[Editor's Note] Pakistan is equipped with legal frameworks that regulate the political finance of both politicians and political parties. Such framework is institutionally empowered in the Elections Commissions of Pakistan(ECP) with the latest Act of Parliament, the Elections Act 2017. Notwithstanding, the author Ahmed Bilal Mehboob from the Pakistan Institute for Legislative Development and Transparency, points out that the ECP does not fully monitor the role of money in politics. The limits on electoral spendings of politicians and those of political parties are inconsistent. This ignores the increasing influence of political parties on political finance like election expenses. President Mehbooh also writes that the current legal, as well as institutional framework, do not thoroughly follow the trends of political campaigning like using social media, which will, in the end, harm the detailed and transparent political finance system in Pakistan. For better-regulated money usage in Pakistan politics, an opportunity for capacity building followed by a series of systemic reforms such as hiring the right professionals, making all the monitoring procedures accessible to the public is required by the ECP.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a federal parliamentary democracy. It has a bicameral legislature at the federal level, while each of the four provinces have unicameral legislatures. The Parliament of Pakistan has the constitutional responsibility to legislate on a vast number of subjects contained in the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution, while each Provincial Assembly can legislate on subjects under the constitutional authority of the provinces. At the federal level, the Prime Minister is elected from a population-based house, the National Assembly, where seats are allocated to each province and the federal capital on the basis of population. Elections are held under the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, and seats reserved for women and members of the non-Muslim population are chosen through a proportional representation (PR) system. Members of the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies each have a five-year term. The executive authority of the Federation is exercised in the name of the President by the federal government, which consists of the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers. This is also the case in provinces where Chief Ministers, together with provincial cabinets, exercise executive authority over each of the four provinces. Seats in the Senate of Pakistan are equally allocated to each of the four provinces and are filled through a PR system by means of the single transferable vote. The Senate does not have a fixed term, but elections on half of its seats are carried out every three years.   In Pakistan, the system of political finance is determined under the latest Act of Parliament on the subject, the Elections Act 2017,¹and before that, the Representation of People Act. Under the law, the Elections Commission of Pakistan (ECP) is legally charged with the responsibility to implement clauses dealing with financial matters in the electoral and political domains. An entire chapter, Chapter VIII on Election Expenses and Statement of Assets and Liabilities, is devoted to the subject in the Elections Act 2017. The chapter details limits on election expenses, how to submit election expenses, and other areas and legal dimensions of political finance. ■   ¹ The Elections Act, 2017 https://www.ecp.gov.pk/Documents/laws2017/Election%20Act%202017.pdf Accessed: 30 December 2021.   ■Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, the founder and President of the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) has over 25 years of experience in senior management and advisory positions and over 15 years of experience in design, planning, and successful implementation of research and policy initiatives in a variety of fields of democratic governance. His research, analyses, and advocacy have helped in shaping and influencing critical policies in Pakistan, in addition to informing the public and media discourse on challenges and opportunities of democratic governance. Mr. Mehboob has carved a non-partisan political research initiative from the platform of well-known indigenous and independent think tank PILDAT and has spearheaded objective and non-partisan, evidence-based analysis and policy reform initiatives in areas such as political and institutional reform including democracy, governance, rule of law, political parties, local governments, electoral processes, civil-military relations, federation-province relations, women and youth in politics, and so on. Under the leadership of Mr. Mehboob, PILDAT, established in 2002, is widely recognized for the quality, seriousness, and objectivity of its policy analyses and successful and effective reform initiatives. Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob is regularly invited to lecture at Pakistan’s premium public policy institutions, including the National School of Public Policy and its affiliates, defense institutions such as the National Defence University and Command and Staff College, public and private institutions of academic excellence, as well as many national, regional, and international think tanks and research institutions. He also writes regularly for media and is invited to appear as an analyst on key issues of democratic governance. Mr. Mehboob holds a B.Sc. degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Engineering & Technology of Lahore, Pakistan. As an engineer, he has served outside Pakistan in both the Middle East and the USA. As a student activist, Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob was elected as President, Engineering University Students Union from 1971-1972 and also served as Chairman, Lahore Students Council in 1972.     Typeset by Juhyun Jun, Research Associate For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) [email protected]  

