing the South Korean case, written by Dr. Sook Jong Lee, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University and Former president of the East Asia Institute. Throughout this paper, Dr. Lee reviews and analyzes the issue of populism in the case of South Korea, and highlights specific cases of popular protests and populist politics to discuss the uniqueness of the Korean populism and its impacts on the country's democracy. She argues that the South Korean populism is not the same as that of Europe and South America, where charismatic populists and majority rule remain dominant. Yet it does share many core elements of populism in the following ways: anti-elitism that grants decisions of the plebiscite more legitimacy than those of the elite; a political discourse centered on moral grounds; and a movement that is largely flamed by rising economic inequality. What makes populism in South Korea unique, she suggests, is that “South Korea’s vertical populism can largely be characterized as ‘tamed populism’ with more positive than negative results” compared to most populist movements in Western democracies.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   The rise of populism throughout the world has drawn much attention. Rightist populism in advanced economies, including many European countries and the US in particular, has alarmed democracy researchers. Foa and Mounk have coined the phrase “deconsolidation of democracy” to describe the dangerous trend of declining support for democracy in the US. Many scholars have attributed the difficulties of governing to economic decline and divisive migration issues, and they argue that poor government performance in dealing with these issues has delegitimized many democracies. Regardless of whether we characterize the situation as a more sustained decline or merely a temporary setback, the current crisis of democracy in the West is not only threatening democracy at home but also contributing to a global downturn of democracy. Domestically, populist protests and the successful entry of populist parties into legislatures are undermining the political stability of European democracies. Trumpism has transformed already polarized American politics into tribalism, with members of opposite sides treating their opponents as enemies. This rightist populism is antagonistic to transnational institutions as well as international rules and norms. As politically disrupted democracies fail to actively promote the liberal international order, authoritarian states have become emboldened in breaking international rules and expanding their influence, and Western democracies have ceased to make unified efforts to support democracy throughout the world.   Concepts and Functions of Populism While populism has been discussed avidly over the last decade, the concept of populism is quite messy in terms of its degree of applicability to diverse forms of political mobilization. According to Kaltwasser et al., the term populism was first used to describe the nineteenth century political movement that spanned both sides of the Atlantic and later emerged in Latin America in the early twentieth century. Kaltwasser et al. state that scholarship on populism began to expand in the 1950s, with research increasing greatly during and after the 1990s. Populism became a pejorative term understood to mean political decay. However, the history of populist movements and even the diversity found in contemporary populism defy this negative description. Populism usually damages established political institutions, but at the same time, it can lead to further democratization of governing systems. Therefore, it seems to be more productive to approach populism without prior judgement and to examine its context and impacts.   The Case of South Korea South Korean politics do not necessarily merit the label of populism per se if one employs a populist model based solely on the experiences of European or Latin American societies. There have been neither clear economic divides nor ethnic or other cultural divides that have led to explosive popular protests or movements. “Populism” has a negative connotation in South Korea, and is usually applied to irresponsible public policies which waste taxpayer money. Politicians often attack one another by charging that their position is populist. Although the government and political parties in South Korea certainly engage in populist redistributive politics, the degree to which they do so is not excessive. What is distinctive about South Korea is its vertical structure of political populism from both below and above. For the operational definition of populism in the Korean context, I will define populism as “politics expressing the popular will of the people both by the people and by the leaders.” South Korean populist politics can be led by people mobilized from below and they can also be maneuvered by the powerful. Since populism is used as a neutral term, its impact on the quality of Korean democracy differs depending on the situation.   Popular Protests from Below Like many other democracies, Korean society is also plagued by rising inequality. People are anxious and extremely sensitive to the perceived lack of social mobility. They also view their society as ridden with high levels of social conflict; between the rich and poor, employers and employees, conservatives and progressives, older and younger generations, men and women, and so on. There are growing populist attitudes among South Koreans as they lose patience with their political system and become more prone to take to the streets to protest. Beetham argues there are three dimensions necessary to deem power as legitimate: conformity to rules that have legal validity, the presence of justifiable rules in terms of shared beliefs, and legitimation through expressed consent. Rules are upheld not just for their impartial application but also for their end result improving welfare and embodying social justice. In Korean society, the justifiability of rules is often challenged since many people believe that the rich and powerful can bend them as they please. This sense of injustice exists as the undercurrent of resentment against the hereditarily privileged class such as chaebol families. Chaebols are conglomerates controlled by a founding family and passed from one generation to another. These economically powerful conglomerates have repeatedly colluded with government and political leaders who have the regulatory power to influence their businesses.   