EAI launched the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) in November 2013 to conduct research related to democratic governance and human rights promotion in Asia. EAI serves as a representative of domestic think tanks and leads the organization of regional think tanks in Asia. It is responsible for supporting and managing research related to democracy at associated research institutes. ADRN was established to analyze threats to democracy in Asia and to promote discussions and practical research projects that could contribute to the consolidation of democracy in the region. Aimed at presenting policies based on research, ADRN examines threats and challenges to democracy by identifying and studying practical agendas for developing regional democracy in Asia. The network includes 22 major think tanks from 14 Asian countries including Taiwan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines, as well as South Korea’s EAI. 

Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance: Indonesia’s Experience to Conquer COVID 19 Pandemic

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Responding to a national crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, entails an important challenge – how can policymakers ensure that policies guarantee the safety, health, and political rights of their citizens? While Indonesia’s early response to the COVID-19 pandemic entailed economic sacrifices and several repercussions, the government was able to overcome such challenges through its implementation of comprehensive policies encompassing public health, financial aid, and economic recovery plans. Sri Nuryanti, a researcher from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, explains how the Indonesian government’s successful initiatives, containing the COVID-19 pandemic with the least number of economic repercussions, led to higher level of trust and societal compliance. In this regard, the Indonesian government was not only able to curb the spread of COVID-19 through the implementation of task forces but also conjured economic recovery plans and provided aid and other types of assistance to minimize financial consequences. On top of that, national elections were held with strict health protocols, safeguarding citizens’ political rights.      ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction[1]   The first Indonesian citizen affected by the coronavirus was reported on March 2, 2020. During the early stage of the pandemic, people thought that the virus would fade away naturally with time. Therefore, Indonesia was already mid-pandemic when policies were applied to contain COVID-19. In the very beginning, Indonesia’s policies consisted of evacuating the Indonesian citizens from Wuhan, China and designating specific hospitals in Galang Island (Riau Islands province) to only treat COVID-19 patients. Hospitals also offered services to act as a facility to observe quarantine and shelter patients to control the spread of COVID-19 on Galang Island. New facilities that could hold 1,000 beds were also constructed and ready to use by April 6, 2020.[2] The policy above shows that the Indonesian government tried to counter the spread of the virus by treating the affected patients on a secluded island. Furthermore, the Indonesian government established a special team to accelerate the efforts to combat the spread of the coronavirus under the coordination of the BNPB (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana/ Indonesia National Board for Disaster Management). As creating a coordinated COVID-19 response between the government, ministerial departments, and other stakeholders was complicated and as new policy dilemmas emerged, maximizing efforts to control the pandemic was found to be challenging.[3] Bloomberg, a private financial, software, data, and media company based in the US, launched a report called the “Covid Resilience Ranking.” This report follows the development of the COVID-19 responses, fatality rate, number of infected cases and PCR tests completed for various countries. Reports are released every month, taking into account the social and economic disruptions. The report also gives an overview of the capacity of local health care systems, the impact of virus-related restrictions, and other COVID-19 related issues. From the Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, the dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic in many countries can be observed. This research utilized data that was published on December 2020.[4]   Figure 1. Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking Source: Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking (December 20, 2020) [5]   The Bloomberg resilience score indicates the resilience of the country, the higher the score, the higher the resilience. The Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking is a compilation of many datasets, indicators, and indexes that is based on three fundamental criteria: the comprehensiveness of the data, the recentness of the data, and the reputation of the data collectors. Therefore, the Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking is very useful in comparing the situation of the country amid the COVID-19 pandemic. From the data above, it is evident that democratic countries tend to have poorer performances compared with authoritarian countries. The US and India recorded low performances compared to authoritarian countries such as China and Vietnam which successfully combated the spread of the coronavirus. Hence, the question of whether democratic values are suitable for coping with the pandemic has been raised. Substantial evidence states that succeeding in containing COVID-19 with the least amount of disruption could lead to the development of high levels of trust and societal compliance. However, it is also important to note that the impact of the pandemic and the response of countries have been found to have a significant impact on the national economy. Indonesia, like other countries, is also facing common challenges. Therefore this study aims to form an explanation for the following research questions: 1) What are the challenges faced by Indonesia?; 2) What are the responses of the Public and Private Sector?; 3) How did COVID-19 change the behavior of the people?; 4) How did the COVID-19 Pandemic impact domestic and foreign policy? ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2]  Chandra Gian Asmara, “RS Galang untuk Covid-19 Beroperasi, Intip Fasilitasnya!” [Galang Hospital for Covid-19 Operates, Peek at the Facilities!], CNBC Indonesia, April 08 2020, (accessed in 21 December 2020). https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200408122625-4-150577/rs-galang-untuk-covid-19-beroperasi-intip-fasilitasnya [3] Agus Wibowo, “Arahan dan Strategi Ketua Gagus Tugas Penanganan Covid-19 untuk Pemerintah Daerah” [Directions and Strategies of the Chai of the Covid-19 Handling Task Force for Regional Governments], Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, March 17 2020, (accessed in 21 December 2020). https://bnpb.go.id/berita/arahan-dan-strategi-ketua-gugus-tugas-penanganan-covid19-untuk-pemerintah-daerah#:~:text=JAKARTA%20%2D%20Kepala%20Badan%20Nasional%20Penanggulangan,daerah%20untuk%20menerapkan%20beberapa%20poin. ( [4] Jinshan Hong, Rachel Chang and Kevin Varley, “Best and Worst Places to Be in Covid: Vaccine Not Slowing Deaths,” Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, December 20, 2020, (accessed on January 11th, 2021 at 10.35)https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/ . [5] Jinshan Hong, Rachel Chang and Kevin Varley, “Best and Worst Places to Be in Covid: Vaccine Not Slowing Deaths,” Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking, December 20, 2020, (accessed on January 11th, 2021 at 10.35)https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/ .     Sri Nuryanti is currently researcher at the Research Center for Politics at Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007-2012, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007-2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a council member of APPRA (Asia Pacific Peace Research Association) and IPRA (International Peace Research Association). She is also currently appointed as the Director in charge of the Electoral Research Institute (ERI).   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Sri Nuryanti 2021-04-12Views : 17159
Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Pandemic Governance in the Philippines: Democratic Recession and Corruption Risks

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note The outbreak of COVID-19 precipitated the emergence of various unprecedented variables for national governance. Prior to the pandemic, authoritarian rule under the Marcos regime in the Philippines had weakened institutional integrity, transparency, and accountability, increasing the leeway for the drastic economic decline during the final years of his command. Subsequent reforms over two decades earned the country a good sovereign credit rating and steady economic growth. However, institutional safeguards for transparent and accountable governance were yet insufficient for the appropriate response for the transfer of emergency authority and funds to the executive branch amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Adding onto existing studies claiming that established democracies show lower levels of corruption than authoritarian regimes, Francisco A. Magno of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance explores how weak democracies reflect a higher tendency to undergo corruption, a phenomenon that was evident in the Philippines amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. A weak institutional base led to the misuse of PhilHealth funds, diminished the nation’s performance of rule of law, eroded institutional constraints, and challenged the freedom of the press. While measures of a government-led task force and the civil society helped resuscitate democratic institutions, threats to democracy prevailed in the Philippines. The author claims that the revival of democratic institutions is crucial in fighting corruption both judiciously and systematically.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction[1]   Previous studies indicate that established democracies show lower levels of corruption than authoritarian regimes or young democracies.[2] In this regard, it is interesting to consider how authoritarian tendencies have diminished the role of democratic institutions and systems of checks and balances that control corruption. The outbreak of corruption scandals that accompanied the Corona Virus Disease (COVID)-19 health crisis in 2020 exemplifies how the democratic recession has negatively affected the state of public accountability in the Philippines. This study probes into whether the COVID-19 pandemic further promoted democratic recession and corruption in the Philippines. It examines the patterns of irregularities emerging from the implementation of public programs aimed at responding to the crisis. Poorly designed institutional arrangements and weak democratic controls foster opportunities for the commission of illicit transactions in the delivery of public goods and services. Finally, this study considers the importance of reviving democratic institutions as a key effort in fighting corruption on a long-term basis.  The eruption of the pandemic shed light on the severe corruption vulnerabilities in many countries. However, even before the pandemic, it was estimated that the loss of about 10 to 25 percent of a public contract’s value could be attributed to corruption.[3] Currently, over 7.8 trillion USD is allocated annually to public health globally.[4] With more public funds being made available to fight the pandemic, stronger safeguards are needed to prevent corruption. The COVID-19 pandemic was found to have hastened corruption. The potential for corruption in pandemic times is greater especially as pressures for swift government action may lead to shortcuts that damage the integrity of institutional processes. The main risk areas include the withholding of accurate health data, irregularities in public procurement, purchase of sub-standard equipment, and misappropriation of health budgets.[5] As the first case was to have been reported on November 17th, 2020 in Wuhan, China - a city in Hubei Province- the COVID-19 pandemic is acknowledged to have begun during this time. In the following weeks, cases of people infected with the virus piled up. However, the Chinese government hid health data and even reprimanded local doctors who warned of the new disease. It was not until December 31, 2019 that the government informed the World Health Organization (WHO) China Country Office on the existence of the fast-spreading virus. Such lack of transparency prevented health authorities over the world from taking preventive action and containing the transmission of the coronavirus across cities, nations, and borders.[6] ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] Ina Kubbe and Annika Engelbert, "Corruption and the impact of democracy." Crime, Law and Social Change 70, 2 (2018) 175-178. [3] UNODC, Guidebook on Anti-Corruption in Public Procurement and the Management of Public Finances. New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Guidebook_on_anti-corruption_in_public_procurement_and_the_management_of_public_finances.pdf (Accessed on October 18, 2013). [4] WHO, Global spending on health: A world in transition, WHO/HIS/HGF/HF Working Paper, No. 19.4, Geneva: World Health Organization (2019); https://www.who.int/health_financing/documents/health-expenditure-report-2019.pdf?ua=1 (Accessed on February 6, 2020). [5] Sarah Steingrüber, Presentation at the “25 years of fighting with the nation the perennial pandemic of corruption” Virtual Town Hall Discussion, Transparency International-Philippines and Stratbase ADR Institute, August 28 2020. [6] Sarah Steingrüber, Monica Kirya, David Jackson, and Saul Mullard, Corruption in the time of COVID-19: A double-threat for low-income Countries, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2020.     Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Francisco A. Magno 2021-04-12Views : 12216
Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Thailand

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note The unprecedented outbreak of COVID-19 stirred up substantial change in the socio-economic landscapes of most countries; Thailand has been no exception. While Thailand was swift to enact a lockdown after the declaration of a state of emergency throughout the country, the lockdown left several business sectors heavily affected, eventually prompting them to shut down and lay off workers. Additionally, the Thai healthcare system experienced a shortage of medical supplies and the lack of professional knowledge on the coronavirus spawned confusion. Subsequent measures to combat the pandemic and social chaos were taken by both the public and private sectors. Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Nuchaprapar Moksart from King Prajadhipok’s Institute, explain how the government decentralized and distributed power to local governments, provided financial aid, enforced 14-day quarantine measures, and enacted lockdown measures. Moreover, private companies made hefty donations and sought measures to adapt to the “new normal.” The authors also provide policy recommendations for the management of COVID-19. They state that the government should be held accountable, enforce laws to protect its citizens, innovate digital technology, and ensure the social and economic stability of its citizens, to name a few.      ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   1.Introduction[1]   At the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak spread panic throughout the world and since then, the virus has affected many countries. Thailand was one of the first countries to record a case of a COVID-19 infection outside of China after the outbreak in Wuhan, China. On January 13, 2020, the Thai Health Ministry confirmed the first COVID-19 cases in Thailand, which included two Chinese tourists from Wuhan. Thailand became the hub of the pandemic, prompting various countries to warn their citizens against traveling to Thailand. In response to COVID-19, the Thai government launched measures to control the rapid increase of new cases. The first measure was the Bangkok lockdown after Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha declared a state of emergency throughout the country. The lockdown period lasted for three months (March to June 2020) in an attempt to minimize transmission rates and reduce the number of new cases. The measures required people to stay at home in order to avoid infection, which resulted in several changes. For instance, people increasingly adopted and utilized digital platforms in their daily life, which was evident through the rapid increase in food delivery. The usage of online shopping, digital entertainment, digital payment, online learning, work-from-home policies, social distancing also increased during this period. In March 2020, the COVID-19 Situation Management Center was established by the cabinet to provide information and organize emergency measures to protect people from the pandemic[2]. Moreover, laws and regulations were implemented to manage the spread of COVID-19, such as the 14-day state quarantine for people entering the country, COVID-19 checkpoints, and the Thai Cha-na smartphone application to track people. However, methods that were implemented to control the outbreak had significant economic effects. After the lockdown measure, several business sectors were directly affected. Flights were banned from landing in Thailand and the tourism industry, which accounted for 15 percent of Thai GDP, disappeared. As a result, hotels, restaurants, and service sectors were immediately shut down. SMEs were no longer able to operate their businesses, leading to the laying off of a vast number of employees. Millions of people in Bangkok and several other provinces were left unemployed, lacked reserve money, and received no social support, therefore resulting in the return of many citizens to their hometowns. In response to the immediate economic impact, the government launched a 5000-baht allowance for 14 million people who had been financially affected by COVID-19. In addition, the Bank of Thailand created soft loans for business owners to help SMEs during the outbreak. The term “new normal” describes the new way of living for Thai society. Technology became an essential tool for people to communicate during the pandemic, and changes were made in response to COVID-19. This paper explores the challenges that Thailand faced amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the responses of the public and private sector, and how COVID-19 changed Thailand’s socio-economic landscape. The final section offers policy recommendations to cope with COVID-19. Moreover, trust-building, social safety nets, and law enforcement are also discussed.■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] Ministry of Public Health, “The setting of Covid 19-Situation Management Center,” Drug and Medical Supply Infomation Center, http://dmsic.moph.go.th/index/detail/8064 (accessed December 2 2020).     Thawilwadee Bureekul is the director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI)where she is involved in the planning, management, implementation, and coordination of the Institute’s research projects. In addition to her role at KPI, Dr. Bureekul is a professor at several universities in Thailand, including the Asian Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Burapha University, Mahidol University, and Silpakorn University. She succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and she was granted the “Woman of the Year 2017” award as a result.   Ratchawadee Sangmahamad is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes citizenship, gender, and election studies. She has published books such as Value Culture and Thermometer of Democracy (with Thawilwadee Bureekul), Thai Citizens: Democratic Civic Education (with Thawilwadee Bureekul and Eugenie Mario), and many articles.   Nuchaprapar Moksart is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes social policy and political economy theory. She also writes on socioeconomic issues.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Thawilwadee Bureekul , Ratchawadee Sangmahamad &Nuchaprapar Moksart 2021-04-12Views : 24360
Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] South Korea’s COVID-19 Pandemic Policy Optimization between Health and Economy

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Ranking 8th among participating countries for Bloomberg’s Covid Resilience Ranking, South Korea has been relatively successful in combating the COVID-19 pandemic. How have countries like South Korea effectively handled the pandemic, while some failed to do so? Jung Kim, Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, explores what factors are important in pandemic policy optimization. In responding to national crises, policymakers face trade-offs between health and the economy – should policies prioritize lives or livelihoods? He claims that contrary to common thought that social capital is the most decisive factor in national policy performance, social risk is actually more decisive during a time of crisis politics such as a pandemic. That is, the higher the level of social risk, the more likely the government will be able to facilitate large-scale collective action that induces voluntary civic compliance with government Nonpharmaceutical Interventions (NPI) policies. He further explains why some countries have succeeded in their response against the pandemic while some failed through a statistical analysis of the determinants of COVID-19 pandemic policy.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction[1]   How have policymakers and citizens responded to the COVID-19 pandemic policy trade-off between health and the economy? Why have some nations succeeded in minimizing the trade-off between protecting lives and protecting livelihoods, but not others? Why and how has South Korea outperformed most other advanced democracies in dealing with the trade-off?[2] Building on a growing literature that analyzes the trade-off between health and the economy  in designing and implementing national COVID-19 policy responses (Desierto and Koyama 2020; Cheibub, Hong, and Przeworski 2020; Ginsburg and Versteeg 2020), this study attempts to answer the above questions examining the case of South Korea with comparative perspective. This research argues that contra conventional wisdom that social capital is the explanans of variation of national pandemic policy performances, social risk is much more important to facilitate large-scale collective action, which is the political foundation of voluntary civic compliance with government non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) policy recommendation and ultimately successful pandemic policy optimization between health and the economy.  A simple theoretical framework of pandemic policy optimization will be introduced in the next section. The third describes a quarterly comparison of national policy responses across OECD countries in 2020. The following section provides statistical cross-country analyses on the determinants of pandemic policy optimization over time. ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second part will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] This study answers the first and second questions and leaves the third one to next round of this research project.     Jung Kim is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, South Korea. He teaches courses on International Relations in East Asia and Political Economy of the Two Koreas, among others. Prior to this, from 2009-2015, he was a Lecturer at the Underwood International College and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. During this time, Mr. Kim was also a Chief Researcher at The East Asia Institute. He pursued his Bachelors and Masters in Political Science at Korea University and went on to pursue his Ph.D. at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Jung Kim 2021-03-30Views : 11844
Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Japan`s COVID Responses: Democratic Measures but Weak Transparency

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note An observation of national responses to the COVID-19 pandemic among Asian countries shows that countries that have implemented democratic processes for pandemic policies have been more successful in handling the pandemic. Japan’s measures against the COVID-19 pandemic, undeniably, conformed to democratic processes and refrained from imposing extreme restrictions on civic liberties. Nonetheless, Japan’s pandemic policy, unlike that of South Korea and Taiwan, yielded limited success. Maiko Ichihara, associate professor at Hitotsubashi University, posits that the Japanese government failed to earn the trust of the public as not only were there inconsistencies among pandemic policies, but there were also no clear indications on the scientific grounds on which the policies were drafted. Additionally, contradictions among press conferences held by government officials and the lack of a single entity responsible for the dissemination of information at the government-level further weakened the public’s faith in the government. Such ambiguity, in fact, has not been limited to the government’s countermeasures to COVID-19, but has long been a prevalent issue. In this regard, the author underscores the pressing need for increased government transparency and accountability.       ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction[1]   In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Asia experienced the most prominent decline in liberal democracy of any region in the world. With extreme restrictions on freedom of movement through strict lockdown measures, repression of media freedom under the guise of combatting fake news and cracking down on criticism of the government, the decline of liberal democracy that we have observed over the past fifteen years has accelerated rapidly. Among Asian countries, the crisis of democracy is most pronounced in South and Southeast Asia,[2] while the Northeast Asian region has remained relatively stable. South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, have gained international respect for their democratic COVID-19 measures. The South Korean government implemented a COVID tracing system that, while not entirely problem-free, recognizes privacy rights and became a model for combatting COVID-19 as a democracy. In the case of Taiwan, there has been a strengthening rather than a decline of democracy, with increased cooperation between the civic tech community and the government. In terms of damage caused by the pandemic, there is a difference between the democratic countries in the subregions of Northeast Asia and Southeast/South Asia. India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, countries that have sought to contain COVID-19 by undermining democracy (by, for instance, enacting anti-fake-news laws to restrict media freedom and making examples of lockdown violators through inhumane treatment), have the highest number of COVID-19 cases in Asia. By contrast, Taiwan and South Korea, which implemented democratic COVID-19 control measures, succeeded in restraining the pandemic to a significant degree. This observation suggests that the degree of compliance with democratic processes may be correlated with the effectiveness of COVID-19 countermeasures. Such seems to be the case in other parts of the world as well: while countries with populist political leaders such as the United States, Brazil, and India have the highest number of COVID-19 cases, democracies with non-populist political leaders and high levels of trust in government such as Australia, Finland, Norway, and New Zealand have controlled the pandemic successfully.[3] Looking at Northeast Asia, it can be said that that Japan, like South Korea and Taiwan, is a democracy where populism is relatively well contained. However, unlike Taiwan and South Korea, Japan has not been internationally recognized for its COVID-19 response. This is because although Japan’s COVID countermeasures are relatively democratic, the government has not won the trust of the public due to the lack of transparency in the information distributed. ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second part will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] Joshua Kurtlantzick, “Addressing the Effect of COVID-19 on Democracy in South and Southeast Asia," Council on Foreign Relations Discussion Paper (November 2020). https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/dpkurlantzick-front-and-back-cover_final_0.pdf [3] Sebastian Strangio, “The Riddle of COVID-19 and Democracy in Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat (September 22, 2020). https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/the-riddle-of-covid-19-and-democracy-in-southeast-asia/?fbclid=IwAR0uA86wbYLmgE7M8fPY1Gby-QlTXsH9asILdq0NscsNQOizLm4K9t0EF2Y; Joshua Keating, “The Pandemic Threatened Global Democracy. Instead, It's Strengthened It,” SLATE (October 30, 2020). https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/10/covid-democracy-threat-stronger.html?fbclid=IwAR0uA86wbYLmgE7M8fPY1Gby-QlTXsH9asILdq0NscsNQOizLm4K9t0EF2Y; Robin Niblett and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Op-Ed: Why Democracies Do Better at Surviving Pandemics,” Los Angeles Times (May 26, 2020). https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-05-26/democracies-autocracies-coronavirus-pandemic-response?fbclid=IwAR3YNw2SI6roSixTbPSRxI7UM1ji8lY2UxAWbs_EZJZsxq56emO8MjQ_xsI     Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and a Visiting Scholar in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is also a co-chair of the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications include: “Universality to Plurality? Values in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberalism: Japan and the International Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017).   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Maiko Ichihara 2021-03-30Views : 11561
Working paper
[ADRN Working Paper] Global Pandemic: Challenges and Opportunities for Democracy in Mongolia

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Mongolia effectively manifested its capacity to swiftly respond to the COVID-19 pandemic as early as January 2020 by closing its Chinese borders. However, it has now become evident that the public bestows little faith in the government’s decision to transition the society into the “total readiness stage.” On one hand, measures taken by the Mongolian government during the COVID-19 pandemic abided by the principles of democratic governance and protected civil rights and freedom. However, the rather abrupt transition, along with the dissemination of inconsistent information and unclear regulations on day-to-day activities were more than enough to cast doubt upon the efficacy of the government. In this regard, Ariunbayar Bazarvaani, the CEO of The Academy of Political Education, and Bumdari Dagva-Ochir, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science of the National University of Mongolia, explore the factors that led to overall public distrust on the government and its capacity to set appropriate measures. Their results show that the Mongolian government’s responses, while adhering to democratic principles, were economically flawed and detrimental to the state budget. The transition into the “total readiness stage” also infringed on human rights. In addition, while the government’s regulations on media were an attempt to control fake news, it may have stifled the media and the freedom of expression.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction[1]   As countries around the world have begun to implement their own risk management policies, the World Health Organization (WHO) has declared COVID-19, the new infectious disease, a pandemic. According to article 11.2 and 11.3.3 of the Law on Disaster Protection, issued by the State Emergency Committee (SEC) on February 13, 2020, the “high level of readiness” against COVID-19 was partially initiated in Mongolia. This resolution was pursuant to Article 4, Resolution No. 62 of the February 12, 2020 Resolution of Government of Mongolia. [2]  The Law on Disaster Protection identifies and specifies the measures for three levels of readiness to combat the coronavirus: everyday level of readiness, high level of readiness and all-out level or readiness. In Mongolia, the first verified community transmission case was announced on November 11 and as suggested by the SEC, the government shifted country to the “Total Readiness Stage” on November 12. However, there was a strong sense of uncertainty and mistrust in Mongolian society regarding the transition to the “total readiness stage.” The