[Editor's Note] In Malaysia, “black-box decisions” made between political parties and Government-Linked Companies(GLCs) have been a major concern in sustaining the country’s democratic system. Such practices exacerbate the monetization of politics, which leads to the problem of business-government intertwined corruption. What makes matters worse is that the current financial corruption in Malaysia has become more serious due to other factors such as internal conflicts within a party and transactions of covert funds. The authors, Iman Amran and Aira Azhari from the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs, point out that Malaysia does not have adequate legal enforcement to punish such misdeeds in politics which is evident in the 1MBM scandal. To create a more transparent political finance environment, the authors recommend a three-pronged approach: 1) initiating reforms in political parties to improve accountability of funds, 2) fairly allocating direct and indirect political funds, and 3) empowering the public through voter and civic education to achieve political literacy that would monitor the transparency of Malaysian politics.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Malays National Organisation’s (UMNO) 60-year rule, extensive networks were formed in which proxies of UMNO held UMNO’s money through different companies. It is widely known that these proxies were then mobilized to provide financing during the party and general elections, which further strengthened UMNO’s grip on power. Malaysia’s Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) have also played a significant role in the financing of politics. GLCs are meant to serve many important social objectives and should be run independently, transparently, and with accountability. However, over the years increasing political interference has undermined the role they are supposed to play and has caused abuse of power and corruption to fester. Furthermore, the appointments of politicians and politically linked persons into the Boards and management of GLCs have greatly compromised their independence. Political appointments have also been used as a means to reward party members who won in elections. This political interference within GLCs has caused monetization of politics, as corporations and businesses who support the ruling party gain easier access to government grants and contracts – making the procurement system opaque and considered as a ‘black-box’. Black-box decisions are made with minimal objectives and little to no clarification over the decision-making process. This is usually how political financing and appointment decisions are made in Malaysia for the past few decades. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, multiple GLC appointments were made.   Malaysia has a long history of political involvement and interference in business. During United Malays National Organisation’s (UMNO) 60-year rule, extensive networks were formed in which proxies of UMNO held UMNO’s money through different companies. It is widely known that these proxies were then mobilized to provide financing during the party and general elections, which further strengthened UMNO’s grip on power. Malaysia’s Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) have also played a significant role in the financing of politics. GLCs are meant to serve many important social objectives and should be run independently, transparently, and with accountability. However, over the years increasing political interference has undermined the role they are supposed to play and has caused abuse of power and corruption to fester. Furthermore, the appointments of politicians and politically linked persons into the Boards and management of GLCs have greatly compromised their independence. Political appointments have also been used as a means to reward party members who won in elections. This political interference within GLCs has caused monetization of politics, as corporations and businesses who support the ruling party gain easier access to government grants and contracts – making the procurement system opaque and considered as a ‘black-box’. Black-box decisions are made with minimal objectives and little to no clarification over the decision-making process. This is usually how political financing and appointment decisions are made in Malaysia for the past few decades. Even during the COVID-19 pandemic, multiple GLC appointments were made.¹ These appointments were highly criticized as the ruling party’s move to further entrench and consolidate the political party’s position in the government. Business and politics are deeply intertwined in Malaysia, making it difficult to separate the two unless robust reforms are done within the political landscape to strengthen the system of political finance in Malaysia.   ¹ Brief IDEAS No. 30: COVID-19 & Malaysia’s Democratic Resilience p. 8-9   ■Iman Amran is a research intern at IDEAS’s Democracy and Governance Unit. She is a final year student of Economics and Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. ■Aira Azhari manages IDEAS’ Democracy and Governance Unit, where she oversees research and advocacy on the topics of accountable governance, anti-corruption and creating a more policy-oriented political culture in Malaysia. She provides political analysis for IDEAS and various audiences including diplomats, MNCs, the media, the corporate sector as well as civil society organisations. Aira has been interviewed by the BBC (World News and Radio), Astro Awani, Bernama, Channel News Asia, Radio Televisyen Malaysia, Lite FM and BFM on matters relating to Malaysian politics, economics and governance. Aira graduated with a Master of Laws in Public International Law from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Liverpool, United Kingdom.     Typeset by Juhyun Jun, Research Associate For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) [email protected]  