The SOFA Revision Candlelight Protests Following the outbreak of the Korean War and subsequent influx of American soldiers, the Korean government signed a new wartime Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the US Military Tribunal over crimes committed by US troops on Korean soil. This unequal SOFA was modified through a series of revisions in 1967, 1991, and 2001 in order to put South Korea and the US on more equal footing. While South Korea had jurisdiction over most crimes committed by American soldiers while off duty, crimes committed while on duty were handed over to the US military for adjudication.   The Mad Cow Disease Candlelight Protests The so-called “mad cow disease candlelight protests” bear more populist features than the SOFA protests described above. On April 18 2008, the Lee Myung-bak government struck a deal with the US to lower the inspection criteria for imported American beef. It was agreed that nearly all parts of American beef from cows aged less than thirty months would be imported without inspections, while the import of specified risky portions of beef from cows aged thirty months and over would be inspected. Students, mothers with young babies, consumers, and people from all walks of life took to the streets to voice their opposition to this decision. Candlelight protests continued for more than two months, subdued only after the government renegotiated the beef import deal with the American government, and the presidential aids in the Blue House were reshuffled after taking the blame for the unpopular policy. The media report broadcast by MBC on the program “PD Diary,” which discussed the potential dangers of American cows with this disease, contributed to the ignition of public fear. Rumors and unscientific claims went viral. Public officials and some doctors tried to assuage the baseless fears of the public, but were no match for those who believed the fake news.   The Choi Soon-sil Gate and Park Impeachment Candlelight Protests The so-called Choi Soon-sil Gate was unique compared to other South Korean government corruption cases in the past. Its impact was huge, leading to the unprecedented impeachment of incumbent President Park Geun-hye. The candlelight protests lasted from October of 2016 to March 2017, which drew the biggest number of people onto the streets. The protests were able to avoid descending into violence despite their massive scale and long duration. The story began in late July 2016 when TV Chosun reported suspicious Blue House involvement in the raising of funds to establish the Mir and K Sports Foundations. It was Hankyoreh News that revealed Choi Soon-sil as President Park’s close confidante and exposed her involvement in the fundraising process for these two foundations. The report quickly drew public attention to this previously unknown woman, which exploded as media outlets competed to bring to light stories about the relationship between Choi and President Park. Whether the stories were true or not, a significant number of people who used to support Park began to turn their backs on her. How could Choi, a private citizen, intervene in government affairs using her close ties with the aloof President? The very idea was enough to anger the public. When it was exposed that Choi had used her money to gain admission for her daughter to a prestigious university, Choi became the embodiment of the corrupt rich in the public eye. Cable TV outlet JTBC reported on October 24 that they had discovered Choi’s tablet PC, which became the smoking gun of her involvement in the fundraising scandal. This prompted people to hold candles on streets in an expression of their anger over the injustice. The first protest on October 29 drew several thousand people, and later protests grew to a crowd of more than one million. One estimate stated that about sixteen million people participated in the twenty total candlelight protests. The protests soon developed into a movement calling for Park’s impeachment. Faced with this popular pressure, the legislature voted to impeach on December 9, 2016, a parliamentary decision that was upheld by the Constitutional Court on March 10, 2017. Progressive civil society organizations and labor unions provided leadership, but spontaneous grassroots participation was the key to sustaining the peaceful popular protests.   Populist Politics from the Top The Politics of Eradicating “Accumulated Evils” The current Moon Jae-in administration was launched in May 2017 after presidential elections were held seven months early following the impeachment of former President Park. After winning the election as an extension of the reform-driven candlelight movement, the Moon administration launched a political drive to eradicate the wrongdoings of previous governments. Dubbing them “accumulated evils,” public investigations were launched into a number of cases involving former high-ranking public officials. A series of prosecutorial investigations have been widely criticized by conservative media as political reprisals, while progressive outlets have praised them as long overdue. Following her impeachment, Park was imprisoned on March 31, 2017, and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison and a fine of twenty billion KRW (approximately eighteen million USD) by the higher court on August 24, 2018. The majority of the public did not view the ruling as unfair, although legal controversy has remained over the bribery of a third party, i.e., Choi, by conglomerates under Park’s influence. The drive to “root out accumulated evils” also reopened the bribery case of another former president. On September 6, 2017, the court sentenced former President Lee Myung-bak to twenty years in prison and a fine of fifteen billion KRW (approximately fourteen million USD) for taking bribes, taking money from a company he had denied ownership of, and other similar crimes. He was imprisoned on March 24 2018 and released shortly thereafter on bail. The unfortunate imprisonments did not stop with these two presidents. Former public officials who had been involved in several controversial policies were also investigated and charged. Some deserved this, but others did not.   