Mongolian government declared the country to be at this level as the first week was filled with panic, with all decision changed daily and discrepancies in the information source. Mongolian citizens also became frustrated with the economic situation of businesses and individuals and the lack of clarity on how to regulate day-to-day activities. However, the ten months of high alert regulations set by the SEC did not yield substantive results. Therefore, this research aims to study the factors that contributed to the social atmosphere that doubts the viability of government and their ability make appropriate recommendations. The main goals of the research are the following: - To determine whether Mongolia has a political risk management system - To identify positive effects of quarantine on governance (the ability to differentiate between populist politicians and whether democratic governance can be more efficient in correcting decisions and information) - To identify Psycho-social features that are caused by quarantine and government decisions and their implementations (Psycho-social refers to the interrelationship of social factors and individual attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors). ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second part will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] ‘Disaster Protection Law’, Law of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar city, https://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/12458?Lawid=12458; ‘On transfer to the ready rate’, Article 4, Number 62, Resolution of the government of Mongolia, https://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/15081?Lawid=15081.     Bazarvaani Ariunbayar is the CEO of the Academy of Political Education and the project manager of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mongolia. He holds a Master of Arts in Political Science, Graduate School of Arts and Science, National University of Mongolia.   Dagva-Ochir Bumdari is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science of the National University of Mongolia. She was awarded a doctoral degree by Kokushikan University in 2013.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Bazarvaani Ariunbayar & Dagva-Ochir Bumdari 2021-03-30Views : 21276
Working paper
[Working Paper] Populism in Thailand

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the sixth publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Thawilwadeee Bureekul, Ms. Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Ms. Nuchaprapar Moksart of the King Prajadhipok's Institute explore the populist phenomena in Thailand. According to the authors, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (in 2001) has been instrumental in establishing populism through policy within Thai politics since the adoption of the 1997 Constitution. Despite the military coups that ensued the Thaksin administration, policy populism continued to provide benefits to the poor and help maintain public trust in the government. However, the authors argue that this kind of populism calls for a "checks and balances by non-governmental organizations [...] to ensure accountability in the implementation process." Given that redistributive policies have the potential of fiscal mismanagement and corruption, they suggest that the "function of laws and regulations should be considered" and the new measures following the 2017 Constitution be strictly enforced.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   Before the Asian 1997 financial crisis and the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, Thailand had endured a great number of fluctuations in its political development. The coming of the TRT party and Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 paved the way for the establishment of new politics in Thailand. The Thaksin administration created a new form of political campaign under the implementation of populist policies to increase public trust in government and improve national well-being such as the thirty baht healthcare scheme, community village funds, agrarian debt relief, One Tambon One Product (OTOP), and so on.   Literature Review Historically, academic definitions of populism have differed and people have often defined  populism in loose terms referencing “people,” leaders who have the power of provocation (especially political leaders), and “catch-all politics.” In addition, the term has also been used as a label for new unclassified groups, which have often refused to refer to themselves as “populists.”   Context of Thailand Populism has been employed in Thailand for many decades, but in the past covered only some aspects of political and economic activity, unlike the universal practice of the Thaksin Shinawatra administration. For example, monetary policy under Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj in 1975 helped people by providing a budget to develop livelihoods in local communities, but such moves were not widely regarded at the time as populist. More than twenty years later the 1997 constitution opened the door to public participation in the policy decision making process, and in 2001 the TRT party under Thaksin Shinawatra introduced a national populist agenda to attract Thai voters. The Thaksin political campaign promoted policies such as the thirty baht healthcare scheme, a community fund, an agrarian debt relief scheme, loans for education and more. This political strategy helped him win the election and represented a new kind of politics in Thailand, changing the landscape of the policy making process for all political parties.He used populist policies to alleviate poverty and help impoverished people gain access to social services. As a result of these policies, many people were satisfied with and supported the TRT and Thaksin.   Populism in Four Periods of Government Populism in the Thaksin Shinawatra Period Thaksin became the twenty-third Prime Minister of Thailand on February 17, 2001 and was in power until September 19, 2006. In 2006, his government was overthrown by a military coup d’état following street demonstrations and political conflict. Before forming the government in 2001, Thaksin was well known as a successful business-man. He used political marketing and policy strategy during his five years and 222 days in office, and together with his TRT party launched an array of policies to promote the rural economy and gain popular support from the people, Key examples include the thirty baht healthcare scheme, the agrarian debt relief scheme, and the one million baht village fund. Populism in the Abhisit Vejjajiva Period Elderly Allowance The Elderly Allowance was implemented under the Abhisit administration to promote income security for every elderly person in Thailand. People over the age of sixty receive an allowance starting at 600 baht every month for the rest of their lives, with the exception of civil servants, who benefit from a government pension. The allowance rises to a maximum of 1,000 baht a month according to age. In 2011, more than 3.5 million people registered for the elderly allowance, and approximately 6.75 million seniors have benefited from the policy.   