[Editor's Note] Political parties play a crucial role in a democratic country like Indonesia. To fulfill its responsibilities, parties need sufficient financial resources to select public officials, to adequately place representatives in institutions, and operate appropriate funding programs. The government provides financial assistance to encourage the institutionalization of party activities, but the amount of assistance only partially covers the expenses. However, as democracy leaves the parties with high maintenance costs, they are driven out to seek political funds by taking advantageous positions in the government and seeking inadequate sponsors. Parties’ endeavor to collect money from many available resources is not a problem itself, however, the author Dr. Sri Nuryanti from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, notes that such practices could pave the way for corruption and abuse which could harm the accountability and integrity of the parties. Dr. Sri advises parties and the government to create concrete guidelines and legal repercussions regarding financial subsidies.   ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   The existence of political parties in a democratic country like Indonesia is playing an important role. The political parties that existed in Indonesia usually compete for the election that is held every five years. Political parties become eligible to compete in the election only after completing many procedural activities such as the submission of the organization and structure of the political party to the General Election Commission, followed by a verification process by the General Election Commission. After the approval of the General Election Commission, the political party is then eligible to take part in the election. For the election that was held in 2019, Election law 2019 regulated that each political party had to deliver their campaign finance report to the General Election Commission according to the schedule provided by the General Election Commission. This was not merely aimed to figure out the political party campaign finance but the greater purpose was to exercise the accountability of political parties towards managing their finances. As a public entity, the political party, therefore, is subjected to financial disclosure.   In Indonesia, there are legal provisions regarding political party finance aimed at achieving better accountability for political parties as well as preventing political corruption. Based on Article 34 of Law Number 2 of 2008 and Law Number 2 of 2011, there are 3 (three) types of financial sources for political parties, namely membership fees, legal contributions, and financial assistance from the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget and Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget   From the legal provisions above, political party finance is not only composed of their internal resources but the political parties that are able to pass the parliamentary threshold, receive financial assistance from the government through the disbursement of political financial assistant schemes regulated by political party law no. 2/2011. The political party finance assistance scheme is implemented through the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara/APBN). These funds are not only used to prepare for the election, but also to turn the wheels of party organization, both for the operation of office activities and for other political party activities such as supporting cadre education, training, and enhancing human resource capabilities within political parties. Usually, each political party hosts general meetings, consolidation and coordination meetings, as well as training for their politicians.     ■ Ridho Imawan Hanafi is a researcher at the Center for Political Studies - Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI). His research focus is on democracy, political parties, elections, as well as politics and governance in Indonesia. He received a Bachelor of Social Science from the Journalism Department of the Faculty of Communication Sciences, Dr. Soetomo University, Surabaya (2005), and received his Masters in Political Science from the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia (2013). He writes articles as part of book’s chapter, journals, and also published his analysis for Indonesian media such as Kompas and Koran Tempo. He is currently as coordinator of the political party research team at the Center (2020-2021).   ■ Sri Nuryanti is a researcher at the Center for Political Studies, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta, Indonesia. She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007–12, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007 to 2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a Co-Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Association and the Executive Council member of the International Peace Research Association. She is the director in charge of the Electoral Research Institute, Jakarta, Indonesia.     