Conclusion In this paper, I argue that it is difficult to categorize South Korean politics as the type of populism typically found in Latin America or Europe. There have been no signs of charismatic populist leaders or parties. There is no such conspicuous horizontal populism wherein the majority rules over the minority within society. Radical rightists and leftists alike treat each other as enemies, and achieving political compromise between them is nearly impossible. Nevertheless, this chasm does not form a horizontal structure of populism since both groups are part of mainstream society. On the other hand, South Korea shares the essential element of anti-elite populism where the decisions of the plebiscite have more legitimacy than decisions made by the elite, and political discourse is centered on moral debates of right and wrong. Major public decisions need to be legitimized by popular support, which causes political leaders to seek more direct ties and emotional rapport with their supporters. Korean populism is primarily vertical, flowing in both directions between the government and the people.     Author’s Biography Sook Jong Lee is the professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University and former president of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about 19 research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Introduction Myanmar is now in democratic transition. Historically, women's participation in politics is weak in Myanmar. Since independence, a limited number of women have taken decision-making and leading roles. Military dominance in politics explains why Myanmar's politics are so heavily dominated by men. Gender stereotypes are culturally deeply embedded. The majority of the population, including women themselves, accepts these culturally dictated gender roles. According to the 2014 Myanmar census, women are over 51% of the population in Myanmar and over 52% of people who can work are women. However, about 50% of women in that group are unemployed. As a training and research institute, Sandhi Governance Institute aims to understand the realities of women in the community, such as the current economic and social situations of young women, the relationships between education levels and social standards as well as economic opportunities in different areas of the country. In other words, Sandhi is exploring issues and opportunities for the empowerment of young women (between the ages of 18 to 35) who are potential leaders both in the political and the development sectors of the country. Thus, research on issues and opportunities for young women's empowerment was conducted by the training participants of Sandhi's women's leadership training for young women (from 18 to 35 years old) program. These participants come from political parties and civil society organizations and through this research they sought to understand how things are going with young women in their places of origin. In assessing the current situation, participants also looked for ways the young women in these communities can be empowered effectively, either by themselves or by local and international organizations as well as the government. This empowerment will contribute to the economic development of Myanmar in the country's transition to democracy. It is expected that this report, which reviews the findings on the current situations of young women in Myanmar and offers recommendations for how to empower them, can be instrumental for policy makers as well as international and local organizations that are interested in providing effective and substantive support to empower young women in Myanmar.   Author Sandhi Governance Institute was founded by two public policy graduates in 2007 and it was registered as private consultancy firm in 2008. Since that time, it has been conducting various development, governance, public policy and political trainings. In addition, it also carries out research on youth and employment opportunities, political parties and civil society.    

.article_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px; } Introduction On July 25, 2018, Pakistan witnessed its 11th General Election (GE) to the National and four Provincial Assemblies. According to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the overall voter turnout across the country stood at 51.7 per cent which was a drop of 3 percentage points from the 10th General Election held in May 2013 when the voter turnout was recorded as 55.02 per cent. Through the 11th General Election held on July 25, 2018 in Pakistan, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has formed Government in the Centre and the Provinces of Punjab, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and is part of the coalition Government in Balochistan while it has joined Opposition in Sindh where Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) has formed Government. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz is the principal opposition party in the Centre and in Punjab. While the PTI, unlike its counterpart parties, namely the PML-N and the PPP, has formed the Federal Government for the first time in Pakistan, the 15th National Assembly, reportedly, has as many as 41% of its members elected for the first time.  