Populism in the Yingluck Shinawatra Period First-time Car Buyer Policy A first-time car buyer policy was implemented between September 16, 2011 and December 31, 2012 under Yingluck Shinawatra’s administration. The aim of the policy was to give low-income citizens an opportunity to buy a new car at a low tax rate. However, the beneficiaries of the first-time car buyer subsidy were not the poor. Instead, the upper income groups, or the Thai middle class, benefited most from the policy. This policy also provided an enormous benefit to automobile companies, which saw increased profits from selling their vehicles.   Populism in the General Prayuth Chan-ocha Period General Prayut Chan-o-cha was the twenty-ninth Prime Minister of Thailand. His government began on August 30, 2014 under the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). His administration played an important role in stimulating the grass roots economy via the Civil State or pracharat project. The government also promoted the twenty-year strategic plan, which is the main project under the NCPO. The details of each of these policies are as follows.   Results of Policy Implementation Success Factors Populism has been the mechanism and approach to alleviating inequality and poverty in Thailand. After Thaksin implemented a populist approach, the public was satisfied with the benefits they received from the policies. Since Thaksin, some populist policies have been created and implemented response to public demand. Healthcare services have been extended to 48 million people, and the adoption of “citizenship rights” means that everyone in the country has equal access to social services and the same rights to welfare. Thus, a number of scholars agree that populism has resulted in an increased quality of life for the Thai people.   Positive and Negative Aspects of Populism Positive Aspects of Populism First, populism has transformed Thai politics from the old election culture of buying support to one of policy competition. Political parties increasingly use populist policies to gain public support and win election. Second, populism has encouraged greater checks on the actions of the government, both through popular movements and through the Parliament.Thirdly, people have become more interested in public policy, resulting in higher rates of voter turnout at elections. Many populist policies offer basic guarantees, e.g. the thirty baht healthcare scheme and accessibility to health care for all, but most of them are political tools as well. Lastly, populism can alleviate inequality, because it can lead to the promotion of aspects of social welfare such as health care, education, old age pensions, and allowances for poor people.   Criticism and Analysis In a group discussion held by King Prajadhipok’s institute on December 12, 2018, experts and academic participants introduced five problems with populist policies. Mechanisms to avoid fiscal mismanagement in the policymaking process and critical recommendations to establish sustainable policies were also part of the group discussion.   Problems with Populist Policies in Thailand Populist policies do not strengthen people’s livelihoods by introducing income distribution, job creation, innovation, or opportunity. Rather, many policies create public reliance on the government as people wait for help rather than engaging in self-reliant behavior. The launch of the 500 baht banknote and the national welfare scheme card under the Prayuth administration are examples of this dependence.   Recommendations to Create Sustainable Policies The Role of Political Parties and Policymakers Political parties should understand the likelihood of successful policy implementation, emphasize the national interest, and be held responsible for the results and consequences of populist policies. Moreover, political parties should not merely emphasize political marketing; instead, all parties should provide opportunities to the public to participate in the policymaking process.   Conclusion and Recommendations In conclusion, populism has been embedded in Thai society for almost two decades. Populism, or prachaniyom, has both positive and negative aspects. It is an approach that can provide benefits to the public, but absent regulation it can result in fiscal problems as well. Even though populism has increased public satisfaction with political parties and established a culture of policy competition, it has also shown that it can have impacts on social economic and politics. First, populist policies interact with the fiscal dimension, and thus policy budgets need to incorporate checks and balances by non-governmental organizations or monetary institutions to ensure accountability in the implementation process. There also needs to be an economic strategy to maintain policies in the long run. Sustainability is a major challenge for the government and the good management of economic mechanisms and economic growth is essential in order to sustain good populist policies in the future.     Author’s Biography Thawilwadee Bureekul is the director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) where she is involved in the planning, management, implementation, and coordination of the Institute’s research projects. In addition to her role at KPI, Dr. Bureekul is a professor at several universities in Thailand, including the Asian Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Burapha University, Mahidol University, and Silpakorn University. She succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and she was granted the “Woman of the Year 2017” award as a result.   Ratchawadee Sangmahamad is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes citizenship, gender, and election studies. She has published books such as Value Culture and Thermometer of Democracy (with Thawilwadee Bureekul), Thai Citizens: Democratic Civic Education (with Thawilwadee Bureekul and Eugenie Mario), and many articles.   Nuchaprapar Moksart is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes social policy and political economy theory. She also writes on socioeconomic issues.

Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, Nuchaprapa Moksat 2019-08-05Views : 11033
Working paper
[Working Paper] Populism in Contemporary Indian Politics

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the fifth publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay and Mr. Kaustuv Chakrabarti of the Participatory Research in Asia study the populist phenomenon in India and its impact on Indian politics. They note that this movement, contrary to other cases of populism around the world, refers to "virtually any policy that is redistributive in nature... particularly when a policy is announced before impending elections." With this condition, Dr. Bandyopadhyay and Mr. Chakrabarti argue that populist decisions "can become more responsible and at the same time more irresponsible." The authors conclude that in order to bring an end to irresponsible and fiscally concerning decisions, civil society needs to "engage with the citizens" to "counter majoritarian populism."     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   In recent times we see populism all around us, but its precise definition remains elusive. From a democratic point of view, the ambivalence is already apparent in the term “populism.” Its root is the Latin word populus (the people), which exhibits a clear link with the democratic idea. Where there is democracy, in other words, there is always populism. On the other hand, the suffix “ism” signals an ideological potentiation in contrast to the moderate character of today’s democracies. By exaggerating the democratic element and mobilizing it against the constraints introduced into democratic systems by constitutional principles, populism moves at least potentially into the proximity of opponents of the system.   History and the Rise of Populism in India Since the late nineteenth century, populism has played a vital role in different phases of Indian history, particularly in mobilizing emergent groups and bringing about different movements and civil society initiatives. Populism has co-existed with several different ideological strands, and yet influenced a range of policies with its discourses and mobilization.   Populist Measures in India India is an example that proves economic liberalization can co-exist with populist politics and that populism can be used as an ideological framework within which the political contradictions that follow from economic change can be managed. The capaciousness of populism allows for a range of interests, some of them conflicting, to be acknowledged in both symbolic and practical ways.   Case Study 1: Guaranteeing Wage Employment in Rural India The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is a social security measure that guarantees the “right to work” to Indian rural citizens. The scheme provides a legal guarantee for at least one hundred days of employment in every financial year to the adult members of any rural household willing to do public works-related unskilled manual labor at the statutory minimum wage.   Case Study 2: Providing Subsidized Cooked Food in Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu’s political history for the past four decades has been characterized by a slew of populist measures. The laundry list of freebies handed out by the late Jayalalithaa included the waiver of all farm loans, free laptops for Class X and XII students, free cell phones for all ration card holders, and government reimbursement of education loans.   Case Study 3: Free Laptops to the Students of Uttar Pradesh (UP) With nearly 200 million people, UP remains the most populous Indian state. It ranks sixteenth among the seventeen Indian states according to the 2015 Human Development report. According to Sen and Ray, UP continues to be counted among the BIMARU states while others, such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, have come out of it. The crisis in education is especially apparent in the four BIMARU states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh – with 445.1 million of India’s population of 1.2 billion and some of the lowest literacy rates in the country, according to the 2011 Census.   Case Study 4: Demonetization The issue of corruption has long been a feature of the BJP’s electoral mobilization against the Congress. An opinion poll of 19,000 respondents conducted in mid-2013 found that 69 percent of respondents thought that the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was corrupt and that corruption had increased under the UPA’s rule, while only 23 percent thought that corruption had increased under the NDA government. Seeking to capitalize on these perceptions, a key theme in the BJP’s election manifesto was a populist narrative on corruption, according to which a “lack of openness in government and lack of people’s participation had led to concentration of power in a few hands and lack of transparency breeding corruption and nepotism on a massive scale.” Corruption was also “a manifestation of poor governance” and “reflects the bad intentions of those sitting in power.”   Impact of Populist Measures on Democratic Governance Democratic governance is the range of processes through which a society in pursuit of justice, equality, welfare, and environmental protection reaches a consensus on and implements regulations, human rights, laws, policies, and social structures. In this sense, democratic governance brings to the fore the question of how a society organizes itself to ensure equality of opportunity and equity (social and economic justice) for all citizens.   Positive Implications of Populist Measures One of the most important aspects of MGNREGS is that villagers can rightfully demand employment. The authority is responsible for providing employment in response to demand or providing an employment allowance in the cases where it has failed to meet the employment demand. According to Alam and Alam, it has made a dent in poverty by increasing employment opportunities. During the first year of implementation (2006-2007), in 200 districts, 21 million households were employed and 905 million person days were generated. In 2016-2017, in 686 districts 51 million households were provided employment and 2.35 billion person days were generated. In 2017-2018, 51 million households have been provided employment and 2.3 billion  person days have been generated across the country.   Negative Implications of Populist Measures Despite many positive outcomes of the MGNREGA, it has been criticized for its poor implementation and leakages. Under the MGNREGA, which was promulgated in 2005, each household is guaranteed 100 days of work every year. On average, each household received only forty-five days of work over the last decade – less than half the guarantee. The IHDS-II surveys report that up to 70 percent of interested poor households did not receive any MGNREGA work between 2004-2005 and 2011-2012. Unemployment allowance has rarely been paid.   Conclusion Populism does not oppose the democratic system per se; on the contrary, the democratic system needs its support and tools (e.g. elections). As analyzed in this paper, not all forms of populism are necessarily corrosive to democracy. In an unequal society where politics are governed by the interests of the political elite, populism plays an important role in balancing power by introducing citizen participation.     Author’s Biography   Kaustuv Chakrabarti is a senior program officer at PRIA. Currently, Kaustuv works on the issues of civic space, multi-stakeholder partnerships, South-South Cooperation, and building CSO capacities. He has been passionately engaged with PRIA’s work on civic space both at the Asian and South Asian level.  He co-authored Civic space under Siege: experiences from South Asia; the “State of Democracy: India” report, and the synthesis report on “Civic Space in Asia: Emerging Issues and Policy Lessons from Six Asian Countries 2018.” He has a Master’s degree in globalization and development from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex.   Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a pioneer CSO, working on participation, democratic governance and civil society development for more than three decades. He has twenty-five years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSOs. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a PhD in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India.  

Kaustuv Chakrabarti, Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay 2019-07-30Views : 10844