Typeset by Juhyun Jun, Research Associate For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Pakistan’s governance structure is uniquely referred to as a “hybrid” structure due to the role and influence of the military in politics, despite it being an electoral democracy with functioning institutions. Its democracy has been facing multiple crises, including concerns over electoral legitimacy, electoral meddling, populism and partisan accountability, weak political parties, public distrust, and the like. In this regard, Aasiya Riaz, Joint Director at PILDAT, explains that the emergence of such hybrid governance in the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Pakistan has been a worrisome development, hindering effective management of the pandemic. The author illustrates through the example of the establishment of the military-led National Command and Operations Centre (NCOC) that government measures highlighted further entrenchment of Pakistan’s hybrid governance system. She asserts that the involvement of newer structures such as the NCOC and NLCC in pandemic management was not only ineffective but has brought to the fore the weaknesses that exist in Pakistan’s democratic governance structure.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page. Pakistan – An Overview[1]   With a population of over 220 million people, Pakistan is the 5th most populous country in the world and its population is equivalent to 2.83% of the world’s total population. The total land area of Pakistan is 770,880 Km2 (297,638 sq. miles) and its population density is 287 per Km (742 people per mi2).[2] A country situated in South Asia, Pakistan is bounded by Iran to the west, Afghanistan to the northwest, China to the northeast, and India to the east and southeast. The coast of the Arabian Sea forms its southern border.[3] Pakistan is an Islamic Republic and has a federal parliamentary democracy. It has a bicameral legislature at the federal level while each of the 4 provinces has unicameral legislatures. At the federal level, the Prime Minister is elected from the National Assembly, a population-based house, where seats are allocated to each province and federal capital based on population. In the National Assembly, elections are held by the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system while seats reserved for women and non-Muslim population are chosen by the proportional representation (PR) system. The National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies each have a 5-year term. The executive authority of the federation is exercised in the name of the President by the Federal Government, consisting of the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers. This is similar in the provinces where Chief Ministers, together with provincial cabinets, exercise executive authority on each of the 4 provinces. Seats in the Senate of Pakistan are equally allocated to each of the 4 provinces and are filled through PR system through the single transferable vote. The Senate does not dissolve while election on half of its seats is carried out after every 6 years. Since 2018 when the latest general election was held in Pakistan, the Federal Government and Provincial Governments in 3 out of 4 provinces in Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and a coalition government in Balochistan are led by Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) while the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) has formed a separate government in Sindh, the fourth province. Despite being an electoral democracy and possessing functioning institutions, Pakistan is continuously characterized as a “Hybrid Regime” in the Economist’s Democracy Index Regime.[4] This characterization could be said to be due to the role and influence of the military in politics and the ongoing concerns regarding the rule of law in Pakistan. ■     Aasiya Riaz , Joint Director at PILDAT, a leading Pakistani think tank she co-founded in 2001, leads PILDAT’s projects and activities,. Ms. Riaz has over 20 years of experience in providing thought leadership in governance and public policy, managing global partnerships with national and international governments, parliaments, and development agencies, and in the facilitation of inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary dialogues, in designing and implementing successful strategic communication strategies and promoting the strengthening of democratic governance and democratic and political institutions under the overall ambit of rule of law. Trained in the field of Media and Political Communication at the London School of Economics, UK, Aasiya has also worked with the mainstream press and electronic media in Pakistan as a political analyst. She was a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy, USA, as well as a distinguished fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Stanford University, USA. Aasiya regularly appears on national and international media for political analysis and commentaries while she is invited to lecture at Pakistan’s premium public policy institutions as well as many national and international think tanks and universities.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note A national emergency such as the COVID-19 outbreak has urged the Sri Lankan government to pursue new paths in managing the pandemic. However, a series of worrisome developments following the implementation of new structures such as the National Operation Centre for the Prevention of COVID Outbreak (NOCPCO) and other “Presidential Task Forces,” with unclear mandates, have dawned upon the country. The Centre for Policy Alternatives, an independent, non-partisan organization in Sri Lanka explains how the COVID-19 pandemic has posed unprecedented challenges in Sri Lanka, with socio-political effects spanning far beyond the immediate public health and economic crises. The authors state that the political landscape formed following the COVID-19 pandemic has been conducive for democratic backsliding. The involvement of the military and former military officials in COVID-19 management has increased military control over the machinery at the expense of public servants. Sri Lanka was unable to hold elections. The legality of the island-wide lockdown was left unanswered. Political speech was increasingly limited and minorities were oppressed. With the aforementioned events and more unfolding in Sri Lanka upon the outbreak of COVID-19, de-democratization of the government accelerated, resulting in executive aggrandizement and a trend towards militarization. In this regard, the authors call for the government and civil societies to take action to prevent further democratic backsliding in Sri Lanka.