.article_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px; } Introduction Systematic attack and violence against religious minorities and indigenous people were widespread before, during and after the Parliamentary election in 2001 by right-wing religious groups in Bangladesh. As a result, past incidents created growing fear that the 11th Parliamentary Elections scheduled to be held in December 2018 will incite a fresh round of persecution. Several Ministers have already expressed apprehension that the Hindu community might be targeted ahead of this year’s elections, while leaders of religious minority communities have urged the government to ensure the safety of minority communities. Foreign diplomats have already become active in preventing another round of communal violence during the upcoming national elections in Bangladesh. An Indian journalist said the role of Hindu voters will be crucial in the elections.    

Introduction  The State of Democracy in Asia Report aims to evaluate the current state of democracy in this dynamically growing region by providing perspectives and insights from Asian experts. The report investigates pressing, contemporary issues such as: Is democracy in Asia really receding? In what areas has democracy tangibly improved? How can democracy be strengthened?  Drawing on a rich array of resources and data, this report offers country-specific analysis, highlights areas of improvement, strengths and vulnerabilities to provide a snapshot of the state of democracy in Asia today.    Quotes from the Paper  “It is important to remember that democracy is a process, not an end goal in itself, and South Korea is still marching down the path toward deepening the quality of democracy. This report pinpoints those components of democracy that are currently at risk owing to global trends and governance, providing policymakers, academics, and citizens alike with a comprehensive assessment and guide for the future.” – East Asia Institute “Democratic governance has been strengthened by a functioning political system. The executive and judiciary have been strong and continue to contribute to the strengthening of the democratic fabric of the country. Challenges remain with regard to overcoming exclusions in society, the polity, and the economy. The full realization of citizenship rights for women, Dalits, tribal members, and minorities continues to be problematic” - Society for Participatory Research in Asia “Since the reformation in 1998, Indonesia’s democratization process has expanded and deepened in many ways. Indonesia’s democracy can be argued to be one of the most stable and solidly progressing in the region. (…) The biggest challenges stem from two major issues. The first is rampant corruption and the second is the problem of identity politics, or the politicization of religious and ethnic issues.” – Centre for Strategic and International Studies Indonesia “The Geron NPO (…) has conducted a questionnaire survey of Japanese intellectuals as part of its preparations. (…) A nearly identical 47% replied that democracy is “not functioning appropriately” and “somewhat not functioning appropriately.” (…) Among a host of replies, 46% said that “winning elections is the primary concern and politicians are not squarely facing their tasks,” and 40% pointed out the “inability of journalism (or media organizations) to serve as a watchdog over politics and a provider of venues for sound debate.” – Genron NPO “The year 2015 was the 25th anniversary of Mongolia’s first multiparty universal elections, and it was the year in which Mongolian democracy reached adulthood. (…) However, twenty-five years represents only about 1% of Mongolia’s over two millennia of statehood. For a nation whose monarchy had lasted so long and who had experienced 70 years of communist rule, democratization was a giant leap.” – Academy of Political Education “While effecting significant change in two national elections in 2015, Sri Lanka faces the both daunting and exciting prospect of restoring governance to all of its peoples with meaningful reconciliation and unity. From constitutional reform to transitional justice and fundamental economic reforms, a host of challenges created and sustained by systemic defects as well as the bad governance and criminality of successive governments must be overcome.” – Centre for Policy Alternatives “Democracy in Taiwan performs quite well in various aspects including free elections, the rule of law, freedom of the press, political participation, anti-corruption, and the protection of minority rights. There are some aspects where the functioning of democracy can be improved. The first one concerns the legacy of the authoritarian regime. (…) The second aspect concerns democratic values, which are an important but often omitted issue. (…) The third issue concerns political polarization.” – Asian Barometer & Academia Sinica “Thailand is among many countries that oscillate between democratic and non-democratic governance. Absolute monarchy ended in 1932 and Thailand became a constitutional monarchy with a Prime Minister as the head of the government and a hereditary monarch as the head of state. However, democratic transition is ongoing and has yet to be consolidated.” – King Prajadhipok’s Institute   Authors  Various researchers from East Asia Institute, Society for Participatory Research in Asia, Centre for Strategic and International Studies Indonesia, Genron NPO, Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs, Academy of Political Education, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Asian Barometer & Academia Sinica, and King Prajadhipok’s Institute contributed to the research and writing of each report.