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page. 1. Challenges Posed by the Pandemic [1]   The pandemic has posed a number of unprecedented challenges in Sri Lanka, with socio-political effects spanning far beyond the immediate public health and economic crises. Given that the number of issues goes beyond what can be adequately analyzed in a single article, this working paper will focus primarily on an aspect of the pandemic crisis that has particular salience in Sri Lanka and from which lessons can be drawn for other countries in the region. Namely, the challenges to democracy that have emerged during the pandemic period. The paper will look at the ways in which the post-COVID-19 political landscape has been a conducive environment for democratic backsliding, focusing on the period between the beginning of the pandemic response in March 2020 until the time of writing in January 2021. It will look, in particular, at how the policy space opened up by the pandemic has created an ideal context for the acceleration of the processes of executive aggrandizement, militarization as well as the infringement of citizens’ civil liberties. Before discussing the democratic backsliding, the public health background against which it has taken place must be taken into consideration. When this paper was written, the number of cases per million of the population was lower in Sri Lanka than those in the rest of the South Asian region. However, the case rate has been rising rapidly since the beginning of the second wave that occurred in late September. As Figure 1 indicates, while Sri Lanka has not endured the kind of public health crises faced by many other countries in the region, the inability to contain the second wave meant that it has not been able to replicate the kind of success achieved by other Asian countries such as Taiwan, Thailand, Mongolia or South Korea.     Figure 1. Cumulative Confirmed COVID-19 Cases per Million People. Source: Roser et al. ‘Our World in Data’ (Accessed January 17, 2021) [2]   While initially, the crisis was more of an economic and political one rather than a public health crisis (to the extent that these crises can be separated), the trajectory of increasing cases may bring to the fore the issues in the capacity of the health system. With 80-90% of cases being asymptomatic, hospital infrastructure and human resources are able to manage the current caseload. However, if the rapid increase in cases continues, it might mean that further investment in hospital capacity may be required. [3] Stringent measures such as the imposition of an island-wide lockdown and restrictions on travel and social gathering account for the initial success in dealing with the first wave. However, these same measures were unable to contain the second wave, as the figures below show.   Figure 2.Daily New Confirmed COVID-19 Cases. Source: Roser et al ‘Our World in Data’ Accessed 17th January 2021 [4]   The Sri Lanka Government attempted to follow the Chinese model for its pandemic response by focusing on rigorous contact testing but did not prioritize the investment of developing testing capacities. For instance, PCR testing at the initial stages was limited to only test those who came in contact or were involved in identified case clusters, as opposed to random sampling within the population. This created problems down the line as the virus spread in areas outside the cluster cases and created difficulties for tracing the origin of new cases. In addition to the efforts required to manage the spread of the virus itself, the main challenge during the pandemic has been in dealing with the second-order effects of the lockdown and the measures put in place to curb the spread of the virus (the details of which shall be discussed in the following section). There has been a 27% decrease in average household income during the pandemic period.[5] Food consumption has also decreased by 30% during this time.[6] As such, the need for the provision of necessities, protecting employment, and providing financial relief has become a key challenge during the pandemic. ■   [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] Roser et al. “Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19).” OurWorldInData.org, 2020. https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus. [3] “UN Advisory Paper: Immediate Socio-Economic Response to COVID-19 in Sri Lanka” United Nations Sri Lanka, July 2020, https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/LKA_Socioeconomic-Response-Plan_2020.pdf. [4] Roser et al “Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19).” OurWorldInData.org, 2020. https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus. [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid.     The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is an independent, non-partisan organization that focuses primarily on issues of governance and conflict resolution. Formed in 1996 in the firm belief that the vital contribution of civil society to the public policy debate is in need of strengthening, CPA is committed to programs of research and advocacy through which public policy is critiqued, alternatives identified, and disseminated.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note While all, if not most, countries have experienced severe repercussions from the COVID-19 pandemic, some countries have taken it harder than others. Nepal is no exception. Pradip Pariyar, Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation, states that Nepal’s management of COVID-19 could have been enhanced if proper policies were implemented and safety protocols were monitored. The author claims that Nepal increasingly appears to be governed based on exclusion and intolerance, given the disproportionate provision of COVID-19 relief materials and other discriminatory measures. Additionally, low-income groups such as construction workers, daily waged factory workers, small shop owners, and street vendors have been hit harder than others. Dissatisfaction and loss of faith in the government prevail among the Nepali people who have been socio-economically impacted by inadequate government response. Not to mention, the author adds that insufficient research laboratories and medical personnel have exacerbated the containment of pandemic-related issues. With no concrete measures yet to fight against the national emergency, Pradip Pariyar posits that the government should prohibit mass gatherings, enforce safety protocols, and compensate vulnerable communities and frontline medical personnel.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page. Introduction[1]   The COVID-19 pandemic has greatly affected countries all around the world. Some countries like China, New Zealand, and Denmark have persevered well through the pandemic whereas many big countries including the USA, UK, India, and Brazil are continuing to struggle to overcome it. In countries like North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Senegal the government has taken stringent steps to battle the pandemic, and the public has fully supported the measures taken by the state. From the cases of countries like the USA and the UK, it is evident that government effort cannot mitigate the effects of the pandemic; the role of public support is equally imperative. During the peak state of the pandemic, when neighboring giants like China and India were developing vaccines for mass inoculation, Nepal was dealing with an internal feud among politicians. The first case in Nepal, confirmed only on January 23, 2020, was a 31-year-old student who had returned to Kathmandu from Wuhan on the 9th of January. As of January 21, 2021, the total infected cases amounted to 268,310, and the fatality from the virus was recorded to be 1,975 people. This number could have been largely controlled if proper policies were implemented and safety protocols were monitored. The Nepal government started losing its credibility as it failed to implement measures effectively, compensate victims, and got involved in power politics and corruption. Nepal has faced many issues on governance that have led to the current vulnerable state of Nepal that is unable to control the pandemic. ■       [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project.     Pradip Pariyar is Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation. Mr. Pradip Pariyar is an alumnus of American University and Tribhuvan University. He specializes in youth empowerment, peace building and capacity building of media professionals. As the elected president of the Association of Youth Organizations Nepal (AYON), he worked closely with government of Nepal to initiate a youth-responsive budget. He was a member of the government task force that developed Youth Vision 2025: a 10-year national youth development policy. He has trained thousands of youths globally on leadership, peace building, and conflict-sensitive journalism. He founded the Nepal Youth Forum to focus on policy advocacy, awareness, and youth empowerment. In 2011, Mr. Pariyar was selected as a youth fellow by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. He received ‘Asia’s 21 Young Leaders Award’ in 2018 by Asia Society. Mr. Pariyar also serves as the chairperson of the Nepal Policy Center, a youth-led think tank. In 2015, he received the Youth Leadership Award from the Nepali Government’s Ministry of Youth and Sports for his decade-long contribution to youth leadership development across Nepal. Traveling throughout the length and breadth of Nepal, Mr. Pariyar witnessed diverse cultures and had encounters with his socially offended country people have invigorated his dream fuelled by the unholy dogma of casteism. He dreams of a just Nepal; a cohesive society where an individual’s potential, competence, edification and hard slog define a person rather than his/her status.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bangladeshi government took various measures such as the development of a guideline, directives, and committees for COVID-19 management and the provision of stimulus packages. Nevertheless, not only did the said measures not reach vulnerable and minority communities, but the government also undermined democratic principles through both legal and extra-legal measures. Rezwan-ul-Alam, the Director of the Knowledge Management team at Manusher Jonno Foundation, states that the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the linkage between public health outcomes and democracy, human rights, and governance in Bangladesh. The author explains that several cases were filed against journalists and local media that exposed corruption scandals in the health sector –an apparent manifestation of the infringements on the freedom of speech. Furthermore, the distribution of both financial and food support was mired by allegations of corruption and mismanagement. It is important to build the foundations for a more rights-based, effective, and accountable democratic governance to combat future possibilities of a national emergency.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page. Introduction[1]   Like many countries around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic has triggered multi-dimensional challenges for Bangladesh.[2] This working paper examines the various challenges that are faced by the government and other non-state actors like non-government organizations (NGOs), media and businesses. It also explores the linkages among public health outcomes, human rights, and governance to assess Bangladesh’s democratic governance situation.   Objectives   The following are the three objectives of this analysis: a) To examine the government’s overall response to the COVID-19 pandemic, whilst covering specific aspects: health, economic, social, and political response; b) To analyze the role of NGOs, media, and private sectors to understand the overall public sentiment towards the authorities’ actions in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic; and c) To recommend both policy and programmatic solutions to build public confidence in the state’s capacity in managing novel shocks in the future. ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2]  A total of 7950 people died and more than half a million infected as per official figure, dated 21 January 2021. https://corona.gov.bd/ Accessed on January 21, 2021     Rezwan-ul-Alam is the Director of the Knowledge Management team at Manusher Jonno Foundation, Bangladesh. He has a solid working experience of 23 years at different positions in Advocacy, Communication, Partnership and Media relations in a number of organizations (TIB, World Bank, UNICEF, Bangladesh Government and media). He holds a PhD in Journalism from City University, London.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Managing a global pandemic at the national level is undeniably difficult, but more so in countries with a weak foundation of governance such as India. The outbreak of COVID-19 in India has disclosed several shortcomings of the governance capacity of India as well as its capability to manage its economic impacts and protect the poor, vulnerable, and informal workers. Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay, director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), and Kaustuv Chakrabarti argue that the pandemic has immensely impacted the lives and livelihood of millions of people in India. It has decelerated economic growth and increased the unemployment rate. India’s weak public health governance was manifest in its limited capacity to provide adequate healthcare and medical personnel. The pandemic is expected to push 4000 million informal workers into deeper poverty and instigate discrimination towards migrant communities. Not to mention, a series of protests and assertions of rights illustrates that Indian politics have reached a critical juncture. In order to move past the aforementioned setbacks, the authors state that it is crucial to improve the social and economic security of the migrant workers, enhance the healthcare system, and develop democratic spaces.     ※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page. Introduction[1]   The COVID-19 pandemic has shaken the foundation of governance in India as in many parts of the world. The lessons emerging from the pandemic reveal that a capable, accountable, inclusive, and participatory state is essential for effectively addressing the challenges posed by the pandemic that will have long-lasting ramifications. Since the end of January, when India identified its first COVID-19 case, over 10,858,300 cases of infections and 155,280 deaths have been recorded. A total of 10,559,604 persons have recovered which means nearly 99 percent of all the people who got infected have recovered (as of February 10, 2021).[2] The COVID-19 pandemic has immensely impacted the lives and livelihood of millions of people in India. The pandemic-induced lockdown has added to unprecedented misery and suffering of the poor, vulnerable, and informal workers including the migrant workers. The economy which was already on a weak footing even before the pandemic has suffered the most. The weak and unprepared health system in the country proved to be grossly inadequate to handle a pandemic of this magnitude. The pandemic provided a pretext to the ruling dispensation to restrict dissents and civic engagement. ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second parts will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2]  Worldometer, Retrieved from https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/india/ on 10 February, 2021.     Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a pioneer CSO, who has dedicated more than three decades for work on participation, democratic governance and civil society development. He has twenty-five years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSOs. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a PhD in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India.   Kaustuv Chakrabarti is an independent author, who served as a senior program officer at PRIA. Kaustuv worked on the issues of civic space, multi-stakeholder partnerships, South-South Cooperation, and building CSO capacities. He has been passionately engaged with PRIA’s work on civic space both at the Asian and South Asian level. He co-authored Civic space under Siege: experiences from South Asia; the “State of Democracy: India” report, and the synthesis report on “Civic Space in Asia: Emerging Issues and Policy Lessons from Six Asian Countries 2018.” He has a Master’s degree in globalization and development from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex.   Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]